LIFE    AND    LETTERS 


OF 


GEORGE    CABOT. 


BY 


HENRY  CABOT  LODGE. 


LITTLE,    BROWN,    AND    COMPANY. 

1878. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress  in  the  year  1877,  by 

HENRY    CABOT    LODGE, 

In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


SECOND     EDITION. 


CAMBRIDGE  : 
PRESS   OF   JOHN    WILSON   AND   SON. 


TO 

MY     MOTHER, 


THIS     MEMOIR     OF     HER     GRANDFATHER     IS 
AFFECTIONATELY    DEDICATED. 

H.    C.    L. 


PREFACE. 


A  SENTIMENT  of  respect  for  the  memory  of  my  great 
grandfather,  and  a  desire  to  rescue  his  name  if  possible 
from  complete  oblivion,  induced  me  to  undertake  the  work 
of  which  this  volume  is  the  result.  The  difficulties  in  my 
way  at  first  seemed  insurmountable.  Mr.  Cabot,  shortly 
before  his  death,  made  an  almost  complete  destruction  of  all 
./his  letters  and  papers  ;  and  I  had,  therefore,  no  material  for 
a  biography  in  the  best  sense  of  the  word.  Mr.  Cabot's 
correspondents,  however,  had  preserved  his  letters;  and 
examination  led  me  to  believe  that  they  were  of  consider 
able  historical  value.  Selections  from  these  letters  form 
the  principal  part  of  this  volume.  Being  debarred  by  the 
nature  of  my  only  materials  from  writing  a  suitable  biog 
raphy,  and  not  considering  that  a  history  of  any  period 
could  be  properly  treated  in  a  work  relating  exclusively 
to  an  individual,  I  was  forced  to  confine  myself  to  the 
task  of  simply  editing  those  letters  which  seemed  to  merit 
publication.  With  this  object,  I  have  prefixed  to  each 
chapter  a  short  account  of  Mr.  Cabot's  public  life,  and  of 
such  events  as  happened  during  the  period  covered  by 
the  letters  and  alluded  to  in  them.  These  introductory 
passages  and  the  notes  as  well  have  been  written  with 
the  sole  purpose  of  rendering  the  accompanying  letters 
intelligible. 


Vi  PREFACE. 

Only  once  have  I  exceeded  the  bounds  which  I  pre 
scribed  to  myself,  and  that  is  in  regard  to  the  Hartford 
Convention.  The  life  of  the  President  of  that  once  fa 
mous  body  seemed  to  me  a  fit  place  and  a  sufficient 
excuse  for  tracing  its  history  in  some  detail,  and  I  was 
still  further  encouraged  to  do  this  by  the  abundance  of 
new  material  offered  to  me  in  the  Pickering  MSS.  and 
by  the  letters  of  Governor  Strong.  I  must  confess  that 
my  single  excursion  beyond  the  editorial  paling  has  been 
a  protracted  one,  but  I  hope  it  will  not  be  deemed  either 
unjustifiable  or  wholly  useless. 

I  have  endeavored  throughout  to  be  scrupulously  accu 
rate  and  fair  in  all  my  statements,  but  I  have  not  sought 
in  treating  New  England  Federalism  to  write  a  judicial 
and  impartial  history  of  the  country.  My  object  was  to 
present  one  side,  and  that  the  Federalist,  in  the  strong 
est  and  clearest  light.  I  wished  to  give  as  vivid  a  picture 
as  I  could  of  the  opinions  and  feelings  of  those-  men  among 
whom  Mr.  Cabot  was  prominent.  To  do  this,  I  have  been 
obliged  to  trace  the  actions  and  policy  of  the  Democratic 
party  and  of  its  famous  leader,  in  order  to  show  how 
they  appeared  to  the  Federalists.  To  the  feelings  of  the 
latter  toward  their  opponents,  I  am  conscious  that  I  have 
done  but  scant  justice,  and  that  they  would  deem  my  ver 
sion  of  their  opinions  a  feeble  reproduction ;  but  neither 
sympathy  nor  intention,  however  genuine,  can  now  revive 
on  paper  in  all  its  force  the  intense  party  spirit  of  seventy- 
five  years  ago.  Unfortunately,  the  path  of  New  England 
Federalism  lies  over  many  battlefields  beside  those  fought 
with  its  legitimate  and  natural  enemies.  Its  fiercest  strug 
gles  were  within  its  own  ranks,  and  the  feuds  of  1798- 
1800  were  never  wholly  at  rest  except  in  the  grave  of  the 
party  itself.  I  have  striven  to  be  impartial  in  dealing  with 


PREFACE.  Vll 

these  controversies,  and  I  have  wished  to  award  to  both 
sides  their  fair  share  of  blame  or  praise. 

I  ought  to  say  here  a  few  words  in  regard  to  the  let 
ters,  and  the  sources  from  which  some  of  them  have  been 
drawn.  Nearly  all  of  those  addressed  to  Hamilton  have 
been  printed  before  in  his  works,  and  a  large  proportion  of 
those  to  Wolcott  have  appeared  in  Gibbs's  "  Administra 
tions  of  Washington  and  Adams."  A  small  number  also  of 
those  to  Colonel  Pickering  have  appeared  in  his  Life  by 
Mr.  Upham.  All  the  others  are,  with  hardly  an  exception, 
now  published  for  the  first  time.  I  have  printed  every  thing 
which  seemed  to  me  of  any  historical  value  ;  and  I  have 
given  the  letters  exactly  as  they  were  written,  without  any 
alteration,  and  without  the  suppression  of  any  passage, 
except  in  the  case  of  a  single  paragraph  too  personal  in 
its  nature  to  warrant  publication.  I  ought  to  add  that 
this  omitted  paragraph  did  not  occur  in  a  letter  written 
by  Mr.  Cabot. 

All  the  letters  to  or  from  Colonel  Pickering,  except 
those  to  Governor  Strong,  are  taken  from  the  Pickering 
papers,  now  in  the  possession  of  the  Massachusetts  His 
torical  Society ;  and  those  to  and  from  Wolcott,  from  the 
Wolcott  MSS.,  in  the  custody  of  the  Historical  Society  of 
Connecticut.  The  Hamilton  and  Washington  letters  are 
among  the  national  archives,  but  all  the  rest  are  in  my 
possession  or  in  that  of  other  private  individuals. 

In  the  matter  of  references,  I  have  tried  to  be  as  spar 
ing  as  possible,  and  have  cited  chapter  and  verse  only  for 
literal  quotations,  or  for  the  support  of  statements  requir 
ing  the  fullest  proof.  For  those  general  facts  which  can 
be  easily  verified  by  referring  to  the  State  Papers  or  the 
Annals  of  Congress,  I  have  not  deemed  it  necessary,  in  a 
work  of  this  nature,  to  give  elaborate  authorities. 


Vlll  PREFACE. 

I  have  now  only  to  return  thanks  for  the  many 
kindnesses  which  I  have  received.  I  am  especially  in 
debted  to  my  friend,  Professor  HENRY  ADAMS,  for  many 
suggestions  and  for  much  valuable  aid.  To  HENRY  LEE, 
Esq.,  I  am  under  many  obligations  for  the  most  un 
wearied  assistance  and  for  much  encouragement,  and  to 
Dr.  EDWARD  STRONG  I  owe  a  special  debt  for  the  generous 
kindness  with  which  he  placed  the  correspondence  of  his 
grandfather  at  my  disposal.  To  thank  individually  the 
many  others  who  have  helped  me  so  readily  and  in  so 
many  ways  would  unreasonably  lengthen  an  already  long 
preface ;  and  I  must  ask  them,  therefore,  to  accept  my 
acknowledgments  collectively,  and  to  be  assured  of  my 
sincere  gratitude.  I  trust  the  result  is  not  wholly  unde 
serving  of  the  interest  so  kindly  shown  by  many  persons 
in  the  undertaking ;  but  I  shall,  for  my  own  part,  be  sat 
isfied  if  I  have  made  a  slight  contribution  to  the  history 
of  my  country. 

HENRY   CABOT   LODGE. 

EAST  POINT,  NAHANT,  June,  1877. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

1751-1775. 

The  Name  and  Family  of  Cabot.  —  Birth  of  George  Cabot. — Educa 
tion.  —  Leaves  Harvard  College.  —  Enters  Merchant  Service.  —  Rises 
to  be  Captain.  —  Results  of  this  Experience 1 

CHAPTER   II. 

1775-1790. 

Business    Relations.  —  Marriage.  —  Town    Affairs.  —  Privateering.  — 
Committee  of  Town  to  consider  Constitution.  —  Convention  at  Con 
cord.  —  Convention  to  form   State  Constitution.  —  Convention  to 
adopt  Federal  Constitution. —  Correspondence 11 

CHAPTER   III. 

1791-1792. 
The  United  States  Senate 38 

CHAPTER  IV. 

1792-1796. 
The  United  States  Senate 59 

CHAPTER   V. 

1796-1798. 

Retreat  from  Politics.  —  Suggested  for  the  French  Commission.  — Polit 
ical  Services.  —  Correspondence  • 97 


X  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

1798. 

Declines  Secretaryship  of  Navy.  —  Renewed  Political  Activity.  — 
Affair  of  the  Major-Generals.  —  Opinion  of  Gerry  and  Marshall. — 
Correspondence 143 

CHAPTER  VII. 

1799. 

The  Second  Mission  to  France.  —  Views  of  Mr.  Cabot.  —  Corre 
spondence 191 

CHAPTER   VIII. 

1800. 

Dissensions    of   Federalists.  —  Hamilton's    Pamphlet.  —  Presidential 

Election.  —  Correspondence 256 

CHAPTER   IX. 

1801-1806. 

Private  Life.  —  Society.  —  Business.  —  Occupations.  —  Political  Mat 
ters. —  Correspondence 301 

CHAPTER   X. 

1807-1814. 

The  British  Orders  in  Council.  —  The  French  Decrees.  —  The  Em 
bargo. —  Mr.  Cabot  takes  part  in  the  Elections  of  1808.  —  Is  chosen 
a  Member  of  the  Council.  —  Death  of  Ames.  —  Publication  of 
Ames's  Works.  —  Mr.  Cabot  undertakes  to  edit  Ames's  Letters. — 
Views  as  to  Charges  of  "  British  Faction  "  and  of  Design  to  dissolve 
the  Union.  —  Death  of  Mr.  Cabot's  Eldest  Son,  Charles.—  Views  in 
regard  to  War  of  1812.  — Correspondence 364 

CHAPTER  XL 

1800-1805. 
New  England  Federalism  and  the  Hartford  Convention  ......    410 


CONTENTS. 

* 

CHAPTER   XII. 

1804-1815. 
New  England  Federalism  and  the  Hartford  Convention  .     .     . 


CHAPTER   XIII. 

1812-1815. 
Correspondence  relating  to  the  Hartford  Convention 627 

CHAPTER   XIV. 

1815-1823. 

Last  Years  of  Mr.  Cabot's  Life.  —  Withdrawal  from  Politics.  — 
Occupations.  —  Illness  and  Death.  —  Personal  Appearance.  — 
Private  Character.  —  Political  Opinions.  —  Influence  in  the  Com 
munity.  —  Respect  in  which  he  was  held.  —  Religious  Belief.  — 
Conclusion .  564 


POLITICAL  WHITINGS 581 

APPENDIX 601 

INDEX  or  LETTERS 605 

GENERAL  INDEX      ...  .607 


THE  LIFE  AND  LETTERS  OF 
GEORGE  CABOT. 


CHAPTER    I. 

1751-1775. 

The  Name  and  Family  of  Cabot.  — Birth  of  George  Cabot  —  Education.  — 
Leaves  Harvard  College.  —  Enters  Merchant  Service.  —  Rises  to  be 
Captain.  —  Results  of  this  Experience. 

AMONG  the  names  on  the  "auncient  role,"  given  by 
Stow,1  of  "the  chiefe  Noblemen  &  Gentlemen,  which 
came  into  England  with  William  the  Conqueror,"  is 
that  of  Cabot.  What  became  of  this  adventurer  who  fol 
lowed  Duke  William  is  unknown :  he  is  a  mere  name 
upon  an  old  parchment;  the  barren  list  does  not  even 
tell  the  place  whence  he  came.  Modern  research,  how 
ever,  has  traced  the  numerous  branches  of  the  Cabot  fam 
ily  back  to  one  stem,  which  has  flourished  in  the  Island  of 
Jersey  since  a  time  when  the  memory  of  man  runneth  not 
to  the  contrary.  It  is  mere  conjecture  to  connect  William's 
follower  with  those  of  like  name  in  the  Channel  Islands ; 
but  the  conjecture  has  the  merit  of  probability,  since 
Normans  had  possessed  the  island  long  before  the  memo 
rable  year  A.D.  1066.2  This  occurrence  on  the  "  auncient 

1  Chronicle  of  England,  John  Stow,  London,  1632,  p.  107.     The  original 
title  of  the  role  reads,  "Cognomina  Conquisitorum  Anglise  cum  Domino 
Gulielmo  Duce  Normannise  et  Conquistore  Angliae." 

2  The  Chabot  family  of  Poitou,  afterwards  so  celebrated  in  French  his 
tory,  is  said  to  have  been  in  Poitou  since  1041.    The  Cabot  of  the  "  auncient 
role  "  may  possibly  have  been  a  Poitou  Chabot,  and  one  of  William's  merce 
naries  ;  but  it  is  more  natural  to  suppose  that  he  was  one  of  the  island  race. 

1 


2  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1751-75. 

role  "  of  the  Cabot  name  is  certainly  its  first  historical 
appearance,  and,  taken  in  connection  with  the  remote 
origin  of  the  Jersey  stock,  seems  to  settle  the  purely 
Norman  extraction  of  the  family.1 

Many  centuries  intervened  before  the  world  heard  of 
another  Cabot.  The  name  first  reappears  at  the  time  of 
the  great  navigators,  John  and  Sebastian.  We  know  the 
story  of  the  discoveries  which  made  them  famous  ;  but,  of 
the  men  themselves,  hardly  more  has  been  preserved  than 
of  their  namesake  who  followed  Duke  William  into  Eng 
land. 

To  the  connection  of  John  and  Sebastian  with  the  discov 
ery  of  this  continent  is  probably  due  the  claim  of  descent  from 
them  that  has  been  made  by  American  Cabots,  but  for  which 
there  is  no  sufficient  foundation.  The  only  evidence  ever 
adduced  in  its  support  has  been  a  chance  resemblance  in  face 
and  feature,  an  heirloom,2  or  some  extremely  vague  tradi- 

The  arms  of  the  Poitou  Chabots  and  the  Jersey  Cabots  are  almost  identical, 
and  they  probably  had  a  common  origin.  See  Hoefer's  Biographie  Univ., 
art.  Chabot.  The  Norman  Cabots  were  of  Jersey  origin.  Their  arms  differed 
from  those  of  the  Jersey  Cabots  and  the  Poitou  Chabots,  being  "  argent ;  three 
leopards'  heads  sable."  But  they  are,  nevertheless,  of  the  same  family ; 
for  their  arms  are  found  upon  the  bell  of  the  old  church  of  St.  Trinity,  in 
Jersey.  See  Armorial  of  Jersey,  by  J.  Bertrand  Payne,  pp.  23-50. 

1  The  following  passages  illustrate  the  purity  of  the  Norman  race  in  Jersey. 
"  This  identity  Jersey  preserved  almost  intact  until  the  commencement  of  the 
present  century.    Laws,  habits,  and  customs  have  been  handed  down  with 
astonishing  fidelity.    The '  clameur  de  Haro'  the  legacy  of  Rollo's  stern  j  ustice, 
although  disregarded  and  ignored  in  its  first  home,  is  here  as  potent  as  ever." 
"  Until  comparatively  a  recent  period,  little  or  no  alien  blood  flowed  in  the 
veins  of  the  Jersey  folk,  and  in  them  continued  the  main  features  of  their 
nationality ;  while  persecution  and  tyranny  have  so  far  debased  the  modern 
inhabitant  of  Normandy  as  to  leave  in  him  but  few  traces  of  his  heroic 
ancestry.     The  Jersiais  are  fully  aware  of  the  degeneracy  of  their  conti 
nental  neighbors ;  for  when  one  of  the  lower  classes  would  express  the  ne 
plus  ultra  of  contempt  for  an  antagonist,  he  sums  it  up  in  the  significant 
phrase,  '  Tu  es  Normand.' "    "  Hardy,  abstemious,  clever,  brave,  and  warlike, 
the  Normans  earned  for  themselves  a  home  on  the  fair  borders  of  France, 
where  they  flourished  while  all  around  them  was  misery  and  wretchedness. 
Then  it  was  that  Jersey  was  part  and  parcel  of  their  domain."  —  Armorial 
of  Jersey,  Payne,  pp.  11,  12. 

2  The  heirloom  referred  to  here  is  a  mourning-ring,  over  two  hundred 


1751-75.]  THE   CABOx   FAMILY.  3 

tion ;  while  careful  investigation  has  never  been  able  to  dis 
cover  the  necessary  links  in  the  pedigree.  There  is  only  one 
bond  which  can  be  sustained  even  by  reasonable  conjecture. 
The  New  England  family  came  from  Jersey,  where  there 
are  two  parishes  still  inhabited  almost  exclusively  by 
Cabots.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that  this  was  the  origi 
nal  home  of  the  race,  which  in  numbers  and  social  arrange 
ments  is  not  unlike  a  Scottish  clan.  Persons  of  all  classes 
in  the  community  possessed  a  common  name  and  common 
origin,  but  beyond  this  there  was  no  relationship  among 
them.1  The  name  is  found  also  in  France,  England,  Bel 
gium,  and  Italy ;  and  this  ubiquity,  at  first  sight,  seems 
to  contradict  the  theory  of  a  single  stock.  But  a  sure 
test  exists  which  proves  the  derivation  of  the  scattered 
branches  from  one  source.  The  coat-of-arins  of  the  Jersey 
family  is  perfectly  defined  and  well  known.  The  device  is 
three  fishes,2  or,  in  the  Jersey  phrase,  "  three  chabots ;  "  and, 
by  this  charge  upon  the  coat-of-arms,  the  origin  of  those 
who  bore  the  name  in  other  countries  can  be  determined. 
The  fishes  are  found  crossed  with  the  Rohan  arms,  when  one 
of  that  great  family  married  a  Chabot  of  Poitou,  and  one  of 
the  most  distinguished  branches  of  the  same  family  is  that 
of  Rohan-Chabot.3  They  were  borne  by  an  Italian  Cardi- 

years  old,  with  the  name  "  Sebastian  Cabot "  engraved  upon  it.     It  is  now 
in  the  possession  of  the  family  of  the  late  Mr.  C.  C.  Foster,  of  Cambridge. 

1  Mr.  George  E.  Waring,  in  his  "  Farmer's  Vacation,"  speaks  as  follows 
of  the  Jersey  society :  "  The  gentry  invariably  cultivate  their  own  estates, 
and  indeed  one  is  at  a  loss  to  learn  where  gentry  ends  and  peasantry  begins. 
The  best  names  in  the  island  are  borne  by  the  small  landholders  as  well  as 
by  the  larger,  and  cousinship  links  the  population  into  a  very  compact  com 
munity."     (p.  183.) 

2  A  charge  corresponding  with  the  family  name  is  known  to  heraldry  as 
"  armes  parlantes,"  and  is  one  of  the  oldest  kinds  of  devices,  forming  the 
connecting  link  between  the  primitive  personal  badge  and  the  heraldic  bear 
ings  with  which  we  are  familiar.    (Armorial  of  Jersey,  p.  7.)    The  arms 
stamped  upon  this  volume  are  taken  partly  from  a  design  made  for  Mr. 
Samuel  Cabot,  of  Boston,  at  the  close  of  the  last  century,  and  partly  from 
the  "  Armorial,"  and  Moule's    "  Heraldry  of  Fish." 

8  See  Etat  Pre'sent  de  la  Noblesse  Franpaise.     Bachelin  de  Florenne,  art, 
Rohan-Chabot,  p.  1601,  4me  eU,  1873-1874. 


4  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1751-75. 

nal  of  the  last  century,  and  they  are  still  preserved  unal 
tered  by  the  family  in  America.1  The  Cabots,  like  their 
northern  ancestors,  were  a  wandering  race;  and,  as  the 
little  channel  island  offered  no  field  for  advancement,  the 
more  adventurous  spirits  were  driven  out  into  the  world 
to  seek  their  fortune.  The  nationality  even  of  John  Cabot, 
the  discoverer,  is  still  uncertain  ;  for  modern  investigation 
has  cast  doubt  upon  the  usually  accepted  story  of  his 
Venetian  birth.2  His  course  of  life  and  personal  character 
istics  would  lead  us  to  suppose  him  of  the  island  race ;  and 
this  supposition  is  converted  into  certainty  by  the  identity 
of  arms  and  motto,  as  borne  by  the  French  descendants  of 
the  discoverer,  with  those  of  the  Jersey  family.3  To  claim 
descent  from  him,  however,  is  quite  another  matter,  and  de 
mands  much  more  direct  evidence  than  any  yet  brought  for 
ward  by  those  who  in  this  country  lay  claim  to  the  honor. 
For  every  Cabot  to  consider  himself  a  descendant  of  John 
Cabot,  the  discoverer,  or  of  Chabot,  the  Admiral  of  France 
and  patron  of  Jacques  Cartier,  is  very  much  as  if  every 
Cameron  claimed  descent  from  Lochiel  or  every  Campbell 
from  the  Dukes  of  Argyll.  Such  relationship  is  purely 
theoretical ;  but  it  is  all  to  which  the  New  England 
Cabots  are  fairly  entitled,  in  regard  to  those  distin 
guished  men  who  have  borne  the  name  in  other  coun 
tries  and  in  past  times.  If  any  further  and  more  positive 
proof  were  needed  on  this  point,  it  is  amply  supplied  by 
the  genealogy  of  the  American  family,  which  has  been 

1  See  F^tat  Present  de  la  Noblesse  frar^aise,  as  above,  articles   Cabot, 
Chabot,  and  Chabot  la  Tour. 

2  Calendar  of  State  Papers,  Venetian,  Rawdon  Brown,  1202-1509,  §§  743 
and  753 ;  Life  of  Sebastian  Cabot,  Mcholls,  London,  1869. 

8  Armorial  de  Languedoc,  L.  de  la  Roque,  Tome  II.  163.  The  French 
Cabots  trace  their  descent  from  Louis,  John  Cabot's  second  son.  M.  de  la 
Roque  says  Sebastian  died  without  issue,  but  gives  no  proof  of  this  asser 
tion.  He  also  states  the  Jersey  and  American  Cabots  to  be  of  the  same 
family  as  the  navigators.  The  identity  of  arms  and  motto  can  leave  but 
little  doubt  on  this  last  point. 


1751-75.]  THE   CABOT  FAMILY.  5 

accurately  traced,1  and  which  the  most  patient  labor  has 
failed  to  carry  beyond  the  parents  of  those  who  first  emi 
grated  to  Massachusetts. 

With  this  explanation  as  to  the  name  and  family,  the 
region  of  conjecture  and  speculation  may  be  left,  and  the 
history  of  the  New  England  family  briefly  and  surely 
sketched  from  the  certain  testimony  of  legal  records  and 
family  papers.  Some  time  in  the  latter  half  of  the  sev 
enteenth  century,  Frangois  Cabot,  of  St.  Trinity,  a  large 
land-owner  and  wealthy  man,2  married  Suzanne  Gruchy.3 
In  1677,  a  son  of  theirs  was  baptized  George  in  the  St. 
Heliers  Church,  whose  records  show  that  three  years  later 
another  son  received  the  name  of  Jean.  There  was  also  an 
older  son,  whose  baptism  is  not  recorded,  named  Frangois. 
About  1699,  old  deeds  conveying  land  at  St.  Heliers  bear 
witness  that  the  three  sons  just  named  sold  a  large  amount  of 
real  estate  ;  and  soon  afterwards,  apparently,  they  emigrated 
to  Massachusetts.  Of  Frangois,  nothing  is  known  after  his 
arrival  in  America,  except  the  bare  fact  that  he  was  a  ship 
owner  and  merchant  in  conjunction  with  his  brother  George. 
The  latter  was  rated  as  a  tax-payer  in  Salem,  in  1700 ;  and 
in  a  conveyance  of  Jersey  land  made  in  the  following  year 
is  described  as  a  joiner.  Soon  after  his  arrival,  George 
Cabot  made  a  good  marriage,  obtaining  the  hand  of  Abigail 
Marston,  of  Salem,  daughter  of  Benjamin  Marston  and 
Patience  Rogers.  Mrs.  Cabot  died  in  1709,  and  her  hus 
band  survived  her  less  than  a  year.  Whether  George 
Cabot  pursued  his  trade  in  his  new  home  is  not  known  ; 

1  For  nearly  all  that  follows  in  regard  to  the  New  England  family,  I  am 
indebted  to  the  kindness  of  Henry  Lee,  Esq.,  by  whose  careful  investiga 
tions  the  Cabot  genealogy  has  been  fully  settled. 

2  Mr.  Payne  says,  in  regard  to  the  Cabot  family,  "  The  eldest  branch  of 
this  family,  which  formerly  held  much  landed  property  in  the  parish  of 
St.  Trinity,  emigrated  to  America  in  the  person  of  George  Cabot,"  &c.  — 
Armorial  of  Jersey,  p.  50.      Mr.  Payne  connects  the  Cabots  of  St.  Trinity 
with  both  the  Chabots  of  Poitou  and  the  Cabots  of  Normandy. 

3  Suzanne  Gruchy  was  of  the  same  family  as  the  Marshal  Grouchy  of 
Napoleon's  time,  who  did  not  come  up  at  Waterloo.    See  Armorial  of  Jersey, 
p.  120. 


6  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1751-75. 

but  old  business  letters  preserve  the  memory  of  various 
mercantile  enterprises,  in  which  he  was  engaged  with  his 
brother  Frarigois.  Mr.  Felt,  in  his  "  Annals  of  Salem,"  l 
speaks  of  Benjamin  Marston's  house  as  the  first  brick  house 
built  in  Salem ;  and  he  says  the  mason  and  builder  was 
George  Cabot.  As  I  have  just  stated,  George  Cabot  mar 
ried  Marston's  daughter ;  but  whether  he  obtained  her 
hand  after  services  rendered  to  her  father  as  a  mason,  or 
whether  from  superior  knowledge  he  was  enabled  to  direct 
the  construction  of  his  father-in-law's  house,  and  was  there 
fore  supposed  to  be  a  mason,  I  am  unable  to  determine. 
The  presumption,  however,  is  strong  that  the  first  George 
Cabot,  though  a  jack-of -all-trades,  was  master  of  none ; 
for  neither  inherited  property,  nor  skill  in  the  joiner's 
or  mason's  crafts,  nor  ventures  at  sea,  were  able  to  save 
him  from  ultimate  failure.  Whatever  his  occupation,  it 
is  certain  that  he  was  unsuccessful,  and  at  his  death 
his  estate  was  found  to  be  insolvent.  George  Cabot  left 
two  children,  —  one  daughter,  and  one  son  named  Mars- 
ton  Cabot.  Marston  was  first  cared  for  by  his  mother's 
family,  but  afterwards  was  adopted  by  his  paternal  uncle, 
and  in  1720  entered  Harvard  College  in  the  same  class 
with  his  cousin,  John.  Despite  the  apparent  generosity  of 
John  Cabot  to  his  brother's  orphan  children,  the  rela 
tions  between  the  nephew  and  uncle  do  not  seem  to  have 
been  pleasant.  While  still  a  boy  and  about  to  enter  col 
lege,  Marston  Cabot,  and  his  uncle  Benjamin  Marston  as 
well,  wrote  to  his  grandmother  in  Jersey,  asking  assistance, 
and  deprecating  a  state  of  dependence  on  his  uncle  John.2 
Graduating  in  1724,  Marston  Cabot  entered  the  ministry, 
and  removed  to  Killingly,  Conn.,  to  take  charge  of  a  parish. 
He  there  married,  begot  thirteen  children,  published  a  few 
sermons,  and  before  he  had  completed  his  fiftieth  year  died 

1  Annals  of  Salem,  I.  414.     Mr.  Felt  cites  no  authority  in  support  of 
this  statement,  and  I  have  relied  solely  on  his  well-known  accuracy. 

2  See  N.  E.  Hist,  and  Gen.  Register,  XXVII.  294. 


1751-75.]  THE  CABOT  FAMILY.  7 

suddenly  one  Sunday  morning  in  his  pulpit.     His  descend 
ants  still  live  in  Connecticut. 

John  Cabot,  the  youngest  of  the  three  emigrant  brothers, 
also  came  to  Salem  in  1700 ;  and,  like  his  brother  George, 
made  a  fortunate  marriage.  His  wife,  Anna  Orne,  belonged 
to  one  of  the  prominent  Essex  families  of  the  earliest  Eng 
lish  emigration.  In  no  other  respect,  however,  does  the 
resemblance  of  John  Cabot's  career  hold  with  that  of  his 
older  brother.  Unlike  George,  he  prospered  greatly  in 
business,  became  a  leading  merchant,1  and  built  himself  a 
goodly  house  in  Salem.  Indeed,  we  have  a  right  to  believe 
that  John  Cabot  brought  a  considerable  amount  of  property 
with  him  to  his  new  home.  Not  only  the  circumstances  of 
his  marriage  point  to  this,  but  Colonel  Benjamin  Pickman,2 
in  describing  the  old  houses  of  Salem,  mentions  John  Cabot's 
house  as  dating  from  the  year  1700.  The  house  could 
hardly  have  been  as  old  as  this ;  but  Pickman's  evidence 
shows  that  John  Cabot,  almost  immediately  upon  his  arri 
val,  was  rich  enough  to  build  what  was  considered  for  many 
years  afterwards  one  of  the  handsomest  of  the  Salem  houses. 
He  was  certainly  not  a  needy  adventurer  in  the  New  World, 
but  followed  the  example  of  many  of  his  prosperous  coun 
trymen3  in  emigrating  to  Salem.  He  had  nine  children. 
The  oldest  son,  John,  was  admitted  to  Harvard,  as  already 
mentioned,  in  1720,  together  with  his  cousin  Marston,  and 
after  graduation  studied  medicine,  and  practised  success 
fully  as  a  physician.  The  youngest  son  of  this  numerous 

1  Samuel  Gardner,  in  his  Journal,  mentions  John  Cabot's  interests  in  the 
fisheries  (Essex  Institute,  II.  252) ;  and,  in  a  description  of  some  rare  coins 
sold  not  long  since  in  Salem,  it  is  said  this  coin  was  given  by  an  "  eminent 
merchant,  John  Cabot,  of  Salem,"  to  his  daughter  Margaret,  on  her  mar 
riage  with  Benjamin  Gerrish,  afterwards  royal  Governor  of  the  Bermudas. 
Essex  Institute,  V.  31 ;   Felt's  Annals,  first  edition,  p.  443. 

2  Proceedings  of  Essex  Institute,  Pickman's  notes,  VI.  107. 

8  The  Englishes,  afterwards  distinguished  in  Salem  history,  were  from 
Jersey,  and  settled  in  Salem  as  early  as  1670.  Lefavour  was  the  name  of 
Still  another  Salem  family  of  Jersey  origin.  See  Essex  Institute  Proc., 
I.  158. 


8  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1751-75. 

family,  who  was  named  Joseph,  entered  into  business,  like 
his  father,  and  was  equally  prosperous.  He  remained  in 
Salem,  and  married  Elizabeth  Higginson,  a  direct  descend 
ant  in  the  fifth  generation  from  Francis  Higginson,  the 
first  minister  of  the  Massachusetts  Bay  Colony.  Nine 
sons  and  two  daughters  were  the  fruits  of  this  marriage. 
The  seventh  child  and  fifth  son  of  Joseph  Cabot  was  George 
Cabot,  —  the  subject  of  this  memoir,  —  born  Dec.  16,  1751. 
Owing  to  the  careless  and  wanton  destruction  of  family 
papers,  little  is  now  known  of  George  Cabot's  early  years. 
His  childhood  was  passed  amidst  the  healthy  and  sober 
influences  of  a  well-ordered  New  England  household,  and 
in  the  pure,  invigorating  atmosphere  of  a  thriving  Purir 
tan  town.  His  father  was  a  prosperous  and  upright  man, 
and  his  mother  a  woman  of  strong  understanding  and 
firm  character.  He  was  educated  at  the  best  schools  of 
the  day,  where  he  displayed  so  much  proficiency  in  his 
studies  that  in  1766  his  father  sent  him  to  Harvard  Col 
lege.  At  that  time,  the  oldest  son  appears  to  have  been 
usually  the  only  recipient  of  the  highest  education ;  and 
the  selection  of  George  was  therefore  a  parental  compli 
ment  to  his  boyish  powers.  Two  years  after  George  entered 
college,  his  father  died.  In  his  will  he  provided :  — 

"  That  my  son  George,  who  now  belongs  to  Harvard  Colledge, 
shall  be  supported  and  maintained  by  and  out  of  my  estate, 
while  he  shall  belong  to  said  Colledge,  (i.e.}  untill  he  shall  have 
taken  one  Degree  there  ;  or  untill  the  time  which  according  to  the 
Common  Usage  shall  or  ought  to  be  appointed  for  giving  Degrees 
to  the  Class  to  which  he  belongs,  or  is  a  member  of ;  the  said 
George  continuing  to  belong  to  said  Colledge  and  not  being 
expelled." 

Although  Joseph  Cabot  was  esteemed  a  wealthy  man, 
his  property,  when  divided  among  the  widow  and  nine  chil 
dren,  yielded  but  six  hundred  pounds  to  each  of  the  younger 
ones,  a  narrow  inheritance,  even  in  those  days  of  small 


1751-75.J 


EDUCATION.  9 


things.  Unwilling  to  be  a  charge  upon  his  father's  estate, 
in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  will,  and  probably  still 
more  unwilling  to  diminish  his  already  slender  patrimony, 
George  left  college  at  the  end  of  his  Sophomore  year,  and, 
true  to  the  Essex  customs,  went  to  seek  his  fortune  at  sea. 
Not  yet  seventeen  years  old,  he  shipped  as  cabin-boy  in  a 
vessel  commanded  by  his  brother-in-law,  Mr.  Joseph  Lee. 
Such  a  change  in  his  mode  of  life  must  have  been  a  sharp 
one  to  a  young  collegian  of  studious  habits :  nor  was  his  lot 
softened  by  relationship  with  his  captain  ;  for,  if  family 
tradition  may  be  trusted,  Mr.  Lee  gave  his  young  kinsman 
the  full  benefit  of  severe  ship's  discipline.  Cabot,  however, 
was  not  discouraged,  but  pursued  his  profession  with  such 
success  and  determination  that,  before  he  reached  his 
majority,  he  was  himself  in  command  of  a  ship. 

This  early  experience  was  not  without  effect  upon  his  after 
life.  By  it  he  was  of  course  deprived  of  the  full  advan 
tages  of  that  classical  education  to  which  his  tastes  strongly 
impelled  him ;  but  his  early  contact  with  the  world  devel 
oped  manly  qualities  and  knowledge  of  men,  while  the 
responsibilities  of  his  profession  demanded  reflection,  fore 
thought,  and  self-command.  Yet,  though  engaged  in  active 
pursuits  before  most  boys  now  leave  school,  he  never  lost 
his  love  of  books.  Always  a  student,  he  now  made  the 
most  of  the  opportunities  afforded  by  travel,  and  turned 
his  attention  to  foreign  languages.  He  acquired  a  good 
knowledge  of  French,  and  became  very  proficient  in 
Spanish,  —  accomplishments  less  common  then  than  now. 
Voyages  to  foreign  countries  were  likewise  beneficial  in 
increasing  his  understanding  of  the  politics  and  interests 
of  other  nations,  and  the  knowledge  so  gained  proved  sub 
sequently  of  great  value.  A  strong  fancy  for  natural  sci 
ences  led  him  to  devote  much  time  to  them  ;  and  he  was 
also  fond  of  metaphysics ;  but  his  favorite  subjects  were 
politics  and  political  econoni}^,  which  continued  to  be  a 
constant  source  of  study  and  amusement  from  the  day  he 


10  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE    CABOT.      [1751-75. 

went  to  sea  to  the  day  of  his  death.  To  practice  he  added 
theory  :  for  commerce  was  to  him  not  only  a  livelihood, 
but  a  study ;  arid,  in  later  life,  the  knowledge  of  commercial 
laws  and  necessities  thus  acquired  gave  him  a  position  of 
authority  in  regard  to  all  such  topics.  Among  the  New 
Englanders,  the  men  of  Boston  and  Salem,  of  Marblehead 
and  Newburyport,  George  Cabot  was  only  one  of  many 
whose  minds  ripened  into  a  peculiar  flavor,  and  grew  strong 
with  a  robust  and  masculine  vigor,  in  this  school  which  never 
failed  to  leave  on  its  scholars  a  characteristic  stamp  of  the 
quarter-deck  and  a  dash  of  salt  water.  For  this  it  was 
well  worth  while  to  sacrifice  two  years  of  a  college  life, 
which  in  those  days  was  neither  highly  cultivated  nor 
deeply  scientific.  Books  and  independent  thinking  were 
always  the  great  pleasures  and  resources  of  his  life,  and  as 
long  as  he  had  opportunity  for  them  he  was  content.  Such 
methods  of  instruction  were  not  calculated  to  develop  the 
imagination,  but  they  were  eminently  fitted  to  stimulate 
the  growth  of  those  talents  most  needed  in  the  American 
Colonies.  Mr.  Cabot's  education  had  the  same  defects  and 
the  same  advantages  as  that  of  his  contemporaries :  it  was 
typical  of  the  mode  of  thought  and  manner  of  life  which 
bred  up  a  class  of  clear-headed,  strong-willed,  sensible  men, 
at  a  time  when  the  sentimentalism,  which  at  a  later  day 
flooded  the  country,  would  have  been  ruinous.  Such  edu 
cation  was  essentially  practical,  but  its  practicality  was  of 
that  sort  which  seeks  in  past  experience  a  guide  for  future 
action.  The  men  of  that  age,  while  striking  out  for  them 
selves  a  new  path  in  a  new  country,  never  fell  into  the  mis 
take  of  abandoning  practice  in  favor  of  theory.  They  may 
possibly  have  leaned  too  strongly  in  the  other  direction,  but 
to  look  at  facts  as  they  were  was  the  lesson  which  their 
early  life  had  taught  them  ;  and  if  from  lack  of  imagination 
they  went  too  far  in  their  contempt  for  theory,  at  least  they 
understood  what  they  meant,  and  maintained  their  own 
cause  with  a  native  shrewdness  and  tenacity  which  stamp 
them  as  men  of  a  peculiar  mould. 


1776-90.]         BUSINESS    RELATIONS.  —  MARRIAGE.  11 


CHAPTER  II. 

1775-1790. 

Business  Relations.  —  Marriage.  —  Town  Affairs.  —  Privateering.  —  Com 
mittee  of  Town  to  consider  Constitution.  —  Convention  at  Concord. — 
Convention  to  form  State  Constitution.  —  Convention  to  adopt  Federal 
Constitution.  —  Correspondence. 

MR.  CABOT  soon  abandoned  the  career  of  a  sea  captain 
for  that  of  a  merchant,  and  was  joined  in  many  business 
adventures  with  his  brother-in-law,  Mr.  Joseph  Lee,  with 
whom,  in  1785,  he  formed  a  partnership.  Mr.  Lee  and 
Mr.  Cabot  were  both  engaged  in  the  same  trade  that  they 
had  severally  pursued  when  in  command  of  ships.  They 
prospered  in  their  business,  and  became  large  ship-owners 
and  merchants.  They  were  established  in  Beverly,  then 
considered  by  its  inhabitants  the  great  New  England  sea 
port  of  the  future.  This  belief  was  common  to  all  Essex 
towns  possessing  a  good  harbor;  and  its  gradual  extinc 
tion,  as  the  tide  of  prosperity  flowed  steadily  towards  Bos 
ton,  is  very  striking.  Despite  the  troubles  with  England, 
the  Essex  commerce  had  much  increased  and  the  little 
trading  towns  flattered  themselves  with  the  hope  that  they 
were  on  the  threshold  of  a  great  career.  The  town  and 
its  young  merchants  during  those  years  throve  together; 
and  the  partnership  afterwards  formed  between  Mr.  Lee 
and  Mr.  Cabot  continued  until  both  removed  from  Beverly. 
In  1774,  Mr.  Cabot  was  married  to  his  double-first-cousin, 
Elizabeth  Higginson.  This  union  was  destined  to  be  both 
long  and  happy.  Mrs.  Cabot  possessed  unusual  mental 
powers,  together  with  great  force  of  character  and  strength 


12  LIFE   AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1775-90. 

of  will ;  while  at  the  same  time  she  did  not  lack  the  more 
attractive  and  more  essential  qualities  of  her  sex.1 

Mr.  Cabot  always  took  a  warm  interest  in  town  affairs, 
and  in  the  town  meetings  learned,  like  so  many  other  New 

1  Mr.  John  Lowell,  the  well-known  lawyer  and  writer  of  the  early  part  of 
this  century,  in  a  letter  to  his  cousin,  Mr.  Stephen  Higginson,  on  the  death 

of  Mrs.  Cabot,  speaks  of  her  as  follows  :  — 

JULY  17,  1826. 

.  .  .  We  have  lost,  my  dear  cousin,  one  of  the  last  of  a  race,  of  whom  we 
may  justly  be  proud;  and  it  is  no  alleviation  to  our  deep,  and  to  us  both, 
sincere  regret  at  the  departure  of  our  dear  aunt  that  we  have  little  reason 
to  expect  to  see  her  equal  in  any  of  our  families.  It  is  not  the  course  of 
the  world  to  estimate  justly  female  merit.  The  present  age  is  somewhat 
more  correct  in  this  respect ;  but  still  many  an  accomplished  woman,  with 
high  and  elevated  powers,  passes  off  the  stage  with  little  notice,  while  a  man 
of  far  inferior  natural  powers,  from  the  adventitious  circumstance  of  his 
having  held  offices  which  a  female  of  great  talents  would  have  better  sus 
tained,  fills  the  world  for  a  time  with  his  posthumous  praises.  I  do  not 
quarrel  with  this  state  of  public  feeling,  because  it  was  part  of  the  wise 
system  of  Providence  that  the  province  of  the  two  sexes  should  be  separate. 
Still,  however,  that  same  Providence  occasionally  permits  that  some  gifted 
females  should  appear,  who  seem  by  their  talents  calculated  to  rule  rather 
than  obey.  Of  this  last  description  was  our  revered  departed  friend.  She 
had  all  the  firmness,  vigor,  resolution,  penetration,  capacity  to  form  and 
express  her  thoughts  in  a  strong,  clear,  and  masculine  style,  which  are 
found  in  men  of  the  firmest,  boldest,  and  most  elevated  temperament  and 
mind.  If  she  had  been  called  like  Elizabeth  to  stations  of  great  power,  she 
would  have  been  like  her,  prudent,  energetic,  and  commanding.  She  had 
none  of  the  advantages  of  early  education  afforded  so  bountifully  to  the 
young  ladies  of  the  present  age;  but  she  surpassed  all  of  them  in  the  acute- 
ness  of  her  observation,  in  the  knowledge  of  human  nature,  and  in  her 
powers  of  expressing  and  defending  the  opinions  which  she  had  formed. 
Without  systematic  knowledge,  her  mind  was  filled  with  information  on 
every  topic  interesting  to  us  in  this  world.  No  doubt  she  derived  great  bene 
fit  from  the  intercourse  with  one  of  the  most  luminous  minds  of  the  age, 
with  whom  for  nearly  fifty  years  she  was  associated.  With  these  great 
qualities,  for  great  they  were,  she  had  a  full  share  of  all  the  virtues  of  her 
sex.  Her  firmness  and  resolution  were  mingled  with  kindness  and  tenderness 
and  affection  for  her  own  children  and  all  her  numerous  friends.  It  is  a 
pleasure  to  me,  and  it  will  be  to  you,  to  take  this  retrospective  view  of  her 
life  and  character.  To  me,  it  is  a  deep  loss ;  for  there  remains  not  another 
mind,  in  a  perfect  state,  to  whom  I  can  look  up  for  sympathy  among  a 
departed  and  departing  race,  very  dear  to  me.  J.  LOWELL. 

This  is  a  good  portrait  of  the  best  type  of  New  England  woman  in 
the  last  century.  I  owe  this  letter  to  the  kindness  of  Miss  Anna  Cabot 
Lowell. 


1775-90.] 


PRIVATEERING.  13 


Englanders,  his  first  lessons  in  parliamentary  debate  and 
in  the  art  of  popular  self-government.  The  only  town 
office  ever  held  by  Mr.  Cabot  was  that  of  fire-ward,  in 
1787  ;  but  he  was  ever  active  in  the  support  of  all  pro 
jects  that  could  promote  the  prosperity  of  Beverly.  In 
1787,  the  scheme  of  the  Essex  Bridge,  to  connect  the  towns 
of  Salem  and  Beverly,  was  proposed ;  and  Mr.  Cabot  was 
the  first  named  in  the  act  of  incorporation.  He  was  sub 
sequently  director  and  president  of  the  Bridge  Company, 
and  gave  much  time  and  attention  to  the  speedy  comple 
tion  of  what  was  then  regarded  as  a  great  undertaking. 

Mr.  Cabot's  marriage  had  taken  place  just  as  the  country 
was  actually  involved  in  war.  In  the  troubles  which  pre 
ceded  the  actual  outbreak  of  hostilities,  and  throughout 
the  Revolution,  Mr.  Cabot  and  all  his  family  and  friends 
warmly  espoused  the  "  patriotic  "  side.  When  war  began, 
the  men  of  Essex  turned  naturally  to  the  sea  as  the  ele 
ment  on  which  they  could  best  serve  their  country. 
They  were  more  fortunate  in  their  choice  than  most  of 
their  fellow-citizens ;  for  privateering,  the  only  naval  war 
fare  possible  to  the  colonists,  was  not  only  patriotic,  but 
profitable  to  those  engaged.  The  Essex  ships  were  scat 
tered  in  all  directions,  and  preyed  upon  English  com 
merce  with  great  prejudice  to  the  enemy,  and  much  benefit 
to  themselves  and  their  country.  Many  of  these  priva 
teers  were  owned  by  the  Cabots  and  Lees,  and  had  notable 
success.  The  "Cicero,"  one  of  Mr.  Cabot's  ships,  was 
commanded  by  Captain  Hugh  Hill,  a  man  of  great  daring 
and  well  known  at  that  time.  Andrew  Cabot's  ship 
"  Defiance,"  also  a  privateer,  was  destroyed  in  the  ill- 
starred  Penobscot  expedition  of  1779.1  The  younger  mem- 


1  Curwen,  himself  an  Essex  man,  in  his  Journal  (p.  234),  speaks  with  a 
slight  touch  of  loyalist  bitterness  of  the  success  of  his  former  friends  :  "  The 
Cabots  of  Beverly,  who,  you  know,  had  but  five  years  ago  a  very  moderate 
share  of  property,  are  now  said  to  be  by  far  the  most  wealthy  in  New  Eng 
land.  Hasket  Derby  claims  the  second  place  on  the  list."  .  .  .  This  was  in 


14  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1775-90. 

bers  of  the  family  served  their  country  in  other  ways. 
Mr.  Cabot's  younger  brother,  Francis,  was  in  Colonel 
Pickering's  regiment  on  his  Rhode  Island  and  New  York 
expedition,  and  subsequently  in  Washington's  army. 

During  these  eventful  years,  Mr.  Cabot  was  often  chosen 
by  his  fellow-townsmen  to  represent  them  in  State  affairs. 
In  1778,  a  Constitution,  framed  by  a  committee  of  the 
General  Court  in  its  capacity  as  a  Convention,  was  sub 
mitted  to  the  people.  The  objections  to  the  instrument 
were  weighty.  There  was  no  declaration  of  rights ;  the  prin 
ciple  of  representation  was  not  a  just  one ;  the  powers  and 
duties  of  the  legislature  and  executive  were  not  properly 
defined;  and  the  Constitution  itself  was  the  work  of  the 
General  Court,  and  not  of  a  convention  of  delegates.1  On 
the  22d  of  May,  this  Constitution  was  submitted  to  the 
town  of  Beverly,  and  rejected  by  a  very  large  majority 
of  the  voters.  A  committee,  consisting  of  George  Cabot, 

1780.  Yet  even  the  profitable  patriotism  of  the  privateer  was  not  always 
unattended  with  sacrifices  and  misfortunes.  Colonel  John  Trumbull,  in  his 
"  Reminiscences  "  (p.  84),  says  that  he  took  passage  at  Bilbao  for  Beverly, 
in  1781,  in  the  "  Cicero,"  a  fine  letter-of-marque  ship,  of  twenty  guns  and  one 
hundred  and  twenty  men,  Captain  Hill,  belonging  to  the  house  of  Cabot. 
When  Colonel  Trumbull  joined  the  ship,  she  had  with  her  a  British  Lisbon 
packet  of  sixteen  guns,  which  she  had  just  taken  as  a  prize.  On  his  arrival 
at  Beverly,  Colonel  Trumbull  saw  lying  in  the  harbor  eleven  privateers  all 
finer  than  the  "  Cicero  "  in  which  he  had  been  a  passenger,  and  all  belong 
ing  to  the  Cabots.  The  following  year  the  same  writer  speaks  of  being  in 
Beverly  again,  and  adds  that  not  one  of  the  privateers  was  to  be  seen  in 
the  harbor.  All  had  been  lost,  and  the  Cabots  did  not  have  a  single  letter- 
of-marque  ship  afloat.  Many  of  these  vessels  belonged  to  John  and  Andrew 
Cabot,  who,  like  their  brother  George,  were  also  Beverly  merchants. 
The  translator  of  Chastellux  has  a  note  on  the  same  subject :  — 
"  The  town  of  Beverly  began  to  flourish  greatly  towards  the  conclusion 
of  the  war,  by  the  extraordinary  spirit  of  enterprise  and  great  success  of 
the  Messrs.  Cabot,  gentlemen  of  strong  understandings  and  the  most  liberal 
minds,  well  adapted  to  the  most  enlarged  commercial  undertakings  and 
the  business  of  government.  Two  of  their  privateers  had  the  good  fortune 
to  capture  in  the  European  seas,  a  few  weeks  previous  to  the  peace,  several 
West-Indiamen,  to  the  value  of  at  least  £100,000  sterling."  —  Chastellux, 
Travels  in  North  America,  translated  from  the  French,  London,  1787,  II. 
252,  253. 

1  Barry,  Histor}  of  Massachusetts,  3-175,  176 ;  Bradford,  II.  158,  159. 


1775-90.]  TOWN  AFFAIKS.  15 

Joseph  Willard,1  and  William  Bartlett,  was  then  appointed 
to  draft  instructions  to  the  town's  representative  in  the 
General  Court,  that  he  might  give  the  precise  reasons  for  the 
town's  dissent.  The  report  submitted  by  this  committee, 
and  adopted  by  the  town,  was  drawn  with  considerable 
ability.  Objection  was  chiefly  made  on  the  ground  of  in 
equality  of  representation,  and  defects  in  the  election  of 
senators.  The  report  concluded  in  a  manner  character 
istic  of  the  New  England  temper :  — 

"  Good  government,  we  are  sensible,  is  essential  to  the  happi 
ness  of  the  community ;  and  this  we  ardently  wish  to  take  place* 
and  shall  sincerely  endeavor  to  promote  and  encourage  it.  But 
if  any  form  is  offered  to  us,  which  we  in  our  consciences  think 
does  not  tend  to  the  public  welfare,  but  in  its  consequences  is 
destructive  of  it,  to  oppose  such  form  with  a  decent  but  manly  and 
zealous  freedom  and  firmness  is  a  duty  we  owe  to  ourselves  and 
posterity,  and  we  shall  ever  esteem  ourselves  bound  to  attend  to 
its  calls." 

In  July,  1779,  a  State  Convention  was  held  at  Con 
cord,  to  adopt  such  measures  as  would  tend  to  appreciate 
the  currency.  This  was  but  one  of  the  many  visionary 
attempts  to  obviate  by  legislative  enactments  the  sure 
workings  of  economic  laws.  It  was  then  considered  possi 
ble  as  well  as  patriotic,  by  fixing  a  maximum  of  prices,  to 
heal  the  wounds  inflicted  on  the  community  through  war, 
the  ruin  of  commerce,  and  disordered  finances.  Mr.  Cabot 
took  a  leading  part  in  this  Convention,  in  opposition  to  the 
theory  that  by  acts  of  the  legislature  men  could  be  forced 
to  sell  at  reduced  rates,  and  the  public  be  thereby  bene 
fited.  The  current  of  popular  feeling,  however,  was  too 
strong  to  be  resisted,  and  modifications  in  the  report  were 
all  that  Mr.  Cabot  obtained.  The  action  of  this  Conven 
tion  was  but  an  example  of  many  similar  ones.  States  and 
counties  were  all  engaged  in  the  vain  effort  to  remedy, 
by  law,  the  inevitable  results  of  war  and  economic  igno- 

1  Afterwards  President  of  Harvard  College. 


16  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1775-90. 

ranee.  Mr.  Cabot's  course  in  opposing  these  generally 
accepted  views  merely  serves  to  show  the  value  of  his 
previous  studies.  In  a  period  when  Adam  Smith  was 
hardly  known,  and  twenty  years  before  the  writings  of  Say 
and  the  Continental  school  had  appeared,  to  oppose  on 
economic  grounds  propositions  deemed  not  only  wise,  but 
patriotic,  shows  both  independence  and  liberality  of  mind. 
Mr.  Cabot  was  at  that  time  not  twenty-nine ;  and,  although 
his  opposition  was  fruitless,  it  was  creditable  to  his  courage 
and  judgment. 

In  the  following  summer,  August,  1780,  Mr.  Cabot  was 
elected  a  delegate  by  the  town  of  Beverly,  to  attend  the 
Convention  for  forming  a  State  Constitution.  This  Con 
vention  was  composed  of  the  best  and  ablest  men  in  Massa 
chusetts.  Among  the  members  were  Samuel  and  John 
Adams,  John  Hancock,  John  Lowell,  Theophilus  Parsons, 
James  Sullivan,  Levi  Lincoln,  and  Caleb  Strong.  The 
Convention,  admirably  adapted  for  the  work  before  it, 
organized  on  September  1st  by  the  choice  of  James  Bow- 
doin  as  President  and  Samuel  Barrett  as  Secretary.  A 
committee  of  thirty,  twenty-six  from  the  counties  and 
four  at  large,  was  appointed  to  draft  a  Constitution. 
The  Convention  then  adjourned  to  the  28th  of  October, 
in  order  to  give  the  committee  time  to  report,  and  to  allow 
certain  towns,  which  had  not  received  precepts,  to  elect 
delegates.  On  the  reassembling  of  the  Convention,  there 
was  much  indecisive  discussion,  followed  by  an  adjourn 
ment  until  January,  1781,  when  the  debate  was  again 
resumed.  The  draft  of  the  General  Convention  was  dis 
cussed  clause  by  clause,  and  each  section  was  usually 
entrusted  to  a  sub-committee  to  redraft  and  report.  The 
journal  of  the  Convention  shows  that  Mr.  Cabot  served 
on  several  of  these  sub-committees.1  The  Constitution,  as 
finally  submitted,  was  not,  however,  adopted  without  con 
siderable  opposition.  The  general  tendency  in  the  Con- 
1  Report  of  the  Convention  to  form  a  Constitution,  Boston,  1780. 


1775-90.]  THE    "ESSEX   JUNTO."  17 

vention  had  been  conservative,  and  the  members  had  made 
as  few  innovations  as  possible.  In  this  they  were  un 
doubtedly  wise ;  but  there  was  a  popular  party  which  con 
sidered  that  the  Constitution  had  not  gone  far  enough,  and 
had  yielded  too  much  to  prejudice  and  tradition.1  In  the 
ensuing  elections,  the  representatives  of  the  State  in  Con 
gress,  and  some  of  the  more  moderate  leaders  at  home, 
opposed  Governor  Hancock,  the  popular  candidate,  and 
supported  James  Bowdoin,  who  was  thought  to  represent 
the  more  conservative  elements.  It  was  a  vain  opposition ; 
but  the  contest,  though  unattended  with  much  virulence, 
produced  a  good  deal  of  strong  feeling  on  both  sides.  Then 
for  the  first  time  may  be  discerned  the  uncertain  outlines 
of  those  divisions  which  grew  steadily  during  the  next  few 
years,  took  definite  shape  in  the  Convention  to  adopt  the 
Federal  Constitution,  and  finally  culminated  in  two  great 
national  parties.  It  was  at  this  time  that  Hancock  is  said 
to  have  bestowed  on  his  opponents  the  title  of  the  "  Essex 
Junto,"2  and  this  is  the  first  appearance  of  the  name  in 
American  politics.  Mr.  Cabot  was  so  closely  connected  with 
the  men  who  are  popularly  supposed  to  have  formed  the 
"  Junto,"  that  it  is  proper  to  give  some  account  of  that 
body,  which  in  its  day  was  honored  by  the  invective  of  Mr. 
Clay,  and  by  the  bitter  hostility  of  both  John  and  John 
Quincy  Adams.  The  denunciations  of  these  distinguished 
men,  while  they  leave  no  doubt  as  to  their  respective  opin 
ions,  are,  nevertheless,  vague,  and  give  no  clear  notion  .as  to 
what  the  object  of  their  invective  really  was.  Judged  solelv 
by  the  rather  uncertain  language  of  its  enemies,  the 
"  Junto  "  was  a  well-defined  organization,  which  for  many 
years  exerted  a  powerful  influence  on  Massachusetts  politics 
and  the  Federal  party.  Like  most  hostile  descriptions, 
this  is  partly  true  and  partly  false ;  and  I  shall  try,  there- 

1  Barry,   3,   179;  Bradford,   II.   187;  Boston  Gazette,  March  13,  1780; 
Austin's  Life  of  Gerry,  I.  353. 

2  Memoir  of  Chief  Justice  Parsons,  p.  48. 

2 


18  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1775-90. 

fore,  to  describe  the  "  Junto,"  and  to  decide  whether  it 
was  really  an  organized  political  body,  or  merely  a  cant 
name  applied  to  certain  individuals,  who  usually  supported 
a  common  policy,  and  represented  a  fraction  of  a  large 
party.  The  "  Junto  "  was  generally  supposed  to  be  com 
posed  of  such  men  as  Theophilus  Parsons,  George  Cabot, 
Fisher  Ames,  Stephen  Higginson,  the  Lowells,  Timothy 
Pickering,  &c.,  and  took  its  name  from  the  county  to 
which  most  of  its  reputed  members  originally  belonged. 

The  men  of  Essex  were  descendants  of  those  who,  in  the 
dark  days  of  1629,  followed  Endicott  into  the  wilderness. 
They  were  of  the  oldest  Puritan  stock ;  and,  after  all  the 
modifications  of  a  century  and  a  half,  they  still  retained 
the  marks  of  their  ancestry.  The  lines  were  softened,  but 
still  distinct ;  and  the  inhabitants  of  Essex,  at  the  close  of 
the  last  century,  more  fully  perhaps  than  those  of  almost 
any  other  New  England  county,  represented  the  Puritan 
character  both  in  its  strength  and  its  limitations.  Strong, 
honest,  in  many  cases  of  an  almost  reckless  courage,  they 
were  sagacious  in  civil,  and  bold  in  military  life.  But 
their  intellectual  vigor  and  clear  perceptions  were  in  many 
instances  combined  with  great  mental  narrowness  and 
rigidity.  Then,  as  always,  in  the  days  of  Revolution,  and 
in  the  years  when  disintegration  threatened  the  country, 
the  men  of  Puritan  descent  were  foremost.  But,  when 
time  brought  changes  and  an  expansion  of  ideas,  the  older 
generation  could  not,  in  Massachusetts,  bend  sufficiently 
to  the  new  political  forces.  They  resisted  when  they 
could,  and,  though  unconvinced,  stoically  submitted  when 
resistance  was  not  longer  possible.  But  the  services  they 
rendered  in  trying  times  may  well  efface  the  remembrance 
of  an  obstinacy,  which  proceeded  from  strength,  not  from 
weakness,  and  by  which  they  were  themselves  the  greatest 
sufferers.1 

1  In  this  description  of  the  "  Essex  Junto,"  I  have  written  without  espe 
cial  reference  to  Mr.  Cabot,  who  was  of  Puritan  descent  on  his  mother's 
side  alone.  The  paragraph  is  intended  to  be  of  general  application  in 
regard  to  the  characteristics  of  the  prominent  Essex  leaders. 


1775-90.]  THE   "  ESSEX  JUNTO."  19 

Of  such  material  was  the  "  Essex  Junto  "  composed,  and 
such  was  the  nature  of  most  of  the  leaders.  Taken  as  a 
whole,  they  present  a  striking  example  of  the  mixture  of 
sense  and  prejudice,  of  liberality  and  narrowness,  of  cau 
tious  sagacity  and  reckless  audacity,  which  has  from  the 
beginning  marked  the  New  England  character.  The  re 
puted  members  of  the  "  Junto  "  held  political  power  in 
Massachusetts  for  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  century,  and 
their  successes  and  failures  are  a  part  of  the  history  of  the 
State.  The  subject  is,  therefore,  of  sufficient  importance 
to  warrant  the  introduction  here  of  the  only  account  of  the 
"  Essex  Junto,"  by  one  of  its  so-called  members.  This 
description  is  from  the  common-place  book  or  diary  of 
Timothy  Pickering ;  and  the  general  tone  is  so  character 
istic  of  the  writer,  that,  though  the  incidental  political 
views  have  no  immediate  bearing  on  the  present  subject, 
I  have  ventured  to  quote  the  entire  passage.  On  this  point, 
the  testimony  of  Colonel  Pickering  l  and  Judge  Parsons  is 
of  the  greatest  value ;  and  it  will  be  seen  from  their  state 
ment  that  the  theory  of  an  organized  body  known  as  the 
"  Junto  "  has  no  foundation. 

"THE  ESSEX  JUNTO." 

"  Many  persons,  in  States  remote  from  Massachusetts,  seem  to 
have  entertained  an  idea  that  a  number  of  influential  men,  origi 
nally  of  the  county  of  Essex,  had  associated  and  formed  an  organ 
ized  body,  whose  object  it  was  to  advance  a  plan  of  public  policy 
peculiar  to  themselves,  in  the  administration  of  the  general  gov 
ernment,  and  particularly  in  opposition  to  that  administration 
which,  by  way  of  excellence,  the  actors  themselves  have  chosen  to 
call  Republican.  And  the  term  '  Essex  Junto '  has  been  used, 
like  that  of  'The  Hartford  Convention,'  for  the  purpose  of  public 
deception.  The  innocent  —  the  more  than  innocent,  the  laudable 
—  purpose  for  which  the  latter  was  instituted,  I  have  lately  taken 
occasion  briefly  to  show  ;  referring  any  who  desired  more  full  and 

1  Colonel  Pickering,  although  absent  from  Massachusetts  in  the  early 
days  of  the  "  Junto,"  was  afterwards  so  intimately  connected  with  its  reputed 
members  as  to  be  a  good  witness. 


20  LIFE   AND    LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.    [1775-90. 

complete  information  to  the  excellent  and  perfectly  satisfactory 
letters  of  Mr.  Otis.  I  will  now  give  a  brief  account  of  'The 
Essex  Junto.' 

"  Although  born  in  Essex,  and  residing  there  during  the  first  two- 
and-thirty  years  of  my  life,  and  officially  well  acquainted  with  the 
county,  I  never  heard  the  term  '  Essex  Junto ; '  nor  till  twenty 
years -afterwards  (in  1797),  when  the  election  of  John  Adams  to 
the  office  of  President  of  the  United  States  had  been  ascertained. 
Having  called  to  see  him  at  his  lodgings  in  Philadelphia  (say  in 
January,  1797),  he  spoke  of  the  issue  of  the  Presidential  election, 
and  seemed  to  be  vexed  because  he  had  so  small  a  number  of  votes 
(only  three)  over  his  rival,  Thomas  Jefferson.  This  he  seemed 
to  think  was  owing,  in  part,  to  some  influential  men  in  Massachu 
setts,  who,  instead  of  zealously  promoting,  were  at  best  but  luke 
warm  in  regard  to  his  election.  There  were  three  in  particular, 
of  whom  he  spoke  with  warmth,  —  George  Cabot,  Stephen  Hig- 
ginson,  and  Theophilus  Parsons.  All  were  natives  of  Essex,  and 
all  were  my  friends.  The  two  former  had  removed  to  Boston,  and 
the  latter  went  thither  afterwards. 

"  These  gentlemen,  well  acquainted  with  certain  peculiarities  in 
Mr.  Adams's  character,  and  thinking,  doubtless,  that  the  adminis 
tration  of  the  general  government  would  be  at  least  as  safe  in 
the  hands  of  another,  were  willing,  I  presume,  that  his  Federal 
associate  in  the  nomination  for  President  and  Vice-President  — 
Charles  C.  Pinckriey,  a  distinguished  citizen  of  South  Carolina  — 
should  stand  at  least  as  high  on  the  electoral  list  as  Mr.  Adams 
himself.  It  was  this  indifference,  or  lukewarmness  towards  him, 
as  one  of  the  Presidential  candidates,  that  appeared  to  have  excited 
in  Mr.  Adams  such  warmth  of  resentment,  petulantly  expressed, 
as  I  have  in  another  paper  recently  mentioned. 

"  In  one  of  my  conversations  with  the  late  Chief  Justice  Par 
sons,  I  asked  if  he  knew  the  origin  of  the  term  '  Essex  Junto.' 
He  answered  that  some  time  prior  to  the  American  Revolution, 
when  Massachusetts  was  under  her  charter  government,  one  of  the 
royal  governors  (all  received  their  appointments  from  the  King 
of  England),  having  a  favorite  measure  to  carry  in  the  Legis 
lature,  was  opposed  by  some  able  and  influential  members  from 
the  county  of  Essex,  and  defeated.  The  governor,  disappointed 
and  irritated,  ascribed  his  defeat  to  the  *  Essex  Junto.'  This 
origin  of  the  name  does  no  discredit  to  Old  Essex.  If  able  and 


1775-90.]  THE   "ESSEX  JUNTO."  21 

influential  men  there  and  elsewhere  in  Massachusetts,  and  in  the 
other  States  of  the  Union,  had  been  able  to  resist  and  defeat  cer 
tain  great  measures  taken  in  some  of  the  administrations  which 
succeeded  Washington's,  they  would  have  been  entitled  to  the  last 
ing  gratitude  of  their  country.  The  men  here  referred  to  were 
those  in  whom  Washington  (entertaining  the  same  views  and  hold 
ing  the  same  principles  in  regard  to  what  the  public  welfare  de 
manded)  placed  his  confidence,  while  he  considered  and  pronounced 
the  popular  leaders  of  their  opponents  i  the  curse  of  their  country.' 
Hence  the  inference  is  obvious,  that  Washington  himself  and  the 
other  eminent  Federalists  deceased,  as  well  as  their  Federal  sur 
vivors,  would  be  comprehended  in  the  term  '  Essex  Junto.'  " 

In  a  letter  to  George  Henry  Rose,  the  British  minister 
to  the  United  States,  in  1806,  Colonel  Pickering  has  given 
another  description  of  the  "Junto."  It  tallies  exactly 
with  that  just  quoted,  but  presents  some  additional  details ; 
and  I  therefore  insert  it :  — 

"  In  the  '  National  Intelligencer '  of  yesterday,  in  the  remarks 
on  my  letter  of  February  16  to  Governor  Sullivan,  you  will  see 
mentioned  the  '  Essex  Junto,'  among  whom  the  editor  has  honored 
me  with  a  place.  This  may  need  explanation  to  a  stranger. 

"  Having  then  been  absent  many  years  from  my  native  State, 
I  think  the  first  time  I  heard  the  phrase  was  from  the  mouth  of 
the  late  President  Adams,  just  at  the  moment  when  he  succeeded 
General  Washington  in  the  Presidency.  He  had  understood  that 
the  persons  comprehended  in  the  term  '  Essex  Junto  '  had  opposed,  at 
least  had  not  favored,  his  election  [they  all  knew  his  pride,  his 
vanity,  and  his  eccentricities],  and  thereby  had  committed  a  deadly 
sin.  Mentioning  this  to  me  with  some  warmth,  and  in  language 
not  very  dignified,  he  pronounced  the  names  of  those  gentlemen, 
who  were  confessedly  the  principals  in  that  society  of  friends  which 
he  called  the  *  Essex  Junto,'  just  as  I  have  written  them,  —  George 
Cabot,  Thoph.  Parsons,  and  Steph.  Higginson.  These  gentlemen- 
now  live  in  Boston,  in  Suffolk  County.  Mr.  Cabot's  character  I 
have  already  given  you.  Mr.  Higginson  is  one  of  the  best  in 
formed  and  most  intelligent  of  our  merchants.  Aud  Mr.  Parsons 
is  so  eminent  a  lawyer  (and,  I  might  add,  a  man  of  universal 
science)  that  in  New  England  he  is  often  designated  by  '  The 
Giant  of  the  Law.'  He  is  now  Chief  Justice  of  Massachusetts, 


22  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1775-90. 

and  would  do  honor  to  either  Bench  in  Westminster  Hall.  These 
three  gentlemen  happened  all  to  have  been  born  in  the  county  of 
Essex.  I  esteem  it  fortunate  that  the  same  county  gave  me  birth, 
and  my  highest  honor  to  have  those  gentlemen  for  my  friends." 

From  this  it  appears  that  the  name  was  originally  applied 
by  a  royal  governor  to  some  of  his  political  opponents; 
and  when  first  given  was  still  familiar,  and  of  ill-repute 
in  England,1  although  its  origin  in  Massachusetts  was  far 
from  discreditable.  Nevertheless,  it  was  an  odious  title ; 
and  Hancock  meant  it  to  be  so,  if  it  is  true  that  he  used 
it  against  his  opponents.  Reintroduced  at  a  moment  when 
parties  were  growing  more  sharply  defined,  the  old  name 
once  revived  was  not  soon  abandoned ;  and,  in  the  political 
strife  of  later  times,  abuse  was  lavished  upon  the  "  Essex 
Junto,"  which  would  have  been  almost  too  strong  for 
the  "  Cabal  "  of  the  Restoration.  But  to-day  this  formi 
dable  political  engine  resolves  itself  into  a  cant  political 
term,  applied  to  a  certain  wing  of  the  Federalist  party. 

Shortly  after  the  new  Constitution  went  into  operation, 
Mr.  Cabot  was  chosen  a  senator  from  Essex.  The  Legisla 
ture  of  1782-83  adjourned  in  the  autumn  of  1782,  until 
January  of  the  next  year.  During  the  time  of  adjourn 
ment,  a  vacancy  occurred  among  the  Essex  senators ;  and 
Mr.  Cabot,  having  been  elected  to  the  position,  took  his 

1  Although  the  name  had  not  been  used  before  the  days  of  royal  gov 
ernors,  the  county  of  Essex  had  grasped  at  political  control  in  Massachu 
setts  at  a  much  earlier  period.  In  1644,  the  Essex  men  turned  Winthrop 
and  Dudley  out  their  offices  of  Federal  commissioners,  and  replaced  them 
with  Hathorne  and  Bradstreet,  both  of  Essex  County.  By  the  same  com 
bination,  a  very  formidable  attempt  was  made  to  dictate  the  proceedings  of 
the  whole  government.  They  aimed  to  remove  the  government  and  the 
court  to  their  county,  and  also  to  obtain  four  places  in  the  magistracy.  Dr. 
Palfrey  says  in  this  connection :  "  Two  hundred  years  ago,  it  seems,  Essex 
men  were  thought  to  be  aspiring  to  rule  the  colony,  as  fifty  years  ago  an 
'  Essex  Junto '  was  cried  out  against  for  its  alleged  ambition  to  rule  the 
Commonwealth.  A  vital  local  influence  has  its  ebbs  and  flows,  which  some 
times  history  discloses."  (Hist,  of  New  England,  II.  157,  note.)  In  the  past 
history  of  Massachusetts,  Essex  seems  to  have  ever  been  the  strongest,  most 
ambitious,  and  most  powerful  politically  of  all  the  counties. 


1775-90.] 


THE   STATE   SENATE.  23 


seat  at  the  opening  of  the  new  year.  The  journals  l  of  the 
State  Senate  bear  witness  to  his  constant  attendance  and 
faithful  work ;  and  this  portion  of  his  career  is  connected 
with  a  brief  contemporary  allusion  to  his  powers  as  a  public 
speaker.  The  English  translator  of  Chastellux's  "  Travels  " 
was  in  Boston  during  the  winter  of  1782-83.  He  says: 
"  There  were  then  violent  debates  in  the  Assembly  and  the 
Senate,  respecting  the  duration  of  the  Sabbath.  One  party 
were  for  having  it  consist  of  six-and-thirty  hours,  commenc 
ing  at  six  o'clock  on  the  Saturday  evening ;  whilst  the  other 
insisted  on  abridging  it  to  eighteen,  reckoning  from  the 
midnight  of  Saturday,  and  finishing  at  six  on  the  Sunday 
evening.  The  former  proposition  passed  the  Assembly, where 
the  country  interest  prevailed ;  but  was  thrown  out  in  the 
Senate  by  the  predominant  interest  of  the  merchants,  aided 
by  good  sense  and  the  palpable  absurdity  of  such  a  regula 
tion  in  a  commercial  country  abounding  with  strangers. 
Mr.  Cabot,  a  very  sensible  man,  and  a  rich  merchant  of 
Beverly,  distinguished  himself  on  this  occasion  by  a  speech 
full  of  eloquence  and  wit."  2  To  the  chance  presence  of  a 
stranger,  Mr.  Cabot  is  indebted  for  the  rescue  of  his  speech 
from  oblivion ;  and  upon  his  public  life  at  that  time 
the  few  words  of  this  eye-witness  throw  a  passing  gleam  of 
light.  The  unexpired  term  for  which  Mr.  Cabot  had  been 
chosen  lasted  only  to  May,  1783  ;  and,  although  urged 
to  continue  in  office,  he  declined  a  re-election. 

In  the  recurring  political  struggles,  Mr.  Cabot  warmly 
espoused  the  cause  of  the  party  opposed  to  Hancock,  and 
gave  his  support  to  Bowdoin.  Not  only  association,  but 
character  and  modes  of  thought,  made  any  thing  except  a 
quiet,  though  vigorous,  conservatism  impossible  to  him.  At 
this  time  (1780-88)  there  were  no  political  parties,  in 
the  strict  sense  of  the  term.  The  war  had  but  just  ceased, 
and  society  was  in  a  state  of  solution :  old  things  had  passed 

1  See  manuscript  Journals  of  Massachusetts  Senate  for  the  years  1782, 
1783,  at  the  State  House  in  Boston. 

2  Chastellux's  Travels  in  North  America,  translated  from  the  French, 
London,  1787,  II.  383,  384. 


24  LIFE  AND   LETTERS  OF   GEORGE    CABOT.     [1775-90. 

away,  but  new  ones  had  not  yet  grown  up  to  take  their 
place.  The  men  who  then  were  masters  had  all  alike  been 
Whigs  and  patriots.  In  other  words,  one  party  had  pre 
vailed  to  such  an  extent  that  no  other  existed.  But  in  the 
opposition  to  Governor  Hancock,  as  I  have  said,  the  germs 
of  the  new  divisions  may  be  discovered.  The  political  dif 
ferences  for  some  time  developed  slowly ;  but,  during  the 
confusion  of  the  years  which  succeeded  the  close  of  the 
war,  the  conservative  elements  gradually  gathered  strength. 
Bowdoin  was  elected  governor  in  1784,  and  held  office  until 
the  close  of  the  Shays  rebellion.  His  vigorous  and  manly 
course  in  that  insurrection  destroyed  his  personal  popular 
ity ;  but  the  party  which  had  supported  him  gained  in 
force  and  consistency  from  the  strong  reaction  against  the 
anarchy  of  the  Confederation.1 

In  1788,  the  Massachusetts  Convention  to  consider  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution  met.  The  Federalists  were 
in  a  minority ;  and  the  majority  opposed  to  them  was  for 
midable  and  determined.  But  the  "friends  of  the  Con 
stitution,"  as  they  were  then  called,  —  whose  leaders  were 
Rufus  King,  Ames,  Parsons,  Cabot,  and  others  of  the  same 
stamp,  —  possessed  great  ability,  and  had  the  advantage  of 
definite  purpose  and  cordial  co-operation.  Their  opponents, 
though  without  much  ability,  were  strong  numerically,  and 
powerfully  supported  by  local  prejudices.  The  appearance 
of  many  of  Shays's  partisans  lent  bitterness  to  the  conflict ; 
but,  if  these  insurrectionists  added  to  the  numbers  and  per 
sistency  of  the  opposition,  they  in  no  less  degree  roused  the 
zeal  of  the  Federalists,  thus  brought  face  to  face  with  the 
recent  promoters  of  rebellion.2 

Between  the  contending  parties  stood  two  men  of  high 
position,  great  influence,  and  almost  unbounded  popularity. 
John  Hancock  and  Samuel  Adams  were  able  to  insure 
success  to  those  who  secured  their  support ;  but  their  opin- 

1  Massachusetts  elected  delegates  in  1786  to  attend  the  Annapolis  Con 
vention,  and  Mr.  Cabot's  name  was  placed  at  the  head  of  the  list.     The  Con 
vention  dispersed  before  the  Massachusetts  delegates  had  left  their  State,  but 
Mr.  Cabot's  selection  for  this  office  shows  his  early  prominence  among  the 
advocates  of  a  better  government. 

2  For  the  composition  of  the  Anti-Federalist  party,  see  Drake's  Mem.  of 
Knox,  p.  97. 


1775-90.]        CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION  OF   1788.  25 

ions  were  not  known.  The  Federalists,  thoroughly  appre 
ciating  the  situation,  devoted  all  their  energies  to  obtain 
for  the  new  scheme  the  adherence  of  the  two  Revolutionary 
leaders,  in  whose  hands  victory  rested.  Hancock  was 
easily  dealt  with.  The  Federalist  leaders  understood  their 
man  perfectly,  and  were  adroit  enough  to  reason  with 
and  flatter  the  governor,  so  successfully  that  Parsons  actu 
ally  persuaded  him  to  preside  at  the  Convention,  and  to 
read  a  speech  prepared  by  Parsons  himself.1  It  was  by  no 
means  so  simple  a  matter  to  secure  Samuel  Adams.  He 
was  not  to  be  flattered,  and  he  could  argue  and  dispute 
with  the  best  and  ablest  of  the  Federalists.  Neverthe 
less,  he,  too,  had  his  weak  point,  and  in  one  way  the  ardent 
supporters  of  the  new  scheme  could  apply  persuasion.  In 
moments  of  doubt  as  to  questions  of  great  moment,  Samuel 
Adams,  with  the  true  instincts  of  a  popular  leader,  had 
always  relied  on  public  feeling  in  Boston  for  guidance ;  and 
the  Federalists  now  made  use  of  public  feeling  to  turn  him 
to  their  side.  The  mechanics  of  the  town  favored  the  Con 
stitution  ;  and  their  leaders  called  a  meeting,  whose  loudly 
expressed  Federalist  sentiments  some  trusty  followers, 
headed  by  Paul  Revere,  promptly  conveyed  to  Adams. 
The  effort  was  successful,  and  Adams  gave  in  his  support 
to  the  new  scheme.  Other  lesser  men  were  also  converted, 
and  much  effective  work  was  done  which  does  not  appear 
in  the  records  of  the  proceedings. 

In  these  unofficial  debates,  Mr.  Cabot's  manner,  address, 
and  powers  of  conversation  were  of  especial  value  and  were 
willingly  exerted.  Since  he  had  last  served  in  a  State  con 
vention,  eight  years  before,  the  country  had  passed  through 
all  the  miseries  entailed  by  the  weak  and  wretched  govern 
ment  of  the  Confederation ;  and  these  misfortunes  had  con 
tributed  to  deepen  his  belief  in  the  necessity  of  a  stronger 
and  more  conservative  establishment.  During  this  interval 

1  Life  of  Samuel  Adams,  II.  248-276;  Life  of  Gerry,  II.  eh.  ii.  See  also 
Memoir  of  Parsons,  p.  70  and  ff.,  for  a  full  account  of  the  Federalist  move 
ments.  For  the  effective  flattery  used  with  Hancock,  compare  Drake's 
Mem.  of  Knox,  p.  98. 


26  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.      [1775-90. 

also,  business  had  taken  him  much  to  New  York,  where  he 
formed  the  acquaintance  of  Hamilton  and  the  other  Feder 
alist  leaders  of  that  State.1  This  acquaintance,  which  in  the 
case  of  Hamilton  ripened  into  a  life-long  friendship,  helped 
to  strengthen  Mr.  Cabot's  already  firm  convictions  ;  and, 
when  he  was  chosen  a  delegate  to  the  Convention,  he  gave 
himself  up  wholly  to  the  work  before  him.  His  personal 
friends  were  those  who  led  the  Federalists,  and  nothing 
contributed  more  to  their  success  than  the  concert  and 
unanimity  displayed  in  their  counsels.  It  would  be  super 
fluous  here  to  follow  in  detail  the  history  of  the  Convention. 
Mr.  Cabot's  position  has  been  defined,  and  his  share  in  the 
labors  outside  the  Convention  has  been  sufficiently  alluded 
to.  To  sketch  the  part  he  took  in  the  public  debates  is  all, 
therefore,  that  remains  to  be  done  in  this  connection.  Mr. 
Cabot  spoke  seldom,  but  always  forcibly  and  clearly ;  and 
his  arguments,  if  we  may  judge  by  the  report,  commanded 
general  attention. 

The  fourth  section  of  the  first  article  in  the  Constitution 
was  vigorously  opposed.  This  section,  it  will  be  remem 
bered,  provides  that  "the  times,  places,  and  manner  of 
holding  elections  for  senators  and  representatives,  shall  be 
prescribed  in  each  State  by  the  Legislature  thereof ;  but 
the  Congress  may  at  any  time,  by  law,  make  or  alter  such 
regulations,  except  as  to  the  places  of  choosing  senators." 
This  appeared  to  the  jealous  eyes  of  the  opposition  to 
infringe  on  the  pet  New  England  principle  of  free  repre 
sentation.  At  this  point,  there  was  a  long  and  vigorous 
resistance  ;  and  the  Federalists  were  obliged  to  put  forth  all 
their  strength  in  order  to  dispel  the  phantom  which  had 
been  conjured  up,  of  an  external  power  controlling  the 
popular  representation.  Mr.  Cabot,  in  replying  to  this 
attack,  began  by  a  few  remarks  on  the  biennial  election 
of  representatives,  saying :  — 

1  Mr.  Cabot  met  Mr.  Jefferson  on  one  of  these  visits  to  New  York,  or 
perhaps  in  Boston,  in  1784  ;  and  the  latter,  then  on  his  way  to  Europe,  bor 
rowed  of  Mr.  Cabot  a  Spanish  grammar,  by  the  aid  of  which  he  mastered  that 
language  in  the  short  space  of  nineteen  days.  (Diary  of  J.  Q.  Adams,  I  317.) 


1775-90.]       CONSTITUTIONAL   CONVENTION   OF   1788.  27 

"  We  should  consider  the  particular  business  which  that  body 
will  frequently  be  called  upon  to  transact,  especially  in  the  way  of 
revenue.  We  should  consider  that,  on  a  question  of  supplies  of 
money  to  support  a  war  or  purchase  a  treaty,  it  will  be  impossi 
ble  for  those  representatives  to  judge  of  the  expediency  or  inex 
pediency  of  such  supplies,  until  they  shall  have  had  time  to  become 
acquainted  with  the  general  system  of  Federal  politics,  in  its  con 
nection  or  relation  to  foreign  powers ;  because  upon  the  situation 
of  those  must  depend  the  propriety  or  impropriety  of  granting 
supplies.  If  to  this  be  added  a  due  attention  to  the  easiest  way 
of  raising  such  supplies,  it  must  appear  that  biennial  elections  are 
as  frequent  as  is  consistent  with  using  the  power  of  the  represen 
tatives,  for  the  benefit  of  their  constituents." 

Mr.  Cabot  then  turned  to  the  fourth  section,  at  that 
moment  under  debate,  and  said:  — 

•'  It  gives  me  no  pain  to  see  the  anxiety  of  different  gentlemen 
concerning  the  paragraph  under  consideration,  as  it  evidences  a 
conviction  in  their  minds  of  what  I  believe  to  be  true,  —  that  a 
free  and  equal  representation  is  the  best,  if  not  the  only,  foundation 
upon  which  a  free  government  can  be  built,  and  consequently  that 
the  greatest  care  should  be  taken  in  laying  it.  I  am,  sir,  one  of 
the  people  :  such  I  shall  continue ;  and  with  these  feelings  I  hold 
'  that  the  right  of  electing  persons  to  represent  the  people  in  the 
federal  government  is  an  important  and  sacred  right.'  The  opin 
ions  that  have  been  offered  upon  the  manner  in  which  the  exercise 
of  this  right  is  provided  for  by  the  fourth  section  satisfy  me  that 
we  are  all  solicitous  for  the  same  end,  and  that  we  only  differ  as  to 
the  means  of  attaining  it ;  and,  for  my  own  part,  I  confess  that  I 
prize  the  fourth  section  as  highly  as  any  in  the  Constitution,  because 
I  consider  the  democratic  branch  of  the  national  government,  the 
branch  chosen  immediately  by  the  people,  as  intended  to  be  a  check 
on  the  federal  branch,  which  latter  is  not  an  immediate  representation 
of  the  people  of  America,  and  is  not  chosen  by  them,  but  is  a  rep 
resentation  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  individual  States,  and  its 
members  delegated  by  the  several  State  legislatures ;  and,  if  the 
State  legislatures  are  suffered  to  regulate  conclusively  the  elections 
of  the  democratic  branch,  they  may,  by  such  an  interference,  first 
weaken,  and  at  last  destroy,  that  check.  They  may  at  first  diminish, 
and  finally  annihilate,  that  control  of  the  general  government 


28  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1775-90. 

which  the  people  ought  always  to  have  through  their  immediate 
representatives.  As  one  of  the  people,  therefore,  I  repeat  that,  in 
my  mind,  the  fourth  section  is  to  be  as  highly  prized  as  any  in  the 
Constitution." 

In  the  debate  on  the  wide  subject  of  the  powers  of  Con 
gress,  Dr.  Willard 

"  Entered  largely  into  the  field  of  ancient  history,  and  deduced 
therefrom  arguments  to  prove  that  where  power  had  been  trusted 
to  men,  whether  in  great  or  small  bodies,  they  had  always  abused 
it,  and  that  thus  republics  had  soon  degenerated  into  aristocracies." 

"  Hon.  Mr.  Gorham  (in  reply  to  the  gentleman  from  Uxbridge) 
exposed  the  absurdity  of  conclusions  and  hypotheses  drawn  from 
ancient  governments,  which  bore  no  relation  to  the  confederacy 
proposed." 

"  Hon.  Mr.  Cabot  went  fully  into  a  continuation  of  the  argu 
ments  of  the  honorable  gentleman  last  up.  In  a  clear  and  elegant 
manner,  he  analyzed  the  ancient  governments  mentioned  by  Dr. 
Willard,  and  by  comparing  them  with  the  proposed  system  fully 
demonstrated  the  superiority  of  the  latter,  and  in  particular  the 
section  under  debate."  1 

In  a  further  debate  on  the  powers  of  Congress,  Mr. 
Dench  argued,  at  length,  that  the  powers  granted  to  the 
central  government  would  dissolve  those  of  the  States.  To 
this  Mr.  Cabot  replied  by  an  elaborate  argument,  and 
proved  to  his  own  and  his  friends'  satisfaction,  if  not  to 
that  of  Mr.  Dench,  the  utter  fallacy  of  such  views.  In  the 
debate  on  the  slave-trade,  — 

"  Mr.  Cabot  asks  the  gentleman  from  Sharon  whether  in  his 
five  hundred  miles'  travel  he  saw  five  thousand  people  who  live  as 
well  as  five  thousand  of  the  lowest  sort  here.  As  to  the  slave- 

1  Mr.  Randal,  who  followed  in  the  debate,  does  not  appear  to  have  received 
so  favorable  an  impression  of  Mr.  Cabot's  efforts  as  the  reporter  Mr.  Ran 
dal  began  by  saying  that  ancient  history  had  no  more  to  do  with  the  ques 
tion  in  hand  than  to  know  how  our  forefathers  dug  clams ;  what  he  feared 
was  a  consolidation  of  the  thirteen  States,  and  an  enforcement  of  Southern 
customs  in  New  England.  History  has  given  a  curiously  twisted  verifica 
tion  of  this  prediction.  The  customs  of  one  part  of  the  country  have  cer 
tainly  been  imposed  on  the  other,  but  not  precisely  as  Mr.  Randal  feared. 
For  these  debates,  see  History  of  Massachusetts  Convention,  1788. 


1775-90.]        CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION   OF   1788.  29 

trade,  the  Southern  States  have  the  slave-trade,  and  are  sovereign 
States.     The  Constitution  is  the  best  way  to  get  rid  of  it."  1 

Mr.  Cabot  also  spoke  on  a  subsequent  occasion,  with  great 
fulness,  on  the  proposed  mode  of  raising  revenue,  of  which 
he  was  particularly  competent  to  judge,  and  upon  which 
he  apparently  enlarged.2  The  complete  though  narrow 
victory  of  the  Federalists,  after  these  long  debates,  was  a 
source  of  great  satisfaction  to  all  who  had  striven  for  that 
result.  The  prize  was  a  large  one.  Without  the  adhesion 
of  Massachusetts,  the  scheme  would  have  been  broken 
down  at  the  start,  and  the  "  more  perfect  union  "  would 
have  been  impossible.  The  Federalist  leaders  in  Massachu 
setts  were  then  the  rising  young  lawyers  and  business  men 
of  the  community,  and  were  admirably  fitted  for  the  work 
that  lay  before  them.  Most  of  them  had  passed  through 
the  war  of  Independence,  and  had  shared  its  privations  in 
one  form  or  another.  But  they  were  not  the  men  who  had 
made  the  war  possible.  They  belonged  essentially  to  the 
period  of  construction,  which  must  always  follow  that  of 
revolution.  King,  Ames,  Parsons,  Cabot,  and  the  rest 
who  made  their  first  party  fight  in  this  Convention,  were 
far  from  believing  the  Constitution  to  be  perfect,  although 
they  worked  so  hard  to  secure  its  adoption.  On  the  con 
trary,  they  deemed  it  highly  defective.  But  it  was  the 
best  that  could  be  done  ;  and  the  Massachusetts  Federalists 
acted  from  the  beginning  on  the  idea  that,  imperfect  as  it 
was,  it  must  be  definitely  adopted,  and  that  no  half-measures 
would  answer.  They  rightly  believed  that,  if  they  failed 
in  this  struggle,  a  miserable  disintegration  and  political 
ruin  were  sure  to  follow.  Their  policy  was  a  sound  one ; 
and  they  carried  their  point  with  great  skill  and  address,  but 
only  after  an  obstinate  struggle.  The  Federalists  did  not 
relax  their  efforts  after  the  actual  adoption  of  the  Consti 
tution,  but  directed  them  to  securing  a  fair  trial  for  the 
experiment.  They  did  not  neglect  to  choose  good  men  to 

1  Parsons's  Minutes  in  "  Massachusetts  Convention,  1788,"  p.  304. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  320. 


30  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1775-90. 

the  Senate  and  to  the  Congress,  to  fulfil  the  difficult  task 
of  organizing  the  new  government  and  setting  it  in  motion. 
In  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  they  had  taken  only 
the  first  step.  Their  struggles  in  the  State  Conventions 
were  as  nothing  to  those  of  the  succeeding  twelve  years, 
during  which  the  Federalists  were  destined  to  firmly  found 
a  nation  in  the  midst  of  the  bitterest  opposition. 

In  the  month  of  June,  1789,  while  the  first  Congress  was 
sitting,  and  the  organization  of  the  government  was  still  in 
progress,  Mr.  Cabot  took  his  wife  to  New  York  for  the  ben 
efit  of  her  health,  then  far  from  good.  He  there  passed  sev 
eral  weeks,  enjoying  the  society  of  those  friends  and  political 
allies  to  whom  he  was  most  attached.  Fisher  Ames  refers 
to  this  visit  with  a  pleasure  which  was  probably  returned 
both  in  anticipation  and  realization.1  During  the  follow 
ing  summer,  Washington  made  his  tour  through  the  Eastern 
States ;  and  on  his  way  from  Boston,  along  the  Essex  shore, 
he  stopped  at  Beverly,  and  breakfasted  with  Mr.  Cabot.2 
To  the  latter,  this  visit  was  the  pleasantest,  if  not  the  most 
memorable,  incident  of  that  eventful  year. 


CABOT  TO  PARSONS. 

BEVERLY,  Feb.  28,  1788. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  feel  exceedingly  disappointed  in  having  you 
pass  this  way  without  stopping.  I  had  so  much  relied  on  seeing 
you,  that  I  could  not  believe  you  had  left  home,  until  yesterday 
I  was  informed  that  you  had  been  lately  seen  in  Boston.  I  was 
about  to  inquire  more  particularly  whether  it  was  you  or  your 
ghost ;  but,  recollecting  that  to  determine  this  required  more  than 

1  Life  and  Works  of  Fisher  Ames,  I.  46,  52. 

2  I  have  mentioned  this  little  incident,  not  merely  because  of  the  compli 
ment  to  Mr.  Cabot  thereby  conveyed,  but  also  because  of  the  pleasant  asso 
ciations  which  the  anecdote  it  recalls  must  always  have  for  me.     When  a 
boy,  it  was  my  great  delight  to  persuade  my  grandfather,  Mr.  Henry  Cabot, 
to  tell  me  how,  as  a  lad  of  seven,  he  hid  under  the  side-table  in  the  dining- 
room  of  the  house  at  Beverly,  in  order  to  get  a  look  at  Washington,  while 
he  sat  at  breakfast  with  his  father.     The  rights  of  children  were  not  so 
much  respected  then  as  now. 


1775-90.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  31 

common  acuteness  of  sight  and  judgment,  I  waived  a  question 
which  by  confounding  my  informant  might  have  placed  him  in  a 
more  humiliating  point  of  view  than  a  man  is  willing  to  be  seen  in. 
However,  I  am  very  glad  to  learn  that  you  are  still  in  any  shape 
on  this  side  the  Styx  ;  for  I  had  begun  very  strongly  to  suspect 
that  the  old  boatman  had  tumbled  you  into  his  scow,  and  paddled 
over  the  stream.  As  these  apprehensions  are  of  a  nature  that  do  not 
readily  subside,  I  beg,  before  the  old  kidnapper  takes  advantage  of 
you,  that  you  would  be  doing  whatever  you  have  not  already  done 
toward  rearing  the  Conventional  Edifice.  The  impatience  discov 
ered  by  the  few  people  I  converse  with  stimulated  me  to  set  about 
collecting  such  materials  as  were  to  be  procured  in  this  quarter. 
These  I  intended  should  pass  your  sole  inspection,  and  only  such 
of  them  as  you  should  judge  would  be  useful  should  be  offered  to 
the  architects.  But,  having  got  into  the  depth  of  incertitude  as  to 
your  ubiquity,  I  forwarded  all  that  I  had  collected  in  their  rough 
state  to  Mr.  Minot,1  with  a  request  that  such  of  them  as  are  not 
suitable  for  any  part  of  the  building  may  be  used  for  firewood, 
which  I  am  sure  is  much  wanted  this  cold  weather.  This  last 
reflection  is  a  very  consolatory  one  to  me,  as  I  had  felt  most  con 
cern  lest  my  lumber  should  not  only  fail  of  answering  any  good 
purpose,  but  might  be  prejudicial  by  incumbering  the  work-yard. 
Whereas,  if  it  arrives  at  the  honor  of  warming  the  hands  of  my 
patriotic  friends,  and  enables  them  more  freely  to  execute  the 
commands  of  their  heads,  I  shall  be  perfectly  satisfied.  With  this 
sentiment  operating  in  its  full  force  on  my  mind,  I  proceed  to  make 
a  little  addition  to  what  I  had  sent  on  before. 

You  will  not  wonder  at  the  free  use  I  make  of  wooden  figures, 
when  you  consider  how  busy  I  am  in  preparing  timber  for  the 
bridge.2  As  to  being  witty,  you  know  that's  so  natural  to  me  that 
it  is  with  difficulty  sometimes  that  I  refrain  from  it.  I  have  at 
this  moment  a  number  of  excellent  puns ;  not  puny  ones,  but  good 
substantial  ones,  big  enough  to  cover  this  whole  paper,  which  I 
could  very  well  entertain  you  with,  but  that  such  Parsons  as  you 
would,  at  the  least,  tell  them  to  a  certain  strong  man,  in  conse 
quence  of  which  I  might  possibly  be  pierced  through.  When  you 
have  discovered  what  may  be  called  the  occult  meaning  of  all  this, 
with  Dr.  Swift's  leave  I  may  possibly  furnish  you  with  more. 

1  George  Richards  Minot,  the  historian  of  Massachusetts. 

2  The  Essex  Bridge,  between  Salem  and  Beverly.    Mr.  Cabot,  as  already 
stated  (p.  13),  was  President  of  the  Bridge  Company. 


32  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1775-90. 

The  objection  to  the  fourth  section  of  the  first  article l  is  stated 
full  as  strongly  in  the  paper  I  sent  Mr.  Minot,  as  I  remember  to 
have  heard  or  seen  it  made  anywhere ;  and  the  argument  that  the 
people  of  one  State  have  an  interest  in  the  elections  of  every  State 
may,  if  placed  in  the  most  striking  light,  be  a  satisfactory  answer. 
But  there  is  (in  my  mind)  ground  for  an  objection  to  that  article 
which,  by  going  a  little  further  back  than  the  opponents  have,  may 
be  taken  and  defended  against  any  thing  /  have  ever  thought  of 
that  could  be  brought  against  it.  I  mean  that  the  objectors, 
instead  of  conceding  as  they  do,  by  implication  at  least,  that  the 
powers  of  that  article  could  not  be  fixed  absolutely  in  the  Consti 
tution,  and  so  reduce  the  question  simply  to  what  body  it  shall  be 
lodged  in ;  if,  instead  of  this,  they  should  insist  that  it  might  and 
ought  to  have  been  fixed  immovably  in  the  Constitution,  it  will  be 
difficult  to  answer  them.  For  I  cannot  see  why  a  rule  might  not 
have  been  made  of  a  kind  that  should  answer  that  description,  and 
yet  accommodate  itself  to  the  changes  of  population,  &c.,  in  all  the 
different  districts.  The  best  answer  to  this  which  occurs  to  me 
is  "  that,  as  the  article  now  stands,  the  different  States  may  each 
enjoy  their  own  favorite  mode;"  but  this  answer,  if  pursued,  will 
very  much  weaken  the  strongest  argument  we  have  ever  used  in 
favor  of  Congress  having  the  right  ultimately  instead  of  the  States. 
Pray  think  of  the  strongest  objection  possible  to  this  article ;  and, 
if  you  can  answer  it  satisfactorily,  it  must  be  of  infinite  advantage. 
I  come  now  to  the  point  for  which  I  have  thought  it  necessary  to 
write  to  you  at  this  time  ;  and  that  is,  to  mention  to  you  the  two 
objections  which  I  am  told  the  people  of  the  country  find  it  the 
most  difficult  to  get  over.  The  first  is  that  of  the  fourth  section, 
mentioned  in  the  last  page,  and  which  I  fear  will  never  be  entirely 
removed.  The  next  is  one  which  seems  to  me  may  be  pretty  fully 
answered,  —  that  of  such  a  consolidation  of  the  States  as  will  dis 
solve  their  governments.  Under  the  head  of  objections  to  the 
Senate,  will  it  not  be  well  to  show  how  far  the  injustice  of  an  equal 
representation  in  that  body  is  balanced  by  the  additional  security 
it  brings  that  no  measures  will  ever  pass  tending  in  the  smallest 
degree  to  consolidation,  which  must  be  always  guarded  against  by 
small  States  ?  Small  States  will  outnumber  great  ones.  This 
argument,  well  managed,  in  addition  to  the  dependence  of  the 
Federal  government  for  the  election  of  all  its  branches,  and  the 

l  Section  in  the  Constitution  as  to  regulation  of  elections  to  Congress. 


1775-90.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  33 

express  and  implied  reference  to  the  State  governments  in  various 
parts  of  it,  will  show  that  the  provisions  for  their  existence  are 
interwoven  in  the  Constitution  in  such  a  manner  as  not  to  be  sepa 
rated  without  rending  it  in  pieces.  I  wish  you  would  introduce 
among  the  preliminary  observations  of  your  address  this  idea  :  that 
the  general  government,  being  an  institution  that  is  to  affect  States 
as  well  as  people,  will  be  obliged  to  admit  into  one  of  its  branches 
that  equality  which  sovereigns  independent  of  each  other  usually 
insist  on.  And  there  is  some  fitness  in  the  principle  which  requires 
that,  as  the  laws  affect  States  as  well  as  people,  the  consent  of 
States,  as  such,  as  well  as  of  individuals,  should  be  first  obtained 
through  their  [representatives  or  legislatures  ?  l  ]  ;  and  as  sovereign 
States  cannot  be  expected  to  submit  to  an  entire  renunciation  of 
claims  which  have  been,  in  a  degree,  sanctified  by  the  language  of 
nations,  it  is  a  strong  motive  why  the  great  States  should  concede 
something  in  this  particular. 
Verbum  sapienti. 

I  am  your  sincere  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  BENJAMIN  GooDHUE.2 

BEVERLY,  March  16,  1790. 

SIR,  —  The  managers  of  our  manufactory  have  desired  me  to 
forward  you  the  enclosed  petition,  with  the  request  that  you  would 
present  it  as  soon  as  a  suitable  opportunity  offers.  It  was  their 
intention  to  have  accompanied  the  petition  with  a  letter  to  you, 
explaining  more  fully  the  facts  it  contains,  and  the  objects  of  their 
wishes ;  but  Dr.  Fisher,  to  whom  this  business  was  assigned,  hav 
ing  fallen  sick,  it  remains  unperformed.  The  Doctor  wishes  you  to 
be  informed  "  that  the  proprietors  have  proceeded  as  far  as  they 
have  with  a  full  reliance  that,  if  it  appeared  upon  fair  experiment 
to  be  a  practicable  and  useful  manufacture  in  this  country,  in  our 
present  state,  the  government  would,  in  some  way  or  another, 
reimburse  them  those  heavy  charges  which  they  have  incurred  in 
introducing  it ; "  "  that  the  managers  have,  of  themselves,  acquired 
that  knowledge  and  experience  in  the  business  which  now  makes 
it  certain  that  it  can  be  prosecuted  with  profit  to  the  greatest  extent 

1  Doubtful  in  MS. 

2  Member  of  Congress  for  Massachusetts  from  the  Essex  district 

3 


34  LIFE   AND  LETTERS   OF  GEORGE   CABOT.     [1775-90. 

by  any  persons  who  can  have  the  advantage  of  our  knowledge 
without  much  expense  ; "  and  therefore  "  that  we  cannot  reimburse 
ourselves  the  great  sums  we  have  expended,  let  the  business  suc 
ceed  ever  so  well  among  the  people  at  large,  who  engage  in  it 
upon  the  information  we  have  purchased."  You  are  not  ignorant, 
I  believe,  that  the  Worcester  people  got  their  machinery  made  by 
a  man  whom  we  had  taught  at  great  expense,  and  that  their  card 
ing  engine  did  not  consequently  cost  an  eighth  part  as  much  as 
ours ;  they  also  took  away  the  second  spinner  we  had  instructed. 
This  woman,  after  having  destroyed  our  materials  and  enjoyed  our 
support  in  learning  to  spin,  was  bribed  to  desert  us  as  soon  as  she 
could  be  useful  to  us.  The  Rhode  Island  undertakers  have,  to  a 
degree,  treated  us  in  the  same  manner ;  and  we  have  not  yet  been 
able  to  stop  this  evil  which  has  cost  us  so  much  money.  We  have 
now  about  forty  people  employed,  all  of  whom,  except  one,  are 
our  own  country  people.  Their  contracts  will  expire  in  succession, 
and  they  will  diffuse  their  knowledge  and  skill  through  all  the 
States  in  the  Union  where  manufactories  can  be  carried  on.  All 
these  things  are  against  us  ;  but  are  they  not  beneficial  to  the  pub 
lic  in  proportion  as  they  are  prejudicial  to  us  ?  We  think  a  fair 
discussion  of  our  pretensions  will  show  them  to  be  well  founded ; 
and  that  if  there  be  any  case  in  which  good  policy  or  public  justice 
(which  is  always  good  policy)  will  dictate  the  propriety  of  govern 
mental  assistance,  it  is  this  case.  The  infinite  importance  of  a 
manufacture  that  will  clothe  us  in  this  cold  climate  in  winter  as 
well  as  wool,  and  which  is  used  universally  in  warm  countries,  will 
be  acknowledged  by  all  to  give  it  a  stronger  claim  to  public  pat 
ronage  than  any  other  that  has  been  attempted  or  proposed.  The 
materials  being  vegetable,  and  the  productions  of  various  countries, 
may  be  considered  as  illimitable  in  quantity  ;  and  such  as  will,  in 
all  human  probability,  be  always  at  a  price  in  this  country  as  low 
as  in  any  manufacturing  country  this  side  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope. 
The  intimate  connection  and  reciprocal  benefit  that  naturally  sub 
sist  between  manufactures  and  agriculture  at  this  period,  between 
these  and  commerce  and  population,  and  betwixt  all  of  them  and  a 
national  strength  and  a  productive  revenue,  will  necessarily  induce 
Congress  to  give  the  subject  a  candid  examination  ;  but  it  will 
always  be  necessary  in  a  popular  assembly  that  some  few  persons 
should  take  upon  themselves  the  trouble  of  thinking  for  others. 
For  this  reason  the  managers  will  be  obliged  to  you  for  such  par- 


1775-00.] 


CORRESPONDENCE.  «  35 


ticular  support  and  personal  attention  to  the  business  as  you  shall 
think  it  merits.  They  flatter  themselves  with  the  hope  that  Con 
gress  may,  by  a  lottery,  allow  them  to  take  a  voluntary  tax  from 
persons  in  different  parts  of  the  Union  to  the  amount  of  their  extra 
expense,  and  thus  divide  among  a  greater  number  the  cost  of  a  ben 
efit  that  is  common  to  all.  Mr.  Ames  is  acquainted  with  many 
circumstances  which  it  would  be  tedious  to  recite  in  this  letter,  but 
which  may  be  convenient  to  be  possessed  of :  we  wish,  therefore, 
you  may  have  an  opportunity  of  consulting  with  him  previous  to 
the  introduction  of  the  petition.  You  may  recollect  that  we 
engaged  in  this  undertaking  in  October,  1787.  Whether  the 
Philadelphians  had  then  begun,  we  are  unable  to  say.  We  did  not 
know  of  their  doing  any  thing  until  the  spring  following;  but,  be 
this  as  it  may,  we  believe  that  we  are  the  only  persons  who,  at 
private  expense,  have  prosecuted  the  business  to  any  effect.  In 
Philadelphia,  it  has  been  supported  by  an  extensive  contribution, 
and  by  the  aid  of  their  State  government,  and  yet  it  is  trifling 
there  compared  with  it  here.  You  will  find  that,  in  all  the  coun 
tries  of  Europe  where  the  benefit  of  this  manufacture  is  enjoyed, 
great  sums  have  been  expended  in  introducing  it,  and  that  these 
have  been  borne  by  the  public.  In  Ireland,  a  bounty  of  five  per 
cent,  and  large  grants  of  money  from  Parliament,  with  loans  free 
of  interest ;  and  in  France  the  government  has  continually  patro 
nized  the  undertakers.  It  will  occur  to  you  that  the  European 
manufacturer  would  gladly  suppress  the  efforts  we  are  making, 
and  that  a  reimbursement  of  our  expenses  would  be  thought  a 
cheap  purchase. 

I  hope  Dr.  Fisher  will  be  able  to  write  you  by  next  post,  in 
which  you  may  have  much  information  not  in  my  power  to  give, 
as  to  the  progress  and  state  of  our  business. 

I  am,  sir,  with  much  respect,  your  most  obedient  servant, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  GOODHUE. 

BEVERLY,  April  6,  1790. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  The  last  post  brought  me  your  obliging  letter  of 
the  28th  ult.,  since  which  some  private  hands  have  conveyed  to  us 
the  disagreeable  intelligence  of  your  overthrow  in  the  House,  and 
the  trials  for  the  non- assumption  of  the  State  debts.  I  never  con- 


36  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1775-90. 

sidered  the  national  government  as  being  more  than  half  estab 
lished  by  the  nominal  acceptance  of  the  form.  To  take  from  our 
newspapers  the  metaphor  they  have  used,  it  was  an  arch ;  but  to  me 
the  keystone  was  wanting.  The  actual  exercise  of  certain  powers 
to  the  exclusion  of  the  States  will  be  finishing  the  work.  Till  this 
takes  place,  I  cannot  think  the  country  completely  safe  from  the 
danger  of  division,  and  consequently  anarchy  and  wretchedness. 

1  am  no  holder  of  public  securities  of  any  kind,  and  never  would 
be  interested  in  any  of  our  funds  on  any  terms ;  but  I  consider  the 
assumption  of  all  our  State  debt  as  so  essential,  that,  as  an  individual, 
I  would  rather  pay  a  fourfold  interest  through  the  national  govern 
ment  than  a  half  per  cent  through  the  medium  of  the  State ;  because 
the  former  may  give  us  protection,  the  latter  cannot.  I  confess 
to  you,  however,  that  I  am  still  indulging  myself  that  you  will 
succeed  in  this  point,  in  the  present  session ;  and,  if  you  do,  I  shall 
think  that  the  Government  has  done  every  thing  its  most  sanguine 
friends  and  every  honest  patriot  could  have  wished.  If  you  fail, 
there  certainly  is  reason  to  apprehend  a  long  and  hard  contest  with 
the  State  governments  for  power. 

Since  our  petition  was  forwarded  to  you,  the  people  of  Lebanon, 
in  Connecticut,  have  sent  for  one  of  our  machine-makers,  who,  I 
suppose,  will  go  and  assist  them  in  setting  up  a  manufactory  there. 
You  know  the  state  of  the  one  in  Worcester,  and  that  there  is  one 
in  Providence,  and  another  in  Greenwich.  All  these  have  the 
benefit  of  the  knowledge  and  information  we  have  purchased.  An 
increased  duty  on  importation  of  such  articles  as  are  manufactured 
here  will  undoubtedly  be  of  public  benefit  by  promoting  these 
attempts,  and,  upon  principles  of  sound  policy,  I  think  ought  to 
take  place ;  but,  upon  a  little  reflection,  you  will  perceive  it  will  be 
little  or  no  relief  to  us.  I  am,  sir,  with  much  respect, 
Your  friend  and  obedient  servant, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  GOODHUE. 

BEVERLY,  May  5, 1790. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  An  invincible  indolence  of  disposition,  derived 
from  nature  and  confirmed  by  habit,  has  prevented  my  acknowl 
edgment  of  the  receipt  of  your  favor  of  the  17th  ult.  Having  set 
tled  it  as  an  irrefragable  truth,  in  my  own  mind,  that  the  national 


1775-90.] 


CORRESPONDENCE. '  37 


government  cannot  go  on  without  assuming  the  State  debts,  I 
cannot  discharge  myself  of  anxiety  for  the  peace  of  our  country 
until  that  object  is  attained.  While  my  pride  is  gratified  to  see  all 
New  England  united  in  their  efforts  and  wishes  to  establish  this 

^ 

measure,  I  am  at  a  loss  to  account  for  the  conduct  of  some  other 
men  whom  I  have  been  accustomed  to  think  well  of.  I  can't  recon 
cile  Mr.  Madison's  present  conduct  with  his  former  principles.  I 
conclude  that  his  principles  now  do  not  guide  him,  or  he  has 
changed  them.  He  was  once  sensible  of  the  folly  of  such  a  divided 
sovereignty  as  left  the  supremacy  nowhere ;  and  he  would  then 
have  thought  that  the  powers  which  must  be  exercised  by  the 
States  in  providing  for  their  own  debts  are  such  as  belong  to  a 
supreme  government  only,  and  cannot  be  safely  left  to  subordi 
nate  ones.  While  Congress  are  acting  so  unworthy  of  themselves, 
and  of  the  great  trust  reposed  in  them,  it  is  to  be  apprehended 
that  the  anti-Federalists  may  seize  the  opportunity  of  attaching 
all  the  State  creditors  to  their  cause  by  providing  honestly  for 
them.  If  they  should  do  this  in  the  State  legislatures,  the  general 
government  would  be  ruined  irrecoverably.  The  only  security 
that  remains  seems  to  be  that  the  members  of  many  of  the  State 
governments  will  not  do  honestly,  even  to  carry  their  own  points 
against  the  national  government.  Thus  we  have  more  to  hope 
from  the  vices  than  the  virtues  of  men  in  some  cases.  "All 
Nature's  difference  keeps  all  Nature's  peace."  I  hope  you  will 
not  be  wearied  out  by  the  perplexities  that  attend  these  great  ques 
tions.  The  welfare  of  the  community  certainly  depends  upon  your 
success.  This  idea  will  animate  you  to  persevere,  and,  if  you  die, 
to  fall  in  the  last  ditch. 

I  am,  sir,  with  much  respect,  your  assured  friend, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 


38  LITE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE  CABOT.      [1791-92, 


CHAPTER    III. 

1791-1792. 
The  United  States  Senate. 

IN  the  month  of  June,  1791,  Mr.  Cabot  was  chosen,  with 
out  opposition,  Senator  of  the  United  States  from  Massa 
chusetts,  for  the  full  term,  to  succeed  Tristram  Dalton. 
He  at  once  accepted  the  office,  and  in  the  following  autumn 
took  his  seat.  The  other  Massachusetts  senator  at  this 
time  was  Caleb  Strong,  with  whom  Mr.  Cabot  main 
tained  a  life-long  friendship.  Mr.  Cabot's  services  in  the 
State  Convention  had  made  him  well  and  widely  known ; 
and,  after  his  arrival  in  Philadelphia,  he  at  once  took  a 
high  position  among  the  Federalist  leaders  in  the  national 
government.  He  took  the  oath  of  office  just  in  time  to  be 
placed  upon  the  committee  to  draft  an  address  in  reply 
to  the  President's  message.  But  his  services  then,  as  well 
as  during  his  whole  senatorial  term,  were  principally  ren 
dered  in  affairs  of  commerce  and  finance.  During  the  ses 
sion  of  1791-92,  Mr.  Cabot  served  on  the  committee  on 
the  mint,  and  on  that  for  establishing  a  consular  system. 
He  was  a  member  of  the  committee  on  appropriations,  and 
also  chairman  of  the  committee  to  consider  the  expediency 
of  legislation,  and,  if  it  was  thought  proper,  to  report  a 
bill  respecting  fugitives  from  justice,  and  from  the  service 
of  masters.  He  also  framed  and  carried  through  a  bill 
"  for  the  encouragement  of  the  Bank  and  other  cod-fisheries, 
and  for  the  regulation  and  government  of  the  fishermen 
employed  therein,"  and  in  this  connection  served  as  the 


1791-92.1 


THE   UNITED    STATES   SENATE.  39 


chairman  of  the  committee  on  fisheries.  In  this,  as  in  all 
subsequent  sessions,  Mr.  Cabot  was  most  assiduous  in  his 
attention  to  all  the  duties  involved  in  his  office.  Invariably 
present  when  the  session  opened,  he  asked  for  leave  of 
absence  but  once  during  his  term  of  service,  and  then  only 
to  go  home  and  tender  his  resignation.  Mr.  Cabot  had  no 
fondness  for  public  life  ;  but  he  had  a  keen  sense  of  respon 
sibility  both  to  his  country  and  to  himself,  and,  if  he  under 
took  to  fill  an  office  at  all,  he  gave  it  his  constant  care 
and  best  attention.  How  much  he  felt  the  then  very 
marked  carelessness  of  senators  in  regard  to  their  atten 
dance,  and  the  misfortunes  involved  by  continual  absences 
from  their  posts,  is  well  illustrated  by  the  letter  to  Mr. 
Strong,  printed  at  the  end  of  the  next  chapter. 

When  Mr.  Cabot  first  took  his  seat  in  the  Senate,  parties 
had  begun  to  crystallize.  The  Federalists,  from  being  sup 
porters  of  the  Constitution,  had  become  the  supporters  of  the 
government.  Now,  as  in  the  contest  for  the  adoption  of 
the  Constitution,  they  had  the  advantage  of  definite  objects 
and  settled  plans,  besides  greater  ability  and  a  more  perfect 
co-operation  than  their  opponents.  As  yet  the  opposition 
was  a  loose  mass  of  heterogeneous  materials;  but  in  the 
two  first  years  of  the  new  government  they  obtained  what 
they  most  sorely  needed,  —  a  great  leader.  Jefferson,  after 
his  return  from  Europe,  had  carefully  surveyed  the  political 
field ;  and,  at  the  date  of  Mr.  Cabot's  election  to  the  Sen 
ate,  had  practically  come  out  as  chief  of  the  opposition, 
though  he  continued  to  hold  the  first  cabinet  office,  and  was 
still  a  nominal  supporter  of  the  administration.  With  a  sure 
hand,  he  was  engaged  in  welding  the  different  elements  of 
opposition  into  the  consistent  and  compact  form  of  a  party. 
By  the  unerring  instinct  of  a  popular  leader,  Jefferson  saw  at 
once  the  Federalists'  advantage  in  their  cry  for  better  govern 
ment  and  strong  policy.  An  antidote  was  needed,  and  Jeffer 
son  furnished  it.  Shrinking  from  an  attack  on  Washington, 
who  was  upheld  and  defended  by  the  implicit  popular  faith, 


40  LIFE    AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1791-92. 

he  struck  at  the  two  party  leaders,  Adams  and  Hamilton  ; 
and,  branding  them  with  the  stigma  of  monarch  ism,  ral 
lied  his  own  followers  with  the  democratic  shibboleth 
of  fidelity  to  republican  institutions.  Party  lines  were 
drawn,  therefore,  with  considerable  sharpness,  during  Mr. 
Cabot's  first  winter  in  Philadelphia.  The  control  of 
both  branches  of  Congress  was  still  in  the  hands  of  the 
Federalists,  but  their  majority  in  the  House  had  been  re 
duced;  and  in  the  Senate,  owing  to  absences  and  to  the 
uncertain  views  of  some  members,  the  Federalists  often 
carried  their  point  only  by  the  casting  vote  of  the  Vice- 
President.  The  first  party  question  of  this  session  arose 
on  the  apportionment  of  representatives  in  accordance 
with  the  new  census.  The  small  number  of  represen 
tatives  had  been  a  fruitful  topic  of  complaint  with  the 
opposition,  and  the  House  passed  a  bill  which  adopted 
thirty  thousand,  the  lowest  number  allowed  by  the  Consti 
tution,  as  the  ratio  of  representation.  By  this  means,  the 
number  of  the  House  was  raised  to  one  hundred  and  thir 
teen,  but  large  fractions  in  the  Northern  States  were  left 
unrepresented.  The  Federalists  in  the  Senate,  by  the  Vice- 
President's  casting  vote,  amended  this  bill  so  that  the  ratio 
should  be  thirty-three  thousand.  A  disagreement  ensued, 
and  the  bill  was  lost.  The  House  then  passed  a  second 
bill  with  the  ratio  of  thirty  thousand,  but  providing  for  a 
new  census  and  new  distribution  before  the  next  Congress. 
The  Federalist  senators  struck  out  the  provision  for  the 
new  census  and  new  distribution,  and  substituted  a  provision 
in  favor  of  the  unrepresented  fractions.  This  arrangement 
raised  the  number  of  the  House  to  one  hundred  and  twenty, 
and  the  bill  embodying  it  was  carried  ;  but  Washington  ob 
jected  on  the  score  of  unconstitutionality,  and  the  measure 
was  lost  on  reconsideration.  A  third  bill  was  now  intro 
duced  in  the  House,  which  conformed  with  the  Senate's 
amendments  to  the  first  bill,  by  making  the  ratio  thirty- 
three  thousand;  and  this  was  agreed  to.  A  letter  from 


1791-92.]  THE    UNITED   STATES   SENATE.  41 

Mr.  Cabot  to  his  friend,  Theophilus  Parsons,  reveals  the 
motive  of  the  Federalist  policy  in  this  matter.  The  Fed 
eralists  believed,  and  justly,  that  any  increase  of  the  rep 
resentation  would  be  prejudicial  to  their  party.  As  it  was 
obvious  that  the  representation  would  have  to  be  enlarged 
without  delay,  the  exertions  of  the  Federalists  were  concen 
trated  in  an  effort  to  mitigate,  as  far  as  possible,  the  results 
of  such  a  measure.  The  ratio  of  thirty  thousand  left  large 
unrepresented  fractions  in  the  Northern  States,  the  strong 
hold  of  Federalism  ;  whereas  the  ratio  of  thirty-three  thou 
sand  absorbed  the  fractions,  or  left  them  in  the  South  only, 
and  thus  diminished  as  much  as  possible  the  anti-Federalist 
effects  of  the  necessary  increase  in  representation.  Mr. 
Cabot  supported  the  Federalist  policy  strongly,  which  was 
saved  at  the  most  critical  moments  only  by  the  casting 
vote  of  Mr.  Adams. 

Mr.  Cabot's  faith  in  the  government  measures  rose,  doubt 
less,  in  no  small  degree  from  his  relations  with  their  author, 
Alexander  Hamilton,  and  from  his  own  share  in  devising 
them.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  consulted  him  fre 
quently  in  regard  to  the  important  questions  of  revenue, 
so  intimately  connected  with  the  interests  of  commerce  and 
manufactures,  —  subjects  on  which  his  judgment  was  highly 
esteemed.  The  financial  policy  introduced  by  Hamilton 
was  soon  strained  to  the  utmost  by  having  to  provide  for 
the  increased  army  which  St.  Clair's  defeat  rendered  neces 
sary  ;  and  Mr.  Cabot's  bill  for  the  encouragement  of  the 
fisheries,  to  which  allusion  has  just  been  made,  formed  at 
this  juncture  a  part  of  Hamilton's  general  scheme.  The 
pecuniary  value  of  the  fisheries  was  enhanced  by  their  im 
portance  as  a  nursery  for  seamen,  an  object  appealing 
strongly  to  the  Federalists,  whose  policy  included,  among 
its  objects  of  first  necessity,  the  establishment  of  a  navy. 
The  problem  Mr.  Cabot  undertook  to  solve  by  his  bill  was 
the  preservation  and  encouragement  of  the  fisheries,  without 
causing  thereby,  at  a  time  when  every  dollar  was  of  impor- 


42  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.      [1791-92. 

tance,  any  diminution  of  the  revenue  arising  from  the  salt 
duties.  What  he  did  substantially  was  to  encourage  the 
fishing  interest  by  a  bounty  on  the  vessels,  and  replace  this 
bounty  to  the  government  by  abolishing  the  drawback  on  salt. 
In  this  way  the  objects  of  the  bill  were  effected.1  In  the 
party  struggle  which  arose  on  the  question  of  coinage,  Mr. 
Cabot,  as  a  member  of  the  Senate  committee  on  the  mint, 
was  especially  interested.  The  bill  for  the  mint  originated 
in  the  Senate,  and  provided  that  on  one  side  of  the  coin 
the  head  of  the  President,  for  the  time  being,  should  be 
stamped.  This  harmless  provision  caused  a  most  violent 
debate  in  the  House.  Rallying  to  the  cry  of  monarchy,  the 
Republicans,  after  a  good  deal  of  frothy  eloquence,  amended 
the  bill  by  substituting  a  figure  of  Liberty  for  the  Presi 
dent's  head,  as  the  device  on  the  coin.  To  this  amendment 
the  Senate,  in  the  end,  very  wisely  agreed,  and  put  a  stop 
to  the  useless  discussion  which  had  been  excited.  In  this 
session,  too,  the  first  indications  of  the  strife  engendered  by 
the  evil  influences  of  the  French  Revolution  were  apparent 
in  the  debate  as  to  the  phraseology  of  the  answer  congratu 
lating  the  French  government  on  the  adoption  of  their 
new  constitution. 

Mr.  Cabot  served  on  all  the  committees  on  claims,  and 
on  those  appointed  to  deal  with  questions  relating  to  the 
revenue.  •  In  those  days,  before  the  era  of  standing  com 
mittees,  special  ones  were  appointed  to  report  on  every  ques 
tion  that  arose  ;  and,  as  a  majority  of  these  questions  related 
to  the  revenue  and  to  finance,  Mr.  Cabot  was  constantly 
employed.  It  would  therefore  be  tedious  beyond  measure  to 
enumerate  all  the  various  committees  on  which  he  served,  and 
I  have  contented  myself  with  alluding  to  the  more  import 
ant  ones,  and  with  endeavoring  to  define  so  far  as  possible, 
from  the  slender  information  conveyed  by  barren  journals, 
the  position  occupied  by  Mr.  Cabot  in  his  party,  and  the 
nature  of  the  official  services  he  was  called  upon  to  render. 

The  session  of  1791-92,  if  compared  with  those  which 
1  See  below,  p.  113,  letters  to  Sewall. 


1 791-92.  j 


CORRESPONDENCE.  43 


followed,  was  an  extremely  peaceable  one;  but  observing 
men  already  detected  the  dark  clouds  gathering  upon  the 
political  horizon. 


CABOT  TO  WASHINGTON.1 

BEVERLY,  January  29,  1791. 

SIR, —  Mr.  William  Kirkpatrick,  a  member  of  the  house  of 
Messieurs  Grivegnee  &  Co.,  of  Malaga,  wishes  to  have  the  honor 
of  serving  the  United  States  in  the  character  of  consul  for  that 
port.  Should  it  be  thought  expedient  to  institute  such  an  office, 
it  may  be  found  that  Mr.  Kirkpatrick's  situation  as  well  as  talents 
and  disposition  peculiarly  enable  him  to  fill  it  with  propriety. 
Permit  me  therefore,  sir,  to  request  that,  when  the  qualifications 
of  candidates  are  under  your  examination,  his  also  may  be 
considered. 

If  any  apology  is  necessary  for  this  freedom,  I  hope  it  may  not 
be  deemed  insufficient  that,  having  been  led  by  my  profession  to 
make  frequent  visits  to  Spain,  among  other  intimacies  I  formed 
one  with  the  principals  of  the  commercial  establishment  to  which 
Mr.  Kirkpatrick  belongs;  that  these  have  desired  my  testimony 
on  this  occasion,  and  that  my  experience  of  their  integrity  and 
their  friendship  to  the  people  of  this  country  constrains  me  to 
think  well  of  a  gentleman  they  recommend,  and  to  confide  in  one 
for  whose  faithfulness  they  are  willing  to  be  responsible. 
I  am,  with  the  most  profound  respect,  sir, 

Your  most  faithful  and  obedient  servant, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 
THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

CABOT  TO  HAMILTON. 

BEVERLY,  Sept.  6,  1791. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  Being  absent  from  home  when  your  letter  of  the 
25th  ultimo  arrived,  it  has  been  out  of  my  power  to  answer  the 
inquiries  it  contains  until  this  day's  post. 

1  I  have  inserted  this  letter  simply  as  an  illustration  of  the  conception 
of  the  civil  service,  entertained  by  senators  in  1791,  and  also  as  showing  the 
relation  to  the  President  which  senators  thought  they  held  with  regard  to 
such  appointments.  —  This  Mr.  Kirkpatrick  was,  I  believe,  the  father  of  the 
Countess  Montijo,  and  consequently  grandfather  of  Eugenie,  late  Empress 
of  the  French. 


44  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1791-92. 

Almost  four  years  have  expired  since  a  number  of  gentle 
men  in  this  place  associated  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  a 
manufactory  of  cotton  goods,  of  the  kinds  usually  imported  from 
Manchester,  for  men's  wear.  The  various  parts  of  this  complex 
manufacture  are  performed  by  machines,  some  of  which  are  very 
intricate,  and  others  delicate.  A  want  of  skill  in  constructing  the 
machinery  and  of  dexterity  in  using  it,  added  to  our  want  of  a 
general  knowledge  of  the  business  we  had  undertaken,  have  proved 
the  principal  impediments  to  its  success. 

Destitute  of  the  necessary  information  ourselves,  we  were  sub 
ject  to  be  misled  by  every  pretender  to  knowledge.  A  number  of 
Europeans,  chiefly  Irish,  have  been  successively  employed  by  us ; 
but  as  no  one  of  them  was  master  of  any  branch  of  the  business, 
and  most  of  them  proved  deficient  in  some  quality  essential  to  use 
fulness,  one  only  has  remained  in  our  service. 

Satisfied  from  experience  that  we  must  at  last  depend  on  the 
people  of  the  country  alone  for  a  solid  and  permanent  establish 
ment,  we  have  for  a  long  time  directed  our  efforts  to  their  instruc 
tion,  so  that,  of  the  forty  persons  now  employed  in  our  workshop, 
thirty-nine  are  natives  of  the  vicinity. 

Our  machines  are  :  — 

1  carding-engine,  which  with  the  labor  of  1  man,  cards  15  Ibs.  per 

day,  and  with  the  labor  of  2  men  is  capable  of  carding  30  Ibs. 

per  day. 

9  spinning-jennies,  of  60  to  84  spindles  each. 
1  doubling  and  twisting  machine,  constructed  on  the  principle  of 

the  jenny. 
1  slubbing-machine   or  coarse  jenny,  to  prepare  the  ropings  for 

the  finest  jennies,  whereon    they  are  fitted   for  doubling  and 

twisting. 

1  warping-mill  sufficient  to  perform  this  part  of  the  work  for  a 
very  extensive  manufactory. 

16  looms  with  flying-shuttles,  10  of  which  are  sufficient  to  weave 
all  the  yarn  our  present  spinners  can  finish. 

2  cutting-frames,  with  knives,  guides,  &c. 

1  burner  and  furnace,  with  apparatus  to  singe  the  goods. 
Apparatus  for  coloring,  drying,  &c. 

A  summary  of   our  accounts,  lately  exhibited  by  the  managers, 
shows  our  actual  expenditures  to  have  been  about  $14,000,  against 


1791-92.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  45 

which  may  be  placed,  —  buildings,  &c.,  worth  as  they 

cost $3,000 

Machinery  and  apparatus  now  worth 2,000 

Goods  and  unwrought  materials 4,000 

Sunk  in  waste  of  materials,  extraordinary  cost  of  first 
machines,  in  maintaining  learners  and  compensating 
teachers,  &c 5,000 


$14,000 

It  should  be  noticed,  however,  that  the  Legislature  of  Massachu 
setts  having  granted  aids  in  land  and  lottery  tickets,  that  may 
amount  to  about  $4,000,  the  net  loss  to  the  proprietors  may  be 
estimated  at  only  $10,000  actual  money,  and  the  interest  on  their 
advances  for  about  two  years. 

At  present,  we  manufacture  at  the  rate  of  8,000  to  10,000  yards 
per  annum,  worth  in  the  market  on  an  average  three-sixths.  These 
goods  cost  us  three  per  cent,  without  adding  any  thing  for  the 
use  of  that  part  of  the  capital  which  is  constituted  by  buildings, 
machinery,  and  apparatus.  If  the  proper  allowance  for  rent  and 
repair  of  these  be  added,  it  would  raise  the  cost  of  the  goods  six 
per  cent  higher,  which  is  indeed  the  true  cost,  and  is  equal  to  what 
they  bring  in  the  market.  The  enclosed  specimens  numbered 
1  and  2  show  the  proficiency  we  had  made  two  years  ago ;  and  by 
comparing  with  these  the  other  specimens  on  the  same  paper, 
which  were  executed  lately,  may  be  readily  seen  the  improvement 
we  have  made  since  that  period. 

With  respect  to  our  future  prospects,  they  are  less  discouraging 
than  they  have  been.  We  have  subdued  the  greatest  difficulties, 
and  we  shall  not  be  exposed  again  to  many  extravagant 
charges  which  heretofore  have  swallowed  up  our  funds  without 
any  reproduction.  Many  expenses,  such  as  the  rent  of  buildings, 
wages  of  the  dyer,  compensation  to  managers,  and  some  others, 
will  remain  nearly  the  same,  though  the  scale  of  business  should 
be  greatly  increased ;  consequently,  the  proportion  chargeable  on 
each  yard  of  goods  will  be  lessened  as  the  whole  work  extends. 
Beside,  we  are  not  without  expectation  of  placing  many  parts  of 
the  work  in  private  families,  where  we  can  avail  ourselves  of  the 
cheapness  of  household  labor.  Our  machinery  has  been  bad  and 
dear :  it  is  now  perfectly  well  made  and  cheap.  Our  artists  have 
been  learning  their  trades  at  our  expense.  Their  work  is  now 


46  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.      [1791-92. 

worth  more  than  it  costs ;  and,  as  they  improve  in  skill  and  adroit 
ness,  we  expect  that  they  will  perform  more  and  better  work  for 
the  same  compensation. 

On  a  comparison  of  the  prices  of  labor  in  this  country  with 
those  of  Great  Britain,  we  perceived  that  although  the  wages  of 
common  labor  is  much  higher  here,  yet  that  of  artificers  is  not. 
Here  the  demand  for  labor  is  chiefly  for  agriculture,  and  the  wages 
seem  to  be  regulated  by  it.  There  the  mechanic  arts  afford  so  much 
employment  that  the  demand  for  every  species  of  skill  and  in 
genuity  is  constant  and  high. 

Hence  it  happens  that  we  can  satisfy  our  artists  with  wages  very 
little  above  the  common  labor  of  the  country,  while  those  who  come 
from  Europe  will  not  work  without  a  much  greater  price. 

It  is  on  considerations  of  this  kind  that  our  hopes  principally 
rest,  and  with  these  ideas  we  shall  proceed  to  extend  our  business 
as  fast  as  we  can  train  the  laborers  to  the  proper  execution  of  the 
work.  This,  however,  must  be  very  slowly,  as  the  heavy  losses 
on  ill-wrought  goods  discourage  extension  beyond  a  very  limited 
ratio. 

We  have  yet  had  no  experience  of  the  cotton  of  the  Southern 
States ;  but  it  appeared  early  to  be  essential  to  our  interest  to  use 
cotton  of  the  longest  fibre  and  the  best  cleaned.  That  of  Cayenne, 
Surinam,  and  Demerara,  has  been  preferred,  though  at  a  price  two 
or  three  pence  higher  than  the  cotton  of  the  islands.  In  proportion 
as  our  workers  are  awkward  and  unskilful  is  the  necessity  of  fur 
nishing  the  best  materials.  Bad  materials  would  be  wasted  alto 
gether.  At  present,  we  wish  to  have  the  cotton  that  grows  nearest  to 
the  equator ;  but,  when  our  spinners  are  more  perfect,  an  inferior 
kind  may  perhaps  be  wrought  with  advantage. 

With  the  highest  respect  and  esteem,  I  have  the  honor  to  be, 
sir, 

Your  most  obedient  and  most  humble  servant, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  HAMILTON. 

OCT.  8, 1791. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  understood  that  after  the  peace  of  1763, 
and  till  the  late  war,  France  gave  direct  assistance  to  her  cod- 
fishery  beside  the  monopoly  of  her  home  and  colonial  markets ;  but, 


1791-92.]  COKKESPONDENCE.  47 

notwithstanding  these  encouragements,  the  supply  from  her  own 
fishery  was  so  scanty  that  her  prohibitory  laws  were  evaded,  and 
very  large  supplies  of  foreign  fish  were  continually  smuggled  into 
her  colonies,  and  consumed  there  at  prices  forty  per  cent  higher  to 
the  planters  than  English  and  American  fish  was  worth  at  the 
free  ports  in  the  neighboring  islands. 

Since  the  peace  of  1783,  fish  of  the  United  States  has  not 
been  wholly  prohibited ;  but  its  admission  has  been  generally  con 
fined  to  a  single  port  in  an  island  (sometimes  very  distant  from  the 
consumers).  The  duty  demandable  on  each  quintal  has  been  from 
three  to  eight  livres,  arid  the  amount  actually  paid  from  two  and  a 
half  to  three ;  while  the  French  fish  has  enjoyed  a  free  access  to 
every  place,  and  upon  landing  has  been  entitled  to  a  very  liberal 
bounty.  Yet,  under  all  these  disadvantages,  the  fishery  of  the 
United  States  has  successfully  rivalled  that  of  France. 

These  facts,  at  first  view,  seem  to  indicate  such  a  preponderance 
of  natural  advantages  in  the  United  States  for  carrying  on  the 
fishery  as  can  hardly  be  balanced  by  France ;  but  it  should  be 
noticed  that,  about  five  years  ago,  the  French  West  India  markets 
were  surcharged  to  such  a  degree  that  the  exporters  of  fish  from 
the  United  States  suffered  great  losses  upon  all  they  shipped 
thither,  and  the  fishery  exhibited  such  symptoms  of  decline  in  con 
sequence  of  it  that  it  may  be  doubted  whether  it  could  possibly 
have  been  supported,  if  that  of  France  had  not  been  interrupted 
by  the  commotions  at  home.  It  should  be  observed,  too,  that  the 
equipments  of  armed  fleets  and  appearances  of  war  occur  so  fre 
quently  to  the  European  nations,  and  especially  to  France,  that  no 
fair  experiment  can  be  tried  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  their 
fishery  would  be  carried  in  a  long  period  of  uninterrupted  pursuit. 
These  and  similar  events,  however,  have  great  influence  upon  the 
fishery  of  the  United  States ;  but  their  frequency  and  effect  in 
future  can  neither  be  foreseen  nor  accurately  estimated,  and  hence 
it  is  the  more  difficult  to  say  "  what  is  the  greatest  disparity  of 
duties  the  fish  of  the  United  States  could  bear,  and  meet  the  fish 
of  France  in  the  French  market ; "  but,  on  the  whole,  should  the 
government  of  the  United  States  restore  to  their  cod-fisheries  in 
some  direct  form  the  full  amount  which  they  pay  to  its  treasury, 
by  the  consumption  of  dutied  articles,  and  should  the  fisheries  of 
France  be  left  without  aid  from  their  government,  except,  like 
those  of  the  United  States,  a  bare  indemnity  from  contribution  to 


48  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE    CABOT.     [1791-92. 

the  public  revenue,  should  the  markets  of  the  French  West  Indies 
be  open  to  the  fish  of  both  countries,  I  think  it  may  be  safely  relied 
on  that  the  fish  of  the  United  States  could  be  afforded  full  ten  per 
cent  cheaper  than  that  of  France,  and  consequently  could  bear  a 
duty  of  ten  per  cent  on  its  value  at  the  place  and  time  of  sale,  and 
yet  sustain  the  competition  with  French  fish  selling  in  the  same 
market  duty  free. 

I  have  thus,  my  dear  sir,  given  you  the  best  opinion  I  can  form 
at  present  on  the  subject  of  your  inquiry.  This  I  have  done,  not 
with  the  expectation  of  adding  to  your  information,  but  solely  to 
show  my  readiness  to  obey  your  commands,  and  to  convince  you  of 
the  esteem  and  respect  with  which 

I  am  very  sincerely  your  assured  friend  and  most  obedient 
servant,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  HAMILTON. 

DEC.  18, 1791. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  It  is  well  stated  by  a  gentleman,  who  has  exam 
ined  the  subject,  that  in  1784  the  British  government,  having 
taken  measures  for  drawing  over  to  their  service  the  whale-fisher 
men  of  the  United  States,  the  government  of  France  at  once  saw 
the  danger  of  suffering  her  great  maritime  rival  to  acquire  the 
advantage  of  four  or  five  thousand  excellent  seamen,  and  with 
them  an  art  of  immense  value  in  marine  consideration  (as  the 
nursery  of  sailors),  which  they  possessed  almost  exclusively. 

France,  therefore,  did  not  hesitate  to  arrest  these  proceedings 
by  giving  informal  but  strong  assurances  that,  if  the  whale-fisher 
men  would  but  for  a  moment  reject  the  temptations  held  out  by 
the  English,  their  friends  in  France  would  soon  procure  for  them 
advantages  superior  to  those  they  were  required  to  refuse.  Ac 
cordingly,  liberal  bounties  in  money,  accompanied  with  other 
allurements,  were  offered  to  those  persons  who  would  remove 
from  the  United  States  to  Dunkirk,  and  from  thence  carry  on  the 
whale-fishery. 

This  measure  at  first  did  not  have  all  the  effect  expected  from 
it ;  and,  rather  than  hazard  the  immigration  of  the  fishermen  of 
the  dominions  of  Britain,  it  was  thought  expedient  to  create  in 
France  a  market  for  the  produce  of  the  whale-fishery  of  the 
United  States.  This  has  been  of  much  benefit  to  us ;  but  partly 


1791-02.1  CORRESPONDENCE.  49 

from  the  fluctuating  policy  of  France  toward  us,  and  partly  from 
the  excessive  premiums  she  gives  to  her  own  vessels,  it  is  to  be 
feared  that  her  whale-fishery  will  be  eventually  established  on  the 
ruins  of  ours.  Already  this  business  has  extended  itself  consider 
ably  at  Dunkirk,  and  the  enormous  profits  which  have  been  made 
by  the  aid  of  public  bounties  cannot  fail  to  draw  from  the  United 
States  many  more  adventures. 

France  is  undoubtedly  an  important  market  for  tobacco,  rice, 
lumber,  oil,  and  occasionally  for  some  other  articles ;  but  the  ordi 
nance  of  the  National  Assembly,  requiring  that  after  October,  1791, 
tobacco  in  American  ships  should  pay  6£  livres  per  quintal,  duty, 
more  than  in  French  ships  (equal  to  near  double  freight),  and 
determining,  also,  that  after  that  period  American-built  vessels 
cannot  be  sold  to  the  citizens  of  France,  must  render  our  trade  to 
that  country  in  our  own  bottoms  comparatively  small. 

In  the  course  of  the  late  war,  France  opened  the  ports  of  her 
colonies  to  foreign  ships.  These  very  soon  engrossed  a  large  share 
of  their  trade ;  and  soon  after  the  peace  an  arret  of  the  Council  of 
State  was  passed,  restricting  the  intercourse  between  those  colo 
nies  and  strangers. 

The  precise  intent  or  effect  of  this  first  public  regulation  after 
the  peace  is  not  within  my  present  recollection,  and  I  have  no 
authority  to  which  I  can  recur  ;  but  soon  after  it  (in  1784)  another 
arret  was  published,  which  established  in  each  of  the  Windward 
Islands  one  port,  and  in  Hispaniola  three  ports,  to  which  foreign 
vessels  might  have  free  access  with  fish,  lumber,  live  stock,  rice, 
Indian  corn,  salted  beef  (but  not  pork),  vegetables  of  a  certain  kind, 
hides,  peltry,  pitch,  tar,  and  turpentine,  but  no  other  commodities ; 
the  duty  on  fish  to  be  three  livres  per  quintal,  and  on  fatted  beef 
three  livres  per  barrel,  and  on  all  these  commodities  such  local 
duties  as  might  be  imposed  in  the  islands,  beside  an  established 
one  per  cent  on  the  value. 

In  return,  and  as  payment  for  these  commodities,  molasses  and 
rum  of  the  islands,  and  goods  previously  imported  from  France,  are 
the  only  articles  allowed  to  be  brought  away. 

Several  years  after  the  second  arret,  a  third  passed,  raising  the 
duty  on  salted  beef  to  a  dollar  per  barrel,  and  on  fish  to  a  dollar 
per  quintal,  and  at  all  times  a  sum  equal  to  the  duty  per  quintal 
imposed  on  foreign  fish  was  given  as  a  bounty  on  each  quintal 
of  fish  of  the  French  fisheries. 

4 


50  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE    CABOT.      [1791-92. 

Although  some  important  products  of  the  United  States  are 
excluded  by  the  arrets,  or  standing  laws,  yet  the  pressing  wants  of 
the  colonists  have  occasionally  induced  a  suspension  of  those  laws 
in  relation  to  particular  articles  ;  but  so  versatile  has  been  the  con 
duct  of  the  French  Government  in  this  part  of  their  administra 
tion  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  have  sometimes  suffered 
exceedingly,  though  perhaps  oftener  profited  by  these  temporary 
indulgences.  Since  the  commencement  of  the  Revolution  in 
France,  and  partly  in  consequence  of  scarcity  there,  the  colonists 
have  been  obliged  to  take  from  the  United  States  large  supplies  of 
flour,  and  some  other  items  not  usually  admitted. 

The  importance  of  the  French  West  India  market  for  the  fish 
of  the  United  States  will  appear  from  observing  that  nearly  one 
half  of  the  whole  fish  is  consumed  there  :  should  this  advantage  be 
lost,  the  fishery  would  be  almost,  if  not  quite,  ruined.  The  molas 
ses  received  from  the  French  islands  is  an  excellent  payment  for 
what  they  buy  of  us ;  but  it  may  be  noted  that  this  article  has 
been  raised  to  its  value  and  consequence  as  an  object  of  commerce 
chiefly,  if  not  altogether,  by  the  people  of  the  United  States.  It 
was  not  thought  to  be  worth  saving  by  the  French  planters  until 
the  Anglo-Americans  became  its  purchasers  and  created  a  demand 
for  it.  At  the  commencement  of  the  molasses  trade  with  the 
French,  it  was  bought  by  the  tun,  supposed  to  measure  sixty  gal 
lons,  and  by  the  hogshead,  supposed  to  contain  one  hundred.  The 
New  England  people  at  that  time  used  to  receive  upwards  of 
ninety  gallons  for  a  tun  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  for  a  hogshead : 
so  little  was  it  valued  by  the  planters,  that  they  for  a  long  time 
submitted  to  this  imposition  in  the  measure. 

It  has  been  much  complained  of  that  at  Cape  Francis  bonds  are 
required  before  a  vessel  is  allowed  to  trade,  with  such  sureties  as 
cannot  be  had  unless  the  captain  pays  an  extravagant  commission 
on  his  whole  cargo  to  some  merchant  of  the  place,  whether  he 
needs  any  other  aid  of  such  merchant  or  not.  What  share  of  this 
abuse,  or  whether  any,  is  chargeable  to  the  government,  I  am 
unable  to  say ;  or  whether  it  extends  to  the  other  parts  of  Hispan- 
iola  I  am  uncertain,  but  I  think  it  does. 

I  am  not  able  to  discern  any  essential  difference  of  principle 
between  the  French  and  English  colonial  systems :  both  aim  at  a 
monopoly  of  their  trade,  but  neither  can  effect  it  perfectly  without 
ruining  the  colony ;  each,  therefore,  relaxes  occasionally  in  some 


1791-92.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  51 

points,  and  constantly  in  others,  according  to  the  necessity  of  the 
case.  Both  nations  admit  nearly  the  same  commodities,  except 
that  France  takes  fish  and  refuses  flour,  while  England  takes  flour 
and  refuses  fish. 

England,  being  more  solicitous  as  well  as  more  able  to  carry  the 
supplies  of  her  colonies  than  she  is  to  furnish  them,  insists  only  on 
being  the  carrier. 

France,  being  unable  to  carry  the  requisite  supplies  of  her  colo 
nies,  insists  only  on  furnishing  them  so  far  as  she  can,  and  permits 
others  to  supply  whatever  of  prime  necessity  she  cannot  supply 
herself. 

The  English  reserve  the  exclusive  right  of  carrying  the  commod 
ities  their  colonists  need  from  the  United  States ;  but  they  impose 
no  duty  on  the  importation  of  the  commodities  themselves. 

The  French  allow  foreigners  to  carry  certain  commodities  which 
their  colonies  need ;  but  they  impose  a  duty  on  the  most  valuable 
of  those  commodities  greater  than  the  whole  freight  or  price  of 
carriage  is  worth. 

The  French  colonies  are,  I  believe,  more  extensive  than  the 
English ;  but,  if  the  French  had  not  from  necessity  taken  some 
things  which  they  legally  prohibit,  it  may  be  doubted  whether  the 
exports  of  the  United  States  to  the  British  West  Indies  would  not 
equal  the  exports  to  the  French  West  Indies. 

Some  unavoidable  business  and  some  unavoidable  dissipations 
have  prevented  me  till  this  moment  from  obeying  your  commands. 
Upon  a  review  of  what  I  have  written,  'tis  some  consolation,  in 
seeing  how  unimportant  the  information  is,  that  you  have  lost 
nothing  by  the  delay. 

I  am,  &c.,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


STEPHEN  HIGGINSON  TO  CABOT. 

BOSTON,  1792. 

DEAR  GEORGE,  —  I  received  yours,  enclosing  your  observations 
relative  to  our  trade  with  the  British  and  French  in  Europe  and 
in  the  West  Indies  ;  and  I  think  they  are  just,  showing  very  clearly 
the  advantages  and  inconveniences  attending  both.  They  are 
alike  attentive  in  all  their  regulations  to  their  own  interest,  or 
what  they  conceive  to  be  such ;  and,  in  every  instance,  discover 
that  to  promote  their  own  trade,  and  to  encourage  their  navigation, 
is  their  only  object. 


52  LIFE  AND   LETTEKS   OF   GEOKGE  CABOT.     [1791-92. 

This  is  the  only  natural  or  proper  principle  by  which  to  arrange 
their  commercial  regulations  ;  and  we  have  no  right  to  expect  of 
either  of  them  any  indulgence,  which  will  not  lead  either  directly 
or  remotely  to  their  object.  We  ought  not  to  ask  of  either  an 
indulgence  which  may  injure  them  in  one  point,  without  offering 
them  a  benefit  that  will  fully  balance  every  probable  disadvantage. 
Commercial  arrangements  between  nations  as  well  as  individuals 
are  the  subject  of  fair,  open  calculation  ;  and,  in  forming  them,  both 
parties  ought  to  be  fully  satisfied  that  the  bargain  will  prove  an 
equal  one,  before  they  definitely  close  it. 

Political  advantages,  such  as  guarantee  of  territory,  an  alliance 
offensive  and  defensive,  support  in  case  of  invasions,  &c.,  may  be 
given  and  received  in  return  for  particular  advantages  in  commerce, 
which  would  otherwise  be  confessedly  unequal.  But  as  we  have 
a  full  compensation  in  kind  to  offer  for  every  commercial  privilege 
we  want  from  others,  and  can  have  no  possible  advantage  from 
blending  commerce  and  politics  in  any  negotiations,  I  presume  that 
we  shall  not  be  misled  or  drawn  aside  from  the  path  of  safety  and 
interest  by  any  attempts  of  others  to  combine  and  confound 
objects  which  ought  ever  to  be  separately  considered. 

You  have  stated  generally  and  rightly  the  advantages  we  have 
derived  from  our  intercourse  both  with  the  French  and  British, 
in  Europe  and  in  the  West  Indies,  and  have  reverted  to  the  prin 
ciples  and  objects  which  seem  to  have  directed  them  both  in  their 
indulgences  and  restrictions. 

In  France,  we,  in  common  with  other  foreigners,  have  the  liberty 
of  freighting  from  port  to  port  in  their  dominions ;  but  this  has 
proved  no  benefit  to  us,  the  freights  being  low  and  not  very  fre 
quent,  nor  have  our  vessels  availed  themselves  of  the  liberty  in 
many  instances.  Much,  however,  may  be  said  of  this  indulgence, 
though  the  British  also  enjoy  it  with  others. 

Our  whale-fishery  is  no  doubt  injured  by  the  establishment  at 
Dunkirk  ;  and  it  is  clearly  the  intention  of  France  to  transfer  this 
business  eventually  from  us  to  themselves.  Their  present  apparent 
indulgence  to  us,  as  to  oil,  is  clearly  to  keep  our  whale-men  at 
home,  till  they  shall  have  had  time  to  get  prepared  for  their  recep 
tion  and  employment;  and,  as  they  shall  be  able,  they  will  by 
degrees  certainly  draw  them  over  to  France. 

To  withdraw  their  present  encouragement  to  our  oil  would  be 
to  hazard  a  transfer  of  the  fishery  from  us  to  the  British ;  and  if 


1791-92.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  53 

4 

OUT  men  are  once  transplanted,  and  the  business  get  into  the  hands 
of  Britain,  it  will  be  wholly  lost  both  to  us  and  France. 

Such  are  the  views  of  France,  I  suppose,  in  their  arrangements 
as  to  our  oil  and  whale  fishery ;  and  having  secured  Mr.  Rotch 
and  others,  who  are  best  acquainted  with  it,  they  can  measure  the 
exact  degree  of  support  necessary  to  keep  it  up  here,  till  they  shall 
be  prepared  to  transfer  it  to  France. 

If  we  could  induce  the  British  to  receive  our  sperm  oils,  as 
formerly,  which  would  not  much  interfere  with  their  Greenland 
fishery,  or  if  they  would  take  it  at  three  to  five  pounds  duty  per 
ton,  we  could  then  extend  that  branch  and  support  the  fishery,  and 
take  our  chance  for  a  market  for  the  common  oil,  which  now  finds 
a  vent  in  the  West  Indies  and  Ireland  to  a  large  amount,  and  will 
daily  increase. 

It  is  much  better  for  both  Britain  and  France  to  have  that 
fishery  remain  with  us,  than  to  be  transferred  to  either  of  them  to 
the  injury  of  the  other ;  and  it  seems  to  me  that  they  may,  upon  this 
subject,  be  played  off  against  each  other  with  advantage.  But,  unless 
something  be  done  to  give  the  business  a  new  face,  France  will,  with 
the  advantages  she  now  has,  eventually  gain  it  wholly  from  us. 

As  to  the  cod-fishery,  I  think  that  is  safe  and  will  succeed  with 
us,  hi  spite  of  them  all ;  and  the  bill l  you  sent  me  will  tend  very 
much  to  secure  and  extend  it.  I  have  shown  it  to  E.  Parsons,  and 
some  from  Gloucester,  who  think,  with  me,  that  it  will  very  much 
benefit  that  branch,  and  contains  every  security  and  aid  which  can 
be  desired.  The  bounty  on  tonnage  instead  of  the  fish  will  prevent 
much  fraud,  and  will  save  a  great  expense,  in  fees  to  officers,  &c., 
and  prove  more  beneficial  both  to  owners  and  men. 

I  cannot  think  that  an  exclusion  of  our  fish  from  direct  importa 
tion  into  the  French  islands  would  be  very  alarming.  If  the  con 
sumption  of  it  in  them  could  be  prevented,  we  should  have  much 
to  fear  ;  but  that  is  impossible,  for  they  cannot  support  their  slavery 
without  it.  They  have  no  substitute ;  and  we  should  supply  it  as 
formerly  through  the  neutral  islands,  with  as  much  benefit  to  our 
selves  as  we  now  derive  from  the  direct  supply. 

Those  islands  have  experienced  an  immense  saving  by  the  admis 
sion  of  our  exports  direct.  It  is  this  which  has  made  them  thrive 
so  surprisingly,  and  increase  their  cultivations  and  the  numbers  of 
their  slaves.  Those  cultivations  must  be  continued.  Their  slaves 

1  See  above,  pp.  38,  41. 


54  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.     [1791-92. 

must  be  fed,  and  with  their  present  habits  and  ideas  as  well,  at 
least,  as  heretofore ;  but  this  can  be  done  only  by  the  use  of  our 
fish,  which  they  must  have  directly  and  cheap,  or  through  the 
neutral  islands,  at  an  advanced  price. 

The  French  will  reluctantly  abandon  their  settlements  for  the 
cod-fishery.  They  must  keep  up  the  appearance,  at  least,  of  sup 
porting  them ;  and  if  they  would  admit  our  fish  paying  ten  per  cent 
duty,  and  give  no  bounty  on  their  own,  or  receive  ours  free  and 
allow  a  bounty  of  ten  per  cent  on  theirs,  I  would  ask  no  better 
terms.  They  would  be  better  than  we  have  enjoyed  for  years,  and 
would  enable  us  to  supply  exclusively  in  a  short  time.  The  French 
will,  as  well  as  the  British,  exclude  such  of  our  exports  as  interfere 
with  their  own  ;  and  both  will  be  the  carriers  of  all  they  want,  as 
far  as  they  can  be.  France  cannot  interrupt  us  much  as  carriers. 
Britain  will  be  our  rivals  in  many  cases. 

France  has  been  versatile  in  her  commercial  intercourse  with 
us,  being  not  well  versed  in  the  subject  of  commerce,  and  from  the 
fluctuating  state  of  her  government  for  several  years  past. 

Britain  has  been  out  of  humor,  and  disposed  to  gain  every  advan 
tage  of  us,  by  trying  projects,  and  proving  the  wisdom  and  stability 
of  our  government. 

But  matters  are  now  closing  to  a  point.  They  have  both  expe 
rienced  our  wisdom,  firmness,  and  resources ;  and  both  must  now 
wish  for  permanent  and  equal  terms  of  future  intercourse. 

It  is  our  part  to  see  that  we  have  a  full  equivalent  for  all  we 
grant,  that  our  bargains  with  all  be  equal.  Why  should  either  of 
them  be  allowed  to  carry  our  produce  to  foreign  markets  direct, 
without  giving  us  an  equivalent,  and  what  shall  that  be  ?  To  give 
us  the  same  liberty  in  their  ports  will  not  do,  because  the  amount 
they  have  to  export  in  transient  or  mere  freighting  ships  bears  no 
proportion  to  ours,  most  of  their  exports  being  taken  off  in  ships 
belonging  to  the  importer  or  exporter,  or  their  connections ;  so 
that  transient  ships  get  very  little  freight  in  their  ports  to  other 
ports  of  Europe,  nor  have  the  Americans  obtained  any  such  freights 
worth  attending  to  since  their  independence.  We  would  have 
some  indulgence  in  the  sale  of  our  exports  with  them,  or  the  im 
portation  of  their  exports,  to  serve  as  an  equivalent,  or  else  be 
admitted  to  some  special  intercourse  with  their  colonies.  France 
will  not  furnish  us  with  an  extensive  market  for  any  of  the  Amer 
ican  exports,  save  tobacco.  Ireland  this  year  has  taken  near  as 


1791-92.]  COKKESPONDENCE.  55 

many  tons  of  our  common  whale-oil  as  France  :  to  the  former,  our 
export  of  it  is  rapidly  increasing ;  to  the  latter,  it  has  lessened. 
The  French  markets  take  no  great  quantity  of  rice  and  ashes ;  and 
their  demand  for  our  wheat,  flour,  &c.,  will  depend,  as  in  England, 
upon  their  own  crops.  Our  beef,  butter,  and  pork  have  not  found 
as  yet  any  sale  in  France  of  consequence. 

Their  prejudice  in  favor  of  the  Irish  articles  and  against  ours 
has  in  part  prevented  it ;  but  their  demand  for  those  articles  in 
general  seems  to  be  very  small. 

Upon  the  whole,  I  see  not  that  the  trade  to  France  is  so  very 
important  to  us.  Tobacco,  which  is  the  great  article  they  do  and 
will  continue  to  receive  from  us,  they  have  endeavored  to  monopo 
lize  the  freight  of  ;  and,  excepting  that  and  oil,  they  admit  all  the 
American  exports  in  any  foreign  vessels,  as  in  ours. 

The  trade  to  their  colonies  is  much  more  important  to  us ; 
in  this  State,  however,  as  little  so  as  any,  because  we  can  supply 
them  through  the  neutral  islands,  our  exports  being  more  essen 
tially  necessary  to  them  than  those  from  the  other  States. 

It  is  not  easy  to  settle  the  comparative  importance  to  those  two 
countries,  or  to  us,  of  our  trade  with  them  and  their  colonies. 
Their  connection  with  and  the  advantage  to  us  is  very  wide,  and 
arises  from  different  sources.  With  the  French,  our  best  trade  is 
in  their  colonies ;  with  the  British,  in  Europe. 

From  the  former,  we  want  indulgences  in  the  West  Indies  ;  from 
the  latter,  in  Europe.  The  most  valuable  articles  wanted  in  the 
British  islands  are  from  those  States  who  are  not  anxious  about 
the  carrying  of  them ;  and  the  bulky  articles  of  lumber  and  stock 
which  they  take  from  this  State  we  could  not  make  much  profit 
upon,  having  no  molasses  to  take  in  return,  nor  any  articles  that 
will  afford  much  profit ;  but  in  Europe  our  trade  with  the  British 
is  vastly  important. 

England  and  Ireland  are  the  greatest  markets  for  our  most 
valuable  exports,  either  for  consumption  or  re-exportation  ;  and 
the  British  have  done  us  the  favor  of  confining  the  importation  of 
them  to  their  own  vessels  and  ours. 

The  articles  most  wanted  in  the  French  islands  are  drawn 
chiefly  from  this  State;  and  they  are  willing  we  should  be  the 
carriers  of  them.  To  us,  this  trade  is  very  important :  it  is  the 
great  support  of  our  cod-fishery ;  and  we  have  for  its  continuance 
the  security  of  its  being  indispensable  to  them,  and  the  certainty  of 


56  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1791-92. 

supplying  them  in  our  own  vessels,  directly  or  indirectly.  There 
is,  therefore,  no  ground  for  much  apprehension  of  our  losing  it, 
nor  any  reason  for  our  giving  up  any  great  points  to  retain  it. 

They  may  claim  some  good  equivalent,  should  they  indulge  the 
importation  of  flour  arid  meat,  &c.,  steadily  and  without  interruption  ; 
but  as  this  would  interrupt,  if  not  supplant,  their  supplies  from 
France,  it  cannot  be  expected ;  and  we  ought  not  to  pay  much 
for  the  liberty  of  supplying  them  only  when  their  necessities 
oblige  them  to  look  abroad  for  food. 

The  imposition  of  duties  on  our  exports  in  either  France  or 
Britain  may  or  may  not  be  injurious  to  us.  If  we  can  rely  on  the 
general  principle  of  the  consumer's  paying  them  when  duties  are  so 
high  as  to  discourage  the  use  of  the  article  ;  if  it  be  imposed  on  our 
exports,  but  not  on  those  of  other  foreigners,  so  as  to  support  a 
rival ;  or  if  it  be  imposed  to  increase  the  production  of  the  article 
with  success  within  themselves,  —  in  all  these  cases,  the  duty  will 
prove  injurious  to  us.  But  where  it  is  imposed  on  an  article 
necessary  to  themselves,  in  which  they  cannot  be  our  rivals; 
when  all  foreigners  pay  alike,  and  the  duty  be  riot  so  high  as  to 
discourage  the  use  of  the  article,  —  in  these  cases,  I  would  not 
pay  much  for  an  exemption,  unless  it  be  an  exclusive  one,  and 
where  we  had  a  rival. 

I  expect  there  will  be  much  management,  and  much  party  spirit 
exhibited  in  adjusting  our  commercial  intercourse  with  Britain  and 
France.  But  if  a  fair  bargain  be  the  object  of  the  parties,  and  the 
negotiators  act  honestly  and  are  well  informed,  the  business  may 
be  settled  easily  to  the  benefit  and  satisfaction  of  all.  The  great 
est  difficulties  that  can  arise  will  be  from  treaties  pre-existing  with 
others,  which  must  be  attended  to  ;  and  these  will  make  it  necessary, 
in  some  cases,  to  extend  or  restrict  beyond  what  would  otherwise 
be  eligible. 

I  wish  you  well  through  the  business.  The  secretary  and  others 
of  you  will  have  only  right  objects  in  view,  and  will  attend  to  the 
subject  with  candor ;  but  others  again  will  enter  upon  it  replete 
with  prejudice,  and  with  all  the  zeal  of  party  men  or  interested 
agents. 

We  are  all  well  here,  and  at  Beverly ;  and,  wishing  you  many 
Happy  New  Years, 

I  remain  yours  affectionately, 

STEPHEN  HJGGINSON. 


1791-92.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  57 

P.  S.  I  give  you  the  above  ideas  just  as  they  were  in  writing : 
they  will,  however,  be  of  the  same  use  to  you,  as  if  reduced  to 
system  and  more  clearly  conveyed.  The  imposition  you  speak  of 
in  the  Cape  is  winked  at,  if  not  worse,  by  the  government 
there ;  but  it  exists  nowhere  except  in  Hispaniola,  and  is  not 
bottomed  upon  any  demands  at  home. 

CABOT  TO  PARSONS. 

(Confidential.) 

BEVERLY,  Oct.  3,  1792. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  It  has  been  generally  supposed  that  the  increase 
of  representation  in  the  national  government  will  be  an  increase 
of  opposition,  at  least  so  far  as  relates  to  the  Southern  States.  It 
must  occasion  some  anxiety  to  the  friends  of  the  Union  that, 
although  Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island  will  send  all  good  men, 
and  Massachusetts  likewise,  yet  a  majority  may  be  found  in  the 
new  House  whose  principles  will  lead  them  to  measures  injurious, 
and  perhaps  ruinous,  to  the  Federal  government.  You  need  not 
be  told  that  your  friend  Benson1  will  decline  the  future  service,  as 
will  Mr.  Lawrence,2  Mr.  William  Smith,8  and  Mr.  Barnwell.4 
But  perhaps  you-  are  not  yet  informed  that  in  Pennsylvania  and 
New  York  the  opponents  are  well  combined,  and  are  incessantly 
active ;  while  the  friends  discover  a  want  of  union  and  a  want  of 
energy.  I  am  informed,  in  a  manner  that  is  satisfactory,  that  a 
very  serious  effort  will  be  made  to  prevent  the  re-election  of  Mr. 
Adams ;  that  in  New  York,  where  the  electors  are  to  be  appointed 
by  the  Legislature,  every  artifice  will  be  practised  to  procure  the 
appointment  of  such  persons  only  as  will  agree  to  degrade  Mr. 
Adams  ;  that  Governor  Clinton  is  invited  to  stand  a  candidate  for 
the  Vice-Presidency,  but,  if  he  refuses,  the  same  party  in  Pennsyl 
vania  and  New  York  are  to  fix  on  a  new  candidate  of  similar 
principles,  and  that  he  will  be  supported  by  the  influence  of  all  the 
Virginian  and  other  malcontents.  The  ruin  of  Mr.  Adams  would 

1  Egbert  Benson,  of  New  York,  at  this  time  member  of  Congress,  and  after 
wards  Judge  of  New  York  Supreme  Court  and  United  States  Circuit  Court. 

2  John  Lawrence,  member  of  Congress  from  New  York,  1789-93 ;  United 
States  Judge  of  the  New  York  District  Court,  1794 ;  United  States  Senator, 
1796-1800. 

8  William  Loughton  Smith,  of  South  Carolina.     He  remained  in  Congress 
until  1799,  when  he  was  appointed  minister  to  Portugal  by  John  Adams. 
4  Robert  Barnwell,  member  of  Congress  from  South  Carolina,  1791-93. 


58  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1791-92. 

be  a  triumph  of  the  Jacobins,  and  would  be  an  important  step 
toward  that  general  overthrow  of  our  establishment  which  is  evi 
dently  intended.  With  these  ideas  upon  his  mind,  a  friend  has 
written  by  the  last  post  to  know  of  me  whether  Massachusetts 
will  send  all  men  of  right  principle  and  good  abilities,  and  espe 
cially  whether  she  will  send  Mr.  Parsons,  whose  assistance  will  be 
prodigiously  important,  and  whose  talents  ought  not  to  be  withheld. 
I  only  answer  as  you  answered  me,  "  that  your  family  and  subsistence 
could  not  be  abandoned."  It  is,  however,  exceedingly  to  be 
lamented  that  you  cannot  or  will  not  come  to  our  help. 

You  will  recollect,  among  the  late  addresses  of  Governor  Clinton, 
the  name  of  our  old  friend  Osgood : l  he  is  now  and  has  indeed  long 
been  considered  as  deep  in  the  principles  of  that  party.  Is  it  not 
probable  that  he  may  beat  up  for  troops  in  this  quarter  to  serve 
them  the  next  campaign  ?  My  neighbor  D.  would  probably  aid  his 
designs.  Some  attention,  therefore,  will  be  necessary  to  secure  the 
choice  of  good  electors  as  well  as  representative.  I  cannot,  with 
propriety,  take  any  part  in  these  proceedings ;  but  my  concern  for 
the  public  welfare  leads  me  inevitably  to  communicate  to  a  few 
confidential  friends  such  information  as  I  may  have  of  the  move 
ments  of  the  opposition,  and  as  they  may  be  supposed  to  desire. 
You  have  withdrawn  yourself  from  the  circle  of  politics ;  but  you 
will  often  be  in  contact  with  those  who  are  within  it,  and  will 
impress  those  whom  you  touch.  It  cannot  but  happen,  therefore, 
that  you  will  do  much  good  without  great  trouble  to  yourself. 
I  am,  with  very  great  respect, 

Your  friend  and  obedient  servant, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 

1  Samuel  Osgood,  of  Massachusetts.  He  had  been  a  member  of  the  Con 
tinental  Congress,  and  had  served  with  distinction  in  the  war  for  Indepen 
dence.  Had  also  been  first  commissioner  of  the  Treasury,  1785-80;  and 
from  1789-91  was  postmaster-general  of  the  United  States ;  afterward, 
speaker  of  the  New  York  Assembly. 


1792-96.]  THE  UNITED   STATES   SENATE.  59 


CHAPTER   IV. 

1792-1796. 
The  United  States  Senate. 

BEFOKE  Mr.  Cabot  returned  to  Philadelphia,  in  the 
autumn  of  1792,  party  strife  had  become  much  embittered. 
Jefferson's  first  attempts  against  the  Federalists  had  been 
made  in  the  shape  of  indirect  attacks  on  them  in  letters 
to  Washington.  Powerful  and  adroit  as  Jefferson  always 
was  in  swaying  the  minds  of  men  by  well-directed  appeals 
to  the  passions  and  by  covert  insinuations,  his  arts  proved 
vain  when  applied  to  the  President.  The  wild  though  in 
genious  chimeras  of  "  a  monarchical  faction  "  and  "  a  cor 
rupt  Treasury  squadron,"  conjured  up  by  Jefferson,  were 
useless  before  the  sound  judgment  and  strong  understand 
ing  of  Washington.  The  President  refused  to  withdraw 
his  confidence  from  men  in  whom  he  had  every  reason  to 
trust,  and  with  whose  measures  he  agreed,  in  order  to  be 
stow  it  on  Jefferson,  tricked  out  for  the  moment  in  the 
novel  garb  of  a  defender  of  the  Constitution.  Baffled  in 
this  attempt,  Jefferson  turned  to  a  more  sympathetic  au 
dience.  By  his  assistance,  Philip  Freneau  established  the 
"  National  Gazette,"  intended  to  be  the  organ  of  the  oppo 
sition,  and  the  means  of  public  attacks  upon  the  Federalist 
policy  and  upon  the  characters  of  its  promoters.  Although 
imbued  with  a  just  hatred  of  newspaper  conflict,  Jefferson 
was  always  ready  to  have  some  one  else  use  that  powerful 
engine  in  his  behalf.  He  never  shrank  from  thrusting  a 
friend,  whether  Madison  or  Freneau,  into  the  thickest  of 
a  fight,  from  which  he  himself  wisely  held  aloof.1  Fren- 
1  Jefferson  to  Madison,  Jefferson's  Works,  IV.  121. 


60  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF  GEORGE   CABOT.      [1792-96. 

eau's  unceasing  and  bitter  attacks  on  the  Treasury  and  the 
whole  financial  system  at  last  roused  Hamilton,  never  the 
coolest  of  men,  and  now  enraged  beyond  endurance,  both 
by  the  nature  of  the  assault  and  by  the  character  of  its 
real  author.  Hamilton  made  a  grievous  mistake  when  he 
descended  into  the  arena  of  the  press ;  for,  though  he 
drove  Jefferson  from  the  field  temporarily,  he  sullied  the 
dignity  of  his  own  high  office  by  the  violence  of  news 
paper  controversy.  It  was  the  first  step  in  the  course 
which  led  the  Federalists  to  the  extreme  measures  that 
ultimately  proved  their  ruin.  The  conflict  between  the 
hostile  leaders  assumed  a  personal  tone,  which  rapidly 
spread  to  their  friends  and  parties.  Washington  strove 
to  allay  the  storm,  but  it  had  gone  beyond  even  his 
control ;  and  Jefferson  soon  announced  his  fixed  determi 
nation  to  retire  from  the  cabinet.  Other  events  con 
spired  to  deepen  the  contest.  The  second  Presidential 
election  had  just  occurred.  The  great  name  of  Washing 
ton  rendered  a  struggle  for  the  first  place  impossible  ;  but 
the  opposition  had  rallied  on  the  question  of  the  Vice- 
Presidency.  By  better  combination  than  they  had  hitherto 
attained,  the  self-styled  "  Republicans  "  succeeded  in  cast 
ing  fifty  votes  for  George  Clinton,  against  seventy-seven 
for  John  Adams.1  A  much  more  serious  affair,  in  its  ulti 
mate  consequences,  was  the  resistance  to  the  whiskey  tax. 
The  President's  proclamation  sufficed  to  quell  the  disturb 
ances  in  North  Carolina;  but  the  turbulent  population  of 
the  western  counties  of  Pennsylvania  were  not  to  be  so 
easily  put  down.  The  resistance  there  had  a  very  ugly 

1  This  comparative  closeness  of  Adams's  and  Clinton's  vote  is  the  theme 
of  one  of  Jefferson's  most  amusing  and  ingenious  tales.  Dec.  26,  1797: 
"  Langdon  tells  me  that,  at  the  second  election  of  President  and  Vice-Presi- 
dent  of  the  United  States,  when  there  was  a  considerable  vote  given  to 
Clinton  in  opposition  to  Mr.  Adams,  he  took  occasion  to  remark  it  in  con 
versation  in  the  Senate  Chamber  with  Mr.  Adams,  who,  gritting  his  teeth, 
said :  *  Damn  'em,  damn  'em,  damn  'em  !  You  see  that  an  elective  govern 
ment  will  not  to.'"  — Jefferson's  Works,  IX.  187. 


1702-96.]  THE  UNITED   STATES    SENATE.  61 

appearance,  and  already  threatened  the  insurrection  which 
soon  afterwards  actually  broke  out. 

Party  feeling,  therefore,  ran  very  high  when  the  last  ses 
sion  of  the  Second  Congress  opened ;  and  the  events  which 
ensued  were  not  calculated  to  abate  it.  The  comparative 
mildness  of  the  previous  session  had  disappeared,  and  was 
not  destined  to  revive  for  many  years. 

This  increase  of  political  animosity  was  publicly  per 
ceptible  only  in  the  House,  where  the  opposition,  guided 
by  their  master,  made  a  concentrated  attack  on  Hamilton. 
The  first  effort  against  the  Federalist  leader  was  a  demand 
for  the  speedy  payment  of  the  debt.  Hamilton  readily 
acquiesced.  There  was  nothing  he  more  desired ;  and  he 
suggested  additional  taxes  for  the  purpose.  This  proposi 
tion  cooled  the  ardor  of  the  gentlemen  who  were  anxious 
to  fix  on  Hamilton  the  charge  of  saddling  the  country 
with  an  irredeemable  debt.  They  therefore  shifted  their 
ground ;  and  their  next  attempt  was  far  more  bitter  to 
ward  their  opponent,  and  more  discreditable  to  themselves. 
Giles,  put  forward  by  Jefferson  and  Madison,  made  an  attack 
on  Hamilton's  personal  integrity.  The  only  results  of  this 
assault  were  renewed  confidence  in  Hamilton,  and  the  tem 
porary  obliteration  of  the  wretched  tool  whom  the  princi 
pal  contrivers  had  used. 

Fiercely  as  the  conflict  raged  in  the  House,  it  apparently 
did  not  as  yet  disturb  the  calmness  of  the  Senate.  Mr. 
Cabot's  services  in  this  session  did  not  differ  materially 
from  those  of  the  last.  He  appears  on  all  the  committees 
on  claims,  and  on  all  appointed  to  consider  questions  of 
revenue  and  finance.  He  was  again  on  the  committee  of  the 
mint,  and  also  on  that  to  regulate  the  value  of  foreign  coin 
age.  He  also  reported  in  this  session  two  bills,  one  of  which 
was  fated  to  play  a  most  important  part  in  our  future  his 
tory.  This  was  the  bill  to  regulate  the  capture  and  deliv 
ery  of  fugitives  from  justice.  At  the  time,  it  passed  with 
out  much  comment ;  but,  after  many  vicissitudes,  it  was 


62  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1792-96. 

destined  to  reappear,  more  than  half  a  century  later,  in  the 
portentous  form  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law.  Mr.  Cabot's 
other  bill  was  to  regulate  the  registration  of  fishing  ves 
sels,  —  a  measure  important  to  New  England  interests. 

Washington  entered  on  his  second  term  March  4,  1793 ; 
and  the  Senate,  after  a  brief  special  session,  adjourned. 
The  members  had  hardly  reached  their  homes,  when  the 
news  of  Genet's  arrival  became  generally  known.  To  trace 
the  course  of  that  feather-headed  Frenchman  in  America, 
to  enumerate  the  insults  which  he  heaped  upon  our  gov 
ernment,  or  to  depict  the  troubles  in  which  he  involved  the 
administration,  is  neither  pleasant  nor  in  this  place  neces 
sary.  The  foreign  influence,  so  much  dreaded  by  the  Fed 
eralists,  had  come  from  a  quarter  where  they  had  not 
looked  for  it,  and  in  a  shape  they  could  never  have  im 
agined.  The  result  was  fatal  to  them  in  the  end.  That 
party  which  bent  most  servilely  to  foreign  influence,, 
which  introduced  it  the  first,  and  maintained  it  the  long 
est,  was  to  suffer  the  least  from  its  own  follies.  Whereas 
the  Federalists,  the  corner-stone  of  whose  policy  was  re 
sistance  to  foreign  intervention,  were  driven  by  the  course 
of  their  opponents  into  a  reaction  so  violent  that  they  ri 
valled  the  democratic  love  of  France  in  their  own  admiration 
of  England.  But  to  Jefferson  and  his  followers  belongs  the 
^ole  glory  of  introducing  foreign  influences  into  our  politics. 
Adoration  of  France  produced  worship  of  England ;  and 
both  brought  a  curse  upon  our  politics,  and  warped  public 
sentiment  among  men  of  every  shade  of  belief  for  the  next 
twenty-five  years.  With  Genet,  this  wretched  business 
began.  The  contagion,  under  the  benign  influence  of  the 
French  envoy,  spread  rapidly ;  and  the  feelings  it  excited 
among  the  Federalist  leaders  are  not,  at  this  day,  easy  to 
understand.  In  the  first  place,  the  event  which  they  had 
always  most  dreaded  was  actually  upon  them.  Foreign 
influence  was  in  their  midst,  and  alien  politics  supplanted 
those  of  native  growth.  They  knew  such  a  state  of  things 


1792-96.]  THE  UNITED   STATES   SENATE.  63 

to  be  morbid  and  unhealthy.  But  they  soon  forgot  the 
broad  and  fundamental  objection  to  the  introduction  of 
French  policy,  in  the  hatred  and  disgust  which  that  policy 
itself  excited.  To  these  men,  the  friends  of  order,  who 
had  just  rescued  the  country  from  the  anarchy  of  the 
Confederation,  came  the  spectre  of  French  democracy. 
Not  the  constitutional  freedom  which  they  venerated ;  not 
the  well-ordered  State  which  they  sought  to  construct ; 
not  the  liberty  for  which  they  had  fought  the  War  of  In 
dependence,  —  none  of  these  principles  were  supported 
by  France.  The  French  liberty  was  a  totally  different 
thing.  France  preached  license,  not  freedom ;  substi 
tuted  names  for  realities;  and,  redressing  wrongs  by  in 
discriminate  massacre,  set  up  a  tyranny  ten  times  worse 
than  the  one  she  had  thrown  down.  To  the  Federalists 
in  America,  comprising  many  of  the  best  political  thinkers 
of  that  age,  the  spectacle  of  French  anarchy  seemed  to 
betoken,  as  plainly  as  the  setting  sun  foretells  the  approach 
of  night,  the  coming  of  French  despotism.  And  it  was 
this  sham  liberty,  beginning  in  fine  words  and  ending 
in  confusion,  shame,  and  tyranny,  which  they  now  saw  im 
ported  amongst  them.  As  they  watched  these  delusions 
spread,  and  Jacobin  clubs  rise  up,  with  all  the  vile  para 
phernalia  of  liberty-poles  and  red  caps,  the  Federalists 
roused  to  a  vigorous  and  bitter  resistance.  "  Anti-Federal 
ists,"  now  changed  to  "Jacobins"  and  "Anarchists,"  was 
retorted  to  the  accusations  of  monarchy,  with  right  good 
will.  Yet  the  hands  of  the  Federalists  were  hampered  in 
dealing  with  their  enemies.  The  memory  of  French  suc 
cor  during  the  Revolution  was  still  fresh  ;  and  this  re 
strained  the  Federalists  at  a  time  when  the  current  was 
setting  against  them  with  a  force  which  demanded  their 
most  unrestricted  efforts.  Mr.  Cabot  was  of  opinion  that 
the  Federalists  ought  to  meet  the  issue  squarely,  explain 
everywhere  that  a  selfish  policy  of  ambition  and  revenge 
had  prompted  French  aid  in  1778,  and  that  it  was  no  time 
for  a  sentimental  and  baseless  gratitude,  when  the  inter- 


64  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE    CABOT.     [1792-96. 

ests  of  property  and  liberty  were  threatened.  Right  or 
wrong,  Mr.  Cabot's  policy  had  the  merit  of  frankness ;  and 
circumstances  ultimately  forced  its  adoption.  But,  in  jus 
tice  to  the  apparently  violent  views  of  the  Federalists,  we 
must  try  to  imagine  what  our  own  feelings  would  have 
been  at  the  time  of  the  French  Revolution,  —  when  its  hor 
rors  were  actually  at  our  doors,  and  threatening  entrance ; 
when  the  ambassador  of  that  polite  nation  preached  his 
crusade  in  our  country,  appealed  to  the  populace  against 
the  government,  and  spread  his  pernicious  doctrines  far 
and  wide.  The  prospect  opened  by  a  general  adoption  of 
such  theories  was  one  which  has  been  revolting  to  intelli 
gence  in  every  age ;  for  it  involved  a  temporary  return  to 
political  and  social  barbarism.  This  natural  alarm  was 
much  increased  by  the  general  sense  of  instability  in  our 
young  government.  Can  it  be  matter  for  wonder  that  the 
Federalists  grew  more  and  more  savage  in  their  hatred 
toward  the  men  who  made  political  capital  out  of  Genet 
and  the  dangerous  doctrines  which  he  promulgated  ? 

Artifices  and  threats  were  alike  vain  when  applied 
to  the  President ;  and  even  now  the  thought  of  Genet, 
baffled  and  impotent  before  Washington,  whose  greatness 
he  professed  himself  unable  to  comprehend,  causes  a  feel 
ing  of  the  keenest  satisfaction.  The  President's  final  re 
fusal  to  hold  any  further  communications  with  Genet  is 
connected  with  an  anecdote  of  Mr.  Cabot,  related  by  Mr. 
J.  A.  Hamilton  in  his  "  Reminiscences."  When  Washing- 
ington  resolved  upon  the  important  step  of  dismissing 
the  French  minister,  he  was  most  anxious  to  receive  the 
united  support  of  all  friends  of  the  administration.  To  quote 
Mr.  Cabot's  own  words,  as  repeated  by  Mr.  Hamilton  :  — 

"  John  Adams,  the  Vice-President,  was  considered  a  very  un 
certain  man ;  and  the  task  was  committed  to  me  to  take  care  that 
he  should  not  go  wrong  on  this  occasion.  I  accordingly  called 
upon  Mr.  Adams  in  the  morning  at  an  early  hour,  and  after  a  few 
incidental  remarks  said :  «  Mr.  Adams,  this  French  minister's  con 
duct  seems  to  me  to  be  most  objectionable.' 


1792-96.]  THE   UNITED   STATES    SENATE.  65 

"  MR.  ADAMS.  — '  Objectionable  ?     It  is  audacious,  sir  ! ' 

"  MR.  CABOT.  —  '  I  think,  if  you  were  President,  you  would  not 
permit  him  to  perform  his  office  very  long ! ' 

"MR.  ADAMS.  — 'Not  an  hour,  sir!  I  would  dismiss  him  im 
mediately.' 

"  MR.  CABOT.  — i  I  wish  you  would  allow  me  to  say  to  the 
President  that  such  are  your  views ! ' 

"  MR.  ADAMS.  — '  Certainly,  sir  !  I  will  say  so  to  the  Presi 
dent  myself,  when  I  see  him.'  "  1 

The  embarrassment  of  the  Federalists  in  dealing  with 
the  French  difficulties  was  increased  by  the  conduct  of 
England.  That  country  still  smarted  from  the  humilia 
tion  inflicted  on  her  by  the  United  States,  and  allowed  her 
desire  for  revenge  to  stand  in  the  way  of  her  best  political 
interests.  The  true  British  policy  obviously  was  to  concili 
ate  her  former  colonies  by  every  means  in  her  power. 
Instead  of  doing  so,  —  with  an  exquisite  stupidity  and  an 
arrogance  only  less  brutal  than  that  displayed  a  few  years 
later,  —  England  adopted  a  course  which  helped  greatly  to 
drive  America  into  the  arms  of  the  French  terrorists,  and 
to  increase  the  difficulties  of  the  administration. 

In  these  unfavorable  circumstances,  the  session  of  1793- 
94  opened.  Public  interest  was  very  keen,  and  centred 
upon  the  Congress  at  Philadelphia.  In  his  message,  Wash 
ington  formulated  in  a  few  brief  words  the  Federalist 
policy  of  a  strong  neutrality,  saying  :  "  There  is  a  rank 
due  to  the  United  States  among  nations,  which  will  be 
withheld,  if  not  absolutely  lost,  by  a  reputation  of  weak 
ness.  If  we  desire  peace,  —  one  of  the  most  powerful  in 
struments  of  our  rising  prosperity,  —  it  must  be  known 
that  we  are  at  all  times  ready  for  war."  As  long  as  the 
United  States  adhered  to  this  truly  national  policy,  our 
dignity,  neutrality,  and  self-respect  were  assured.  Its  en 
tire  abandonment  by  Jefferson,  a  few  years  later,  led  to  the 
wretched  and  degraded  condition  of  our  country  and  our 
politics  during  the  first  years  of  the  present  century. 

1  Reminiscences  of  James  A.  Hamilton,  p.  10. 
5 


66  LIFE   AND    LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1792-96. 

In  1793,  the  Federalists,  though  perfectly  united  in  sup 
port  of  the  administration,  and  thoroughly  devoted  to  the 
leaders  who  guided  them  so  strongly  and  so  well,  were  in 
a  most  difficult  situation.  The  majority  in  the  House  was 
against  them,  and  for  success  they  had  to  rely  solely  upon 
their  superior  ahility,  discipline,  and  concentration  of  pur 
pose.  In  the  Senate,  their  numerical  strength  had  suffered 
little  or  no  diminution.  The  opposition's  plan  of  action 
was  now  changed.  They  dropped  the  system  of  personal 
attack  on  Hamilton,  and  made  up  an  issue  upon  the  per 
fectly  false  question  of  supporting  the  French  or  British 
interest.  Under  the  direction  of  Jefferson,  they  strove 
for  a  commercial  policy  which  should  be  at  once  hostile  to 
England  and  favorable  to  France;  and  in  this  plan  they 
were  aided  both  by  popular  feeling,  and  by  the  ill-advised 
conduct  of  Great  Britain. 

The  most  important  question  in  the  Senate,  at  the  open 
ing  of  the  session,  was  raised  by  the  petition  of  Conrad 
Laub  and  others  against  Albert  Gallatin's  election  as  sen 
ator  from  Pennsylvania.  Mr.  Cabot  was  second  on  the 
committee  to  whom  this  petition  was  referred.  Their 
report  was  adverse,  and  the  subsequent  decision  of  the 
Senate  coincided  with  the  views  of  the  committee.  Mr. 
Cabot's  official  services  were  of  the  same  nature  as  before. 
He  was  chairman  of  the  committees  on  the  regulation 
of  coinage,  the  remission  of  duties,  and  the  appropria 
tions.  He  was  also  chairman  of  several  minor  committees 
on  claims  and  light-houses,  and  of  the  highly  important 
ones,  to  which  were  assigned  financial  questions,  on  the  pay 
ment  of  interest,  on  the  assumption  of  State  debts,  and 
on  laying  duties  on  wines.  As  chairman  of  the  committee 
on  appropriations,  and  of  those  concerned  with  the  debt, 
Mr.  Cabot  appears  to  have  occupied  the  position  of  leader 
in  regard  to  matters  of  commerce  and  finance. 

With  the  new  year,  Jefferson  retired  from  office,  but  by  no 
means  from  the  control  of  his  party,  to  which  he  was  now 


1792-06.]  THE    UNITED    STATES    SENATE.  67 

able  to  give  his  undivided  attention.  In  pursuance,  how 
ever,  of  the  general  hostile  policy  introduced  by  the  re 
strictive  commercial  measures  of  Virginia,  the  Federalists, 
to  the  great  disgust  of  their  opponents,  brought  forward, 
and  carried  through,  a  bill  looking  to  the  foundation  of  a 
navy.  This  was  another  integral  part  of  the  Federalist 
policy,  as  laid  down  by  Washington,  and  abandoned  by 
Jefferson. 

While  these  matters  were  in  progress  came  the  news  of 
the  British  orders  in  council  against  neutral  ships,  and  of 
Lord  Dorchester's  speech  to  the  Western  Indians.1  Public 
feeling  was  inflamed,  and  the  Federalists  were  the  first  to 
take  the  lead  in  proposing  strong  and  energetic  measures. 
A  restriction  of  the  first  order  in  council  produced  a  tem 
porary  lull,  of  which  Washington  determined  to  take  ad 
vantage  by  sending  an  extraordinary  mission  to  England. 
This  scheme  originated  with  Hamilton,  who  sent  for  Mr. 
Cabot  to  advise  with  him.  Mr.  Cabot,  convinced  of  the 
wisdom  of  the  plan,  held  a  conference  with  his  brother 
senators,  Rufus  King,  Oliver  Ellsworth,  and  Caleb  Strong, 
all  of  whom  fully  approved  the  mission,  and  agreed  that 
Hamilton  was  the  most  proper  person  to  be  appointed. 
Ellsworth  was  selected  to  confer  with  the  President,  who, 
after  some  hesitation,  agreed  in  the  necessity  of  such  a 
step.  Although  Washington's  own  wishes  favored  the 
choice  of  Hamilton  as  the  ambassador,  he  was  deterred 
from  carrying  them  into  execution  by  considerations  of  the 
clamor  which  would  be  raised  against  such  an  appoint 
ment,  and  which  would  endanger  the  success  of  a  decided 
peace  policy.  Hamilton  himself  readily  withdrew  his 
claims,  holding  that  personal  desires  ought  to  yield  to 
public  considerations.2  The  choice,  therefore,  fell  upon 
Jay,  who  was  duly  nominated  and  confirmed. 

1  This  speech  suggested  the  probability  of  a  speedy  rupture  between  the 
United  States  and  England.     See  Hildreth,  IV.  482. 

2  Hamilton's  History  of  the  Republic,  V.  532-35  inclusive.     Mr.  Hamil- 


68  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.     [1792-96. 

The  opposition,  enraged  at  the  mission,  passed  resolutions 
for  a  suspension  of  trade,  which  were  killed  in  the  Senate ; 
the  Federalists  taking  the  impregnable  ground  that  war 
like  preparations,  and  not  interferences  with  trade,  were 
the  true  method  to  ensure  peace.  I  have  briefly  sketched 
the  state  of  public  affairs  at  this  time,  in  order  to  show  the 
views  of  which  Mr.  Cabot  was  a  consistent  supporter ;  but 
we  are,  fortunately,  not  left  to  the  letters  of  friends  only 
for  information  as  to  his  political  opinions  and  party  stand 
ing.  The  celebrated  "  Anas "  afford  a  glimpse  of  the 
manner  in  which  he  was  regarded  by  Jefferson.  As  a 
friend  of  Hamilton  and  a  stanch  Federalist,  Mr.  Cabot 
could  hardly  expect  at  the  hands  of  the  Democratic  chief 
better  treatment  than  that  given  him  in  the  following 


"Dec.  1,  1793.  Beckley  tells  me  he  had  the  following  fact 
from  Lear.1  Langdon,  Cabot,  and  some  others  of  the  Senate, 
standing  in  a  knot  before  the  fire  after  the  Senate  adjourned,  and 
growling  together  about  some  measure  which  they  had  just  lost, 
'  Ah ! '  said  Cabot,  '  things  will  never  go  right  until  you  have  a 
President  for  life  and  an  hereditary  Senate.'  Langdon  told  this 
to  Lear,  who  mentioned  it  to  the  President.  The  President 
seemed  struck  with  it,  and  declared  he  had  not  supposed  there 
was  a  man  in  the  United  States  who  could  have  entertained  such 
an  idea."2 

ton  is  my  only  authority  for  this  account  of  the  circumstances  connected 
with  the  origin  of  the  mission  and  the  selection  of  Jay.  In  confirmation  of 
his  statement,  he  refers  to  minutes  of  the  conference  held  by  Mr.  Cabot 
and  the  other  senators.  Where  or  of  what  nature  those  minutes  are, 
I  am  unable  to  say;  and  Mr.  Hamilton  offers  no  explanation.  As  Mr. 
Hamilton  had  access  to  many  still  unpublished  documents,  his  opportunities 
of  information  were  unusually  good ;  but  the  absence  of  exact  references 
in  his  work  to  any  manuscript  evidence  he  may  have  used  renders  this  ex 
planation  necessary. 

1  Tobias  Lear,  Washington's  private  secretary,  afterwards  strongly  sus 
pected  of  removing  important  letters  from  among  Washington's  papers, 
and  conveying  them  to  Jefferson.     The  latter  gave  him  a  foreign  mission. 

2  Jefferson's  Works,  IX.  184.     To  test  by  the  usual  standards  a  story 
told  ^  by  a  political  opponent,  embellished  many  years  after,  and  originally 
received  by  that  opponent  on  hearsay  and  at  fourth  hand,  would  be  super- 


1792-96.]  THE   UNITED    STATES   SENATE.  69 

The  summer  of  1794  was  marked  by  the  outbreak 
of  the  whiskey  rebellion,  and  the  vigorous  suppression 
of  that  insurrection  by  Hamilton.  This  in  a  large 
measure,  and  Wayne's  Indian  victories  in  a  smaller  de 
gree,  were  the  means  of  greatly  strengthening  the  hands 
of  the  government.  Hamilton,  after  encountering  many 
difficulties,  by  an  energetic  display  of  force  proved  the 
ability  of  the  new  government  to  sustain  itself ;  and  Wash 
ington  took  advantage  of  the  situation  to  condemn  in  his 
message  the  Jacobin  clubs  and  societies,  which  had  grown 
up  rankly  in  servile  imitation  of  their  French  prototypes. 
The  opposition,  though  rallying  bravely  in  defence  of  their 
beloved  "  societies,"  lost  heart ;  and  the  concentration  and 
vigorous  attack  of  the  Federalists  made  them  give  ground 
in  a  fashion  which  caused  intense  disgust  to  Jefferson.  An 
account  of  Mr.  Cabot's  services  during  this  session  would 
be  but  a  tedious  repetition  of  those  rendered  in  previous 
years.  Claims,  loans,  the  revenue  system,  and  finance 
formed  as  usual  his  principal  duties  in  the  Senate. 

At  this  time,  Mr.  Cabot  made  an  important  change  in 
the  circumstances  of  his  private  life.  He  withdrew  from 
all  active  business,  in  possession  of  a  reasonable  and  suffi 
cient  fortune,  and  at  the  same  time  left  Beverly  to  make 
his  home  in  Brookline,  where  he  had  purchased  an  estate. 
The  fashion  of  retirement  to  a  country  place,  or  farm,  was 
much  more  common  in  those  days,  when  the  traditions  and 
customs  of  England  still  lingered  in  the  community,  than 
now.  Mr.  Cabot's  house  in  Brookline  is  still  standing, 
and  but  little  altered.  Like  most  New  England  dwell 
ings,  it  stood  near  the  road  which  led  from  the  village  ; 
but  the  narrow,  country  lane,  winding  through  the  estates 
of  a  single  possessor,  is  now  replaced  by  broad  streets 
uniting  before  the  old-fashioned,  gabled  house,  which  in 

fluous.  The  anecdote  is  at  least  amusing,  no  small  merit  in  the  eyes  of  any 
one  familiar  with  the  writings  of  the  time;  and  the  last  touch  about  the 
President  displays  the  genius  of  a  true  artist  in  historical  statements. 


70  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE   CABOT.      [1792-96. 

1795  was  secluded  and  solitary.  The  farm  covered  the 
slopes  of  a  hill,  and  stretched  far  away  over  lands  now 
thickly  dotted  with  modern  villas.  Mr.  Cabot  intended  to 
devote  himself  to  the  care  and  management  of  his  new 
domain,  to  which  he  gave  the  name  of  "  Greenhill." 
Judge  Iredell  was  a  guest  there  in  the  summer  of  1795 ; 
and  he  speaks  in  his  letters  of  the  beauty  of  the  place,  then 
dressed  in  all  the  glories  of  June.1 

Mr.  Cabot  had  hardly  returned  to  Brookline,  when  he 
was  recalled  to  Philadelphia  to  attend  the  executive  session 
held  for  the  ratification  of  the  Jay  treaty.  The  contents 
of  that  famous  treaty,  its  ratification  by  the  Senate,  and  the 
action  of  the  President  absorbed  all  the  political  interests 
of  the  ensuing  summer.  The  first  feeling,  when  the  pro 
visions  of  the  treaty  were  known,  was  one  of  indignation  ; 
but  sober  second  thought  eventually  brought  over  to  its 
support  the  great  majority  of  the  people,  who  considered 
peace  cheaply  purchased,  even  at  a  somewhat  heavy  price. 
Mr.  Cabot  was  one  of  the  most  uncompromising  defenders 
of  the  treaty.  He  took  the  ground  that,  defective  as  it 
was,  we  could  rationally  expect  nothing  more,  in  view  of 
our  own  strength  as  compared  with  that  of  England.  If 
it  were  admitted  that  these  terms  were  the  best,  or  nearly 
the  best,  possible,  the  only  question  then  was  between  them 
or  war ;  and  Mr.  Cabot  firmly  believed  that  a  ruinous  war 
would  at  that  time  have  destroyed  the  Union,  and  produced 
irreparable  disintegration.  In  his  letters  to  Rufus  King  and 
Oliver  Wolcott,  he  fully  sets  forth  his  views  ;  and  it  is  not 
necessary,  therefore,  to  dwell  further  upon  them  here.2 

The  great  event  of  the  next  session  of  Congress  —  that 
of  1795-96  —  was  the  discussion  in  the  House  upon  the 
treaty.  While  this  debate  lasted,  party  feeling  was  at 
fever-heat.  Nothing  was  possible  to  the  Senate  but  to  await, 
with  what  patience  they  could  muster,  the  issue  of  the 

1  Life  of  Iredell,  II.  446,  447. 

2  See  below,  p.  85. 


1792-96.J  THE   UNITED   STATES   SENATE.  71 

struggle.  Jefferson  represents  that,  while  the  fate  of  the 
treaty  was  in  suspense,  the  Federalists  resolved  to  dissolve 
the  Union,  if  the  House  decided  adversely  to  the  treaty, 
and  that  they  announced  their  intention  on  the  floor  of 
the  Senate.  Mr.  Cabot  is  mentioned,  in  the  "  Anas,"  as 
one  of  the  leaders  in  this  movement,  and  as  the  person 
on  whom  it  chiefly  devolved  to  give  utterance  to  this 
formidable  threat. 

"  March  1.  —  Mr.  Tazewell  tells  me  that,  when  the  appropria 
tions  for  the  British  treaty  were  on  the  carpet,  and  very  uncertain 
in  the  Lower  House,  there  being  at  that  time  a  number  of  bills  in 
the  hands  of  committees  of  the  Senate,  none  reported,  and  the 
Senate  idle  for  want  of  them,  he  in  his  place  called  on  the  com 
mittees  to  report ;  and  particularly  on  Mr.  King,  who  was  of  most 
of  them.  King  said  that  it  was  true  the  committees  kept  back  their 
reports,  waiting  the  event  of  the  question  about  appropriation ; 
that,  if  that  was  not  carried,  they  considered  legislation  as  at  an 
end ;  that  they  might  as  well  break  up,  and  consider  the  Union  as 
dissolved.  Tazewell  expressed  his  astonishment  at  these  ideas,  and 
called  on  King  to  know  if  he  had  misapprehended  him.  King  rose 
again,  and  repeated  the  same  words.  The  next  day,  Cabot  took 
an  occasion  in  debate,  and  so  awkward  a  one  as  to  show  it  was  a 
thing  agreed  to  be  done,  to  repeat  the  same  sentiments  in  stronger 
terms,  and  carried  further,  by  declaring  a  determination  on  their 
side  to  break  up  and  dissolve  the  government." l 

Tried  by  the  ordinary  historical  tests,  this  story  may  be 
rejected,  in  common  with  the  rest  of  the  "  Anas,"  which  are 
never  to  be  safely  relied  on,  unless  corroborated  by  outside 
evidence.  Yet  there  is  in  this  an  element,  or  rather  a  sug 
gestion,  of  truth  more  misleading  than  even  absolute  inac 
curacy.  The  Federalists  believed,  and  made  no  secret  of 
their  belief,  that  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  would  bring 
war,  and  that  war  at  that  period  meant  a  dissolution  of  the 
Union.  From  this  undisputed  fact,  Jefferson  concludes  a 
plot,  and  substantiates  his  conclusion  by  a  skilful  detail  of 

i  Jefferson's  Works,  IX.  190. 


72  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1792-96. 

circumstantial  evidence  and  minute  facts.  His  accusation 
of  a  definite  scheme,  however,  finds  no  support  in  the  pri 
vate  letters  of  the  Federalists. 

Early  in  this  session,  it  became  the  duty  of  the  Senate  to 
return  thanks,  through  the  President,  for  a  flag  presented 
to  the  United  States  by  the  French  Republic.  The  resolu 
tion  offered  referred  to  the  French  as  "  that  magnanimous 
nation,"  &c.  Mr.  Cabot  moved  to  strike  out  those  words  ; 
and,  after  a  sharp  debate,  the  motion  prevailed.  The  only 
addition  this  year  to  Mr.  Cabot's  usual  duties  on  questions 
of  finance,  revenue,  &c.,  was  his  service  on  the  committee 
on  naval  armament,  —  a  subject  in  which  he  took  the 
deepest  interest. 

In  the  latter  part  of  May,  1796,  Mr.  Cabot  returned  to 
Brookline,  without  waiting  for  the  close  of  the  session, 
and  prepared  his  resignation,  which  he  shortly  after  sent 
to  the  Legislature.  The  only  hesitation  he  felt  in  taking 
this  step  was  caused  by  the  fear  that  his  successor  might 
not  be  a  man  of  suitable  character.  When  satisfied  on 
this  point,1  he  immediately  and  with  great  gladness  aban 
doned  public  life.  The  prevailing  cause  of  his  early  with 
drawal  was  a  strong  distaste  for  the  asperities  of  politics, 
becoming  every  day  more  personal  and  bitter.  This 
aversion  to  the  broils  and  to  the  daily  wear  and  tear  of 
public  life  had  made  his  position  an  irksome  one  for  some 
time  past ;  while  a  life  of  leisure  and  quiet,  at  all  times 
the  most  congenial  to  his  tastes,  by  his  retirement  from 
business  was  now  open  to  him. 

I  have  tried  in  the  preceding  paragraphs  to  depict  the 
political  position  of  Mr.  Cabot,  his  rank  in  his  party,  and 
his  services  to  the  country.  I  much  regret  that  secrecy,  and, 
after  that  was  removed,  bad  reporting,  have  deprived  me  of 
any  material  for  an  account  of  Mr.  Cabot's  share  in  the 
debates.  He  was  not  fond  of  public  speaking,  and  made  no 

1  Mr.  Cabot's  friend,  Benjamin  Goodhue,  of  Salem,  was  chosen  his 
successor. 


1792-96.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  73 

pretensions  to  the  powers  of  oratory  ;  and  yet  he  seems  to 
have  been  a  not  ineffective  debater.  Fisher  Ames,  a  good 
judge,  though  possibly  a  partial  friend,  says :  "  Madison,  in 
speaking,  never  relaxes  into  pleasantry,  and  discovers  little 
of  that  warmth  of  heart  which  gives  efficacy  to  George 
Cabot's  reasoning,  and  to  Lowell's."  1  The  following  letters 
will  show,  better  than  any  description  of  mine,  Mr.  Cabot's 
opinions  and  thoughts  upon  the  public  affairs,  in  which  he 
took  an  active  and  not  unimportant  part :  — 


CABOT  TO  HAMILTON. 

MY  DEAR  SIR, —  The  people  of  Massachusetts  entertain  the 
idea  that  a  balance  is  due  to  the  State  more  than  sufficient  to  cover 
her  State  debt,  and  some  anxiety  has  been  excited  in  the  Legisla 
ture  of  that  State  lest  she  should  finally  fail  of  receiving  it. 

After  the  failure  of  the  assumption  bill,  I  intended  to  have  had 
five  minutes'  conversation  with  you  on  the  subject,  but  that  your 
time  seemed  to  be  overcharged  with  other  business. 

I  hope  you  will  find  leisure  and  inclination  to  furnish  me  soon 
with  your  ideas  on  the  interesting  subject  of  commercial  policy, 
and  that  you  will  say  definitely  whether  my  continuance  in  the 
bank  is  to  be  desired  or  not,  since  it  furnishes  so  copious  a  topic 
for  complaint.2 

I  called  this  morning  to  bid  you  farewell,  but  you  were  absent. 

May  God  bless  you !  G.  CABOT. 

EVENING,  March  4,  1793. 

CABOT  TO  RUFUS  KING. 

BEVERLY,  Aug.  2,  1793. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  This  morning's  post  brought  me  your  favor  of 
the  27th  of  July.  I  thought  a  publication  of  some  of  the  ideas  it 

1  Works  of  Fisher  Ames,  II.  42. 

2  Mr.  Cabot  had  been  appointed  President  of  the  Boston  Branch  of  the 
United  States  Bank,  when  that  institution  was  first  organized.     This  natu 
rally  offered  a  fine  opportunity  for  references  to  "  corrupt  Treasury  squad 
rons  ; "  and  Mr.  Cabot  had  no  liking  for  the  position  of  target,  if  it  could  be 


74  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF    GEOPwGE    CABOT.     [1792-96. 

contained,  with  others  which  were  naturally  excited,  might  be  use 
ful,  and  therefore,  after  giving  them  a  little  change  of  form  and 
arrangement,  have  set  them  off  for  the  press.  But  as  they  are  gone 
by  a  subterraneous  passage,  and  under  the  patronage  of  another 
gentleman,  it  is  uncertain  whether  they  will  ever  appear,  or,  if 
they  do,  in  what  shape. 

The  people  in  this  part  of  the  country  have  but  one  wish  respect 
ing  the  national  peace,  —  and  that  is,  that  it  may  be  preserved,  — • 
excepting  a  few  factious  men  in  Boston  and  a  very  few  in  other 
places.  They  are  well  united,  too,  in  the  sentiment  that  the  Pres 
ident  is  the  proper  guardian  of  the  public  tranquillity,  and  that  the 
measures  he  takes  to  secure  it  are  fit  and  proper,  and  ought  to  be 
supported.  Our  commercial  and  maritime  people  feel  themselves 
deeply  interested  to  prevent  every  act  that  may  put  our  peace  at 
hazard ;  but  who  can  restrain  opinions  ?  The  cause  of  truth 
requires  that  they  should  be  free,  and  will,  on  the  whole,  profit  by 
this  freedom.  Unfortunately,  the  propagators  of  falsehood  are  the 
most  industrious,  and  for  the  moment  the  most  successful.  Indeed, 
they  are  most  of  them  stimulated  by  the  strongest  personal  motives  ; 
while  their  opponents  are  actuated  chiefly  by  a  love  of  the  public. 
Who  can  doubt  on  which  side  the  victory  will  be  in  such  a  con 
test  ?  It  has  been  with  surprise,  as  well  as  concern,  that  I  have 
seen  the  rapid  progress  of  Jacobinical  principles  since  my  return 
from  Philadelphia.  Until  Pacificus  *  appeared,  there  were  very 
few  persons  whose  ideas  were  tolerably  just  respecting  the  relation 
of  the  United  States  to  France.  Indeed,  there  are  not  many  now 
who  think  correctly  upon  that  subject;  but  for  these  erroneous 
sentiments  the  friends  of  the  government  are  as  blamable  as  their 
adversaries.  Why  have  they  not  always  told  the  truth,  at  least  so 
much  of  it  as  would  have  enabled  the  people  to  understand  that 
France,  in  the  aid  she  gave  to  tlfe  United  States,  was  actuated  by 
policy,  or,  to  speak  out,  by  ambition  ?  Why  has  it  been  concealed 
that,  from  the  first  moment  of  her  connection  with  us,  she  inserted 
herself  into  all  our  councils;  that  by  her  influence  there  she  pro 
cured  measures  that  placed  the  most  precious  interests  of  our 

honorably  avoided.  His  application  to  be  released  from  the  bank  duties 
failed,  for  he  continued  to  act  as  President  of  the  Boston  Branch  until  after 
the  close  of  Mr.  Adams's  administration. 

1  Hamilton  wrote  under  that  name  at  the  time  when  public  feeling  against 
England  was  strongest,  and  when  Genet  was  most  popular. 


1792-96.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  75 

country  at  her  own  mercy ;  that  she  obstructed  our  commercial 
views ;  that  at  the  treaty  of  peace  she  endeavored  to  depress  us ; 
and,  in  a  word,  that  she  has  constantly  aimed  to  keep  us  low,  imbe 
cile,  and  dependent,  &c.  ?  But  all  this  declamation  is  out  of  time. 
Although  I  have  lived  much  at  home,  yet  I  have  not  been  wholly 
inattentive  to  what  was  passing  these  few  months,  and,  previous  to 
the  receipt  of  your  letter,  had  promoted  in  some  degree  the  meas 
ures  you  wish.  It  will  be  useful  to  rouse  the  sober  part  of  the 
community,  and  oblige  them  to  attend  to  a  subject,  the  discussion 
of  which  can  no  longer  be  avoided. 

I  am  always  happy  to  hear  from  you,  and  remain,  with  sincere 

esteem, 

Your  friend,  &c.,  G.  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  PARSONS. 

PHILADELPHIA,  Jan.  8,  1794. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  A  want  of  leisure  has  prevented  me  from  making 
you  the  return  I  had  promised  for  your  obliging  letter.  You  must, 
however,  indulge  me  in  the  hope  that  my  neglect  will  not  discour 
age  you  from  a  repetition  of  the  favor. 

I  sent  you  by  Mr.  Amory  Genet's  correspondence  ;  but  before  it 
reaches  you  its  contents  will  be  less  interesting,  as  you  will  have 
previously  heard,  what  is  incontestably  true,  that  this  fellow  has 
been  attempting  to  raise  a  large  body  of  troops  (to  be  embodied 
on  the  Indian  territory)  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  the  Spaniards, 
as  he  pretends,  but  possibly  to  be  employed  in  support  of  his  fac 
tion  and  principles  within  the  United  States.  These  particulars 
may  render  his  letters  comparatively  insipid.  My  respects  to  Mrs. 
Parsons. 

Your  assured  friend,  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  SAMUEL  PHILLIPS.* 

PHILADELPHIA,  8th  March,  1794. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Scarcely  a  day  has  passed  since  I  last  wrote 
you  without  a  recollection  of  the  subject  of  your  letter,  to  which 

1  Samuel  Phillips,  of  Andover,  Mass.,  founder  of  the  Phillips  Academy 
in  his  native  town,  and  of  the  American  Academy  of  Arts  and  Sciences.  Mr. 
Phillips  was  in  active  political  life  for  many  years,  but  held  only  provincial 
and  State  offices. 


76  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1792-9& 

no  satisfactory  reply  can  be  given.  But,  having  already  imparted 
to  you  the  ideas  which  heretofore  have  occurred  to  my  mind,  I 
make  no  scruple  of  adding  now  that  the  prospect  of  our  public 
affairs  becomes  daily  less  favorable.  The  hazard  to  which  the 
French  faction  and  its  partisans  were  exposing  us  has  very  much 
diminished  in  relation  to  our  internal  tranquillity  ;  but  the  measures 
they  promoted,  and  the  spirit  they  excited  in  the  course  of  the  last 
summer  among  our  people,  must  be  supposed  to  have  had  great 
effects  upon  the  temper  and  disposition  of  the  British  government 
towards  this  country.  And,  although  our  government  conducted 
wonderfully  well  in  preserving  the  neutrality,  yet  it  is  quite  cred 
ible  that  the  hostile  sentiments  of  our  citizens  to  the  British  nation, 
propagated  with  so  much  zeal  and  industry  and  published  with  so 
many  aggravating  circumstances,  may  have  produced  a  belief  in  the 
government  of  that  nation  that  our  influence  in  the  war,  open  or 
covered,  ivould  be  exerted  in  favor  of  France.  To  which  let  it  be 
added,  that,  in  spite  of  the  declared  neutrality,  the  enemies  of 
Britain  did  equip  and  arm  vessels  in  our  ports,  with  which,  as  Mr. 
Genet  says,  they  captured  or  destroyed  fifty  sail  of  British  vessels, 
and  annihilated  their  trade  with  the  United  States.  It  is  therefore 
at  least  probable  that  Great  Britain  has  taken  into  her  account  of 
contingencies  a  war  with  the  United  States.  I  do  not,  however, 
believe  that  she  is  willing  to  make  us  an  open  enemy,  if  she  can 
effect  her  projects  against  France  and  the  French  colonies  without 
it.  But  the  objects  of  her  pursuit  are  of  such  a  nature  and  of  such 
magnitude  that  she  will  not  hazard  the  attainment  of  them  from  a 
consideration  of  our  rights,  even  if  she  were  persuaded  we  should 
go  to  war  to  vindicate  them.  I  think  the  language  of  her  conduct 
is  so  far  intelligible.  She  plainly  says  to  us,  "  You  shall  not  hold 
any  intercourse  with  our  enemies  which  in  our  judgment  may 
enable  them  to  resist  our  attacks."  In  resolving  to  treat  us  with 
such  levity,  doubtless  Great  Britain  considered  our  weakness  and 
inability  to  injure  her.  She  considered,  also,  that  we  had  already 
done  her  some  harm,  which  might  justify  rigorous  measures  on  her 
part.  But  she  considered  chiefly  that  our  interest  and  inclination 
together  led  us  to  aid  her  enemies,  and  therefore  she  had  nothing 
very  important  to  fear  by  incurring  our  resentment.  But  with 
these  views  I  think  the  minister  of  Great  Britain  must  have  also 
connected  some  others  not  uninteresting.  Though  we  are  weak  in 
arms,  and  they  are  strong,  yet  they  must  feel  a  reluctance  at  pro- 


1792-96.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  77 

ducing  events  which  could  operate  to  the  derangement  of  their 
resources  even  in  a  small  degree.  We  are  large  customers  and 
have  running  accounts  of  great  extent,  and  the  disturbance  of  our 
intercourse  must  be  embarrassing  to  the  merchants  and  others  with 
whom  we  deal.  A  shock  to  them  like  fire  to  a  train  might  run 
too  fast  to  be  stopped  and  too  far  to  be  borne.  And  an  appre 
hension  of  this  would  surely  be  sufficient  to  restrain  them  from  all 
wanton  aggression  and  from  all  avoidable  provocation.  On  the 
whole,  therefore,  among  the  variety  of  reasons  which  I  have  con 
jectured  as  the  ground  on  which  our  vessels  are  detained  in  the 
West  Indies,  the  most  probable  is  that  they  think  it  essential  to 
destroy  our  intercourse  with  the  French  colonies,  in  order  to  get 
the  more  ready  possession  of  them,  and  therefore  at  the  commence 
ment  of  their  operations  they  have  determined  to  arrest  all  neutral 
vessels  in  that  predicament.  If  this  be  all  that  is  intended,  many 
questions  may  be  suggested  as  to  what  is  actually  done,  and  which 
do  not  seem  exactly  to  correspond  with  this  idea.  So  far  as  I  am 
acquainted  with  the  subject,  however,  all  these  may  be  solved  on 
principles  of  public  policy  or  private  interest.  We  have  as  yet 
very  little  accurate  information,  and  not  enough  to  enable  us  to 
judge  whether  any  thing,  and,  if  any  thing,  what,  ought  to  be  done 
on  our  part.  Enough,  however,  is  known  to  create  great  anxiety 
and  to  depress  the  public  credit,  and  it  is  on  this  account  I  state  to 
you  the  reflections  I  make.  I  think  the  friends  of  government 
will  be  opposed  to  war  and  to  whatever  may  have  a  tendency  to 
produce  it ;  but  I  think  it  probable  they  may  propose  some  provi 
sional  arrangements  of  a  defensive  kind,  and  endeavor  to  obtain  by 
negotiation  that  redress  which  could  not  easily  be  obtained  in  any 
other  way.  We  all  perceive  that,  bad  as  our  condition  is,  war 
would  make  it  much  worse,  and  therefore  must  be  avoided.  An 
unarmed  nation  entering  late  into  a  war  with  those  who  are  well 
armed,  and  have  been  long  engaged,  suffers  out  of  all  measure  :  this 
fact  has  been  too  well  proved  to  be  denied. 

MONDAY,  March  10. 

Since  Saturday,  when  I  finished  the  foregoing  sheet,  we  have 
been  informed  of  the  evacuation  of  Toulon,  which  event  must  of 
itself  have  some  effect  in  moderating  the  insolence  of  Great  Brit 
ain.  In  its  consequences,  it  may  perhaps  humiliate  all  the  com 
bined  nations.  I  believe  it  to  be  for  the  interest  and  peace  of  our 


78  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF  GEORGE   CABOT.     [1792-96. 

country  that  they  should  on  all  sides  suffer  deeply,  and  no  one  tri 
umph.  On  the  one  hand,  the  haughtiness  of  P^nglarid,  in  case  of 
success,  would  become  intolerable  to  our  maritime  commerce ;  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  French  principles  would  destroy  us  as  a  society. 
They  are  more  to  be  dreaded,  in  a  moral  view,  than  a  thousand 
yellow  fevers  in  a  physical.  It  is  on  this  account,  in  addition  to 
numberless  others,  that  a  war  is  to  be  deprecated,  as  it  would  by 
giving  us  a  new  common  interest  attach  us  more  closely,  and  pro 
duce  the  greatest  possible  assimilation  with  them.  I  pray  Heaven, 
therefore,  that  this  dreaded  evil  may  be  averted  from  us,  as  one  from 
which  the  present  generation  could  not  possibly  be  recovered.  The 
post  of  this  day  from  the  eastward  brings  us  some  intelligence  of 
vessels  being  liberated  that  were  seized  by  the  British ;  and,  as  this 
corresponds  with  my  prevailing  sentiments  that  they  do  not  mean 
to  plunder  us  and  to  make  war,  I  indulge  the  hope  that  their  sys 
tem,  when  fully  developed,  will  turn  out  to  be  less  hostile  than 
appearances  have  indicated  or  rumor  pronounced.  Should  this 
prove  to  be  the  case,  the  elasticity  of  the  public  mind  would  soon 
recover  its  proper  tone,  and  our  affairs  would  brighten.  But,  while 
the  Europeans  are  contending  in  a  spirit  of  desperation,  our  tran 
quillity  must  be  precarious,  and  it  would  be  presumptuous  to  disre 
gard  the  danger.  After  so  long  a  letter,  which  you  must  now  be 
willing  to  see  ended,  I  wish  it  were  in  my  power  to  give  you  a 
definitive  opinion.  But  there  are  not  data  on  which  to  form  it. 
I  therefore  have  been  diffuse  in  describing  the  impressions  of  my 
mind.  Your,  &c.  GEORGE  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  PARSONS.1 

( Confidential. ) 

BROOKLINE,  Aug.  12,  1794. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  At  the  close  of  the  late  session  of  Congress,  I 
resolved  to  free  myself  from  the  torments  of  political  anxiety,  at 
least  during  the  present  recess.  But  to  attain  this  desirable  respite 
is  no  easy  thing  for  any  man  who  sincerely  loves  his  country,  who 
feels  any  sort  of  responsibility  for  its  welfare,  and  who  believes 
that  any  thing  remains  to  be  done  to  secure  or  promote  it.  The 
public  good  has  always  been  the  victim  of  private  vices.  We 

1  When  this  letter  was  written,  the  "  whiskey  insurrection  "  was  in  pro 
gress ;  a  circumstance  which  doubtless  invigorated  the  expression  of  the 
writer's  sentiments. 


1792-96.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  79 

witness  the  ready  sacrifice  which  personal  ambition  makes  of  equal 
rights.  We  see  the  facility  with  which  a  wicked  faction  has  tri 
umphed  over  public  liberty  by  assuming  popular  names.  We 
have  seen  the  expression  of  the  general  will  of  a  great  society 
silenced,  the  legal  representatives  of  the  people  butchered,  and 
a  band  of  relentless  murderers  ruling  in  their  stead  with  rods 
of  iron.  Will  not  this,  or  something  like  it,  be  the  wretched  fate 
of  our  country,  if  the  people  can  be  excited  to  resist  the  laws  of 
their  own  making,  and  to  consider  as  tyrants  those  who  are  ap 
pointed  to  execute  them  ?  I  know  of  no  security  individuals  can 
have  for  the  enjoyment  of  their  equal  rights  but  the  force  of  the 
laws,  these  being  so  many  declarations  of  the  general  will  fairly 
and  constitutionally  made.  But  if  this  general  will  is  superseded 
by  faction,  and  its  supremacy  can  be  no  longer  maintained,  there 
is  an  end  of  that  equality  of  rights  which  is  the  very  essence  of 
liberty. 

All  governments  rest  on  opinion.  Free  governments,  espe 
cially,  depend  on  popular  opinion  for  their  existence,  and  on  popu 
lar  approbation  for  their  force.  If,  therefore,  just  opinions  and 
right  sentiments  do  not  prevail  in  the  community,  such  systems 
must  necessarily  perish.  Let  me  ask  if  such  sentiments  do  prevail 
at  this  moment.  On  the  contrary,  are  they  not  hostile  or  distrust 
ful  ?  and  is  not  this  hostility  and  distrust  chiefly  produced  by  the 
slanders  and  falsehoods  which  the  anarchists  incessantly  inculcate  ? 
I  think  no  honest,  well-informed  man  will  answer  these  questions 
in  the  negative. 

It  is  the  belief  of  many  able  statesmen  that  no  free  government, 
however  perfect  its  form  and  virtuous  its  administration,  can  with 
stand  the  continued  assaults  of  unrefuted  calumny.  This  is  al 
ready  verified  in  some  degree  in  our  country,  and  the  fact  is  so 
alarming  that  the  real  friends  of  liberty  and  order  can  no  longer 
indulge  themselves  in  that  repose  with  which  they  are  lulled  by 
a  confidence  in  the  rectitude  of  their  principles.  For,  while  they 
slumber,  the  anarchists  are  up  and  doing.  These  ideas,  common 
to  the  minds  of  those  with  whom  I  generally  converse,  constrain 
me  to  solicit  your  exertion  and  co-operation  with  other  good  men 
to  counteract  the  mischievous  attempts  everywhere  making  to  de 
stroy  the  peace,  order,  and  liberty  of  our  country.  Truth  alone 
can  be  used  by  men  of  virtue  in  this  contest.  But  truth  will  be 
a  sufficient  defence,  if  extensively  propagated.  It  is  well  known 


80  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE    CABOT.     [1792-96. 

that  you  can  give  great  aid  in  this  honorable  work,  —  by  timely 
explanations  in  conversations,  by  occasional  paragraphs  in  the 
newspaper,  by  republishing  from  other  papers  such  pieces  as  are 
calculated  to  inform  and  rectify  the  public  mind,  and  finally  by 
stimulating  other  patriots  to  join  in  these  efforts.  Conscious  that 
I  am  actuated  by  those  motives  only  which  honest  minds  approve, 
no  apology  is  necessary  for  this  application  to  you  on  a  subject  so 
deeply  interesting  to  all,  and  in  relation  to  which  I  have  always 
had  the  satisfaction  to  find  your  opinions  and  mine  essentially 
agree.  With  great  esteem  and  respect, 

I  remain  your  friend  and  servant, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  KING. 

BROOKLINE,  25th  July,  1795. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  Going  into  town  yesterday  for  the  first  time  since 
my  return,  I  met  your  letter  of  the  13th,  and  was  greatly  rejoiced 
to  find  that  the  insanity  which  is  epidemic  in  this  quarter  is  less 
prevalent  with  you.  It  would  be  consolatory  to  believe  that  among 
the  crew  of  our  political  ship  the  sound  would  always  be  sufficient 
to  take  care  of  the  sick.  But  I  have  not  this  desirable  faith.  The 
readiness  and  severity  with  which  the  treaty  has  been  condemned 
is  a  new  proof  that  our  government  cannot  rely  for  support  even 
upon  good  men  in  cases  of  emergency,  for  these  very  generally 
acquiesced  in  the  censure,  without  any  examination  of  the  subject. 
It  is  true  that  they  are  now  mortified  at  their  indiscretion,  and 
many  of  them  will  have  the  magnanimity  to  retread  their  steps ; 
but  pride  will  probably  prevent  others  from  acknowledging  they 
were  wrong.  A  number  of  gentlemen  visited  me  soon  after  I 
arrived  here,  and  were  easily  satisfied  that  the  ideas  circulated  re 
specting  the  treaty  were  very  incorrect ;  but  they  all  united  with 
me  in  sentiment,  that  explanations  would  be  fruitless  during  the 
ferment,  which  was  extreme  and  universal.  What  was  then  fore 
seen  has  been  realized.  Men's  minds  had  gone  too  far ;  and,  when 
inclined  to  come  back,  a  little  effort  has  been  successful  in  greatly 
accelerating  the  reverberation.  With  a  view  to  ascertain  the  state 
of  public  opinion  and  to  contribute  my  mite  towards  forming  it 
rightly  in  other  parts  of  the  State,  I  attended  the  Commencement 
at  Cambridge,  and  was  gratified  to  perceive  that  sensible  and  vir 
tuous  men  from  other  quarters  resented  the  proceedings  of  Boston ; 


1792-96.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  81 

so  that,  if  I  were  to  judge  from  the  evidence  of  that  day.  I  should 
pronounce  that  the  sober  sense  of  Massachusetts  approves  the 
treaty.  Since  that  time,  a  piece  entitled  "  Candid  Remarks  on  the 
Treaty  "  has  been  republished  here  from  some  of  your  papers,  the 
effects  of  which  are  highly  beneficial.  Such  a  summary  defence 
was  well  adapted  to  the  moment,  but  I  hope  a  more  elaborate  one 
will  be  produced  at  New  York,  and  handed  along  very  soon.  Our 
mercantile  men  have  learned  something  more  of  our  rights  and  the 
rights  of  the  other  nations  than  they  knew  formerly,  but  they  have 
yet  to  learn  that  the  commerce  of  the  United  States  is  not  such  as 
would  enable  us  to  dictate  the  terms  on  which  an  intercourse  is  to 
be  held  with  the  nations  of  Europe. 

Upon  examining  the  East  India  article,  I  don't  see  that  our  ves 
sels  are  prohibited  the  coasting  trade  ;  and  I  should  imagine  they 
will  enjoy  it  as  usual,  until  an  explicit  prohibition  shall  be  declared 
by  the  British.  The  more  I  have  examined  this  article,  the  better 
it  has  appeared ;  and  most  men  with  whom  I  converse  seem  to  agree 
that  it  is  good.  I  have  much  more  to  say,  but  my  potatoes  need 
hoeing  and  must  not  be  neglected ;  so  I  only  add,  with  respects  to 
Mrs.  King,  that 

I  remain  your  faithful  friend,  G.  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  KING. 

BROOKLINE,  July  27,  1795. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  Your  favor  of  the  20th  did  not  come  to  hand  until 
this  moment.  It  was  not  wholly  unexpected  that  our  mob  should 
inflame  yours :  all  society  is  full  of  combustible  materials,  arid  a 
flame  once  alighted  easily  produces  a  general  conflagration.  It 
dannot  be  sufficiently  regretted  that  some  of  our  respectable  men 
jliave  on  this  occasion  joined  the  Jacobins,  and  very  many  of  them 
acquiesced  in  their  measures.  They  now  see  the  pernicious  ten 
dency  of  their  proceedings,  and  a  good  portion  of  them  already 
condemn  them.  I  believe  it  adds  much  to  their  mortification  to 
reflect  that  they  listened  to  the  representations  and  observations  of 
a  man  whose  want  of  sense  has  been  thought  at  Boston  a  security 
against  his  influence.  After  all,  no  sufficient  apology  is  offered 
for  the  conduct  of  men  who  have  habitually  supported  order,  and 
now  have  arranged  themselves  with  its  enemies.  Some  of  them, 
indeed,  say  that  they  were  deceived  by  the  accounts  brought  by 


82  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1792-96. 

Mr.  Langdon ; l  others,  by  the  mutilated  abstract  published,  which 
totally  removed  alienage ;  and  many  confess  that  they  condemned 
the  treaty  without  knowing  its  merits.  You  will  perhaps  hold  me 
responsible  for  these  excesses,  but  I  decline  being  surety  against 
the  folly  and  nonsense  of  any  man.  If  I  had  thought  as  ill  of  the 
citizens  of  Boston  as  their  conduct  respecting  the  treaty  would  now 
justify,  or  if  I  had  realized  that  Mr.  Langdon  could  furnish  sparks 
to  inflame  them,  it  is  possible  that  a  few  hours'  conversation  with 
some  of  them  on  the  evening  of  my  arrival  might  have  retarded 
the  rapidity  of  the  current,  though  I  don't  think  it  could  have 
changed  its  course. 

In  justice  to  Dr.  Eustis,2  I  ought  to  mention,  as  from  his  friends, 
that  one  of  his  motives  for  sharing  in  the  agency  was  that  of  pre 
venting  greater  mischief.  This  is  laudable,  and  sometimes  expe 
dient  ;  but  the  services  of  our  friends,  when  accompanied  by 
improper  concessions  to  our  enemies,  are  too  costly  to  be  profit 
able.  You  will  see  a  sharp  speech  of  Dexter's,3  which  does  him 
credit  for  its  spirit  and  good  sense ;  but  it  is  introduced  by  admitting 
that  the  treaty  is  "  not  so  good  as  he  hoped."  I  shall  desire  him 
to  point  out  some  of  those  good  things  which  he  had  a  right  to  hope 
for,  presuming  that  his  hopes  and  even  desires  are  regulated  by 
reason. 

I  wish  you  would  inform  me  by  return  of  post  whether  these  pop 
ular  tumults  have  produced  any  embarrassment  to  the  President, 
and  whether  the  treaty,  with  its  accompaniments,  is  gone  ?  Our 
good  men  here  all  presume  that  the  President  is  too  firm  to  be 
shaken,  and  therefore  have  the  more  willingly  indulged  themselves 
in  supineness.  I  think,  however,  they  would  rally,  and  make  a 
reputable  effort,  if  it  were  believed  to  be  indispensable.  In  Salem 
and  the  other  seaports,  they  are  pretty  steady ;  and  in  the  country 
as  yet  I  have  not  heard  of  the  treaty's  being  anywhere  unpopular, 
and  every  day  furnishes  new  evidence  that  the  old  friends  of  order 
are  reuniting  even  at  Boston. 

It  was  observed  here  that  your  Jacobins  were  prudent  to  en- 

1  I  suppose  this  to  refer  to  John  Langdon,  afterwards  governor  of  New 
Hampshire.     His  desertion  of  the  Federalists  rendered  him  very  unpopular 
with  that  party. 

2  Dr.  William  Eustis,  afterwards  a  Democratic  Congressman  from  Mas 
sachusetts,  Governor  of  the  State,  and  Secretary  of  War  in  Mr.  Madison's 
cabinet. 

3  Samuel  Dexter,  the  distinguished  lawyer. 


1792-96.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  83 

deavor  to  knock  out  Hamilton's  brains,1  to  reduce  him  to  an  equal 
ity  with  themselves ;  but  I  trembled  at  the  first  account  which  was 
related  of  that  adventure,  and  offered  up  an  unfeigned  prayer  for 
his  safety,  —  I  mean  the  silent  prayer  of  an  affectionate  heart. 
Mrs.  King's  order  has  been  transmitted  to  the  manufactory,  and  in 
due  time  she  shall  hear  further.  In  the  interim,  believe  me  truly 
her  and  Your  faithful  friend,  G.  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  KING. 

BROOKLIXE,  Aug.  4,  1795. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  The  uncertainty  you  mention  respecting  the 
ratification  of  the  treaty  by  the  President  renews  my  anxiety  for 
the  welfare  of  our  country.  Although  I  have  entertained  some 
fears  that  the  business  was  delayed,  yet,  as  no  objections  from  the 
President  had  ever  come  to  my  knowledge,  my  hopes  greatly  pre 
ponderated.  I  shall  seize  this  moment,  while  the  proceeding  of  the 
President  is  unknown,  to  suggest  to  the  Boston  merchants  the  pro- 
fpriety  of  a  manly  declaration  of  their  sentiments  ;  but  although  I 
[have  reason  to  believe  that  the  treaty  is  now  generally  approved 
iby  them,  yet  so  many  of  them  indiscreetly  censured  it,  that  it  is 
jdoubtful  how  far  they  will  incline  formally  to  express  their  present 
(^pinions. 

Pride  is  a  powerful  enemy  in  this  case,  and,  combined  with  the 
natural  reluctance  which  men  feel  at  combating  popular  prejudices, 
may  not  be  easily  overcome ;  but,  be  this  as  it  may,  you  may  be 
fully  assured  that  the  most  respectable  part  of  our  community  have 
become  the  advocates  of  the  treaty,  and  are  extending  the  opinion 
of  its  propriety  every  moment. 

I  am  told  that  the  only  article  which  is  now  unsatisfactory  to 
any  of  the  Federalists  here  is  the  10th,  which  shows,  I  think,  that 
they  are  hard  pressed  by  their  friends.  Indeed,  it  will  not  surprise 
me  to  find  the  Senate  blamed  for  not  accepting  the  entire  instru 
ment  by  some  men  who  have  lately  censured  every  part,  such  is 

1  A  large  public  meeting,  called  by  the  enemies  of  the  treaty,  was  held  in 
New  York,  July  18,  1795.  The  Federalists,  to  the  disgust  of  the  Democrats, 
appeared  there  in  force.  Hamilton  rose  to  address  the  meeting,  and  just  as 
he  began  was  struck  on  the  forehead  with  a  stone.  "  If,"  said  Hamilton, 
"  you  use  such  knock-down  arguments  as  these,  I  must  retire,"  and  there 
upon  withdrew.  The  meeting,  however,  was  a  failure,  and  the  Federalists 
were  satisfied. 


84  LIFE   AND   LETTEES   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1792-96. 

the  versatility  of  opinion.  Although  we  have  neither  a  Curtius 
nor  a  Camillus,1  yet  the  explanations  given  by  Gore  in  the  news 
paper  and  those  circulated  by  others  in  private  conversation  have 
so  well  aided  the  investigations  of  individuals  that  the  subject  is 
pretty  well  understood,  and  its  friends  increased  in  a  corresponding 
ratio.  I  am,  however,  very  glad  to  see  the  systematic  and  able 
defence  setting  up  in  your  city,  and  shall  take  measures  to  extend 
its  operation  in  this  quarter.  I  have  too  much  respect  for  the 
character  of  the  President  to  believe  that  he  can  be  deterred  from 
his  duty  by  the  clamor  or  menaces  of  these  city  mobs,  but  still  I 
agree  with  you  that  their  doings  should  be  counteracted  by  the 
good  people,  lest  it  should  be  imagined  that  all  are  alike  infected 
with  the  rage  of  disorganization. 

Your  sincere  friend,  G.  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  OLIVER  WOLCOTT. 

BOSTON,  Aug.  13,  1795. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  The  Chamber  of  Commerce  here  has  held  a  meet 
ing  on  the  subject  of  the  treaty,  and  with  a  remarkable  unanimity 
approved  it.  They  also  passed  a  vote  reprobating  the  attempts 
everywhere  made  to  excite  clamor  and  discontent.  The  proceed 
ings  are  to  be  transmitted  to  the  President. 

At  Salem,  the  respectable  people  are  all  acquiescent ;  arid  many 
of  them  approve,  but  they  think  it  unadvisable  to  act.  At  New- 
buryport,  the  principal  merchants  are  also  well  satisfied ;  and  some 
steps  have  been  taken  to  bring  them  to  express  their  opinions,  but 
I  am  not  yet  informed  of  the  success. 

On  the  whole,  it  may  be  safely  pronounced  that  the  sober  and 
discreet  part  of  even  our  seaports,  and  still  more  of  our  country 
towns,  feel  a  great  anxiety  lest  the  treaty  should  by  any  means 
miscarry. 

1  "  Camillus  "  was  the  signature  under  which  Hamilton  wrote  his  famous 
essays  in  defence  of  the  Jay  treaty.  King  assisted  largely  in  this  work, 
contributing  a  number  of  the  "  Camillus  "  papers.  The  introductory  essay 
of  the  series  was  signed  "Curtius."  Jefferson  (Works,  IV.  121)  supposed 
it  to  have  proceeded  from  the  pen  of  Hamilton,  but  was  mistaken  in  his 
opinion.  (See  Hamilton's  History  of  the  Republic,  VI.  280.)  It  would  seem 
from  the  expressions  in  this  letter,  that  King  was  the  author  of  "  Curtius;  " 
but  there  is  no  direct  evidence  of  this,  and  I  believe  the  "  Curtius  "  letters 
are  now  generally  and  correctly  attributed  to  Pelatiah  Webster,  a  well-known 
writer  and  pamphleteer  of  the  day. 


1792-96.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  85 

It  is  with  no  less  chagrin  than  astonishment  that  I  learn  this 
day  the  consummation  of  the  business  has  been  delayed  by  popu 
lar  clamor.  If  delay  should  terminate  in  refusal,  we  are  ruined. 
The  present  system  will  have  finished  its  destiny. 

Yours  faithfully,  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  KING. 

BROOKLINE,  Aug.  14,  1795. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  Since  my  last,  I  have  been  at  Newburyport, 
where  the  merchants  are  perfectly  well  united,  and  have  by  this 
time  probably  made  a  formal  declaration  of  their  opinions.  I  un 
derstand  that  the  only  point  on  which  they  differed  was  the  expe 
diency  of  giving  to  the  negotiation  personal  praise,  and  this  was 
omitted  entirely  on  the  ground  of  avoiding  present  irritation. 

The  Boston  Chamber  of  Commerce  have  held  a  meeting.  The 
number  attending  was,  as  usual,  about  forty.  They  were  of  the 
most  reputable  class,  and  with  only  a  single  dissentient  appro 
bated  the  treaty,  and  reprobated  the  attempts  everywhere  made  to 
excite  discontent  and  tumult  among  the  people.  Their  proceed 
ings,  as  well  as  those  of  Newburyport,  are  to  be  transmitted  to  the 
President.  At  Boston,  the  members  of  the  Chamber  of  Com 
merce  who  did  not  attend  are  to  be  invited  to  concur  in  writing ; 
and  it  is  expected  that  three-fourths,  including  nineteen-twentieths 
of  the  real  respectability,  will  concur. 

At  Salem,  Mr.  Derby,  Gray,  and  some  others,  having  consulted, 
declare  it  to  be  their  opinion  that  seven-eighths  of  their  town  would 
vote  to  leave  the  business  where  the  Constitution  has  placed  it ;  but 
they  think  it  not  best  to  make  any  movement,  because,  they  say, 
as  no  opposition  has  been  made  among  them  they  ought  to  be  con 
sidered  unanimously  favorable. 

/  After  all,  where  is  the  boasted  advantage  of  a  representation 
system  over  the  turbulent  mobocracy  of  Athens,  if  the  resort  to 
popular  meetings  is  necessary?  Faction,  and  especially  the  fac 
tion  of  great  towns,  always  the  most  powerful,  will  be  too  strong 
for  our  mild  and  feeble  government. 

The  newspapers  will  inform  you  of  the  arrival  of  a  vessel  from 
Rochelle  yesterday,  the  captain  of  which  informs  me  that  he  fell 
in  with  the  British  fleet  of  fourteen  sail  of  the  line,  which  had 
combated  fourteen  French  and  captured  three.  The  action  was 


86  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1792-96. 

off  Belle  Isle,  and  the  English  captain  told  our  informant  that  the 
whole  French  fleet  would  have  been  taken,  if  night  had  not  covered 
them.  Yours  truly,  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  Aug.  24,  1795. 

MY  DEAR  Sm,  —  In  answer  to  your  question,  it  may  be 
said  with  confidence  that  New  England  will  be  calm  and  steady, 
and  that  the  national  government  will  lose  nothing  in  the  present 
storm,  that  depends  upon  her. 

It  is,  however,  a  lamentable  truth  that  the  first  impressions  upon 
good  men  were  so  erroneous  as  to  give  every  encouragement  to 
faction.  This  delusion  was  indeed  momentary,  and,  having  soon 
been  dissipated  by  reason  and  information,  has  been  succeeded  by 
a  greater  anxiety  for  the  success  of  the  negotiation  with  Britain 
than  has  appeared  upon  any  other  occasion  since  the  establishment 
of  the  present  government.  It  was  in  this  state  of  the  public 
mind  that  the  President's  letter  appeared,  and  gave  universal  satis 
faction  to  the  true  friends  of  order  in  all  parts  of  our  country. 
Even  faction  and  anarchy  have  acknowledged  the  merit  of  this 
letter.  It  is  a  remarkable  proof  of  the  unstability,  or  rather  ver 
satility,  of  popular  opinion,  that  some  of  those  men  who  execrated 
the  twenty  senators  for  advising  to  a  ratification  on  any  terms  are 
already  beginning  to  censure  them  for  having  cavilled  at  the 
twelfth  article,  and  thus  put  at  hazard  such  important  benefits  as 
the  treaty  would  secure  to  the  country.  I  am  satisfied,  if  the 
business  should  not  finally  be  closed,  this  sentiment  will  extend 
very  far ;  and  even  if  all  the  rest  of  the  treaty  should  take  effect, 
if  no  new  agreement  can  be  made  on  the  subject  of  the  twelfth 
article,  and  France  should,  as  she  will  whenever  able,  establish  her 
colony  monopoly,  we  shall  be  condemned  for  refusing  the  partial 
benefit. 

With  unfeigned  respect  and  unaffected  attachment,  I  remain 

Your  faithful  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 

The  next  three  letters  refer  to  the  visit  of  Lafayette's 
son,  who  had  fled  to  the  United  States  for  safety  and  pro 
tection.  The  relations  of  the  United  States  with  France 
were  at  that  time  very  delicate,  and  Lafayette  was  an  out- 


1792-96.]  COBRESPONDENCE.  87 

cast  from  his  grateful  country.  Washington  hesitated  to 
assist  young  Lafayette  openly,  and  desired  also  to  sound 
M.  Adet,  the  French  minister,  on  the  matter.  At  the 
same  time,  his  deep  affection  for  his  old  comrade  in  arms 
urged  him  to  do  every  thing  for  his  son.  In  this  dilemma, 
Washington  determined  to  entrust  the  care  of  young  La 
fayette,  then  at  Boston,  under  the  assumed  name  of  Motier, 
to  Mr.  Cabot.  He  wrote  to  young  Lafayette,  explaining  his 
own  difficult  position  and  the  reasons  for  his  leaving  such 
a  matter  to  another's  care  ;  and  he  also  wrote  to  Mr.  Cabot, 
who  replied  at  once,  giving  a  full  account  of  his  interview 
with  Motier,  and  his  tutor,  M.  Frestel.  These  two  letters 
have  been  already  published  by  Mr.  Sparks,1  and  explain 
perfectly  Washington's  position.  For  some  time  after  these 
letters,  Washington  felt  constrained  to  take  no  notice  of 
young  Lafayette,  and  to  even  abstain  from  writing  him. 
In  November,  the  young  Frenchman  and  his  tutor  set  out 
for  New  York.  The  President  at  this  time,  in  explanation 
of  his  course,  wrote  to  his  namesake :  — 

"  I  imposed  upon  Mr.  Cabot,  a  gentleman  of  character,  and  one 
in  whose  discretion  I  could  place  entire  confidence,  the  agreeable 
office  of  assuring  you,  in  my  name,  of  my  warmest  affection  and 
support,  and  of  my  determination  to  stand  in  the  place  of  a  father 
and  friend  to  you  under  all-  circumstances  ;  requesting  him,  at  the 
same  time,  to  make  arrangements  with  M.  Frestel  for  supplying 
your  immediate  wants  ;  and,  moreover,  that  he  would  add  thereto 
every  thing  consolatory  on  my  part."  2 

Mr.  Cabot  relinquished  his  charge  to  Hamilton,  who,  at 
the  request  of  the  President,  watched  over  the  young  exile 
until  the  time  arrived  when  he  could  with  safety  enter  the 
President's  family.  The  original  embarrassment  of  Wash 
ington  in  this  affair  had  been  greatly  aggravated  by  the 
fact  that  the  arrival  of  Lafayette's  son  was  not  long  a  se 
cret.  The  opposition,  not  content  with  offering  festivals 

1  Writings  of  Washington,  XI.  64-67. 

2  Ibid.,  XI.  95. 


88  LIFE   AND    LETTEES   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1792-96. 

to  young  Lafayette,  took  advantage  of  the  delicacy  and 
restraint  entailed  by  official  position  to  abuse  the  Presi 
dent.  In  the  words  of  a  stanch  Federalist  of  the  day,  "  It 
was  circulated  among  these  devils  that  the  President  took 
no  notice  of  the  lad,  because  he  loved  the  British  and  hated 
the  French."  1  The  letter  to  Mr.  Cabot  admirably  illus 
trates  the  truth  of  this  ingenious  calumny  deceased  so  many 
years  ago.2 

WASHINGTON  TO  CABOT. 

(Private  and  Confidential.) 

PHILADELPHIA,  7th  Sept.,  1795. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  The  enclosed  letters  (which,  after  reading,  be  so 
good  as  to  return  to  me)  will  be  the  best  apology  I  can  offer  for 
the  liberty  I  am  about  to  take,  and  for  the  trouble,  if  you  comply 
with  my  request,  it  must  necessarily  give. 

To  express  all  the  sensibility  which  has  been  excited  in  my 
breast  by  the  receipt  of  young  Fayette's  letter,  from  the  recollec 
tion  of  his  father's  merits,  services,  and  suffering,  from  my  friend 
ship  for  him,  and  from  my  wishes  to  become  a  friend  and  father  to 
his  son,  are  unnecessary.  Let  me  in  a  few  words  declare  that  I 
Witt  be  his  friend  ;  but  the  manner  of  becoming  so,  considering  the 
obnoxious  light  in  which  his  father  is  viewed  by  the  French  gov 
ernment,  arid  my  own  situation  as  the  executive  of  the  United 
States,  requires  more  time  to  consider  in  all  its  relations  than  I  can 
bestow  on  it  at  present ;  the  letters  not  having  been  in  my  hands 
more  than  an  hour,  and  I  myself  on  the  point  of  setting  out  for 
Virginia  to  fetch  my  family  back,  whom  I  left  there  about  the 
first  of  August. 

The  mode  which,  at  the  first  view,  strikes  me  as  the  most  eligi 
ble  to  answer  his  purposes  and  save  appearances  is  to  administer 
all  the  consolation  to  the  young  gentleman  that  he  can  derive  from 
the  most  unequivocal  assurances  of  my  standing  in  the  place  of 
and  becoming  to  him  a  father,  friend,  protector,  and  supporter. 
But  secondly,  for  prudential  motives,  as  they  may  relate  to  himself. 

1  Life  of  Jeremiah  Smith,  by  J.  H.  Morison,  p.  98. 

2  See  also  Washington's   correspondence  with    Hamilton   on   the  same 
matter.     Works  of  Hamilton,  VI.  51-74 ;  also  Writings  of  Washington,  XI. 
72,  94,  118. 


1792-96.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  89 

his  mother  and  friends  whom  he  has  left  behind,  and  to  my  official 
character,  it  would  be  best  not  to  make  these  sentiments  public ; 
of  course  that  it  would  be  ineligible  that  he  should  come  to  the 
seat  of  the  general  government,  where  all  the  foreign  characters 
(particularly  that  of  his  own  nation)  are  residents,  until  it  is  seen 
what  opinions  will  be  excited  by  his  arrival ;  especially,  too,  as  I 
shall  be  necessarily  absent  five  or  six  weeks  from  it,  on  business, 
in  several  places.  Third,  considering  how  important  it  is  to  avoid 
idleness  and  dissipation,  to  improve  his  mind,  and  to  give  him  all 
the  advantages  which  education  can  bestow,  my  opinion  and  my 
advice  to  him  is  (if  he  is  qualified  for  admission)  that  he  should 
enter  as  a  student  at  the  University  in  Cambridge,  although  it 
should  be  for  a  short  time  only.  The  expense  of  which,  as  also  of 
every  other  means  for  his  support,  I  will  pay,  and  now  do  author 
ize  you,  my  dear  sir,  to  draw  upon  me  accordingly ;  and,  if  it  is  in 
any  degree  necessary  or  desired,  Mr.  Frestel,  his  tutor,  should 
accompany  him  to  the  University  in  that  character.  Any  arrange 
ments  which  you  shall  make  for  the  purpose,  and  any  expense 
thereby  incurred  for  the  same,  shall  be  borne  by  me  in  like  manner. 

One  thing  more,  and  I  will  conclude :  let  me  pray  you,  my  dear 
sir,  to  impress  upon  young  Fayette's  mind,  and  indeed  upon  that 
of  his  tutor's,  that  the  reasons  why  I  do  not  urge  him  to  come  to 
me  have  been  frankly  related,  and  that  their  prudence  must  appre 
ciate  them  with  caution.  My  friendship  for  his  father,  so  far  from 
being  diminished,  has  increased  in  the  ratio  of  his  misfortunes,  and 
my  inclination  to  serve  the  son  will  be  evidenced  by  my  conduct. 

Reasons  which  readily  will  occur  to  you  and  cannot  easily  be 
explained  to  him  will  account  for  my  not  acknowledging  the  receipt 
of  his  or  Mr.  Frestel's  letter. 

With  sincere  esteem  and  regard,  I  am,  dear  sir, 

Your  obedient  and  obliged 

GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 

P.  S.  You  will  perceive  that  Lafayette  has  taken  the  name  of 
Motier.  Whether  it  is  best  he  should  retain  it  and  aim  at  perfect 
concealment  or  not  depends  upon  a  better  knowledge  of  circum 
stances  than  I  am  possessed  of ;  and  therefore  I  leave  this  matter 
to  your  own  judgment,  after  a  consultation  with  the  parties. 


90  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.    [1792-96. 


CABOT  TO  WASHINGTON. 

BROOKLINE,  Sept.  16,  1795. 

gIR)  —  The  letter  which  you  did  me  the  honor  to  write  on  the 
7th  was  received  last  evening,  when  I  immediately  waited  on  the 
gentlemen  who  are  the  subject  of  it.  They  were  in  a  state  of  anx 
iety  respecting  a  new  place  of  residence  where  they  might  live 
unnoticed.  Considerations  of  the  kind  which  you  have  mentioned, 
and  some  others,  render  this  eligible  for  the  present;  but  it  is 
found  impracticable  here.  Already  Mr.  Motier  is  known  to  too 
many  persons ;  and  a  public  festival  announced  by  the  French 
consul  for  Monday  next,  at  which  all  their  citizens  in  this  vicinity 
are  expected  to  attend,  occasions  serious  embarrassment,  to  which 
is  added  that  some  circumstances  of  delicacy,  relative  to  the  family 
in  which  they  are  placed,  make  an  immediate  removal  proper. 

It  was  at  this  moment  of  solicitude  I  arrived  to  testify  to  them 
the  benignity  of  your  intentions  by  expressing  those  unequivocal 
assurances  of  friendship  which  your  goodness  had  dictated,  and 
which  were  received  with  every  emotion  of  the  most  lively  sen 
sibility.  A  conversation  succeeded,  which  had  for  its  object  a 
relief  from  their  present  perplexity  with  the  least  possible  devia 
tion  from  the  path  you  had  proposed.  In  addition  to  the  motives 
already  explained  for  removing  further  than  Cambridge,  it  was 
urged  that  the  studies  now  actually  pursuing  by  Mr.  Motier  are 
entirely  different  from  those  presented  in  any  of  our  universities, 
and  that  your  desires  will  therefore  be  best  accomplished  by  a  con 
tinuance  in  his  present  course  under  Mr.  Frestel.  It  was  admitted, 
however,  that  other  aids  would  be  requisite  in  those  branches  of 
education  which  Mr.  Frestel  does  not  possess.  With  a  view  to 
these,  and  to  combine  with  them  abstinence  from  society,  it  is 
thought  best  to  seek  a  position  near  some  principal  town,  where 
all  the  desiderata  can  be  found.  No  determination  was  formed ; 
and  we  parted,  to  reflect  more  on  the  step  to  be  taken,  and  to 
examine  if  there  were  any  situation  in  this  quarter  which  would 
correspond  with  their  wishes ;  but  to-day,  on  their  visiting  me,  I 
found  they  had  concluded  it  would  be  best  to  go  to  New  York  in 
the  Friday's  stage,  where  they  expect  to  be  accommodated  in  a 
country  house,  which  is  in  the  possession  of  their  friend,  Mr.  La 
Callombe,  and  with  whom  they  may  remain  in  retirement  until  you 
shall  direct  otherwise. 


1792-96.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  91 

The  suddenness  of  their  departure  will  deprive  me  of  an  oppor 
tunity  of  being  essentially  useful  to  them,  and  of  executing  your 
commands,  which  would  be  the  most  grateful  occupation  of  my 
life. 

I  shall  give  them  letters  to  Colonel  Wadsworth 1  and  to  Colonel 
Hamilton,  the  latter  of  whom  will  probably  know  where  they 
may  be  found  after  they  shall  be  established. 

I  shall  speak  of  Mr.  Frestel  and  a  young  gentleman  whom  .he 
accompanies,  leaving  ifr  with  them  to  make  such  other  disclosures 
on  some  occasions  as  discretion  will  approve. 

Mr.  Frestel  has  a  passport  from  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety, 
and  stands  fair  with  his  country ;  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  Mr. 
Motier  would  have  any  occasion  to  be  private,  but  for  the  con 
dition  of  his  friends,  he  likewise  having  a  passport  as  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States,  under  the  name  of  Motier,  which  is  not 
newly  assumed,  but  is  a  name  which  regularly  remained  to  him 
after  the  law  passed  proscribing  titles.  An  unbounded  affection 
cements  the  tutor  and  pupil,  and  renders  them  inseparable ;  and  it 
is  impossible  to  see  without  delight  the  exquisite  gratification  of 
the  former  at  the  elevation  of  character  which  the  latter  has 
already  attained. 

Mr.  Frestel  repeatedly  mentioned  that  he  has  some  communica 
tions  to  make,  which  may  affect  those  whom  you  love,  but  which 
can  hardly  be  explained  without  an  interview.  I  promised  to  in 
timate  his  idea,  but  reminded  him  that  you  would  be  absent  for 
several  weeks,  and  added  that  possibly  before  your  return  he 
might  know  your  pleasure  in  this  respect.  If  any  pecuniary  ac 
commodations  had  been  necessary,  I  should  have  furnished  them  ; 
but  at  present  they  are  supplied.  With  the  highest  respect  and 
esteem,  I  remain,  sir, 

Your  obedient  and  faithful  servant,  GEORGE  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  CHRISTOPHER  GORE. 

PHILADELPHIA,  Jan.  5,  1796. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Your  reflections  on  Randolph's  publication2 
have  given  much  pleasure  to  me,  and  to  several  of  my  friends  to 
whom  they  have  been  communicated. 

1  General  James  Wadsworth,  of  Connecticut. 

2  An  intercepted  despatch  of  Fauchet,  the  French  minister,  had  indicated 
that  Edmund  Randolph,  then  Secretary  of  State,  was  in  his  pay.     Randolph 


92  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1792-96. 

The  questions  which  suggest  themselves  so  naturally  to  the 
mind  of  the  reader,  and  which  you  have  stated,  are  of  some  impor 
tance;  but  it  has  become  doubtful  whether  any  formal  answer 
should  be  given  to  a  production  which  has  so  disappointed  public 
expectation  that  it  engages  no  attention  either  of  party  or  individ 
uals.  The  man  has  found  no  defenders,  and  not  enmity  enough  to 
sink  him  lower  than  he  has  placed  himself. 

It  may,  however,  be  proper  to  make  it  known  that  Fauchet's 
letter  was  kept  back  by  the  President  from  no  considerations  that 
were  personal,  but  solely  to  finish  the  official  papers  relative  to 
the  ratiiication  in  the  Secretary's  office ;  after  which,  a  disclosure 
would  have  been  made  to  Randolph  immediately,  but  for  the  indis 
position  of  the  Attorney- General,1  whose  assistance  was  very  prop 
erly  required  at  a  consultation  so  deeply  affecting  the  public  wel 
fare.  In  vain  did  the  messenger  go  every  day  to  his  house,  five 
miles  from  town,  to  solicit  his  attendance.  It  was  impossible.  He 
grew  worse,  and  finally  it  was  apprehended  that  he  would  never 
recover.  As  soon  as  the  expectation  of  seeing  him  was  extin 
guished,  it  was  decided  by  the  President  to  make  the  disclosure  to 
Randolph,  which  was  done  without  permitting  any  communication 
to  be  made  by  the  officers  of  government  to  any  person  whatever ; 
and  it  appears  at  this  moment  that  the  first  intimation  of  the  busi 
ness  from  our  government  was  given  by  Randolph  himself.  He 
probably  put  the  letter  immediately  into  the  hands  of  Dallas  2  and 
others  whose  advice  he  needed.  It  is  true  that  some  whispers 
were  beginning  to  circulate  about  this  town  at  the  same  time, 

thereupon  resigned,  and  published  a  "  Vindication,"  which  was  a  very  lame 
affair.  It  is  said  that  Washington,  on  being  asked  if  he  had  read  the  book, 
replied,  "  Yes,  sir,  I  have  read  every  line,  every  letter  of  it ;  and  a  danm'der 
scoundrel  God  Almighty  never  permitted  to  disgrace  humanity  ! "  Washing 
ton  was  aroused  by  the  gross  misrepresentations  of  Randolph.  It  will  be  re 
membered  that  Randolph  afterwards  proved  to  be  a  public  defaulter.  For 
the  anecdote  of  Washington,  see  Hamilton's  History  of  the  Republic,  VI. 
309  ;  for  Randolph's  pecuniary  troubles,  Administration  of  Washington  and 
Adams,  I.  280.  Although  Randolph  then  labored  under  an  irremovable 
weight  of  suspicion,  from  which  nearly  a  century  has  not  relieved  him,  the 
whole  business  is  still  involved  in  mystery.  We  shall  probably  never  know 
the  exact  truth  in  regard  to  his  dealings  with  the  French  minister  until  the 
French  archives  have  been  thoroughly  examined,  and  Fauchet's  private  corre 
spondence  with  his  own  government  brought  to  light. 

1  William  Bradford,  of  Pennsylvania. 

2  Alexander  J.  Dallas,  of  Pennsylvania ;  afterwards  Secretary  of    the 
Treasury  under  Mr.  Madison,  1814-16. 


1792-96.]  COERESPONDENCE.  93 

which  had  relation  to  the  subject;  but  these  undoubtedly  pro 
ceeded  from  the  English,  who  were  not  under  so  strong  obliga 
tions  to  be  reserved. 

The  hesitation  to  ratify  which  was  produced  in  the  President's 
mind  after  the  departure  of  the  senators  from  this  city  arose  first 
from  the  provision  order  which  it  was  insinuated  was  bottomed  on 
the  treaty.1  The  "  certain  person"  spoken  of  by  Randolph  (Ham 
ilton)  was  on  this  occasion  consulted  by  the  President,  and,  as  I 
understand,  advised  to  withhold  the  exchange  of  ratifications  in  Eng 
land  until  the  order  should  be  revoked  or  satisfactorily  explained, 
so  that  no  pretence  should  be  had  for  saying  that  we  acquiesced 
in  a  construction  so  extraordinary  of  the  treaty.  This  circum 
stance,  which,  if  known,  would  refute  so  much  calumny  against 
Hamilton,  happened  at  an  unlucky  moment  for  the  President.  It 
unsettled  his  previous  resolution,  and  laid  him  open  to  all  the  arti 
fices  which  were  then  practising  by  Randolph  to  deter  him  from 
giving  the  final  sanction.  You  will  easily  trace  the  information, 
which  the  Jacobins  exclusively  possessed  at  this  period,  of  the  state 
of  the  President's  mind ;  and  you  will  see  the  motives  they  had  for 
so  much  exertion  in  exciting  tumultuous  meetings,  and  other  sedi 
tious  practices.  A  channel  was  open,  through  which  every  senti 
ment  expressed  by  the  President  in  confidence  could  be  conveyed 
to  the  demagogues  of  the  great  towns  by  every  post. 

A  review  of  these  ideas,  connected  with  the  transactions  of  the 
last  summer,  will  furnish  the  only  clew  to  the  executive  proceed 
ings,  and  will  account  for  the  promptitude  which  seems  to  have 
characterized  the  last  act,  especially  if  it  be  remembered  that  Ham 
mond  2  was  waiting  for  the  President's  determination,  which  had 
been  long  promised.  The  most  dangerous  as  well  as  most  atro 
cious  part  of  Randolph's  design,  however,  cannot  be  fully  devel 
oped  without  bringing  the  President  into  a  position  in  which  he 

1  The  "  provision  order  "  was  the  order  in  council  authorizing  the  seizure 
of  all  ships  conveying  provisions  which  might  in  any  way  be  used  by  the 
French.      So  extensive  a  claim  was  denied  by  the  United  States,  who  held 
that  provisions  were  contraband  only  when  being  conveyed  to  some  port 
absolutely  blockaded  or  besieged.     The  British  withdrew  this  claim  when 
the  negotiations  opened,  but  Jay  was  unable  to  agree  to  any  article  on  this 
point.    In  July,  1795,  just  after  the  Senate  ha,d  ratified  the  treaty,  news 
came  that  British  cruisers  were  again  enforcing  the  provision  order ;  and  the 
Democrats  promptly  asserted  that  this  new  infringement  of  neutral  rights 
was  due  to  the  treaty. 

2  The  British  minister. 


94  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE    CABOT.     [1792-96. 

never  should  be  placed.  The  design  of  separating  the  President 
from  the  Senate,  so  ruinous  if  effected,  can  only  be  inferred  now 
from  the  information  which  Randolph  supplies ;  but  the  officers  of 
the  government,  who  must  possess  the  most  ample  evidence,  have 
no  doubt  of  the  fact.1 

I  send  to  Mr.  Higginson,  by  this  post,  a  copy  of  Hamilton's  letter 
on  the  power  of  the  commissioners,  which,  to  save  me  the  trouble 
of  transcribing,  I  must  request  you  to  call  for,  if  you  wish  to 
read  it. 

With  much  esteem  and  regard,  I  remain,  dear  sir, 

Your  faithful  friend,  G.  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  WASHINGTON. 

MARCH  4,  1796. 

Sm,  —  The  great  importance  of  selecting  persons  speedily  for 
the  offices  created  by  the  British  treaty,  and  the  difficulty  of  finding 
those  who  may  be  in  all  respects  competent  to  the  duties  required, 
have  suggested  the  belief  that  it  might  not  be  unacceptable  to  the 
Executive  to  receive  from  various  parts  of  the  Union  the  names  of 
candidates  who  may  be  thought  most  suitable. 

Under  the  impressions  of  these  ideas,  I  have  frequently  reviewed 
the  circles  in  which  I  have  been  accustomed  to  move  ;  and  it  ought 
to  be  confessed  that  very  few  have  occurred  to  my  mind  whose  char 
acters  were  wholly  free  from  objections.  However,  I  do  not  hesi 
tate  to  mention  Mr.  Gore 2  as  a  gentleman  who,  in  my  estimation, 
unites  most  of  the  qualifications  requisite  for  a  commissioner  in 
London,  and  possesses  more  fitness  for  that  trust  than  any  other 
person  in  Massachusetts  who  can  be  considered  as  a  candidate. 

I  also  take  the  liberty  of  naming  Mr.  Parsons  as  a  lawyer 
whose  well-known  talents  peculiarly  fit  him  for  investigating  and 
deciding  on  the  claims  of  British  creditors,  and  Mr.  Learned,  of 
Connecticut,  as  a  gentleman  whose  probity  and  good  sense  qualify 
him  for  many  offices  where  public  confidence  is  required. 

With  the  highest  possible  respect,  I  am,  sir, 

Your  most  obedient  servant,         G.  CABOT. 

1  This  letter  throws  a  good  deal  of  light  on  the  intrigues  by  which  it  was 
attempted  to  defeat  the  treaty.     Mr.  Cabot  was  in  a  position  to  know  accu 
rately  the  true  state  of  affairs,  and  his  account  brings  out  very  forcibly  the 
part  played  by  Randolph.    For  the  views  of  Washington  and  Hamilton,  see 
Hamilton's  Works,  VI.  12,  16,  19,  25,  33,  and  35. 

2  Mr.  Gore  was  subsequently  appointed,  and  acted  as  commissioner  under 
the  treaty. 


1792-96.1  CORKESPONDENCE.  95 


CABOT  TO  CALEB  STRONG. 

PHILADELPHIA,  Thursday,  April  27,  1796. 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND,  —  The  question 1  in  the  House  will  be 
taken  this  day,  or  at  farthest  to-morrow  ;  and  all  agree  that  the 
result  will  be  unfavorable.  It  is  hoped,  however,  that  the  majority 
will  not  be  greater  than  fifty-two  to  forty-eight. 

It  is  distressing  to  the  few  of  us  who  remain  here  that,  at  so 
delicate  a  conjunction,  when  the  Senate  will  be  called  to  act  a 
part,  it  is  totally  uncertain  on  what  side  the  majority  will  be  found 
on  a  question  of  the  most  consequential  kind.  Mr.  Vining  2  can 
not  be  heard  of,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  him  here  in  any 
event ;  and  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  8  has  this  day  left  us  :  so  that  at 
this  moment  we  should  lose  the  most  important  questions,  if  forced 
to  a  decision.  I  have  stated  these  and  some  further  ideas  in  a  let 
ter  to  Mr.  Paine ; 4  hoping  that  he  would  not  persist  in  his  deter 
mination  to  remain  at  home,  when  he  knows  that  it  is  impossible 
to  transact  the  business  depending  in  our  House  without  his  assist 
ance.  The  President  and  the  friends  of  order  in  the  Legislature 
are  extremely  discouraged  by  the  evident  weakness  of  the  Senate 
at  a  time  when  all  its  members  will  be  needed,  and  their  firmness 
put  to  the  severest  trial.  I  pray  you  to  come  on  without  a  moment's 
delay,  as  you  would  wish  to  save  us  from  defeat,  and  our  country 
from  disgrace  and  ruin. 

Your  faithful  friend,  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  STRONG. 

BROOKLIXE,  June  6,  1796. 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND,  —  The  letters  which  several  successive 
mails  have  brought  from  you  give  me  much  pleasure,  not  only  as 
they  contain  interesting  information,  but  much  more  as  they  testify 
a  sentiment  to  which  my  heart  is  always  alive. 

My  letter  of  resignation  is  written,  and  will  be  delivered  to  the 
Legislature  in  two  or  three  days  ;  and,  as  it  is  understood  that  you 

1  This  refers  to  the  execution  of  the  British  treaty. 

2  John  Vining,  senator  from  Delaware. 

8  Frederick  Frelinghuysen,  general  in  the  Revolutionary  War,  and 
senator  from  New  Jersey. 

4  Elijah  Paine,  senator  from  Connecticut. 


96  LIFE  AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE   CABOT.     [1792  96. 

also  intend  to  relinquish  Congressional  service,  I  should  have  been 
willing  to  have  had  your  resignation  gone  before  mine.  Indeed? 
I  am  so  habituated  to  follow  or  act  with  you  that  I  should  have 
felt  more  satisfied  (if  possible)  that  I  was  doing  right.  You  were 
successful  in  your  intention  to  make  Mrs.  Cabot  and  me  laugh 
heartily,  by  proposing  that  I  should  write  you  from  Congress.  Yes, 
truly,  I  will  repay  your  fidelity  "  when  I  am  there,  and  you  are  at 
home" 

Judge  Lowell  has  just  mentioned  to  me  that  the  State  of 
Tennessee  is  actually  admitted  into  the  Union.  I  charge  this  to 
the  momentary  ill-humor  of  a  disappointed  gallant.  How  mortify 
ing  a  reflection  is  it  that  the  most  important  concerns  of  a  nation 
should  be  conducted  by  such  caprice  !  With  what  exultation  may 
the  ministers  of  monarchical  governments  expose  the  secret  move 
ments  of  our  pure  republican  system,  where  the  public  good  is  sup 
posed  to  be  the  constant  spring  of  action  ! 

But,  although  I  shall  never  be  able  to  entertain  you  with  what 
is  passing  among  the  aristocrats  of  the  great  world,  I  have  no 
reluctance  at  giving  you  a  faithful  narrative  of  what  occurs  at 
Greenhill.  Here  is  no  faction  nor  cabal,  although  our  government 
is  perfectly  democratic.  The  swinish  multitude  are  occasionally 
noisy  ;  but  a  sop  from  the  cook  or  a  pail  from  the  dairy-woman 
never  fails  to  quiet  them.  More  humane  than  those  of  Paris,  they 
are  satisfied  with  milk  instead  of  blood.  Accordingly,  we  go  on 
harmoniously  together  ;  I  supplying  their  table,  and  they  supply 
ing  mine.  I  wish  you  were  here  to  partake  of  one  out  of  twenty- 
five  which  my  breeders  have  been  good  enough  to  produce  this 
spring.  If  you  have  really  done  with  Congress,  as  I  fear  is  the 
case,  why  should  you  not  visit  Boston,  and  make  my  house  your 
lodging?  Be  assured  nothing  would  give  us  greater  pleasure, 
provided  you  do  not  attempt  to  rival  me  too  far  in  the  favor  of 
the  ladies  here. 

Your  unfeigned  and  affectionate  friend,  G.  CABOT. 


1796-98.1 


RETREAT   FROM   POLITICS. 


97 


p$t  TL;p^ 

UNIVERSITY 


CHAPTER  V. 


1796-1798. 

Retreat  from  Politics.  —  Suggested  for  the  French  Commission.  —  Political 
Services.  —  Correspondence. 

MR.  CABOT  wished  and  intended,  when  he  resigned  from 
the  Senate,  to  lead  a  perfectly  retired  life  and  one  of  unin 
terrupted  quiet.  He  thought  his  abandonment  of  office 
would  free  him  entirely  from  the  trials  of  patience  and 
temper  so  inseparable  from  political  life,  but  he  was  not 
destined  to  escape  so  easily.  The  four  years  of  Mr.  Adams's 
administration  were  crowded  with  important  questions,  and 
were  marked  by  those  bitter  dissensions  which  ultimately 
destroyed  the  Federalist  party.  However  much  Mr.  Cabot 
might  shut  out  the  world,  he  could  not  exclude  the  strong 
emotions  nor  repress  the  deep  interest  excited  in  his  mind 
by  the  course  of  French  policy  and  by  the  dangers  menac 
ing  both  his  party  and  his  country.  He  was  often  applied 
to  for  advice  during  this  critical  period,  was  frequently 
consulted  by  the  party  leaders,  and  was  finally  called 
upon  in  such  a  way  that  he  was  forced  to  render  active 
assistance.  Though  he  refused  office,  he  .could  not  refuse 
his  friends  the  aid  of  his  influence  and  exertions  within 
his  own  immediate  sphere.  His  correspondence  from  the 
time  of  his  resignation  to  the  accession  of  Jefferson 
furnishes  abundant  evidence  of  much  unassuming  politi 
cal  activity.  True  to  his  first  idea  of  seclusion,  he  took 
no  part  in  the  canvass  which  occurred  soon  after  his 
resignation,  and  which  resulted  in  the  choice  of  Mr. 
Adams.  His  opinions  as  to  the  proper  course  for  the 

7 


98  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1796-98. 

Federalists,  in  this  instance,  were  clear  and  distinct.  Mr. 
Cabot  believed  that  the  first  object  was  to  defeat  at  all 
hazards  the  election  of  a  Democratic,  or,  to  use  his  own 
words,  a  "  French  President."  This  point  assured,  he  con 
ceived  that  the  next  duty  of  the  party  was  to  unite  on  Mr. 
Adams  as  their  first  choice.  In  a  letter  to  Wolcott,  he  says  : 
"I  do  not  hesitate  to  avow  my  opinion  that  the  first  and 
highest  duty  of  the  electors  was  to  prevent  the  election  of 
a  French  President ;  and,  this  being  provided  for,  the  next 
object  would  have  been  to  secure  the  election  of  Mr.  Adams. 
But  I  will  never  admit  that  we  ought  to  take  any  consider 
able  risk  of  seeing  a  French  or  any  foreign  President 
rather  than  the  risk  of  any  one  Federal  candidate  in  pref 
erence  to  another." 1  Mr.  Cabot's  preferences  were  de 
cidedly  in  favor  of  Mr.  Adams,  in  which  he  differed  from 
Hamilton,  whose  personal  inclinations  were  all  for  Pinck- 
ney  ;  nor  does  he  seem  to  have  been  alarmed  in  regard 
to  the  Vice-Presidency,  about  which  Hamilton  was  at  this 
time  so  justly  anxious.2 

1  See  below,  p.  119. 

2  I  have  elsewhere  (North  American  Review  for  July,  1876)  discussed 
Hamilton's  position  as  to  the  Federalist  candidates,  and  I  have  there  taken 

/The  ground  that  Hamilton's  openly  expressed  preference  for  Pinckney  never 
led  him  into  an  attempt  to  bring  in  that  gentleman  over  Mr.  Adams.  Ham 
ilton's  exertions  were  directed  to  having  all  the  electors  vote  for  Adams  and 
Pinckney,  because  he  wished  at  all  hazards  to  secure  both  offices.  He  was 
perfectly  willing  to  risk  the  choice  of  Pinckney  to  the  first  place,  but  to 
assert  that  he  ever  intrigued  to  bring  about  such  a  result  seemed  to  me 
unwarranted  by  the  authorities.  The  charge  against  Hamilton  of  trying  to 
relegate  Mr.  Adams  to  the  Vice-Presidency  was  freely  made  at  the  time  by 
Mr  Adams's  supporters,  and  was  flatly  denied  by  the  other  wing  of  the 
party.  The  accusation  has  been  repeated  by  later  writers,  but  seems  wholly 
unsustained  on  any  reasonable  construction  of  the  numerous  private  letters 
relating  to  that  time  and  now  before  the  public.  This  view  is  confirmed  by 
the  letters  in  this  volume.  Mr.  Cabot  was  in  a  position  to  know  of  such  an 
intrigue,  had  it  existed.  He  was  in  all  the  Federalist  counsels,  was  the  inti 
mate  friend  of  Hamilton,  and  yet  never  alludes  to  any  scheme  intended  to 
benefit  Pinckney  at  the  expense  of  Mr.  Adams.  His  silence  on  such  a  point 
is  strong  proof  that  the  story  had  no  foundation,  but  what  he  does  say  in 
regard  to  the  election  is  even  more  striking  and  convincing.  From  Mr. 
Cabot's  description  of  the  probable  action  of  the  Massachusetts  electoral 


P< 
u 

re 


1796-08.] 


THE   PRESIDENTIAL   ELECTION   OF  17C6.  99 


"While  the  Presidential  election  was  in  progress  and  dur 
ing  the  ensuing  winter,  public  attention  became  more  and 
more  engrossed  by  our  relations  with  France.  Monroe, 
substituted  for  Morris  as  a  conciliatory  measure,  had  in 
gratiated  himself  with  our  "  magnanimous  allies ;  "  if  not 
at  the  expense  of  his  own  self-respect,  certainly  with  great 
detriment  to  the  dignity  of  the  country  he  represented. 
This  jinwise,  if  not  improper,  conduct  provoked  the  censure 
of  Washington,  and  finally  led  to  Monroe's  recall,  and  to  the 
appointment  of  General  Pinckney  in  his  stead.  Mr.  Cabot 
viewed  Monroe's  course  with  a  steadily  increasing  aversion, 
which  culminated  in  the  deepest  indignation  when  the  news 
came  of  the  insults  offered  to  Pinckney  on  his  arrival  in 
Paris,  and  the  still  more  degrading  flattery  lavished  upon 
the  departing  Monroe.  The  subsequent  dismissal  of  our 
minister  with  every  mark  of  contempt,  and  the  renewal  of 
extensive  depredations  on  our  commerce,  rendered  war  im 
minent.  While  affairs  were  in  this  unpromising  condition, 
the  new  President  was  inaugurated.  Mr.  Adams,  believing 
fully  in  the  Washingtonian  policy  of  a  strong  neutrality, 
desired  above  every  thing  to  prevent  by  all  honorable  means 
the  disaster  of  a  French  war,  and  his  attention  therefore  was 
at  once  directed  to  the  scheme  of  a  special  embassy.  The 
necessity  of  such  a  step  Hamilton  had  foreseen  some  months 
before.  In  a  letter  dated  Jan.  22,  1797,  Hamilton  pressed 
this  matter  on  Washington's  attention  : 1  — 

"  The  best  form  of  the  thing,  in  my  view,  is  a  commission  in 
cluding  three  persons,  who  may  be  called  commissioners  pleni 
potentiary  and  extraordinary.  Two  of  the  three  should  be  Mr. 
Madison  and  Mr.  Pinckney ;  a  third  may  be  taken  from  the  north 
ern  States,  and  I  know  of  none  better  than  Mr.  Cabot,  who,  or 
any  two  of  whom,  may  be  empowered  to  act. 

college,  it  is  evident  that  the  only  risk  anybody  there  meant  to  run  was  that 
of  bringing  in  Jefferson  rather  than  endanger  the  choice  of  Mr.  Adams  to 
the  first  place.    All  the  Massachusetts  electors  were  of  course  supporters 
of  Mr.  Adams.     See  below,  p.  112. 
i  Hamilton's  Works,  VI.  195. 


100  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1796-98. 

"  Mr.  Madison  will  have  the  confidence  of  the  French  and  of 
the  opposition.  Mr.  Pinckney  will  have  something  of  the  same 
advantage  in  an  inferior  degree.  Mr.  Cabot,  without  being  able  to 
prevent  their  doing  what  is  right,1  will  be  a  salutary  check  upon 
too  much  Gallicism,  and  his  real  commercial  knowledge  will  sup 
ply  their  want  of  it.  Besides  that,  he  will  enjoy  the  confidence  of 
all  the  friends  of  the  administration.  His  disposition  to  preserve 
peace  is  ardent  and  unqualified. 

"This  plan,  too,  I  think,  will  consist  with  all  reasonable  atten 
tion  to  Mr.  Pinckney's  feelings. 

"  Or  (which,  however,  I  think  less  eligible)  Mr.  Madison  and 
Mr.  Pinckney  only  may  be  joint  commissioners,  without  a  third 
person. 

"  Mr.  Cabot,  if  appointed  without  being  consulted,  will,  I  think, 
certainly  go." 

No  action  was  taken  by  Washington  in  this  important 
matter.  The  approaching  end  of  his  term  of  office,  and 
the  short-sighted  opposition  of  Pickering  and  Wolcott  to  a 
peace  policy,  probably  induced  him  to  leave  a  settlement 
of  this  difficult  business  to  his  successor.  The  idea  of  the 
commission,  however,  was  ever  present  to  Hamilton's  mind, 
and  we  find  him  writing  to  Sedgwick,  Feb.  26,  1797  :  — 

"  Were  I  Mr.  Adams  then,  I  believe  I  should  begin  my  Presi 
dency  by  naming  an  extraordinary  commission  to  the  French 
republic ;  and  I  think  it  would  consist  of  three  persons,  Mr.  Madi 
son,  Mr.  Pinckney,  and  Mr.  Cabot.  I  should  pursue  this  course 
for  several  reasons :  because  I  would  have  a  man  as  influential 
with  the  French  as  Mr.  Madison,  yet  I  would  not  trust  him  alone, 
lest  his  Gallicism  should  work  amiss ;  because  I  would  not  wound 
Mr.  Pinckney,  so  recently  sent  in  the  same  spirit ;  thirdly,  I  think 
Cabot  would  mix  very  useful  ingredients  in  the  cup." 2 

The  morning  after  the  inauguration,  Fisher  Ames,  then 
about  to  retire  from  public  life,  called  upon  the  new 

1  This  I  understand  to  refer  to  the  dangers  to  be  apprehended  in  a  nego 
tiation,  from  Mr.  Cabot's  bitter  and,  as  far  as  it  was  in  his  nature,  violent 
hatred  of  France,  the  French,  and  all  their  works.     The  excesses  of  the 
French  Revolution  had  deeply  prejudiced  Mr.  Cabot  against  every  thing 
Gallic. 

2  Hamilton's  Works,  VI.  209. 


1796-98.]  FRENCH  COMMISSION.  101 

President,  and  after  speaking  of  the  state  of  our  French 
relations,  of  the  necessity  of  a  commission,  and  of  sending 
some  man  who  would  command  the  confidence  of  the 
Northern  States,  recommended  the  appointment  of  Mr. 
Cabot.  Ames  suggested  that  Mr.  Cabot  should  be  sent  as 
one  of  the  three,  if  a  commission  was  determined  on,  or 
alone,  if  but  one  was  to  go.  Mr.  Adams,  after  describing 
this  interview,  says :  — 

"  I  had  thought  of  Mr.  Ames  himself,  as  well  as  Mr.  Cabot, 
Judge  Dana,  Mr.  Gerry,  and  many  others." *  "I  considered  Mr. 
Ames's  candidate,  Mr.  Cabot,  as  deliberately  as  any  of  the  others, 
and  with  as  favorable  and  friendly  a  disposition  as  any  other 
without  exception.  But  I  knew  his  character  and  connections 
were  as  well  known  in  France,  particularly  by  Talleyrand,  as  Mr. 
Gerry's  were  ;  and  that  there  were  great  objections  against  the 
former,  and  none  at  all  against  the  latter.  It  would  be  therefore 
inexcusable  in  me  to  hazard  the  success  of  the  mission  merely  to 
gratify  the  passions  of  a  party  in  America,  especially  as  I  knew 
Mr.  Gerry,  to  say  the  least,  to  be  full  as  well  qualified  by  his 
studies,  his  experience,  and  every  quality,  for  the  service  as  the 
other."  2 

While  the  President  hesitated  as  to  the  composition  of 
the  embassy,  Hamilton  was  urging  the  necessity  of  the 
measure  upon  all  the  leading  men  of  his  party.  On  March 
22,  1797,  he  wrote  to  Pickering :  — 

..."  I  would  appoint  a  commission  extraordinary,  to  con 
sist  of  Mr.  Jefferson  or  Mr.  Madison,  together  with  Mr.  Cabot 
and  Mr.  Pinckney.  To  be  useful,  it  is  important  that  a  man 
agreeable  to  the  French  should  go.  But  neither  Madison  nor 
Jefferson  ought  to  go  alone.  The  three  will  give  security.  It 
will  natter  the  French  pride.  It  will  engage  American  confidence, 
and  recommend  the  people  to  what  shall  be  eventually  necessary."  8 

Again,  a  few  weeks  later,  he  wrote  to  Wolcott,  arguing 
with  great  force  the  wisdom  of  such  a  mission  as  he 
describes :  — 

1  Works  of  John  Adams,  Letters  to  the  "Boston  Patriot,"  IX.  283. 

2  Ibid.,  IX.  287. 

8  Hamilton's  Works,  VI.  214. 


102  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE   CABOT.     [1796-98. 

"  We  ought  to  do  every  thing  to  avoid  rupture  without  unworthy 
sacrifice,  and  to  keep  in  view,  as  a  primary  object,  union  at  home. 
No  measure  can  tend  more  to  this  than  an  extraordinary  mission. 
And  it  is  certain,  to  fulfil  these  ends  proposed,  it  ought  to  embrace 
a  character  in  whom  France  and  the  opposition  have  full  credit. 
What  risk  can  attend  sending  Madison,  if  combined,  as  I  propose, 
with  Pinckney  and  Cabot  ?  or  such  a  man  (two  deciding )  ?  Depend 
on  it,  Pinckney  is  a  man  of  honor,  and  loves  his  country.  Cabot 
we  both  know." 1 

At  the  same  time,  Hamilton  wrote  to  William  Smith, 
and  in  discussing  the  proposed  commission  said  :  — • 

"And,  to  produce  the  desired  effect,  it  seems  to  me  essential 
that  it  shall  embrace  a  distinguished  character,  agreeable  to  France 
and  having  the  confidence  of  the  adverse  party.  Hence  I  think 
of  Madison ;  but  I  think  of  him  only  as  one,  because  I  would  not 
trust  him  alone.  I  would  unite  with  him  Pinckney  and  some 
strong  man  from  the  North,  —  Jay,  Cabot ;  and  two  of  the  three 
should  rule.  We  should  then  be  safe." 

From  these  extracts,  Hamilton's  plan,  or  rather  the  prin 
ciples  on  which  it  was  based,  may  be  readily  understood 
and  appreciated.  Sharp,  strong,  and  well-defined,  this  pol 
icy  bore  all  the  characteristic  marks  of  the  mind  which 
devised  it.  The  central  figure  in  Hamilton's  arrangement 
of  the  commission  was  the  "  distinguished  character "  of 
the  opposition.  The  subordinate  parts  were  to  be  filled  by- 
two  strong  Federalists,  one  from  the  South,  the  other  from 
the  North ;  and  they  were  to  be  the  checks  and  balances  on 
the  movements  of  their  colleague.  In  this  way,  dignity, 
force,  and  consistency  would  have  been  imparted  to  the 
embassy  from  the  outset,  and  not  only  the  geographical 
but  the  political  exigencies  would  have  been  duly  provided 
for.  There  was  one  man  in  the  United  States  pre 
eminently  fitted  to  play  the  part  of  the  u  distinguished 
character"  of  the  opposition,  and  there  was  only  one. 

1  Administrations  of  Washington  and  Adams,  I.  490;  and  Works  of 
Hamilton,  VI.  230. 


1796-98.]  FKENCH  COMMISSION.  103 

Send  any  one  else  in  Madison's  place,  and  the  difficulties  of 
the  situation  were  enhanced  at  once  a  thousand-fold.  The 
two  strong  Federalists,  on  the  contrary,  might  have  been 
replaced  by  a  dozen  others  equally  good.  Mr.  Adams 
remembered  the  geographical,  but  not  the  political  uni 
ties.  The  commission  sent  was  composed  of  Pinckney, 
Marshall,  and  Gerry.  Pinckney  was  common  to  both 
arrangements.  Marshall  and  Gerry  replaced,  in  Mr. 
Adams's  commission,  Cabot  and  Madison,  as  suggested  by 
Hamilton.  Mr.  Adams  apparently  labored  under  the  idea 
that  he  was  merely  substituting  Gerry  for  Cabot,  both 
being  Northern  men ;  while  in  reality  Marshall  took 
Cabot's  place,  and  Gerry  Madison's.  This  was  an  all- 
important  difference.  To  send  Marshall  instead  of  Cabot 
was  wise,  but  to  exchange  Madison  for  Gerry  was  ruinous. 
The  whole  merit  of  the  scheme  resided  in  "'  the  distin 
guished  character  "  of  the  opposition,  by  whose  presence  the 
country  would  be  united  and  France  appeased,  yet  whose 
dangerous  tendencies  would  be  controlled  by  the  two  sup 
porters  of  the  administration.  Madison  was  such  a  character, 
a  man  of  first-rate  intellectual  powers,  of  wisdom  and  address, 
while  Gerry  was  neither.  Partly  from  the  ill-advised  opposi 
tion  1  of  his  secretaries,  who  resisted  the  appointment  of  Mad- 

1  See  Wolcott  to  Hamilton,  Hamilton's  Works,  VI.  223.  Mr.  Adams, 
in  his  letters  to  the  "  Boston  Patriot "  (Works,  IX.  287),  says :  "  I  then  called 
the  heads  of  departments  together,  and  proposed  Mr.  Gerry.  All  the  five 
voices  unanimously  were  against  him.  Such  inveterate  prejudice  shocked 
me,"  &c.  In  deference  to  the  opposition  excited,  Mr.  Adams  gave  up  Mad 
ison,  who  was  in  every  respect  just  the  one  man  for  the  place,  but,  stimulated 
by  the  same  opposition  to  Gerry,  nominated  him  at  once.  Wolcott's  scheme 
of  joining  J.  Q.  Adams  and  Ingersoll  (Hamilton's  Works,  VI.  223)  to 
Pinckney  was,  of  course,  absurd  on  its  face.  Neither  the  younger  Adams 
at  that  time,  nor  Ingersoll  at  any  time,  was  of  sufficient  weight  and  promi 
nence  to  be  placed  on  such  a  mission.  Mr.  Adams's  blunder  in  saying 
ail  "  five  "  opposed  him  has  been  admitted  in  the  complete  edition  of  his 
works.  There  were  at  that  time  but  four  cabinet  officers. 

The  letters  of  the  secretaries  differ  most  materially  from  Mr.  Adams's 
account  of  this  interview,  and  McHenry's  especially  shows  how  much  later 
animosities  and  passions  had  distorted  Mr.  Adams's  views,  and  made  him 


104  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.      [1796-98. 

ison  only  to  be  saddled  with  that  of  Gerry,  partly  from  his 
own  obstinacy,  his  strange  partiality  to  Gerry,  and  his  notion 
that  he  was  only  putting  him  in  Cabot's  place,  Mr.  Adams 
blundered  into  this  fatal  appointment.  Had  he  but  per 
ceived  that  Madison  was  the  essential  part  of  the  commis 
sion,  all  would  have  gone  well.  The  President  yielded  to 
opposition  in  Madison's  case,  and  disregarded  it  in  that  of 
Gerry.  By  an  opposite  course,  not  only  the  subsequent 
troubles  with  France  might  have  been  averted,  but  the 
political  ruin  in  which  the  Federalists  were  afterwards 
involved  might  have  been  prevented.  Mr.  Adams  took 
the  ground  that  Gerry  justified  all  his  hopes,1  and  brought 
back  the  intelligence  which  ultimately  led  to  peace.  No 
one  now  would  question  Gerry's  honesty  or  integrity  of  pur 
pose  ;  but  he  was  a  man  of  slight  intellect,  dull  perceptions, 
and  no  great  force  of  will  or  character.  Such  a  man  was 
strong  enough  to  quarrel  with  his  associates,  but  not  strong 
enough  to  baffle  Talleyrand,  guide  the  course  of  the  com 
mission,  and  bring  the  negotiation  to  a  successful  issue. 
All  this  Madison  might  possibly  have  done.  Gerry,  with 
every  appearance  of  having  compromised  both  himself  and 
his  office,  merely  brought  home  information  such  as  an  indus 
trious  and  intelligent  valet  might  have  gleaned ;  while  the 
objects  of  the  mission  were  left  a  hopeless  wreck,  and  the 
Federalist  party  plunged  in  a  desperate  quarrel  among 
themselves. 

I  have  dwelt  upon  this  point  at  some  length,  because  Mr. 
Cabot's  name  is  so  mixed  up  in  the  whole  affair.     He  does 

believe  in  the  existence  of  mysterious  and  deadly  hostility,  when  nothing 
of  the  sort  existed.  McHenry's  account  of  the  transaction  is  at  least 
perfectly  natural,  and  does  not  require  a  strong  effort  of  the  imagination 
from  the  reader.  Either  McHenry,  a  perfectly  honorable  man,  has  wilfully 
and  knowingly  lied,  or  the  "inveterate  prejudice  against  Gerry/' and  the 
affection  for  Cabot  on  the  part  of  the  heads  of  departments,  has  been 
greatly  exaggerated  by  Mr.  Adams,  induced  by  the  memory  of  later  and 
more  bitter  struggles  to  see  plots  and  intrigues  in  every  incident  of  his 
administration. 

1  Works  of  John  Adams,  IX.  288. 


1796-98.]  FRENCH  COMMISSION.  105 

not  himself  appear  to  have  known  that  his  name  was  even 
suggested  by  his  friends  for  this  important  post.  He  was 
opposed  to  the  plan  of  a  commission  ;  for,  though  appreciat 
ing  the  value  of  peace,  and,  in  the  event  of  war,  the  necessity 
of  union,  he  did  not  believe  that  any  further  pacific  dealings 
with  France  could  result  in  good.  In  the  disputes  of  which 
he  was  to  some  extent  the  innocent  cause,  Mr.  Cabot  had, 
therefore,  no  personal  interest  whatever;  and  that  Mr. 
Adams,  too,  at  the  time  was  free  from  any  personal  motives, 
is  proved  by  his  offering  to  Mr.  Cabot  soon  afterwards  a 
seat  in  his  cabinet.  Unfortunately,  Mr.  Adams  believed 
subsequently  that  his  rejection  of  Mr.  Cabot  was  his  "  first 
offence  against  the  sovereign  heads  of  departments."  I 
have  been  unable  to  find  in  Mr.  Cabot's  correspondence  or 
elsewhere  any  proof  of  this  assertion.  The  secretaries  were 
averse  to  any  mission  at  all,  and  especially  hostile  to  one 
which  comprised  Madison  or  Gerry.  This  was  the  true 
cause  of  their  opposition  at  the  time  to  the  schemes  of  both 
Adams  and  Hamilton ;  and  they  gave  a  sullen  acquiescence 
to  the  measures  adopted.  If  the  secretaries  had  felt  ag 
grieved  by  the  non-appointment  of  Cabot,  it  would  have 
appeared  in  their  letters.  Is  it  conceivable  that  the  selec 
tion  of  Cabot  should  have  reconciled  them  to  a  policy  so 
distasteful  that  they  had  opposed  Hamilton  in  regard 
to  it?  Though  Hamilton's  scheme  had  included  Mr. 
Cabot  as  an  essential  part,  still  Pickering  and  Wolcott  dis 
liked  it  none  the  less.  The  fact  was  that  Mr.  Adams  en 
tirely  misconceived  the  true  state  of  affairs,  and  his  belief 
that  "  the  rejection  of  Mr.  Cabot  was  his  first  offence  against 
the  sovereign  heads  of  departments  "  is  not  sustained  by  the 
evidence. 

In  the  interval  between  the  arrival  of  the  news  of  Pinck- 
ney's  dismissal  and  the  assembling  of  Congress  in  special 
session,  it  became  all  important  to  rouse  the  people  to  a 
sense  of  the  aggressions  of  France,  and  to  prepare  the  pub 
lic  mind  for  strong  action  on  the  part  of  the  executive. 


106  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.     [1796-98. 

Wolcott  therefore  wrote  to  Mr.  Cabot,  setting  forth  the 
probable  policy  of  the  government,  and  urging  him  to  use 
all  his  influence  that  a  right  direction  might  be  given  to 
public  opinion.  Averse  as  Mr.  Cabot  was  to  political  activ 
ity  of  all  sorts,  this  was  an  occasion  on  which  he  could  not 
hold  back.  To  rouse  the  people  against  France,  to  bring 
home  to  them,  if  possible,  the  infamous  conduct  of  their 
"  magnanimous  allies,"  was  a  duty  from  which  Mr.  Cabot 
had  no  wish  to  shrink.  He  at  once  addressed  a  circular 
letter  to  several  of  the  leading  New  England  Federalists, 
in  which  he  described  the  attitude  of  France  in  the  late 
negotiations,  and  the  probable  policy  of  the  administration, 
and  urged  the  greatest  efforts  to  obtain  for  the  govern 
ment  a  hearty  and  general  support.  He  also  sent  several 
articles,1  conceived  in  the  same  spirit,  to  the  papers,  and 
lost  no  opportunity  to  declare  the  sentiments  by  which,  at 
that  crisis,  all  good  men  ought  to  be  actuated.  Just  before 
the  opening  of  Congress,  Mr.  Cabot  addressed  a  second 
letter  to  a  few  friends  in  public  positions,  giving  his  views 
on  the  situation.  He  therein  expressed  his  hostility  to 
an  embassy,  and  dwelt  upon  the  importance  of  prompt 
war  measures.  He  even  went  so  far  as  to  suggest  the  pos 
sible  necessity  of  an  embargo,  a  policy  to  which  he  was 
always  consistently  opposed.  But,  above  every  thing,  he 
urged  the  need  of  a  cordial  and  united  support  of  the  exec 
utive,  to  whom  he  looked  for  a  clear  and  well-digested  plan 
of  action.  Even  the  assurance  that  Hamilton  was  anxious  for 
the  new  embassy  could  not  reconcile  Mr.  Cabot  to  the  scheme. 
It  was  his  firm  conviction  that  any  more  friendly  dealings 
with  France  would  tend  only  to  the  revival  of  the  Gallo 
mania  and  Jacobinism  in  the  United  States. 

"  Quidquid  id  est,  timeo  Danaos  et  dona  ferentes ; " 
Laocoon's  famous  sentence  in  its  widest  extent  not  unfitly 
represented  Mr.  Cabot's  feeling  then  and  always  in  regard 

to  the  French. 

1  See  pp.  581-600. 


179G-98.J  CORRESPONDENCE.  107 

On  May  13th,  Congress  met.  The  firm  and  manly  tone 
of  the  President's  message  delighted  Mr.  Cabot,  and  com 
manded  his  fullest  support  and  admiration.  His  one  anx 
iety  was  now  in  regard  to  the  action  of  the  House ;  and, 
with  a  view  to  influencing  them,  he  exerted  himself  to  pro 
cure  from  the  Massachusetts  Legislature  an  expression  of 
opinion  favorable  to  the  President's  views.  Although  the 
Federalist  policy  proved  in  a  slight  degree  successful  in 
Congress,  the  extra  session  was  consumed,  for  the  most  part, 
in  hopeless  wrangling  and  futile  party  strife. 

The  American  envoys  reached  Paris  in  October,  1797 ; 
and  a  few  weeks  later  Congress  again  assembled  for  the 
regular  session.  The  President  urged,  in  his  message,  the 
necessity  of  still  stronger  defensive  measures,  although  refer 
ring  hopefully  to  the  prospects  of  the  French  mission. 
Congress  responded  but  faintly  to  the  vigorous  policy  of 
the  Executive.  Every  one  was  waiting  and  expectant,  for 
it  was  universally  felt  that  nothing  decisive  could  be  done 
until  the  fate  of  the  pending  negotiation  was  settled.  The 
Federalists  urged  warlike  preparations,  and  the  Democrats 
resisted ;  but  political  interests  and  speculations  were  cen 
tred  on  the  irregular  and  tardy  mails  bearing  the  latest 
news  from  Europe. 


PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

(Private.) 

PHILADELPHIA,  June  11,  1796. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  The  President  has  determined  to  make  a  change 
in  the  consulate  at  Hamburg.  Do  you  know  of  any  respectable 
American  citizen,  of  a  mercantile  character,  who  would  be  willing 
to  accept  the  appointment?  It  has,  I  take  it,  been  a  lucrative 
place,  even  by  the  fees  of  office  ;  although  these  couJd  be  of  little 
consequence  to  a  merchant  of  Mr.  Parish's 1  great  wealth  and 

1  Mr.  Parish's  case  was  one  of  the  many  difficulties  which  arose  during 
Mr.  Monroe's  ambassadorship.  Parish  was  an  English  merchant,  who  had 
befriended  us  during  the  Revolution.  Our  consular  system,  owing  to  our 


103  LIFE   AXD    LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1796-98. 

extensive  dealings.  Yet  there  have  been  repeated  complaints 
against  him  for  taking  exorbitant  fees  (as  seven  dollars  instead 
of  two  for  every  certificate),  which,  considering  his  established 
reputation  and  riches,  appears  unaccountable.  Of  this,  however, 
an  explanation  would  have  been  asked,  if  other  causes  of  a  politi 
cal  nature  had  not  influenced  the  decision.  The  change  will  be 
softened  to  Mr.  Parish,  if  a  worthy  American  succeeds  him ;  and 
in  this  light  I  have  placed  the  matter  in  my  letter,  advising  him  of 
the  President's  determination. 

Pray  inquire  among  your  friends,  and  favor  me  with  an   an 
swer.  .  .  . 

I  am  very  sincerely  yours,  T.  PICKERING. 

commerce,  was  extensive ;  and  in  many  places  it  was  impossible  to  have 
an  American  citizen  in  the  office  of  consul.  Such  was  the  case  at  Ham 
burg  ;  and  Mr.  Parish,  on  account  of  former  good  offices,  eminent  posi 
tion  in  the  mercantile  community,  and  good  reputation,  was  selected  as 
our  representative.  As  was  common  then  and  now,  he  was  also  agent  for 
another  country,  and,  as  it  happened,  England.  Keports  reached  Monroe 
that  Mr.  Parish,  "comparatively  with  England"  (Parish's  native  country), 
was  unfriendly  to  America ;  that  he  was  "  absolutely  unfriendly  to  France 
and  the  French  Revolution ;  "  that  he  was  an  agent  for  Great  Britain,  and 
that  he  granted  American  passports  to  Englishmen.  The  three  first  of 
these  charges  were  undoubtedly  true,  and,  though  objectionable  on  the 
score  of  policy,  were  not  of  such  a  nature  as  to  justify  a  peremptory  dis 
missal.  The  last  charge  as  to  issuing  false  passports  would,  if  true,  have 
been  a  gross  violation  of  morality  and  of  trust.  In  regard  to  this,  Monroe 
says,  "In  justice,  however,  to  this  gentleman,  I  must  add  that  I  do  not 
know  any  instance  in  which  he  has  betrayed  in  this  respect  [passports],  and 
that  in  others  I  only  apply  to  him  general  principles,  and  bring  to  your  view 
the  complaints  of  our  countrymen."  To  this  recommendation,  dated  July  6, 
1795,  for  the  removal  of  Parish  "on  general  principles/'  Colonel  Pickering, 
then  acting  Secretary  of  State,  replied  on  November  23d  of  the  same  year : 
"  Your  suggestions  in  regard  to  Mr.  Parish,  our  consul  at  Hamburg,  have 
led  me  to  remind  Mr.  Adams  of  a  request  formerly  made  to  him,  to  inquire 
into  his  conduct,  and  report  the  same  to  this  department.  Such  I  under 
stand  to  be  the  fact,  and  that  no  report  has  yet  been  received."  This  was 
a  proper  and  natural  answer  to  what  Monroe  himself  treated  merely  as  a 
subject  to  which  he  desired  to  call  the  attention  of  the  government.  Before 
Monroe  received  this  letter,  he  had  received  one  from  a  different  quarter.  On 
Dec.  5,  1795,  or  rather  on  the  13th  Frimaire,  in  the  fourth  year  of  the  Repub 
lic,  De  la  Croix  wrote  to  Monroe,  requesting  the  recall  of  Parish,  as  an  agent 
of  England  and  a  granter  of  false  passports.  When  Pickering's  letter  came 
therefore,  Monroe  was  prepared  to  describe  it  "  as  advising  him  that  this 
British  subject  should  not  be  compelled  to  yield  his  post  to  an  American 
citizen,  at  my  request,  supported  as  it  was  by  such  weighty  reasons."  This 


1796-98.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  109 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  July  8,  1796. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  inquired  diligently  for  a  character  to  sup 
ply  the  vacancy  at  Hamburg,  and  all  my  friends  unite  in  the  belief 
that  Mr.  Samuel  Williams,1  of  Salem,  is  a  very  suitable  man.  His 
reputation  for  integrity  and  good  sense  is  thoroughly  established ; 
and  I  fully  believe  his  appointment  would  be  thought  a  wise  .one 
by  all  who  know  him.  He  has  been  for  some  time  past  in  France, 
and  is  now  in  England,  where  his  brother  Timothy  supposes  he 
would  reside  a  year  or  two ;  *  but,  although  it  cannot  be  ascer 
tained  here  yet,  yet  he  thinks  it  in  the  highest  degree  probable 
that  he  would  readily  accept  the  trust. 

Yours  sincerely  and  faithfully,  G.  CABOT. 

*  [That  is,  if  not  called  by  any  appointment  or  other  occasion  to  quit 
England.  —  T.  P.] 


ingenious  misrepresentation  may  be  passed  over  in  favor  of  one  which 
immediately  succeeds  it.  Monroe  says,  "  For  although  the  administration 
(not  being  able  to  resist  the  objections  to  his  continuance)  did  remove  him, 
yet  it  was  done  in  a  manner  so  as  to  show  the  French  government  it  was 
not  done  in  compliance  with  its  request."  This  statement  Monroe  bases 
on  a  letter  of  Pickering's  (dated  June  2,  1796)  to  the  French  minister,  in 
answer  to  one  complaining  of  Parish.  In  this  letter,  Pickering  says 
that,  in  consequence  of  Monroe's  complaints,  inquiries  had  been  insti 
tuted  in  regard  to  Parish,  but  were  not  yet  concluded.  He  then  says 
that  Parish  had  an  undoubted  right  to  act  as  agent  for  England,  and 
characterizes  the  issuing  of  false  passports  as  a  crime  of  the  deepest 
dye.  But  Pickering  adds,  there  is  no  proof  of  this  last  charge,  and 
then  continues :  "  Desirous,  however,  of  maintaining  a  course  of  action  as 
impartial  as  his  principles,  the  President  has  for  some  time  contemplated 
a  change  in  the  consulate  at  Hamburg,  and  proposes  to  supply  the  place  of 
a  foreigner  by  an  American  citizen."  The  letter  to  Mr.  Cabot  ten  days 
later  was  the  result  of  this  determination.  From  this  letter,  and  the  passage 
just  quoted  from  Pickering's  official  note,  it  is  evident  that  Parish  was 
removed  solely  and  openly  on  general  grounds  of  policy  and  from  prin 
ciples  of  strict  neutrality,  while  Monroe  represents  the  government  as  con 
cealing  their  motives.  The  confutation  of  this  specimen  charge  may  be 
drawn  entirely  from  the  documents  cited  by  Monroe  himself.  (View  of 
Conduct  of  Executive,  pp.  xlvii,  195,  302,  319,  and  368.)  It  is  of  importance, 
as  bearing  on  the  general  character  of  Monroe  and  his  French  mission. 

1  Mr.  Williams  was  subsequently  appointed,  and  accepted  the  office.  At 
a  later  day,  Mr.  Williams  was  the  largest  American  banker  in  London.  He 
was  a  nephew  of  Colonel  Pickering. 


110  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1796-98. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  Aug.  31,  1796. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  feel  much  indebted  to  you  for  your  favor 
of  the  22d,  and  am  rejoiced  at  the  information  it  contains.  Gov 
ernment  cannot  long  be  respected,  if  it  should  submit  tamely  to  the 
abuse  of  its  own  servants  ;  and  this  sentiment  is  so  natural  that  a 
general  indignation  is  felt  at  the  supposed  baseness  of  our  minister.1 
His  disgrace  is  surely  merited,  and  his  recall  is  highly  approved 
by  all  those  whose  opinions  I  have  heard.  There  are,  indeed,  some 
who  think  the  measure  has  been  too  long  delayed,  because  they 
fully  believe  that  the  French  executive  has  been  invited  to  bully  us 
for  daring  to  be  so  independent  as  to  be  just  to  ourselves.  It  is 
unfortunate  for  our  country  that  a  fact  of  this  kind,  however  true, 
is  not  very  susceptible  of  proof,  since  a  mere  negative  conduct  in 
the  minister  may  be  perfectly  understood,  and  therefore  none  but 
the  greatest  of  all  blockheads  would  be  likely  to  go  farther ;  and 
yet  it  has  been  frequently  said,  by  Americans  coming  from  France, 
that  the  execrations  of  our  government  were  confined  chiefly  to 
that  circle  of  society  of  which  Mr.  Monroe  was  the  centre.  What 
ever  may  be  the  final  destiny  of  our  national  system,  it  cannot  be 
doubted  that  those  who  are  entrusted  with  the  administration  will 
have  the  concurrence  of  every  honest  citizen  in  displacing  faithless 
officers  and  disgracing  treacherous  ones.  The  examples  which 
have  already  occurred  I  am  persuaded  have  increased  the  respect 
of  the  people,  and  have  discouraged  the  efforts  of  faction.  It  is 
asked  what  becomes  of  Skipwith,2  the  tool  of  Monroe.  I  have 
answered  that  I  know  nothing  of  the  disposition  of  the  executive 
towards  him,  but  that  it  may  be  relied  upon,  or  he  would  be  no 
longer  suffered  to  hold  a  public  trust  after  he  shall  have  been 
proved  unworthy  of  it  by  reasonable  testimony,  but  that  those  who 
complain  of  him  ought  not  to  imagine  that  the  executive  can 
know  his  conduct  without  being  informed,  or  that  it  will  act  with- 


1  Monroe. 

2  Fulwar  Skipwith  was  Monroe's  secretary.     On  the  death  of  Barclay, 
our  consul  at  Paris,  Monroe  appointed  Skipwith  to  fill  the  office  temporarily. 
Skipwith  was  as  ardent  a  Franco-maniac  as  Monroe,  and  the  latter's  confi 
dential  adviser.     See  Monroe's  Conduct  of  the  Executive,  pp.  viii,  39,  50, 
57,  87,  94,  &c. 


1796-08.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  Ill 

out  a  competent  knowledge.     1  pray  you  to  make  my  regards 
acceptable   to    Mrs.   Pickering,  and   be  assured  that  I  am 

Your  faithful  friend,  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  Oct.  11,  1796. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  — ...  The  President's  advice 1  is  an  excellent 
coronation  of  an  excellent  public  life.  I  think  it  will  do  as  much 
as  an)T  thing  can  toward  saving  us  from  the  miserable  servitude 
to  which  our  folly  and  vices  seem  to  destine  us. 

Mr.  J.  B.  Cutting2  tells  me  that  the  French  successes  in  Italy 
will  certainly  secure  the  election  of  Mr.  Jefferson.  France,  he 
says,  must  be  appeased  by  our  making  a  president  she  likes.  If 
the  report  be  true  that  she  has  a  powerful  fleet  at  Halifax,  I 
imagine  Mr.  Cutting's  opinion  will  be  adopted  by  many  who  have 
always  considered  (and  some  of  them  desired)  that  our  national 
independence  should  depend  on  France.  .  .  . 

Yours  truly,  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT   TO   WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  Nov.  30,  1796. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  am  glad  to  see  Mr.  Adet's  manifesto,3  which 
you  were  so  good  as  to  send  me.  If  the  devil  is  in  company,  it  is 
always  best  to  see  his  cloven  foot.  Although  I  am  not  sure  that 
our  country  can  escape  all  the  evils  which  threaten  it  from  without, 
yet  I  am  persuaded  that  our  chance  will  be  best  when  we  no  longer 
indulge  ourselves  in  the  foolish  belief  of  French  friendship.  The 
copy  you  sent  me  was  the  only  one  I  heard  of  by  the  post,  and 
consequently  I  cannot  state  to  you  the  opinions  of  others ;  but 
my  own  is  clear,  that  this  measure  will  serve  to  strengthen  our 
government. 

1  This  refers  to  Washington's  Farewell  Address. 

2  Dr.  J.  B.  Cutting  had  been  abroad  in  a  semi-official  capacity,  and  appears 
to  have  been  a  busy  though  unimportant  politician.     His  brother,  Nathaniel 
Cutting,  seems  to  have  indulged  in  the  same  pursuits.     See  Gibbs,  Adminis 
trations  of  Washington  and  Adams,  I.  492 ;  and  below,  pp.  121, 122. 

3  Adet,  just  before  leaving  the  country,  published  a  species  of  procla 
mation  in  Bache's  "  Aurora,"  in  which  he  called  upon  all  Frenchmen  resident 
in  America  to  wear  the  tri-colored  cockade,  "  the  symbol  of  a  liberty  the 
fruit  of  eight  years'  toils  and  five  years'  victories."    Most  of  the  Democrats, 


112  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1796-98. 

No  decisive  judgment  can  be  yet  formed  respecting  the  votes  of 
our  electors  for  a  second  man.  They  will,  doubtless,  give  Mr. 
Adams  every  vote,  and  I  think  a  large  majority  (perhaps  all)  to 
Mr.  Pinckney.  Upon  this  last  point,  they  will'probably  be  gov 
erned  by  the  best  intelligence  which  can  be  had  on  the  day  of 
voting.  If  they  could  certainly  make  Mr.  A.  President  and  Mr.  P. 
Vice-president,  this  would  be  done ;  or,  if  it  should  be  pretty  evi 
dent  that  Mr.  A.  can  not  be  carried,  and  that  Mr.  P.  may,  I  should 
not  doubt  they  would  give  Mr.  P.  every  vote.  At  any  rate,  you 
may  rely  that  proper  attention  is  paid  to  the  business. 

Yours  sincerely,  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT   TO    PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  Feb.  2,  1797. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  can  hardly  thank  you  sufficiently  for  the  excel 
lent  treat  you  have  sent  me  under  a  cover  dated  24th  ultimo.1  I 
had  just  dined  at  Mr.  Higginson's  when  the  packet  was  brought  me  ; 
but  although  it  was  a  snow-storm,  and  I  was  obliged  to  come  home, 
we  nevertheless  read  over  the  document  before  we  parted.  You 
would  certainly  have  been  gratified,  could  you  have  witnessed  the 
strong  emotions  of  approbation  which  were  continually  excited; 
and  you  would  have  laughed,  in  concert  with  us,  at  many  of  our 
recognitions  of  the  old  "  Lover  of  Truth."  2  I  have  perused  the 
piece  to-day  with  as  much  attention  as  the  time  would  allow,  and 
I  am  fully  satisfied  it  must  do  infinite  service  to  our  country.  If, 
however,  it  should  provoke  some  snarling  and  barking  among  the 

unable  to  resist  this  touching  appeal,  joined  their  French  brethren  in  mount 
ing  the  cockade,  —  a  fashion  which  was  afterward  generally  adopted  as  a 
badge  of  party.  The  Federalists  called  Adet's  address  the  "  Cockade  Procla 
mation."  Soon  after  this,  Adet  sent  notes  to  the  State  Department  and 
to  the  "  Aurora,"  which  he  seems  to  have  regarded  as  co-ordinate  branches 
of  the  government.  The  proclamation  was  surpassed  by  the  eloquence 
of  the  note.  The  latter  is,  unfortunately,  too  long  for  insertion;  but 
it  avowed  that  the  name  of  America  still  excited  "sweet  emotions"  in 
the  French  heart.  This  was  consoling,  but  hardly  justified  a  change  of  the 
national  policy.  Mr.  Cabot's  reference  here  is  to  the  note. 

1  The  "  excellent  treat "  was  Colonel  Pickering's  despatch  of  Jan.  16, 
1797,  to  Pinckney.    In  this  able  paper,  Colonel  Pickering  replied  to  Adet's 
charges,  and  made  a  clear  presentation  to  the  general  public  of  our  rela 
tion  with  France. 

2  Signature  used  by  Colonel  Pickering  in  his  first  writings  in  the  Salem 
newspaper,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution. 


179<>-98.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  113 

factious  curs,  I  shall  riot  wonder ;  but  I  trust  you  will  not  be  dis 
turbed  by  their  noise.  I  pray  you  to  accept  my  unfeigned  respect 
and  regard,  and  believe  me  ever 

Your  sincere  and  obliged  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  SAMUEL 

BROOKLIXE,  Sunday,  Feb.  5,  1797. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  It  would  afford  me  great  pleasure,  on  personal  as 
well  as  public  considerations,  to  repay  you  the  aid  once  given  me 
on  the  subject  of  the  fisheries,  when  you  were  a  master,  and  /  a 
servant. 

I  have  long  been  sensible  that  the  allowances  for  salt  considera 
bly  exceeded  the  quantity  consumed,  and  possibly  still  more  ex 
ceeded  the  quantity  on  which  a  duty  had  been  paid.  I  think  you 
will  find  the  public  books  exhibit  a  view  of  the  accounts  previous 
to  1795  much  more  unfavorable  than  the  one  presented  by  that 
year.  Being  aware  of  this,  I  had  expected  an  attack  upon  the 
fishery  system,  and  had  cast  about  for  the  means  to  repel  it ;  and  I 
had  satisfied  myself  that  a  good  answer  might  be  given  to  those 
who  should  charge  us  with  unfairness  in  the  data  and  calculation 
on  which  the  allowance  law  was  founded.  It  was  the  intention  of 
that  law  to  give  to  the  fishery  as  much  in  the  form  of  a  tonnage 
allowance  as  the  public  would  probably  have  given  on  the  exporta 
tion  of  fish,  if  the  drawback 2  had  continued,  including  the  charges 
borne  by  the  public  in  ascertaining  the  quantity  of  Jish  exported. 
To  determine  what  this  would  be,  I  offered  a  statement,  showing 
the  number  and  tonnage  of  the  vessels  in  several  principal  places, 
with  the  actual  quantities  of  fish  taken  in  those  places ;  and  I 
offered  another,  showing  the  whole  quantity  of  fish  exported ;  and, 
by  apportioning  this  to  the  tonnage  employed  in  taking  it,  I  proved 
how  much  the  public  would  pay  per  ton.3  These  statements  are 
lost,  and  cannot  easily  be  recovered ;  and  it  would  be  difficult  to 
avail  ourselves  of  the  benefit  of  their  results  without  a  complete 
recollection  of  all  the  component  parts.  I  remember  that  the  cal 
culation  of  a  season's  produce  was  in  some  cases  made  from  the 

1  At  this  time  member  of  Congress,  and  afterwards  judge  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Massachusetts  for  many  years ;   chief  justice  from  1813-14,  the 
year  of  his  death. 

2  On  the  salt  duties. 

3  See  above,  pp.  38,  41. 

8 


114  LTFE    AND   LETTERS    OF   GEOEGE   CABOT.      [1796-98. 

known  produce  of  a  part  of  one  season  only,  the  public  record  at 
that  time  not  furnishing  more  perfect  materials.  In  addition  to 
the  information  derived  from  the  public  offices,  I  procured  from 
individuals,  in  various  places,  estimates  of  the  quantities  of  salt  con 
sumed  on  a  hundred  quintals  of  fish  in  each  of  the  different  fares, 
and  also  the  quantity  of  fish  taken  in  each  fare  by  each  vessel,  on 
an  average.  From  all  these  estimates,  formed  by  different  persons 
in  different  places,  I  made  a  general  estimate,  as  perfect  as  I  was 
able  to  make,  having  due  regard  to  the  particular  branches  of  the 
business,  and  other  local  interruptions  which  must  have  affected  the 
individuals  in  their  estimates.  The  allowance  by  law  on  the  ton 
nage  shows  how  much  salt  each  vessel  must  have  been  supposed  to 
consume ;  and  although  the  allowance  at  the  time  was  not  narrow, 
yet  I  am  convinced  it  could  not  have  exceeded  the  actual  consump 
tion  to  any  considerable  amount ;  and  yet,  perhaps,  it  may  now 
appear  by  the  public  books  that  the  allowances  were  extrava 
gant,  and  the  calculations  grossly  erroneous.  Several  circum 
stances,  not  foreseen  at  the  time  of  the  passing  of  the  law,  have 
occurred  which  have  produced  these  appearances.  At  the  time 
the  law  passed,  and  for  a  considerable  period  before,  salt  was 
cheap,  having  been  sold  as  low  as  six  shillings  eight  pence  the 
hogshead  by  the  cargo  for  fresh  salt,  and  from  that  upward  to 
ten  and  twelve  shillings  for  St.  Martin's.  The  price  of  fish  at  the 
same  time  was  ten  to  fifteen  shillings  ;  thus  a  quintal  of  fish  was 
worth  more  than  a  hogshead  of  salt.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that 
under  such  circumstances  salt  would  be  used  more  freely  than 
when  it  was  dearer.  I  think  seven  hogsheads  of  salt  for  a  hundred 

quintals  of  Isle   of  fish,  ten  hogsheads  for  Bank  fish,   and 

twenty-two  hogsheads  for  Bay  fish,  were  estimated  as  the  ordinary 
consumption,  the  two  latter  being  a  little  increased  in  the  summer 
fares.  Supposing  a  vessel  to  take  nine  hundred  quintals  in  a  sea 
son,  one  hundred  and  fifty  were  assigned  to  the  spring  fare,  two 
hundred  and  fifty  to  the  fall,  and  five  hundred  to  the  summer  fare. 
The  summer  fish  required  more  salt,  and  would  sell  for  the  least 
money.  Since  the  law  has  been  in  operation,  salt  has  risen  to 
these  prices:  that  is,  twenty  shillings  for  the  lowest  quality  ;  and 
the  best  has  been  as  high  as  thirty-six  shillings,  while  fish  has  not 
doubled.  Supposing  the  law  to  have  been  accurately  just  in  the 
relations  which  prices  bore  to  each  other  when  it  passed,  yet  these 
have  so  changed  since  that  it  may  have  become  otherwise.  It  is 


1796-98.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  115 

easy  to  perceive  that  the  vessels  might  with  profit  carry  on  those 
parts  of  the  fishery  where  the  least  salt  was  consumed,  and  the 
fish  most  valuable  per  quintal,  as  the  spring  and  fall  fares,  particu 
larly  the  former ;  while  the  summer  fares,  and  especially  those  to 
the  Bay  of  St.  Lawrence,  could  not  be  made,  on  account  of  the 
great  consumption  of  salt  and  the  low  value  of  that  kind  of  fish. 
Indeed,  the  summer  fare  always  consumed  the  principal  part  of  the 
salt,  not  less  than  fifteen  hogsheads  per  one  hundred  quintals  hav 
ing  been  used  sometimes  in  the  Bay.  This  single  circumstance 
might  account  for  the  fact,  if  it  is  a  fact,  that  the  allowance  to  the 
fishery  greatly  exceeds  the  salt  consumed.  There  are  other  causes 
which  co-operate,  —  such  as  instances  of  vessels  fishing  only  four 
months  instead  of  the  whole  season,  they  being  attracted  by  exor 
bitant  profits  to  foreign  trade.  I  think  it  important,  however,  to 
suggest  that  at  the  commencement  of  the  operation  of  the  fishery 
law  there  was  on  hand  an  immense  supply  of  salt.  All  the  stores 
were  full,  and  it  might  have  been  bought  the  year  before  lower 
than  at  any  time  since  our  Revolution  by  fifty  per  cent.  Until  all 
this  extraordinary  surplus,  which  was  hoarded  up  for  great  profits 
in  consequence  of  duties  laying  and  expected,  no  proof  could  be 
drawn  from  the  public  books  of  more  being  allowed  to  the  fishery 
than  was  consumed  in  it.  That  there  were  fresh  hoards  is  a  well- 
known  fact,  and  may  be  well  credited  from  the  prices,  which  could 
only  have  been  depressed  so  extremely  as  they  were  by  the  super 
abundance  of  the  article  in  the  market,  and  this  in  all  the  Eastern 
States.  My  own  stores  were  filled,  and  I  was  solicited  in  1790  or 
1791  to  buy  at  Portsmouth  and  Newburyport  at  eight  shillings, 
deliverable  in  Beverly  or  Boston ;  and  I  know  of  no  better  evi 
dence  of  a  universally  surcharged  market.  I  like  your  salt-tax, 
and  am  in  favor  of  a  direct  tax  also,  sufficient  to  make  up  all 
deficiencies.  But  I  am  in  the  midst  of  company,  and  cannot  add 
to  my  letter  by  this  post.  To-morrow  I  will  look  into  my  chaos 
of  papers ;  and,  if  any  memoranda  can  be  found  that  may  be  of 
use,  I  will  forward  them  by  the  succeeding  post. 

Yours  sincerely,  G.   CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  SEWALL. 

BROOKLINE,  Feb.  6,  1797. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  looked  over  those  of  my  papers  that  can 
be  of  much  use  to  you.     Some  of  the  notes  which  I  had  made  to 


116  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE    CABOT.      [1796-98. 

support  the  debate  in  the  Senate  are  enclosed.  They  are  not  alto 
gether  intelligible,  and  in  some  particulars  were  applicable  only  to 
that  debate.  The  general  estimates  of  which  I  spoke  in  my  letter 
of  yesterday  were  put  into  the  hands  of  different  members,  and 
probably  were  never  returned,  as  I  find  no  copy.  I  admitted  the 
supporting  of  one  branch  of  industry  permanently  by  bounties 
which  must  be  paid  by  a  tax  on  others  was,  in  general,  absurd ;  but 
it  might  be  the  duty  of  government  to  do  it  in  several  cases.  It 
might  do  it  very  properly  in  a  case  where  the  business  would  be 
permanently  profitable  to  the  country  after  it  was  fully  established ; 
but  where  the  establishment  was  obstructed  by  extraordinary  and  arti 
ficial  means,  practised  by  rival  nations,  which,  it  might  be  hoped 
would  be  relaxed  or  relinquished  after  a  little  while,  &c.,  it 
must  be  in  some  degree  the  duty  of  government  to  afford  public 
aid,  if,  as  in  this  case,  a  great  multitude  of  the  citizens  with  a  large 
capital  were  so  engaged  as  to  be  dependent  on  its  continuance. 
Mr.  Jefferson,  in  his  report,  says :  "  Fisheries  with  distant  nations 
would  come  to  nothing,  if  not  supported  from  their  treasuries.  The 
advantages  of  ours  place  them  on  higher  ground,  such  as  to 
relieve  the  Treasury  from  giving  support,  but  not  to  permit  it  to 
draw  support  from  them"  l  Although  I  argued  that  the  fishery, 
as  a  source  of  pecuniary  advantage,  might  be  entitled  to  some  pecu 
niary  aid,  yet  I  confessed  it  needed  only  to  have  a  full  remittance 
of  the  revenue  drawn  from  it ;  and  this  was  the  principle  of  the  bill, 
and  upon  this  its  defence  chiefly  rested.  But  I  maintained  stren 
uously  that,  if  more  assistance  were  necessary  to  keep  up  the  fish 
eries,  there  were  reasons  of  policy  which  ought  to  reconcile  every 
man  in  the  United  States  to  the  measure.  I  stated  the  capture  of 
more  than  two  thousand  British  vessels  by  the  privateers  of  New 
England  in  our  war,  and  the  actual  arrival  of  more  than  twelve 
hundred  in  safe  ports.  This  important  fact  had  great  weight  with 
those  gentlemen  who  realized  it.  I  think  the  whole  navigation  of 
Great  Britain  is  stated  to  have  been  less  than  seven  thousand  ves 
sels  in  the  year  1775,  and  the  New  Englanders  alone  captured 
nearly  one-third  of  that  number  before  the  peace  of  1782.  Six  or 
seven  hundred  of  them  were  recaptured  by  the  British. 

Yours  truly,  G.  CABOT. 

1  See  Jefferson's  Works,  VII.  554,  555. 


1796-98.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  117 


WOLCOTT  TO  CABOT. 

PHILADELPHIA,  March  27,  1797. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  It  is  now  certain  that  General  Pinckney  has  been 
refused  a  reception  by  the  Directory,  and  that  the  refusal  has  been 
attended  with  extraordinary  circumstances  of  indignity.  In  addi 
tion  to  the  facts  detailed  in  a  letter  from  Paris  dated  the  7th  of 
January,  which  are  correctly  stated,  there  is  one  which  you  ought 
to  know.  Mr.  La  Croix,  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  Monroe,  announced  it  to 
be  the  determination  of  the  Directory  not  to  receive  another  minister 
plenipotentiary  from  the  United  States  until  the  grievances  of 
France  shall  have  been  redressed.  The  grievances  of  which  a 
redress  is  to  be  a  preliminary  to  the  reception  of  a  minister  are 
supposed  to  be  those  stated  by  Adet,  and  to  which  the  government 
have  given  an  answer  by  which  they  must  and  will  abide.  The 
violation  of  the  British  treaty,  the  repeal  of  laws,  and  the  claim  of 
consular  jurisdiction  paramount  to  the  courts  of  our  country,  are 
points  never  to  be  conceded. 

It  is  also  proper  that  you  should  know  that  Mr.  Pinckney  was 
specially  instructed,  prior  to  his  departure,  on  every  subject  of  com 
plaint  which  then  and  now  exists,  and  that  his  letter  of  credence 
stated  that  the  President,  "  sincerely  desirous  to  maintain  that 
good  understanding  which  from  the  commencement  of  their  alli 
ance  has  subsisted  between  the  two  nations,  arid  to  efface  unfavora 
ble  impressions,  banish  suspicions,  and  restore  that  cordiality  which 
was  at  once  evidence  and  pledge  of  a  friendly  union,  had  judged 
it  expedient  to  appoint,"  &c.  In  point  of  rank,  General  Pinckney 
was  invested  with  a  character  equal  to  that  enjoyed  by  Mr.  Jay, 
and  was  moreover  designated,  as  has  been  shown,  as  the  messenger 
of  conciliation.  I  have  stated  these  facts,  because  the  Jacobins 
will  endeavor  to  prevent  any  defensive  measures  Until  an  envoy 
extraordinary  can  be  sent,  and  the  issue  of  his  mission  known. 
Our  friends,  having  been  the  advocates  of  negotiation  on  a  former 
occasion,  may  be  deceived  by  the  specious  appearance  of  a  parallel 
case. 

The  truth  is,  General  Pinckney  is  in  fact  an  envoy  extraordinary, 
special  objects  being  designated  in  his  letters  of  credence ;  and  in 
name  he  is  a  minister  of  equal  rank.  So  far  as  respects  the  sub 
stance  or  any  point  of  etiquette,  France  ought  therefore  to  be  satis 
fied.  Mr.  Pinckney  is  rejected,  because  the  Directory  mean  to 


118  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.      [1796-98. 

plunder  us ;  and  they  will  suffer  no  discussions,  to  avoid  hearing 
and  being  disgraced  with  the  manner  in  which  they  know  we  shall 
utter  our  complaints. 

It  is  contrary  to  the  system  of  France  that  we  should  remain 
neutral.  No  nation  will  be  permitted  to  be  neutral :  we  must  join 
France,  or  defend  ourselves  against  France.  The  Directory  ex 
pect  that  the  people  will  not  support  the  government :  if  they 
separate  on  this  occasion,  our  country  is  undone. 

In  my  opinion,  we  must  prepare  for  a  serious  state  of  things, 
one  which  will  continue  for  a  considerable  time,  and  to  meet  which 
firmness,  decision,  and  system  are  indispensable.  We  must  arm 
for  the  defence  of  our  commerce  when  attacked ;  we  must  fortify 
some  or  all  our  ports ;  we  must  equip  ships-of-war  to  serve  as 
convoys ;  we  must  lay  a  tax ;  and  we  must  keep  a  minister  as 
near  the  Directory  as  he  shall  be  suffered,  to  improve  any  opportu 
nity  for  discussion  and  amicable  adjustment,  but  never  to  disgrace 
our  government  by  retracting  any  thing  which  has  been  done. 

The  plan,  on  the  other  hand,  will  be  to  do  nothing,  until  the 
issue  of  an  extraordinary  mission  can  be  known.  In  the  mean  time, 
our  commerce  will  be  ruined,  our  public  credit  blasted,  despondency, 
distress,  and  faction  will  impair  and  divide  our  country,  and  finally 
the  French  faction  will  obtain  an  ascendency. 

I  do  not  write  this  from  any  knowledge  that  the  measures  I 
mentioned  will  be  adopted  by  the  President.  But  this  I  am  cer 
tain,  —  these  measures  or  something  better  will  be  recommended  by 
him.  He  will  do  what  is  right.  In  the  mean  time,  the  country 
ought  to  be  roused,  not  inflamed.  They  ought  to  make  up  their 
minds  for  a  serious  and  persevering  exertion.  They  must  consent 
to  sacrifices ;  and  they  must  cling  to  their  government,  and  reject 
the  distinction  attempted  to  be  established  by  the  Directory,  or 
they  are  lost.  On  the  contrary,  if  they  do  what  is  right,  I  will 
pledge  my  head  that  they  will  be  successful.  I  rely  upon  you  to 
be  an  apostle  of  truth  in  Massachusetts. 

Yours  truly,  OLIVER  WOLCOTT,  JR. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BEOOKLINE,  April  3,  1797. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Your  favor  of  the  16th  ultimo  and  its  accom 
paniment  were  received  yesterday.  Whether  the  government  will 


1796-98.]  COKKESPONDENCE.  119 

have  virtue  enough  to  profit  by  your  labors  or  not,  time  alone  can 
show  ;  but  we,  the  people,  are  certainly  much  the  wiser,  and  as  one 
of  them  I  thank  you  for  the  instruction. 

I  foresaw  at  an  early  period  that,  if  the  Federalists  were  faith 
ful  to  the  country,  their  conduct  would  be  liable  to  misinterpreta 
tion  ;  and,  considering  the  sort  of  stuff  men  are  made  of,  I  confess 
my  apprehensions  have  been  very  great  that  some  of  the  best  char 
acters  in  the  nation  would  be  looked  upon  with  jealousy.  Although 
I  took  no  part  in  the  election,  I  do  not  hesitate  to  avow  my  opinion 
that  the  first  and  highest  duty  of  the  electors  was  to  prevent  the 
election  of  a  French  President ;  and,  this  being  provided  for,  the 
next  object  would  have  been  to  secure  the  election  of  Mr.  Adams. 
But  I  will  never  admit  that  we  ought  to  take  any  considerable 
risk  of  seeing  a  French  or  any  foreign  President  rather  than  the 
risk  of  any  one  Federal  candidate  in  preference  to  another.  But 
our  misfortune  is  that,  when  we  profess  to  set  the  interest  of  the 
public  above  that  of  our  friends,  their  pride  forbids  them  to  believe, 
or  egotism  to  forgive  it. 

I  have  not  the  privilege  of  a  Democrat,  and  therefore  cannot 
answer  your  questions  for  the  people.  But  for  myself  I  can 
readily  say  that  the  United  States  are  manifestly  in  the  right,  and 
therefore  cannot  confess  they  are  in  the  wrong.  Of  consequence, 
they  can  neither  repeal  the  acts  of  their  legislature,  nor  reverse 
the  just  judgments  of  their  courts,  nor  violate  their  engagements  to 
another  nation.  But  you  would  know  what  the  people  will  think. 
I  presume,  if  the  government  assumes  the  tone  it  ought,  that  the 
people  will  accord  with  them  ;  and,  if  the  government  does  not,  I 
should  expect  the  people  will  blame  them  hereafter,  when  they 
shall  have  experienced,  in  addition  to  their  losses  of  property,  the 
more  irreparable  loss  of  honor.  Such  is  my  course'  of  thinking, 
when,  abstracted  from  the  world,  I  revolve  the  subject  in  my 
mind ;  but  I  ought  to  add  that,  whenever  I  go  out  of  my  own  house 
or  have  guests  within  it,  I  am  led  to  distrust  my  reasonings  and 
conclusions. 

I  find  myself  lost  in  the  errors  of  the  French  Revolutionists,  who 
maintain  that  the  people  always  understand  their  true  interests 
and  will  always  vindicate  them.  How  this  may  be  in  the  political 
millennium  I  know  not ;  but,  in  the  present  state  of  society,  folly 
and  the  vices  which  are  its  natural  offspring  have  a  power  which 
cannot  be  overcome. 


120  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1706-98. 

After  all,  we  must  take  the  world  as  it  is,  and  by  expecting  less 
expose  ourselves  to  less  chagrin.  I  have  long  seen  that  your 
sensibility  was  deeply  wounded  by  the  want  of  interest  in  the 
affairs  of  the  nation  which  is  discovered  in  many  public  men  ;  but 
I  hope  you  will  not  always  be  a  prey  to  that  sort  of  anxiety  ;  and,  if 
you  cannot  arrive  at  a  pure  apathy,  I  hope  you  will  at  least  moderate 
your  sufferings,  for  I  am  sure  the  consciousness  of  what  you  have 
done  ought  to  satisfy  pride  as  well  as  principle,  and,  if  there  is  to 
be  public  disgrace,  no  part  of  it  will  attach  to  you. 

Yours  faithfully,    '  G.  C. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  April  7,  1797. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  It  gives  me  infinite  pleasure  to  learn  from 
you  that  our  Palirmrus  is  undaunted  at  the  storm  which  is  gather 
ing.  Popular  gales  sometimes  blow  hard,  but  they  don't  blow  long  ; 
and  the  man  who  has  the  courage  to  face  them  will  at  last  out- 
face  them.  I  hope  from  my  soul  that  the  President  will  enjoy 
that  immortality  which  is  due  to  the  man  who  dares  do  right  when 
all  the  world  does  wrong.  I  believe,  however,  if  he  is  sternly  and 
strongly  right,  a  great  many  people  will  discover  that  they  them 
selves  are  so.  I  readily  accept  the  apostleship  you  mention,  and 
shall  use  your  discourse  as  if  it  were  my  own.  Your  letter  arrived 
yesterday  afternoon,  and  already  my  zeal  has  produced  a  letter  of 
two  sheets,  which  will  be  transcribed  as  a  circular  to  half  a  dozen 
friends.  I  shall  quote  no  authorities  to  infidels,  and  as  for  the 
faithful  they  won't  need  them. 

I  am  as  ever  your  affectionate  and  faithful 

G.  CABOT. 
CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  April  13,  1797. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  — It  has  been  my  intention  to  communicate  to  you 

two  occurrences  of  last  summer,  which  seemed  to  be  of  consequence 

to  be  known  to  those  whose  opinions  must  guide  our  affairs.     The 

first  is  the  substance  of  a  conversation  *  with  the  Duke  de  Liancourt,1 

*  /  think  this  conversation  ivas  in  the  month  of  August.  —  G.  C. 

1  Frederic  Alexandre  Francois  Due  de  la  Rochefoucauld-Liancourt,  an 
emigre  of  1792,  after  which  time  he  travelled  in  the  United  States.  He  re 
turned  to  Paris  in  1799,  and  published  an  account  of  his  travels  in  eight 
volumes.  In  his  book  (English  Translation,  I.  481)  he  says:  "  I  met  here 
again,  to  my  great  satisfaction,  Mr.  Cabot,  Senator  of  the  United  States  for 
Massachusetts.  He  stands  in  high  estimation  among  the  Americans  on 
account  of  his  well-informed  mind  and  amiable  character." 


1796-98.1  CORRESPONDENCE.  121 

in  which  he  disclosed  to  me  the  determination  of  the  French  Direc 
tory  to  order  the  seizure  of  all  vessels  that  should  be  found  to  have 
on  board  any  article  of  the  product  or  manufacture  of  any  of  the 
British  dominions,  and  all  such  products  and  manufactures  to  be  con 
demned,  wheresoever  from,  whithersoever  bound,  and  to  whomsoever 
belonging.  Whether  the  vessel  was  to  be  condemned  or  not,  he  did 
not  clearly  express.  He  assured  me  of  the  authenticity  of  his 
information,  and  that  the  system  would  be  carried  into  operation 
"  as  soon  as  the  Emperor  should  be  broken  down"  which  he  said 
would  be  in  September  or  October.  After  a  moment's  pause,  I 
observed  that  I  did  not  at  all  doubt  the  truth  of  his  information, 
and  that  my  mind  was  ready  to  receive  much  more.  He  perceived 
that  my  gravity  and  moderation  were  affected,  and  suddenly  added, 
"  What !  you  think  this  would  be  unjust?  "  "  I  think,"  said  I,  "  it 
would  be  very  impolitic,  because  it  would  confirm  all  those  charges 
of  tyranny,  injustice,  and  contempt  for  the  rights  of  others,  &c., 
&c.,  which  are  made  against  France  by  the  wise  and  virtuous  part 
of  mankind.  It  would  be,  in  fact,  a  greater  outrage  upon  neutral 
nations  than  was  ever  committed."  "  Why,"  said  he,  "  it  may  be 
disagreeable ;  but  there  is  no  other  way  of  destroying  England." 
I  acknowledged  to  him,  in  a  spirit  of  irony,  that  if  the  English 
could  be  destroyed  in  no  other  way,  that  would  justify  it ;  but  I 
added  that  my  own  opinion  was  that  such  a  measure  would  unite 
the  English  to  a  man,  and  excite  the  most  desperate  spirit  in  the 
nation ;  that  they  would  cover  the  sea  with  their  ships,  and  by  the 
greatness  of  their  exertion  would  annihilate  the  remaining  navy  of 
their  enemies,  and  would  block  up  for  nine  months  in  the  year 
every  port  of  France  on  the  Atlantic.  He  smiled  at  my  opinions, 
and  said  the  power  of  England  was  at  an  end.  Her  resources 
were  exhausted,  and  she  could  not  add  a  single  ship,  nor  find  the 
means  of  supporting  her  present  navy  another  season.  I  rejoined 
that  all  the  civilized  world  would  have  cause  to  mourn,  if  this  should 
be  true ;  for  they  would  then  be  obliged  to  fight  against  France,  or 
give  up  their  independence.  ^ 

The  other  occurrence  was  an  unexpected  visit  from  Cutting,1  who 
asked  me,  without  much  ceremony,  "  whom  we  intended  to  make 
President."  I  told  him  I  had  nothing  to  do  with  it,  but  the 
friends  of  the  government  would  certainly  make  Mr.  Adams,  if 
they  could,  or,  if  they  could  not  elect  him  without  a  hazard  of 
Jefferson's  coming  in,  they  would  perhaps  make  Mr.  Pinckney ; 

1  See  above,  p.  111.  For  some  account  of  Dr.  Cutting,  see  "  Recollections 
of  Samuel  Breck,"  pp.  173.  185. 


122  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1796-98. 

for  they  deemed  it  essential  to  the  safety  of  the  country  to  exclude 
Mr.  Jefferson,  and,  if  possible,  to  choose  Mr.  Adams.  He  affected 
great  surprise  at  these  sentiments,  and  assured  me  that,  if  I  went 
into  the  world  instead  of  remaining  in  solitude,  I  should  find  a  total 
change  of  sentiments  among  the  Federalists,  which  had  recently 
taken  place ;  that,  whatever  they  might  think  of  the  tendency  of 
the  French  Revolution  to  serve  or  to  injure  the  cause  of  freedom, 
they  were  all  united  in  their  estimate  of  the  French  power  and  of 
the  use  that  would  be  made  of  it ;  and  that  they  saw  plainly  "  we 
must  soothe  France  by  making  their  favorite  Jefferson  President, 

^or  we  must  take  a  war  with  them"  "This  language,"  said  I  to  Mr. 
Cutting,  "  is  what  I  should  have  expected  from  you  and  your 
party ;  but,  if  the  alternative  is  made,  I  trust  there  is  virtue  in  the 
country  to  make  a  war  against  tyrants  rather  than  tamely  submit 
to  them  as  masters."  He  said  he  was  sorry  I  thought  him  a  party 
man,  &c.,  &c.,  and  then  asked  me  if  I  had  seen  the  paper  of  the 
day.  I  told  him  no.  "  Oh,"  said  he,  "  the  contest  is  nearly  over. 
Buonaparte  has  cut  up  all  the  Austrians,  and  there  will  be  no 

^further  opposition  in  Italy."  He  then,  repeating  his  regret  at  my 
tenacity,  assured  me  that  Colonel  Hamilton  had  declared  to  him 
that  Mr.  Jefferson  must  be  supported,  as  the  only  way  of  appeasing 

^.France.  I  told  him  Colonel  Hamilton's  opinion  would  have 
weight  with  me  on  every  such  subject,  but  he  was  frequently  mis 
represented  for  party  purposes,  and  nothing  short  of  hearing  it 
from  his  own  mouth  would  make  me  believe  he  was  willing  to  see 
Mr.  Jefferson  President.  All  this  respecting  Hamilton  I  am  per 
suaded  is  false,  but  the  extreme  desire  discovered  by  Mr.  Cutting 
to  draw  from  me  a  sentiment  of  acquiescence  in  Mr.  Jefferson's 
election  for  the  sake  of  pacifying  France  is  unaccountable.  I  give 
you  the  essence  of  what  passed,  leaving  out  many  little  circum 
stances  which  would  be  tedious  to  recite.  It  was  my  expectation 
to  pass  a  night  with  Mr.  Adams  in  November,  when  I  should  have 
related  every  thing  to  him  ;  but  my  indolence  conquers  every  thing, 
and  I  stayed  at  home,  where  I  have  radicated  too  strongly  to  be 
easily  removed. 

I  shall  write  you  again  in  a  few  days,  when  I  may  possibly  send 
you  a  copy  of  a  letter  which  I  have  addressed  to  a  few  friends  con 
fidentially,  assuring  them  that  the  government  would  be  firm,  and 
showing  the  necessity  of  our  exciting  the  people  to  support  the 
measures  which  shall  be  adopted. 

Your  faithful  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


1796-98.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  123 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

APRIL,  1797. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  As  I  hold  myself  accountable  to  those  by 
whom  /  am  sent,  I  enclose  you  a  copy  of  one  of  my  epistles,  that 
it  may  be  seen  whether  the  doctrines  I  teach  are  sound  or  not.  I 
also  enclose  you  an  answer  from  one  of  the  gentlemen  to  whom 
my  circular  had  been  sent,  that  you  may  see  how  men  are  affected 
by  a  little  display  of  political  truth.  Mr.  Watson  writes  with  a 
running  pen.  and  therefore  may  express  a  little  more  than  he 
would,  if  required  to  be  precise ;  but,  in  support  of  his  opinion,  I 
may  add  that  Mr.  William  Gray,  Jr.,1  who  is  one  of  our  most  sen 
sible  men  and  the  greatest  merchant  in  this  State,  assures  me  that 
be  finds  men  in  every  place  and  situation  united  in  the  conviction 
of  the  perfidy  and  wickedness  of  France  towards  us,  and  he  has  no 
doubt  the  people  will  zealously  support  every  efficient  measure 
which  the  government  shall  adopt  for  our  protection  and  defence. 
I  desired  my  son  to  transmit  you  a  copy  of  my  letter  to  Jeremiah 
Smith,  that  you  might  more  perfectly  know  the  ideas  I  have  propa 
gated  ;  and  for  the  same  purpose  I  wish  you  to  read  a  piece  I  sent 
to  the  printer  this  morning  for  the  next  "  Centinel,"  addressed  to 
the  "  Lovers  of  our  Country,"  and  signed  "  Fortiter  in  Re."  2 

Several  gentlemen  who  live  in  the  interior  of  our  State,  to  whom 
I  have  written,  have  made  me  no  reply ;  but  I  am  satisfied  that 
public  opinion  is  in  a  right  course  and  makes  a  daily  progress,  so 
that  the  only  anxiety  among  good  men  now  is  lest  the  House  of 
Representatives  should  be  governed  by  a  French  faction.  I  am 
confirmed  in  the  belief  that,  if  the  President  speaks  with  his  usual 
masculine  tone  of  decision  upon  the  dangers  of  our  country  and  the 
duties  which  arise  from  them,  he  will  be  supported  by  the  spirit 
and  feelings  of  the  bulk  of  the  people.  All  the  tools  of  France 
and  many  of  their  opposers  earnestly  desire  that  an  envoy  may  be 
sent.  I  think  it  wrong,  but  it  will  take  place ;  and,  if  accompanied 
by  vigorous  preparations  for  possible  wants,  it  may  do  no  great 
harm,  especially  if  the  persons  sent  are  not  Frenchmen.  My  own 
opinion  as  to  the  characters  suitable  is  that  men  should  be  sought 
whose  principles  are  unquestionable,  their  respectability  acknowl- 
edo-ed,  and  whose  detestation  of  the  French  tyrants  has  not  been 

C5 

strongly  expressed  to  the  public  and  is  not  known. 

Your  faithful  and  affectionate  friend,        G.  CABOT. 

1  William  Gray,  of  Salem,  the  largest  ship-owner  and  merchant  in  the 
United  States,  and  lieutenant-governor  of  Massachusetts  in  1810. 

2  See  below,  p.  582. 


124  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1796-98. 

CIRCULAR  LETTER  REFERRED  TO  IN  PRECEDING  LETTERS. 

(Confidential.) 

APRIL  6,  1797. 

SIR,  —  If,  in  a  free  country  like  ours,  the  public  welfare  ordi 
narily,  or  indeed  ever,  depends  upon  the  prevalence  of  just  senti 
ments  among  the  people,  it  is  of  the  highest  importance  that  such 
sentiments  should  prevail  at  this  time,  when  our  political  affairs  are 
fast  verging  to  a  great  and  unavoidable  crisis.  It  is  not,  however, 
from  any  peculiar  confidence  in  my  own  ideas  on  this  subject  that 
I  address  them  to  you,  but  it  is  because  certain  facts,  rather  than 
opinions,  of  which  I  am  possessed,  ought  to  be  imparted  to  those 
whose  influence  in  the  community  will  contribute  greatly  to  pre 
serve  its  interest  and  its  honor.  The  two  great  rivals  of  Europe, 
whose  ambition  so  often  disturbs  the  repose  of  other  nations, 
could  not  fail  to  view  the  United  States  as  an  object  of  great  inter 
est  to  them  in  all  their  struggles  for  power.  It  is  well  known 
that  the  French,  in  particular,  had  determined,  from  the  commence 
ment  of  the  present  war  against  England,  that  we  should  become 
their  associate ;  and  at  some  periods  they  have  had  great  reason  to 
calculate  upon  the  event.  Happily,  however,  all  their  attempts 
to  involve  us  by  fraud  or  by  force  have  been  hitherto  baffled ;  but 
elevated  by  their  unparalleled  successes  on  the  land,  and  irritated 
by  their  defeats  on  the  sea,  they  have  long  since  taken  the  most 
outrageous  and  desperate  resolutions  against  those  nations  who 
hold  a  pacific  intercourse  with  their  enemy ;  they  long  ago  re 
solved  "  that  they  would  destroy  the  commerce  which  any  neutral 
people  should  presume  to  carry  on  with  any  of  the  dominions  of 
England."  This  unprecedented  measure  is  now  executing,  and, 
if  unresisted,  will  doubtless  be  followed  by  others  more  atrocious. 

General  Pinckney  went  from  the  United  States  specially  in 
structed  on  every  subject  of  dispute  which  now  exists.  His  creden 
tial,  of  which  the  Directory  have  a  copy,  sets  forth  that  the 
President,  "  sincerely  desirous  to  maintain  that  good  understanding 
which  from  the  commencement  of  their  alliance  has  subsisted  be 
tween  the  two  nations,  and  to  efface  unfavorable  impressions, 
banish  suspicions,  and  restore  that  cordiality  which  was  at  once 
the  evidence  and  pledge  of  a  friendly  union,  had  judged  it  expe 
dient  to  appoint  Mr.  Pinckney  minister  plenipotentiary,"  &c. 

But  notwithstanding   our   minister  was    thus    designated  as   a 


1796-08]  CORRESPONDENCE.  125 

special  minister  of  conciliation,  and  such  terms  were  used  as  might 
have  soothed  their  pride,  the  Directory  have  refused  to  receive 
him,  and  the  refusal  has  been  accompanied  with  indignities.  Some 
of  the  facts  relative  to  this  business  have  been  detailed  in  a  letter 
from  Paris  dated  January  7th,  which  has  appeared  in  our  news 
papers,  but  perhaps  it  ought  not  to  be  published,  that  Mr.  de  la 
Croix  announced  to  Mr.  Monroe  the  determination  of  the  Direc- 
torv  not  to  receive  another  minister  plenipotentiary  from  the  United 
States  until  the  grievances  of  France  shall  have  been  redressed. 
These  grievances  are  supposed  to  be  those  specified  by  Mr.  Adet, 
and  to  which  our  government  has  already  given  a  complete  answer, 
and  by  their  answer  the  government  must  abide.  The  demands 
which  France  makes  upon  us  "  to  violate  a  solemn  treaty  with  a 
powerful  nation,  to  repeal  just  and  necessary  laws,  and  to  admit 
a  French  consular  jurisdiction  paramount  to  our  judicial  courts," 
are  points  that  never  can  be  conceded  but  with  the  total  surrender 
of  independence  ;  and  yet  these  are  to  be  yielded  (if  yielded  at  all) 
as  preliminary  to  any  discussion  of  the  questions  in  dispute,  for  we 
are  still  to  learn  what  further  marks  of  humiliation  would  be  re 
quired  of  us,  if  we  were  to  submit  to  these.  We  know  the  choice 
of  our  President  was  viewed  as  an  interesting  object  on  which 
they  bestowed  all  their  influence.  As  this  has  failed,  they  are  now 
prepared  to  embarrass  the  new  administration.  They  rely,  too,  on 
the  exertions  of  a  powerful  faction  to  oppose,  at  all  hazards,  the 
system  which  has  prevailed  through  the  period  of  Washington's 
administration.  But,  whatever  may  be  the  success  of  their  opera 
tions  within  our  country,  it  is  on  our  commerce  their  policy  bears 
with  the  most  force.  Viewing  our  trade  as  a  material  prop  to 
British  credit,  they  aim  at  the  destruction  of  it,  in  hopes  by  that 
means  to  weaken  the  power  of  England.  If  by  this  violence  and 
injustice  to  neutrals  they  should  make  them  all  their  enemies,  they 
would  still  calculate  upon  being  no  great  losers,  for  plunder  and 
contributions  would  be  a  valuable  consideration  to  those  who  have 
no  other  revenues  ;  and  if,  in  the  process,  a  neutral  nation  becomes 
disorganized  and  ruined,  it  is  of  course  a  natural  ally  to  their  sys 
tem,  and  will  directly  or  indirectly  add  to  their  strength.  It  seems 
therefore  evident  that  neutral  nations,  and  ours  especially,  must 
either  submit  to  ruin  or  resist  it :  but  if  this  is  the  alternative,  and 
we  hesitate  which  to  prefer,  we  are  already  half  undone ;  for,  if 
our  indignation  is  not  excited  by  the  wounds  which  innocence  and 


126  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1796-98. 

honor  receive,  public  liberty  must  soon  be  lost,  and  private  rights 
will  speedily  follow.  In  this  delicate  conjuncture  of  affairs,  it 
appears  to  me  necessary  that  the  public  mind  should  be  informed 
and  prepared  as  fast  as  possible  for  the  efforts  we  may  be  called 
to  make.  The  country  should  be  roused  without  being  inflamed, 
and  by  a  dispassionate  attention  to  the  public  dangers  should  be 
reconciled  to  additional  taxes,  and  should  strengthen  the  govern 
ment  by  additional  confidence  in  the  measures  it  may  adopt.  What 
these  will  be  no  man  can  foretell ;  but  it  is  not  improbable  that 
merchants  may  be  authorized  to  arm  their  ships  for  defence,  and 
that  the  several  frigates  which  are  in  forwardness  may  be  equipped 
as  convoys,  that  our  most  valuable  seaports  may  be  further  forti 
fied,  and  probably  a  military  force  provided  to  suppress  the  insur 
rections  of  slaves  in  those  places  where  the  French  emissaries  or 
others  shall  excite  them.  But,  as  the  preservation  or  attainment 
of  peace  is  the  only  end  desired,  it  is  likely  that  a  minister  may  be 
always  in  Europe,  authorized  to  seize  any  moment  to  secure  that 
best  of  blessings.  But,  whatever  there  may  be  in  these  conject 
ures,  it  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  the  President  will  be  firm,  and  as 
far  as  depends  upon  him  will  never  concur  in  degrading  the  coun 
try,  and  still  less  in  relinquishing  its  independence.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Jacobin  plan  will  be  to  enfeeble  and  divide  the  public 
sentiment,  that  nothing  may  be  done  ;  while,  in  the  mean  time,  com 
merce  will  more  and  more  languish  under  continued  depredations, 
public  credit  and  private  credit  may  be  impaired,  and  from  a  gen 
eral  impoverishment  distress  and  despondency  must  ensue,  and, 
what  will  be  the  greatest  of  all  evils,  France  by  the  instrumental 
ity  of  faction  will  govern  the  country  at  last.  These  ideas  are 
important,  so  far  as  the}T  are  correct :  to  me  they  appear  correct, 
and  therefore  need  no  apology  for  being  offered  to  the  friends  of 
the  United  States. 

With  great  respect,  I  am,  sir, 

Your  most  obedient  servant,  G.  CABOT. 

APRIL  10,  1797. 

Since  writing  the  foregoing,  I  am  told  there  are  some  good  peo 
ple  who  think  it  would  be  wise  to  send  an  envoy  extraordinary  to 
France,  it  having  been  suggested  that  the  rank  of  minister  pleni 
potentiary  is  objected  to  by  the  Directory.  But  I  answer  that  the 
rank  of  the  two  characters  is  the  same,  and  is  so  established  by  all 


1796-98.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  127 

the  writers.  Beside  which,  Mr.  Pinckney  is  in  fact  an  envoy 
extraordinary  for  special  purposes  ;  and  even  if  it  were  otherwise, 
and  the  rank  were  different,  it  would  puzzle  ingenuity  to  furnish 
a  reason  why  they  should  reject  a  minister  from  us  of  the  same 
grade  with  the  highest  they  ever  sent  to  us.  To  this  I  add  that 
the  Directory  have  not  made  the  objection  ;  and  it  must  therefore 
be  understood  that  for  the  present  France  has  shut  the  door  of 
negotiation,  expecting  no  doubt  that  this  last  step  of  violence 
would  intimidate  our  government,  and  deter  them  from  further 
defending  the  rights  of  our  country,  or  that  the  people  would  no 
longer  support  their  own  government. 

I  am,  &c.,  GEORGE  CABOT. 

MARSTON  WATSON  *  TO  CABOT. 

MARBLEHEAD,  April  14,  1797. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  Your  confidential  communication,  dated  the  6th, 
I  received  yesterday  at  Boston. 

No  one  can  be  more  impressed  than  I  am  with  the  necessity  of 
giving  a  currency  to  sentiments  of  real  patriotism,  and  a  loyal  dis 
position  to  support  the  government  at  the  present  and  approaching 
important  period ;  and  under  such  persuasion  I  omit  no  favorable 
opportunity,  publicly  and  privately,  to  express  and  circulate  such 
opinions  and  disposition  where  I  have  a  hope  of  influence.  And 
I  think  you  have  recollection  enough  of  the  people  of  Essex  gen 
erally,  and  of  those  of  Marblehead  particularly,  to  believe  that  nine- 
tenths  of  them  are  fully  satisfied  in  all  the  truths  and  reasonings 
that  you  have  suggested  relating  to  our  foreign  connections,  the 
objects  and  measures  of  France,  and  their  ultimate  tendency  to  the 
interests  and  politics  of  this  country,  unless  independently  repressed 
by  our  government  on  the  firm  support  of  the  voice  of  the  whole 
nation.  I  cannot  be  mistaken  in  this  confidence  in  my  townsmen 
and  neighbors,  who,  with  an  ardent  desire  for  the  preservation  of 
peace  and  security,  are  cordially  and  firmly  devoted  to  aid  the  gov 
ernment  by  any  necessary  surrender  of  the  lucrative  prospects  of 
their  commerce,  of  their  capital,  or  their  personal  service,  when 
ever  the  exigencies  of  the  nation  shall  demand  them ;  and  I  am 
happy  in  believing  that  these  opinions,  favorable  to  the  support  of 

1  Mr.  Watson  was  a  prominent  merchant  of  Marblehead,  and  afterwards 
of  Boston.  His  letter  is  in  reply  to  that  just  given. 


128  LIFE   AND    LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1796-98. 

our  government  and  national  rights,  are  not  peculiar  to  our  vicin 
ity,  but  that  it  is  at  least  very  general  in  New  England.  From  all 
appearances  of  the  effects  of  the  licentious  and  ruinous  depreda 
tions  of  the  French  on  the  property  of  our  citizens,  and  the  indig 
nities  to  our  government  on  their  minds,  I  cannot  but  think  that 
your  anxiety  for  the  general  welfare  underestimates  the  real  patri 
otism  of  our  countrymen  generally  through  the  United  States ; 
and  if  it  should  at  once  become  a  national  question  whether  to 
abandon  our  rightful  honors  or  interest,  or  abandon  all  commercial 
and  political  connections  with  France,  or  virtually  in  any  way  to 
surrender  to  them  any  portion  of  our  independence,  that  there 
would  be  scarcely  a  hesitation  with  three-fourths  of  the  people  of 
all  classes,  as  well  those  with  but  little  information,  who  would 
only  be  governed  by  their  passions,  as  those  who  have  better  op 
portunity  to  understand  for  themselves.  And  from  effects  to  trace 
motives  and  causes,  and  consequently,  like  members  of  a  free  na 
tion,  vindicate  and  support  the  government  to  the  utmost  extremity, 
I  confess  I  can  see  the  mischievous  wishes  of  the  bad  men  among 
us  with  the  same  concern  that  you  do ;  but  I  have  rather  more 
confidence  in  the  insignificance  of  their  power,  and  that  France 
and  all  other  nations  will  be  soon  satisfied  of  that  truth.  I  know 
that  you  are  assured  of  my  fullest  concurrence  with  your  sentiments 
and  wishes,  and  that  no  favorable  opportunity  will  be  lost  to  pro 
duce  any  influence  favorable  to  them. 

I  am,  with  esteem,  sincerely  yours,  M.  WATSON. 

My  acquaintance  with  Congressional  folks  is  so  small  that  I  have 
never  been  informed  whether  the  objection  to  the  land-tax  origi 
nated  in  political  motives,  or  only  from  the  strong  hand  of  economy 
in  the  landed  interest.  But,  whatever  it  was,  I  think  it  is  to  be 
lamented  that  it  did  not  prevail.  Justice  as  well  as  urgent  patriot 
ism  certainly  demands  some  more  direct  contributions  from  that 
part  of  the  community ;  and  I  sincerely  hope  that  at  the  ensuing 
session  Congress  will  agree  to  think  so. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  April  17,  1797. 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND,  —  Jeremiah  Smith,  who  called  on  me  yes 
terday,  tells  me  that  a  difference  of  sentiment  prevails  among  you 
great  men  in  and  out  of  the  cabinet,  respecting  the  expediency  of 


1796-98  ]  CORRESPONDENCE.  1 29 

a  new  embassy  to  France.  From  the  facts  which  have  been  stated 
to  me,  I  do  not  see  how  we  can  possibly  find  new  messengers,  with 
the  expectation  that  they  will  not  be  kicked  from  the  door,  unless  we 
first  appease  those  to  whom  the  visit  is  intended,  by  performing 
the  penance  they  have  prescribed  ;  and  this  all  agree  is  impossible 
for  us  to  do. 

I  confess  to  you  I  was  struck  with  the  formal  precision  of  the 
words  used  by  the  Directory.  The  literal  sense  of  the  declaration 
would  be  saved,  though  they  were  to  receive  an  embassy  from  us, 
if  it  were  other  than  a  minister  plenipotentiary.  But  why  this 
equivocation  ?  Surely  it  was  to  leave  the  door  open  for  accommo 
dation,  if  the  actual  state  of  things  should  render  it  desirable  to 
them.  If  they  have  not  acted  upon  some  such  principle,  the  new 
embassy  would  be  fruitless ;  and,  if  they  have,  it  is  unnecessary, 
because  in  this  latter  case  they  will  be  guided  in  their  conduct 
toward  us  by  events  in  Europe  and  the  circumstances  of  their  own 
country. 

But  I  take  it  for  granted  the  only  solid  argument  in  favor  of  a 
new  embassy  is  the  tendency  of  it  to  satisfy  popular  opinion  here, 
and  to  unite  the  country  in  the  measures  which  must  be  taken  after 
ill  success.  I  am  afraid  this  argument  claims  more  weight  than  it 
truly  merits.  I  conceive  that  the  government  has  attempted  nego 
tiation  already,  as  far  as  it  can  without  abasement ;  and,  if  the 
knowledge  of  this  does  not  satisfy  the  country,  it  is  not  certain 
that  any  thing  that  can  be  done  will  satisfy  them.  But  my  fears 
concerning  the  effects  of  a  new  embassy  are  that  France  will 
strengthen  her  party  by  it.  She  will  know  our  motive  to  be  to  put 
her  so  clearly  in  the  wrong  that  her  friends  here  can  be  no  longer 
her  advocates ;  but,  as  she  must  know  this,  she  can  with  certainty 
counteract  us,  and  by  a  very  obvious  policy  give  to  her  friends 
new  strength. 

She  can  propose  to  the  new  embassy  a  treaty  which  shall  contain 
many  things  which  would  be  extremely  popular,  accompanied  with 
some  requisitions  which  we  could  not  grant  without  present  dis 
honor,  and  ultimately  a  war  with  another  nation.  The  commis 
sioners  would  reject  such  a  project,  if  they  are  honest;  but  the 
party  in  this  country  would  then  be  able  to  rally  again.  France  is 
now  grown,  and  daily  growing,  more  odious  to  the  people;  but 
from  a  thousand  causes  this  weaning  from  folly  is  a  difficult  work, 
and  I  incline  to  think  France  would  now  gladly  prevent  its  being 

9 


130  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1796-98. 

perfected.  If  therefore,  according  to  my  ideas,  the  result  of  a  new 
embassy  may  be  to  supply  new  means  to  the  French  party  now 
exhausted,  the  danger  of  this  may  be  a  fair  offset  against  the  hope 
of  uniting  the  country  in  some  efficient  mode  of  defence.  At  the 
same  time  I  express  these  as  my  own  opinions,  it  is  impossible  that 
the  mass  of  the  people  should  not  (if  left  to  themselves)  prefer  one 
more  attempt  to  persuade  our  French  brethren  to  do  justice  and  be 
friends.  Public  attention  is  pretty  well  excited  in  this  quarter, 
and  hitherto  the  public  mind  has  held  a  right  course.  I  should 
imagine,  by  the  time  Congress  meets,  we  shall  be  willing  to  take 
such  burthens  as  may  be  reasonable  to  lay  upon  us.  I  think,  how 
ever,  much  will  depend  upon  the  tone  of  the  government :  if  it  is 
niascul  ne,  our  notes  will  conform.  I  hope  the  President  will  speak 
decidedly  upon  every  topic  that  is  connected  with  the  business  of 
the  meeting  ;  and  especially,  if  it  is  clear  that  we  cannot  and 
ought  not  attempt  farther  negotiation,  I  hope  he  will  say  it.  Mrs. 
Cabot  tells  me  the  chaise  is  waiting  to  carry  us  to  Judge  Lowell's, 
and  that  I  must  give  her  love  and  close  my  letter. 

Yours  faithfully,  G.  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  JEREMIAH  SMITH. 

[The  following  letter  is  the  "  copy  of  one  addressed  to  a  few  friends," 
referred  to  in  the  next  letter  to  Gore.  See  p.  133.] 

BEOOKLINE,  April  17,  1797. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  It  is  easy  to  say  what  ought  not  to  be  done 
in  certain  conjunctures,  but  difficult  to  determine  what  ought.  The 
truth  is  that  we  often  arrive  at  a  dilemma  in  which  something  must 
be  done,  and  yet  that  something  must  appear  to  be  wrong  ;  for  the 
inconveniences  of  the  course  taken,  whatever  it  be,  must  be  consid 
erable,  and  will  be  the  most  known  and  the  only  ones  felt.  But  no 
considerations  of  this  kind  will  deter  many  men,  whom  I  am  proud 
to  call  friends,  from  adopting  any  measures  which,  in  their  judg 
ment,  the  public  good  may  require.  What  are  these  measures,  you 
ask  ?  I  wish  I  could  give  a  satisfactory  reply  to  the  question,  but 
I  confess  I  cannot.  There  is,  however,  in  my  mind  no  difficulty 
in  deciding  that  an  embargo  would  be  much  more  injurious  to  us 
than  all  depredations  will  be,  —  much  more  injurious  to  us  than 
to  the  French ;  and,  indeed,  much  more  to  the  other  nations  who 
have  colonies  than  to  the  French.  It  would  be  particularly  incon 


1796-98.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  131 

venient  to  the  English,  who  are  now  fighting  for  the  independence 
of  the  neutral  nations  which  remain  unconquered  by  France.  This 
idea  is  so  obvious  that  I  shall  expect  many  zealous  advocates  for 
an  embargo  among  those  who  prefer  the  interests  of  France  to 
those  of  the  United  States.  As  &  permanent  measure  or  principal 
measure  in  any  system,  I  consider  an  embargo  as  always  prepos 
terous,  being  necessarily  more  distressing  to  the  nation  that 
imposes  it  than  to  the  nation  against  which  it  is  intended  to 
operate;  but  there  is  an  infinitude  of  cases  in  which  partial, 
special,  or  temporary  embargoes  may  be  expedient,  and  there 
fore  at  all  times  of  public  danger  the  executive  ought  to  be 
authorized  by  law  to  lay  them.  In  the  most  probable  cases, 
this  power  cannot  be  exercised  directly  by  Congress,  without 
defeating  its  own  designs.  I  now  release  you  from  the  embargo, 
and  proceed  to  express  my  hopes  that  the  first  measures  of  Con 
gress  will  be  to  provide  more  revenue.  A  land-tax,  however  unpala 
table  at  first,  will  be  approved  by  the  people  themselves,  after  they 
are  brought  to  contemplate  a  little  more  soberly  the  nature  and 
extent  of  the  public  dangers.  The  few  frigates  which  are  in  for 
wardness  ought  to  be  equipped  forthwith,  and  the  merchants  should 
be  authorized  to  defend  their  vessels,  as  far  as  it  can  be  done  with 
out  actual  war.  If  no  better  idea  occurs  on  the  point,  let  convoys 
accompany  them,  who  shall  fulfil  the  twenty-seventh  article  of  the 
treaty,  which  prescribes  the  conduct  of  armed  vessels  of  one  nation 
towards  the  trading  vessels  of  another.  In  the  West  India  scene, 
where  we  suffer  greatly  from  little  paltry  pirates,  this  sort  of 
defence  would  be  sufficient  generally  ;  but  a  minute  examination 
of  the  rights  of  nations  is  requisite,  to  enable  a  man  to  delineate 
this  system  fully.  Our  most  valuable  and  exposed  seaports  should 
be  better  fortified,  and  a  small  military  corps  raised  arid  established 
to  keep  the  fortresses.  Thus  prepared  and  provided  for  the  worst, 
I  would  diplomatically  declare  that  none  of  these  things  are  to  be 
understood  as  making  a  rupture  with  France ;  but  that,  on  the  con 
trary,  no  offence  is  authorized  against  the  persons,  properties,  or 
rights  of  the  French  Republic,  or  any  of  its  citizens,  to  whom  we 
are  disposed  to  do  justice  as  we  always  have  done,  and  with  whom 
we  wish  to  be  at  peace  ;  but  that  the  measures  are  solely  defensive, 
&c.  If  these  measures  can  be  carried,  adjourn  for  three  months. 

With  respect  to  a  new  embassy,  it  would  be  disgraceful,  and 
indicate  a  dread  of  France,  which  is  already  too  great;  but  my 


132  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE  CABOT.     [1796-98. 

principal  objection  to  it  is  that  it  may  be  easily  made  the  means  of 
recruiting  the  exhausted  strength  of  the  French  party  within  our 
country,*  and  their  mischiefs  are  more  to  be  dreaded  than  any  their 
masters  can  perpetrate  without. 

Thus,  my  friend,  you  see  with  what  readiness  I  give  you  my 
crudest  opinions.  If  they  are  erroneous,  it  will  be  satisfactory  that 
they  have  no  authority,  and  I  no  responsibility.  But,  before  I  close 
this  letter,  let  me  entreat  you  to  be  at  Philadelphia  on  the  day 
mentioned  by  the  President.  Probably  you  will  then  find  a  well- 
digested  plan  of  the  executive,  which,  if  not  repugnant  to  your  own 
ideas,  you  will  zealously  support.  If  no  system  is  formed  by  the 
executive,  or  such  as  shall  be  formed  is  not  supported,  there  will  be 
no  consistency,  and  of  course  no  efficiency,  in  our  measures.  If  I 
were  to  fill  another  sheet,  I  should  probably  suggest  nothing  which 
has  not  been  familiar  to  your  mind.  There  can  be  nothing  new  in 
this.  It  is,  however,  the  best  return  I  can  make  to  your  very  flat 
tering  letter,  and  may  be  regarded  as  an  additional  proof  of  the 
great  esteem  with  which  I  am 

Truly  your  friend,  &C.1  G.  CABOT. 

*  E.g.,  by  making  propositions  which  would  be  popular  here,  and  only 
insisting  on  one  or  two  points  which  would  involve  us  in  a  contest  with  Great 
Britain.  —  G.  C. 

CABOT  TO  GORE. 

BROOKLINE,  April  17, 1797. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  am  so  much  in  your  debt  for  letters  and 
other  favors  that  I  hardly  dare  to  acknowledge  the  extent,  unless 
I  could  be  assured  you  would  take  the  acknowledgment  for  pay 
ment,  or  at  least  as  a  compensation  for  giving  time.  It  is  impossi 
ble  that  your  official  duties,2  with  all  their  perplexities,  should  so 
far  engross  your  thoughts  as  to  prevent  your  notice  of  the  inter 
esting  events  which  occupy  us  here  ;  and  I  wish  it  were  in  my 
power  to  satisfy  in  any  degree  the  desire  you  must  feel  to  know 
our  measures  and  their  success.  My  own  indolence,  which  I 
thought  nothing  could  overcome,  has  given  way  to  my  anxiety  for 
the  cause  of  order  and  of  our  country.  You  may  have  seen  that 
I  was  taken  as  your  suppleant  in  the  difficult  office  of  rectifying 

1  This  letter  has  been  already  printed  in  Morison's  Life  of  Smith,  p.  98. 

2  Mr.  Gore  was  at  this  time  in  London,  as  one  of  the  commissioners 
under  the  Jay  treaty. 


1796-98.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  133 

public  opinion ;  l  and,  if  I  have  been  less  successful,  you  will  attrib 
ute  it  to  the  proper  causes.  The  enclosed  copy  of  a  letter,2  which 
I  addressed  to  a  few  friends,  will  show  you  my  course  of  thinking 
on  the  subject  which  is  to  engage  Congress ;  and  I  am  riot  without 
hopes  that  the  people  will  be  disposed  to  support  measures  of 
energy,  though  a  little  burdensome,  when  they  are  brought  to  see 
the  public  dangers  in  their  true  light.  If  the  country  should  be  put 
into  a  posture  of  defence,  adequate  revenues  provided,  and  convoys 
allowed  to  enforce  and  fulfil  the  twenty-seventh  article  of  the  treaty 
with  France,  and  a  diplomatic  declaration  that  all  these  meas 
ures  are  purely  defensive,  and  not  to  be  understood  to  mean  any 
thing  like  a  rupture,  —  that,  on  the  contrary,  no  offence  is  author 
ized  against  the  persons,  properties,  or  rights  of  the  French  Repub 
lic,  or  any  of  its  citizens,  to  all  of  whom  we  will  for  ever  render 
complete  justice,  and  with  whom  we  earnestly  wish  to  remain  at 
peace,  —  I  should  expect  ultimately  to  see  our  dignity  preserved. 
But  I  am  very  recently  informed  that  a  friend  of  ours  at  New 
York,  whose  opinions  are  almost  always  the  wisest  in  the  world, 
thinks  that  a  new  embassy  is  advisable,  to  consist  of  Mr.  Pinckney, 
now  in  Holland,  Mr.  Madison,  and  some  person  from  this  quarter. 
I  have  not  heard  the  reasons  for  this  measure,  but  imagine  the 
principal  one  to  be  its  tendency  to  unite  the  country  in  a  system  of 
vigorous  defence,  if  it  fails.  But,  having  viewed  it  in  all  the  atti 
tudes  my  imagination  could  place  it,  I  confess  my  apprehension  is 
very  strong  that  France  would  seize  upon  the  occasion  to  renew 
the  exhausted  strength  of  her  party  in  the  United  States.  This 
she  might  do  by  profuse  promises,  which,  as  they  never  would  be  ful 
filled,  could  cost  nothing,  and  by  insisting  on  one  or  two  points,  the 
yielding  of  which  would  involve  us  in  new  difficulties  with  another 
nation.  Besides,  if  France  has  left  open  a  way  to  back  out,  she 
will  use  it  or  not,  as  events  in  Europe  may  determine  her.  If  she 
is  full  of  power,  our  humiliating  overtures  will  be  fruitless  ;  and,  if 
she  is  distressed,  they  will  be  unnecessary.  In  a  word,  although 
peace  is  not  to  be  abandoned  by  the  government  so  long  as  it  is 
possible  to  retain  it,  yet  I  believe  that  the  people  at  this  moment 
are  prepared  to  take  a  proper  tone,  if  the  government  will  give  it. 
Adet  is  about  to  sail  for  France ;  and  I  understand  that  he  tells  his 

1  Mr.  Cabot  had  sent  to  Mr.  Gore  a  copy  of  the  circular  letter  given 
above,  p.  124. 

2  This  refers  to  the  letter  just  given,  addressed  to  Jeremiah  Smith. 


134  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1796-98. 

confidants  that  there  will  be  no  war,  but  that  every  thing  will  be 
accommodated  as  soon  as  he  arrives,  or  his  letters  reach  Paris. 
Almost  all  the  tools  of  France  have  held  up  the  idea  that  France 
would  not  make  war  upon  us,  but  only  plunder  our  commerce  in 
their  own  defence  and  to  punish  us  for  having  sacrificed  their 
interests  in  the  British  treaty  ;  but  I  am  well  persuaded  that 
Adet  is  greatly  disappointed  in  the  effect  of  their  measures  upon 
the  country,  and,  above  all,  the  effects  of  Pickering's  letter.1 

You  know  very  well  that  all  power  has  been  concentrating  in 
the  House  of  Representatives.  It  has  made  great  progress,  and 
much  must  therefore  depend  upon  them ;  and  they  depend  upon 
Gallatin.  Yours  truly,  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  April  22,  1797. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Since  I  wrote  you  last,  Mr.  Swan 2  has 
returned  from  New  York,  where  he  had  been  to  have  a  last 
interview  with  Adet,  who  is  about  sailing  for  France.  Swan  has 
stated  to  a  friend  of  mine  that  Adet  has  no  expectation  of  a  war, 
but  relies  fully  that  all  misunderstandings  will  be  cleared  up 
immediately  upon  his  arrival  in  France,  or  upon  the  arrival  of  his 
letters,  if  he  himself  fails.  Thus  far  Mr.  Swan,  whom  you  know. 

If  Adet  does  confide  his  sentiments  to  Swan,  he  cannot  wish 
them  to  remain  secret.  It  is  conceivable  that  Adet  may  wish  to 
see  the  influence  of  his  nation  recovered  by  a  conciliatory  conduct 
toward  the  United  States  ;  but  it  is  more  probable  that  he  wishes, 
by  exciting  this  idea  here,  to  prevent  all  preparatory  measures 
against  a  different  conduct.  It  has  been  a  striking  artifice  in  the 
Revolutionists  to  divide  and  disarm  those  they  intended  to  attack, 
by  leading  them  to  expect  moderation  and  justice.  But,  in  every 
instance  of  nations  and  individuals,  the  credulous  have  become 
victims ;  and  I  cannot  but  fear  that  we,  too,  are  destined  to  suffer 
from  this  kind  of  folly.  It  is  hardly  within  possibility  that  the 
House  of  Representatives  should  not  temporize  rather  than  act 

1  The  reply  to  Adet's  charges  in  the  letter  to   our  minister  at  Paris, 
already  referred  to,  p.  112. 

2  Colonel  James  Swan.    Born  in  Scotland,  he  came  in  early  youth  to 
Boston.     He  served  through  the  Revolution   with   distinction,   and  was   a 
wealthy  merchant  and  writer  of  some  note.     The  last  fifteen  years  of  his 
life  he  passed  in  a  debtors'  prison  in  Paris. 


1796-98.1 


CORRESPONDENCE.  135 


with  decision,  unless  new  events  occur  before  they  meet,  which 
shall  rouse  them  by  rousing  the  country. 

I  am  well  persuaded,  however,  that,  if  the  House  should  unite 
with  the  other  branches  in  measures  of  suitable  vigor,  the  country 
will  go  along  with  the  government,  and  support  it  with  constancy. 
I  think,  too,  that  firmness  and  prudence  well  combined  would 
carry  us  safe  through  the  crisis,  and  that  France,  upon  the  return 
of  adversity,  which  will  come,  will  respect  us  more  and  treat  us 
better.  She  now  despises  us,  as  she  does  all  who  do  not  resist  her  ; 
and  she  always  respects  the  English  above  every  other  people. 

Yours  truly,  G.  CABOT. 

At  an  early  period,  you  asked  of  me  "  what  the  people 
would  think  should  be  done  by  the  government  to  ward  off  the 
impending  evils."  I  answered  then  that  they  would  take  their 
opinion  from  the  government,  if  the  government  has  one.  But  I 
ought  perhaps  to  state  to  you  now  that  the  expediency  of  sending 
an  envoy  is  more  generally  admitted  than  denied.  At  the  same 
time,  I  believe  it  is  expected  that  other  measures  of  preparation 
will  be  taken,  so  that  we  may  be  ready  for  the  worst  events.  I 
repeat  to  all  my  acquaintances  my  fears  that,  if  an  envoy  is  sent 
and  received,  the  French  will  completely  re-establish  their  undue 
influence  in  our  country. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  May  12,  1797. 

MY  DEAR  SIR, —  Since  the  receipt  of  your  favor  of  the  5th, 
which  was  handed  me  last  evening,  I  have  revolved  the  subject  of 
it  in  my  mind  as  frequently  as  the  time  would  admit ;  and  finally 
I  could  think  of  no  persons  in  this  State,  whose  names  I  would 
mention  for  commissioner  on  the  British  debts,  except  Mr.  Jackson,1 
the  supervisor,  or  my  quondam  colleague,  Mr.  Strong.  Both 
these  gentlemen  deservedly  possess  the  public  confidence,  and  are 
habituated  to  those  patient  investigations  which  the  office  may 
require.  My  preference  would  be  for  Mr.  Jackson,  because,  ceteris 
paribus,  treaty  makers  should  be  kept  free  from  the  imputations 

i  Jonathan  Jackson,  of  Newburyport.  He  was  for  many  years  prominent 
in  Massachusetts  politics,  and  a  successful  merchant.  He  was  the  father  of 
Judge  Jackson,  of  the  Massachusetts  Supreme  Court,  of  Dr.  James  Jackson, 
and  of  Pa  trick 'Tracy  Jackson,  the  eminent  merchant  and  manufacturer. 


136  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1796-98. 

of  deriving  individual  benefit  from  that  public  act.  In  every  other 
point  of  view,  Mr.  Strong  will  doubtless  be  an  unexceptionable 
character.  Whether  either  of  the  gentlemen  would  engage  in  this 
service,  I  am  unable  to  say ;  but  I  will  try  to  ascertain  Mr.  Jack 
son's  disposition,  and  inform  you  by  the  next  post.  The  union 
of  the  four  commissioners  in  the  choice  of  any  fifth  man  would 
probably  strengthen  his  inclination  to  accept  the  office,  as  it  would 
place  him  in  a  situation  of  great  respectability,  and  where  the  duty 
of  impartiality  would  be  rendered  easier  from  the  peculiar  great 
ness  of  its  obligation. 

I  am  five  miles  from  the  post-office,  and  therefore  can  add 
nothing  to  these  first  impressions  now ;  but,  if  any  thing  further 
occurs,  it  shall  follow  by  the  succeeding  post. 

Yours  faithfully,  G.  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  May  14,  1797. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  thought  it  a  fulfilment  of  your  desires  to 
ascertain  whether  Mr.  Jackson  would  engage  as  a  fifth  commis 
sioner,  if  he  were  invited.  I  therefore  communicated  to  him  the 
substance  of  your  inquiry,  and  added  that  I  had  mentioned  his 
name  to  my  correspondent  at  Philadelphia,  as  one  that  might  be 
compared  with  others  ;  but  he  readily  decided  that  it  would  be  im 
possible  for  him  to  execute  the  commission,  if  it  should  be  offered, 
alleging,  among  other  reasons,  that  his  state  of  health  forbids  a 
journey  southward,  and  that  the  business  of  his  present  office  (riot 
perfectly  ordered  by  his  predecessor)  would  require  the  careful 
labor  of  several  months  to  arrange  with  propriety. 

I  take  it  for  granted  that  your  intention  is  to  form  a  list  of  the 
best  names,  and  from  these  to  select  the  most  suitable  character. 
If,  however,  it  should  be  thought  expedient  to  take  a  man  in  this 
part  of  the  Union,  I  think  Brother  Strong  unites  excellent  quali 
ties  for  the  office.  He  is  happy  in  a  moderation  of  manner,  which 
has  prevented  his  firmness  of  purpose  from  giving  offence,  and 
therefore  may  conciliate  the  good  opinion  of  the  South,  while  he 
highly  enjoys  that  of  the  North. 

Very  respectfully  and  affectionately, 

I  remain  your  constant  friend, 

G.  CABOT. 


1796-98.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  137 


CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  May  15,  1797. 

MY  DEAR  SIR, —  Almost  all  men  seem  finally  to  expect  that  an 
envoy  extraordinary  is  to  be  sent  to  France ;  but  no  one  has 
attempted  to  show  the  propriety  of  such  a  step,  except  that  its 
tendency  is  to  unite  the  country  eventually.  I  had  one  conversa 
tion  with  Ames  upon  this  subject,  in  which  he  supported  the 
measure,  chiefly  on  the  ground  that  without  it  the  government 
could  do  nothing,  and  with  it  might  be  brought  to  prepare  for  an 
ultimate  efficient  defence.  After  all  I  have  heard  and  all  I  have 
been  able  to  imagine,  my  mind  is  still  as  unsatisfied  as  at  first.  I 
often  ask  myself  what  instructions  can  be  given  to  the  new  min 
ister,  that  will  not  immediately  bring  us  to  issue  with  France.  To 
say  that  he  shall  not  enter  the  Republic,  until  a  recognition  is 
promised,  is  making  a  point  at  the  outset,  which,  while  Mr.  Pinck- 
ney  remains  alone  at  the  door,  may  be  possibly  avoided.  And  yet 
I  can  have  no  idea  of  an  envoy  being  put  on  any  other  terms. 
Again,  is  it  possible  that  an  acknowledgment  can  be  made  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  that  they  have  done  wrong  towards  France? 
If  they  were  disposed  to  make  such  an  acknowledgment  in  general 
terms,  it  would  be  impossible  to  point  out  the  particular  case. 
Even  our  Jacobins  are  brought  to  confess  that  the  United  States 
have  done  nothing  which  they  had  not  good  right  to  do ;  but  they 
complain  that  our  government  did  not  forbear  to  do  what  (though 
right  in  itself)  must  have  been  known  would  displease  our  allies, 
and  so  make  them  quarrel  with  us,  or  rather  punish  us.  Again, 
can  we  send  a  minister  without  instructing  him,  when  received  by 
the  French,  to  ask  of  them  some  reparation  for  all  the  injuries 
their  agents  and  servants  have  done  us  ?  If  not  to  these  ends,  to 
what  does  the  mission  aim  ?  France  is  acting  as  I  have  seen  a 
cunning  knave  in  private  life,  —  first  commit  the  most  insufferable 
injuries,  and  then  take  the  high  ground  of  complainant.  In  such 
a  case,  no  good  can  come  from  an  act  which  will  place  the  injured 
party  in  the  attitude  of  entreaty,  weakness,  and  fear.  I  still  wish 
it  were  possible  for  our  country  to  assume  a  dignified  countenance, 
and,  without  provoking  hostilities,  pre'pare  to  repel  them.  I  am 
well  persuaded,  if  we  could  do  this,  all  would  be  well.  The  hope 
of  seducing  us  within,  or  coercing  us  without,  would  be  extinct ;  and 
France  would  not  then  suppose  it  for  her  interest  to  quarrel  with 


138  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1796-98. 

us.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  people  wish  to  avoid  new  taxes, 
and  especially  one  upon  land;  but  the  rapidity  with  which  the 
people  have  come  to  a  right  way  of  thinking  on  French  politics 
leads  me  to  believe  that  almost  any  measures  the  government  may 
take  would  be  approved,  and  especially  if  accompanied  with  an 
address  to  the  people,  explaining  the  necessity  and  pointing  to  the 
public  danger.  But,  after  all,  my  greatest  reliance  is  that  Great 
Britain  will  keep  the  monster  at  bay,  until  he  destroys  himself  or 
becomes  less  dangerous  to  others ;  and  I  cannot  believe  that  any 
vicissitudes  in  the  internal  affairs  of  England  will  sensibly  diminish 
their  naval  strength,  or  divert  its  application,  as  long  as  France 
remains  formidable.  England  certainly  possesses  abundant  means 
of  every  kind  to  defend  herself  against  France,  and  as  many  of  the 
powers  on  the  continent  as  France  can  compel  to  act  as  auxiliaries. 
I  shall  not  believe  therefore,  until  I  see  it,  that  England  will  yield 
in  the  present  contest.  Mr.  Erskine,  Mr.  Waddington,  and  some 
thousands  of  others,  will  try  at  every  period  of  misfortune  to 
displace  the  ministers ;  but  the  government,  the  landed  as  well  as 
other  property  of  the  nation,  the  weight  of  character,  and  essen 
tially  the  body  of  the  nation,  must  and  do  hate  France,  and  will 
under  all  circumstances  fight  France  as  long  as  they  can. 

Farewell.  G.  CABOT. 

TUESDAY,  May  16. 

Since  writing  the  preceding,  I  have  received  a  letter  from  Mr. 
King,  by  which  it  appears  that  he  considers  the  late  proceedings 
in  England  as  a  fair  commencement  of  a  paper-money  system.  It 
was  evident  to  us  all  that,  if  the  stoppage  of  payment  in  gold  and 
silver  were  not  merely  a  thing  of  a  day,  and  resulting  from  causes 
in  their  nature  of  short  duration,  a  paper  currency  must  take 
place;  but  is  any  way  of  managing  these  unavoidable  difficulties 
less  hazardous? 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  May  22,  1797. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  thank  you  sincerely  for  the  copy  of  the 
President's  message  with  its  accompaniments  from  your  office, 
which  you  were  so  good  as  to  send  me.  It  is  abundantly  evident 
now  that  the  first  opinion  I  formed  was  a  just  one,  of  the  benefit 
which  the  community  would  derive  from  your  letter  to  Mr.  Pinck- 


1796-98.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  139 

ney.  The  French  disease  will  yield  to  powerful  discutients,  if  to 
any  thing. 

We  are  all  charmed  with  the  speech  of  the  President,  and  I 
am  persuaded  this  part  of  the  country  will  support  the  policy  he 
indicates. 

Accept  my  unfeigned  regards,  and  be  assured  of  my  highest 
esteem.  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  May  31,  1797. 

MY  DEAR  SIR, — If  it  were  doubtful  whether  the  government 
could  give  a  tone  to  the  nation,  I  think  the  effect  of  the  Presi 
dent's  speech  is  a  proof  of  its  truth. 

All  the  Federalists,  and  many  others,  approve  highly  the  style  he 
has  used,  and  swear  to  support  him.  Still,  however,  we  look  with 
anxiety  for  the  address  of  the  House,  as  it  shall  finally  pass ;  for, 
if  the  representatives  fall  off,  they  will  be  followed  by  many  of  the 
people. 

Our  Legislature  assembles  this  day,  and  it  is  expected  they  will 
express  their  coincidence  of  opinion  with  the  President.  With  a 
hope  to  stimulate  them  to  this  proper  conduct,  I  threw  into  the 
"  Centinel "  of  this  date  a  piece  signed  "  One  of  the  American  Peo 
ple."  J  When  this  is  done,  I  shall  hope  you  will  think  my  apostle- 
ship  may  be  suspended  as  no  longer  necessary,  and  I  hope  you  will 
be  persuaded  that  I  have  faithfully  executed  the  trust.  We  are 
told,  and  I  believe  it  to  be  true,  that  our  eastern  district  will  send 
a  recruit  to  the  Federal  party,  by  electing  Parker  instead  of 
Dearborn. 

Brother  Ellsworth,  a  few  days  since,  made  us  a  friendly  visit 
of  three  or  four  hours,  and  gave  us  a  more  realizing  view  of  your 
family  than  we  had  enjoyed  for  a  long  time.  We  are  to  see  him 
again  to-morrow  evening.  He  perceives  with  some  triumph  that 
my  political  faith  has  been  a  little  strengthened  by  the  manifesta 
tions  of  right  temper  among  the  people  since  the  publication  of  the 
speech.  If  Congress  should  be  disposed  to  do  all  that  they  ought, 
I  trust  they  will  rescue  us  from  the  continued  disgrace  of  starving 
our  public  officers ;  and,  when  this  happens,  I  shall  hope  you  will 
have  it  in  your  power  to  draw  every  good  man  you  need  as  an 

1  See  below,  p.  584. 


140  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE  CABOT.      [1796-98. 

auxiliary  in  your  department,  and  that  you  will  no  longer  delay  to 
expel  a  commissioned  traitor.1  Expectation  has  been  alive  since 
the  appearance  of  an  infamous  letter,  as  it  is  called ;  but,  for  my 
own  part,  whether  the  letter  was  written  by  the  person  to  whom 
it  is  imputed  or  not,  I  should  always  have  believed  the  sentiments 
are  precisely  those  he  maintains.  Indeed,  the  attack  he  made  pub 
licly  upon  Adams,  in  his  note  to  a  printer,  was  no  less  scandalous. 
In  all  these  things,  I  devoutly  acknowledge  the  hand  of  Provi 
dence  ;  and,  if  I  would  be  persuaded  that  we  deserve  these  kind  inter 
ferences,  I  could  be  as  easy  as  some  of  our  friends. 

G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  June  27,  1797. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  just  returned  from  a  circuitous  jour 
ney  of  four  hundred  miles,  which  has  occupied  seventeen  or  eigh 
teen  days.  Your  favor  of  the  8th  I  found  upon  my  table  at  my 
arrival  here. 

In  passing  up  the  Merrimac  and  down  the  Connecticut,  one 
hundred  and  fifty  miles  on  each  river,  I  found  the  people  every 
where  maintaining  more  just  sentiments  of  our  political  affairs 
than  I  had  conceived  possible  after  so  much  pains  had  been  taken 
to  mislead  them. 

At  Concord,  I  was  in  the  House  of  Representatives  when  the 
address  in  answer  to  Governor  Gilman's  speech  was  discussed;  and 
I  can  assure  you  I  never  saw  in  any  assembly  so  much  of  the  right 
sort  of  American  spirit.  Of  one  hundred  and  thirty-one  members, 
there  were  not  more  than  four  or  five  tainted  with  Jacobinism ; 
and  although  twenty-eight  voted  against  the  address,  yet  most  of 
these  acted  upon  the  principle  of  accommodating  the  four  or  five 
who  professed  to  desire  only  a  little  less  force  in  the  expression 
of  what  all  agreed  was  the  public  sentiment.  In  the  Upper  House 
there  was  equal  union  and  spirit;  and  I  am  persuaded  nineteen- 
twentieths  of  these  men  would  have  marched,  with  Governor  Gil- 
man  at  their  head,  upon  a  moment's  call,  to  defend  the  country  and 
its  government  against  France,  —  as  Stark  and  his  followers  did 
to  repel  the  British  in  1777.  When  I  came  into  Vermont,  I  found 

1  This  refers  to  Tench  Coxe,  shortly  after  dismissed  by  Wolcott  for  offi 
cial  misconduct.  See  p.  148.  See  also  Administrations  of  Washington  and 
Adams,  II.  6,  9. 


1790-98.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  141 

the  same  temper  and  spirit ;  so  that  I  could  not  forbear  to  conclude 
that  the  disaffection  in  Boston  and  its  vicinity  is  almost  all  that 
exists  in  New  England,  for  I  consider  the  paltry  opposition  of 
Portsmouth  as  only  sufficient  to  blow  the  fire  of  patriotism  in  the 
rest  of  the  State  of  New  Hampshire. 

I  have  seen  by  the  newspapers  that  Ames  was  nominated  for  a 
fifth  commissioner.  I  should  have  mentioned  him  with  the  first 
men,  if  I  had  not  considered  his  ill-health  as  a  total  disqualifica 
tion.  I  had  just  visited  him,  and  he  appeared  too  feeble  to  attend 
to  business  of  any  sort. 

We  resist  the  French  successfully  in  our  own  country,  but  they 
beat  us  in  Europe.  If  England  revolves,  our  tranquillity  must  be 
disturbed ;  but  I  still  hope  and  confide  that  England  in  every  sup- 
posable  condition  will  command  the  ferry,  and  that  interest  and 
pride  will  always  stimulate  her  to  keep  the  French  boats  from 
passing.  .  .  .  Your  unfeigned  friend, 

G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  Oct.  4,  1797. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  am  greatly  obliged  to  you  for  the  pamphlet 
you  sent  me,  as  I  felt  a  strong  desire  to  see  the  argument  which 
should  prove  conclusively  that  the  knight  would  be  a  knave,  if  he 
was  not  by  nature  a  fool.1 

I  am  persuaded  this  subject  stands  pretty  well  in  the  public 
view  already  ;  but  I  am  nevertheless  convinced  that,  since  the  policy 
of  France  has  dragged  our  executive  into  the  street,  it  is  best  to 
make  the  people  who  are  there  understand  that  we  are  wholly 
right,  and  our  accusers  altogether  wrong. 

I  hope  therefore  your  letter  will  be  communicated  to  Congress, 
that  it  may  be  regularly  published. 

In  a  late  letter  from  Mr.  Gore,  he  informs  me  that  the  office 
of  consul  will  soon  be  vacated  by  the  return  of  Mr.  Johnson  to 
Maryland ;  and,  as  it  is  of  much  public  importance  that  the  consul 
ship  in  such  a  city  as  London  should  be  well  filled,  he  expresses  a 

J  This  refers  to  a  letter  from  Pickering  to  the  Chevalier  de  Yrujo,  the 
Spanish  minister.  Yrujo  had  become  unpopular  from  his  libel  suits  against 
Cobbett.  His  intrigues  with  the  Democrats  also  gave  a  peculiar  zest  to  this 
sharp  state  paper,  which  Pickering  afterwards  transmitted  to  Congress 
with  his  official  report.  See,  for  full  account,  Life  and  Works  of  Pickering, 
in.  396-411  inclusive. 


142  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF  GEOEGE   CABOT.      [1796-98. 

solicitude  that  among  the  candidates  the  best  should  be  selected. 
His  own  opinion  is  decidedly  in  favor  of  Mr.  Williams,1  our  consul 
at  Hamburg,  who  he  thinks  would  accept  the  trust.  I  have 
formerly  expressed  to  you  my  opinion,  and  that  of  the  commercial 
men  who  know  him  in  this  quarter ;  and  I  repeat  that  his  sound 
understanding  and  well-established  character  and  principles  render 
him  in  my  estimation  highly  deserving  of  public  confidence. 

I  rejoice  that  at  this  period  of  distress  in  the  city  of  Philadel 
phia  2  you  and  your  family  are  so  remote  from  the  scene  ;  and, 
wherever  you  may  be,  I  pray  for  the  welfare  of  you  and  yours, 
being,  with  sincere  esteem  and  affection, 

Your  faithful  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 

1  See  above,  p.  109,  note. 

2  This  refers  to  the  yellow  fever,  which  raged  with  great  violence  in 
Philadelphia  during  the  summer  of  1797.    Despite  his  precaution,  Colonel 
Pickering  lost  a  child  from  the  disease. 


1798.]  SECRETARYSHIP  OF   THE  NAVY.  143 


CHAPTER  VI. 

1798. 

Declines  Secretaryship  of  Navy.  —  Renewed  Political  Activity.  — Affair  of 
the  Major-Generals.  —  Opinion  of  Gerry  and  Marshall.  —  Correspondence. 

THE  winter  of  1797—1798  in  Philadelphia  passed  away 
unmarked,  except  by  the  ever-increasing  bitterness  of  party 
hostility.  Meanwhile,  the  American  envoys,  in  Paris, 
were  subjected  to  the  insults  and  intrigues  of  Talleyrand. 
No  definitive  tidings  came  from  them  until  March,  when 
the  President  sent  a  message  to  Congress,  announcing  that 
the  negotiation  had  failed,  and  that  the  country  must  arm. 
The  Federalists  received  the  message  with  exultation  ;  and, 
though  Jefferson  at  once  pronounced  it  "  insane,"  the  oppo 
sition  was  for  the  moment  demoralized.  But  they  soon 
rallied ;  and  although  so  keenly  alive  to  the  dignity  of  the 
country,  so  sensitive  to  British  insults,  so  bellicose  even  in 
1794,  they  were  now  filled  with  a  generous  enthusiasm 
for  peace  and  moderation.  A  series  of  dilatory  resolutions 
were  introduced,  and  in  the  course  of  the  debate  a  call  was 
made  for  papers  and  despatches.  The  amiable  Giles,  by 
whose  exertions  the  demand  was  made  as  sweeping  as  possi 
ble,  little  imagined  the  result  of  his  request ;  for  the  Presi 
dent,  in  reply  to  the  call,  sent  to  Congress  the  famous 
X.  Y.  Z.  letters,  and  in  a  moment  the  whole  country  was 
aflame.  The  now  famous  cry,  "  Millions  for  defence,  not 
one  cent  for  tribute,"  rose  on  all  sides.  Opposition  faded 
away,  and  even  Jefferson  quailed  before  the  storm. 

By  the  tone  of  the  President's  message,  Mr.  Cabot  was 
roused  to  renewed  exertions.  He  again  strove  by  every 


144  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

means,  by  articles  in  the  papers  and  by  personal  exhorta 
tions,  to  stimulate  public  feeling ;  and  he  regarded  the 
publication  of  the  X.  Y.  Z.  letters  as  a  most  fortunate  event 
for  the  country.  The  attitude  of  France  thus  disclosed 
was  no  surprise  to  him,  and  his  only  feeling  was  one  of 
profound  satisfaction  that  the  true  character  and  feeling 
of  the  French  should  be  brought  home  so  forcibly  to  the 
American  people. 

The  strength  of  the  popular  indignation  enabled  the 
Federalists  to  make  provision  for  an  army  and  navy,  and  to 
establish  a  separate  department  for  the  latter  branch  of  the 
service.  To  the  new  secretaryship  thus  created,  Mr.  Cabot 
was  appointed.  Mr.  Adams  said  subsequently,  in  his  letters 
to  the  "  Boston  Patriot,"  "  I  afterwards  nominated  Mr. 
Cabot  to  be  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  a  station  as  useful,  as 
important,  and  as  honorable  as  the  other,1  and  for  which  he 
was  eminently  qualified."  2  Mr.  Cabot's  name  was  at  once 
sent  to  the  Senate,  and  confirmed  without  opposition.  The 
commission  was  made  out,  and  immediately  forwarded 
to  him  by  Colonel  Pickering,  together  with  a  private 
letter  warmly  urging  his  acceptance  of  the  post.  Mr. 
Cabot's  honest  belief  in  his  own  unfitness,  combined  with 
his  dislike  of  publicity  and  great  natural  indolence,  led  him 
to  refuse  an  office  for  which  he  was  well  suited  and  in  which 
he  might  have  rendered  important  services.  The  reasons 
alleged  in  his  letter  certainly  do  not,  it  must  be  confessed, 
justify  the  refusal  of  such  an  appointment  at  such  a  time, 
although  for  his  own  comfort  and  peace  of  mind,  especially 
in  view  of  after  events,  it  was  well  that  he  declined  as  he 
did.  Fortunately,  too,  neither  the  administration  nor  the 
country  was  embarrassed  by  his  refusal,  since  his  successor,3 
Mr.  Stoddert,  proved  himself  in  every  respect  an  able  and 
efficient  officer. 

1  That  of  envoy  to  France. 

2  Works  of  John  Adams,  IX  287. 

3  I  say  successor,  because  Mr.  Cabot  actually  held  the  office  for  a  month  ; 
and  his  name  stands  first  on  the  list  of  secretaries  of  the  navy. 


1798.]  WAR  WITH  FRANCE.  145 

By  the  disclosure  of  all  the  secrets  of  the  negotiations, 
the  infamous  demands  of  the  French  were  at  last  understood 
throughout  the  country.  Addresses,  manifesting  a  thorough 
popular  appreciation  of  his  vigorous  policy,  poured  in  upon 
the  President ;  and  this  phase  of  public  sentiment,  as  may 
be  seen  by  his  letters  to  Wolcott,  of  course  afforded  to  Mr. 
Cabot  the  greatest  possible  gratification.  The  President  re 
plied  to  these  addresses  with  the  greatest  fervor,  and  pushed 
with  vigor  the  wrarlike  preparations.  The  most  important 
business  was  of  course  the  organization  of  the  provisional 
army  ;  and  to  but  one  man  could  this  duty  be  entrusted. 
Washington,  summoned  from  retirement  by  the  universal 
demand  of  the  people,  accepted  the  new  task,  on  condition 
that  he  should  not  be  called  into  active  service  until  hos 
tilities  fairly  began,  and  that  he  should  be  allowed  to  name 
the  general  officers.  To  these  conditions  the  President 
assented  ;  and  Washington  sent  in  a  list,  which  gave  Hamil 
ton  the  first  place,  Pinckney  the  second,  and  Knox  the  third. 
In  this  order,  too,  the  nominations  were  sent  to  the  Senate, 
and  by  them  confirmed.  Against  this  arrangement  Knox 
rebelled,  demanding  the  first  place  ;  and  Mr.  Adams  not 
only  listened  to  his  remonstrances,  but  seemed  inclined  to 
yield  to  his  requests.  Such  a  change  in  the  position  of  the 
major-generals  was  wholly  indefensible,  technically  as  well 
as  politically,  and  was  also  inconsistent  in  principle  with 
the  other  appointments  which  Mr.  Adams  was  then  daily 
making.  Even  if  Hamilton  was  regarded  with  indifference 
by  the  masses  of  the  party,  he  was  no  less  the  first  choice 
of  Washington  than  of  the  Federalist  leaders  throughout 
the  country ;  and  it  should  be  remembered  that  those  were 
the  days  of  leaders,  and  when  they  were  satisfied  the  rest 
of  the  party  generally  followed  them,  without  much  delay. 
Knox,  on  the  other  hand,  had  no  strength  in  the  party,  and 
in  abilities  was  certainly  far  inferior  to  Hamilton.  To  put 
him  at  the  head  of  the  list,  therefore,  conduced  neither  to 
party  unity  nor  to  the  good  of  the  public  service.  Even  to 

10 


146  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

hint  at  such  a  change  was  a  grievous  mistake ;  and  one  is 
at  a  loss  to  know  why  Mr.  Adams  should  have  committed  it. 
The  only  apparent  solution  is  that  Mr.  Adams's  deeply 
rooted  dislike  and  distrust  of  Hamilton,  inflamed  by  Knox 
and  stimulated  by  the  opportunity,  flared  up,  and  found  in 
this  change  of  rank  a  dangerous  expression. 

Mr.  Cabot,  of  course,  shared  in  the  alarm  excited  among 
the  leading  Federalists  by  this  sudden  disposition  on  the 
President's  part.  Most  anxious  for  party  harmony,  he 
wrote  to  the  President,  not  only  urging  Hamilton's  claim 
to  the  first  place,  but  especially  pressing  on  his  atten 
tion  the  grave  danger  of  serious  party  dissensions,  if  a 
change  were  now  made.  Whether  Mr.  Adams,  despite 
representations  of  this  sort  from  all  sides,  would  still  have 
persisted  cannot  be  determined ;  but  a  voice  which  no 
American  at  that  day  dared  to  disregard  was  now  heard  to 
demand  that  the  original  order  of  appointments  should 
remain  untouched.  Mr.  Adams  yielded  to  the  request  of 
Washington,  and  the  threatened  quarrel  was  averted,  but 
unhappily  not  forgotten.  Mr.  Cabot  was  greatly  disturbed 
by  the  whole  affair,  and  strove  in  every  way  to  allay  the 
angry  feelings  which  had  been  excited.  His  one  thought 
was  for  his  party  and  its  policy,  so  greatly  endangered  by 
the  struggle  for  rank. 

While  this  affair  was  in  progress,  Gerry  returned  from 
France;  and  his  intimacy  with  the  President  awakened 
suspicions  that  he  had  a  hand  in  changing  the  relative  posi 
tions  of  the  major-generals.  Gerry  was  also  very  justly  dis 
trusted  on  account  of  his  inexplicable  and  dubious  conduct 
while  in  Paris ;  so  that  the  Federalists,  well  aware  of  the 
President's  strange  partiality  for  him,  watched  his  course 
with  extreme  anxiety.  Mr.  Adams's  hasty  and  unguarded 
utterances  with  reference  to  French  affairs  were  widely 
circulated ;  and  these,  together  with  his  apparent  de 
sire  to  screen  Gerry  and  his  local  separation  from  his 
cabinet,  were  topics  which  occupied  Mr.  Cabot's  thoughts 


1798.]  PARTY   SPIRIT.  —  JOHN  MARSHALL.  147 

and  filled  his  letters  during  the  latter  part  of  this  year. 
.  Then,  as  always,  he  especially  dreaded  any  conduct  which 
might  give 'to  the  policy  and  actions  of  the  administra 
tion  the  least  appearance  of  weakness,  indecision,  or  dis 
sension. 

One  other  subject,  frequently  referred  to  in  the  letters 
of  1798,  offers  a  curious  example  of  the  rigidity  with 
which  party  lines  were  then  drawn.  Congress  had,  be 
fore  their  adjournment  the  previous  summer,  passed  the 
famous  alien  and  sedition  laws,  which  were  generally  ac 
cepted  by  the  administration  and  its  supporters  as  very 
wholesome  measures.  One  of  the  wisest  and  coolest  of 
the  Federalists,  however,  John  Marshall,  then  just  on  the 
threshold  of  his  great  career,  expressed  in  the  "  Freeholder  " 
his  opposition  to  these  laws.  His  party  friends  were  dis 
mayed,  and  so  much  feeling  was  aroused  that  any  de 
fence  of  him  was  very  ill  received.  Ames  says  :  "  John 
Marshall,  with  all  his  honors  in  blossom  and  bearing  fruit, 
answers  some  newspaper  queries  unfavorably  to  those  laws. 
George  Cabot  says  that  Otis,  our  representative,  condemns 
him  ore  rotundo,  yet,  inconsistently  enough,  sedulously  de 
clares  his  dislike  of  those  laws.  George  Cabot  vindicates 
John  Marshall,  and  stoutly  asserts  his  soundness  of  Federal 
ism.  I  deny  it."  1  Ames  was  by  no  means  the  sternest  of 
party  men ;  and  yet  he  was  amazed  apparently  that  Mr. 
Cabot  should  defend  any  one  convicted  of  so  bad  a  lapse 
from  grace  as  Marshall.  Indeed,  Mr.  Cabot  himself  speaks 
in  a  rather  deprecating  tone,  even  while  he  defends  Mar 
shall  most  stoutly.  With  all  their  great  virtues  and  abilities, 
there  was  a  good  deal  of  dogmatism  about  the  Federalists 
of  tha.t  day. 

1  Works  of  Fisher  Amesj  II.  246. 


148  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE  CABOT.  [1798. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  9th  January,  1798. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  The  bare  possibility  that  you  may  not  have 
received  from  any  other  hand  Lord  Malmesbury's  negotiation  in 
duces  me  to  transmit  the  enclosed  paper. 

My  letter  from  England  announces  the  expectation  there  that 
the  arms  of  the  French  Republic  are  next  to  be  employed  in 
reducing  Spain  to  the  form  of  a  province,  in  expunging  Portugal 
from  the  catalogue  of  nations,  and  in  subverting  and  plundering 
Hamburg  and  Denmark.  Like  the  Romans,  whom  they  imitate, 
war  and  rapine  are  necessary  to  their  existence ;  and  if  the  modern 
Carthage  does  not  restrain  them,  and  they  remain  united,  doubtless 
they  will  revolutionize  the  whole  civilized  world,  and  we  must 
again  fight  for  our  independence,  or  lose  it.  If,  however,  England 
is  not  destroyed  by  internal  faction,  she  will  be  able  to  keep  the 
monsters  in  their  den  until  they  devour  each  other.  Accept,  my 
dear  sir,  my  unfeigned  wishes  for  the  welfare  of  you  and  all 
yours.  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  Jan.  19,  1798. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  rejoice  to  hear  that  you  have  finally  ex 
pelled  a  traitor  from  the  Treasury,  who  never  deserved  to  have 
been  trusted.1  The  toleration  of  such  a  fellow  in  office  after  his 
duplicity  was  known  indicates  truly  a  weakness  in  the  government, 
and  I  have  never  yet  believed  that  this  kind  of  policy  was  wise. 
Let  the  government  be  just  and  upright  in  every  thing ;  but  the 
higher  it  holds  its  head,  the  more  people  will  look  up  to  it,  while, 
if  it  abases  itself  even  by  the  affectation  of  humility,  it  will  cer 
tainly  be  despised  and  trampled  under  the  feet  of  barbarous 
Democrats. 

I  have  late  letters  from  Europe,  which  mention  the  designs 
of  France  to  plunder  Hamburg  and  invade  Denmark,  and  that 
Prussia  is  beginning  to  ferment  with  Jacobin  leaven,  which,  if  it 
works  powerfully,  is  to  be  accompanied  by  a  Jacobin  invasion. 
These  projects,  with  those  meditated  against  Spain  and  Portugal, 
are  sufficient  to  occupy  the  Parisian  horde  till  a  new  convulsion 
may  call  them  to  their  own  dens.  In  the  mean  time,  we  are  learn- 

1  Tench  Coxe  again. 


1798.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  149 

ing  something,  though  slowly,  on  this  interesting  subject.  I  keep 
my  house,  but  sometimes  scribble  for  the  good  of  others.  In  the 
first  page  of  the  "  Mercury,"  I  appear  as  "  A  Sincere  Lover  of  my 
Country,"  and  am  preparing  to  appear  again  as  a  "  Political  Moni 
tor."  1  Thus  you  see  I  try  to  help  a  little  in  the  good  cause. 

Yours  jideliter,  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  Feb.  9, 1798. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  can't  say  that  I  am  much  grieved  at  the 
attack  made  on  you  in  Bache's  paper.2  "  Improbis  vituperari 
laudari  est."  So  that  there  is  as  much  sweet  as  bitter  in  the 
potion  that  is  served  up.  Besides,  every  government  has  its  weak 
sides,  and  ours  has  many:  it  is  but  just,  therefore,  its  enemies 
should  attack  those  points  from  which  they  are  easily  repelled,  and 
I  have  often  been  proud  to  see  that  the  close  texture  of  many  of 
our  public  characters  was  impervious.  Your  friends  laugh  to  see 
the  charge  that  has  been  advanced,  and  think  its  folly  full  as  great 
as  its  indignity.  I  am  much  flattered  with  your  enclosure  of  27th 
ult.,  and  assure  you  that  I  feel  always  interested  in  whatever  con 
cerns  you  or  yours,  being,  very  sincerely, 

Your  affectionate  friend,  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  23d  March,  1798. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  thank  you  for  the  trouble  it  cost  to  transmit 
my  letter  from  Mr.  King,  and  for  the  few  lines  with  which  it  was 
accompanied.  Well  knowing  the  incessant  labors  and  ill-requited 
services  of  every  faithful  man  in  the  higher  offices  of  our  govern 
ment,  I  always  feel  reluctant  to  occupy  any  part  of  their  time. 

Mr.  King's  letter  is  short  and  gloomy ;  but  he  has  appeared  to 
me  to  despond  too  much  heretofore,  and  therefore  I  would  per 
suade  myself  that  he  now  overshades  his  picture.  But,  however 
this  may  be,  I  cannot  dissemble  my  apprehensions  that  a  melan 
choly  destiny  is  allotted  to  our  country,  if  England  yields  to 
France.  Undoubtedly,  the  designs  of  France  to  subject  to  her 

1  See  below,  pp.  586,  588. 

2  The  famous,  or,  perhaps  in  view  of  the  attacks  on  Washington,  infa 
mous,  "  Aurora." 


150  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

own  control  every  nation  of  the  civilized  world  are,  and  have 
been,  systematically  pursued  by  every  party  that  has  governed. 
Every  thing  in  France  is  resolved  into  force,  and  she  has  discov 
ered  the  secret  of  dividing,  and  of  course  weakening,  every  nation 
whom  she  wishes  to  subdue.  Indeed,  she  may  be  said  to  have 
natural  allies  numerous  and  powerful  in  every  state ;  and,  I  add, 
most  numerous  and  most  powerful  in  the  freest  states,  where  the 
mildness  of  government  encourages  faction  to  attempt  every  thing, 
because  it  hopes  for  every  thing. 

Your  affectionate  friend,  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  March  26,  1798. 

MY  DEAR  SIR, —  I  have  written  to  you  less  frequently  than 
might  have  been  expected,  because  I  have  felt  no  disposition  to 
have  any  thing  like  an  agency  in  political  affairs,  and  because  I 
have  thought  it  little  less  than  criminal  to  occupy  any  part  of  the 
time  of  our  public  slaves.  Indeed,  such  is  my  sympathy  with 
many  of  our  public  men  that  it  has  become  extremely  painful  to 
think  of  their  tasks. 

I  live  perfectly  recluse,  scarcely  going  beyond  the  limits  of  my 
farm  once  in  a  month.  I  do  not  pretend,  however,  to  be  uninter 
ested  in  what  passes  in  the  world ;  on  the  contrary,  I  partake  in  all 
the  anxieties  of  those  who  foresee  and  tremble  at  the  destiny  of 
our  country.  But,  while  I  am  so  selfish  as  to  applaud  myself  for 
shunning  all  responsibility  which  might  belong  to  official  character, 
I  have  omitted  no  opportunity  to  inculcate  just  sentiments  upon 
those  who  bear  me  prate,  or  read  what  I  write ;  for  I  have  often 
been  tempted  to  write  by  the  belief  that  public  opinion  depended 
much  on  the  newspapers,  and  that  I  could  say  something  that 
would  be  useful.  It  ought  to  be  some  compensation  to  our  execu 
tive  officers  to  know  that  their  administration  is  universally  ap 
proved  and  generally  admired  by  the  wise  and  the  good.  These, 
as  far  as  I  can  learn  their  sentiments,  have  thought  that  the  Adams 
administration  has  done  every  thing  in  its  power  to  rescue  the 
country  from  dishonor  and  the  servitude  with  which  it  is  threat 
ened  ;  but  I  confess  to  you  there  prevails  everywhere  in  this  quar 
ter  a  despondency  that  is  alarming.  The  truth  is  that  the  spirit  of 
the  country  has  been  sinking  from  the  time  that  the  House  of  Rep- 


1798.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  151 

resentatives,  in  June  last,  discovered  their  disposition  to  submit  to 
the  aggressions  of  France  rather  than  to  prepare  to  repel  them. 
At  that  moment,  if  the  legislature  had  been  as  faithful  to  their 
trust  as  the  executive,  I  have  not  the  smallest  doubt  the  indigna 
tion  of  all  the  States  (on  this  side  the  Delaware,  at  least)  would 
have  been  sufficiently  roused,  and  that  France  would  have  seen 
that  there  was  a  point  at  which  her  provocations  must  stop,  or  she 
would  lose  this  country.  But  the  people  have  been  taught  by  the 
example,  and  still  more  explicitly  by  the  language  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  that  it  is  expedient  to  submit  to  a  foreign  domina 
tion  rather  than  hazard  its  resentment  by  declaring  we  will  main 
tain  our  rights.  We  are  now  so  accustomed  to  this  humiliation 
that  it  ceases  to  disquiet  us,  and  for  every  new  disgrace  that  is 
thrown  upon  us  we  seek  for  excuses  to  bear  it  without  impatience. 
We  are  ashamed  to  acknowledge  the  influence  of  our  fears,  and  yet 
we  show  that  they  repress  every  sentiment  of  honor.  Perhaps  no 
misfortune  greater  than  this  could  happen  to  our  country,  as  regard 
ing  its  independence.  The  independence  of  the  smallest  states  has 
often  been  secured  against  the  rapacious  ambition  of  the  greatest 
by  a  desperate  resolution  to  defend  themselves  in  every  extremity ; 
and  although  it  is  evident  that  France  meditates  the  subjugation 
or  destruction  of  every  civilized  nation,  yet,  as  she  acts  always  in 
each  case  upon  calculations  of  the  advantage  of  success  and  the 
disadvantage  of  failure,  I  am  fully  satisfied  she  would  never  at 
tempt  to  subdue  the  United  States  by  force,  if  she  were  to  see  us 
unitedly  determined  to  resist  her  with  vigor.  At  present,  we  cer 
tainly  invite  rather  than  discourage  her  attacks,  and  I  am  not  sure 
that  the  executive  can  excite  in  either  the  legislature  or  the  people 
a  just  indignation  or  a  proper  sense  of  the  public  danger.  But 
this  I  know :  it  is  the  duty  of  the  executive  to  attempt  it,  and  o£ 
every  good  citizen  to  co-operate.  I  hope,  therefore,  the  President 
will  persist  in  the  manly  course  he  has  hitherto  trod,  and  that  he 
will  tell  plainly  and  forcibly  to  Congress  and  the  people  their  dan 
ger  and  their  duties  as  they  appear  to  him,  and  say  to  them  they 
must  not  slight  the  former  as  an  excuse  for  neglecting  the  latter. 
If  this  will  not  do  all  that  is  wished,  it  will  do  the  best  that  can  be 
done ;  and,  if  we  are  to  be  lost  finally,  it  will  be  a  consolatory  re 
flection  to  the  executive  and  its  friends  that  they  have  done  their 
duty.  It  would  be  a  greater  undertaking  for  France  to  conquer 
us,  if  we  were  united,  than  to  conquer  Germany  and  all  the  south 
western  parts  of  Europe.  Sooner  than  attempt  it,  if  we  were 


152  LIFE   AND   LETTEES    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

united,  she  would  certainly  be  peaceable  on  terms  that  would  leave 
us  the  government  of  our  own  country ;  but  if  we  remain  divided 
and  imbecile,  as  seems  probable,  we  must  undoubtedly  be  a  colony 
to  France,  if  England  will  consent  or  is  obliged  to  leave  the  sea.  I 
have  long  seen  that  the  fate  of  the  civilized  world  is  probably  to 
be  decided  by  the  issue  of  the  present  contest  between  France  and 
England ;  and  I  confess  I  see  no  reason  to  doubt  that  England  will 
triumph  at  last,  if  the  nation  continues  tolerably  united.  Mr.  King 
is  gloomy ;  but  he  has  constantly  been  so,  and  I  cannot  but  think 
he  stands  at  a  point  from  whence  the  power  of  England  is  never 
seen  with  advantage.  England  is  a  free  country,  and  the  force  of 
faction  which  proves  it  free  gives  it  the  appearance  of  division  and 
weakness.  The  despotism  of  France  admits  but  one  language. 
But  England  is  undoubtedly  able  to  continue  the  war  for  twenty 
or  even  a  hundred  years,  if  the  disease  of  Jacobinism  does  not  enfee 
ble  her.  She  may  monopolize  the  commerce,  not  the  navigation,  of 
the  two  Indies,  the  United  States,  and  a  part  of  Europe ;  she  may 
supply  all  these,  and  will  supply  even  France  with  manufactures, 
and  the  consumers  will  pay  the  increased  cost.  If  England  will 
persevere,  she  will  save  Europe  and  save  us ;  but,  if  she  yields,  all 
may  be  lost.  I  am  sure  she  can,  and  I  think  she  will  persevere,  be 
cause  it  becomes  more  and  more  manifest  that  she  is  contending  for 
existence  with  a  foe  that  can  never  be  appeased  or  trusted.  If  it 
were  possible  to  work  up  the  French  to  such  a  frenzy  as  to  attempt 
an  invasion  of  England,  I  think  all  the  friends  of  virtue  and  order 
in  the  world  ought  to  be  willing  to  trust  the  event,  because  there 
can  be  no  case  supposed  in  which  a  trial  by  force  would  be  so  much 
to  the  disadvantage  of  France.  I  have  often  wished  the  attempt 
might  be  made  with  half  a  million  of  men  determined  to  conquer 
or  perish,  as  I  fully  believe  they  would  perish,  and  with  them 
the  physical  force  and  the  destructive  fame  of  Jacobinism.  But 
France,  always  ready  to  do  the  wickedest  things  that  can  be  pro 
posed,  rarely  is  guilty  of  weak  ones.  She  will  never  attempt  to 
invade  England  without  first  seeing  the  British  fleet  vanquished. 
Your  sincere  and  affectionate  friend,  G.  CABOT. 

27th. 

Postscript.  —  My  son  has  just  brought  in  the  President's  mes 
sage,1  which  I  fully  approve,  and  hope  he  will  tell  the  whole  story 
at  the  first  suitable  moment. 

1  That  in  which  Mr.  Adams  announced  the  results  of  the  French  mission. 


1798.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  153 


CABOT   TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  April  21,1  1798. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  received  your  several  favors  to  the 
14th  inclusively,  with  their  enclosures  ;  and  I  rejoice  to  find  that  by 
the  last  you  were  not  destitute  of  hope  that  the  spirit  of  the  coun 
try  might  rise  in  opposition  to  tyrannical  France. 

I  took  the  first  moment  of  going  to  town  to  ascertain  the  fact 
whether  the  apathy,  which  has  so  long  disgraced  and  so  much 
endangered  us,  still  continued.  I  found  Mr.  Higginson  with  an 
address  in  his  hand  of  a  good  complexion ;  and  before  I  left  town, 
which  was  in  a  few  hours,  adequate  measures  were  taken  to  obtain 
the  most  extensive  subscriptions,  and  to  invite  the  co-operation  and 
concurrence  of  the  whole  people  of  the  State. 

My  expectations  are  strong  that  the  business  will  prosper,  and 
that  the  body  of  the  people  will  be  brought  to  a  good  temperament, 
so  that  the  measures  of  government  will  be  zealously  supported 
by  a  majority,  and  duly  acquiesced  in  by  all.  I  doubt,  however, 
whether  the  mercury  in  the  popular  body  will  rise  sufficiently  to 
press  upon  the  Legislature.  I  hope,  therefore,  that  Congress  will 
proceed  rapidly  to  establish  every  thing  requisite  for  our  national 
defence.  If  more  taxes  are  wanted,  let  them  be  laid  without  fear ; 
but  let  great  care  be  taken  to  show  that  they  are  unavoidable,  and 
that  we  are  called  to  part  with  a  little,  as  the  only  possible  means 
of  saving  the  remainder,  and  with  it  our  liberty  and  independence. 
If  this  could  be  done  in  an  address  from  the  Legislature,  I  would 
answer  for  its  complete  success ;  but,  if  this  is  unattainable,  it  must 
come  from  some  other  source.  We  keep  our  presses  going  with 
Harper's  2  excellent  speech  and  pamphlet ;  and,  if  no  address  from 
government  or  any  branch  is  practicable,  Harper  must  devote  him 
self  to  the  work  of  proving  to  the  people  the  absolute  propriety  of 
what  is  done.  He  has  the  requisite  talents  and  motive,  and  must 
work :  indeed,  if  he  knew  the  extent  of  his  fame  already  ac 
quired,  his  ambition  would  stimulate  him  to  the  most  laborious 

1  On  April  3d,  the  famous  X.  Y.  Z.  letters  had  been  sent  to  the  House. 
Hence,  the  more  confident  the  tone  of  this  letter,  and  the  account  given  of 
public  demonstrations,  &c. 

2  Robert  Goodloe  Harper,  of  Maryland.     The  speech  here  referred  to 
was  that  made  in  reply  to   Giles  (see  Annals   of   Congress,  1797-99,  II. 
1341,  1353),  in  the  debate  on  the  Spriggs  Resolutions,  introduced  by  the 


154  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE    CABOT.  [1798. 

undertakings.  But  any  majority  that  can  pass  a  law  must  be 
able  to  pass  an  address  to  explain  its  expediency,  and  to  prevent 
the  mischievous  effects  of  misrepresentation.  I  lay  great  stress  on 
this  idea,  from  a  conviction  of  its  utility,  if  wisely  and  ably  pursued. 
As  the  President  may  be  called  frequently  to  answer  addresses,  I 
take  it  for  granted  he  will  profit  by  every  such  occasion,  to  convey 
to  the  people  those  truths  which  they  ought  to  know  and  those 
sentiments  they  ought  to  feel.  Perhaps  you  have  seen  that  the 
little  town  in  which  I  live  has  petitioned  against  arming.  Our 
whole  number  of  voters  is  about  sixty-five,  and  upwards  of  fifty 
attended  the  meeting.  Although  I  am  extremely  averse  to  moving 
in  politics,  yet  my  conscience  would  not  permit  me  to  see  the  gov 
ernment  abandoned.  I  therefore  entered  into  the  debate,  which 
continued  several  hours ;  and  finally  the  vote  for  petitioning  ob 
tained  thirty-five  to  twenty-three.  I  have  the  satisfaction,  how 
ever,  to  believe  that  some  salutary  truths  were  inculcated,  and  that 
many  of  the  petitioners  are  substantial  friends  of  the  government. 
I  think  it  must  be  satisfactory  to  the  executive  to  know  that,  with 
all  the  aberrations  of  the  public  mind,  it  has  constantly  approved 
the  administration  of  that  branch  of  government,  even  while  the 
absurd  hope  was  cherished  that  France  would  be  conciliated.  A 
few  violent  Jacobins  have  alone  rejected  this  opinion ;  but  the  de 
spatches  have  silenced  them,  and  convinced  many  of  their  followers 
that  they  are  wrong. 

I  am  fearful  our  envoys  will  remain  in  France  until  the  de 
spatches  are  known  there.  In  that  case,  they  must  give  up  their 
lives,  or  contradict  their  own  communications,  or,  according  to  the 
order  of  the  day,  pay  a  deal  of  money.  Should  they  suffer  in  any 
way,  they  will  enjoy  the  sympathy  of  every  good  man  in  the  world ; 
and  their  sufferings  will  serve  their  country  by  dispelling  a  part  of 
the  remaining  delusions. 

Your  affectionate  and  faithful  friend, 

G.  CABOT. 

Democrats  after  the  receipt  of  the  message  announcing  the  failure  of  the 
French  mission.  The  pamphlet  by  Harper  was  entitled  "  Observations  on 
the  Dispute  between  the  United  States  and  France."  It  was  a  very  able 
production,  and  had  great  celebrity  as  well  as  great  effect  at  the  time  of  its 
publication. 


1798.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  155 

PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE,  May  5,  1798. 

SIR,  —  The  President  of  the  United  States  being  desirous  of 
availing  the  public  of  your  services  as  Secretary  of  the  Navy  of 
the  United  States,  I  have  now  the  honor  of  enclosing  the  commis 
sion,  and  of  expressing  the  sentiments  of  respect  with  which  I  am, 
sir,  your  most  obedient  servant,  TIMOTHY  PICKERING. 

PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

PHILADELPHIA,  May  5,  1798. 

SIR,  —  I  cannot  transmit  your  commission,  without  expressing 
my  individual  wishes  that  you  would  accept  the  office  of  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  of  the  United  States.  I  know  at  the  same  time  that 
you  cannot  accept  it  without  making  some  sacrifices  ;  but  our 
present  situation  demands  this  as  a  duty  from  every  citizen,  and 
especially  from  those  who  are  eminently  qualified  to  contribute  to 
the  safety  and  prosperity  of  our  country.  In  this  new  office,  the 
President  wishes  to  find  not  only  a  person  of  practical  knowledge 
in  maritime  affairs,  but  a  statesman ;  and  how  seldom  can  these 
two  characters  be  found  combined  in  one  person  ?  In  every  charac 
ter,  public  and  private,  you  know  how  happy  those  of  us  whom  you 
are  already  acquainted  with  would  be  made  by  your  acceptance 
of  the  office.  The  public  advantages  to  be  derived  from  your  con 
ducting  the  department  you  can  fully  estimate,  and  your  friends 
have  anticipated.  Although  the  formation  of  a  navy  has  been  con 
templated  these  four  years,  it  is  at  the  present  moment  only  that 
the  establishment  may  be  considered  as  commencing,  and  it  is  of 
vast  importance  that  the  foundation  be  well  laid,  —  that  the  first 
institutions  and  regulations  be  adjusted  in  the  best  manner  to  its 
present  most  efficient  use  and  future  prospering.  I  will  suggest 
but  one  other  consideration.  If  you  decline  taking  the  office, 
where  will  your  country  find  a  substitute  ?  There  is  not  one  in 
Philadelphia,  and  you  will  readily  believe  there  is  no  one  south 
ward  of  it ;  and,  if  you  fix  your  eye  on  any  one  at  the  eastward, 
will  you  propose  to  yourself  these  questions  :  "  Can  he  relinquish 
his  private  affairs  more  conveniently  than  I  ?  Can  he  accept  the 
office  without  making  greater  sacrifices  than  I  must  make  ?  In  a 
word,  is  it  the  duty  of  any  citizen  more  than  mine  to  perform  this 
indispensable  public  service  ?  " 


156  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

When  President  Washington  tendered  to  me  the  office  I  now 
hold,  I  made  objections.  (I  believe  that  I  have  mentioned  the 
circumstances  to  you.)  He  urged  my  acceptance,  among  other 
reasons,  in  the  prospect  of  peace  in  Europe,  and  the  lessened 
burthens  and  embarrassments  in  executing  the  office.  This,  unfor 
tunately,  has  proved  an  unfounded  expectation.  I  have  for  some 
time  past  reflected  seriously  on  the  vast  importance  of  employing 
the  best  abilities  and  energies  of  the  country  in  the  management 
of  our  public  affairs  ;  and  therefore,  without  difficulty,  resolved  to 
make  room  for  another  to  take  my  station,  which  the  interests  of 
the  country  required,  or  to  return  to  private  life,  as  those  who 
can  and  have  a  right  to  judge  should  deem  most  eligible.  This  is, 
and  will  continue  to  be,  my  determination. 

With  the  most  earnest  solicitude  for  your  public  services,  and 
sincere  wishes  for  your  individual  and  domestic  happiness, 
I  remain,  dear  sir,  very  truly  yours, 

TIMOTHY  PICKERING. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  May  11,  1798. 

MY  DEAR,  SIR,  —  By  the  same  mail  which  brought  me  your 
official  letter  of  the  5th,  I  received  a  private  one  to  which  I  feel 
anxious  to  make  a  satisfactory  reply.  Although  it  is  true  that  my 
inclinations,  habits,  duties,  and  interests  all  remarkably  concur  in 
confining  me  to  private  life,  and  although  in  consequence  of  this  I 
have  been  continually  growing  less  fit  for  any  public  station  where 
great  efficiency  is  required,  yet  such  is  my  zeal  to  maintain  the 
political  institutions  of  our  country,  and  thus  preserve  the  country 
itself,  that  I  should  not  at  this  moment  hesitate  to  engage  in  the 
office  to  which  I  am  invited,  if  I  were  not  perfectly  convinced  that 
the  service  is  beyond  my  strength. 

I  have  seen,  with  a  painful  sympathy,  the  tasks  which  our 
executive  officers  are  called  to  perform,  and  have  often  made  the 
reflection  that,  if  they  were  not  capable  of  the  most  intense  and 
persevering  application,  the  public  business  must  suffer.  I  have 
seen  with  pride,  however,  that  the  affairs  of  our  executive  govern 
ment  have  been  conducted  with  a  degree  of  order,  intelligence,  and 
steadiness  that  do  great  honor  to  the  nation  ;  but  I  must  be 
allowed  to  say  that  I  am  incapable  of  imitating  those  efforts  which 
in  others  have  been  productive  of  so  much  good.  This  is  a  cir- 


1708.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  157 

cumstance  so  important  that,  in  my  estimation,  it  greatly  outweighs 
the  advantage  of  any  practical  knowledge  which  a  person  could  be 
supposed  to  bring  into  the  office.  It  is  undoubtedly  requisite  that 
the  officer  at  the  head  of  the  naval  department  should  possess 
considerable  knowledge  of  maritime  affairs  ;  but  this  should  be 
elementary  as  well  as  practical,  including  the  principles  of  naval 
architecture  and  naval  tactics.  He  should  also  possess  skill  suffi 
cient  to  arrange  systematically  the  means  of  equipping,  manning, 
and  conducting  the  naval  force  with  the  greatest  possible  despatch 
and  with  the  least  possible  expense ;  and,  above  all,  he  should 
possess  the  inestimable  secret  of  rendering  it  invincible  by  any 
equal  force.  Thus  a  knowledge  of  the  human  heart  will  constitute 
an  essential  ingredient  in  the  character  of  this  officer,  that  he  may 
be  able  to  convert  every  incident  to  the  elevation  of  the  spirit  of 
American  seamen.  Suffer  me  to  ask  how  a  man  who  has  led  a 
life  of  indolence  for  twenty  years  can  be  rendered  capable  of  these 
various  exertions  ?  In  the  present  case,  it  is  physically  impossible. 
Notwithstanding  the  grateful  sensations  which  are  excited  by  so 
nattering  a  testimony  of  the  national  confidence,  yet  I  think  I  do 
not  deceive  myself  in  saying  that  I  had  rather  not  have  been 
thought  fit  for  this  office,  than  be  justly  chargeable  with  refusing 
at  this  time  any  essential  service  which  I  ought  to  perform.  Let 
me  therefore  repeat  that,  waiving  all  other  objections,  it  is  an 
insuperable  one  that  my  powers  are  inadequate  to  the  work.  To 
be  obliged  to  offer  apologies,  however,  just  when  substantial  aid 
is  demanded  by  the  government,  would  of  itself  have  given  me 
great  pain,  but  this  is  exceedingly  increased  by  the  consideration 
that  I  must  disappoint  those  to  whose  friendly  sentiments  I  am 
always  indebted,  and  whose  esteem  I  cannot  part  with  without  the 
greatest  regret. 

In  reply  to  your  questions,  I  would  say  it  is  not  to  be  expected 
that  a  man  will  be  found  possessing  the  ability  to  perform,  at  once, 
all  the  duties  of  an  office  new  and  difficult.  But  I  trust  men  may 
be  found,  and  it  seems  to  me  indispensable  that  such  should  be 
found,  who  will,  by  industrious  application  of  genius  and  talents, 
soon  acquire  the  requisite  qualifications.  I  well  know  many 
of  the  circumstances  respecting  your  appointment  to  the  depart 
ment  of  state,  and  I  feel  myself  at  liberty  to  insist  upon  the  exam 
ple  to  show  that  a  man  who  has  been  accustomed  to  apply  his 
powers  properly  to  a  few  things  becomes  capable  of  every  thing. 


158  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

The  power  or  habit  of  intense  and  persevering  application  is,  in 
my  opinion,  one  of  the  most  rare  and  the  most  valuable  of  human 
talents.  In  great  affairs,  nothing  can  be  well  done  without  it ; 
and,  with  it,  men  of  a  certain  force  of  mind  and  character  can  do 
every  thing,  and  do  every  thing  well.  A  man  possessing  this 
faculty  is  the  man  now  wanted.  It  is  a  faculty,  however,  of  which 
I  am  remarkably  destitute  ;  and  your  candor  must  admit  the  fact. 
I  urge  it  in  sincerity,  as  an  abundant  justification  in  declining  the 
momentous  and  difficult  trust  with  which  it  was  proposed  I  should 
be  honored.  Under  one  cover  with  this,  I  enclose  an  answer  to 
your  official  letter,  which  I  pray  may  be  considered  as  decisive  and 
unequivocal.  I  can  never  sufficiently  express  my  gratitude  for  the 
sentiments  of  your  private  letter,  and  I  must  ask  forgiveness  for 
writing  so  much  concerning  myself.  Accept  my  unfeigned  wishes 
for  your  happiness,  and  believe  me  ever 

Your  faithful  and  obliged  friend,  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  June  9,  1798. 

MY  DE^R  SIR,  —  When  those  who  have  a  right  to  command 
our  services  condescend  to  solicit  them,  it  is  not  to  be  imagined 
that  a  refusal,  however  proper,  can  be  wholly  forgiven.  I  know 
too  much  of  human  nature  to  deceive  myself  with  the  belief  that  I 
can  escape  censure  under  circumstances  where  others  would  incur 
it.  I  therefore  have  made  up  my  account  for  the  frowns  of  my 
friends,  as  evils  that  must  be  borne.  Still,  however,  I  calculate  on 
a  good  residuum  of  esteem  and  regard  with  those  I  love  best,  and 
with  this  I  must  be  content.1 

I  have  been  impatient  to  express  to  you  my  satisfaction  at  the 
great  success  of  the  President  in  awakening  the  country  from  the 
fatal  stupor  into  which  it  had  sunk.  We  have  still  some  dis 
affected,  seditious  people  in  this  quarter  :  they  are  few,  however,  in 
number,  and  reside  chiefly  in  the  town  and  vicinity  of  Boston ; 
and  their  influence  is  extremely  diminished.  All  men  whose 
opinions  I  know  are  unbounded  in  their  applause  of  the  manly, 
just,  spirited,  and  instructive  sentiments  expressed  by  the  Presi 
dent,  in  his  answers  to  the  addresses.  I  am  persuaded  the  good 
effects  of  these  open  declarations  cannot  be  overrated.  They  have 

1  This  refers,  of  course,  to  the  subject  of  the  two  preceding  letters, 
the  secretaryship  of  the  navy. 


1798.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  159 

excited  right  feelings  everywhere,  and  have  silenced  clamor.  But 
Caesar's  maxim  must  be  observed,  and  nothing  be  left  undone  by 
the  government:  the  stronger  and  more  decisive  measures  they 
take,  the  more  readily  will  they  be  supported.  I  was  glad  to  see 
the  bill  for  prohibiting  intercourse  with  the  dominions  of  France  ; 
but  I  should  have  thought  the  prohibition  should  lie  on  all  for 
eigners  as  well  as  citizens  and  residents.  Otherwise,  I  foresee 
attempts  will  be  made  by  our  own  people  to  change  their  bottoms 
in  the  neutral  islands,  and  then  supply  the  French ;  and  I  think  it 
is  an  object  of  importance  to  prevent  the  supply  of  Guadaloupe 
and  Hispaniola.  You  have  passed  the  Rubicon  :  rapid  marches  are 
necessary  to  success,  and  at  least  they  inspirit  your  troops.  Why 
should  not  a  bill  pass,  authorizing  the  executive  to  send  away  the 
French  consuls,  &c.  ?  If  you  mean  to  take  no  measures  but  such 
as  are  purely  defensive  and  fair  retaliations,  yet  this  authority 
should  be  given.  The  refusal  to  receive  our  ministers  would 
certainly  justify  our  refusal  to  permit  consuls  to  act,  although  they 
admit  our  consuls ;  but,  if  squeamishness  doubts  this,  we  ought  to 
be  prepared  to  send  away  their  consuls,  when  any  exigency  in  the 
opinion  of  the  executive  shall  require  it. 

I  do  not  see  that  the  executive  is  authorized  to  accept  of  volun 
tary  naval  aid  which  may  be  offered.  I  should  have  thought  it 
wise  to  give  commissions  to  such  private  vessels  as  the  President 
should  approve,  and  which  might  be  obligated  to  convoy  others. 
If  privateers  from  the  French  islands  continue  numerous,  the  mer 
chants  may  be  glad  to  associate  occasionally  in  forming  little  arma 
ments  for  the  protection  of  their  vessels  in  a  single  voyage.  I 
think,  however,  these  aids  ought  not  to  be  resorted  to,  until  the 
government  has  done  its  own  duty  ;  and  I  hope,  before  Congress 
rises,  General  Smith J  will  be  disposed  to  increase  the  number  of 
vessels  to  be  equipped  by  the  public  for  the  protection  of  com 
merce.  It  ought  to  be  remembered  that  this  kind  of  force  will  be 
inestimably  precious,  if  an  attempt  to  invade  us  should  be  made. 
The  men  who  will  have  been  trained  in  the  public  sea  service  will 
be  able  to  do  more  than  any  equal  number  of  any  other  descrip 
tion,  and  they  will  be  in  readiness  to  act. 

It  is  pretty  certain  that,  if  Great  Britain  yields,  we  shall  have 
the  weight  of  the  whole  European  world  to  oppress  us.  This 
seems  to  be  understood,  and  men  are  momently  declaring  their 
belief  that  we  can  and  shall  sustain  it  all  without  sinking.  Doubt 

1  Samuel  Smith,  at  this  time  member  of  Congress  from  Maryland. 


160  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF    GEORGE    CABOT.  [1798. 

less,  if  we  were  united  and  determined  to  die  rather  than  submit,  we 
\  should  succeed ;  but  the  cursed  foul  contagion  of  French  principles 
]  has  infected  us,  and  time  is  required  to  restore  us  to  soundness. 

My  hope  is  that  France  will  exert  all  her  powers  in  an  attempt 
upon  England.  If  she  fails,  the  world  will  be  free.  I  have  the 
highest  confidence  in  the  success  of  England  in  such  a  contest. 
Her  chance  would  be  much  better  than  in  a  long  protracted  war  of 
such  immense  expense,  and  which  gives  room  for  so  many  contin 
gencies.  But  I  cannot  believe  that  the  French  will  trust  them 
selves  on  the  sea.  With  all  their  victories  on  land,  they  are  no 
match  for  the  English  on  the  sea,  and  I  should  expect  the  French 
to  be  defeated  even  with  a  superiority  of  naval  force  of  three  to 
two  ;  nor  do  I  think,  if  they  could  land  in  England,  that  they 
would  be  able  to  conquer  it.  I  therefore  wish  the  cause  of  the 
civilized  world  to  be  tried  there.  I  see  no  other  chance  so  favor 
able. 

Although  you  are  doubtless  better  informed  than  I  am,  yet  it 
may  not  be  amiss  to  mention  that  my  letters  from  London  1  of  the 
9th  April  state  to  me  confidentially  that  Pinckney  and  Marshall 
are  to  be  turned  away,  and  Gerry  kept,  if  possible.  It  seems  the 
delay  of  the  envoys  has  been  produced  by  the  extreme  fastidious 
ness  of  one  of  the  gentlemen.  I  don't  believe,  however,  he  will 
be  such  a  dupe  as  to  remain  after  his  colleagues  shall  depart.  Per 
haps  the  case  will  not  occur,  for  it  is  highly  probable  that  the 
despatches  which  have  been  published  will  arrive  in  France  before 
any  of  them  can  have  embarked.  A  gentleman  who  left  France 
the  last  of  March  tells  me  that  no  idea  was  entertained  there  that 
we  should  offer  any  resistance.  The  Gallo-Americans  had  no 
doubt  we  should  pay  money,  and  he  says  they  will  be  all  surprised 
at  learning  that  we  dare  to  refuse  the  demands  of  France. 

Will  you  allow  me  to  suggest  the  propriety  of  selecting  young 
men  for  the  lieutenants  and  sailing-masters  in  the  navy  ?  Old 
sailors  are  incapable  of  improvement,  and  young  ones  may  be 
made  whatever  you  wish.  I  deem  it  a  misfortune  that  any  but 
young  men  should  have  employments  now  which  will  lead  to  im-' 
portant  commands  in  a  few  years. 

Yours  faithfully,  G.  CABOT. 

1  Besides  occasional  letters  from  Mr.  Gore,  Mr.  Cabot  also  received 
letters  from  his  younger  brother,  Mr.  Samuel  Cabot,  then  in  London,  as 
agent  of  the  American  commission  under  the  Jay  treaty. 


1798.1  COKKESPONDENCE.  161 


PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

(Confidential,) 

TREXTON,  Sept.  20,  1798. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  You  have  seen,  and  I  trust  approved,  the  order  in 
which  the  names  of  Hamilton,  Pinckney,  and  Knox  were  arranged 
for  general  officers.  Nobody  at  the  seat  of  government  doubted 
whether  they  would  rank  in  that  way,  being  that  in  which  they 
were  nominated  and  approved  by  the  Senate.  But  you  must  have 
noticed  that,  two  or  three  times  in  the  "  Centinel,"  the  idea  was 
suggested  that  General  Knox  was  the  first  major-general.  At 
length  it  has  appeared  that  General  Knox  demanded  the  first  rank. 
The  first  intimation  of  it  to  me  was  in  his  answer  to  a  letter  which 
I  wrote  him  at  the  request  of  the  late  Captain  Mitchell,  who  wished 
to  be  his  aide-de-camp.  I  was  astonished  at  the  claim.  I  knew 
indeed  that  Knox  was  proud  and  vain  and  ambitious  ;  but  I 
thought  that  as  for  years  he  had  been  the  daily  witness  of  Hamilton's 
vast  superiority  of  talents,  and  had  known  how  highly  they  stood 
in  the  public  estimation,  and  supposing  also  that  he  felt  an  ardent 
friendship  for  Hamilton,  I  was  astonished  to  find  him  not  hesitat 
ing,  but  apparently  desirous  not  to  serve  under  Hamilton.  The 
President's  tour  to  Massachusetts  furnished  Knox  with  the  lucky 
opportunity  of  making  and  enforcing  his  claim  by  the  plausibility 
of  his  arguments  and  his  adulatory  professions  of  respect,  honor, 
and  devotion  to  the  great  man.  You  probably  know  that  Knox 
is  capable  of  using  the  deepest  flattery ;  and  flattery  has  often  too 
much  effect  on  the  finest  minds,  and  in  the  present  instance  would 
make  the  stronger  impression  as  operating  against  a  competitor  for 
whom  the  President  had  no  liking,  if  he  did  not  feel  for  him  aver 
sion.  In  a  letter  to  the  President,  marked  private,  but  which  is 
filed  in  the  war  office,  dated  June  26,  he1  thus  begins:  "  I  have 
often  intended,  in  the  ardor  of  my  unqualified  admiration  of  the 
measures  of  the  supreme  executives,  to  express  the  same  respect 
fully  to  you.  But  hitherto  I  have  been  restrained  from  an  ap 
prehension  of  invading  upon  your  important  duties.  A  crisis, 
however,  is  rapidly  approaching,  which  renders  it  indispensable 
that  the  mind  of  the  meanest  citizen  be  known  as  to  the  part  he 
intends  to  act."  Having  then  made  some  assertions  on  the  nature 
of  the  impending  war  and  the  most  vulnerable  points  to  be  guarded, 

1  Knox. 
11 


162  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

he  says  :  "  Whoever  you  should  please  to  appoint  as  the  immediate 
commanding  officer  of  the  provisional  army,  you  will,  I  am  per 
suaded,  contemplate  General  Washington  as  the  efficient  Com- 
mander-in-Chief.  His  name  would  be  a  host,  and  the  occasion 
would  be  worthy  of  his  name.  He  alone  would  be  able  to  combine 
and  draw  into  activity  and  harmonize  all  that  remains  of  the  late 
army  that  could  be  useful.  My  .diffidence  in  uttering  these  senti 
ments  is  inexpressible,  and  only  to  be  equalled  by  my  respect  and 
attachment  to  you." 

"  After  having  said  so  much,  I  should  lose  all  self-respect,  were 
I  not  to  say  that,  if  there  be  any  sort  of  service  to  which  my 
humble  abilities  should  be  judged  equal,  I  should  faithfully  and 
ardently  execute  it,  believing  as  I  do  that  the  occasion  will  demand 
the  labors  of  all  the  friends  of  their  country  to  defend  its  rights 
and  liberties  against  the  all-devouring  rapacity  of  the  French 
rulers."  Who  that  reads  these  professions  of  patriotism  and 
humility  would  imagine  that  his  humility  aspired,  and  would  be 
content  only  with  the  rank  of  second  in  command,  and  that  his 
patriotism  admitted,  at  such  a  crisis,  a  personage  of  his  conse 
quence  to  withdraw  from  the  service  of  his  country  ?  This  imagi 
nary  importance  of  character,  and  usefulness  to  serve  in  a  station 
which  to  all  who  know  him  must  seem  abundantly  equal  to  his 
talents,  would  hardly  be  worth  a  thought,  were  not  the  President 
inclined  to  favor  his  pretensions.  Knox  has  appealed  to  a  rule 
observed  in  the  American  war,  in  which  he  says  it  was  directed 
that,  of  appointments  of  officers  to  the  same  rank  on  the  same  day, 
the  priority  was  to  be  determined  by  the  rank  held  prior  to  the 
new  appointment ;  consequently,  as  he  was  a  major-general  and 
Hamilton  only  a  lieutenant-colonel,  the  latter  must  now  take  the 
subordinate  station.  But  there  can  be  no  such  general  rule  ;  at 
least,  none  is  found  in  the  journals  of  Congress.  The  only  one  to 
which  he  can  refer  is  that  of  Nov.  24,  1778.  But  that  you  will 
see  is  absolutely  confined  to  the  officers  appointed  in  pursuance  of 
the  resolves,  Sept.  16,  1776,  and  prior  to  the  1st  of  January,  1777. 
If,  however,  the  old  regulations  are  to  govern,  and  it  is  upon 
Knox's  representation  of  their  force  to  the  President  that  the  lat 
ter  has  said  he  thinks  Knox  has  a  "  legal "  right  to  rank  before 
Hamilton,  we  appeal  to  a  resolve  which  is  directly  in  point,  and 
general  in  its  nature.  This  is  that  of  the  4th  of  January,  1776, 
in  these  words :  "  In  all  elections  of  officers  by  Congress,  where 


1798.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  163 

more  than  one  are  elected  on  the  same  day  to  commands  of  the 
same  rank,  they  shall  take  rank  of  each  other  according  to  their 
election,  and  the  entry  of  their  names  in  the  minutes,  and  their  com 
missions  shall  be  numbered  to  show  their  priority."  This  is  an 
obvious  rule,  perfectly  just  in  principle,  and  ought  to  decide  the 
present  question,  for  it  was  to  regulate  the  relative  rank  of  new 
officers.  And  such  are  Hamilton  and  Knox,  who,  prior  to  their 
late  appointments,  were  private  citizens,  without  other  claims  to 
office  or  rank  than  agreeably  to  their  positive  and  relative  talents 
and  merit.  If  Knox  has  a  legal  right  to  precede  Hamilton,  then 
Hand,  who  was  a  brigadier  in  the  American  war,  will  precede 
Pinckney,  Hamilton,  and  Lee,  the  first  having  been  only  a  colonel, 
and  the  two  last  lieutenant-colonels ;  and  then,  too,  General  White 
must  precede  Dayton  ;  and  the  practice  must  run  through  the  whole 
train  of  old  officers  who  shall  be  called  to  serve  in  the  new  army. 
General  Washington's  opinion  appears  by  the  arrangement  of  their 
names  in  the  list  he  gave  in  his  own  handwriting  to  the  Secretary 
of  War,  who  laid  it  before  the  President,  who  had  requested  Gen 
eral  Washington's  opinions  on  the  officers  proper  to  be  called  into 
service,  in  the  principal  stations.  But,  besides  this,  General  Wash 
ington  wrote  a  letter  to  Hamilton,  left  it  open  for  the  Secretary  of 
War  to  take  a  copy,  and  the  latter  laid  the  original  before  the 
President.  In  that  letter,  General  Washington  says  explicitly  to 
Hamilton :  "  You  will  see  that  as  to  my  old  friend.  General  Knox, 
whom  I  love  and  esteem,  I  have  ranked  him  below  you  both, "  — 
that  is,  below  both  Hamilton  and  Pinckney,  between  whom  alone 
there  arose  any  hesitation  in  General  Washington's  mind,  and  that 
chiefly  from  local  considerations  :  the  high  respect  borne  for 
General  Pinckney  in  the  Southern  States ;  his  great  popularity, 
added  to  his  being  really  a  soldier ;  and  the  probability  that  the 
Southern  States  would  be  the  theatre  of  war,  and  where,  conse 
quently,  the  great  popularity  of  General  Pinckney,  and  the  exten 
sive  influence  of  his  connections,  would  render  his  services,  in  an 
acceptable  station,  of  immense  importance. 

I  have  much  more  of  detail  to  give  you,  but  fear  I  shall  miss  the 
mail.  The  object  of  this  letter  is  to  engage  you  in  this  matter  in 
such  way  as  you  and  one  or  two  confidential  friends  (say  Higgin- 
son  and  Ames)  shall  deem  most  eligible  to  prevail  on  the  President 
to  acquiesce  in  the  first  arrangement,  —  Hamilton,  Pinckney,  Knox. 
The  affair  has  been  fully  and  handsomely  stated  in  a  private  letter 


164  LIFE   AND   LETTEES   OF   GEOBGE   CABOT.          [1798. 

from  Mr.  Wolcott  to  the  President :  the  arguments  are  irrefraga 
ble,  and  ought  to  be  irresistible.  But  the  President  has  committed 
himself  so  far,  it  will  be  difficult  to  retreat ;  and  yet  his  own  honor, 
reputation,  and  influence  we  all  think  involved  in  it,  and  there 
with  the  public  welfare.  Hamilton  will  not  serve,  if  superseded  by 
Knox.  Yet  this  is  a  fact  which  it  may  not  be  expedient  to  com 
municate  to  the  President,  for  he  personally  dislikes  Hamilton,  and 
may  in  this  way  be  willing  to  get  rid  of  him.  For  the  President 
does  not  estimate  his  abilities  as  all  other  public  men  do :  nay,  he 
thinks  the  public  voice  prefers  Knox,  and  that  the  "  Five  New 
England  States  will  not  submit  to  the  humiliation  intended  for 
them, "  —  that  is,  in  placing  Hamilton  above  Knox  !  How  egregi- 
ously  the  President  is  misinformed !  The  mail  is  ready  to  close, 
and  I  must  quit  abruptly.  Pray  contrive  some  means  of  prevent 
ing  so  serious  a  mistake  as  is  here  presented  to  your  view.  If 
Knox  could  be  persuaded  that  the  voice  of  the  country,  even  of 
New  England,  requires  Hamilton  to  be  placed  second  to  General 
Washington,  and  that  the  old  rules  will  not  legally  apply  to  the 
present  case,  —  and  that,  if  they  do,  they  are  decidedly  in  favor  of 
Hamilton, — perhaps  he  may  be  induced  to  withdraw  his  claim. 
This  might  yet  save  his  own  reputation,  while  it  would  relieve  the 
President  from  extreme  embarrassment. 

The  nature  of  this  communication  is  delicate,  and  I  commit  it  to 
your  perfect  confidence. 

Very  sincerely  yours,  TIMOTHY  PICKERING. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

(Private. ) 

BROOKLINE,  Mass.,  Sept.  27,  1798. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  Your  confidential  communication  of  the  20th  was 
received  last  evening,  and  shall  be  attended  to  without  delay. 

The  order  of  the  appointments,  being  supposed  to  have  estab 
lished  the  rank,  was  very  highly  approved  here  by  those  whose  solici 
tude  for  the  public  "welfare  is  sincere.  It  soon  appeared,  however, 
that  another  sort  of  men  were  active  in  encouraging  the  discon 
tents  which  Knox  might  be  likely  to  feel.  I  think,  however,  an 
acquiescence  would  have  soon  taken  place,  if  General  Lincoln 1  had 

1  General  Benjamin  Lincoln,  distinguished  in  the  war  of  Independence. 


1798.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  165 

not  countenanced  Knox's  pretensions  in  a  manner  more  decided 
than  is  usual  for  him  to  act  in  any  political  affairs.  The  principal 
reason  for  this  extraordinary  conduct  is  probably  to  be  found  in 
the  peculiar  circumstances  of  General  Lincoln,  who  is  an  indorser 
of  Knox's  notes,  which  are  floating  in  this  quarter  to  a  very  great 
amount. 

My  first  impression  on  reading  your  letter  is  that  I  ought  to 
write  a  letter  to  the  President,  stating  the  course  of  public  opinion 
here  as  it  has  appeared  to  me. 

If  this  idea  should  be  pursued,  I  will  transmit  you  a  copy  of 
what  I  shall  write  him. 

Mr.  Higginson,  who  is  with  me,  thinks  of  nothing  better  at 
present;  and  I  shall  call  Ames  to  co-operate  with  us  either  by 
taking  a  similar  step,  or  by  making  a  visit  for  the  purpose. 
I  am,  dear  sir, 

Your  faithful  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  JOHN  ADAMS. 

(Private.) 

BROOKLINE,  Sept.  29,  1798. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  A  sincere  desire  to  prevent  a  possible  embarrass 
ment  to  the  administration  of  our  government,  and  to  see  preserved 
entire  that  influence  by  which  alone  the  honor  and  independence 
of  our  nation  can  be  maintained,  has  induced  me  to  trouble  you 
with  my  thoughts  at  this  time. 

When  the  appointments  of  major-generals  were  first  known,  it 
was  readily  perceived  that  the  order  in  which  they  were  made 
naturally  determined  their  rank  ;  and  it  was  seen  with  infinite 
satisfaction,  by  the  most  zealous  friends  of  our  country,  that  the 
actual  arrangement  was  in  the  highest  degree  propitious  to  the 
security  and  welfare  of  the  United  States. 

Among  the  many  respectable  persons  whose  opinions  were  early 
disclosed  to  me,  there  was  not  one  who  did  not  applaud  the  execu 
tive  for  having  happily  united  in  the  military  service  the  greatest 
weight  of  character  with  the  greatest  powers  of  genius  and  talents, 
in  a  manner  perfectly  adapted  to  the  present  exigency  and  to  future 
contingencies.  But  this  excellent  disposition,  so  much  approved  by 
one  sort  of  men,  could  not  please  men  of  another  sort,  who  eagerly 
seized  an  opportunity  to  disturb  it  by  suggesting  that  Genera] 


166  LIFE   AND   LETTEES   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

Knox  would  be  disgraced,  if  he  served  in  a  station  subordinate  to 
Colonel  Hamilton.  Few  men  who  possess  a  common  portion  of 
vanity  or  ambition  are  able  to  resist  an  attack  of  this  kind ;  and 
yet  I  believe  that  General  Knox's  own  consciousness  of  the  vast 
superiority  of  his  rival,  co-operating  with  a  natural  good  temper, 
would  have  produced  his  final  acquiescence,  if  he  had  been  left 
wholly  to  himself.  But  he  was  not :  on  the  contrary,  he  was 
stimulated  to  declare  his  discontents,  which  he  did  pretty  soon  in 
whispers  among  his  friends.  Even  here  he  might  have  stopped,  if 
he  had  been  countenanced  only  by  those  who  reprobate  all  the 
measures  of  the  executive ;  but  he  soon  found  himself  supported  by 
General  Lincoln  in  a  manner  more  decisive  than  is  usual  for  him 
of  late  years  to  support  any  political  opinions. 

The  feelings  of  General  Knox  are  so  natural,  that,  if  they  do 
not  justify  his  conduct,  they  at  least  explain  it ;  but  I  confess  all 
my  own  reflections  leave  me  at  some  loss  for  the  motives  of  Gen 
eral  Lincoln.  It  was  at  first  insisted  on  that  as  General  Knox 
could  not,  consistently  with  his  honor,  serve  in  a  station  below 
Colonel  Hamilton,  it  must  be  presumed  that  the  appointments 
were  not  made  in  the  order  they  appeared ;  but,  the  fact  being 
ascertained,  it  was  then  contended  that  the  priority  of  order  gave 
no  priority  of  rank  in  appointments  made  on  the  same  day. 

This  doctrine,  I  believe,  is  new,  both  at  the  seat  of  government 
and  here,  and  it  would  seem  to  me,  if  it  were  admitted,  would  have 
the  absurd  effect  of  destroying  all  claims  to  priority  of  rank  among 
persons  appointed  on  the  same  day,  and  who  had  not  been  officers 
before. 

I  do  not  recollect  ever  to  have  heard  it  denied  until  now  that 
the  priority  in  the  order  of  appointments  on  the  same  day  settled 
the  rank  as  decisively  as  a  priority  of  years. 

Such  were  the  ideas  which  prevailed  in  the  Senate  at  the  time 
of  the  naval  appointments  in  1794,  and  such  they  continue ;  for  I 
am  informed  that  in  the  late  session  the  question  was  started,  and 
the  concurrence  of  the  Senate  with  the  nominations  of  all  the 
major-generals,  except  that  of  Colonel  Hamilton,  would  have  been 
postponed  for  a  day  to  prevent  doubts  as  to  his  rank ;  but  that  the 
perfect  conviction  of  his  rank  being  secured  by  a  prior  nomination 
by  the  President,  and  a  prior  concurrence  of  the  Senate,  rendered 
the  postponement  unnecessary.  But  it  is  said  there  is  a  rule 
which  governs  in  this  case,  and  which  was  established  in  our 
Revolutionary  war. 


1798.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  167 

There  is,  I  am  told,  a  resolve  which  declares  that,  in  elections 
made  on  the  same  day  of  officers  to  the  same  rank,  the  priority 
shall  be  determined  by  the  rank  held  previous  to  the  elections. 
This  was,  I  believe,  a  special  provision  for  a  particular  description 
of  persons  designated  by  the  resolve.  There  is,  however,  another 
resolve  which  is  general,  and  which  provides,  according  to  what 
seems  reasonable,  without  any  positive  rule,  that  in  elections  on 
the  same  day  the  rank  shall  follow  in  the  order  of  the  elections ; 
therefore,  if  either  of  these  obsolete  resolves  be  applicable,  which 
at  best  is  doubtful,  it  would  seem  natural  to  take  the  latter,  which 
is  general,  and  was  intended  for  all  new  officers,  as  all  those  must 
be  considered  who  are  private  citizens  and  out  of  all  office  at  the 
time  of  appointment. 

I  recollect  there  were  some  occasions  in  which  pains  were  taken 
to  accommodate  the  pretensions  of  gentlemen  founded  on  these 
antiquated  titles,  but  I  think  they  were  always  treated  as  mere 
matters  of  discretion,  and  never  admitted  as  rightful  claims  ;  and  I 
am  sorry  to  add  that,  in  my  opinion,  the  attention  which  has  been 
given  them  in  many  instances  has  been  very  prejudicial  to  the 
public  service. 

And  I  do  not  see,  if  the  opinions  of  Generals  Lincoln  and  Knox 
are  correct,  why  other  officers  of  the  former  army  now  employed 
must  not  be  elevated  above  Pinckney,  Hamilton,  and  Lee,  and  thus 
the  whole  line  of  new  appointments  be  deranged  and  broken  up  ; 
an  evil  which  I  think  the  country  would  deplore  as  great  in  the 
extreme.  I  would  not  venture  to  say  what  is  the  opinion  of  the 
most  enlightened  men  through  New  England,  concerning  the  char 
acter  of  every  individual  of  the  major-generals  ;  but,  on  the  com 
parative  merits  and  talents  of  Hamilton  and  Knox,  I  am  well 
persuaded  there  is  a  remarkable  uniformity  of  sentiment  in  favor 
of  the  former.  It  has  been  intimated  to  me  repeatedly  that 
General  Knox's  friends  cherished  a  hope  that  the  President  would 
listen  to  his  demands,  and  might  be  persuaded  to  favor  them.  If 
there  is  an  expectation  of  this  kind,  I  have  presumed  it  might  be 
useful  to  be  apprised  of  it,  and  I  indulge  the  belief  that  my  motives 
for  offering  this  notice  will  be  so  justly  appreciated  as  to  render  an 
apology  unnecessary. 

I  am,  sir.  with  every  sentiment  of  unfeigned  respect  and  attach 
ment,  Your  most  obedient  and  faithful  servant, 

GEORGE  CABOT, 
THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


168  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

(Private.) 

BROOKLINE,  Oct.  6,  1798. 

MY  DEAR  SIR, —  I  have  just  written  to  Mr.  Pickering  a  short 
letter,  in  which  I  have  suggested  a  method  by  which  all  embarrass 
ment  resulting  from  the  question  of  rank  may  possibly  be  prevented. 
General  Knox  has  said  that  he  could  acquiesce  in  the  arrangement 
made,  if  General  Pinckney  could.  Now,  as  I  am  satisfied  the 
arrangement  is  in  all  respects  proper,  I  presume  Pinckney  will  not 
countenance  the  objection  made  by  Knox  ;  and  therefore,  even  if 
Pinckney  for  other  reasons  should  decline  the  service,  he  may  so 
manage  as  to  dissipate  the  doubts  excited  by  Knox's  friends. 

We  are  all  solicitous  to  see  what  course  Gerry  intends  to  steer, 
that  we  may  shape  our  own  accordingly.  The  gross  impropriety 
and  folly  of  his  conduct  in  France  makes  it  difficult  for  him  to  act 
a  right  part  here,  even  if  he  is  well  disposed.  He  has  divided  the 
delegation,  as  if  to  show  that  it  represented  a  divided  country ;  he 
has  held  secret  conferences  with  the  French  government,  to  which 
his  colleagues  had  a  right  to  be  privy,  and  his  engagement  that 
they  should  not  was  contrary  to  duty  ;  he  has  acted  conformably  to 
the  French  maxim,  that  there  might  be  an  adjustment  of  differences 
and  an  establishment  of  fraternity  with  us,  by  sacrificing  our  gov 
ernment  and  disavowing  the  principles  and  policy  of  its  adminis 
tration.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  as  if  he  must  say  now  that  peace 
and  safety  were  attainable,  if  our  government  had  not  prevented  it 
by  precipitating  measures  of  hostility. 

I  hope,  however,  he  will  say  nothing  of  this  kind ;  and  it  is  said 
his  language  is  approbatory  of  the  administration.  A  few  days 
more  will  disclose  to  us  his  determination.  I  wish  the  Presi 
dent  knew  precisely  how  Gerry  is,  and  will  be,  viewed  by  the 
friends  of  government ;  but  your  own  recollection  of  what  passed 
at  your  table l  must  suggest  the  delicacy  I  feel  towards  him  on  this 

1  In  a  letter  to  his  wife,  dated  June  21,  1795,  Mr.  Adams  says :  "  I  dined 
yesterday  at  Mr.  Wolcott's,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  with  King,  Ells 
worth,  and  Cabot,  and  a  few  others.  The  conversation  turned  upon  old 
times.  One  of  the  company  expressed  such  inveteracy  against  my  old 
friend  Gerry  that  I  could  not  help  taking  up  his  vindication.  The  future 
election  of  a  governor,  in  case  of  an  empty  chair,  excites  a  jealousy  which 
I  have  long  perceived.  These  things  will  always  be  so.  Gerry's  merit  is 
inferior  to  that  of  no  man  in  Massachusetts,  except  the  present  governor, 


1798.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  169 

account,  you  cannot  have  forgotten  the  warmth  with  which  I  in 
sisted  on  his  unfitness  for  all  great  affairs.  The  experience  which 
has  been  had  of  the  justness  of  my  opinion  would  make  a  recog 
nition  of  it  extremely  painful.  It  is  unfortunate  that  Congress  did 
not  declare  war :  the  danger  of  French  artifice  would  then  have 
been  less.  It  is  impossible  to  make  the  people  feel  or  see  distinctly 
that  we  have  much  more  to  fear  from  peace  than  war :  that  peace 
cannot  be  real,  and  only  leaves  open  a  door  by  which  the  enemy 
enters  ;  and  that  war  would  shut  him  out ;  that  the  French  are 
wolves  in  sheep's  clothing,  entreating  to  be  received  as  friends,  that 
they  may  be  enabled  to  destroy  and  devour.  But  war  open  and 
declared  would  not  only  deprive  our  external  enemy  of  his  best 
hopes,  but  would  also  extinguish  the  hopes  of  internal  foes.  The 
rights  and  duties  of  every  citizen  in  a  state  of  war  would  be  known 
and  regarded. 

Traitors  and  sedition-mongers,  who  are  now  protected  and  toler 
ated,  would  then  be  easily  restrained  or  punished.  I  hope  there 
fore  we  shall  not  long  persist  in  pacific  war,  with  one  part  of  our 
citizens  against  us  and  another  part  neutral.  At  this  moment,  it 
appears  to  me  every  thing  depends  on  the  approaching  elections : 
if  they  issue  favorably,  the  hands  of  the  country  need  be  bound  no 
longer  ;  and,  in  that  case,  I  think  the  executive  can  do  every  thing. 
For,  if  the  present  Congress  at  the  next  session  refuses  to  do  any 
thing  which  national  safety  requires,  the  executive  ought  to  summon 
the  new  Congress  on  the  5th  of  March,  and  ought  to  say  that  the 
new  elected  representative  body,  just  constituted  by  the  people, 
must  be  well  qualified  to  declare  their  will ;  and,  as  from  the 
numerous  addresses  from  every  part  of  the  Union  the  people 
seem  to  be  strongly  impressed  with  the  reality  of  the  dangers  of 

according  to  my  ideas  and  judgment  of  merit.  I  wish  he  was  more  enlarged, 
however,  and  more  correct  in  his  views.  He  never  was  one  of  the  threads 
tied  into  the  Essex  knot,  and  was  never  popular  with  that  set." 

The  discussion  apparently  was  sharp  ;  and  "  one  of  the  company  "  —  Mr. 
Cabot,  as  appears  from  the  letter  given  above  —  remembered  it  well,  and 
felt  a  delicacy  in  speaking  again  to  Mr.  Adams  on  the  subject.  Mr.  Adams 
stood  alone  in  his  admiration  for  Gerry,  and  was  apparently  very  sensi 
tive  to  any  allusions  to  him.  (See  Works  of  Pickering,  III.  441.)  Mr. 
Adams  attributed  the  general  low  opinion  of  Gerry's  talents  to  the  Essex 
Federalists;  and  this  deepened  his  feelings  on  this  point,  as  on  every 
other  which  concerned  the  natives  of  that  county.  Indeed,  the  hostility  of 
the  "  Essex  Junto  "  to  Gerry  seems  to  have  been  his  strongest  claim  upon 
Mr.  Adams's  affection  and  admiration. 


170  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

the  country,  they  ought  to  have  the  earliest  opportunity  of  taking 
such  measures  as  they  think  indispensable  to  the  security  of  the 
United  States,  and  which  have  not  appeared  so  to  one  branch 
of  the  present  legislature.  A  proclamation,  well  formed  on  this 
principle,  addressed  to  the  new  House,  would  give  them  a  strong 
and  right  impulse,  and,  I  have  no  doubt,  would  be  strengthened  by 
the  spirit  of  the  people.  The  new  Congress,  meeting  under  such 
impressions,  could  act  with  vigor  and  decision  ;  and  we  should  no 
longer  doubt  whether  our  representatives  were  Frenchmen  or 
Americans.  Farewell.  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

(Private.) 

BROOKLINE,  Oct.  6,  1798. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  sent  by  the  post  some  days  ago  the  letter  I 
promised  you  I  would  write  to  the  President.  Mr.  Higginson  and 
Mr.  Ames  approved  it ;  and  I  have,  by  their  advice,  sent  a  copy  of 
it,  together  with  yours,  to  Mr.  Goodhue,  accompanied  with  a  request 
that  he  would  make  a  visit  to  Quincy,  to  enforce  the  ideas  of  mis 
chief  which  we  all  entertain  from  any  attempt  to  derange  the  order 
of  general  officers  which  now  is  established.  When  I  get  my 
copy  back  from  Mr.  Goodhue,  it  shall  be  transmitted  to  you,  that 
you  may  see  precisely  what  it  is.  General  Knox  is  now  in  Maine, 
but  will  be  at  Boston,  probably,  in  a  week  or  ten  days.  If  I  can 
contrive  to  satisfy  him  that  he  must  be  a  loser  if  he  pursues  the 
game  which  he  is  playing,  I  shall  certainly  do  it ;  but,  at  present,  I 
think  of  no  person  here  who  can  tell  him  all  he  ought  to  know  in 
a  manner  that  would  be  well  received.  Colonel  Wadsworth,1  of 
Hartford,  could  manage  the  business  perfectly  well,  if  he  were 
applied  to  for  the  purpose  by  Mr.  Wolcott,  and  could  afterwards 
see  Knox. 

Colonel  Wadsworth  has  been  in  the  habits  of  friendship  and 
intimacy  with  Knox  for  many  years,  and  has  been  accustomed  to 
tell  him  of  his  faults  with  great  freedom ;  and  has,  I  believe,  in 
some  instances  really  served  him  by  doing  it.  For  my  own  part,  I 
should  never  wish  to  be  so  employed ;  but,  in  a  case  where  great 
good  might  be  expected  from  it,  no  man  ought  to  decline  it. 

A  few  days  since,  I  gave  a  little  dinner  to  Mr.  Listen's 2  family, 

1  See  above,  p.  91. 

2  The  British  minister. 


1798.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  171 

including  Mr.  Jeffrey,1  his  host ;  and  knowing,  as  I  did,  that  the 
doctrines  of  General  Knox  on  the  subject  of  rank  had  been  vehe 
mently  insisted  on  at  Jeffrey's  table,  by  Dr.  Eustis,2  Morton,  and 
others,  I  purposely  introduced  the  subject,  and  pronounced  my 
opinion  very  emphatically,  that  Knox  would  be  ultimately  injured 
by  suffering  himself  to  be  pushed  forward  in  the  manner  he  did.  I 
urged  that  the  rank  was  now  legally  settled,  according  to  usage  as 
well  as  reason ;  and  that,  by  denying  it,  the  preference  of  Colonel 
Hamilton  would  become  so  apparent  as  to  injure  Knox  both  in 
his  feelings  and  reputation. 

In  the  course  of  the  discussion,  an  appeal  was  made  to  Mr. 
Liston  and  Lord  Henry  Stuart,  both  of  whom  declared  that,  in 
England,  if  an  officer  were  once  out  of  commission,  from  any  cause, 
his  old  rank  would  be  lost,  if  he  came  into  service  again ;  and  that 
he  must  regularly  go  through  all  the  grades  which  any  one  would, 
who  had  never  been  commissioned. 

The  result  of  our  whole  conversation  was  a  unanimity  of  senti 
ment  that  our  government  was  right  in  its  arrangement,  and  that 
no  question  could  properly  be  raised  concerning  the  rank.  I  have 
been  told  that  Knox  latterly  said  he  would  serve,  if  General 
Pinckney  did,  and  not  otherwise.  If,  therefore,  General  Pinck- 
ney  should  feel  no  such  motives  for  refusing  as  operate  here,  the 
whole  difficulty  may  be  avoided ;  for,  if  Piuckney  refuses  to  serve 
from  any  other  motive,  and  will  so  manage  as  to  demonstrate  his 
own  acquiescence  in  the  rank,  Knox  may  be  perfectly  saved  on  his 
own  terms. 

Mr.  Gerry  is  at  length  returned,  and,  I  am  told,  passed  some 
time  yesterday  at  Quincy. 

I  am  not  well  informed  yet  of  the  course  he  steers.  The  half 
way  men  say  he  condemns  the  French  bitterly,  and  recommends 
to  our  people  union  and  vigor ;  and,  it  is  said,  he  declared  to 
E.  Bobbins  (the  speaker  of  our  House  of  Representatives)  that 
he  highly  approved  of  the  spirited  measures  of  our  government. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  am  informed  credibly  that,  since  he  left 
France,   he  has  maintained  strenuously  the    ridiculous    and   dan 
gerous   opinion   that   peace   might   have   been   preserved,   if  our 
government  had  not  proceeded  so  far  in  the  measures  of  hostility. 
With  unfeigned  esteem  and  affection, 

I  remain  your  assured  friend,  G.  CABOT. 

1  Patrick  Jeffrey,  uncle  of  Lord  Jeffrey.     His  wife  was  Mrs.  Haley,  sister 
of  John  Wilkes,  who  had  come  to  Boston  in  1785. 

2  See  above,  p.  82. 


172  LIFE   AND   LETTEKS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1798. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  Oct.  12,  1798. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  the  pleasure  to  enclose  you  a  copy  of 
what  I  wrote  to  the  President,  in  obedience  to  your  commands. 
Although  what  I  have  written  will  do  little  more  than  confirm  the 

O 

idea  of  what  the  public  sentiment  must  be,  yet  I  cannot  think 
more  is  necessary  in  this  case ;  but  every  day  convinces  me  of  the 
impropriety  of  the  local  separation  of  the  President  from  the 
heads  of  departments.  I  fear  that,  at  this  moment,  the  desire  to 
palliate  Mr.  Gerry's  errors  influences  the  President  to  speak  of 
all  the  envoys  as  having  conducted  equally  well  and  equally  ill. 
This  is  not  true,  and,  if  persisted  in,  will  justly  offend  those  who 
have  done  their  duty,  and  all  their  friends.  I  pray  you  to  accept 
my  best  regards  and  invariable  esteem.  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

(Confidential.} 

OCT.  16,  1798. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  Every  day  brings  some  new  proof  of  the  necessity 
there  is  for  some  person  to  inform  the  President  of  the  danger  to 
which  he  exposes  the  government  and  himself,  by  attempting  to 
vindicate  Mr.  Gerry  at  the  expense  of  his  colleagues.  I  have 
just  been  canvassing  the  subject  with  Mr.  Higginson  and  Mr. 
Sewall 3  at  Boston.  We  are  all  aware  of  the  schisms  among  the 
friends  of  government,  which  may  be  apprehended ;  and  we  con 
cluded  to  urge  Otis  to  make  a  visit  to  Quincy,  for  the  purpose  of 
communicating  freely  to  the  President  what  passes  abroad  on  this 
subject,  and  how  much  his  frankness  exposes  him  and  his  friends. 
Sewall  offers  to  accompany  Otis,  if  required ;  but  his  known  dislike 
of  Gerry  makes  it  best  that  he  should  not  be  a  principal.  You 
recollect  enough  of  what  passed  at  your  own  table  to  perceive 
that  I  am  disqualified  to  speak  of  Mr.  Gerry  to  the  President. 
But,  my  dear  sir,  must  there  not  be  something  more  done  ?  Must 
it  not  become  a  maxim,  never  to  be  violated,  that  the  President 
shall  be  always  accompanied  by  those  whom  he  has  selected  to 
assist  him  in  carrying  on  the  executive  government  ?  If,  at  any 
time,  he  is  absent  for  the  benefit  of  relaxation,  let  it  be  adhered  to 
that  he  does  no  business,  and  gives  no  opinions.  If  some  system 
1  See  above,  p.  113. 


1798.J 


CORRESPONDENCE.  173 


like  this  is  not  established,  there  will  be  no  order  nor  consistency 
in  our  affairs.  It  is  a  delicate  thing  to  say  all  this  in  plain  terms  ; 
but  it  is  so  fit  and  proper,  indeed  so  indispensable  to  the  public, 
and  to  the  ease  as  well  as  honor  of  the  President,  that  you  must 
cause  it  to  be  well  understood. 

We  are  grieved  to  see  the  Maryland  elections  turn  out  so  ill. 
The  spirit  of  French  democracy  is  as  active  as  it  is  wicked,  and 
thus  becomes  more  than  a  match  for  every  other  sort  of  spirit. 
We  had  been  flattering  ourselves  that  in  this  State  we  should  have 
no  more  Jacobin  votes  after  the  present  Congress ;  but  Isaac  Par 
ker  l  will  decline,  and  will  be  succeeded  by  Dearborn.2  Yarnum  8 
is  more  likely  to  be  chosen  than  not,  and  Freeman4  may  be 
elected  merely  because  no  good  Federalist  will  consent  to  be  a 
candidate  in  his  district.  Gr-  C. 


PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

TRENTON,  Oct.  20, 1798. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  this  morning  read  Colonel  Hamilton's 
letter  of  the  19th  instant  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  which  is  the 
following  passage.  Having  mentioned  the  arrival  of  General 
Pinckney,  he  says  :  — 

"  You  will  learn  with  pleasure  that  he  sent  me  a  message  by 
young  Rutledge,  purporting  his  entire  satisfaction  with  the  mili 
tary  arrangements,  and  readiness  to  serve  under  my  command. 
Communicate  this  to  our  friends  Pickering  and  Wolcott,  as  I  am 
not  well  enough  to  write  them  by  this  post." 

This,  according  to  an  intimation  in  your  letter  to  me,  will  settle 
the  matter  with  Knox.  But  his  conduct  has  been  such  in  this 
affair  as  cannot  fail  to  have  displeased  his  old  patron  and  former 
friend,  General  Washington  ;  and  I  doubt  whether  there  will  exist 

1  Afterwards   a  judge  of    the    Supreme   Court,  and  chief    justice  of 
Massachusetts. 

2  General  Henry  Dearborn.    Afterwards  in  Mr.  Jefferson's  cabinet,  and 
prominent  in  the  war  of  1812. 

3  Joseph  Bradley  Varnum,   general  in  the  Revolutionary  army;    for 
many  years  a  leading  Democrat ;  member  of  Congress  from  Massachusetts, 
and  Speaker  of  the  House  in  the  tenth  and  eleventh  Congresses. 

*  I  presume  this  refers  to  Dr.  Nathaniel  Freeman,  a  local  politician  of  some 
prominence  in  the  Plymouth  district,  and  judge  of  the  Court  of  Common 
Pleas.  He  was  never  a  member  of  Congress. 


174  LIFE    AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

again  that  perfect  cordiality  between  them,  or  between  Hamilton 
and  Knox.  The  latter,  however,  must  feel  himself  so  much  in  the 
wrong  that  it  may  produce  a  modest  demeanor,  and  restore  him  to 
their  friendship :  it  may  do  him  good  to  have  been  a  little  troubled. 

I  received  this  morning  a  letter  from  Mr.  King,  a  letter  in  which 
is  the  following  passage  :  "  Notwithstanding  his  pretended  deli 
cacy,  Hauteval l  by  no  means  denies  the  agency  ascribed  to  him 
in  soliciting  the  bribe  required  by  Talleyrand.  Colonel  Trumbull, 
who  was  at  Paris  soon  after  the  arrival  there  of  the  commissioners, 
has  more  than  once  informed  me  that  Hauteval  told  him  that  both  the 
douceur  and  the  loan  were  indispensable,  and  urged  him  to  employ 
his  influence  with  the  American  commissioners  to  offer  the  bribe 
as  well  as  the  loan."  Delicate  [word  illegible  in  MS.~]  when  de 
ciphering  the  despatches,  I  voluntarily  spared  his  name,  because 
the  envoys  mentioned  it  with  respect,  for  secrecy  was  enjoined 
only  with  regard  to  X.  and  Y. 

Pray  write  me  from  time  to  time  of  Gerry's  deportment,  and 
contrive  to  have  his  derelictions  minuted  for  future  use. 
I  am,  with  sincere  affection, 

Yours,  T.  PICKERING. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

( Confidential. ) 

BROOKLINE,  Oct.  26,  1798. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  received  your  favor  of  the  15th,  and 
am  happy  to  find  that  the  business  which  gave  rise  to  our  present 
correspondence  is  likely  to  end  so  well.  General  Knox  has  lately 
been  summoned  to  Boston  by  urgent  and  anxious  creditors.  He 
does  not  now  pay  his  notes,  and  General  Lincoln's  property  is  at 
tached.  How  many  painful  reflections  arise  from  these  incidents  ? 
Who  does  riot  see  that  the  manners  of  our  country  are  daily  unfit 
ting  us  for  a  mild  elective  government  ?  If  our  great  men  must 
be  guarded  by  sheriffs,  those  sheriffs  must  be  sufficiently  strong  to 
keep  them. 

Mr.  Gerry  is  very  copious  in  declarations  of  loyalty.  He  says 
all  must  unite  with  the  government,  and  even  those  who  do  not 
approve  every  measure  are,  nevertheless,  bound  to  support  them. 
He  is  also  liberal  in  his  condemnation  of  the  French  government ; 

1  One  of  Talleyrand's  agents  in  demanding  bribes  from  the  American 
envoys,  better  known  by  the  letter  Z.  in  the  X.  Y.  Z.  despatches. 


1798.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  175 

but  he  still  maintains  (as  he  always  must)  that  an  adjustment  might 
have  been  made,  &c.  Our  good  people  all  censure  Mr.  Marshall 
for  his  opinions  of  the  Sedition  Act.  I  have  examined  what  he 
has  said,  and  have  moderated  the  blame  they  incur  as  well  as  I 
could.  I  also  desired  a  young  friend  to  write  the  vindication  you 
saw  in  Wednesday's  "  Centinel." 

The  President's  answer  to  the  Machias  address  has  attracted 
some  attention,  from  the  disposition  it  manifests  to  merge  the  great 
errors  of  a  very  little  man  with  the  little  errors  (if  any  can  be 
found)  of  great  and  good  men.  This  may  become  the  source  of 
serious  disquietude  among  the  friends  of  government.  I  have 
taken  some  pains  to  arrest  its  progress,  but  with  little  success  hith 
erto.  I  hope,  however,  to  cause  it  to  be  understood  that  silence  on 
the  comparative  merits  of  the  envoys  would  be  proper. 

I  think  the  President  will  soon  discover  that  Knox  is  not,  and 
has  not  been,  thought  a  suitable  man  for  the  second  commander  by 
the  best  New  England  men.  Even  in  Boston,  the  number  is  small 
who  hold  him  very  high,  and  those  mostly  table  friends  or  expec 
tants  of  office.  It  is  openly  said  he  declines,  which,  if  true,  you 
know  from  the  war  office. 

Yours,  faithfully  and  affectionately,         G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  Oct.  31,  1798. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  A  great  deal  of  pains  has  been  taken  to  give  a 
wrong  direction  to  the  public  sentiment  on  the  subject  of  the  late 
military  appointments,  but  T  think  the  circumstance  of  General 
Pinckney's  acceptance  of  his  commission,  and  his  approbation  of 
the  arrangement,  will  have  great  influence  in  bringing  good  men 
to  think  rightly,  and  in  silencing  the  clamors  of  the  factions.  I 
lost  no  time  in  communicating  the  information,  and  I  have  the 
satisfaction  to  see  it  producing  great  good. 

Mr.  Gerry  is  very  zealous  and  unequivocal  in  his  jcommenda- 
tion  of  our  government  as  it  regards  French  affairs.  In  the  pres 
ence  of  Judge  Patterson,1  Mr.  Theophilus  Parsons,  and  Judge 
Lowell2  (as  the  latter  himself  assures  me),  he  declared  his  utter 

1  William  Patterson,  senator  from  New  Jersey,  and  at  this  time  a  judge 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 

2  John  Lowell,  of  Newburyport,  an  eminent  lawyer,  judge  of  the  United 
States  District  Court,  1789-1801 ;  and  then  chief  justice  of  the  Circuit  Court 
for  Maine,  New  Hampshire,  Massachusetts,  and  Rhode  Island. 


176  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE    CABOT.          [1798. 

detestation  of  the  French  government,  and  his  approbation  of  our 
own,  which  he  thinks  has  conducted  perfectly  right ;  and  he  insists 
warmly  that  no  honest  man  can  withhold  his  full  support  of  our 
government,  even  if  its  measures  were  not  all  perfectly  conform 
able  to  his  opinion  of  right.  He  says  we  have  every  thing  to  fear 
from  the  wickedness  and  power  of  France,  unless  we  are  united 
and  act  with  vigor ;  that  she  will  certainly  practise  every  seduc 
tion  to  corrupt  us,  and  will  assuredly  seize  the  first  opportunity  to 
divide  and  destroy  us.  If,  however,  we  are  united  and  firm,  he 
thinks  us  perfectly  safe.  Such,  I  am  told,  is  his  language,  and 
that  he  uses  it  freely.  I  will  endeavor  to  procure  from  some  one 
his  precise  expressions,  but  you  already  have  their  substance. 

Mr.  Marshall  has  given  great  uneasiness  here  by  his  answers  to 
the  "  Freeholder ; "  and  Gerry  takes  advantage  of  it  to  enforce  the 
belief  that  Marshall's  politics  will  not  prove  sound  according  to 
New  England  ideas,  and  he  is  confident  "  that  Marshall  will  not 
in  Congress  act  with  New  England  men,  whom  he  holds  in  great 
contempt"  I  do  not  yet  believe  this.  Mr.  Marshall  I  know  has 
much  to  learn  on  the  subject  of  a  practicable  system  of  free  gov 
ernment  for  the  United  States.  I  believe,  however,  he  is  a  man 
of  so  much  good  sense  that,  with  honest  principles,  he  cannot  fail 
to  discern  and  pursue  a  right  course,  and  therefore  that  he  will 
eventually  prove  a  great  acquisition. 

I  mentioned  in  my  last  the  report  of  Knox's  declining  to  serve 
as  third  major-general :  this  is  now  confirmed ;  and,  as  he  is  seen 
with  Gerry  more  than  usual,  it  will  not  be  surprising  if  they  join 
stocks  and  make  a  common  defence.  It  can  never  be  sufficiently 
lamented  that  these  men  are  authorized  to  quote  the  President  as 
on  their  side.  Without  this  sanction  to  their  respective  opinions, 
they  would  have  found  no  support  among  the  Federalists ;  but 
even  with  this  advantage  I  have  no  doubt  that  they  will  be  very 
generally  censured.  You  have  already  been  informed  that  Knox's 
paper  is  discredited  with  the  names  of  Generals  Lincoln  and  Jack 
son  1  upon  it.  It  is  believed  that  Knox's  notes  now  extant  exceed 
one  hundred  thousand  dollars,  perhaps  one  hundred  and  twenty  or 
one  hundred  and  thirty  thousand.  I  am  unable  to  say  for  what 
portion  of  this  Lincoln  is  responsible,  but  it  is  thought  forty  or 
fifty  thousand,  which  is  much  more  than  he  can  pay.  I  have  so 

1  Henry  Jackson,  of  Boston,  distinguished  as  an  officer  in  the  war  of 
Independence. 


1798.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  177 

often  seen  men  made  desperate  by  pecuniary  wants  that  I  am 
always  grieved  to  see  men  of  influence  reduced  on  account  of  what 
they  may  do  as  well  as  what  they  may  suffer. 

I  pray  you  to  accept  my  unfeigned  regards,  and  believe  me 

Your  faithful  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 

PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

( Confidential.) 

TRENTON,  Nov.  6, 1798. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  this  moment  received  your  letter  of  the 
26th  ult.  I  regret  the  embarrassments  of  General  Knox,  and 
the  misfortunes  into  which  they  have  plunged  General  Lincoln ; 
but  I  have  for  some  time  past  wished  for  what  is  now  decided,  that 
General  Knox  should  not  enter  into  the  army.  He  has  positively 
refused  to  accept  the  commission  of  third  major-general,  which  was 
finally  and  solely  tendered  to  him.  How  very  different  and  how 
excellent  the  conduct  of  General  Pinckney  !  As  soon  as  he  learned, 
on  arrival,  that  some  questions  and  difficulties  occurred  about  the 
priority  of  rank  among  the  three  first  named  major-generals,  he 
wrote  a  note  to  General  Hamilton,  explicitly  informing  him  that 
with  great  pleasure  he  should  serve  under  his  command.  Arid,  on 
his  coming  to  Trenton,  General  Pinckney  told  me  that  he  was 
gratified  in  the  first  rank  being  given  to  General  Hamilton,  whose 
superior  genius  and  military  talents  deserved  it.  Nay,  further, 
before  he  was  made  acquainted  with  the  whole  history  of  the  busi 
ness,  he  would  have  given  place  to  Knox  also,  if  that  would  have 
removed  all  inquietude !  Yet  General  Pinckney  is  a  man  of  high 
sense  of  honor,  of  valuable  military  acquirements,  and  he  has  made 
the  military  much  his  study,  and  is  of  great  influence  in  the  South 
ern  States,  on  all  which  might  be  founded  a  claim  to  an  elevated 
rank.  But  he  is  truly  a  patriot  and  an  honest  man. 

I  took  notice  of  the  President's  answer  to  the  Machias  address, 
and  regretted  the  passage  which  involved  the  three  envoys  in  the 
same  censure.  I  gave  General  Marshall  information  of  it,  and 
expressed  my  opinion  that  for  his  and  General  Pinckney's  reputa 
tion  it  would  be  necessary  that  he  should  write  a  history  of  their 
mission.  He  answered  that,  since  he  consented  to  be  a  candidate 
for  a  seat  in  Congress,  such  torrents  of  abuse  had  been  poured 
upon  him  he  feared  his  own  testimony  concerning  himself  would, 

12 


178  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE    CABOT.  [1798. 

among  his  enemies  and  their  followers,  fail  of  meeting  clue  credit. 
Added  to  which,  his  professional,  business  was  so  in  arrears  in  con 
sequence  of  his  absence,  that  he  really  had  no  time  to  undertake 
such  a  justification.  But  I  suppose  you  know  that  the  President 
tendered  the  commission  of  Judge  of  the  Supreme  Court  to  Mar 
shall  before  it  was  offered  to  Bushrod  Washington ;  and,  in  his 
letter  to  me,  the  President  really  pronounced  a  handsome  panegyric 
on  Marshall,  and  said  he  was  the  only  one  of  the  three  envoys  who 
had  conducted  unexceptionably.  But  I  was  not  able  to  discern  a 
single  circumstance  in  General  Pinckney's  conduct  that  was  repre 
hensible.  It  is  true  he  remained  in  France  three  or  four  months 
longer  than  General  Marshall ;  but  it  was  to  rescue  his  daughter 
from  death,  and  he  has  saved  her. 

Yesterday  I  received  from  the  President  a  letter  dated  the  26th 
ult.,  in  which  he  says  :  "  The  enclosed  letter  to  me  from  Mr. 
Gerry  I  received  last  night,  and  pray  you  to  have  it  inserted  in 
a  public  print.  It  will  satisfy  him,  and  do  no  harm  to  any  one. 
It  explains  some  circumstances  advantageously."  I  was  surprised 
at  the  expression,  "  and  do  no  harm  to  any  one;"  for  it  gave  the 
lie  to  me  or  my  informer,  in  declaring  that  the  "  important  fact "  I 
had  stated  on  incontrovertible  evidence  "  never  existed."  The  evi 
dence  was  General  Marshall's  letter  to  me,  whose  very  words  I 
used  in  stating  the  fact,  and  had  before  sent  those  words  to  the 
President,  who  showed  them  to  Gerry,  when  he  first  manifested 
his  uneasiness  at  some  expressions  in  my  letter  to  P.  Johnston. 
Upon  which,  Gerry  gave  to  the  President  the  same  explanations 
which  are  contained  in  his  letter  to  the  President  of  the  20th  ult., 
a  copy  of  which  I  enclose.  These  explanations,  you  will  see,  are 
contemptible  quibbles  about  immaterial  circumstances  attending  the 
important  facts  to  be  stated  and  established.  My  sense  of  Gerry's 
letter  and  conduct,  and  of  the  President's  prayer  "  to  have  the  let 
ter  published,"  you  will  find  in  my  answer  to  the  President  of  yes 
terday,  of  which  also  I  enclose  a  copy.  I  am  sorry  that  want  of 
time  absolutely  forbids  my  giving  you  the  long  detail  of  facts  on 
which  my  accusation  against  Gerry  for  duplicity  and  treachery  is 
founded.  There  is  no  question,  in  my  view  of  them,  that  they 
prove  his  betraying,  in  his  frequent  secret  conferences  with  Talley 
rand,  the  opinions,  propositions,  and  determinations  of  his  col 
leagues  ;  and  Talleyrand's  propositions  to  him  were  under  an 
injunction  of  secrecy  towards  them,  with  which  Gerry  was  sum- 


1798.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  179 

ciently  abject,  base,  and  treacherous  in  his  joint  trust  from  his 
country  to  comply. 

Faithfully  and  affectionately  yours, 

TIMOTHY  PICKERING. 

P.  S.  What  you  say  in  vindication  of  General  Marshall's  an 
swers  to  a  "  Freeholder  "  induces  me  to  send  you  the  enclosed 
extract  of  my  letter  to  Mr.  Goodhue,  who,  in  his  letter  of  October 
26,  expressed  his  fears  that  Marshall  was  not  sound  at  heart.1 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  Nov.  7,  1798. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  yesterday  met  Mr.  H.  G.  Otis  and  Mr.  Ed. 
Robbins,2  each  of  whom  separately  had  conversed  freely  with  Mr. 
Gerry ;  and  they  both  agreed  that  Mr.  Gerry  had  unequivocally 
approved  the  proceedings  of  our  government,  and  condemned  that 
of  France.  Mr.  Robbins  stated  to  me  that  he  questioned  Gerry 
very  closely,  and  that  his  answers  were  satisfactory.  He  asked  in 
particular  whether  Mr.  Gerry  thought  the  measures  of  our  govern 
ment  toward  France  were  wise  and  proper,  to  which  Mr.  Gerry  re 
plied  that  they  were  perfectly  so  in  his  opinion,  and  that  their  effects 
upon  the  French  government  proved  it,  for  that  in  proportion  as  our 
tone  was  raised  theirs  was  lowered. 

Mr.  Otis  intimated  to  him  the  state  of  public  opinion  concerning 
him :  that  the  friends  of  government  were  not  satisfied,  and  that 
its  enemies  had  calculated  upon  finding  in  him  a  character  round 

1  The  passage  in  Mr.  Goodhue's  letter  referred  to  here  runs  as  fol 
lows  :  — 

"  We  meet  with  ups  and  downs  in  our  political  prospects,  and  I  confess 
nothing  has  given  me  more  surprise  and  regret  than  that  General  Marshall 
should  so  far  degrade  himself  as  to  fan  the  flame  of  opposition  to  govern 
ment  by  giving  his  opinion  so  decidedly  against  the  Alien  and  Sedition 
Bills.  What  does  he  mean  ?  Or  have  we  been  mistaking  hitherto  his  true 
character  ?  I  sometimes  have  been  led  to  think  that  none  of  the  Virginia 
Federalists  are  little  better  than  half-way  Jacobin."  (Goodhue  to  Picker 
ing,  Oct.  26,  1798.  The  letter  is  misplaced  chronologically,  and  can  be 
found  in  Vol.  XXVI.  of  the  Pickering  MSS.)  This  extract  illustrates  very 
well  what  I  have  said  above  (p.  147)  in  regard  to  Mr.  Cabot's  defence  of 
Marshall  on  this  occasion,  and  also  shows  the  rigid  and  unyielding  temper 
of  the  New  England  Federalists. 

2  See  above,  p.  171. 


180  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

which  they  might  rally  with  new  spirit.  He  replied  that  he  was 
sensible  of  the  predicament  in  which  he  stood,  but  he  thought  it 
an  ill  compliment  to  his  understanding  to  suppose  he  could  be  made 
subservient  to  the  designs  of  the  opposition.  I  think,  from  all  I 
have  heard,  that  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  Gerry  professes  his 
entire  approbation  of  our  national  measures,  and  recommends  to 
every  one  to  support  them ;  and  that  he  insists  that  it  is  the  duty 
of  those  who  are  not  satisfied  with  the  administration  to  support  it 
nevertheless,  but  that  for  himself  he  is  satisfied  with  it. 

He  told  Mr.  Bobbins  that  the  mockery  of  elections  in  France 
was  so  gross  that  the  most  ignorant  were  not  deceived.  All  the 
people  know  that  they  have  less  liberty  than  ever,  for  they  hardly 
dare  to  think  freely  now  upon  any  subject  that  has  any  relation  to 
public  affairs.  He  mentioned  examples  within  his  own  knowledge 
of  persons  returned  as  members  of  the  legislature,  who  were  refused 
a  seat  because  their  principles  did  not  suit  the  Directory,  and  eight 
or  ten  electors  having  afterward  sent  other  members  of  the  flexible 
kind.  This  is  impudently  called  the  choice  of  the  people.  The 
people,  however,  as  Mr.  Gerry  says,  see  very  plainly  that  all  this 
is  a  perfect  farce,  but  dare  not  say  so,  lest  it  be  converted  to  a 
tragedy. 

I  know,  my  dear  friend,  that  you  are  not  so  prone  to  see  objects 
in  a  gloomy  light  as  I  am ;  but  I  cannot  forbear  to  express  to  you 
my  apprehensions,  which  are  now  greater  than  ever,  that  our 
country  is  destined  to  act  over  the  same  follies,  to  practise  the  same 
vices,  and  of  consequence  to  suffer  the  same  miseries  which  com 
pose  the  history  of  revolutionary  France.  I  trust  we  shall  fall 
short  of  them  in  each  particular,  but  we  shall  in  some  considerable 
..degree  imitate  their  errors  and  their  sufferings.  This  is  a  fate 
which  cannot  be  wholly  averted :  it  may,  however,  be  procras 
tinated  and  mitigated  by  the  exertions  of  good  men  ;  and  these  I 
hope  will  be  never  withheld.  Our  elections  here  indicate  a  state 
of  the  public  mind  less  satisfactory  than  was  believed.  Your  old 
friend,  the  doughty  general,  though  not  elected,  has  received  a 
support  in  this  district  which  astonishes  the  Federalists.  But  it  is 
more  grievous  to  observe  the  motives  which  govern  the  voters : 
they  vote  for  the  man  who  would  vote  against  taxes.  I  recollect 
to  have  heard  that  Dr.  Manning,  of  Ipswich,  wishing  to  recom 
mend  himself  to  the  people,  boasted,  toward  the  close  of  our 
Revolutionary  war,  that  during  the  whole  contest  he  had  never 


1798.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  181 

voted  for  a  tax,  although  he  was  in  the  legislature  many  years. 
How  long  could  a  just,  equal,  and  free  government  be  maintained 
by  a  people  who  would  approve  of  such  a  representative  ?  I  have 
fondly  cherished  the  belief  that  our  countrymen  would  give  a  fair 
chance  to  the  experiment  of  a  just  government  altogether  elective 
by  the  people  and  perfectly  free ;  but  I  am  ready  to  say  that,  as  I 
understand  human  nature,  such  a  system  cannot  long  be  supported 
by  any  people  whatever.  In  every  government  where  any  thing 
like  justice  is  respected,  there  will  necessarily  be  great  inequalities 
of  property  and  condition,  and  the  numbea  of  the  poor  will  greatly 
exceed  that  of  the  rich.  This  alone  will  furnish  unprincipled 
ambition  with  means  to  subvert  a  free  state,  or  compel  it  to  adopt 
in  its  own  defence  principles  and  provisions  which  are  hostile  to 
popular  liberty.  Thus,  as  I  reason,  whether  the  government  of 
a  free  state  or  the  faction  which  opposes  it  prevails,  popular  liberty 
will  find  a  new  restraint  at  the  issue  of  every  conflict.  If  the  gov 
ernment  is  successful,  the  restraint  will  be  legitimate  and  salutary  ; 
but,  if  faction  triumphs,  there  will  nothing  of  rational  liberty  remain. 
I  ought  to  apologize  for  drawing  you  into  these  painful  specula 
tions,  but  they  absorb  my  own  mind  so  much  that  I  can  write 
nothing  else. 

I  beg  to  be  remembered  affectionately  to  Mrs.  Pickering,  and 
that  you  will  ever  believe  me  your  faithful  and  much  obliged 
friend.  GEORGE  CABOT. 

P.  S.  —  There  has  been  more  appearance  of  deep  and  well- 
digested  design  on  the  part  of  our  Jacobins  at  the  late  election  in 
this  district  than  I  have  seen.  It  seemed  as  if  they  had  been  all 
instructed  individually  to  be  silent  on  the  subject  previous  to  the 
election,  and  every  man  to  attend  and  give  his  vote.  For  this 
latter  purpose,  I  have  reason  to  believe  that  select  persons  went 
through  the  district  and  called  out  every  Jacobin  vote.  I  mention 
this,  because,  if  it  happened  so  in  other  places,  we  must  not  doubt 
the  systematic  process. 

PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

TRENTON,  Nov.  10,  1798. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  just  received  your  favor  of  the  31st  ult. 
I  am  glad  that  Mr.  Gerry  has  been  so  explicit  in  respect  to  the 
character  of  the  French  government.  gu^  now  wju  tnjg  consjst 


182  LIFE   AND  LETTEKS   OF   GEOKGE  CABOT.          [1798. 

with  his  intimations  (and,  if  I  mistake  not,  they  repeatedly  occur 
in  his  official  report  since  his  return  home)  of  that  government 
being  sincere  in  its  desires  of  peace  and  reconciliation  with  the 
United  States  ?  When  I  can  again  read  his  budget,  I  will  correct 
the  mistake,  if  I  now  make  one.  I  am  satisfied  that  the  true  friends 
of  their  country  need  be  under  no  apprehensions  concerning  Gen 
eral  Marshall's  rectitude  or  steadiness.  It  is  a  great  misfortune 
that  the  President's  promptness  (I  might  use  another  word)  of 
opinion  and  his  strong  predilection  for  Gerry  should  have  given 
countenance  and  support  to  the  pretensions  and  conduct  of  ftnox 
and  Gerry  ;  but,  in  respect  to  the  former,  he  must  certainly  be 
convinced  of  his  error,  and,  when  he  reads  Marshall's  journal  (a 
copy  of  which  I  have  purposely  taken,  and  the  verity  of  which 
will  be  confirmed  by  General  Pinckney),  he  will  be  convinced  of 
Gerry's  disgraceful  pusillanimity,  weakness,  duplicity,  and  I  think 
treachery.  By  my  last,  enclosing  a  copy  of  my  letter  to  the  Presi 
dent,  you  will  see  I  have  announced  so  much  to  him.  The 
President's  unbiassed  opinion  of  General  Marshall  I  cannot  with 
hold  from  you.  It  is  given  in  a  letter,  dated  September  26,  when 
filling-  the  vacant  seat  on  the  bench  of  the  Supreme  Court.  The 
only  candidates  about  whom  there  appeared  any  competition  in 
the  President's  mind  were  Bushrod  Washington  and  General  Mar 
shall.  I  gave  to  the  President  reasons  why  Marshall  would  decline 
the  office.  The  President,  in  his  answer,  said  he  could  not  blame 
him  if  he  should  decline.  Washington  was  the  alternative.  Of 
both,  the  President  wrote  me  thus  :  "  The  name,  the  connections, 
the  character,  the  merit  and  abilities  of  Mr.  Washington,  are 
greatly  respected ;  but  I  still  think  that  General  Marshall  ought 
to  be  preferred.  Of  the  three  envoys,  the  conduct  of  Marshall 
alone  has  been  entirely  satisfactory,  and  ought  to  be  marked  by 
the  most  decided  approbation  of  the  public.  He  has  raised  the 
American  people  in  their  own  esteem  ;  and,  if  the  influence  of 
truth  and  justice,  reason  and  argument,  is  not  lost  in  Europe,  he 
has  raised  the  consideration  of  the  United  States  in  that  quarter 
of  the  world."  And  be  assured,  my  dear  sir,  that  this  opinion  of 
Marshall  is  correct,  in  respect  to  his  efficiency  in  the  mission.  But 
I  am  yet  to  learn  in  what  General  Pinckney  is  reprehensible. 
There  is  not  to  be  found  a  more  honorable  man.  He  does  honor 
to  Marshall's  eminent  qualities  of  mind  and  heart.  The  despatches 
would  have  appeared  to  still  greater  advantage  in  style,  sentiment, 


1798.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  183 

and  energy,  had  they  been  adopted  from  Marshall's  pen ;  but  for 
the  sake  of  unanimity,  to  gain  Gerry's  signature,  Pinckney  and 
Marshall  were  obliged  to  let  them  pass  through  his  alembic, 
in  which  you  will  readily  imagine  that  much  of  the  spirit 
escaped.  I  hope  Marshall  may  get  into  Congress.  His  general 
politics  are  well  known,  and  his  integrity  is  unblemished.  He 
will  assuredly  act  with  the  intelligent  New  England  men.  Gerry 
has  the  foolish  vanity  to  imagine  that  he  himself  represents  the 
sense  and  virtue  of  his  immediate  countrymen ;  and,  as  it  was  im 
possible  for  Marshall,  fatigued  with  his  delays  and  pertinacity  in 
trifling  objections,  disgusted  with  his  wrongheadedness,  and  indig 
nant  at  his  duplicity,  ultimately  not  to  manifest  his  contempt  for 
him,  Gerry  has  transferred  this  contempt  to  his  country. 
I  remain,  my  dear  sir,  with  great  truth  and  esteem, 
Your  faithful  friend  and  servant, 

TIMOTHY  PICKERING. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLIXE,  Nov.  17,  1798. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  lament  that  your  excellent  letter  of  the  5th 
could  not  have  reached  the  President  before  he  left  home.  It  is 
important  to  himself  and  to  the  country  that  he  should  think  more 
justly  of  the  merits  of  his  favorite  Gerry,  or,  at  least,  that  he 
should  act  as  he  would,  if  he  did  think  justly.  Your  letter  can 
hardly  fail  of  producing  this  good  effect,  if  he  can  have  time  to 
ruminate  a  little  upon  it,  and  give  his  good  sense  and  good  principles 
a  fair  chance  to  be  consulted  ;  and  I  sincerely  hope  this  will  yet 
happen  before  his  speech  to  Congress  is  prepared,  as  I  have  some 
reason  to  fear  he  will  repeat  the  sentiments  expressed  to  the 
Machias  addressers,  and  perhaps  be  more  pointed. 

When  I  read  Gerry's  letter,  I  could  hardly  realize  that  such 
a  tissue  of  miserable  quibbles  and  wretched  cavillings  should  be 
thought  an  advantageous  explanation  of  any  thing.  Indeed,  in  my 
judgment,  its  publication  would  injure  him  as  much  or  more  than 
that  which  it  proposes  to  answer ;  because,  while  it  does  not  dimin 
ish  the  substance  of  what  is  implied  in  yours,  it  discovers  a  pitiful 
disposition  to  give  such  importance  to  the  most  trifling  circum 
stances.  Mr.  Wolcott  can  tell  you  that  in  a  dispute  with  the  Pres 
ident  at  his  (Mr.  Wolcott's)  table,  concerning  the  character  of  Mr. 


184  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

Gerry,  I  was  provoked  to  be  rude ;  arid  that  I  pronounced  him 
"  totally  unfit  to  conduct  any  great  affairs  of  himself,  and  from 
his  captious  and  jealous  temper  altogether  unqualified  to  act  with 
others."  Such  he  has  always  been  ;  such  his  late  colleagues  have 
found  him ;  and  such,  I  am  persuaded,  even  the  French  now  think 
him.1  Decency  would  forbid  me  to  revive  in  the  mind  of  the 
President  a  subject  of  so  much  mortification  as  our  dispute  would 
prove,  after  what  he  knows  of  the  envoyship ;  and,  on  this  account, 
I  have  not  dared  to  speak  to  him  upon  it.  But  I  have  been  sur 
prised  that  so  little  public  disapprobation  of  Gerry  should  have 
been  expressed,  since  he  himself  has  furnished  abundant  testimony 
of  his  own  unworthiness,  in  entering  into  conferences  with  Talley 
rand  under  a  stipulation  that  his  colleagues  should  not  be  informed 
by  him  of  that  which  he  was  bound  in  duty  to  tell  them.  This 
was  not  merely  unfaithfulness,  —  a  sort  of  negative  fault,  —  it  was 
positive  treachery  ;  it  was  co-operating  with  an  insidious  enemy  in 
his  attempts  to  divide  our  country,  after  he  had  avowed  his  expec 
tation  of  subduing  it  by  the  force  of  our  divisions.  After  all,  such 
is  our  feeble  condition  that  it  is  expedient  to  be  silent,  and,  if 
possible,  to  prevent  a  public  investigation  which  may  make  new 
schisms.  On  this  account  I  am  extremely  solicitous  that  the  Pres 
ident  should  perceive  that  a  disposition  to  cover  the  follies  and 
faults  of  Gerry,  if  not  repressed,  will  eventually  bring  forward 
Pinckney  and  Marshall  to  criminate  him  ;  and  that  they,  with  truth 
and  justice  on  their  side,  will  necessarily  be  supported  by  all  men 
of  virtue,  honor,  and  ability. 

I  lament  with  you  the  misfortunes  of  Knox  on  his  own  account, 
and,  I  am  sorry  to  add,  on  that  of  the  public ;  for  already  he 
begins  to  intimate,  though  obscurely,  that  Hamilton  is  a  man  of 
insatiable  ambition  and  not  to  be  trusted. 

I  am  always,  with  high  esteem  and  true  affection, 

Your  faithful  G.  CABOT. 

1  The  justice  of  this  surmise  may  be  gathered  from  Talleyrand's  decla 
ration,  that  "  he  [Gerry]  wanted  decision  at  a  moment  when  he  might  easily 
have  adjusted  every  thing,  that  he  was  too  irresolute,  and  that  the  corre 
spondence  between  them  was  a  curious  monument  of  advances  on  his  part 
and  evasions  on  Gerry's."  Pinckney's  opinion  of  his  colleague  was  even 
worse.  He  wrote  "  that  he  had  never  met  with  a  man  so  destitute  of  can 
dor  and  so  full  of  deceit."  (See  Hildreth,  V.  261.)  Pinckney,  no  doubt, 
judged. Gerry  harshly;  but  it  is  evident  that  the  latter  showed  his  mental 
incapacity  most  clearly  to  all  concerned  in  this  business. 


1798.1  CORRESPONDENCE.  185 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  Nov.  24,  1798. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  The  mail  of  yesterday  brought  me  your  favor 
of  the  10th.  I  have  some  fears  that,  while  I  have  stated  to  you  the 
opinions  which  Mr.  Gerry  has  openly  avowed,  I  may  have  seemed 
to  think  him  consistent.  You  need  not  examine  his  budget  to  dis 
cover  whether  you  have  done  him  justice  in  making  him  the  advo 
cate  of  Directorial  sincerity.  However  absurd  it  may  be,  he  has 
assured  some  of  our  Jacobin  leaders  (the  "VVinthrops1  particularly) 
that  the  French  were  sincere  in  their  professions  of  desiring  an 
honorable  peace  with  us.  In  all  this,  every  thing  will  be  intelligi 
ble  to  those  who  know  Gerry  and  his  conduct  in  the  late  mission ; 
to  all  others,  it  must  be  unintelligible.  Gerry  can  offer  no  excuse 
for  listening  to  the  proposal  of  his  French  friends  to  remain  in 
France,  without  urging  as  a  part  of  it  his  own  belief  that  a  safe 
and  an  honorable  adjustment  might  have  been  made  with  them. 
He  did  not  intend  to  be  their  tool,  but  he  was  their  dupe.  He  is  too 
proud,  however,  to  confess,  if  he  is  not  too  self-conceited  to  see  the 
latter;  and  he  asserts  the  former  by  his  unreserved  censures  of 
them  in  every  thing,  except  their  disposition  of  peace  towards  us. 
It  would  be  natural  to  ask  how  the  President  could  possibly  be 
imposed  upon  by  any  explanations  which  could  be  made  of  such 
gross  folly  and  misconduct.  Here  it  is  impossible  not  to  see  a 
strong  motive  which  Gerry  would  have  to  applaud  the  executive 
administration  ;  and,  without  going  further,  we  may  account  for  all 
that  Gerry  professes  to  individuals,  while  his  reserve  to  the  public 
may  be  fairly  ascribed  to  his  determination  to  retain  the  Jacobin 
suffrages  at  all  events.  It  has  been  proposed  in  private  circles  to 
invite  him  to  express  formally  to  the  public  that  approbation  of 
our  own  government  and  that  condemnation  of  the  French  which 
he  has  declared  to  individuals  ;  but  no  act  of  his  life  that  I  have 
known  will  warrant  the  expectation  of  his  doing  a  thing  so  obvi 
ously  proper,  in  the  opinion  of  wise  and  good  men,  unless  it  coin 
cided  with  some  of  his  paltry  selfish  purposes. 

I  had  made  the  same  reflection  on  Gerry's  opinions  concerning 
General  Marshall  which  you  have  expressed ;  and  I  concur  fully 
with  you  in  the  sentiments  that  his  merit  is  of  the  first  order,  and 
that  he  is  to  be  cherished  as  a  most  precious  acquisition  to  the 
cause  of  order,  morality,  and  good  government. 

1  Judge  James  Winthrop,  and  his  brothers  John  and  William.  All  three 
were  active  Democrats. 


186  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

Our  people  have  become  silent,  and  satisfied  with  the  distribution 
of  the  military  trusts.  The  knowing  ones  are  better  pleased  than 
they  would  have  been  with  an  acquiescence  by  Knox. 

We  are  rejoicing  cordially  that  Nelson  has  given  a  decisive  blow 
to  the  naval  power  of  the  French  tyrants  in  the  Mediterranean. 
If  our  country  could  act  up  to  the  standard  of  its  executive  admin 
istration,  the  Gallic  crows  would  soon  pick  the  carcasses  of  each 
other.  I  remain  always,  with  unfeigned  affection, 

Your  faithful  friend,  and  obliged  GEORGE  CABOT. 


GORE  TO  CABOT. 

LONDON,  Dec.  8,  1798. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  Thinking  and  hoping,  as  I  do,  that  no  terms  will 
be  offered  by  the  French  that  can  induce  our  government  to 
resume  a  negotiation  on  the  subject  of  their  depredations,  has 
restrained  me  from  writing  my  sentiments  on  the  manner  of 
arranging  the  terms  of  an  article,  that  should  adjust  either  the 
objects,  or  measure  of  compensation,  or  the  requisite  circumstances 
which  should  entitle  the  object  to  the  consideration  and  decision  of 
those  appointed  to  award  the  compensation.  In  the  low  state  of 
French  despotism,  the  Directory  may  propose  terms  ;  and,  although 
no  one  would  believe  that  any  would  be  kept,  that  were  obligatory 
on  them,  yet  the  government  may  feel  it  inexpedient  to  refuse 
acceding  to  them.  In  such  an  event,  great  care  should  be  taken, 
in  wording  the  article,  to  include  all  cases,  and  exclude  all  doubt 
as  to  the  objects,  both  as  to  quality  and  time  of  examination  by 
the  board,  —  not  with  any  expectation  of  deriving  satisfaction  for 
the  injury,  but  with  the  view  of  more  completely  and  definitely 
fixing  the  breach,  so  as  to  leave  nothing  for  their  supporters  or 
apologists  to  allege  in  their  behalf,  or  against  the  United  States. 
The  article  under  which  we  act  has,  by  some  people,  been  settled 
down  to  the  most  senseless  jumble  of  words  that  two  men  could 
have  thrown  together.  The  description,  according  to  these  com 
mentators,  contained  no  case  for  the  board,  where  the  High  Court 
of  Appeals  had  acted,  because  it  never  could  be  conceived  that 
this  government  would  have  subjected  the  decisions  of  so  high  and 
respectable  a  tribunal  to  the  revision  or  examination  of  another. 
It  did  not  contain  any  that  had  not  passed  through  all  the  courts ; 
because  it  was  only  in  cases  where  compensation  could  not  be 


1708.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  187 

obtained  in  the  ordinary  course  of  judicial  proceedings  that  the 
board  was  to  take  cognizance. 

The  board  could  not  examine  any  cases  yet  pending  in  the 
courts,  prior  to  the  term  allotted  for  presenting  memorials,  for  the 
last-mentioned  reason ;  nor  afterward,  because  it  had  no  authority 
to  receive  ;  nor  at  the  time  of  its  completion,  because  the  very 
assertion  of  the  cause  yet  being  undecided  in  the  courts  of  the 
Crown  showed  that  there  was  still  wanting  proof  of  a  material 
allegation,  —  viz.,  that  compensation  could  not  be  obtained  in  the 
ordinary  course,  which  fact,  said  these  gentlemen,  only  can  appear 
by  proof  of  having  resorted  to  and  exhausted  all  the  judicial 
means,  and  that  these  had  failed.  In  my  opinion,  the  words  used 
in  the  British  treaty  were  adequate  to  the  end ;  but  if  a  nation, 
possessing  like  this  a  character  for  integrity,  and  desirous  of 
sustaining  that  character,  should,  under  the  existing  circumstances, 
be  disposed  to  cavil,  and  fritter  down  to  nothing  the  provisions  of 
a  treaty,  what  are  we  to  expect  from  another,  the  reverse  of  every 
thing  good,  wise,  or  honorable  ?  We  should  leave  no  uncertainty 
in  language,  no  terms  under  which  their  advocates  may  apologize 
for  their  breaches.  Beside  general  and  comprehensive  terms,  it 
would  be  well  to  insert  particular  descriptions,  taking  care  at  the 
same  time  not  to  diminish  the  force  and  extent  of  the  former  by 
the  insertion  of  the  latter.  All  conclusions  unfavorable  to  the 
claimants,  which  might  be  drawn  from  the  terms,  should  by 
express  provision  be  excluded. 

You  may  ask  why  I  do  not  write  these  remarks  to  Mr.  Pick 
ering.  My  answer  is,  I  have  no  correspondence  with  him,  other 
than  a  joint  and  official  one  on  the  subjects  of  our  duties ;  and 
reasons  of  delicacy  forbid  such  an  intrusion  in  this  way.  He 
knows  all  the  objections  that  have  been  raised ;  and,  if  his  mind 
should  contemplate  them  on  making  a  similar  arrangement,  he  will 
not  fail  to  use  all  necessary  cautions.  If,  in  the  course  of  events, 
a  new  attempt  should  be  made  at  negotiation,  you  can  just  suggest, 
if  you  think  proper,  some  of  these  things  to  his  recollection. 
Express  provision  should  also  be  made  that  those  who  execute  the 
commission  should  be  entitled  to  the  immunities  of  public  minis 
ters.  It  would  give  weight  to  the  commission,  avoid  inconveniences 
to  the  individuals,  and  could  never  disserve  the  country  who 
expected  benefit  from  such  an  arrangement. 

In  our  present  relation  to  Great  Britain,  it  is  more  than  proba- 


188  LIFE    AND    LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

ble  we  may  finish  our  commission  in  the  course  of  time.  But 
there  is  a  coldness,  phlegm,  and  delay,  among  those  who  think 
they  have  an  indispensable  right  and  duty  to  decide  before  the 
cause  is  examined  by  us,  that  calls  for  all  the  patience  of  my 
constitution.  When  we  meet,  this  will  be  a  fit  subject  for  conver 
sation,  and  more  fit  than  for  paper. 

I  have  read,  with  great  satisfaction,  Mr.  Pickering's  letter  to 
the  addresses  from  Prince  Edward  County.  I  have  read,  also, 
General  Marshall's  letter,  and  answers  to  queries.  Gallatin  is 
re-elected,  and  Lyon  a  will  be.  The  elections  make  us  tremble  for 
the  safety  as  well  as  honor  of  our  country.  I  rejoice  sincerely 
in  the  final  adjustment  of  the  questions  between  Hamilton,  &c. 
That  Knox  should  be  embarrassed  in  his  pecuniary  affairs,  and 
General  Lincoln  involved  with  him,  I  do  most  heartily  regret.  I 
was  the  more  pleased  to  learn  that  the  military  etiquette  was 
disposed  of,  as  I  foresaw  in  its  progress  great  parties  of  new 
division  among  those  whose  unanimity  is  indispensably  necessary 
to  the  salvation  of  our  country. 

Since  the  understanding  between  Toussaint  the  Black  and  the 
British  government,  possibly  the  trade  of  St.  Domingo  may  be 
opened  to  our  people.  But  what  the  designs  of  this  government 
are,  I  cannot  tell,  —  probably  their  monopoly  system.  However,  I 
think  we  can  easily  defeat  them,  in  such  a  scheme  as  respects  St. 
Domingo.  Buonaparte,  having  possessed  himself  of  Egypt,  will,  in 
a  great  measure,  cut  off  the  Turks  from  their  supplies  of  rice, 
coffee,  &c.,  which  they  formerly  received  by  the  way  of  Alexandria 
at  Constantinople.  And  it  is  very  probable  our  vessels  might 
make  beneficial  voyages  to  this  last-mentioned  place.  Fish,  and 
the  articles  of  the  East  Indies,  are  much  wanted  there.  And 
foreign  shipping  is  much  employed  in  freighting  from  Constanti 
nople  to  the  various  ports  in  the  Levant.  A  Mr.  Abbot  tells  me 
that,  several  years  ago,  a  ship  came  to  Constantinople  direct  from 
India.  The  house  of  which  he  is  a  member  succeeded  in  procur 
ing  her  admission,  on  terms  of  the  most  favored  nation.  Should 
this  be  an  advantageous  trade  for  our  merchants,  it  would  be 

1  Matthew  Lyon,  then  a  member  of  Congress  from  Vermont,  and  after 
wards  from  Kentucky.  He  was  a  well-known  Democrat  in  his  day,  a  good 
deal  of  a  demagogue,  a  rough  and  ready  debater;  and  the  thrashing  he 
received  at  the  hands  of  Roger  Griswold,  on  the  floor  of  the  House,  gave 
him  at  the  time  considerable  notoriety. 


1708. 


CORRESPONDENCE.  189 


advisable  for  our  government  to  adopt  measures  for  placing  the 
commerce  on  a  permanent  footing  by  treaty  with  the  Porte.  The 
present  time  will  probably  be  as  favorable  as  any  future  period. 
We  ought,  likewise,  to  secure  a  free  passage  into  the  Black  Sea,  and 
this  should  be  settled  with  the  Emperor  of  Russia.  Great  Britain 
would,  at  least  at  present,  not  thwart  us  in  these  views.  I  under 
stand  she  says  she  would  promote  our  views  on  these  subjects. 

There  is  a  report  of  a  battle  between  Jourdan  and  the  Aus- 
trians,  but  it  does  not  come  in  such  a  way  as  to  obtain  credit. 

Yours  truly,  C.  G. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  Dec.  14,  1798. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  been  unable  to  comprehend  the  motives 
which  influence  the  Federalists  to  neglect  the  infinitely  important 
subject  of  electing  the  President  and  Vice-President.  The  defect 
of  the  constitution  in  this  particular  is  so  obvious,  and  the  incon 
venience  and  absurdity  of  it  so  much  felt,  that  I  should  imagine  a 
proposition  to  amend  it  could  not  fail  of  success.  It  is  certain  that 
in  the  late  election  we  were  in  great  danger  of  seeing  a  French 
President  instead  of  an  American  placed  in  the  chair,  when  a 
majority  of  the  electors  were  truly  Americans,  merely  because 
each  elector  could  not  constitutionally  determine  the  character  of 
his  own  vote.  If  this  article  in  the  Constitution  is  not  amended, 
we  shall  be  exposed  to  great  embarrassments  at  the  next  election, 
as  we  were  at  the  last ;  and  the  evil  of  division  and  jealousy  among 
men  who  have  the  same  honest  views  will  be  unavoidable.  It  will 
be  the  opinion  of  many  good  men,  as  it  was  before,  that  the  public 
safety  requires  first  to  exclude  the  enemies  of  our  country,  and 
then  to  choose  the  best  of  its  friends,  but  not  to  hazard  the  success 
of  the  former  for  a  preference  among  the  latter.  This  principle 
of  action  will  be  held  sacred  by  many  of  the  truest  patriots  ;  but 
it  will  not  always  be  admitted  by  others  to  be  any  thing  more  than 
a  good  cover  for  supporting  a  favorite  candidate,  or  opposing  one 
who  ought  to  be  elected.  You  know  that  many  painful  heart 
burnings  have  more  than  once  been  produced  among  those  whom 
we  esteem,  and  that  very  lately  (perhaps  now)  this  same  business 
disturbs  the  harmony  of  our  first  councils. 

I  have  troubled  you  with  this  hint,  because  there  is  no   time 


190  LIFE   AND    LETTERS    OF   GEORGE    CABOT.  [1798. 

to  be  lost.  If  two-thirds  of  each  House  will  agree  this  session  to 
recommend  the  amendment,  the  State  legislatures  may  ratify  it 
in  good  season  ;  but,  if  not,  I  should  think  every  possible  exertion 
should  be  made  in  the  States  to  accomplish  it  with  the  next  Con 
gress,  which  I  trust  will  be  somewhat  better  than  the  present.  I 
am  looking  impatiently  for  the  President's  speech,  with  some  hope 
that  he  will  say  frankly  that  the  safety  and  independence  of  the 
United  States  are  endangered  by  the  personal  intercourse  between 
us  and  our  insidious  and  perfidious  enemy  ;  and  that  war,  by  end 
ing  it,  would  tend  to  secure  us,  and  make  every  man's  rights  and 
duties  plain  and  clear.  There  are,  in  my  mind,  irresistible  reasons 
for  changing  the  present  state  of  things,  even  if  unqualified  war  is 
inexpedient.  Why  should  our  merchants  be  denied  the  liberty  of 
making  reprisals  on  those  who  have  an  authorized  right  to  plunder 
them  ?  Our  enemies  have  no  commerce,  but  they  often  capture 
the  property  of  every  nation  which  has,  and  opportunities  to  recap 
ture  their  prizes  will  sometimes  occur,  especially  as  our  armed 
vessels  are  very  numerous,  and  becoming  daily  more  so.  Besides 
this,  encouragement  to  private  armaments  would  add  greatly  to 
our  strength  and  security,  by  increasing  our  seamen  and  training 
them  to  the  management  of  armed  vessels.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  is  no  possibility  of  losing  any  thing.  France  wars  upon  us 
now  as  much  as  she  is  able,  and  will  certainly  apply  more  force,  if 
she  can  with  a  prospect  of  success.  Why  not  preclude  her,  there 
fore,  by  every  possible  augmentation  of  our  own  force  ?  She  will 
be  humble  and  respectful,  and  even  just  toward  us,  precisely  in 
proportion  to  her  estimate  of  our  power. 

Yours  faithfully,  G.  C. 


1799.]  SECOND   MISSION  TO   FKANCE.  191 


CHAPTER    VII. 

1799. 
The  Second  Mission  to  France.  —  Views  of  Mr.  Cabot.  —  Correspondence. 

THE  great  event  of  the  year  1799  was  the  President's 
renewal  of  negotiations  with  France.  This  change  of  pol 
icy,  which  proved  the  immediate  cause  of  the  downfall  of 
the  Federalists'  party,  forms,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  else,  the 
subject  of  Mr.  Cabot's  letters  during  this  year.  The  ap 
pointment  of  the  new  commission  was  in  all  ways  of  the 
deepest  and  most  far-reaching  consequence ;  and,  since  Mr. 
Cabot  was  a  prominent  representative  of  the  opinions  held 
by  most  of  the  leading  Federalists,  a  few  pages  will  not,  I 
hope,  be  wasted  in  defining  briefly,  and  if  possible  accurately, 
his  exact  position  in  regard  to  this  famous  measure. 

Several  important  bills  introduced  early  in  the  session 
by  the  committee  on  defence  were  still  before  Congress 
when  the  new  year  opened.  Gallatin,  then  heading  the 
opposition,  objected  to  the  passage  of  these  bills  until  cer 
tain  additional  documents,  promised  by  the  President  and 
relating  to  the  recent  negotiations,  were  laid  before  the 
House.  Early  in  January,  1799,  the  President  sent  in  the 
desired  papers,  comprising  Gerry's  correspondence  with 
Talleyrand,  and  certain  letters  from  the  consul-general, 
Skipwith.  These  were  soon  followed  by  an  elaborate  report 
from  Colonel  Pickering  on  French  affairs,  drawn  with  con 
siderable  ability,  and  reflecting  with  much  sharpness  on  all 
that  related  to  Talleyrand,  the  Directory,  and  Gerry. 
Within  a  few  days  after  this  report,  the  President  trans 
mitted  to  Congress  information  of  a  new  French  decree,  by 


192  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

the  terms  of  which,  all  Americans  serving  in  hostile  vessels 
were,  if  captured,  to  be  condemned  to  the  treatment  of 
pirates.  Thus  stimulated,  the  House  passed  a  retaliation 
bill  in  answer  to  the  new  decree,  renewed  the  act  of  non- 
intercourse  with  France,  and  made  large  appropriations  for 
the  navy,  while  the  Senate  passed  a  bill  providing  for  a 
greatly  increased  army.  The  Legislature  was  engaged  upon 
these  vigorous  measures,  when  they  and  the  public  generally 
were  startled  by  the  President's  nomination  of  William 
Vans  Murray,  resident  minister  at  the  Hague,  to  be  min 
ister  plenipotentiary  to  the  French  Republic.  Public  opin 
ion  at  that  time  was  much  divided  on  the  subject  of  French 
affairs.  A  large  section  of  the  Democratic  party,  including 
all  the  worst  foreign  elements,  and  led  by  Jefferson,  favored 
peace  with  France  on  any  and  all  terms.  They  were  actu 
ated  by  a  sentimental  adoration  of  any  thing  called  a  repub 
lic,  by  the  Jacobin  spirit  then  at  its  height,  and  many  of 
them  by  a  general  love  of  faction  and  hatred  of  order.  Most 
strongly  opposed  to  these  extremists  were  the  Federalist 
leaders,  among  whom  Hamilton  was  conspicuous.  These 
men  saw  clearly  that  peace  and  a  strong  neutrality  were  for 
the  best  interests  of  the  country,  but  they  Avere  convinced 
that  neither  of  these  objects  could  be  served  by  further  nego 
tiations  with  France.  They  believed  that  a  French  peace 
at  that  time  would  be  taken  merely  as  an  evidence  of  weak 
ness,  could  not  be  lasting,  and  would  invigorate  Jacobinism 
in  the  United  States.  On  the  other  hand,  they  felt  confi 
dent  that  a  French  war  would  give  life  to  the  national  sen 
timent,  strengthen  the  administration,  and  secure  their  own 
party  supremacy.  Between  the  partisans  who  favored  peace 
on  any  terms  and  the  war  Federalists  were  a  portion  of  the 
Democratic  and  the  larger  part  of  the  Federalist  party. 
This  party  of  the  centre  composed  a  majority  of  the  whole 
nation.  They  were  of  that  class  so  varying  in  numbers,  but 
so  inevitably  found  under  every  constitutional  government 
at  all  times  and  seasons,  which  is  always  ready  to  follow  any 


1799.]  SECOND   MISSION   TO   FRANCE.  193 

leader  who  seems  to  consult  most  carefully  the  immediate 
interest  and  dignity  of  the  country.  This  large  floating 
vote  had  been  driven  over  to  the  support  of  the  war  Feder 
alists  by  the  outrageous  conduct  of  France  toward  the  first 
commission.  So  great  an  accession  of  popular  strength  had 
raised  the  war  party  to  a  position  of  absolute  control  in  the 
country ;  and  the  nomination  of  Murray,  indicating  what 
seemed  a  complete  change  of  policy  on  the  part  of  the  ex 
ecutive,  fell  upon  them  in  the  hour  of  their  success  with 
overwhelming  effect.  They  felt  instinctively  that  the 
great  mass  of  the  people  would  sympathize  with  the  Presi 
dent's  action,  and  that  they  must  bow  to  a  public  opinion 
which  it  would  be  madness  to  resist.  Exasperated,  amazed, 
bewildered,  the  war  party  yielded,  and  sought  merely  to 
palliate  what  they  could  not  entirely  prevent.  They  suc 
ceeded  in  enlarging  to  three  the  number  of  envoys,  and 
with  this  for  the  time  they  were  fain  to  be  content. 

Mr.  Cabot's  letters  give  a  clear  picture  of  the  views  of 
the  more  moderate  type  of  Federalist  leader  at  this  period. 
But,  before  tracing  in  outline  the  contents  of  these  letters, 
it  becomes  necessary  to  define  briefly  the  controversy  to 
which  they  relate,  and  the  dire  results  which  that  contro 
versy  produced.  The  conflict  arose  upon  a  policy,  the  sound 
ness  of  which  no  one  would  to-day  think  of  questioning ;  yet 
when  it  was  adopted  by  Mr.  Adams,  in  1799,  it  resulted  in 
the  common  ruin  of  President  and  party.  That  it  should 
have  turned  out  in  this  way  was  owing  to  many  causes,  of 
which  some  are  not  readily  apparent.  Because  a  portion  of 
the  party  held  erroneous  views,  and  because  the  President, 
in  opposition  to  these  views,  carried  through  a  proper  pol 
icy,  is  but  an  unsatisfactory  explanation  of  the  consequent 
defeat  of  the  Federalists.  Parties  of  far  less  strength  have 
survived  greater  differences  of  opinion ;  but  the  causes  of 
defeat  in  this  instance  lay  deeper,  and  were  inherent  not 
only  in  the  party,  but  also  in  the  character  of  the  prominent 
men.  There  were  too  many  leaders  in  the  Federalist  party, 

13 


194  LIFE   AND   LETTEKS   OF   GEOEGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

and  all  these  leaders  were  unbending  and  dogmatic  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree.  Most  unfortunately,  too,  the  princi 
pal  supporters  of  the  differing  policies  held  the  two  highest 
offices  in  the  administration,  and,  when  opposed,  were  as  de 
termined  and  unyielding  as  any  men  in  the  whole  country. 
The  outlook  was  certainly  not  a  hopeful  one,  if  any  violent 
difference  of  opinion  arose  in  a  party  so  composed  and  so 
situated.  Fortunately  for  the  historical  interests  involved, 
all  those  principally  concerned  have  left  elaborate  accounts 
of  what  they  severally  said,  did,  and  thought.  The  letters 
to  the  "  Boston  Patriot "  explain  Mr.  Adams's  position  ; 
Hamilton's  famous  pamphlet,  his  letters  and  those  of  Pick 
ering,  Wolcott,  McHenry,  Ames,  and  Cabot,  define  the 
attitude  of  the  war  Federalists  ;  while  a  letter  from  Mr. 
Stoddert,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  represents  the  opinion 
of  moderate  men  both  in  and  out  of  the  cabinet.1 

The  first  intimation  of  the  contemplated  change  of  policy 
on  the  part  of  the  President  was  given  at  the  opening  of 
the  session.  Influenced  by  Gerry's  reports,  Mr.  Adams 
wished  to  state  in  his  message  that,  while  the  war  measures 
already  on  foot  ought  by  no  means  to  be  abandoned,  the 
door  was  still  to  be  kept  open  for  negotiation  whenever 
France  should  evince  a  proper  respect  toward  the  United 
States.  Such  sentiments  as  these  were  resisted  in  the  cab 
inet.  Pickering,  followed  by  Wolcott  and  McHenry,  stren 
uously  opposed  the  insertion  in  the  message  of  any  paragraph 
which  even  hinted  at  the  possibility  of  our  sending  another 
minister  to  France.  Stoddert  and  Lee  inclined  to  the  same 
views,  but  the  character  of  their  opposition  ivas  mild  and 
temperate.  The  President  nevertheless  persisted,  and  from 

1  This  important  letter  was  addressed  to  Mr.  Adams  at  the  time  of  the 
publication  of  the  "Patriot"  letters.  Mr.  Adams  did  not  publish  Mr.  Stod- 
dert's  letter,  and  replied  to  but  one  or  two  of  the  objections  which  were 
offered  in  it.  As  I  shall  have  occasion  to  refer  to  this  letter,  and  from  its 
intrinsic  value,  I  have  printed  it  in  full  in  this  connection,  and  also  one  from 
James  McHenry,  the  Secretary  of  War ;  so  that  all  sides  are  now  before 
the  public.  I  am  indebted  to  the  Pickering  manuscripts,  in  the  possession 
of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  for  the  letters  of  both  Stoddert  and 
McHenry  on  this  important  question. 


1799.]  SECOND   MISSION   TO   FRANCE.  195 

the  manner  in  which  the  message  was  received  it  was  evi 
dent  that  public  opinion  coincided  with  the  views  of  Mr. 
Adams. 

Mr.  Cabot's  letters  during  the  early  part  of  the  year 
are  largely  occupied  with  the  subject  of  the  message.  He 
was  disappointed  at  the  conciliatory  tone  therein  adopted, 
and  was  surprised  at  what  seemed  to  him  indications  of 
hesitation  and  uncertainty  in  the  President's  policy.  He 
also  regretted  that  the  tone  of  Colonel  Pickering's  report  had 
been  moderated,  but  neither  of  these  incidents  in  the  least 
prepared  his  mind  for  what  was  to  follow.  The  war  Federal 
ists  were  so  confident  of  the  strength  of  their  position,  and 
believed  the  success  and  maintenance  of  their  policy  to  be 
so  assured,  that  they  had  no  apprehension  of  an  entire  rever 
sal  of  all  their  schemes  by  any  action  of  the  President. 
They  were  destined  to  be  quickly  undeceived. 

During  the  winter,  Mr.  Adams  received  through  Pichon, 
the  French  Secretary  at  the  Hague,  and  thence  through 
Murray,  our  minister  at  the  same  place,  assurances  of  a  dis 
position  on  the  part  of  the  French  government  to  renew 
negotiations  in  a  proper  spirit.  Acting  on  this  information, 
Mr.  Adams,  without  any  warning  to  his  cabinet,  sent  to 
the  Senate  the  nomination  of  William  Vans  Murray  to  be 
minister  plenipotentiary  to  the  French  Republic.  No  nom 
ination  probably  ever  produced  such  a  profound  sensation. 
No  one  understood  precisely  what  it  meant,  though  every 
body  recognized  at  once  its  gravity  and  importance.  The 
blow  fell  most  severely  on  the  dominant  Federalists  all  over 
the  country,  and  to  no  one  did  it  cause  more  bitter  disap 
pointment  than  to  Mr.  Cabot.  He  had  been,  since  Pinck- 
nev's  dismissal,  a  most  consistent  opponent  of  any  negotia 
tions  with  France  until  she  had  learned  to  treat  us  with 
respect ;  and  no  one  had  so  strongly  and  persistently  op 
posed  the  first  mission.  The  conduct  of  Talleyrand  and 
the  failure  of  the  first  ambassadors  seemed  to  Mr.  Cabot  to 
assure  the  maintenance  of  a  vigorous  policy,  and  the  eradi- 


196  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF    GEOKGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

cation  of  Jacobinism  in  the  United  States.  He  believed 
that  fresh  negotiations  were  not  only  wrong,  but  impossible, 
without  great  advances  from  the  French.  The  news  of  the 
new  nomination  therefore  filled  him  with  indignation  ;  for 
he  considered  peace  with  France  to  mean  a  revival  of  French 
principles  in  the  United  States,  and  the  utter  loss  of  any 
real  national  independence.  There  is  now  no  difficulty  in 
perceiving  that  Mr.  Cabot  and  his  wing  of  the  party  erred 
completely  in  maintaining  so  unyielding  an  attitude  toward 
France.  But  it  was  not  then  so  easy  to  decide  rightly, 
and  the  war  policy  could  be  supported  by  many  plausible 
and  some  sound  arguments ;  and  this  fact,  while  it  palliates 
the  mistakes  of  the  Federal  leaders,  reflects  credit  on  the 
power  of  the  President's  judgment.  The  verdict  of  history 
must  be  given  in  Mr.  Adams's  favor,  so  far  as  the  general 
policy  towards  France  is  concerned.  Nor  is  the  fact  that 
the  nation  generally  sympathized  with*  his  course  any  de 
traction  from  his  merit.  Almost  all  the  leaders  of  his  party 
opposed  him.  They  were  all  men  of  ability  and  determina 
tion,  and  they  possessed  an  amount  of  political  weight  and 
actual  power  that  it  is  now  difficult  to  conceive.  In  their 
hands  rested  the  power  to  ruin  the  President  and  destroy 
the  party,  and  it  required  as  much  boldness  and  tenacity  of 
purpose  to  resist  them  as  to  oppose  the  wishes  of  the  great 
est  popular  majority.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Mr. 
Adams  acted  wisely  and  patriotically,  and  that  in  opposing 
his  party  on  what  might  w^ell  appear  a  doubtful  question, 
for  the  sake  of  his  country,  he  displayed  the  highest  courage. 
This  is  sufficient  praise  for  any  statesman,  but  it  is  much 
to  be  regretted  that  approbation  of  Mr.  Adams's  course 
must  stop  here.  The  manner  in  which  the  policy  was  car 
ried  through  was  as  wholly  wrong  as  the  policy  itself  was 
wholly  right. 

The  first  and  capital  mistake  was  the  President's  refusal 
to  consult  his  secretaries.  The  condemnation  of  this  step 
may  be  drawn  from  Mr.  Adams's  own  account :  no  other 


1799.]  SECOND   MISSION  TO  FRANCE.  197 

testimony  is  needed.  The  letters  to  the  "  Boston  Patriot " 
are  occupied  principally  with  a  very  complete  defence  of  the 
general  policy  and  sources  of  information  leading  to  Mur 
ray's  nomination,  and  with  violent,  ill-timed,  and  distasteful 
denunciations  of  Hamilton ;  but  they  are  singularly  unsatis 
factory  on  the  all-important  question  of  not  consulting  the 
cabinet. 

The  defence  made  by  Mr.  Adams,  on  this  point,  substan 
tially  is  that  he  knew  the  secretaries  would  oppose  him 
openly  and  secretly,  and  therefore  deemed  it  useless  to  con 
sult  them.  If  this  is  the  only  defence,  and  it  seems  to  be 
so,  it  is  really  no  defence  at  all.  In  every  way,  such  a 
step  was  a  fatal  and  irretrievable  blunder.  Mr.  Adams's 
courage  was  undoubted,  and  of  the  highest  kind ;  yet  this 
avoidance  of  his  secretaries  gave  an  air  of  timidity  and 
evasion  to  the  whole  business.  An  appearance  of  weakness 
was  thereby  communicated  to  an  otherwise  impregnable 
position.  Moreover,  it  infuriated  his  opponents  in  the  cab 
inet,  estranged  many  men  who  might  otherwise  have  been 
conciliated,  and  left  the  moderate  members  of  the  party 
entirely  adrift.  Stoddert  says  that,  if  Mr.  Adams  had  con 
sulted  the  cabinet,  he  would  have  had  a  majority  in  his 
favor.  This  seems  hardly  probable  ;  but  it  is  certain  from 
such  a  statement  that  Mr.  Adams  would  have  received  the 
support  of  at  least  two  of  his  secretaries.  Putting  aside 
the  fact  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  President  to  consult  his 
cabinet,  it  is  nevertheless  clear  that  such  an  omission  was 
a  grave  political  blunder.  The  opposition  which  he  antici 
pated  was  embittered,  not  avoided,  by  the  refusal  to  con 
sult  ;  and  Mr.  Adams  lost  in  this  way  the  grand  opportunity 
of  starting  the  measure  with  a  portion  of  his  cabinet  pledged 
to  its  support.  Stoddert  and  Lee  by  no  means  relished  the 
domination  of  their  colleague  in  the  state  department,  and 
were  quite  ready  to  accept  the  President's  lead.  But  the 
tacit  rejection  of  their  counsels  forced  them  back  into 
a  silent  adhesion  to  Colonel  Pickering.  In  a  word,  Mr. 


198  LIFE   AND    LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

Adams  was  master  of  the  situation ;  and  he  threw  away  the 
advantages  of  his  position,  by  refusing  to  meet  opposition 
at  the  outset.  He  united  -when  he  should  have  divided, 
and  he  afterwards  divided  when  he  should  have  strained 
every  nerve  to  conciliate  and  to  unite. 

A  partial  explanation  of  the  origin  of  these  capital  mis 
takes  may  be  found  in  the  lack  of  tact,  which  is  so  striking 
in  Mr.  Adams's  character.  But  even  the  fact  that  he 
could  not  deal  with  other  men  judiciously  does  not  account 
for  his  extraordinary  mismanagement  in  this  instance. 
Every  thing  was  in  his  favor,  and  yet  he  contrived  to  do 
right  only  at  the  heavy  expense  of  party  ruin.  A  com 
parison  of  the  following  letters  of  McHenry  and  Stoddert, 
both  moderate  men,  with  those  of  Mr.  Adams  to  the  "  Bos 
ton  Patriot,''  makes  all  the  difficulties  of  the  last  Federalist 
administration  perfectly  comprehensible.  The  want  of 
cordiality  between  the  President  and  his  advisers,  which 
existed  from  the  beginning,  becomes,  from  these  letters, 
more  apparent  than  ever ;  but  the  real  secret  is  to  be  found 
in  the  peculiar  temperament  of  Mr.  Adams.  Not  a  sus 
picious  man  by  nature,  but  frank  and  open,  almost  to  a 
fault,  if  his  distrust  was  once  awakened,  there  were  then  no 
bounds  to  his  dark  imaginings.  He  had  a  fair  share  of 
jealousy  in  his  composition,  and  a  large  amount  of  self- 
confidence  ;  but  the  fatal  element  was  the  rapid  process  of 
mental  exaggeration.  When  this  once  began,  there  were 
no  limits ;  and  he  supplemented  this  imaginative  power  by 
an  absolute  and  honest  conviction  of  the  truth  of  the  con 
ceptions  he  had  himself  framed.  In  the  affair  of  the 
major-generals,  he  ran  sharply  against  the  opposition  of 
Colonel  Pickering;  and  he  felt  at  that  time  that  the 
influence  of  the  leaders  was  brought  to  bear  against  him. 
So  far,  all  was  natural.  This  was  not  the  first  nor  the  last 
time  that  cabinet  officers  resisted  their  superior,  or  that 
party  leaders  had  striven  to  control  their  chief.  But  Mr. 
Adams  did  not  stop  here,  and  endeavor,  as  a  more  astute 


1799.]  SECOND   MISSION  TO   FRANCE.  199 

man  would  have  done,  to  quietly  frustrate  and  disarm  his 
opponents.  He  resisted  stubbornly,  and  yielded  only  under 
pressure  ;  and  then  he  proceeded  to  account  for  his  troubles, 
after  his  own  fashion.  We  can  see  in  the  letters  to  the 
"  Boston  Patriot,"  with  shadows  deepened  by  the  lapse  of 
time,  the  picture  which  Mr.  Adams  drew,  in  his  own  mind, 
of  his  opponents  and  their  arrangements.  Jealousy  led  him 
to  suppose  Hamilton  his  great  enemy.  Hence  Hamilton 
was  the  Deus  ex  machina  who  guided  the  cabinet,  the 
"  mightier  spirit  "  who  moved  the  political  puppets.  Ham 
ilton,  thirsting  after  empire,  and  seeking  to  rise  upon  the 
ruins  of  the  republic,  was  the  central  figure  in  the  back 
ground.  Then  came  the  cabinet,  organized  in  a  compact 
conspiracy  against  him ;  then  the  Federalist  leaders,  in  the 
part  of  assistant  conspirators,  and  the  Senate  and  the  press 
as  their  adjuncts.  Now  if  this  description  be  compared 
with  HcHenry's  and  Stoddert's  letters,  the  conspiracy  van 
ishes,  the  organized  cabinet  disappears,  and  we  find  that 
one  certainly,  and  probably  two,  of  the  secretaries,  had  no 
knowledge  even  of  Hamilton's  opinion.  Instead  of  Ham 
ilton  as  the  leader  of  opposition,  it  is  clear,  from  all  the 
sources,  that  Colonel  Pickering  was  far  more  entitled  to 
that  place,  and  that  it  was  he  who  aspired  to  lead  the  party, 
and  control  not  only  the  President,  but  Hamilton  himself. 
As  to  Hamilton's  dreams  of  empire,  this  is  not  the  place  for 
a  discussion  of  them ;  but,  whoever  the  dreamer  was  in  this 
case,  the  delusions  remained  delusions,  and  nothing  more. 
So  long  as  Mr.  Adams  merely  amused  himself  by  construct 
ing  these  theories,  no  harm  was  done  ;  but,  unluckily,  he 
acted  upon  them  as  if  they  were  as  well  established  as  the 
movement  of  the  tides.  Thus  it  was  that,  on  the  theory  of 
a  conspiracy,  he  refused  to  consult  his  cabinet,  and  by  unit 
ing  his  cabinet  and  the  party  leaders  on  a  perfectly  tenable 
ground  did  much  to  give  reality  to  his  own  preconceived 
ideas.  There  was  opposition  to  Mr.  Adams,  in  the  cabinet 
and  in  the  party,  from  the  time  of  the  affair  of  the  major- 


200  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

generals;  and  it  rapidly  hardened  and  consolidated.  But 
neither  an  organized  opposition  of  the  whole  cabinet,  nor 
a  combined  and  extended  confederation  among  the  leaders 
to  control  the  executive,  seems  ever  to  have  existed,  except 
in  the  mind  of  Mr.  Adams  himself.  His  own  vehement 
temperament,  his  uncompromising  disposition,  and  his  rapid 
conversion  of  simple  incidents  into  extensive  and  portentous 
combinations  were  his  worst  enemies. 


STODDERT  TO  JOHN  ADAMS. 

BLADENSBURG,  12th  October,  1809. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  Until  within  a  few  days,  I  had  only  seen  detached 
parts  of  your  letters  published  in  the  "  Boston  Patriot."  I  have 
now  a  pamphlet  containing  eighteen  letters  :  I  presume  the  first 
eighteen  you  sent  to  the  press.  I  do  not  know  that  more  have  been 
published. 

It  was  impossible  for  me  to  read  these  letters,  and  subscribe  to 
their  justice,  —  at  least,  so  far  as  they  respect  myself.  You  have 
connected  me  with  acts  in  which  I  had  no  concern.  You  have  pro 
duced  an  impression  that  there  was  not  one  head  of  a  department 
under  your  administration  who  felt  the  obligation  imposed  on  him 
by  his  official  situation  to  be  faithful  to  your  reputation,  as  well  as 
to  the  public  interest ;  and  you  give  too  much  countenance  to  an 
opinion,  that  the  heads  of  departments,  if  not  themselves  the  blind 
partisans  of  a  foreign  government,  were  under  the  influence  —  the 
contemptible  tools  —  of  men  who  were. 

For  myself  I  say,  and  I  appeal  to  every  part  of  my  conduct  for 
the  verity  of  what  I  say,  that  you  have  done  me  the  highest  injus 
tice  ;  that  never  did  I  forget  I  was  bound  by  honor  to  protect  your 
reputation  so  long  as  I  remained  your  confidential  adviser.  Nor 
am  I  so  nice  a  casuist  as  to  be  able  to  discern  at  what  period  since, 
the  obligation,  which  I  cannot  but  consider  in  some  degree  mutual 
between  a  President  and  a  head  of  a  department,  ceased.  That 
in  no  instance  did  an  overweening  partiality  for  any  foreign  gov 
ernment  make  me  lose  sight  for  a  moment  of  the  honor  or  the 
interest  of  my  own.  As  to  General  Hamilton,  I  scarcely  knew 
him ;  and  perhaps  my  crime  as  to  him  was  that,  though  believing 
highly  of  the  brilliancy  of  his  talents  and  of  his  sincere  patriotism 


1799.1  SECOND   MISSION   TO  FRANCE.  201 

and  honorable  principles,  I  never  entertained  an  exalted  opinion  of 
his  discretion  or  the  solidity  of  his  judgment,  and  always  thought 
it  unfortunate  for  the  Federal  party,  and  of  course  for  the  coun 
try, —  for  I  believe  the  views  of  that  party  have  always  been 
directed  to  the  best  interests  of  the  country,  —  that  the  opinions  of 
this  gentleman  were  deemed  so  oracular. 

But  to  come  to  facts.  You  say  the  five  heads  of  departments 
were  unanimously  against  the  appointment  of  Mr.  Gerry,  "  and 
you  were  shocked  at  such  inveterate  prejudices  ;  "  in  another  place, 
"  None  but  the  friends  of  Hamilton  would  go  down  with  the  heads 
of  departments."  It  was  not  until  June,  1798,  that  I  had  the  mis 
fortune  to  be  called  to  office.  Well  may  I  say  "  misfortune,"  for 
such  I  have  ever  since  found  it.  Mr.  Gerry,  I  believe,  was  ap 
pointed  in  1797 :  he  had  long  been  in  France.  Before  I  was  in 
office,  and  until  I  was  in  office,  there  were  but  four  heads  of  depart 
ments. 

In  the  nomination  of  Mr.  Murray  to  France,  you  say :  "  You 
knew  the  sentiments  of  all  your  ministers,  and  the  secret  motives 
that  governed  them  better  than  they  did  themselves.  You  knew, 
if  you  had  asked  their  advice,  three  of  them  would  very  laconically 
protest  against  the  measure :  the  other  two  would  have  been  loath 
to  dissent  from  their  brethren,  and  would  more  modestly  and  mildly 
concur  with  them.  The  consequence  would  be  that  the  whole 
would  be  instantly  communicated  to  A,  B,  C,  D,  &c.,  the  public 
and  the  presses  would  have  it  at  once,  and  such  a  clamor  raised  as 
to  excite  the  Senate  to  put  their  negative  upon  the  whole  plan." 
Against  the  justice  of  this  whole  charge  and  every  part  of  it  impli 
cating  me,  I  solemnly  protest.  Prior  to  this  time,  I  do  not  believe 
I  had  met  in  cabinet  more  than  three  times,  except  on  the  subject 
of  the  commission  under  the  British  treaty.  Once,  I  recollect,  there 
was  a  meeting  in  consequence  of  the  Pennsylvania  insurrection,1 
on  which  occasion  the  departments  were  not  unanimous  in  advising 
the  course  to  be  pursued.  I  well  remember  that  the  majority  was 
against  my  opinion,  as  to  the  importance  proper  to  be  given  to  the 
governor  of  the  State  in  suppressing  that  insurrection.  Oh  that 
you  had  adopted  the  opinion  of  the  majority  !  This  was  a  matter 
of  no  little  importance  ;  but  I  mention  it  merely  to  show  that  there 
was  not  that  weak,  criminal  acquiescence  of  some  of  the  heads  of 
departments  to  the  opinions  of  others  which  you  describe. 

But  on  this  particular  subject,  the  nomination  of  Mr.  Murray 

*  The  Fries  rebellion. 


202  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

to  France:  I  had  never  seen,  prior  to  his  nomination,  his  letter 
to  you,  —  the  only  circumstance  which  made  the  measure  a  proper 
one.  Of  course,  you  could  not  have  known  what  my  opinion  would 
have  been  with  that  document  before  me.  One  or  two  days  after 
the  nomination,  you  showed  me  the  letter,  and  voluntarily  entered 
into  some  explanation  why  you  had  taken  the  step  without  consult 
ing  the  heads  of  departments.  It  is  not  necessary,  nor  would  my 
memory  enable  me,  to  repeat  all  that  passed  on  that  occasion.  You 
had  reason  to  believe  I  did  not  hold  myself  at  liberty  to  oppose 
a  measure  of  yours  and  retain  my  office ;  and  I  strongly  advised 
you,  since  the  nomination  of  Mr.  Murray  was  made,  to  adhere  to  it, 
expressing  my  conviction  that  the  Senate  would  acquiesce.  You 
were  then  determined  to  adhere ;  but  afterwards,  and  perhaps 
more  wisely,  though  I  think  at  the  expense  of  some  personal 
dignity,  made  a  modification  of  your  message. 

Until  this  time  —  and,  indeed,  during  the  whole  time  I  was  in 
office  —  my  own  department  required  my  whole  attention,  and  I 
had  as  little  leisure  as  inclination  to  attend  to  the  affairs  of  other 
departments.  Before  I  entered  into  office,  the  only  system  I  ever 
knew  of,  as  to  our  foreign  relations,  had  been  formed ;  and  this 
system  was  to  be  found  in  the  laws  and  in  the  public  acts  of  the 
executives.  I  heard  of  no  intended  deviation  from  it  from  you, 
or  from  any  of  the  heads  of  departments.  It  had  been  determined 
to  resist  the  aggressions  of  France,  but  to  leave  wide  open  the 
door  of  reconciliation  with  perfect  honor.  A  majority  of  a  caucus, 
composed  entirely  of  Federal  members  of  the  two  Houses,  would 
not  agree  to  a  declaration  of  war ;  and  the  result  of  the  meeting 
showed  too  plainly  to  be  mistaken  by  the  President  that  it  was  his 
duty  to  avail  himself  of  the  first  fair  opportunity  that  presented 
for  seeking  reconciliation,  without  debasement.  The  Democratic 
party  was  certainly  averse  to  war ;  so  was  the  Federal  party,  if 
war  could  be  avoided  without  dishonor. 

In  this  view  of  the  subject,  —  and  to  my  understanding  it  is  a 
true  one,  —  I  cannot  conceive  how  you  could  have  avoided  insti 
tuting  a  negotiation  on  the  receipt  of  Mr.  Murray's  letter ;  nor  can 
I  perceive  on  what  ground  the  five  heads  of  departments,  or  any 
of  them,  would  have  given  their  advice  against  the  measure,  had 
they  been  consulted.  All  might  not  have  agreed  in  the  nomi 
nation  of  Mr.  Murray,  but  I  am  convinced  there  would  have  been 
a  majority  for  his  appointment.  It  was  the  manner  and  not  the 


1799.]  SECOND   MISSION  TO  FRANCE.  203 

matter  of  that  measure,  the  holding  them  up  to  the  world  as  per 
sons  in  whom  you  could  not  confide  in  a  thing  that  might  lead  to 
peace  with  France,  that  created  the  dissatisfaction  on  the  part  of 
the  heads  of  departments,  and  the  opposition  —  if  there  really  was 
opposition  —  through  their  means. 

To  say  there  was  not  great  dissatisfaction  would  be  uncandid. 
It  was  not  possible  there  should  not  be,  if  the  heads  of  depart 
ments  possessed  the  feelings  of  men  fit  for  exalted  stations.  I  felt 
it  myself,  though  perhaps  having  the  least  right  of  any  to  feel  it, 
if  from  no  other  cause,  from  the  short  time  I  had  been  in  office, 
and  my  little  experience  as  a  statesman ;  and  I  deliberated  seri 
ously  with  myself  whether  it  did  not  become  me  at  once  to  resign 
my  office.  Not  resigning,  there  was,  according  to  my  own  notions 
of  right,  which  will  always  govern  my  own  conduct,  but  one  proper 
course  for  me  to  pursue  :  to  act  always  as  if  the  measure  of  a  new 
negotiation  with  France  had  been  taken  with  my  advice. 

Some  other  things  I  would  notice,  but  I  fear  I  have  already 
exhausted  your  patience.  I  must,  however,  say  a  word  as  to  the 
meeting  at  Trenton,  and  the  letter  from  the  five  heads  of  depart 
ments.  Of  the  letter,  I  will  only  say  that  I  have  entirely  forgot 
ten  its  contents,  if  it  advised  a  relinquishment  of  the  measure  of 
the  mission,  or  any  thing  more  than  a  short  suspension  of  it,  in 
consequence  of  the  then  uncertain  state  of  France.  I  wish  the 
letter  had  been  published.  When  you  arrived  at  Trenton,  the 
causes  that  had  produced  the  letter  had  in  some  degree  subsided, 
and  it  was  less  proper  to  suspend  the  mission  than  it  had  appeared 
to  be  a  few  weeks  before  ;  and,  for  rny  own  part,  I  then  thought 
it  most  proper  the  mission  should  proceed.  If  I  did  not  say  so  to 
you,  it  was  because  there  was  no  occasion  for  it.  You  came  to 
Trenton  seemingly  determined.  The  departments  met  you  to  con 
sider  the  instructions  to  the  ministers,  but  never  I  think  to  discuss 
the  propriety  of  sending  on  the  mission  ;  and  I  believe  you  have 
been  mistaken  in  ascribing  to  the  heads  of  departments  language 
held  with  you  by  General  Hamilton  and  others  at  Trenton.  I 
pretend  not,  however,  to  know  the  language  held  by  others. 
I  know  such  language  was  not  held  by  me. 

Yours,  &c.  BEN.  STODDERT. 


204  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.  [1799. 


MCHENRY  TO  PICKERING. 

NEAR  BALTIMORE,  Feb.  23,  1811. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  Your  last  letter  is  dated  the  13th  instant.  I 
return  you  its  enclosures  ;  viz.,  Mr.  Stoddert's  letter  to  Mr.  John 
Adams,  dated  the  12th,  and  Mr.  Adams's  answer,  dated  the  30th 
October,  1809,  with  Mr.  Stoddert's  to  you,  dated  11  February, 
1811.  I  hope  you  will  not  be  displeased  at  my  having  taken 
copies  of  them. 

I  have  at  length  procured  Mr.  Adams's  printed  correspondence 
with  the  editor  of  the  "  Boston  Patriot,"  in  eighteen  letters. 
From  the  cursory  reading,  I  perceive  he  has  fallen  into  many 
errors,  some  important  forgetfulness,  and  not  a  few  striking  mis 
representations,  to  say  nothing  of  his  coarse  and  unmanly  abuse 
of  a  deceased  statesman. 

How  many  recollections  have  these  puerile  letters  awakened ! 
Still,  in  his  own  opinion,  the  greatest  man  of  the  age,  I  see  he 
will  carry  with  him  to  the  grave  his  vanity,  his  weaknesses  and  fol 
lies,  specimens  of  which  we  have  so  often  witnessed,  and  always 
endeavored  to  veil  from  the  public. 

In  letter  No.  10,  Mr.  Adams,  speaking  of  the  second  abortive 
mission  to  France,  observes  :  "  I  mentioned  Mr.  Dana  and  Mr. 
Gerry  to  the  heads  of  departments,  and  many  leading  men  in 
both  houses.  They  all  preferred  Mr.  Dana.  But  it  was  evident 
enough  to  me  that  neither  Dana  nor  Gerry  was  their  man.  Dana 
was  appointed,  and  refused.  I  then  called  the  heads  of  depart 
ments  together,  and  proposed  Mr.  Gerry.  All  five  were  unani 
mously  against  him.  Such  inveterate  prejudice  shocked  me.  I 
said  nothing,  but  I  was  determined  I  would  not  be  the  slave 
of  it." 

This  statement  wants  correctness.  Mr.  Stoddert,  in  his  letter 
to  Mr.  Adams  (above  mentioned),  denies  the  possibility  of  his 
being  present,  as  his  appointment  of  Secretary  of  the  Navy  did 
not  take  place  till  some  time  after.  I  well  remember  the  meeting, 
for  I  have  often  thought  of  it  since.  It  was  composed  of  Mr. 
Wolcott,  yourself,  Mr.  Lee,  and  myself.  Mr.  Adams,  in  a  familiar 
way,  said,  "  Gentlemen,  what  think  you  of  Mr.  Gerry  for  the  mis 
sion  ?  "  None  of  the  gentlemen  offering  to  speak,  I  observed :  "  I 
have  served  in  the  old  Congress  with  Mr.  Gerry.  If,  sir,  it  was 


1799.]  SECOND   MISSION  TO   FRANCE.  205 

a  desirable  thing  to  distract  the  mission,  a  fitter  person  could  not, 
perhaps,  be  found.  It  is  ten  to  one  against  his  agreeing  with  his 
colleagues."  Mr.  Wolcott  made  some  remark.  Mr.  Lee  and  you 
were  silent.  Mr.  Adams  replied :  "  Mr.  Gerry  was  an  honest  and 
firm  man,  on  whom  French  arts  could  have  no  effect.  He  had 
known  him  long,  and  knew  him  well."  Nothing  more  was  said 
on  the  subject,  but  I  soon  discovered  that  to  controvert  his  wishes 
was  next  to  incurring  his  enmity.  Mr.  Gerry  was  appointed  with 
Mr.  Marshall  and  General  Charles  Cotesworth  Pinckney. 

Justly  offended  at  the  treatment  these  gentlemen  met  with  in 
France,  it  drew  from  him  his  celebrated  declaration  to  Congress 
(21  June,  1798),  "I  will  never  send  another  minister  to  France, 
without  assurances  that  he  will  be  received,  respected,  and  honored 
as  the  representative  of  a  great,  free,  powerful,  and  independent 
nation." 

I  shall  not  pretend  to  penetrate  into  all  the  motives  that  weighed 
with  Mr.  Adams,  to  retire  from  the  ground  of  this  declaration,  and 
send  a  third  mission  to  France.  He  acknowledges  he  concealed 
his  intention  from  the  heads  of  departments,  and  signifies  that  he 
wras  equally  careful  not  to  intrust  it  with  any  member  (meaning 
Federal  members)  of  either  branch  of  Congress.  "  I  knew  (Letter 
XI.)  if  I  called  the  heads  of  departments  together,  and  asked  their 
advice,  three  of  them  (meaning  you,  Mr.  Wolcott,  and  myself) 
would  very  laconically  protest  against  the  measure :  the  other  two 
would  more  modestly  and  mildly  concur  with  them."  The  conse 
quence,  he  adds,  would  be  that  the  thing  would  be  instantly  com 
municated  to  members  of  Congress,  and  a  clamor  raised  against  it 
in  the  newspapers,  all  which  would  probably  have  excited  the 
Senate  to  put  their  negative  on  the  measure. 

Such  are  Mr.  Adams's  reasons  for  not  making  confidants,  on  this 
occasion,  of  the  heads  of  departments.  Having  treated  us  in  this 
account  as  well  as  he  did  his  best  friends  in  Congress,  ought  we 
not  to  thank  him,  and  be  satisfied  ? 

With  respect  to  the  mission  itself,  he  rests  its  propriety  on 
letters  written  by  Mr.  Barlow  and  Mr.  Codman,  and  twenty  others, 
whose  names  I  have  forgotten  ;  and  on  Pichon's,  transmitted  by 
Mr.  Murray,  coaxing  and  wheedling  for  another  experiment,  —  all 
of  which  found  their  way  to  the  President,  who  did  not  or  would 
not  perceive  that  the  object  of  the  French  government  in  this 
machinery  was  to  obtain  instead  of  being  obliged  to  send  a  minis- 


206  LIFE    AND   LETTERS    OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

ter,  which  must  have  taken  place  but  for  his  precipitancy  in  catch 
ing  the  bait.  That  there  was  an  undercurrent  in  this  business, 
you  are  not  unapprised ;  an  understanding,  I  mean,  with  others, 
if  not  with  the  Federal  members  of  Congress.  I  shall  therefore 
only  observe  that  Mr.  Adams  furnishes  positive  proof  that  he  did 
not  put  confidence  in  these  letters  or  any  of  them. 

The  proof  I  allude  to  will  be  found  in  his  two  messages  to  the 
Senate.  They  are,  one  nominating  Mr.  Murray,  dated  Feb.  8, 
1789,  the  other  joining  with  Mr.  Murray,  Judge  Ellsworth,  and 
Patrick  Henry,  dated  Feb.  28,  1799.  "If  the  Senate,"  says 
the  first  message,  "  shall  advi-se  and  consent  to  this  appointment, 
effectual  care  shall  be  taken  in  his  instructions  that  he  shall  not 
go  to  France  without  direct  and  unequivocal  assurances  from  the 
French  government,  signifying  that  he  shall  be  received  in  charac 
ter,  shall  enjoy  the  privileges  attached  to  his  character  by  the  law 
of  nations,  and  that  a  minister  of  equal  rank,  title,  and  powers, 
shall  be  appointed  to  treat  with  him,  to  discuss  and  conclude  all 
controversies  between  the  two  republics  by  a  new  treaty."  "  It  is 
not  intended,"  says  the  second  message,  "  that  the  two  former 
gentlemen  will  embark  for  Europe  until  they  shall  have  received 
from  the  executive  directory  assurances,  signified  by  their  secre 
tary  of  foreign  relations,  that  they  shall  be  received  in  char 
acter,"  &c. 

The  condition  here  annexed,  as  a  prerequisite  to  the  envoys, 
going  to  France,  being  of  the  same  import  in  the  first  as  in  the 
second  message,  it  cannot  be  said  to  have  been  inserted  at  the 
instance  of  the  heads  of  departments,  or  any  Federal  member  of 
Congress ;  for  Mr.  Adams  expressly  says  (Letter  XL)  he  concealed 
his  intention  to  send  a  mission  from  them  all.  On  his  own  show 
ing,  therefore,  he  considered  the  measure,  at  the  moment  of  recom 
mending  it  to  the  Senate,  as  resting  on  sand  and  of  dubious  issue. 
Had  he  thought  otherwise,  he  would  not  have  employed  his  pre 
cautionary  proviso. 

In  Letter  V.,  he  states  that  the  articles  of  instruction  for  this 
mission  were  unanimously  agreed  upon,  to  his  intense  satisfaction, 
and  committed  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  who,  by  the  by,  had 
framed  them  to  be  reduced  into  a  proper  form,  and  transmitted  to 
him  at  Quincy,  "for  revision,  correction,  or  signature,  as  there 
might  be  occasion  ;  "  but  that,  instead  of  them,  he  received  a  letter 
signed  by  all  five  of  the  heads  of  departments,  earnestly  entreating 


1799.]  SECOND   MISSION   TO   FRANCE.  207 

him  to  suspend  the  mission ;  that,  upon  receipt  thereof,  he  instantly 
determined  to  go  "  to  Trenton,  meet  the  gentlemen  face  to  face, 
confer  with  them  coolly  on  the  subject,  and  convince  them,  or  be 
convinced  by  them,  if  he  could."  What  followed  this  determina 
tion  ?  He  arrives  at  Trenton,  ill  of  the  yellow  fever,  or  something, 
as  he  says,  very  like  it,  which  he  had  caught  at  Hartford.  "  111  as 
I  was,  I  sent  for  the  heads  of  departments.  Four  of  them  were 
there.  The  Attorney- General  was  gone  to  Virginia.  Many  days 
were  employed,  sometimes  at  my  own  apartments,  and  sometimes 
at  their  offices."  Everybody  at  Trenton,  he  continues,  seemed  to 
be  of  opinion  that  the  first  arrivals  from  England  would  bring  the 
news  that  Louis  XVIII.  was  restored  to  the  throne  of  France. 
Suwarrow,  at  the  head  of  a  Russian  army,  was  to  have  marched 
from  Italy  to  Paris,  on  one  side,  and  Prince  Charles,  through 
Germany  to  Paris,  on  the  other;  and  detachments  from  both 
armies  to  Havre,  to  receive  the  king,  who  was  to  be  brought  over 
by  a  British  fleet,  and  escorted  with  flying  colors  to  Versailles.  I 
could  scarcely  believe  my  senses,  when  I  heard  such  reveries.  Yet 
the  heads  of  departments  appeared  to  believe  them,  and  urged 
them  as  decisive  arguments  for  suspending  the  embarkation  of  our 
envoys  till  the  spring.  In  vain  did  I  urge  the  immense  distances 
the  two  imperial  armies  had  to  march,  the  great  number  of  towns 
and  cities  in  the  route  of  both,  in  positions  chosen  with  great  skill, 
fortified  with  exquisite  art,  defended  by  vast  trains  of  heavy 
ordnance,  garrisoned  by  numerous  troops  of  soldiers,  perfectly 
disciplined  and  animated  with  all  the  obstinacy  and  ardor  of  the 
Revolutionary  spirit.  In  vain  did  I  allege  the  military  maxim  which 
would  certainly  govern  both  Prince  Charles  and  Suwarrow,  —  that 
is,  never  to  leave  a  fortified  city  in  the  rear  of  your  army  in 
possession  of  your  enemy  ;  that  the  siege  of  one  town  would  con 
sume  the  whole  season ;  that  neither  the  Russians  nor  Austrians 
were  probably  provided  with  mortars  and  heavy  cannons  neces 
sary  for  sieges.  Nothing  would  do:  Louis  XVIII.  must  be  upon 
the  throne  of  France.  Well,  suppose  he  is  :  what  harm  will  there 
be  in  embarking  our  envoys  ?  They  will  congratulate  his  Majesty  ; 
and  if  his  Majesty  cannot  receive  them  under  their  credentials  to 
the  French  republic,  he  will  be  glad  to  see  them  in  his  kingdom, 
and  assure  them  of  his  royal  protection  till  they  can  write  home 
for  fresh  commissions,  and  such  shall  be  ready  for  them  at  a  min 
ute's  warning.  In  vain  did  I  urge  the  entire  change  of  property 


208  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

in  France,  and  the  necessity  the  present  possessors  were  under  to 
defend  themselves  at  every  sacrifice  and  risk. 

To  this  detail,  this  minuteness  of  time,  place,  and  argument,  Mr. 
Stoddert  in  his  letter  to  Mr.  Adams  (above  quoted)  replies  that 
not  a  word  of  all  this  passed  at  those  meetings  or  conferences  with 
the  heads  of  departments.  My  recollection  entirely  coincides  with 
Mr.  Stoddert's.  No  discussion  of  the  kind  here  mentioned  hap 
pened,  nor  was  the  question  of  suspension  ever  touched  on  by  any 
head  of  a  department  or  by  Mr.  Adams  at  any  of  our  meetings. 
The  few  official  meetings  we  had  at  Trenton  were  exclusively  em 
ployed  in  revising  the  instructions  which  had  been  agreed  to  in 
Philadelphia.  On  any  thing  relative  to  the  question  of  suspension, 
the  heads  of  departments  observed  a  profound  silence.  We  had 
respectfully  offered  our  opinion,  which  terminated  our  duty,  and 
had  obtained,  as  I  conceived,  his  final  answer  in  a  letter  written 
after  his  receipt  of  ours,  directing  a  draft  of  the  instructions,  in 
which  he  intimates  that  the  departure  of  the  envoys  would  be  sus 
pended  for  some  time.  Why  has  Mr.  Adams  omitted  any  notice 
of  this  fact  ?  And  why  has  he  not  favored  the  public  with  our 
joint  letter  recommending  the  suspension  ?  Surely,  this  was  a 
document  important  to  his  argument,  and  which  fairness  of  repre 
sentation  required  to  be  produced.  It  ought  to  exhibit  the  reasons 
that  operated  on  those  who  signed  it,  and  must  be  considered  as 
the  best  interpreter  of  their  thoughts.  As  instructed  by  my  mem 
ory,  it  was  very  short.  It  could  not  therefore  have  contained  half 
the  trash  put  into  our  mouths  by  Mr.  Adams.  He  also  appears  to 
have  forgotten  that,  before  the  supplementary  envoys  sailed  from 
the  United  States,  information  was  received  of  a  new  revolution  in 
the  French  government.  This  we  had  expected ;  and  this  event, 
had  it  pleased  Mr.  Adams  to  have  produced  our  joint  letter,  it 
would  have  been  seen,  had  the  greatest  weight  in  our  recommenda 
tion.  Was  it  possible  for  the  most  clear-sighted  politician  to 
anticipate  that  the  envoys  would  be  received  and  respected  as  such 
by  the  new  revolutionists  ? 

Throughout  these  letters,  Mr.  Adams  affects  to  consider  a  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States  as  every  thing  in  government,  and  the 
heads  of  departments  little  more  than  mere  clerks.  I  cannot  sub 
scribe  to  this  hypothesis  Do  not  the  heads  of  departments,  like 
him,  hold  a  high  and  responsible  station  in  government  ?  In  offer 
ing  advice  to  a  President,  do  they  not  perform  an  incumbent  duty  ? 


1799.]  SECOND   MISSION   TO   FRANCE.  209 

What  more  did  we  do  ?  Less  we  ought  not  to  have  done.  Not, 
therefore,  to  our  recommendations  or  advice,  but  to  his  own  way 
ward  disposition,  his  own  wavering  and  changeable  policy,  are  to 
be  charged  the  humiliations  our  country  has  since  experienced,  and 
the  ruin  of  the  great  Federal  temple  erected  by  Washington. 

Mr.  Adams  talks  much  of  his  system  of  policy  respecting  foreign 
nations.  His  system  and  ours  for  some  years  were  the  same. 
Ours  was  General  Washington's.  We  held  with  him  that  we 
ought  never  to  quit  our  own  to  stand  upon  foreign  ground ;  under 
no  pretext  to  weave  our  destiny  with  that  of  any  European  power  ; 
that  our  true  policy  was  to  avoid  permanent  alliances  with  any 
portion  of  the  foreign  world ;  to  trust  to  temporary  ones  for  ex 
traordinary  emergencies,  and  to  suitable  military  establishments, 
to  enable  us  to  act  up  to  and  avail  ourselves  of  our  maxims. 
Three  of  the  gentlemen  who  were  heads  of  departments  with  Mr. 
Adams  were  also  heads  of  departments  with  General  Washington. 
These  gentlemen  could  never  for  a  moment  depart  from  his 
maxims ;  they  were  the  soul  of  their  system ;  they  could  not  tear 
them  from  their  hearts,  and  retain  their  honor  and  integrity ;  they 
held  them  to  be  the  only  sound  ones  for  their  country,  the  only 
ones  proper  for  the  guidance  of  our  foreign  affairs,  and  in  no  in 
stance  did  they  ever  advise  or  countenance  a  departure  from  them. 
I  cast  back  on  my  accuser  all  insinuations  to  the  contrary. 

I  cannot  close  this  letter,  notwithstanding  it  is  already  longer  than 
I  intended  when  I  sat  down  to  write,  without  adverting  to  his  entire 
misconception  of  the  cause  of  General  Hamilton's  appearing  at 
Trenton,  who  he  says  arrived  there  a  few  hours  before  him,  and 
was  brought  there  to  persuade  him  to  countermand  the  mission.  I 
have,  be  assured,  no  reason  or  ground  for  supposing  that  the  Gen 
eral  was  apprised  or  had  any  knowledge  of  the  President's  ap 
proach  ;  and  I  know  the  business  that  occasioned  his  coming  to 
Trenton  was  with  my  department.  If  he  had  any  other,  I  am 
totally  ignorant  of  it.  Being  in  Trenton,  it  was  proper  he  should 
visit  Mr.  Adams.  If  the  mission  became  a  subject  of  their  con 
versation,  does  it  follow  that  it  was  his  errand  to  argue  him  out 
of  it  ?  This,  to  say  no  worse  of  it,  is  miserable  logic.  General 
Hamilton  never  mentioned  to  me  what  passed  at  his  visit,  or 
whether  any  thing  was  said  respecting  the  mission.  The  fact  is, 
to  complete  his  instructions  to  General  Wilkinson,  who  was  to  be 
disposed  on  the  frontiers,  it  was  necessary  to  consult  my  depart- 

14 


210  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

ment.     For  this  purpose,  General  Hamilton  had  my  permission  to 
come  to  Trenton,  and  I  certainly  had  a  right  to  give  it. 

Mr.  Adams,  for  reasons  best  known  to  himself,  endeavors  to 
represent  General  Hamilton  as  a  man  without  fair  pretensions  to 
sound  judgments  or  useful  talents,  a  visionary  politician  consumed 
by  indelicate  pleasures  and  a  censurable  ambition.  Far  be  it  from 
me  to  attempt  to  palliate  pleasures,  the  indulgence  in  which  Mr. 
Hamilton  himself  publicly  lamented.  Has  Mr.  Adams  the  mag 
nanimity  to  acknowledge  his  early  or  his  later  failings?  Is  he 
sure  that  his  own  judgment  and  genius  can  stand  a  comparison 
with  Hamilton's,  or  will  leave  behind  them  to  posterity  as  useful 
results  ?  Were  their  respective  literary  productions  to  be  exam 
ined  in  the  court  of  criticism,  which,  think  you,  would  obtain  most 
suffrages,  —  those  wearisome  accounts  of  governments  ancient  and 
modern,  that  cold  collection  of  other  men's  thoughts,  "  The  Defence 
of  the  American  Constitutions,"  or  those  well-sustained  papers 
in  the  "  Federalist,"  known  to  be  written  by  Hamilton  ?  In 
his  diplomatic  correspondence,  we  meet  with  nothing  beyond  the 
reach  of  an  ordinary  mind,  arid  with  follies  into  which  an  ordinary 
mind  would  never  fall.  Can  aught  found  in  these  letters  be  drawn 
into  competition  with  Hamilton's  reports  to  Congress  on  the  most 
important  branches  of  finance  and  legislation,  —  those  prescient 
measures,  without  a  single  exception,  such  as  an  enlightened  people 
should  have  clung  to  and  perpetuated?  As  to  their  minds  ab 
stractedly  considered,  Hamilton's  was  profound,  penetrating,  and 
invariably  sound,  and  his  genius  of  that  rare  kind  which  enlight 
ens  the  judgment  without  misleading  it ;  the  mind  of  Mr.  Adams, 
like  the  last  glimmering  of  a  lamp,  feeble,  wavering,  and  unsteady, 
with  occasionally  a  strong  flash  of  light,  his  genius  little,  and  that 
little  insufficient  to  irradiate  his  judgment. 

This  letter  has  grown  to  too  great  a  length.  I  have  more  to 
say,  but  it  would  be  tiresome  to  extend  it  further.  It  might  also 
be  useless,  for  in  a  few  passing  years  the  eighteen  letters  will 
perhaps  be  neither  read  nor  remembered. 

I  am,  dear  sir,  now  and  always, 

Your  sincere  and  affectionate  friend,        JAMES  McHENRY. 

The  mischief  of  Mr.  Adams's  treatment  of  his  secretaries 
seems  to  have  impressed  Mr.  Cabot  much  more  strongly 
than  it  did  the  other  party  leaders.  Colonel  Pickering,  for 


1799.]  SECOND   MISSION  TO   FKANCE.  211 

example,  regarded  it  apparently  as  a  mere  wanton  insult ; 
and  he  dwelt  upon  it  as  a  circumstance  winch  relieved  him 
from  all  responsibility,  and  ought  therefore,  in  justice  to 
himself,  to  be  generally  known.  Mr.  Cabot,  on  the  other 
hand,  saw  clearly  that  by  it  the  safety,  indeed  the  very 
existence,  of  the  party  was  menaced,  and  that  the  evils 
necessarily  resulting  from  such  difficulties  would  be  thereby 
increased  tenfold. 

Indeed,  so  great  was  the  importance  which  he  attached 
to  this  breach  between  the  President  and  the  secretaries, 
that,  after  the  first  access  of  disappointment  on  hearing  of 
Murray's  nomination,  it  excluded  even  the  fears  awakened 
by  the  sudden  reversal  of  his  own  most  cherished  policy. 
In  a  letter  to  Colonel  Pickering,  Mr.  Cabot  says :  — 

"  I  feel  more  apprehension  of  mischiefs  which  are  yet  to  arise 
from  the  same  cause  that  produced  the  nomination  of  Mr.  Murray 
than  from  the  nomination  itself.  I  perceive  that  a  dangerous  divi 
sion  of  the  supporters  of  the  government  may  take  place,"  &c. 1 

Again  he  says,  in  the  same  letter :  — 

"  There  seems  to  be  no  ground  for  expecting  consistency  in  our 
administration,  while  the  false  and  dangerous  dogma  is  maintained 
that  the  President  is  to  decide  upon  great  national  measures  with 
out  first  availing  himself  of  the  fullest  information  and  judgment 
of  others.  No  man  could  be  safely  trusted  that  should  practise 
upon  this  vain  idea.  The  greatest  men  and  the  best  governments 
have  been  those  who  have  known  how  to  profit  most  by  the  talents 
of  others."2 

In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Gore,  he  observes :  — 

"  A  just  sentiment  of  personal  dignity  and  official  independence 
would  be  satisfied  to  act  rightly,  after  having  heard  all  that  could 
be  said  by  those  it  might  consult.  The  truest  greatness  is  that 
which  knows  best  how  to  avail  itself  of  the  best  talents  of  others. 
It  is  sufficient  that  a  man  is  superior  to  menace  or  entreaty,  and 
that  after  hearing  his  counsellors  he  should  feel  superior  to  personal 
influence,  but  never  to  the  authority  of  reason  and  truth."  3 

i  See  p.  226.  2  See  p.  227.  «  See  p.  231. 


212  LIFE   AND   LETTEBS   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

From  these  extracts,  it  is  evident  that  the  event  most 
dreaded  by  Mr.  Cabot  was  a  division  in  the  party  so  in 
curable  that  it  could  lead  only  to  destruction.  From  this 
feeling,  he  suppressed  a  series  of  papers  which  he  had  pre 
pared  for  publication,  because  he  feared  that  the  strictures 
on  the  French  policy  reflected  on  the  President.  He  also 
urged  upon  his  friends  the  adoption  of  a  similar  course. 

In  a  letter  to  Colonel  Pickering,  he  says  :  — 

"  I  have  always  objected  to  those  newspaper  discussions  which 
must  necessarily  implicate  the  President,  and  I  think  some  humili 
ation  ought  to  be  submitted  to  rather  than  depart  from  this  salu 
tary  respect ;  but  I  fear  the  mistaken  zeal  of  personal  friends  will 
finally  draw  out  those  who  think  they  act  upon  the  broadest  prin 
ciples  of  the  public  good."  1 

Mr.  Cabot  appreciated  the  "  dictatorial  "  temper  of  the 
Federalists,  he  perceived  how  dangerous  the  "  rivalry  "  among 
the  leaders  was,  and  he  therefore  strove  to  assuage  as  far  as 
he  could  the  violence  of  the  feelings  which  had  been  gen 
erated.  From  such  motives  as  well  as  on  general  principles, 
he  strenuously  opposed  Colonel  Pickering's  theory,  that  the 
Senate  ought  to  interfere  with  a  nomination  because  it  was 
the  precursor  of  a  policy  they  disliked.  On  the  other  side, 
Mr.  Cabot  feared  the  influence  of  Mr.  Adams's  harsh  speeches 
directed  against  all  who  differed  from  him  in  opinion ;  and 
he  especially  dreaded  the  course  pursued  by  Mr.  Adams's 
personal  partisans.  He  believed,  and  rightly,  that  the 
truest  and  best  supporters  of  the  President  were  to  be 
found  now,  as  formerly,  among  those  men  who  were  at 
the  moment  opposed  to  the  French  mission.  In  short,  Mr. 
Cabot,  bitterly  as  he  disliked  the  new  French  policy,  wished 
to  heal  the  wounds  that  had  been  inflicted,  and  to  hold  the 
party  together,  even  at  the  expense  of  personal  sacrifices. 
He  saw  in  the  Federalists  the  best  and  wisest  defenders  of 
order  and  good  government,  and  esteemed  their  political 
ascendancy  too  highly  to  be  willing  to  risk  its  continuance 
through  a  difference  of  opinion  on  any  single  point, 
i  See  p.  226. 


1799.]  SECOND   MISSION  TO  FRANCE.  213 

Such  a  hope  was  vain  from  the  characters  of  the  principal 
men  engaged  in  the  contest.  To  Hamilton  has  usually  been 
attributed  the  deadly  hostility  which  finally  ruined  Mr. 
Adams  and  the  party  ;  but  Hamilton  came  upon  the  scene 
only  at  the  last  moment.  A  much  more  reckless  enemy 
than  Hamilton  had  already  made  the  tragic  denouement 
inevitable.  Colonel  Pickering  was  at  first,  and  for  some 
time  continued  to  be,  the  real  leader  in  the  opposition  to  the 
President.  Bold,  ambitious,  determined,  Colonel  Pickering 
had  come  to  believe  himself  master  of  the  party  and 
of  the  administration.  He  awoke  suddenly  to  the  con 
sciousness  of  defeat  and  humiliation,  and  from  that  moment 
his  one  thought  was  to_de_stro.y  the  President.  By  highly 
abusive  letters  scattered  Mbrojadcast  through  the  land,  he 
endeavored  to  inflame  all  the  leading  Federalists  with 
the  same  personal  resentment  toward  the  President  that 
he  himself  felt.  Unluckily,  he  found  ready  listeners ;  and, 
still  more  unluckily,  Mr.  Adams  greatly  assisted  the  benev 
olent  objects  of  his  secretary.  Colonel  Pickering's  attacks 
were  soon  brought  to  the  President's  ears,  and  he  retorted 
by  sweeping  condemnations  of  all  who  opposed  him.  Both 
Colonel  Pickering  and  Mr.  Adams  were,  like  most  of  the  New 
England  Federalists,  given  over  to  the  belief  that  all  who 
differed  from  them  in  opinion  were  little  less  than  criminals 
and  traitors.  There  was  a  healthy  Puritan  spirit  about  such 
a  condition  of  mind,  but  it  did  not  conduce  to  the  pacifica 
tion  of  party  dissensions:  and,  with  two  such  combatants 
fighting,  it  became  difficult  to  maintain  general  harmony. 
Men  whom  Colonel  Pickering's  own  appeals  could  not  rouse 
were  stung  by  the  accusations  of  being  a  "  British  faction." 
There  was  nothing  Mr.  Cabot  more  dreaded  than  the 
revival  of  this  old  and  bitter  cry;  for  it  was  one  which 
aroused  the  worst  passions  on  all  sides,  and  shut  the  door 
on  peace.  Those  upon  whom  Mr.  Adams  was  said  to  fix 
the  name  were  men  who  had  fought  through  the  Revolu 
tion^  and  who  had  dragged  the  country  out  of  the  sloughs 


214  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

of  the  Confederacy.  It  had  been  applied  to  the  same 
men  years  before,  by  Mr.  Jefferson  ;  and  the  persons 
then  attacked  had  keenly  felt  all  the  bitter  injustice  of 
the  charge.  Loose  accusations  of  treason  do  immeasurable 
harm,  and  no  good :  they  lower  party  warfare  to  a  mere 
interchange  of  abuse  ;  and  in  this  case,  as  in  all  others,  they 
were  productive  of  the  greatest  disasters.  Mr.  Cabot  clearly 
foresaw  the  evils  of  such  venomous  attacks,  which  he  attrib 
uted  to  Gerry  and  to  the  little  knot  of  men  of  similar 
capacity,  who  were  at  that  moment  the  President's  most 
noisy  and  violent  supporters.  Thus  it  happened  that  every 
one  added  fuel  to  the  already  hot  fire,  and  in  rousing  the 
bitterest  animosities  Colonel  Pickering  proved  only  too 
successful.  Those  whom  he  could  not  personally  influence 
were  affected  by  the  retorts  which  his  assaults  drew  from 
the  President. 

Thus,  with  matters  growing  steadily  worse  for  the  Fed 
eralists,  the  spring  and  summer  of  1799  passed  aw^ay.  The 
war  party  put  every  engine  in  motion  to  influence  and 
restrain  the  President.  Through  every  channel,  they  sought 
to  dissuade  him  from  his  project  ;  but  they  merely  excited 
still  further  a  naturally  jealous  temperament,  and  effected 
nothing.  No  one  of  them  apparently  perceived  that  the 
policy  was  too  obviously  wise  to  be  abandoned,  and  that  all 
attempts  to  block  proceedings  simply  made  a  bad  business 
worse.1  A  temporary  suspension  of  the  mission  gave  a 
gleam  of  hope  that  they  might  succeed,  but  at  the  last 
moment  the  President  despatched  the  envoys  without  a 
word  to  any  one.  It  was  but  a  repetition  of  the  old  story. 
Mr.  Adams,  confident  that  he  was  right,  persisted  in  his 
policy  ;  and  we  must  admire  his  constancy,  judgment,  and 

1  McHenry  and  Stoddert  both  claim  that,  after  the  policy  was  decided, 
the  only  wish  of  the  cabinet  was  to  suspend  the  mission.  This  proves  that 
there  was  not  that  organized,  united  resistance  in  the  cabinet  at  Trenton 
which  Mr.  Adams  imagined  he  perceived  ;  but  I  feel  convinced  that  Picker  • 
ing,  at  least,  did  not  until  the  last  moment  abandon  his  efforts  to  wholly 
defeat  the  despatch  of  the  commission,  and  that  he  also  believed  himself 
master  of  the  whole  cabinet. 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  215 

patriotism.  But  he  did  the  right  thing  in  such  a  wrong 
way,  he  displayed  so  little  address,  so  little  regard  for  the 
feelings  or  opinions  of  others,  that  he  alienated  all  and 
conciliated  none.  On  the  other  side  was  Pickering  rag 
ing  at  the  President,  and  determined  to  crush  him  at  all 
hazards.  One  leader  after  another  was  drawn  into  the 
fight ;  and  the  Federalist  party  entered  upon  the  new 
century  with  a  Presidential  election  before  them,  and 
distracted  by  the  deepest  and  bitterest  animosities.  The 
prospect  was  not  cheering,  nor  were  its  sinister  auguries 
belied  in  the  events  which  followed. 


PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

(Private.) 

PHILADELPHIA,  Feb.  4,  1799. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  enclose  you  two  pamphlets  :  one,  of  Mr.  Gerry's 
communication,  to  which  Skipwith's  are  annexed  ;  the  other  my 
report  upon  them,  in  which  I  was  naturally  led  to  bring  into  view 
some  things  before  made  public. 

I  was  mortified  that  some  remarks  on  Gerry's  conduct  and 
opinions  were  excluded :  you  will  be  at  no  loss  to  account  for  this 
exclusion.  The  enclosed  paper  will  show  you  how  the  report 
stood  when  it  went  from  my  hands.  I  was  not  solicitous,  how 
ever,  for  retaining  any  other  passages  than  those  noted  as  I.,  K., 
and  M.,  on  pages  15,  17,  and  19.  I  proposed  a  substitute  for 
"  5.  Because,  &c.,"  to  this  effect :  "  5.  Because  Mr.  Gerry  has 
expressed  his  opinion  '  that  before  the  arrival  of  the  despatches 
of  the  envoys  the  minister  appeared  to  him  sincere,  and  anxious 
to  obtain  a  reconciliation,'  —  an  opinion  which  a  candid  exami 
nation  of  those  despatches,  and  of  his  own  correspondence,  will 
show  to  be  erroneous  ; "  but  1  could  not  prevail.  It  was  this  un 
founded  but  dangerous  opinion  which  first  induced  me  to  think  of 
making  a  report.  I  more  than  ever  regret  the  exclusions,  since 
you  inform  me  of  the  "  chilling  fogs  of  Gerryism."  But.  now  that 
his  silly  budget  is  before  the  public,  he  is  fair  game  for  the  at 
tack  of  every  man  of  discernment  who  feels  his  country  dishonored 
by  the  folly  and  perverseness  of  that  "  make-weight." 

Either  you  or  Mr.  Higginson  have  written  me  a  few  weeks 
since  about  the  President's  speech,  in  that  part  which  relates  to 


216  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

the  sending  another  ambassador  to  France.  We  were  anxious  that 
it  should  have  a  different  form ;  we  wished  it  to  be  peremptory, 
not  to  send  another ;  and  we  are  unanimously  of  that  opinion, 
but  — .  My  only  hope  now  is  that  despots  will  have  too  much 
pride  to  give  a  direct  and  official  assurance  that  a  minister  shall  be 
received,  &c. ;  and  on  the  conditions  explicitly  mentioned  which 
a  negotiation  must  embrace,  but  which  they  will  have  no  desire  to 
concede.  But,  those  fellows  are  so  debased  by  gains,  I  am  not 
very  sanguine  that  they  will  riot  stoop  to  any  measure  which  may 
authorize  the  expectation  of  negotiating,  in  order  to  prevent  our 
placing  ourselves  in  a  more  warlike  attitude.  We  shall  'not  be  safe 
until  we  assume  that  posture.  A  treaty,  if  considered  on  terms 
perfectly  agreeable  to  us,  would  not  give  us  security,  —  nay,  the 
more  satisfactory  to  us,  the  more  likely  to  be  broken  by  the  "  Great 
Nation,"  whose  government  would  easily  find  a  pretext.  In  the 
summer  of  1797,  the  Portuguese  minister  had  paid  his  money  and 
concluded  a  treaty,  which  was  drawn  out  ready  for  signature  ;  but 
the  next  morning  the  Directory  required  new  conditions,  and  be 
cause  D'Arunjo  refused  to  comply,  he  was  ordered  to  leave  France. 
He  went  to  the  Hague,  and  related  the  fact  to  Mr.  Murray. 

I  must  beg  you  to  make  my  apology  to  Mr.  Higgirison  —  and 
one  is  due  to  you  also — for  several  letters  which  remain  unan 
swered.  I  really  want  time. 

Believe  me  very  sincerely  yours,         T.  PICKERING. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

(Private.) 

BROOKLINE,  Feb  14,  1799. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Your  favor  of  the  4th  was  handed  me  last 
evening,  and  though  the  pamphlets  do  not  accompany  it,  yet  this 
was  the  less  to  be  regretted,  because  I  have  read  over  again  and 
again  and  again  the  excellent  report  of  the  Secretary  of  State  on 
French  affairs,  which  you  were  so  kind  as  to  enclose  to  me  on  the 
day  of  its  publication. 

I  had  suspected  that  the  "  Lover  of  Truth  "  would  be  restrained 
from  telling  all  he  knew,  and  from  exciting  all  our  just  sentiments 
by  freely  expressing  his  own.  I  think,  however,  his  task  has  been 
well  performed,  and  that  he  has  effectually  dispelled  the  fogs  which 
chilled  the  upper  part  of  our  atmosphere.  I  think  it  impossible 
for  any  man  of  common  sense  to  avoid  seeing  that  Gerry  is  too 
great  a  fool  to  have  been  employed  by  a  wise  government  in  a 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  217 

business  of  so  much  consequence.  Moderate  men  feel  themselves 
compelled  to  admit  that  he  cannot  be  acquitted  of  criminality  but 
at  the  entire  expense  of  his  understanding.  But,  although  public 
opinion  cannot  be  misled  concerning  his  merits,  it  is  feared  that 
his  conduct  has  already  produced  essential  mischief.  It  is  appre 
hended  that  those  who  have  had  too  strong  a  desire  to  vindicate 
Mr.  Gerry  have  necessarily  adopted  his  inconsistency.  How  are 
we  to  understand  the  practicability  of  a  safe,  pacific  system  of  in 
tercourse  with  those  whose  object  is  universal  domination,  and 
whose  means  are  fraud  and  perfidy  as  well  as  force  ?  The  spirit 
of  our  country  was  once  so  depressed  that  every  thing  was  to  be 
feared,  but  the  transactions  of  the  last  year  had  lighted  up  a  hope 
ful  fire  which  promised  a  perennial  and  salutary  warmth.  From 
the  commencement  of  our  present  session  of  Congress,  the  ardor 
of  our  citizens  has  been  damped  to  a  degree  that  threatened  the 
return  of  our  former  dangers.  I  hope  we  are  again  recovering, 
but  the  proper  temper  of  the  nation  cannot  be  revived  without 
new  and  open  outrages  on  the  part  of  France.  So  dangerous  is  it 
to  check  the  spirit  of  a  just  indignation,  which  was  given  to  man 
to  guard  him  against  the  insolence  and  tyranny  of  his  fellows.  I 
regret  this  falling  off  the  more,  because  it  will  sink  our  reputation 
abroad ;  and  reputation  is  power.  The  statesmen  of  Europe  will 
take  back  a  little  of  the  praise  they  have  lately  given  us :  they 
wrill  say  we  are  still  duped  by  the  French.  This  is  the  more  cruel, 
as  it  will  be  applied  where  it  is  undeserved.  I  think  you  ought 
to  have  nerves  of  iron ;  and  I  believe  you  have,  or  you  would  be 
wearied  to  death  with  the  labors  and  perplexities  of  your  office, 
which  are  created  by  domestic  caprice  as  well  as  foreign  intrigue 
and  injustice.  Mr.  Higginson,  Judge  Dana,1  and  I  were  lately 
conversing  on  these  topics,  and  we  agreed  that  you  must  be  forti 
fied  against  every  event,  and  by  all  means  be  induced  to  persevere 
as  well  to  perfect  your  own  fame  as  to  save  the  country. 

Yours  faithfully  and  affectionately,  GEORGE  CABOT. 

You  make  an  acknowledgment  of  some  epistolary  obligation, 
which  I  reject,  and  once  for  all  absolve  you  from  any  claims  I 
may  have  had,  or  shall  have,  except  only  where  I  expressly  make 
them,  or  where  you  suppose  I  can  render  you  service. 

1  Francis  Dana,  judge  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  afterwards  chief  jus 
tice  of  Massachusetts. 


218  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  Feb.  15,  1799. 

Mr  DEAR  SIR,  —  Undoubtedly  you  have  read  the  speech  and 
answers  at  the  opening  of  the  session  of  our  Legislature.  Governor 
Sumner  acts  upon  the  best  principles  of  Federalism.  He  evidently 
seconds  the  policy  and  views  of  the  national  executive,  and  in  this 
spirit  he  adopted  a  style  less  firm  and  decisive  than  his  own  senti 
ments.  Both  branches  of  the  Legislature  without  concert  were  im 
pressed  with  the  idea  that  the  government  had  not  held  a  language 
suited  to  the  times,  or  in  unison  with  the  public  sentiment ;  and  in 
their  answers  they  raise  the  tone  as  much  as  they  can  with  propriety, 
and  guard  against  the  depression  of  the  public  pulse.  Had  the 
President  taken  the  high  ground  which  was  expected,  no  man 
would  more  readily  or  faithfully  support  it  than  Governor  Sumner. 

By  these  proceedings,  as  well  as  by  the  stern  and  sharp  reproof 
given  to  the  seditious  Virginians,  you  will  see  that  the  people  here 
are  better  than  the  national  government ;  and  it  cannot  be  suffi 
ciently  regretted  that  this  excellent  temper,  which  was  excited  by 
the  Federal  administration,  may  subside  for  want  of  a  proper  nutri 
ment  from  the  same  source.  It  was  expected  by  all  good  men 
that  the  chief  magistrate  would  have  aimed  principally  to  show  the 
people  the  danger  of  trusting  to  the  appearance  of  moderation  in 
the  tyrants  of  France,  and  to  have  proved  that  we  have  much  more 
to  fear  from  arts  of  this  sort  than  from  their  arms.  If  he  had 
reminded  us  that  "  the  tiger  always  crouches  before  he  leaps  upon 
his  prey,"  every  tongue  would  have  repeated  the  expression,  and 
every  heart  responded  to  the  just  caution  which  it  teaches. 

I  think  you  will  derive  pleasure  from  reading  the  resolutions  of 
our  Legislature  in  answer  to  those  of  Virginia.1  If  they  contain 
some  little  inaccuracies,  they  are  strong  upon  the  whole,  and  must 
tend  to  support  the  orthodox  party  in  that  State.  These  resolu 
tions  had  only  one  member  negative  in  the  Senate,  and  one-fifth  of 
the  House.  Perhaps  a  greater  unanimity  is  hardly  to  be  desired ; 
for  I  am  persuaded  that  a  majority  of  the  best  men  would  either 

1  These  were  the  famous  nullification  resolutions  drawn  by  Madison. 
The  stronger  ones  from  Kentucky,  of  the  same  import,  were  the  work  of  Jef 
ferson,  who,  being  then  Vice-President  of  the  United  States,  was  at  the  bottom 
of  the  whole  business. 


1700.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  219 

be  inactive,  or  act  ill,  if  they  had  no  opposers  to  stimulate  them  and 
to  criticise  with  severity  whatever  they  do.     Farewell. 

Yours  truly,  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  Feb.  21,  1799. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  When  the  French  government  threatened  to 
ravage  our  coasts  with  their  cruisers  from  the  West  Indies,  they 
believed  the  hand  of  our  government  was  so  tied  up  by  faction  that 
no  resistance  could  be  made ;  but,  as  soon  as  they  saw  our  inter 
course  and  naval  armament  bills  had  passed,  they  were  sensible 
their  colonists  might  be  driven  to  despair,  and  the  colonies  finally 
lost  to  them.  The  French  have  been  the  wisest  as  well  as  wicked 
est  politicians  in  the  world  ;  they  have  been  remarkable  for  adapt 
ing  their  measures  to  the  character  of  the  people,  and  above  all  for 
profiting  by  their  vices.  They  consider  us  as  mercenary  to  excess, 
and  a  review  of  their  proceedings  would  prove  that  they  expected 
to  establish  an  influence  over  us  by  constantly  addressing  our  ava 
rice.  A  nation  may  be  so  addicted  to  commerce  and  the  arts  of 
procuring  property  as  to  be  insensible  to  every  other  sentiment. 
Such  a  condition  would  be  extremely  deplorable,  and  is  only  to  be 
avoided  by  cultivating  a  love  of  glory  as  a  balance.  All  the  ex 
penses  of  British  wars  are  a  thousand  times  remunerated  to  that 
nation  by  the  preservation  of  their  high  spirit  and  character.  In 
stead  of  a  free,  gallant,  and  generous  people,  as  they  now  are,  an 
uninterrupted  peace  would  in  fifty  years  have  sunk  them  to  the 
level  of  sordid,  defenceless  Jews.  It  is  chiefly  on  the  sea,  how 
ever,  that  the  English  prowess  is  tried ;  yet  this  has  been  sufficient 
to  display  virtues  and  talents,  the  fame  and  reward  of  which  are  found 
to  be  worth  more  than  much  money.  In  our  country,  the  commer 
cial  spirit  must  predominate ;  and  there  are  reasons  peculiar  to  our 
society  why  the  love  of  wealth  should  be  a  stronger  passion  than 
in  the  societies  of  the  Old  World.  As  this  cannot  be  prevented,  it 
should  be  consulted  and  provided  for  as  much  as  possible  in  all  our 
political  arrangements.  It  was  with  a  reference  to  this  idea  that 
I  expressed  formerly  a  hope  that  the  government  would  have  de 
clared  war  in  this  session,  or  at  any  rate  would  cut  off  all  personal 
intercourse  with  the  French  territories,  and  especially  would  author 
ize  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  to  make  reprisals  upon  French 


220  LIFE    AND    LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

property  of  every  description.  Such  a  measure  could  have  added 
nothing  to  our  difficulties,  but  must  have  been  attended  with  many 
and  great  advantages.  Avarice  would  have  fought  our  battles, 
and  would  train  up  innumerable  defenders  of  the  country ;  and  a 
love  of  glory  and  spirit  of  patriotism  would  have  grown  upon  the 
love  of  gain.  But  I  have  feared  that,  in  the  awkward  and  indefi 
nite  state  we  are  now  placed,  our  adventurous  spirits  will  be  tempted 
to  seek  for  the  means  of  gratifying  themselves  in  the  evasions  of 
our  laws,  and  administering  to  the  necessities  of  our  enemy.  I  am 
recently  impressed  with  these  apprehensions  more  deeply  than 
before,  because  I  see  the  prices  of  provisions  are  rising  high  in  the 
French  islands,  and  French  letters  of  marque  begin  to  appear  in 
the  West  Indies,  which  will  be  employed  in  taking  our  commodities 
from  the  Danish  islands  ;  and  because  the  news  agent  at  Guadaloupe 
has  undoubtedly  come  out  to  amuse  us  with  some  show  of  modera 
tion,  while  he  in  fact  concerts  measures  with  the  Gallo- Americans 
to  supply  the  French  colonies.  Nothing  can  be  more  evident  than 
the  permanent  substantial  benefits  which  would  accrue  to  the 
United  States  from  the  independence  of  the  West  India  islands, 
which  may  result  from  our  withholding  supplies ;  but,  at  any  rate, 
whether  this  happens  or  not,  our  enemy  is  so  extremely  vulnerable 
in  that  scene,  that  we  must  be  stupid  or  worse  if  we  do  not  make 
him  feel  our  power.  As  I  have  not  seen  the  new  intercourse  bill, 
I  am  uninformed  of  the  power  it  vests  in  the  President ;  but  it  is 
little  short  of  betraying  the  country,  if  the  legislature  do  not  give 
authority  to  capture  all  French  property,  and  all  American  prop 
erty  employed  in  French  trade. 

The  friends  of  Barney  l  are  still  in  the  great  flour  cities,  and 
some  of  them  in  the  government.  They  were  willing  to  sacrifice 
the  peace  of  the  country  in  1794  to  their  private  interests,  arid  they 
will  now  be  willing  to  sacrifice  its  honor.  But  it  is  time  to  speak 
plainly  upon  these  subjects  ;  and  it  is  the  duty  of  those  who  conduct 

1  Captain,  afterwards  Commodore,  Joshua  Barney,  of  Baltimore.  He 
was  a  most  violent  Jacobin  and  French  sympathizer.  In  1794,  he  went  with 
Monroe  as  bearer  of  an  American  flag  to  France ;  and  at  the  reception  of 
the  latter  he  presented  his  flag,  received  a  French  one  in  exchange,  and 
made  a  speech  on  the  occasion.  For  this  service,  he  was  given  and  accepted 
a  commission  as  captain  in  the  French  navy,  in  which  capacity  he  served 
for  several  years.  The  reference  here  is  to  the  extensive  evasion  of  the  non- 
intercourse  acts  by  smuggling  provisions  from  Baltimore  to  the  French 
islands. 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  221 

our  national  affairs  to  destroy,  if  possible,  every  project  for  supply 
ing  the  dependencies  of  France.  You  will  please  to  remember 
that  I  have  expressly  renounced  all  claim  to  answers,  and  therefore 
I  have  been  less  reluctant  to  write. 

With  unfeigned  esteem,  I  remain  yours,  &c.,  G.  C. 


PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

(Private.) 

PHILADELPHIA,  Feb.  21,  1799. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  You  will  be  shocked,  as  we  all  were,  by  the 
President's  nomination  of  Mr.  Murray  minister  plenipotentiary  to 
negotiate  a  treaty  with  the  French  republic.  I  beg  you  to  believe 
that  it  is  the  sole  act  of  the  President.  Not  one  officer  about  him 
had  any  knowledge  of  his  design.  He  has  learned  that  all  his 
friends  and  the  friends  of  his  country  are  mortified  and  disgusted, 
and  he  is  now  suffering  the  pains  of  purgatory.  This  would  be 
well  enough;  but  how  is  the  country  to  be  retrieved  from  the 
calamitous  consequences  ?  How  is  its  honor  thus  prostrated  in  the 
dust  to  be  recovered  ?  It  has  already  damned  one  measure  calcu 
lated  to  invigorate  the  spirit  and  enterprise  of  our  navy.  The  bill 
for  granting  a  bounty  on  every  gun  taken  was  yesterday  lost  in  the 
House,  fifty-two  to  forty-eight. 

The  nomination  is  committed  in  the  Senate  to  a  committee,  con 
sisting  of  Sedgwick,  Stockton,  Read,  Bingham,  and  Ross.1  You 
would  suppose  that  all  these  might  be  depended  on  in  every  Federal 
question  except  Bingham.  Unfortunately,  Ross  is  candidate  for 
governor  of  Pennsylvania,  —  the  election  will  be  made  next  Octo 
ber, —  and  lately  has  become  what  you  Yankees  call  peoplish. 
The  committee  will  study  to  invent  some  change  by  which  the 
measure  may  be  rendered  less  mischievous;  but  the  President's 
character  can  never  be  retrieved.  He  cannot  recover  the  confi 
dence  of  the  Federalists.  The  citizens  are  astonished,  and  many 
would  not  believe  it  possible.  This  reminds  me  of  "  Porcupine's  "  2 

1  Theodore  Sedgwick,  senator  from  Massachusetts,  and  afterwards  judge 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  that  State.    Richard  Stockton,  son  of  the  signer  of 
the  same  name,  and  senator  from  New  Jersey.    Jacob  Read,  general  in  the 
war  of  Independence,  senator  from  South  Carolina,  and  afterwards  United 
States  judge  of  the  District  Court  of  that  State.    William  Bingham  and 
James  Ross  were  the  senators  from  Pennsylvania. 

2  William  Cobbett's  nom  de  plume. 


222  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

neat  but  cutting  satire  of  yesterday :  it  is  enclosed.  If  any  thing 
could  gall  him  more,  it  is  that  the  serpents  of  the  "  Aurora  "  are 
daily  slavering  him  with  their  praise. 

Adieu,  my  dear  friend.  Bad  as  things  are,  I  will  not  yet 
despair. 

T.  PICKERING. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  Feb.  22,  1799. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  sincerely  thank  you  for  the  kind  intentions 
which  are  sufficiently  manifest,  notwithstanding  your  willingness  to 
disguise  them,  in  your  letter  of  the  12th. 

I  am  grieved  to  hear  you  complain  of  the  weight  of  duty  which 
I  have  often  feared  might  become  intolerable  to  you.  I  pray  for 
your  own  sake,  but  still  more  for  the  public,  that  you  may  neither 
be  disabled  nor  discouraged.  I  speak  with  sincerity  of  the  public, 
because  I  see  nowhere  a  man  to  fill  the  place.  For  yourself,  the 
only  adequate  motive  is  that  honest  fame  which  is  the  just  reward 
of  the  greatest  and  most  difficult  services.  I  have  sometimes 
hoped  that  time,  which  accommodates  us  to  our  burdens,  would 
have  reconciled  you  to  yours,  and  that  the  sensibility,  which  wastes 
human  strength  like  a  hectic  fever,  would  become  less  exquisite ; 
but,  if  you  are  compelled  to  sacrifice  your  health  or  quit  your 
office  at  last,  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  option  you  ought  to 
make.  In  any  event,  you  will  doubtless  take  no  step  without  the 
utmost  deliberation,  nor  without  first  ascertaining  the  position  of 
comfortable  ease  which  you  are  to  take,  and  which  must  be 
always  completely  in  your  power  to  secure.  I  have  a  great  deal 
to  say  on  this  subject,  but  you  would  think  I  had  already  said  too 
much,  if  you  did  not  know  the  great  interest  I  take  in  your  happi 
ness.  I  agree  with  you  fully  on  the  importance  of  an  established 
right  to  trade  freely  with  any  of  the  principal  islands,  but  to  secure 
this  we  must  perhaps  forbear  to  supply  them  until  their  dependence 
on  the  Jacobin  parent  is  entirely  destroyed.  I  should  think,  too, 
that  the  English  must  be  consulted,  and  that  without  a  perfect 
concert  there  would  be  no  safety  in  the  system,  for  indeed  the 
occurrence  is  produced  by  their  arms.  I  have  always  apprehended 
that  our  money-loving  people  would  be  apt  to  supply  the  French 
colonies,  notwithstanding  your  prohibitory  laws.  You  ought  to  go 
one  step  further  ;  and,  if  you  cannot  declare  war,  you  ought  never- 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  223 


theless  to  authorize  indiscriminate  reprisals  on  French  property, 
and  prohibit  personal  intercourse.  It  is  as  singular  as  it  is  humil 
iating  that,  while  the  French  capture  our  property  ad  libitum, 
and  have  done  it  for  years,  we  restrain  our  citizens  from  retaliating. 
It  has  appeared  to  me  the  path  of  policy  is  so  plain  that  it  cannot 
be  mistaken,  and  nothing  but  the  foulest  traitorism  and  faction  can 
prevent  its  being  pursued.  General  reprisals  would  instantly 
increase  the  number,  and  still  more  the  force,  of  private  vessels  of 
war.  Avarice  would  fight  our  battles,  and  would  train  innumera 
ble  sea  soldiers  to  defend  our  coasts  against  invaders,  if  they  ever 
come,  and  give  us  weight  and  respect  among  the  maritime  nations, 
if  they  should  not.  The  incidents  of  active  war  would  every  day 
interest  the  feelings  of  the  community,  and  destroy  that  apathy 
which  has  been  so  dangerous ;  and  by  driving  away  Frenchmen, 
and  forbidding  personal  intercourse  between  the  countries,  the 
ducts  of  corruption  would  be  principally  cut  off.  It  is  time  to  say 
openly  what  I  have  said  these  five  years,  that  the  Revolutionary 
monster  that  has  arisen  in  France  must  be  destroyed,  or  it  will 
never  cease  to  destroy  others.  These  opinions,  indeed,  are  exten 
sively  embraced  now. 

I  repeat  that  you  are  not  to  write  to  me,  unless  I  expressly 
request  it,  or  you  have  commands  of  your  own  to  give  ;  but,  as  I 
am  still  called  to  preach  political  sermons  to  occasional  auditors, 
I  wish  in  future  you  would  send  me  annually  the  report  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  which  gives  a  view  of  the  exports  and 
imports.  I  have  not  seen  one  these  several  years. 

Yours  truly,  G.  CABOT. 


PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

PHILADELPHIA,  Feb.  26,  1799. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  The  President,  finding  that  Mr.  Murray  would 
be  negatived,  or  finally  impressed  with  the  importance  of  yielding 
to  the  public  sentiment  (by  which  I  mean  the  sentiment  of  the  real 
friends  of  the  country,  and  supporters  of  his  administration),  yes 
terday  morning  sent  in  a  new  nomination,  —  Chief  Justice  Ellsworth, 
Patrick  Henry,  and  Mr.  Murray  ;  the  two  former  not  to  leave 
America  until  they  receive  assurances  from  the  French  government 
that  they  will  be  received.  And  as  this  is  the  amelioration  which 
was  desired  as  the  best  palliative  of  the  evil  of  any  nomination, 


224  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

and  for  the  purpose  of  treating  with  France,  Ellsworth  being 
here,  I  presume  he  was  consulted,  and  consented  to  the  nomination 
from  the  necessity  of  preventing  a  greater  evil.  Patrick  Henry 
probably  will  decline. 

I  have  received  your  letter  of  the  15th.  You,  Governor  Sum- 
ner,  and  other  men  to  whom  you  refer,  have  seen  and  lamented  the 
falling  off  in  the  President's  speech  at  the  opening  of  this  session 
of  Congress.  We  endeavored  to  raise  its  tone  respecting  France, 
but  were  repelled.  The  nomination  of  Murray  was  in  the  spirit  of 
that  part  of  the  speech  to  which  I  refer.  Perhaps  I  may  find  here 
after  an  opportunity  of  giving  further  information  to  you  on  this 
subject.  I  am  very  truly  yours,  T.  PICKERING. 


CABOT  TO  PICKETING. 

(Private.) 

BROOK  LINE,  March  7, 1799. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  received  in  course  your  favors  of  the  21st 
and  26th  ult.,  and  with  the  latter  a  packet  of  seeds  which  shall  be 
tried  in  our  soils. 

Indignation,  grief,  and  disgust,  in  a  rotatory  succession,  are  the 
only  sentiments  excited  by  the  nomination  of  Mr.  Murray  in  the 
breasts  of  well-informed,  decided  Federalists.  The  half-informed 
and  the  feeble  see  no  harm  in  any  measure  which  professes  to 
have  peace  for  its  object ;  and  they  will  not  listen  to  the  painful 
proofs  that  a  safe  peace,  which  they  truly  desire,  is  rendered  less 
attainable  by  this  new  evidence  of  our  weakness  and  this  new 
encouragement  to  French  artifice  ;  while  the  temporizers,  trimmers, 
and  Federal  hypocrites  with  Jacobin  hearts,  rejoice  in  an  oppor 
tunity  to  throw  off  the  mask,  and  under  sanction  of  a  great  name 
oppose  that  system  of  national  dignity  and  defence  which  they  had 
reluctantly  supported  because  it  had  become  popular. 

The  modification  which  the  business  has  undergone  removes  the 
objection  of  incompetency  in  the  negotiator,  but  the  pernicious 
consequences  of  leading  the  public  mind  to  negotiation  instead  of 
resistance  are  not  abated.  I  have  thought  it  a  duty  to  inculcate 
the  idea  that  we  should  have  nothing  to  dread  from  France,  if  we 
could  but  realize  the  extent  of  her  designs  and  the  means  by  which 
she  expected  to  accomplish  them ;  and  I  thought  I  was  serving  the 
government  when  I  insisted  that  all  the  affected  moderation  and 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  225 

crouching  of  the  French  was  only  a  trick  to  soothe  our  resentments 
and  lull  us  into  a  fatal  security.  The  wrecks  of  European  States, 
who  were  beguiled  from  their  true  course  by  the  false  lights  which 
France  had  hung  out,  ought  to  warn  us  of  the  danger  of  following 
them  ;  but  it  would  seem  as  if  States  cannot  profit  by  the  examples 
of  others,  nor  even  by  their  own  experience.  It  has  been  fre 
quently  remarked  that  for  several  years  our  distance  from  Europe 
had  saved  us  from  a  participation  in  its  calamities,  and  had  given 
us  opportunity  to  learn  wisdom  at  their  expense ;  and  it  has  been 
observed,  with  some  pride  and  great  joy,  that  finally  our  people 
(a  majority)  had  acquired  such  just  ideas  of  the  national  policy  as 
to  approve  and  support  it  at  every  expense  and  every  hazard.  If 
this  was  the  case,  the  blessing  is  in  great  jeopardy,  if  not  absolutely 
lost ;  for  it  is  to  be  feared  that  a  new  division  of  the  country  is 
this  moment  forming,  by  which  the  men  who  have  heretofore 
devised  and  supported  the  national  measures  will  be  the  minority. 

You  will  see  by  the  paragraphs  in  the  Boston  papers  that  the 
presses  there  have  been  attended  to  by  those  who  are  strongly 
attached  to  the  President  personally,  or  who  approve  these  half-way 
measures  which  lead  to  whole  ruin.  Immediately  after  the  first 
intelligence  was  received,  I  penned  a  paragraph  for  the  next  day's 
"  Centinel,"  expressing  doubts  of  the  truth  of  the  intelligence,  be 
cause  it  was  contrary  to  the  avowed  policy  of  the  President,  and 
because  the  assurances  said  to  have  been  given  by  France  could 
now  deceive  no  one,  as  all  the  world  knew  the  sole  design  of  such 
professions  must  be  to  facilitate  their  destructive  designs,  &c.  I 
am  not  sure  the  paragraph  arrived  at  the  printing-office ;  but,  if  it 
did,  it  was  rejected.  I  then  wrote  a  little  piece,  certainly  unex 
ceptionable  in  form,  showing  the  manner  in  which  the  Greeks  were 
amused  by  negotiations,  till  their  liberties  were  destroyed  by 
Philip,  &c.  But  this,  which  was  sent  to  the  "  Mercury "  office, 
was  refused,  although  its  publication  was  particularly  requested, 
and  although  I  have  formerly  written  a  number  of  pieces  for  that 
paper  which  they  valued  so  highly  as  to  send  me  repeated  solicita 
tions  for  more.  JThus  you  see  already  the  seeds  of  division  vege 
tate.  I  have  not  been  in  town ;  but  I  know  many  of  the  best  men 
feel  extreme  chagrin,  and  doubtless  would  be  more  open  in  express 
ing  it,  if  they  did  not  consult  the  public  welfare  more  than  their 
own  personal  gratifications. 

I  have  always  objected  to  those  newspaper  discussions  which 

15 


226  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.  [1799, 

must  necessarily  implicate  the  President,  and  I  think  some  humili 
ation  ought  to  be  submitted  to  rather  than  depart  from  this  salu 
tary  respect ;  but  T  fear  the  mistaken  zeal  of  personal  friends  will 
finally  draw  out  those  who  think  they  act  upon  the  broadest  prin 
ciples  of  the  public  good. 

I  rejoice  extremely  to  find  Ross  acting  with  firmness.  I  always 
esteemed  him  highly,  and  I  know  of  few  things  in  life  more  unpleas 
ant  than  being  obliged  to  renounce  or  abate  a  favorable  opinion  of 
a  friend.  With  unfeigned  esteem  and  affection, 

I  remain  as  ever  yours,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  March  18,  1799. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Although  I  have  neither  faith  nor  hope 
myself,  yet  it  is  possible  we  must  be  all  subject  to  the  evils  of 
negotiation  with  the  present  regency  of  France.  I  fulfil  a  duty, 
therefore,  in  transmitting  you  Mr.  Gore's  letter 1  which  relates  to 
it.  From  our  newspapers  as  well  as  from  other  sources,  you  will 
receive  information  of  the  schisms  created  among  Federalists  by 
the  unaccountable  conduct  of  the  President.  I  have  been  once  in 
town ;  and  I  met  no  man  who  did  not  censure  the  President  ex 
tremely,  though  they  differed  much  as  to  the  expediency  of  declar 
ing  it.  But  I  heard  of  many,  and  they  were  such  as  might  be 
expected  to  do  so,  who  insisted  on  the  propriety  of  our  justifying 
what  had  been  done,  and  of  denouncing  whomsoever  should  dare 
to  do  otherwise.  Personal  friends  of  the  President,  temporizing 
men,  with  real  Jacobins  who  profess  Federalism,  have  been  active 
and  zealous  ;  while  the  open,  avowed  Jacobins  have  been  somewhat 
at  a  stop,  and  for  a  time  said  but  little.  Taking  a  retrospect  from 
the  point  at  which  we  now  stand,  I  feel  more  apprehension  of 
mischiefs  which  are  yet  to  arise  from  the  same  cause  that  produced 
the  nomination  of  Mr.  Murray  than  from  the  nomination  itself.  I 
perceive  that  a  dangerous  division  of  the  supporters  of  government 
may  take  place,  by  which  the  men  who  act  on  truly  public  princi 
ples  will  be  opposed  by  many  who  have  hitherto  followed  them, 
and  that  these  will  be  necessarily  countenanced  by  the  President. 
Should  this  happen,  the  animosity  to  England,  which  is  still  pop 
ular,  will  be  resorted  to ;  and  we  shall  be  told  that  the  President  is 

1  This  letter  is  printed  in  the  previous  chapter.     See  p.  186. 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  227 

calumniated,  because  he  will  not  yield  to  a  British  faction,  &c.  It 
seems  to  me  that  the  late  transactions  must  operate  unfavorably  on 
the  discussions  which  are  taking  place  between  you  and  Great 
Britain,  respecting  the  commission  at  Philadelphia,  and  on  the  busi 
ness  of  the  commissioners  in  London.  I  had  an  hour's  conver 
sation  with  Mr.  Listen  at  Boston,  which  satisfied  me  that  he  was 
disposed  to  smooth  every  unavoidable  difficulty  between  the  two 
countries,  confiding  that  our  government  would,  as  far  as  possible, 
keep  the  United  States  out  of  the  fangs  of  France,  and  thus  at  last 
become  independent  and  free  of  French  influence.  I  found  he  was 
perfectly  satisfied  with  your  sentiments  and  principles,  and  he  de 
clared  to  me  that  he  had  not  a  wish  to  embarrass  us  with  any 
engagements  which  you  would  not  approve.  Indeed,  he  said  ex 
pressly  to  me  that  he  was  pleased  with  General  Marshall's  opinions 
published  on  this  subject. 

I  ran  over  several  topics  with  Mr.  Liston,  in  which  he  professed 
to  agree  with  me,  and  especially  that  we  have  great  common  inter 
ests  which  ought  to  keep  us  friends  in  spite  of  all  the  irritations 
which  from  various  causes  must  arise  for  a  time.  But  I  cannot 
refrain  from  suggesting  to  you  the  utility  of  impressing  him  now 
with  the  importance  of  acting  conformably  to  those  sentiments,  by 
which  he  will  certainly  serve  his  own  country  no  less  than  ours. 
We  have  so  many  men  who  seek  for  a  quarrel  with  Great  Britain, 
that  no  ordinary  skill  can  prevent  it,  unless  that  nation,  laying  aside 
a  little  of  its  haughtiness,  will  faithfully  and  generously  accommo 
date  its  policy  to  the  nature  and  character  of  our  government.  Our 
system  must  occasionally  yield  to  the  errors  and  prejudices  of  the 
people,  arid  if  it  were  always  to  be  administered  by  the  best  men 
in  the  world,  still  it  would  be  less  stable  than  theirs  ;  and  there 
fore  political  duty — that  is,  true  interest  —  requires  that  they  should 
be  sufficiently  flexible  to  prevent  that  discord  which  is  constantly 
aimed  at  by  the  bitter  enemies  of  both.  Be  all  this  as  it  may, 
there  seems  to  be  no  ground  for  expecting  consistency  in  our  ad 
ministration,  while  the  false  and  dangerous  dogma  is  maintained 
that  the  President  is  to  decide  upon  great  national  measures  with 
out  first  availing  himself  of  the  fullest  information  and  judgment 
of  others.  No  man  could  be  safely  trusted  that  should  practise 
upon  this  vain  idea.  The  greatest  men  and  the  best  governments 
have  been  those  who  have  known  how  to  profit  most  by  the  talents 
of  others.  Henry  IV.'s  greatest  glory,  in  my  opinion,  consists 


228  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

in  having  known  how  to  appreciate  the  character  of  Sully;  and 
the  British  administration  would  not  have  existed  for  a  month, 
still  less  to  astonish  the  world  by  its  constancy  and  its  energies,  if 
the  king  did  not  steadily  pursue  the  course  pointed  out  by  those 
whose  abilities  he  employs  in  his  council.  It  is  enough  that  the 
chief  magistrate  is  superior  to  all  personal  influence,  whether  of 
menace  or  entreaty ;  that  he  is  superior  to  the  influence  of  every 
authority  but  that  of  reason  well  informed.  But  that  dignity  and 
independence  should  require  a  man  to  act  in  the  most  important 
concerns  without  the  aid  of  counsel  from  others  is  the  error  of 
vanity  which  the  populace  alone  ought  to  indulge.  The  power  of 
displacing  all  officers  whom  the  President  is  expected  to  consult  is 
su-rely  sufficient  to  preserve  his  spirit  of  independence  ;  and  he  need 
not  be  afraid  to  examine  their  investigations,  hear  their  discussions, 
or  consider  their  results.  If  their  power  force  a  conviction,  he 
ought  to  yield  to  it ;  if  not,  he  is  at  liberty  to  discard  it,  and  to 
act  a  part  which  shall  seem  to  him  better.  This  is  my  idea  of 
dignity,  and  this  is  the  way  to  avoid  mistakes.  This  is  the  secret 
of  Washington's  greatness.  I  am  sensible  it  is  as  delicate  as  it  is 
difficult  to  make  the  arrangement  I  long  since  intimated,  by  which 
it  should  be  understood  that  the  President  would  habitually  hear 
his  servants  before  he  decides  upon  their  tasks,  and  that  when  he 
is  absent  from  them  he  would  refrain  from  all  business. 

Your  faithful  friend,  G.  CABOT. 


CABOT   TO   PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  May  2,  1799. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Soon  after  the  return  of  the  President,  I 
visited  him  at  Quincy,  where  I  was  hospitably  entertained  at 
dinner  with  the  family.  It  was  the  wish  of  several  of  my  friends 
that  I  should  discharge  the  friendly  duty  of  disclosing  such  facts 
and  sentiments  as  were  known  and  felt  by  the  best  public  men 
here,  and  which  might  be  useful  to  him.  It  was  particularly 
desired  that  he  should  be  informed  of  the  insincerity  of  men  who, 
under  the  mask  of  patriotism,  inflame  his  jealousy  of  his  best 
friends  and  the  best  friends  of  the  country.  But,  though  I  was 
treated  with  great  cordiality  and  confidence  on  many  subjects,  a 
studied  course  kept  us  distant  from  those  on  which  I  should  have 
spoken  freely,  if  permitted,  though  with  great  pain  to  myself.  In 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  229 

a  late  letter  from  Mr.  Gore,  he  intimates  to  me  that  if  the  gov 
ernment  should  find  it  necessary  to  appoint  a  minister  plenipo 
tentiary  for  St.  Petersburg  or  Constantinople,  or  any  other  court, 
at  the  time  of  his  present  employment  being  ended,  and  he  should 
be  thought  a  suitable  person  to  serve  the  country  in  that  character, 
he  would  undertake  it.  I  have  written  to  Mr.  Gore  that  I  should 
take  the  liberty  to  mention  his  name  to  you  and  to  Mr.  Wolcott, 
and  that  I  would  also  communicate  his  idea  to  the  President,  if  an 
opportunity  occurred,  which  I  do  not  suppose  probable.  I  think 
it  unnecessary  to  speak  of  Mr.  Gore's  qualifications  or  pretensions, 
all  which  must  be  well  known  to  you  ;  and  I  think  it  cannot  be 
unknown  to  the  President  that  he  has  applied  his  talents  and 
devoted  his  studies  to  politics  almost  exclusively  these  ten  years 
past.  You  have  seen  the  discussions  in  our  papers  under  the  "  En 
voys,"  written  by  Otis,  and  other  paragraphs  by  other  persons 
concerning  the  President's  nomination  of  Mr.  Murray.  I  think, 
however,  you  may  be  assured  that  sensible  men  very  generally 
condemn  that  measure,  and  chiefly  differ  as  to  the  expediency  of 
expressing  their  censures  publicly. 

With  the  highest  esteem  and  unabating  attachment,  I  remain 

Your  affectionate  and  faithful  friend, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  May  2,  1799. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  fulfil  my  own  inclination  as  well  as  promise 
in  mentioning  to  you  that  Mr.  Gore,  one  of  our  commissioners  in 
London,  at  the  expiration  of  his  present  service  would  willingly  go 
to  Constantinople  or  St.  Petersburg  or  any  other  court,  as  minister 
plenipotentiary,  if  the  government  should  need  a  person  for  such 
an  employment  and  should  think  him  capable  of  serving  them 
acceptably.  Mr.  Gore  has  formed  himself  for  such  an  office  by 
assiduous  study  and  attention  for  ten  years,  and  would  certainly 
be  well  received  anywhere,  and,  I  think,  could  not  fail  to  advance 
the  reasonable  views  of  the  government.  The  Jacobins  have 
lately  become  more  systematical,  I  think,  in  their  electioneering 
projects,  and  have  in  this  part  of  the  country  availed  themselves 
greatly  of  those  momentary  discontents  which  naturally  follow  the 
promulgation  of  a  new  tax.  We  are  taking  some  pains,  however, 


230  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

to  keep  the  people  steady ;  and  I  hope  with  a  majority  these  labors 
will  succeed. 

On  a  late  visit  to  Quincy,  I  was  treated  with  cordial  hospitality 
and  with  some  confidence ;  but  I  was  studiously  (as  I  thought)  pre 
vented  from  speaking  on  those  topics  which  so  much  engage  public 
attention.  I  performed  a  duty  in  attempting  it,  and  saved  myself 
great  pain  in  being  defeated.  General  Knox  tells  the  President 
he  has  many  good  men  about  him,  —  men  of  wise  heads  and  honest 
hearts,  —  but  they  are  of  a  sort  that  will  raise  insurrection,  if  some 
of  them  be  not  dismissed.  He  only  named  Tench  Francis,  but  it 
is  easy  to  fill  up  his  list.  I  wish  he  would  name  all  himself,  and 
describe  their  faults.  Doubtless  the  public  would  highly  commend 
much  of  that  conduct  he  condemns. 

Your  affectionate  and  faithful  friend, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  GORE. 

MAY  2,  1799. 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND,  —  If  acknowledgments  of  debt  would  dis 
charge  obligation,  I  should  write  a  long  letter  of  acknowledgments. 
The  particular  subject  of  your  letter  of  the  26th  of  January  had 
often  occurred  to  me,  and  some  friends  with  whom  I  converse 
about  you.  We  had  presumed  the  employment  would  be  agreeable, 
and  we  knew  the  honor  of  it  was  merited.  If  my  wishes  had 
power,  you  would  be  gratified.  I  shall  write  to  Mr.  Woleott  and 
Mr.  Pickering 1  concerning  it ;  and,  if  I  can  directly  or  indirectly 
communicate  it  to  the  President  in  a  manner  likely  to  promote  your 
views,  I  shall  certainly  do  it. 

I  rejoice  that  the  President's  speech  was  so  much  approved  by 
the  good  people  on  your  side  the  water,  but  they  certainly  praise 
it  at  the  expense  of  our  country.  The  spirit  of  that  speech  was 
elevated  than  the  spirit  of  reflecting  men  through  the  nation, 
and  its  effect  has  been  to  depress  them :  if,  however,  this  had  been 
all,  it  would  have  been  tolerable ;  but  it  is  to  be  lamented  that  the 
affected  moderation  of  that  speech  was  to  supply  by  authority  what 
was  wanted  in  argument,  —  to  silence  the  offensive  remonstrants 
against  Gerryism,  to  open  a  way  for  soothing  Jacobin  spirits,  to 
provide  for  something  like  a  support  against  the  dictatorial  temper 

1  This  promise  was  fulfilled  in  the  two  preceding  letters. 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  281 

of  high-minded  Federalists,  and  to  show  that  he  could  conduct  the 
affairs  of  the  nation  without  advisers,  &c.  Nothing  can  be  more 
unfortunate  for  him  and  for  the  country  than  this  course  of  think 
ing,  as  weak  and  false  as  it  is  vain  and  dangerous.  A  just  senti 
ment  of  personal  dignity  and  official  independence  would  be  satis 
fied  to  act  rightly,  after  having  heard  all  that  could  be  said  by  those 
it  might  consult.  The  truest  greatness  is  that  which  knows  best 
how  to  avail  itself  of  the  best  talents  of  others.  It  is  sufficient 
that  a  man  is  superior  to  menace  or  entreaty,  and  that  after  hear 
ing  his  counsellors  he  should  feel  superior  to  personal  influence, 
but  never  to  the  authority  of  reason  and  truth.  How  many  do 
wrong  that  they  may  differ  from  those  whose  opinions  they  wish  to 
be  thought  not  to  respect ! 

I  do  not  suspect  that  the  President  has  in  the  smallest  degree 
abated  his  detestation  of  French  revolutionism.  Nor  do  I  doubt 
that  the  country  pretty  well  understands  its  nature  and  its  danger 
ous  tendency  toward  us ;  but,  as  in  other  free  states,  the  spirit  of 
faction  predominates  over  every  thing.  Rivalry  among  the  Fed 
eralists  generates  opposition  to  those  distinguished  characters  who 
might  render  us  most  service.  Disappointed  men  oppose  and 
calumniate  them  openly ;  and  all  the  desperate  adventurers  who 
are  uneasy  with  their  present  condition  know  that  the  poor  we 
have  always  with  us,  and  that  these,  with  many  of  the  ignorant, 
are  easily  formed  into  a  revolutionary  corps  in  every  country. 
The  jealousy  of  the  rich  is  a  passion  in  the  poor,  which  can  always 
be  appealed  to  with  success  on  every  question,  and  instead  of  an 
answer  to  every  argument.  Time  and  experience  will  prove  the 
fallacy  of  every  theory  of  government  which  admits  universal 
suffrage  as  a  right,  but  our  people  will  not  be  wise  enough  to 
apply  a  remedy  voluntarily.  Like  other  evils,  therefore,  it  must 
be  left  to  produce  its  own  cure.  So  I  preach,  instead  of  replying 
directly  to  your  inquiries  about  Congress,  &c. 

I  have  often  wished  you  here  to  write  books,  because  they  would 
do  much  service  in  palliating  and  protracting  evils  which  cannot 
be  wholly  averted.  We  all  work  a  little  ;  but  your  patience,  per 
severance,  and  mellifluence  are  extremely  wanted. 

May  Heaven  bless  you.  G.  C. 


232  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 


CABOT  TO  GORE. 

JUNE  9,  1799. 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND,  —  I  have  by  a  former  conveyance  informed 
you  that  I  had  written  to  Mr.  Pickering  and  Mr.  Wolcott  concern 
ing  a  future  destination,  arid  I  have  no  doubt  they  will  promote  your 
wishes,  because  they  will  in  so  doing  serve  the  public.  It  is  prob 
able,  however,  that  their  influence  will  be  much  less  than  it  ought 
to  be,  as  they  are  suspected  of  enjoying  more  consideration  in  the 
community  than  consists  with  the  respect  claimed  by  another. 

It  has  been  a  part  of  the  cant  of  Democratic  writers  to  ascribe 
to  kings  exclusively  an  undue  love  of  praise,  and  to  subjects  the 
disgrace  of  giving  it,  however  unmerited.  Few  kings  I  believe 
could  be  named,  who  swallowed  grosser  flattery  than  our  Governor 
Hancock  daily  required  and  received  from  servile  citizens.  You 
recollect  how  entirely  men  of  dignity  and  worth  were  excluded 
from  his  confidence,  because  they  could  not  yield  the  adulation  he 
desired.  It  must  be  unhappy  for  our  country  if  ever  a  man  of  such 
character  should  be  raised  to  the  head  of  the  Union. 

I  have  received  your  favor  of  the  9th  of  March,  with  a  copy  of 
one  of  the  27th  of  February,  the  original  of  which  has  not  come 
to  hand.  I  am  impatient  to  see  the  manuscript  of  which  it  speaks, 
not  doubting  it  will  be  useful  to  the  public,  and  at  any  rate  to  a 
part  of  that  public.  Be  assured,  if  it  reaches  me,  I  will  observe 
your  directions,  and  pursue  a  course  which  shall  best  fulfil  your 
wishes. 

Notwithstanding  your  reasoning  upon  the  nominations  for  Peters 
burg  and  the  Porte,1  I  have  no  suspicion  that  there  exists  a  dis 
position  toward  you  particularly  unfriendly.  If  I  did,  I  would 
disclose  it  frankly.  I  shall,  however,  be  able  to  ascertain  the 
precise  circumstances  of  those  nominations  in  a  month  or  two,  and 
if  there  be  any  thing  in  them  of  importance  you  shall  be  informed. 

It  has  often  occurred  to  me  that  you  and  Mr.  King  would  blame 
me  much  for  the  scanty  information  I  give  you  of  what  passes  on 
this  side  of  the  water,  and  especially  that  I  should  omit  to  explain 
why  the  United  States  remain  in  such  an  absurd  state  in  relation 

1  Mr.  King,  minister  to  England,  had  heen  appointed  to  negotiate  a  treaty 
with  Russia  through  the  Russian  minister  at  London.  Mr.  Smith,  our  minister 
at  Lisbon,  had  been  appointed  to  negotiate  with  the  Porte.  Thus  Mr.  Gore 
failed  to  obtain  either  of  the  employments  for  which  he  had  expressed  a 
desire. 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  233 

to  France.  But  the  truth  is  that  I  have  been  discouraged  from 
attempting  to  explain  a  course  of  conduct  which,  after  it  was  com 
menced,  has  been  guided  by  accident  and  caprice.  If  there  was  a 
system  in  the  heads  of  the  advisers,  as  I  presume  there  was,  it  never 
has  been  fully  adopted  by  the  principal,  or  has  been  relaxed  from 
jealousy.  You  know  all  that  I  do  of  the  character  of  the  agents, 
and  you  can  easily  conceive  of  the  inconsistencies  which  they  might 
produce.  A  jealousy  of  Pickering  and  Wolcott,  and  a  resentment 
against  all  censurers  of  Gerry,  have  greatly  diminished  their  influence ; 
while  men  of  another  cast  are  naturally  taken  into  favor,  and  their 
suggestions  listened  to.  The  old  jealousy  of  Hamilton  is  revived 
with  tenfold  force  ;  and  even  the  raising  an  army,  so  essential  to  the 
protection  of  the  government  and  country,  is  frowned  upon  by  the 
President,  because  it  may  display  Hamilton's  greatness :  so  that 
we  are  not  to  be  saved,  lest  the  man  most  conspicuous  in  saving  us 
should  be  called  saviour.  So  I  read  our  politics,  but  it  is  chiefly 
without  book. 

We  are  lamenting  the  death  of  Sumner,1  whose  loss  is  irrepar 
able.  Ames  is  one  of  the  council  to  Lieutenant- Governor  Gill, 
but  whether  he  will  be  listened  to  I  don't  know. 

Farewell.  Yours,  G.  C. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  July  8,  1799. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  transmit  herewith  a  copy  of  Mr.  Lowell's  ora 
tion,  which  gave  great  pleasure  to  the  auditory  on  Thursday.  The 
President  was  particularly  gratified  with  it,  and  declared  his  appro 
bation  of  every  sentiment  except  those  which  were  complimentary 
to  himself.  I  have  been  often  told  that  you  intended  to  make  a 
visit  to  your  natale  solum  in  the  course  of  this  summer,  but  am 
now  informed  that  you  have  relinquished  the  design.  This,  if  true, 
will  greatly  disappoint  very  many  here,  and  especially  your  affec 
tionate  friend,  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  Sept.  5,  1799. 

Mr  DEAR  SIR,  —  The  letter  directed  to  Mr.  Lowell  was  de 
livered  to  him  :  he  has  long  thought  properly  on  the  subject  of 
government,  and  knows  how  to  estimate  the  men  who  support  our 
own. 

1  Hon.  Increase  Sumner,  at  that  time  Governor  of  Massachusetts. 


234  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

It  has  been  thought  incredible  that  the  United  States  should  at 
this  period  renew  their  negotiations  with  France:  it  is  not  seen 
that  any  good  can  come  of  it,  but  much  trouble  may  come,  which 
might  otherwise  be  avoided.  It  is  mere  fastidiousness  to  say  we 
will  negotiate  because  we  have  a  right ;  it  is  Quixotism  to  suppose 
that  we  must  exercise  this  right  to  prove  that  we  possess  it,  or  to 
prevent  our  forbearance  from  being  imputed  to  fear.  When  our 
rights  are  questioned,  they  must  be  maintained  at  every  hazard ; 
but  neither  prudence  nor  honor  requires  us  to  provoke  attacks. 

A  negotiation  with  France  will  necessarily  excite  the  jealousy,  if 
not  the  resentment,  of  the  coalesced  powers,  who  will  say  that  they 
are  fighting  for  us  as  well  as  themselves,  and  that  the  security  and 
tranquillity  we  enjoy  are  the  fruit  of  their  efforts  and  the  price  of 
their  blood  ;  that  it  is  a  dishonorable  traffic  on  our  part,  and  but 
for  their  energies  would  soon  appear  to  be  unsafe  ;  and,  finally, 
that  the  disposition  of  the  common  enemy  to  treat  with  us  at  all 
arises  wholly  from  the  distress  into  which  they  have  driven  him, 
and  that  the  end  he  proposes  by  it  is  a  recruit  of  means  to  annoy 
them.  If  any  ideas  of  this  sort  are  entertained  by  the  coalesced 
powers,  they  will  feel  exasperated  at  our  conduct,  and  will  lead  us 
to  dread  their  successes  as  much  as  we  have  dreaded  those  of 
France  ;  for  power,  we  well  know,  always  engenders  haughtiness, 
insolence,  and  injustice.  It  appears  to  me  we  have  already  as 
much  misunderstanding  with  some  of  them  as  can  be  either  borne 
or  explained  with  good  humor  ;  and  it  is  not  easy  to  discover  how 
we  are  to  avoid  downright  quarrels,  after  new  sources  of  irritation 
shall  be  opened. 

There  are  very  few  men  of  information  or  reflection  in  this 
quarter  who  do  not  feel  alarmed.  Our  preachers  and  orators 
almost  universally  have  expressed  a  joy  at  the  separation  from 
France,  and  a  confident  hope  that  we  should  keep  aloof  from  her 
influence,  poisons,  and. plagues  ;  and  I  certainly  do  not  know  one 
in  twenty  among  the  Federalists  who  thinks  there  is  any  apology 
for  attempting  to  renew  the  intercourse  in  any  shape. 

A  few  men  try  to  console  themselves  with  the  confidence  they 
place  in  Mr.  Ellsworth  ;  but  the  evil  is  negotiation.  If  the  disas 
ters  of  the  campaign  are  not  mitigated  by  some  successes  to  the 
arms  of  France,  she  will  probably  grant  us  every  thing  in  promises  ; 
and  the  more  she  grants  in  this  way,  the  more  we  shall  be  embar 
rassed  by  the  measure,  and  finally  gain  nothing.  But  France  will 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  235 

gain  a  great  deal.  She  will  involve  us  in  difficulties,  and  perhaps 
war  with  her  enemies,  and  in  that  case  will  recover  all  her  in 
fluence  here  ;  but  without  war  she  will  gain  a  free  access,  which 
she  now  wants.  You  know  my  obstinate  opinions  upon  the  nature 
of  French  republicanism  :  it  is  a  modification  of  the  vilest  and 
wickedest  ambition  the  world  has  ever  seen.  I  believe  a  small 
portion  of  numbers  in  France  can  be  found  who  would  not  be 
glad  to  see  the  present  system  annihilated,  and  the  old  regime 
restored,  or  some  sort  of  monarchy.  I  have  no  doubt  such  a 
change  will  take  place  sooner  or  later.  If  military  events  accel 
erate  it,  the  new  government  in  France  will  feel  no  partiality 
toward  those  who  have  officiously  and  unnecessarily  attached  them 
selves  to  the  bloody  usurpers,  as  the  present  regents  will  be  called. 
This  view  of  the  subject  makes  the  negotiation,  at  least,  of  doubtful 
policy,  as  regards  the  French  nation.  You  see  I  cannot  refrain 
from  perplexing  myself  with  affairs  which  are  committed  to  better 
hands.  But  I  will  not  tease  you  with  all  my  conjectures  or  appre 
hensions.  I  pray  Heaven  to  bless  you,  and,  as  our  clergy  express 
it,  to  preserve  to  you  the  spirit  of  your  station. 

Your  affectionate  and  faithful  friend,          GEORGE  CABOT. 


PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

TRENTON,  Sept.  13,  1799. 

DEAR  SIR, —  This  morning  I  received  your  favor  of  the  5th. 
Mr.  Higginson  had  before  written  me  on  the  same  subject ;  and, 
for  such  information  as  I  can  give,  I  pray  you  to  read  my  answer 
of  yesterday  to  him,  after  which  I  wish  the  letter  may  be  burnt. 

In  that  answer,  I  have  said  that  but  for  recent  events,  intending 
chiefly  those  in  France,  the  attempt  to  divert  the  President  from 
the  negotiation  could  not  have  been  made.  After  the  first  nom 
ination  of  Mr.  Murray,  instead  of  rejecting  the  project  absolutely, 
the  supporters  of  government  thought  no  remedy,  or  rather  pallia 
tive,  was  practicable  but  the  nominating  of  three  commissioners  in 
the  place  of  one.  The  principle  was,  as  I  understood,  that  the 
Federalists  had  from  the  beginning  declared  that  the  Senate  had 
no  right  to  judge  of  a  measure  of  the  kind,  but  only  of  the  men 
proposed  to  execute  it.  This  principle,  having  been  from  the  for 
mation  of  the  government  advanced  and  advocated  by  the  Federal 
ists,  could  not,  on  the  occasion  of  Murray's  nomination,  be  departed 


236  LIFE  AND   LETTERS    OF  GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

from  without  inconsistency.  I  have  never  deliberated  on  this 
point,  but  taken  it  up  as  I  found  it.  I  wish,  however,  that  the 
stand  had  now  been  made.  I  wish  the  project  of  negotiating  with 
France,  such  as  she  then  was,  had  been  peremptorily  rejected,  if 
a  vote  of  rejection  could  have  been  obtained,  of  which  there  was 
at  least  some  doubt ;  the  weak  and  timid  Federalists  manifesting 
a  deposition  to  join  the  antis  for  the  sake  of  peace.  The  nomi 
nation  of  ambassadors  and  other  foreign  ministers  seems  to  me 
different  from  the  nomination  of  judges  and  other  officers.  Of  the 
latter,  the  duty  and  the  extent  of  their  powers  are  prescribed  by 
the  known  laws  of  the  land,  and  therefore  nothing  remains  for 
the  Senate  to  judge  of  but  the  fitness  or  unfitness  of  the  candidates 
for  the  offices  to  which  they  are  nominated  by  the  President.  But, 
in  foreign  affairs,  the  Senate  have  a  right  of  judging  whether  any 
and  what  special  relations  shall  be  formed  with  other  sovereigns 
and  states,  the  power  of  making  treaties  being  vested  in  them  in 
concurrence  with  the  President. 

And  why  not  the  initiative  as  well  as  the  concluding  power? 
"Why  not  of  deciding  beforehand  whether  any  connection  should 
be  formed,  as  afterwards  whether  the  proposed  terms  and  condi 
tions  of  the  connection  are  salutary  or  hostile  to  the  interests  of 
the  United  States  ?  Why  should  the  perfect  right  and  freedom  of 
judging  in  the  Senate  be  controlled  by  an  independent  act  of  the 
President  ?  Did  not  the  Constitution  intend  to  vest  in  the  Senate 
the  like  independent  power  to  reject  treaties  formed  by  the  Presi 
dent,  as  to  reject  bills  formed  by  the  House  of  Representatives  ? 
In  the  latter  case,  have  not  the  Senate  a  perfect  right  to  reject  as 
well  because  a  bill  is  founded  in  an  erroneous  principle  as  for 
defective  or  improvident  provisions  in  the  enacting  clauses  ?  But 
is  not  the  Senate  foreclosed  from  judging  of  the  principle  of  a 
treaty,  by  previously  assenting  to  the  nomination  of  ministers  to 
negotiate  it  ?  And  if  afterwards  they  reject  one,  when  the  articles 
are  adapted  to  the  subjects  treated  on,  will  it  not  expose  the  coun 
try  to  the  reproach  of  bad  faith  ? 

I  remember  to  have  read  in  the  records  of  my  office  a  report 
made  to  President  Washington,  in  1792,  by  Mr.  Jefferson,  of  cer 
tain  terms  to  be  proposed  in  a  treaty  with  Spain,  and  a  submission 
of  it  to  the  Senate  for  their  previous  opinion  and  advice;  and  their 
opinion  and  advice  were  given. 

As  I  have  never  before  considered  this  subject,  my  reasoning 


1790.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  237 

may  be  very  wild  and  inconclusive.  I  must  presume  it  is  so,  since 
the  principle  has  been  so  long  since  discussed  and  settled  by  men 
from  whom  I  place  myself  at  a  humble  distance.  But,  if  their 
construction  is  the  only  one  of  which  the  constitution  will  admit,  it 
is  time  it  was  changed.  From  what  I  have  heard  of  the  Presi 
dent's  opinion  on  this  subject,  I  perceive  that  such  a  previous  inter 
position  of  the  Senate  with  their  advice  and  opinion  would  be 
deemed  as  unwarrantable  and  unholy  as  it  was  for  an  unanointed 
priest  to  touch  the  Jewish  ark. 

I  have  this  week  sent  to  the  President  a  draught  of  instructions 
to  the  envoys,  as  settled  here  with  my  colleagues.  Pursuant  to  the 
President's  orders,  I  at  the  same  time  sent  the  press  copy  of  them 
to  Mr.  Ellsworth.  This  excellent  man,  when  here  in  August,  saw 
no  alternative  but  that  he  must  go.  The  subsequent  changes  in 
Europe,  and  especially  in  France,  I  think  must  change  his  ideas. 
I  wish  you  would  write  him  upon  it,  and  propose  his  attempting  to 
dissuade  the  President  from  the  pursuit.  I  also  will  write  him. 
There  is  nothing  in  politics  he  more  detests  than  this  mission,  and 
nothing  in  nature  he  more  dreads  than  the  voyage  across  the 
wide  Atlantic.  Governor  Davie1  is  evidently  pleased  with  the 
business ;  but  his  letter  to  me  was  prior  to  the  late  arrivals  from 
Europe.  Is  there  no  man  near  the  President,  whose  opinion  he 
will  respect,  believing  it  to  be  given  sincerely  for  his  honor  and 
glory,  as  well  as  for  his  country's  good  ? 

My  chief  clerk  has  found  the  report  of  Mr.  Jefferson,  before 
mentioned;  and  I  enclose  the  resolve  which  the  Senate  passed  upon 
it  the  16th  of  March,  1792.  I  feel  myself  obliged  by  all  your 
communications,  and  pray  you  to  continue  them,  being  as  sincerely 
as  respectfully  yours,  TIMOTHY  PICKERING. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  Sept.  22,  1799. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  As  soon  as  I  was  made  to  believe  that  the 
new  envoys  were  actually  going  to  France,  I  sat  down  and  penned 
the  observations  contained  in  the  enclosed  six  numbers.  My 
motive  was  solely  to  present  to  the  President  a  view  of  the  subject 
in  the  light  in  which  it  appeared  to  almost  every  man  whose  opin 
ion  he  respected  three  years  ago. 

I  did  not  however  feel  satisfied  that  it  would  not  drag  him  before 
the  public  eye,  by  the  discussions  which  it  would  excite.     I  there- 
1  Of  North  Carolina. 


238  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

fore  did  not  publish.  When  you  have  run  them  over,  and,  if  you 
please,  shewn  them  to  our  friend  Mr.  Wolcott,  you  may  enclose 
them  to  me  in  a  blank  cover. 

Your  faithful  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 

I  have  this  moment  received  your  favor  of  the  13th,  which  I 
will  answer  by  the  next  post. 

A  plain  and  perspicuous  statement  has  been  attempted  of  the 
few  leading  ideas  which  occur  on  the  report  of  the  day,  that  a  new 
cargo  of  envoys  is  speedily  to  be  shipped  for  France.  Upon 
review  of  what  is  written,  I  confess  there  does  not  appear  to  me 
any  sufficient  motive  for  the  publication,  but,  on  the  contrary,  it 
may  produce  an  unnecessary  irritation.  If  any  thing  could  be 
done  at  this  hour,  it  must  be  by  an  able  display  of  the  subject,  in  a 
private  letter  to  Ellsworth,  which  might  engage  him  to  expostulate 
strongly  with  the  President,  and  refuse  to  go. 

[ Memo,  of  passages  from  some  papers  of  George   Cabot,  of  Sept. 

22,  1799.] 

Having  described  the  character  of  the  French  govern 
ment,  he  says  :  — 

"  With  such  a  power,  there  ought  to  be  no  truce,  and  there  can 
be  no  peace  but  at  the  expense  of  national  honor  and  national 
safety.  A  peace  with  such  a  power  is  a  bridge  for  an  enemy  to 
advance  upon  into  the  country  he  means  to  destroy." 

"  While  France  is  governed  by  men,  or  principles  such  as  have 
governed  her  for  several  years,  we  have  only  the  option  to  be  her 
'  enemies '  or  her  *  slaves.' " 

"  The  despatches  of  our  envoys  disclosed  our  dangers,  and  put 
an  end  to  those  delusions  which  had  almost  consummated  our  ruin." 
"  The  people  were  then  made  sensible  that  in  vain  we  had  drunk 
of  the  cup  of  humiliation  to  its  very  dregs.  They  saw  the  fatal 
error  of  Switzerland  and  other  States,  and  were  convinced  that, 
under  Providence,  they  must  trust  to  their  arms  at  last  for  the 
security  of  their  most  '  precious  interests.'  *  These  interests,'  the 
President  has  lately  assured  us,  '  are  still  held  in  jeopardy  by  the 
hostile  designs  and  insidious  arts  of  a  foreign  nation,'  —  France. 
It  is  now  a  problem  how  a  treaty  can  be  made  with  France,  which 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  239 

will  not  be  beneficial  to  her,  and  injurious,  or  at  lest  fruitless,  to 
the  United  States." 

"  From  the  nature  and  constitution  of  the  revolutionary  system, 
France  is,  and  must  continue,  irreconcilably  hostile  to  every  inde 
pendent  State.  If  she  stoops,  she  stoops  only  to  conquer.  She 
must  aim  at  controlling  by  art  and  intrigue  those  whom  her  arms 
do  not  reach." 

"  France  at  this  moment  will  grant  us  in  promises  whatever 
we  should  be  likely  to  demand ;  yet,  as  she  acknowledges  no  obli 
gation  but  that  of  physical  force,  it  is  evident  that  whatever  we 
concede  must  be  in  effect  gratuitous.  Should  we  give  only  the 
ordinary  privileges  of  hospitality  to  her  incendiaries,  we  should 
again  see  some  part  of  our  country  on  fire,  if  the  present  order 
of  things  in  France  is  maintained.  But  if  that  order  is  annihi 
lated,  as  it  probably  will  be  in  the  hands  of  Frenchmen,  it  may 
happen  that  the  new  government  will  not  regard  as  friends  those 
who  have  officiously  and  unnecessarily  associated  with  their  bloody 
tyrant  usurpers,  as  the  revolutionists  may  then  be  styled." 

With  respect  to  "  the  interests  and  feelings  of  the  other  great 
powers  at  war,  it  is  true  that,  while  we  respect  the  rights  of  other 
nations,  we  are  not  accountable  to  them  for  the  discretion  with 
which  we  exercise  our  own.  But  we  cannot  be  insensible  that 
actions  in  themselves  strictly  lawful  are  often  highly  inexpedient. 
In  the  use  of  the  clearest  rights  and  in  the  preservation  of  unsul 
lied  honor,  prudence  guides  the  individual,  and  policy  must  guide 
the  nation.  In  a  contest  like  the  present,  where  every  thing  is  at 
stake,  the  sensibility  of  the  combatants  will  be  lively,  their  jeal 
ousy  quick,  and  resentment  strong.  The  coalesced  powers  feel  — 
ivhat  no  one  can  deny  —  that  they  are  fighting  the  battles  of  every 
independent  people  as  well  as  their  own.  It  cannot  be  expected, 
therefore,  that  they  would  see  the  friendly  overtures  of  any  coun 
try,  to  the  common  enemy,  without  great  emotions.  It  would  be 
a  new  thing  under  the  sun,  if  such  a  transaction  should  not  en 
gender  distrust  and  give  birth  to  every  hostile  sentiment." 

[When  the  French  legislature  passed  the  law  prohibiting  the 
neutral  powers  to  carry  on  any  commerce  with  England,  or, 
which  was  the  same  thing,  declaring  the  produce  and  manufac 
tures  of  the  British  good  prize  in  neutral  vessels,  although  the 
property  of  neutrals,  and  vessels  and  cargoes  subject  to  confisca 
tion,  I  thought  that  this  outrage  upon  the  rights  of  all  nations 


240  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OP   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

would  have  justified  Great  Britain  in  counteracting  it  by  prohibit 
ing  the  neutral  nations  to  have  any  commerce  with  France,  and 
enforcing  the  prohibition  by  the  capture  and  confiscation  of  all 
vessels  attempting  to  carry  it  on.  —  T.  P.] 

"  Seventy  millions  of  dollars,  in  a  late  letter  addressed  to  the 
citizens  of  the  United  States,  citizen  Barlow l  tells  us  have  been 
taken  from  us  by  the  French.  Probably  citizen  Barlow  exagger 
ates  the  account ;  but,  however  this  may  be,  he  hardly  attempts  to 
palliate  the  atrocity  of  this  immense  robbery,  although  he  is  the  tool 
of  the  Directory ;  and  yet  to  this  moment  we  have  not  dared  to 
make  reprisals  on  French  property  !  The  restraining  our  captures 
to  the  armed  vessels  of  France  is  a  humiliation  of  our  country 
which  has  been  too  long  protracted  already ;  and  its  continuance 
after  Congress  shall  meet  will  be  without  excuse,  unless  we  are  in 
fact  courting  those  whom  we  really  detest,  and  whose  friendship 
every  good  man  dreads." 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  Sept,  23,  1799. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  very  early  turned  my  attention  to  the 
power  of  the  Senate  in  the  appointment  of  officers.  I  do  not 
recollect  that  I  ever  thought  the  terms  of  the  Constitution  would  be 
better  satisfied  with  the  use  of  that  power  in  the  limited  manner 
contended  for  by  the  Federalists  than  by  the  extent  contended  for 
by  their  opponents ;  but  I  never  doubted  that  the  limitation  of  the 
Federalists  was  absolutely  necessary  to  prevent  the  executive  power 
from  passing  into  the  hands  of  a  cabcd.  Under  this  conviction, 
I  easily  adopted  the  idea  that  the  power  of  the  Senate  was  in  no 
sense  initiative  or  even  active,  but  negative  and  censorial,  and  was 
never  to  be  exercised  but  in  cases  where  the  persons  proposed  for 
office  were  unfit.  I  have  always  rejected  the  idea  of  non-concur 
rence  with  a  nomination  merely  because  the  nominee  was  less 
suitable  for  the  office  than  thousands  of  others  :  he  must  be  posi 
tively  unfit  for  the  office,  and  the  public  duty  not  likely  to  be  per 
formed  by  him,  to  justify  in  my  mind  the  non-concurrence.  It  has 
always  appeared  to  me  that  a  departure  from  this  principle  would 
soon  wrest  from  the  President  altogether  the  essence  of  the  nomi 
nating  power,  which  is  the  power  of  selecting  officers ;  and  I  am 
fully  persuaded  that  the  disposal  of  offices  is  of  all  things  the 

1  Joel  Barlow,  afterwards  minister  to  France  during  Mr.  Madison's  ad 
ministration. 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  241 

most  dangerous  to  a  body  of  men.  The  motives  to  provide  for  the 
friends  of  each  other,  and  to  feed  their  dependants,  are  so  power 
ful,  that  they  will  always  be  yielded  to  by  men  who  do  not  stand 
individually  responsible  to  public  opinion.  I  am  persuaded  that 
any  body  of  men  as  numerous  as  the  Senate,  possessing  such  a 
power,  however  pure  they  may  have  been  originally,  will  be  cor 
rupted  by  it,  and  will  corrupt  others.  With  respect  to  the  power 
of  the  Senate  in  making  treaties,  I  believe  in  matters  of  such 
great  moment  it  was  well  to  provide  that  their  sanction  should  be 
given  to  treaties  before  they  could  have  the  force  of  laws,  or  be 
binding  on  the  nation.  It  is  a  check  upon  the  President  that  may 
be  always  salutary  by  way  of  prevention  of  abuses,  and  is  a  quiet 
and  effectual  remedy  in  the  last  resorts  ;  but  the  same  sort  of  ob 
jections  as  are  made  to  their  sharing  actually  with  the  President 
the  power  of  appointment  to  office  apply  to  their  sharing  in  the 
actual  management  of  foreign  relations.  If  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States  should  be  admitted  to  possess  the  right  to  determine 
a  priori  what  foreign  connections  should  be  sought  or  shunned,  I 
should  fear  that  they  would  soon  exhibit  the  humiliating  spec 
tacle  of  caps  and  hats,  which  so  long  and  so  naturally  appeared  in 
Sweden.1  I  confess  to  you  my  opinion  that  republican  govern 
ments  have  never  yet  had  a  fair  experiment  in  the  world,  chiefly 
because  they  have  never  constituted  the  supreme  executive,  at  the 
same  time  single  and  independent,  of  competent  force  and  sufficient 
duration.  If  a  free  government  is  a  government  of  laws,  constitu 
tionally  enacted,  there  ought  always  to  exist  a  power  to  execute 
those  laws ;  otherwise  it  is  a  faction  governs  instead  of  the  laws. 
The  presidential  authority  of  the  United  States  will  dwindle  to 
nothing,  if  the  policy  of  the  Senate  should  so  far  change  that  they 
assume  to  themselves,  and  deny  to  the  President,  all  the  power  the 

1  By  the  great  limitations  imposed  on  the  royal  power  after  the  death 
of  Charles  XII.,  the  Diet  became  all-powerful.  Consisting  of  four  orders, 
nobles,  burghers,  clergy,  and  peasants,  the  Diet  was  always  turbulent,  and 
soon  grew  to  be  corrupt.  The  "  Hats  "  were  those  who  wished  to  invigorate 
the  royal  power,  which  the  "  Caps  "  sought  to  still  further  diminish.  The 
"  Caps  "  were  in  the  pay  of  Russia,  and  the  "  Hats  "  soon  sold  themselves  to 
France.  These  miserable  intrigues  and  turbulent  dissensions  were  at  their 
height  during  the  reign  of  Adolphus  Frederick  (1751-1771).  The  son  and 
successor  of  Frederic,  Gustavus  III.,  rebelled  against  this  odious  legislative 
tyranny,  accompanied  by  foreign  interference.  By  a  well-executed  coup 
d'tftat,  he  overthrew  the  power  of  the  Diet,  and  converted  the  most  limited 
monarchy  in  Europe  into  one  of  the  most  absolute. 

16 


242  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOEGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

words  of  the  Constitution  will  allow.  I  am  sensible  there  are  evils 
both  ways,  and  the  caprice  which  has  been  discovered  to  govern 
some  most  important  determinations  leads  one  to  lay  less  stress  on 
the  advantage  of  individual  responsibility  than  abstract  reasonings 
promise ;  still,  however,  it  is,  in  my  opinion,  the  best  part  of  our 
Federal  theory.  I  certainly  do  not  mean  to  flatter  when  I  attribute 
to  this  principle,  operating  through  the  medium  of  the  executive 
departments,  every  thing  excellent  which  has  been  done  by  the 
government. 

I  well  remember  the  business  of  the  Spanish  treaty,  and  I  think 
I  was  one  of  the  committee  to  whom  the  reference  was  made.  A 
number  of  commercial  points  were  examined,  and  the  Senate  agreed 
that  they  would  ratify,  &c.  This  was  abundant  caution  on  the 
part  of  the  President,  and  was  not  supposed  to  be  a  measure  which 
the  Senate  could  with  any  propriety  have  moved  in,  unless  required 
by  the  President. 

The  arguments  you  have  used  are  better  than  those  I  heard 
in  the  Senate  on  that  side  of  the  question.  They  are  sufficient  to 
warrant,  perhaps,  the  construction  they  advocate,  if  that  construction 
would  in  fact  be  propitious  to  the  best  administration  of  the  gov 
ernment.  You  see  I  give  you  my  unstudied  sentiments  with  a 
frankness  which  would  need  apology,  if  separated  from  other  senti 
ments  which  I  indulge  with  pride  and  pleasure.  Mr.  T.  Williams 
has  just  received  a  pamphlet  containing  Sir  William  Scott's  opinion 
and  decision  on  the  ships  captured  under  the  Swedish  convoy.  I 
was  allowed  only  twenty  minutes  to  run  it  over,  but  I  saw  enough 
to  make  me  insist  it  should  be  sent  to  you,  unless  it  immediately 
goes  through  the  press. 

I  remain  your  faithful  friend,  and  much  obliged 

GEORGE  CABOT. 

P.  S.  I  had  written  to  Mr.  Ellsworth  through  the  medium  of 
Governor  Trumbull,  and  received  his  answer  before  your  sugges 
tion.  I  rejoiced  to  find  he  thinks  precisely  as  we  do  on  the  general 
merits. 

PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

TRENTON,  Sept.  29,  1799. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  just  received  your  favor  of  the  23d.  With 
respect  to  the  appointment  to  office  by  a  body  of  men,  I  have  for  a 
long  series  of  years  entertained  the  same  opinion  which  you  express  ; 


1799.1  CORRESPONDENCE.  243 

and  yet  there  are  exceptions  which  produce  no  mischief,  as  in 
Connecticut,  where  even  the  judges  are  annually  appointed  by  the 
legislative  body.  But  such  are  the  excellent  habits  of  the  people 
of  that  small  State  that  the  executive  as  well  as  judicial  offices  are 
in  fact  held  during  good  behavior.  The  ideas  I  expressed  on  the 
treaty-making  power  were  those  of  the  moment,  arising  as  I  wrote. 
They  concerned  a  question  which,  having  been  settled  before  I  came 
into  the  administration,  I  had  never  heard  discussed,  and  which,  for 
want  of  an  occasion,  had  never  exercised  my  own  reflections  ;  and, 
pressed  by  the  existing  evil,  my  thoughts  reached  after  an  imme 
diate,  I  should  rather  say  direct,  remedy.  It  is  doubtless  best 
that  the  initiative  power  in  making  treaties  should  rest  with  the 
President ;  and,  as  foreign  powers  know  that  the  validity  of  his 
stipulations  depends  on  the  sanction  of  the  Senate,  they  will  accord 
ingly  make  their  calculations.  The  secrecy  necessary  in  negotiat 
ing  would  be  impracticable,  if  the  Senate  were  to  partake  in  the 
first  stages  thereof;  and  this,  when  writing  you  before,  struck  me 
so  forcibly,  that  I  conceived  the  Senate  should  be  previously  con 
sulted  only  on  the  single  question,  —  Shall  any  treaty  be  formed 
with  such  a  foreign  power? 

( Confidential. ) 

With  your  letter,  I  received  this  morning  one  from  Mr.  Ellsworth, 
dated  the  26th,  in  which  he  quotes  from  a  letter  he  had  just  re 
ceived  from  the  President  the  following  words :  "  The  convulsions 
in  France,  the  change  of  the  Directory,  and  the  prognostics  of  a 
greater  change,  will  certainly  induce  me  to  postpone,  for  a  longer 
or  shorter  time,  the  mission  to  France."  These  are  the  very  rea 
sons  (to  be  sure,  very  obvious  ones)  which,  with  the  assent  of  my 
colleagues,  I  had  stated  to  the  President  as  motives  for  suspending 
the  mission  in  a  letter  the  receipt  of  which  he  has  acknowledged, 
but  without  expressing  himself  so  strongly  as  in  the  above  passage 
to  Mr.  Ellsworth.  I  have  indeed  supposed  that,  not  having  conde 
scended  to  consult  us  in  the  origin  of  this  humiliating  business,  we 
should  not  be  the  first  to  be  made  acquainted  with  a  suspension 
or  abandonment  of  it :  it  would  savor  of  concession.  Before  this 
reaches  you,  another  promising  circumstance  will  be  known  to  you, 
—  his  departure  from  Quincy  for  Trenton,  where  he  will  meet 
Messrs.  Ellsworth  and  Davie  and  the  heads  of  departments  prior 
to  a  final  determination.  It  has  therefore  happened  well,  probably, 


244  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

that  the  publication  of  "  Cato  " l  was  omitted.     You  will  find  the 
six  numbers  enclosed.     Mr.  Wolcott  has  read  them. 

I  am  most  truly  yours,  TIMOTHY  PICKERING. 

I  have  received  from  Mr.  King  Sir  William  Scott's  opinion  and 
decision  on  the  Swedish  convoy.  The  instructions  to  our  armed 
vessels  conform  to  the  doctrine  he  lays  down.  Have  you  got  Bar 
low's  late  letter,  addressed  to  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  in 
which  he  tells  us  that  "  seventy  millions  of  dollars  have  been  taken 
from  us  by  the  French  "  ?  I  have  not  seen  it. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  Oct.  16, 1799. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  ought  immediately  on  receipt  of  your  favor 
of  the  2d  to  have  made  the  acknowledgment ;  but  I  procrastinated 
it,  upon  the  idea  that  I  should  accompany  it  with  a  few  remarks  on 
the  observations  you  had  made  on  British  finances,  and  the  effects 
which  might  ultimately  be  felt  here  in  case  of  their  derangement. 

I  am  forcibly  struck  with  the  importance  of  your  opinions,  and 
see  in  them  a  new  motive  to  regret  the  unfortunate  measures  of 
our  executive.  I  think,  however,  that  the  resources  of  Great  Brit 
ain  have  always  been  underrated.  An  industrious,  enterprising, 
and  ingenious  nation,  possessing  almost  exclusively  and  securely 
the  navigation  and  trading  stock  of  three-quarters  of  the  globe,  and 
a  large  portion  of  the  skill,  machinery,  and  capital  of  its  manufac 
tures,  and  all  the  advantages  of  these  well  protected  to  the  individ 
ual  proprietors  by  a  liberal,  just,  and  stable  government,  offer  a 
mass  of  productive  power,  the  fruits  of  which  can  hardly  be  cal 
culated. 

I  saw  plainly  at  the  moment  bank-notes  were  not  exchangeable 
for  gold  and  silver  at  the  option  of  the  holder,  that  these  metals 
were  no  longer  the  measure  of  value.  I  have  been  astonished  to 
see  the  paper  supported ;  and  I  do  not  expect  to  see  this  support 
continue,  unless  the  paper  shall  in  fact  be  exchangeable  at  the 
pleasure  of  the  holder.  Gold  and  silver  must  inevitably  disappear 
soon  after  the  depreciation  of  paper  appears  ;  but,  all  this  being 
perfectly  understood,  it  is  presumable  that  those  who  guide  the 
affairs  of  the  nation  will  either  return  and  adhere  rigidly  to  the 

1  The  signature  under  which  Mr.  Cabot  wrote  the  series  of  papers  not 
published  at  the  time,  but  given  above,  pp.  238-240. 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  245 

metals,  or  introduce  a  paper  system  which  shall  accommodate  their 
necessities,  and  finally  relieve  the  nation  from  some  part  of  its  bur 
den.  But,  in  either  course,  the  society  ought  not  to  be  disorganized ; 
and,  constituted  as  they  are  and  abounding  in  means,  I  should  think 
motives  could  not  be  wanting  to  preserve  the  order  of  the  state 
while  the  operation  is  performing.  If,  however,  it  be  true  that  the 
passions  of  the  nation  must  be  occupied  in  a  foreign  war  to  prevent 
their  employment  at  home,  such  a  war  must  be  with  the  great 
powers  of  Europe,  or  it  will  not  be  sufficiently  interesting.  Indeed, 
every  war  into  which  France  or  England  enters  may  be  expected 
to  engage  them  both  as  adversaries ;  and  this  great  rivalry  seems 
to  me  to  furnish  a  strong  motive  with  each  of  them  to  avoid  push 
ing  us  to  hostility.  I  cannot  deny  that  what  you  suggest  as  a 
means  of  preserving  their  artists  and  manufacturing  capitals  will  be 
likely  to  occur  to  the  British  cabinet,  and  will  be  so  strong  a  temp 
tation  to  break  with  us,  that,  if  aided  by  other  motives,  it  may 
prevail.  I  do  believe,  however,  it  would  be  a  short-sighted  policy 
which  sacrifices  permanent  objects  to  temporary  ones.  In  saying 
this,  I  assume  for  fact  that  our  own  policy  will  be  prudent  and  con 
ciliatory  toward  them.  This  country  for  half  a  century  to  come 
may  be  immensely  valuable  to  Great  Britain  as  a  consuming  cus 
tomer,  and  this  connection  would  be  at  least  as  beneficial  to  us  as 
to  them.  Nothing  but  violence  can  interrupt  this  salutary  inter 
course.  Violence  long  continued,  however,  often  repeated  or 
extremely  aggravated,  may  destroy  it.  Instead  of  laws  like  those 
proposed  by  Madison,  Great  Britain  ought  to  be  made  to  see  that 
we  will  not  sacrifice  our  interests  to  our  passions,  still  less  to  the 
passions  of  France.  She  ought  to  be  satisfied  that  we  are  not 
the  dupes  of  her  rival,  and  that  we  never  will  quarrel  with  her  or 
embarrass  the  commercial  intercourse  with  her  while  she  regulates 
her  own  conduct  toward  us  by  the  rules  of  acknowledged  justice. 
If  these  impressions  could  be  made,  not  by  verbal  profession  merely, 
but  by  uniform  public  policy,  I  think  no  wise  administration  of 
that  country  would  desire  to  quarrel  with  us,  and  no  one  that  did 
not  defy  the  censures  of  the  British  people  would  dare  to  do  it. 

You  see  by  these  impotent  endeavors  to  disprove  the  dangers 
you  apprehend  that  I  am  alarmed  at  them.  It  is  to  be  feared  that 
we  shall  be  plunged  into  a  sea  of  troubles  before  we  are  prepared. 
If  the  strange  and  disastrous  course  taken  last  winter  is  to  be  pur 
sued,  or  indeed  is  not  to  be  openly  and  unequivocally  abandoned, 


246  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOEGE   CABOT.          [1799. 

a  war  with  Great  Britain  is  hardly  avoidable.  Under  the  delusive 
pretence  of  impartial  and  independent  sentiments,  I  expect  soon  to 
see  an  address  to  the  latent  animosities  of  our  people  against  the 
English.  A  man  who  loses  the  approbation  of  the  wise  and  good 
can  hardly  forbear  to  appeal  to  their  adversaries,  who  will  be  glad 
to  succor  him. 

If  it  be  not  practicable  to  persuade  such  a  one  that  he  may  yet 
easily  secure  the  permanent  support  of  his  first  friends,  if  he  will 
be  steady  to  his  own  first  principles,  our  affairs  are  hopeless. 
Every  thing  will  be  rendered  odious  that  is  truly  valuable,  our 
army,  public  credit,  &c.,  will  be  sacrificed  to  popularity,  and  at  last 
opposition  to  French  principles  will  be  treated  as  a  predilection  for 
whatever  is  British.  You  see  how  I  run,  and  will  justly  say  I 
ought  to  stop.  Farewell. 

G.  C. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

OCT.  16,  1799. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  It  has  given  inexpressible  pleasure  to  all  the 
thinking  men  from  New  York  to  Portsmouth  to  see  that  the 
embassy  to  France  is  suspended.  Mr.  Ellsworth  communicated 
this  agreeable  intelligence  as  soon  as  he  received  it,  and  it  travelled 
with  the  rapidity  of  good  news.  Still,  however,  it  is  seen  that 
much  more  is  to  be  done  to  retrieve  our  lost  character :  we  cannot 
recover  the  high  ground  on  which  we  stood  twelve  months  ago. 
The  truth  is,  we  had  then  more  reputation  than  real  character :  I 
fear  now  we  have  less.  I  am  almost  ashamed  to  use  a  term  which 
has  been  so  frequently  applied  as  to  seem  absurd,  yet  I  cannot 
refrain  from  saying  that  we  are  arrived  at  a  great  crisis  in  our 
affairs.  We  are  certainly  in  danger  of  involving  the  country  in  a 
war,  in  which  the  losses  by  commerce  and  internal  expenses  will 
not  be  the  greatest  evils:  our  strongest  passions  will  be  vented 
upon  each  other.  I  am  expecting  to  see  the  popular  animosity  to 
the  English  resorted  to,  as  a  means  of  recruiting  personal  influence. 
It  will  not  surprise  me  to  see  the  importance  of  impartial  an.d 
independent  sentiments  insisted  on,  while  the  true  design  of  the 
preacher  will  be  to  captivate  the  public  feelings  by  abstract  ideas, 
which,  though  just  and  proper  in  themselves,  are  often  rendered 
pernicious  by  the  manner  in  which  they  are  applied.  Every  man 
of  honor  and  dignity  recognizes  the  worth  of  elevated  sentiments, 
every  lover  of  the  country  feels  a  glow  of  patriotism  at  the  expres- 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  247 

sion  of  manly  spirit  toward  those  whose  haughtiness  wounds  our 
just  pride,  and  whose  insolence  and  power  seem  to  insult  our  weak 
ness.  To  these  add  a  formidable  party,  ready  to  catch  at  whatever 
can  be  used  to  foment  our  hatred  to  the  English,  and  mitigate  our 
resentments  toward  France.  In  a  word,  it  appears  to  me  all  our 
prudence,  if  we  were  free  to  exercise  it,  would  not  be  more  than 
enough  to  keep  peace.  Doubtless  you  have  received  informal 
accounts  of  the  general  reprobation  in  Europe  of  the  nominations 
to  France.  It  is  not  confined  to  England,  but  is  heard  on  the  bor 
ders  of  the  Mediterranean  as  well  as  the  Baltic  and  North  Sea : 
such,  at  least,  is  the  information  of  all  my  visitors  from  Boston.  Is 
it  not  possible  to  make  the  President  see  this  business  in  its  true 
light  ?  Will  he  not  acknowledge  that  we  ought  upon  principle, 
and  at  any  rate  upon  policy,  to  conciliate  the  good-will  of  the 
coalesced  powers  ?  These  powers  are  become  victorious,  and  for  a 
little  while  may  be  too  formidable  to  be  trifled  with.  Does  not 
our  own  interest  require  that  all  suspicions  should  be  removed, 
concerning  our  disposition  toward  the  parties  at  war  ?  Is  it  not 
possible  to  satisfy  the  President  that  those  of  whom  he  is  jealous 
have  no  views  but  public,  and  that  they  will  cordially  support  him 
and  his  administration  upon  the  principles  he  has  always  avowed, 
and  with  few  exceptions  generally  practised?  It  appears  too 
evident  that,  if  the  President  persists  in  the  course  he  has  taken 
a  few  steps  further,  he  must  break  all  terms  with  his  best  friends, 
his  only  real  friends,  who  are  in  fact  the  genuine  friends  of  the  gov 
ernment  and  the  country.  I  confess  I  don't  know  the  man,  but 
perhaps  you  do,  who  might  by  a  full  and  free  conversation  recon 
cile  him  to  his  ministers,  and,  what  is  more  difficult,  reconcile  him 
to  himself.  It  is  worth  the  trial  before  the  meeting  of  Congress. 
It  may  afterwards  be  too  late.  I  looked  to  Ellsworth,1  but  he 
says  he  can  do  no  more.  Where  is  Judge  Patterson  ?  He  has 
the  right  sort  of  sense  and  spirit. 

I  know  of  only  one  copy  of  Barlow's  address,  which  was  the  one 
I  had  read.  Measures  are  taken  to  procure  it  for  you,  but  I  don't 
know  yet  the  success.  If  it  can  be  obtained,  it  shall  be  transmitted. 

With  unfeigned  respect,  esteem,  and  attachment, 

I  remain  ever  yours,  G.  C. 

1  Oliver  Ellsworth,  of  Connecticut,  so  frequently  referred  to  in  these 
letters,  is,  of  course,  well  known  as  chief  justice  of  the  United  States  and 
envoy  to  France.  He  served  as  senator  from  Connecticut  during  Mr. 
Cabot's  term  of  office,  and  they  were  always  warm  friends. 


248  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF    GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 


PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

(Private  and  confidential.) 

TRENTON,  Oct.  22,  1799. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  The  die  is  cast:  the  envoys  go  to  France,  or 
rather  to  Europe,  to  see  if  they  can  enter  France. 

When  the  President  wrote  Mr.  Ellsworth,  from  Quincy,  that  he 
should  delay  the  mission  for  a  longer  or  a  shorter  time,  we  im 
agined  he  would  not  finally  decide  the  great  question  —  to  send  or 
not  to  send  —  without  asking  some  opinions.  But  we  have  mis 
taken.  Nobody  was  consulted :  he  had  deliberated  fully  on  the  subject, 
and  his  determination  was  unchangeable.  Thus  decided,  it  would 
have  been  indecorous  to  have  asked  advice.  If  you  were  deputed 
on  this  mission,  you  would  little  imagine  that  you  were  going  on  a 
party  of  pleasure;  yet  the  President  suggests  that  it  will  be  "  enter 
taining  "  as  well  as  "  instructive  "  to  the  envoys,  and,  u  whether  it 
succeed  or  riot,  useful  to  their  country." 

I  thought  of  your  idea,  that,  in  the  last  resort,  Mr.  Ellsworth 
should  refuse.  But  what  would  have  been  the  alternative  ?  Prob 
ably  the  appointment  of  Madison  or  Burr. 

This  measure  will  unquestionably  change  the  whole  administra 
tion,  if  it  should  not  eventually  occasion  the  subversion  of  the 
government.  A  change  of  the  administration  from  one  set  of 
Federal  hands  to  another  would  be  of  little  moment,  but  it  will 
riot  be  such  a  change.  Jefferson  will  be  President,  Gallatin  Secre 
tary  of  the  Treasury,  Madison  Secretary  of  State,  and  two  other 
like  political  characters  be  placed  at  the  head  of  the  other  depart 
ments. 

There  is  but  one  way  in  which  these  evils  can  be  prevented,  —  it  is 
the  only  way  in  which  the  mischiefs  of  this  French  mission  can  be 
repaired,  the  only  atonement  which  the  President  can  make  to  his 
country  for  this  fatal  error,  —  his  announcing  publicly,  at  the  close 
of  the  next  session  of  Congress,  that  he  will  retire.  Then  the  Fed 
eralists,  uniting  in  one  man  for  his  successor,  might  yet  save  the 
country  from  ruin. 

The  envoys  embark  forthwith  at  Newport,  in  the  United  States 
frigate. 

Mr.  Murray  has  given  many  details  of  the  French  affairs.  He 
thinks  the  Republic  will  not  last  six  months.  The  President  says 
it  will  last  seven  years,  and  desires  his  opinion  may  be  remem- 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  249 

bered.1  Whatever  is  unfavorable  to  this  prediction  is  doubted  or 
disbelieved.  The  account  we  have  had  of  the  battle  of  Novi  and 
the  death  of  Joubert  was  a  stock-jobbing  story ! 2  I  have  not  time 
to  add,  but  that  I  am  ever  most  truly  yours, 

T.  PICKERING. 

PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

(Private.) 

TRENTON,  Oct.  24,  1799. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Your  letter  of  the  16th  has  just  come  to 
hand.  I  have  already  written  you  that  the  great  question  of  the 
mission  to  France  has  been  finally  decided  by  the  President  alone. 
Patterson  is  in  Georgia;  but  an  angel  from  heaven  would  have 
produced  no  change.  In  most  matters,  we  are  consulted,  and  our 
ideas  often  adopted ;  but  on  this  all-important  question,  from  first 
to  last,  we  have  been  absolutely  excluded.  Some  conversation  took 
place  last  Thursday  with  the  envoys,  who  dined  with  the  President 
(after  the  point  had  been  previously  decided),  when  many  strange 
ideas  were  broached.  I  heard  Judge  Ellsworth  recite  a  part,  but  had 
not  patience  to  hear  the  remainder,  and  went  away.  It  was  at 
Wblcott's  the  same  evening.  I  have  desired  him  to  commit  it  to 
writing,  which  he  has  promised  to  do. 

I  am  sincerely  yours,  TIMOTHY  PICKERING. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  Oct.  31,  1799. 

MY  DEAR  SIR, — The  two  letters  I  received  from  Trenton  yes 
terday  deprived  me  of  last  night's  sleep.  My  gloomy  imagination 
is  too  apt  to  persuade  me  that  the  worst  which  can  happen  will 
happen,  or  rather  that  measures  of  a  tendency  manifestly  evil  will 
produce  the  evil  to  which  they  tend.  Thus,  from  the  moment  the 
nomination  of  ministers  to  France  was  made  known  to  me,  I  saw 
an  unavoidable  division  of  the  Federalists,  and  apprehended  the 
triumph  of  Jacobinism  in  the  United  States ;  and  I  foresaw  dis 
tinctly  a  foreign  war,  ruinous  and  disgraceful,  which  by  prudent 

1  This  prediction  is  correct  in  regard  to  the  conquests  of  the  allies ;  but, 
within  less  than  a  month  from  this  time,  Bonaparte  was  proclaimed  first 
consul,  and  the  French  republic  ceased  to  exist  in  aught  but  name. 

2  Joubert  was  defeated  at  Novi,  by  Suwarrow,  with  great  loss,  Aug.  15, 
1799.     Joubert  himself  and  ten  thousand  Frenchmen,  including  many  dis 
tinguished  officers,  were  slain. 


250  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

measures  might  be  honorably  avoided.1  These  things  are  undoubt 
edly  to  be  dreaded,  as  the  consequences  of  the  absurd  and  unad 
vised  project  of  courting  the  revolutionary  sect,  and  appearing  to 
connect  ourselves  with  them  at  a  moment  when  their  power  is  so 
fallen  as  to  leave  us  without  the  plea  of  necessity,  and  when  it  is 
highly  probable  they  are  about  to  expiate  the  crimes  they  have 
committed  against  rational  liberty  and  the  wretchedness  they  have 
inflicted  upon  millions  of  innocent  people.  The  annunciation  by 
the  President  of  his  resolution  to  decline  being  a  candidate  at  the 
next  election  would  be  indeed  the  most  effectual  reparation  and 
atonement  that  could  be  made  for  the  fatal  error ;  but  this  is  not  to 
be  expected,  and  I  should  sooner  expect  a  resignation,  which  would 
punish  those  2  who  have  dared  to  prefer  the  interest  of  the  body  of 
the  country  to  that  of  its  head.  I  have  flattered  myself  that  the 
great  Washington  would  again  come  upon  the  stage,  if  the  occa 
sion  should  be  made  to  appear  worthy  of  his  reappearance.3 

The  prediction  of  years'  duration  to  the  revolutionary  sect  in 
France  may  be  true,  but  it  is  highly  improbable.  Frenchmen  will 
themselves  annihilate  the  remaining  powers  in  France,  if  the 
coalesced  powers  act  with  discretion  and  in  concert.  If  they  liber 
ate  the  conquered  nations  and  leave  France  to  herself,  a  king  will 
be  established  before  the  expiration  of  1800.  It  will  probably  be 
the  case,  at  any  rate  ;  but  such  a  prediction  as  that  of  the  seven 
years  favors  the  policy  so  generally  reprobated  by  other  wise  men. 
Similar  to  this  is  the  opinion  of  J.  Q.  Adams,  in  a  letter  from 
Berlin,  19th  of  April,  to  a  friend  in  London.  He  approved  of  the 
nomination  ;  he  thought  the  campaign  there  favorable  to  France, 
although  every  one  else  thought  otherwise.  My  messenger  waits, 
and  only  allows  me  to  add  that  I  am  always 

Your  faithful  and  affectionate  friend,  G.  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

Nov.  1,  1799. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  not  been  able  to  find  a  copy  of  Joel  Bar 
low's  address,  but  I  am  told  that  the  one  which  had  been  formerly 
lent  me  is  in  Philadelphia.  Whether  it  is  in  the  hands  of  the 

1  All  these  events  ultimately  came  to  pass,  though  the  consequences 
were  not  in  all  respects  as  dreadful  as  the  writer  anticipated. 

2  By  causing  Mr.  Jefferson,  then  Vice-President,  to  succeed  at  once  to 
the  first  office. 

8  Compare  Sparks's  Life  of  G.  Morris,  III.  123. 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  251 

President  or  his  secretary,  or  of  some  other  person,  could  not 
be  ascertained.  I  think  it  probably,  however,  to  be  with  the 
President.  My  young  friends  are  still  looking  out  for  another 
copy  for  you.  It  is,  on  the  whole,  a  very  contemptible  perform 
ance  ;  yet  there  may  be  some  good  use  of  it  in  proving  the  con 
nection  between  our  patriots  and  the  Directory,  which  appears  by 
the  letter  to  the  latter  from  Barlow  and  Skipwith. 

Yours  truly,  G.  CABOT. 


WOLCOTT  TO  CABOT. 

(Private.) 

PHILADELPHIA,  Nov.  4,  1799. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  agree  with  you  that  the  resources  of  Great 
Britain,  derived  from  superior  skill,  ingenuity,  and  industry,  pro 
tected  by  a  stable  government,  have  rarely  or  never  been  properly 
appreciated.  Amidst  the  passions  and  turbulence  of  the  times,  the 
finances  have  been  administered  with  firmness  and  intelligence, 
which  have  rarely  been  imparted  to  statesmen.  Some  evils  have 
been  foreseen  and  avoided,  others  have  been  mitigated,  and  in 
every  conjunction  the  government  has  manifested  an  exact  knowl 
edge  of  its  real  situation. 

But  after  paying  the  respect  which  is  due  to  the  foresight  and 
energy  of  the  British  administration,  and  after  admitting  (as  I  ex 
plicitly  do)  that  the  government  was  right  in  prosecuting  the  war 
at  every  hazard,  I  cannot  but  think  that  the  success  of  the  financial 
system  of  Great  Britain  has  been  in  a  great  measure  owing  to  the 
misfortunes  of  other  nations,  and  that  an  immediate  peace  would 
greatly  endanger  the  government.  Great  as  the  profits  of  the 
nation  really  are,  they  must  be  admitted  to  be  insufficient  to  fur 
nish  thirty  millions  annually  to  the  government  in  loans,  besides 
twenty-five  millions  of  revenue,  and  all  in  addition  to  the  immense 
capital  required  for  new  establishments  in  the  four  quarters  of  the 
globe.  The  true  cause  of  the  existing  credit  of  the  government,  in 
my  opinion,  is  that  Great  Britain  has  so  far  the  exclusive  com 
mand  of  several  great  objects  of  commerce  that  she  can  for  a  time 
prescribe  for  the  commercial  world  an  artificial  measure  of  value. 
The  precious  metals  could  not  be  commanded  in  sufficient  quantities 
to  answer  the  purposes  of  interior  circulation  and  to  balance  all 
her  public  and  commercial  negotiations  with  foreign  countries. 


252  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

She  has  therefore  declared  paper  to  be  money ,  and  gold  and  silver 
to  be  merchandise.  Her  immense  commerce  enables  her  to  com 
mand  the  gold  and  silver  necessary  for  foreign  intercourse,  and 
the  quantity  of  paper  is  so  regulated  by  the  administration  and  by 
governmental  operations  of  finance  as  not  greatly  to  exceed  the 
demand.  The  price  of  labor,  of  manufactures,  in  short  of  every 
thing,  is  however  gradually  rising,  and  the  system  must  fail  when 
ever  any  considerable  foreign  nation  can  successfully  compete  with 
Great  Britain  in  manufactures  or  in  the  supply  of  the  tropical 
climates,  which  constitute  the  basis  of  her  commerce  and  revenue. 

Events  may  happen  which  may  disconcert  the  plans  of  the 
British  government.  I  believe,  however,  that  their  calculations 
are  formed  for  a  long  continuance  of  the  war ;  that  a  speedy 
restoration  of  any  settled  system  in  France  is  not  expected ;  and 
that  there  exists  but  little  confidence  in  the  sincerity  of  the  Aus 
trian  government.  By  continuing  the  war,  the  fine  edge  of  Jacob 
inism  will  be  worn  smooth,  the  enthusiasm  of  the  new  sectaries 
will  be  abated.  As  the  danger  diminishes,  Great  Britain  will 
diminish  her  resistance.  In  the  mean  time,  that  island  will  be 
made  the  entrepot  of  the  world,  and  the  national  debt  be  disposed 
of  in  the  best  manner  which  circumstances  will  permit.  When 
peace  is  made,  I  presume  it  is  intended  that  Great  Britain  shall  be 
at  least  as  little  embarrassed  with  debt  as  her  neighbors. 

I  am  sensible  that  the  reasoning  on  which  my  opinion  is  founded, 
and  which  does  not  presume  any  intentional  fraud,  would  be  deemed 
abstruse,  if  fully  detailed.  Perhaps  it  is  unfounded.  I  know  that 
a  war  would  be  illy  relished  by  the  merchants  and  manufacturers 
of  Great  Britain,  and  the  same  may  be  said  with  truth  of  the 
merchants  and  ship-owners  of  the  United  States.  It  is  on  this 
circumstance  I  found  my  argument  of  the  ill  policy  of  the  late 
measures  of  our  government.  We  might  have  secured  the  influ 
ence  of  these  men  in  our  favor,  and  thus  preserved  peace,  and  have 
attracted  much  of  the  capital  and  commerce  of  Great  Britain  to 
our  country.  There  are,  however,  ill-concealed  prejudices  existing 
in  both  countries ;  and  my  apprehension  is  that  the  passions  of 
certain  descriptions  of  persons  in  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  will  be  employed  to  aid  the  deliberate  calculations  of  the 
British  cabinet.  If  our  envoys  arrive  when  the  governments  of 
Europe  are  prepared  to  negotiate  for  a  general  peace,  the  mission 
will  by  accident  become  a  proper  and  safe  measure.  /  do  not 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  253 

expect  a  general  peace  ;  and,  if  the  war  continues,  I  believe  experi 
ence  will  show  that  a  great  mistake  has  been  committed.  I  cannot 
believe  that  either  the  British  government  or  their  merchants  will 
consider  it  for  their  interest  to  permit  us  to  prosecute  a  free  com 
merce  with  France ;  and  if,  after  a  treaty  shall  be  made,  our  trade 
shall  be  interdicted,  the  United  States  will  commence  or  retaliate 
hostilities. 

But  it  has  been  decreed  that  the  negotiation  shall  be  prosecuted, 
and  we  must  submit.  The  President  directed  the  instructions  to 
be  prepared,  and  his  orders  were  obeyed.  Expectations  were  in  a 
certain  way  encouraged,  that  the  persons  who  were  compelled  to 
participate  in  this  business  would  be  permitted  to  explain  their 
sentiments  ;  but,  as  soon  as  the  papers  were  completed,  the  envoys 
were  directed  to  proceed  immediately.  The  President,  having 
formed  his  own  judgment  upon  the  measure,  did  not  think  it  right 
to  consult  opinions  which  he  foreknew  could  not  shake  his  purpose. 
Thus  are  the  United  States  governed  as  Jupiter  is  represented 
to  have  governed  Olympus :  without  regarding  the  opinions  of 
friends  or  enemies,  all  are  summoned  to  hear,  reverence,  and  obey 
the  unchangeable  fiat.  It  must  for  some  time  remain  a  question 
whether  the  master  or  his  servants  are  in  an  error. 

Although  without  desponding  I  deprecate  this  measure  in  respect 
to  our  foreign  relations,  yet  the  effects  upon  our  domestic  interests 
appear  to  me  incapable  of  mitigation.  It  is  certain  that  the  Fed 
eral  party  will  be  paralyzed,  nor  do  I  perceive  how  the  present 
system  of  measures  can  be  maintained.  The  people  will  not 
support  the  army ;  the  navy  will  not  be  increased ;  neither  taxes 
nor  loans  will  be  permitted  beyond  what  may  be  necessary  to  dis 
charge  existing  engagements  ;  the  President  will  gain  no  new 
supporters ;  his  former  friends  will  be  in  disgrace  with  the  public  ; 
and  the  administration  of  John  Adams,  so  much  extolled,  will  end 
by  a  transfer  of  the  powers  of  the  government  to  the  rival  party. 
I  am,  dear  sir,  Your  friend  and  obedient  servant,  O.  W. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  Nov.  14,  1799. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  — I  have  read  your  excellent  letter  of  the  4th, 
in  which  you  have  added  to  the  stock  of  ideas  occasioned  by  your 
former  observations  on  British  affairs.  My  mind  has  been  occu 
pied  with  some  other  subjects,  or  this  would  have  absorbed  it. 


254  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1799. 

Whether  all  the  consequences  you  apprehend  should  be  experienced 
or  not,  I  shall  always  be  satisfied  your  reasonings  are  just,  as  they 
are  profound.  I  still  think,  however,  that  means  will  be  found  to 
manage  that  great  debt,  and  bring  it  to  a  bearable  weight  without 
greatly  disordering  the  state. 

I  had  yesterday  some  conversation  with  Mr.  Senator  Dexter, 
and  was  much  pleased  to  find  his  good  sense  prevailing  over  all 
sorts  of  nonsense  on  the  subject  of  the  late  occurrence. 

Your  obliged,  &c.,  G.  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  Dec.  16,  1799. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  The  intimations  contained  in  the  speech  are 
of  the  sort  which  I  feared,  but  not  so  plain  as  I  expected.  The 
partisans  of  Jacobinism  rejoice  to  see  that  the  principles  of  this 
sect  are  no  longer  denounced,  and  triumphantly  ask  "if  it  is  not 
evident  now  that  the  charges  of  their  enemies  are  calumnious?" 
"  Great  pains  had  been  taken,"  they  say,  "  to  misrepresent  them  to 
the  people,  and  to  make  it  believed  that  the  French  revolutionary 
system  was  a  war  against  real  liberty  and  legitimate  property  in 
every  country,  and  that  the  owners  of  property  everywhere  ought 
therefore  to  discountenance  it."  "  But,"  it  is  asked,  "  if  this  were 
true,  would  the  head  of  our  nation  be  seen  negotiating  with 
France  ?  "  "  Would  they  treat  with  the  Directory,  if  it  were  true 
that  the  Directory  were  supposed  capable  of  such  vile  conduct  as 
is  ascribed  to  them?"  "At  any  rate,"  they  say,  "the  President 
discards  the  jealousy  of  French  designs,  which  had  begun  to  take 
hold  of  our  citizens,"  &c.,  &c.  But  if  the  silence  observed  toward 
French  principles  is  in  itself  so  grateful,  it  is  no  less  so  to  find 
some  general  expressions  of  uneasiness  which  may  be  explained  by 
the  well-known  feelings  toward  another  nation  which  are  always 
popular.  To  these  sources  of  pleasure  the  Jacobins  add  the  hope 
of  getting  rid  of  the  army,  and  the  influence  of  some  great  men 
connected  with  it,  so  that  the  pure  principles  of  democracy  may  be 
no  longer  restrained,  but  have  a  free  course,  as  in  France,  &c., 
&c.,  &c. 

How  often  has  it  happened  that  we  have  derived  from  our 
blunders  greater  benefits  than  from  what  we  should  have  called  the 
wisest  policy  ?  There  is  a  reason  for  this,  which  in  many  cases  it 


1799.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  255 

is  easy  to  discern.  The  republic  is  not  to  be  despaired  of.  If  we 
are  to  have  an  inundation  of  Democratic  evils,  we  shall  have  better 
dikes  afterwards ;  if  we  are  only  threatened,  we  shall  strengthen 
those  we  already  have.  While  I  cannot  but  feel  the  greatest  con 
cern  for  the  events  which  are  soon  to  happen,  I  confide  in  the 
ultimate  good  destiny  of  our  country  ;  and  I  feel  extremely  anxious 
that  those  who  now  labor  to  administer  its  affairs  properly  should 
then  enjoy  the  superior  satisfaction  of  having  striven  against  every 
error,  and  persevered  in  fulfilling  duties  the  more  difficult  from 
being  left  unsupported.  Sure  I  am  at  this  moment  that  the  merit 
of  those  men  whose  services  are  now  rendered  under  circumstances 
of  great  discouragement  is  distinctly  seen  and  justly  valued  by  the 
wisest  and  best  citizens.  Suffer  me,  therefore,  to  hope  that  the 
helm  of  state  will  not  be  abandoned  by  those  who  watch  while  they 
cannot  guide  it.  It  is  often  remarked  that  the  situation  is  difficult 
as  well  as  delicate  into  which  the  auxiliaries  of  our  Federal  head 
are  brought;  but  it  always  is  maintained  that  their  honor  and 
dignity  will  be  best  supported  by  a  steady,  inflexible  adherence  to 
official  duties. 

I  don't  know  why  I  trouble  you  with  ideas  of  this' sort,  unless 
it  is  that  I  partake  of  the  fear  sometimes  expressed,  "  that  the 
patience  of  our  secretaries  will  be  exhausted."  It  ought  not  to 
be  supposed  possible,  and  therefore  I  pay  them  no  compliment 
in  admitting  the  influence  for  a  moment. 

Your  obliged  and  faithful  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


256  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE    CABOT.  [1800. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

1800. 

Dissensions  of  Federalists.  —  Hamilton's  Pamphlet.  —  Presidential  Election. 
—  Correspondence. 

MISFORTUNES  accumulated  about  the  dominant  party, 
as  the  last  year  of  the  century  closed.  When  Congress 
assembled,  though  the  Federalists  had  for  the  first  time  a 
large  working  majority,  it  was  seen  that  the  great  secret 
of  their  former  success  had  been  lost.  Perfect  harmony 
was  at  an  end.  The  moderate  Southern  men,  under  the 
lead  of  Marshall,  approved  the  French  mission ;  but  the 
extreme  wing  of  the  party  dissented  wholly  from  the  peace 
policy  of  the  President,  and  as  the  necessary  result  all 
consistent  action  was  paralyzed.  Jefferson  perceived  with 
exultation  that  their  majority  availed  his  opponents  noth 
ing.  This  early  display  of  the  bad  effects  of  internal 
quarrels  was  by  no  means  the  smallest  evil  which  at  that 
time  befell  the  Federalists.  Their  differences  were  greatly 
aggravated  by  Tench  Coxe's  perfidious  publication  of  a 
letter  written  to  him  by  Mr.  Adams,  in  1792.  The  latter, 
with  the  hasty  suspicion  that  was  always  too  common  with 
him,  had  there  hinted  in  plain  terms  that  the  Pinckneys 
of  South  Carolina  were  British  sympathizers.  The  publi 
cation  of  the  letter  at  this  time  helped  to  inflame  Mr. 
Adams's  opponents.  It  convinced  them  that  Mr.  Adams 
purposed  and  had  long  planned  their  ruin,  by  rousing 
against  them  the  latent  popular  hatred  of  any  one  who 
dared  to  speak  well  of  England.  From  its  nature  as  well 
as  from  its  falseness,  this  charge  was  one  of  the  prime  causes 
in  the  dissolution  of  the  party ;  and  every  thing  that  tended 


1800.]  DISSENSIONS    OF   FEDERALISTS.  257 

to  show  Mr.  Adams  to  be  its  author  embittered  the  resist 
ance  of  the  ultra-Federalists. 

But  the  event  which  removed  the  last  chance  of  peace 
was  the  death  of  Washington.  In  the  midst  of  their  feuds 
and  anxieties,  with  political  overthrow  staring  them  in  the 
face,  the  Federalist  leaders  had  begun  to  look  despairingly 
to  Washington  as  the  only  man  who  could  maintain  the 
party  and  govern  the  country.  They  were  not  without 
hopes  even  that  the  great  Virginian  might  be  induced  to 
again  emerge  from  retirement  and  assume  the  Presidency. 
But  now  all  this  was  ended  by  death,  and  even  the  vague 
hope  afforded  by  the  possibility  of  Washington's  reappear 
ance  was  taken  from  them. 

From  Mr.  Cabot's  earliest  letters  in  this  year,  it  is  clear 
that  there  were  symptoms  of  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the 
extreme  Federalists,  and  of  the  President  as  well,  to  accept 
the  situation  with  a  better  temper,  and,  if  possible,  to  heal  the 
wounds  already  inflicted  on  the  party.  Every  thing,  however, 
was  against  such  a  solution.  Not  only  had  personal  hostilities 
gone  too  far  to  be  allayed,  but  the  element  'of  secrecy  added 
much  to  all  the  difficulties  of  the  situation.  The  great 
mass  of  the  party,  though  differing  among  themselves 
perhaps  as  to  the  expediency  of  the  second  mission,  were 
sincerely  united  in  wishing  party  harmony.  Through  igno 
rance,  they  were  prevented  from  forwarding  the  object  of 
their  wishes  by  any  general  and  decisive  manifestation  of 
opinion.  Every  one  knew  that  grave  dissensions  existed 
among  the  leaders;  but  very  few  persons  understood 
exactly  what  those  differences  were,  or  how  far  they  had 
gone,  nor  did  any  of  the  immediate  parties  to  the  quarrel 
desire  to  make  their  controversies  public.  Mr.  Adams  had 
no  wish  to  drive  the  hostile  chiefs  into  open  rebellion ;  and 
the  leaders,  conscious  of  their  own  weakness  in  the  party, 
were  most  unwilling  to  appeal  to  that  tribunal  for  redress. 
But  the  fire  burnt  all  the  more  hotly,  because  smothered 
in  this  unnatural  manner.  Moreover,  the  leaders  of  the 

17 


258  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.  [1800. 

party,  though  opposed  to  Mr.  Adams,  were  by  no  means 
united  in  their  own  plans.  Pickering  and  Wolcott  wished 
the  overthrow  of  Mr.  Adams,  at  any  and  all  risks ;  while 
the  others,  more  prudent  and  less  exasperated  by  personal 
encounters,  saw  the  impossibility  of  such  a  step.  The 
result  was  that  in  a  secret  caucus  of  the  Federal  members 
of  Congress,  held  at  Philadelphia,  it  was  voted  to  support 
Adams  and  Pinckney  for  the  offices  of  President  and  Vice- 
President.  Yet  owing  to  the  differences  among  themselves, 
which  crippled  every  movement  of  the  Federalists,  it  was 
not  decided  whether  Mr.  Adams  or  Mr.  Pinckney  was  to 
be  considered  the  party  choice  for  the  first  office.  From  the 
nature  of  the  existing  electoral  law,  the  simple  determina 
tion  to  vote  for  two  candidates  equally  without  distinctly 
settling  the  distribution  of  the  two  offices  left  the  door  open 
for  indefinite  intrigue.  Hence  the  omission  to  indicate 
beyond  question  the  party  choice  afforded  an  almost  irre 
sistible  inducement  to  the  enemies  of  the  President  to 
quietly  try  to  bring  Pinckney  in  over  him  ;  while,  to  the 
partisans  of  Mr.  Adams,  the  possibility  of  such  an  event 
was  an  incentive  to  throw  away  a  sufficient  number  of 
votes  to  insure  the  relegation  of  Pinckney  to  the  second 
place.  Thus,  while  one  side  was  tempted  to  gratify  their 
personal  hatred,  at  the  expense  of  party  faith  and  honor, 
the  other  was  ready  to  risk  a  total  defeat  rather  than  ex 
pose  their  favorite  candidate  to  the  loss  of  the  first  office. 

The  action  of  one  or  two  of  the  more  prominent  leaders 
contributed  to  widen  still  further  the  already  existing 
breach,  and  to  foster  the  intrigues  for  which  the  uncertain 
action  of  the  caucus  gave  abundant  opportunity.  The  first 
overt  act  was  committed  by  Mr.  Adams.  By  the  results 
of  the  Federal  caucus  and  the  disastrous  termination  of 
the  New  York  elections,  the  President  must  have  perceived 
that  his  fate  in  the  coming  campaign  would  depend  solely 
upon  the  action  of  the  Southern  Federalists.  He  there 
fore  determined,  now  that  it  could  make  matters  no  worse, 


1800.]  DISSENSIONS   OF   FEDERALISTS.  259 

to  rid  himself  of  his  opponents  in  the  cabinet,  and,  in 
pursuance  of  the  object,  requested,  and  at  once  received, 
McHenry's  resignation.  On  the  refusal  of  Pickering  to 
follow  McHenry's  example,  Mr.  Adams  dismissed  him 
from  the  Secretaryship  of  State.  The  only  criticism  that 
can  be  made  on  this  action  of  the  President's  is  that  he 
should  have  dismissed  Pickering,  McHenry,  and  Wolcott 
as  well,  at  least  a  year  sooner  than  he  actually  did.  There 
is  no  necessity  to  seek  for  good  and  sufficient  reasons  for 
these  cabinet  changes.  The  secretaries  had  consistently 
opposed  Mr.  Adams  in  his  recent  measures ;  and,  whether 
those  measures  were  wise  or  not,  this  of  itself  is  full 
justification  for  their  dismissal.  No  man  can  carry  on 
an  administration  properly,  unless  his  cabinet  is  in  sub 
stantial  agreement  with  him.  Such  had  long  ceased  to 
be  the  case  with  Mr.  Adams ;  and  that  he  hesitated  so 
long  to  exercise  an  undoubted  right,  and  to  perform  what 
was  in  fact  a  duty,  can  only  be  attributed  to  his  unwilling 
ness  to  force  a  party  quarrel.  Had  he  changed  his  secreta 
ries  sooner,  the  trouble  sure  to  result  from  such  a  step  might 
possibly  have  been  in  a  measure  overcome  before  the  party 
became  involved  in  another  electoral  contest.  Inasmuch  as 
Mr.  Adams's  removal  of  the  secretaries  can  be  defended  on 
the  broadest  and  soundest  political  principles,  it  is  to  be 
regretted  that  it  has  been  thought  necessary  to  bring  sweep 
ing  charges  of  intrigue  and  bad  faith  against  them  and  all 
their  friends.  Intrigue  and  bad  faith  are  harsh  words,  and 
demand  great  care  and  exact  definition  on  the  part  of  those 
who  use  them.  There  is  unfortunately  in  this  instance 
ground  for  such  accusations ;  but  they  have  been  exagger 
ated,  and  have  not  been  applied  with  sufficient  precision. 

To  say  that  cabinet  officers  are  guilty  of  intrigue  and  of 
bad  faith,  because  they  discuss  the  government  policy  in 
letters  to  confidential  friends,  seems  wholly  unreasonable. 
That  leaders  of  a  party  in  office  should,  under  the  seal  of 
secrecy,  reveal  the  policy  of  the  administration  to  a  few 


260  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1800. 

other  leaders  out  of  office,  seems  so  unquestioned  a  right  that, 
to  borrow  a  legal  phrase,  history  may  be  said  to  take  judi 
cial  cognizance  of  it.  We  may  even  go  farther,  and  say 
that  cabinet  officers  have  an  undoubted  right,  if  differing 
from  the  supreme  executive  as  to  the  expediency  of  a 
measure,  to  make  an  effort  to  alter  his  course  by  bringing 
to  his  notice  the  views  of  his  most  prominent  supporters, 
as  well  as  the  general  party  sentiment.  This  was  done, 
and  to  judge  by  the  correspondence  was  all  that  was  done, 
in  the  affair  of  the  major-generals ; l  yet  Mr.  Adams  made 
a  charge  of  intrigue,  which  has  since  been  renewed  against 
all  concerned  in  that  affair.  The  case  is  very  different, 
however,  where  cabinet  officers,  opposed  in  opinion  to  their 
official  chief,  use  the  opportunities  of  their  confidential 
relations  to  destroy  or  injure  him.  Pickering  took  advan 
tage  of  his  position  in  attacking  Mr.  Adams,  and  both  he 
and  Wolcott  furnished  Hamilton  with  material  obtained  in 
their  official  capacity  for  use  in  further  attacks.2  Such  a 
course  deserves  the  stigma  of  bad  faith,  and  Pickering  and 
Wolcott  are  open  to  all  the  censure  which  must  attach  to 
it.  But,  be  all  this  as  it  may,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
Mr.  Adams  was  fully  justified  in  ejecting  his  secretaries, 
nor  that  their  dismissal  was  a  most  disastrous  opening  to  the 
ensuing  campaign.  Colonel  Pickering  now  lost  all  restraint, 
and  wrote  to  every  Federalist  leader  letters  abounding  in 
the  most  virulent  invective  against  the  President.  The 
latter  retorted ;  and  accusations  of  being  a  "  damned  fac 
tion,"  an  "  Essex  Junto,"  and  "  a  British  faction,"  were 
again  loudly  repeated  against  all  Mr.  Adams's  opponents. 

Mr.  Cabot  had  received  the  news  of  Pickering's  dismissal 
with  unfeigned  indignation ;  for  he  saw  in  this  step,  as  he 

1  Colonel  Pickering,  as  appears  from  letters  in  the  Pickering  MSS.,  had 
a  more  definite  plan,  and  desired  more  combination  in  regard  to  the  ap 
pointment  of  Hamilton.     But  he  seems  to  have  stood  alone ;  and  with  this 
exception  I  am  satisfied  of  the  correctness  of  the  statement  in  the  text. 

2  See  Pickering  to  Hamilton,  Hamilton's  Works,  VI.  443;  Wolcott  to 
Hamilton,  Ibid.,  447  ;  Hamilton  to  Wolcott,  Ibid.,  449.     Authorities  can  be 
multiplied,  but  these  serve  as  illustrations. 


1800.]  DISSENSIONS   OF  FEDERA LISTS.  261 

believed,  the  complete  abandonment  by  Mr.  Adams  of  all 
the  best  principles  of  the  Federalist  party.  Besides  the  fact 
that  Colonel  Pickering  was  his  warm  personal  friend,  Mr. 
Cabot  was  still  further  aroused  by  the  cry  of  "  British  fac 
tion,"  raised  by  the  President  and  his  supporters.  He 
knew  that  the  sympathy  which  he  and  many  of  his  friends 
felt  for  Great  Britain  in  her  struggle  with  France,  and 
their  desire  that  the  United  States,  so  far  as  they  co-operated 
with  any  foreign  power,  should  aid  England,  were  dictated 
by  reason  and  by  motives  of  the  soundest  policy.  With 
even  more  keenness  and  with  the  greatest  justice,  he  felt 
outraged  by  the  illiberal  demagogue  cry  of  a  "  British  fac 
tion."  Rightly  or  wrongly,  he  attributed  the  authorship 
of  this  charge  to  the  President,  and  to  such  partisans  as 


Gerry ;  and  he  deeply  resented  it.  Mr.  Cabot  was  far  more 
unwilling  than  most  of  his  contemporaries  to  embroil  him 
self  in  personal  quarrels  i\  but  he  felt  it  to  be  inconsistent 
with  his  own  self-respect  to  make  any  advances  toward  a 
renewal  of  his  former  friendly  intercourse  with  Mr.  Adams, 
on  the  latter's  return  to  Quinc}^  in  the  spring  of  1800. 
Thus  did  the  animosity  of  Colonel  Pickering,  and  the  con 
sequent  violence  exhibited  by  Mr.  Adams,  serve  to  complete 
the  alienation  of  the  more  temperate  men  among  the  extreme 
Federalists,  —  men  like  Mr.  Cabot,  who  were  in  the  begin 
ning  truly  desirous  of  making  much  personal  sacrifice,  that 
party  harmony  might  be  secured. 

The  absorbing  question  during  the  summer  of  1800  was, 
of  course,  the  impending  election.  Mr.  Cabot  believed 
that  there  were  only  two  courses  possible,  —  either  the  open 
rejection  of  Mr.  Adams,  or  a  fair  and  equal  support  of 
Adams  and  Pinckney.  The  action  of  the  caucus  at  Phila 
delphia,  and  the  popular  favor  with  which  Mr.  Adams 
was  generally  regarded,  had  made  the  first  of  these  alter 
natives  impossible ;  and  Mr.  Cabot  therefore  felt  that  it 
only  remained  to  adopt  the  second  in  perfect  good  faith. 
He  considered  it  essential,  either  for  success  or  honorable 


262  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOEGE   CABOT.  [1800. 

defeat,  that  unquestioned  fairness  in  the  maintenance  of 
the  pledge  to  cast  an  equal  vote  for  Adams  and  Pinckney 
should  be  observed,  and  that  a  spirit  of  mutual  conces 
sion  should  be  manifested  by  the  contending  factions. 
But  matters  had  gone  too  far  for  such  moderate  counsels. 
The  charge  of  belonging  to  a  "  British  faction  "  had  worked 
Hamilton  beyond  the  point  of  dislike  toward  Mr.  Adams, 
into  a  condition  of  such  rage  that  passion  seems  to  have 
completely  mastered  his  political  judgment.  His  first  step 
was  to  transmit  to  Mr.  Adams  a  letter  requesting  an  ex 
planation  of  the  charge  of  belonging  to  a  "  British  faction," 
directed  against  himself,  and  authorized,  as  he  understood, 
by  the  President  himself.  If  the  latter  could  have  an 
swered  this  letter  by  a  denial  of  the  authorship  of  this 
charge,  it  is  clear  he  should  have  done  so.  If  he  could  not, 
then  the  silence  which  he  observed  was  perhaps  the  wisest 
course  under  the  circumstances.  This  much  is  certain, 
that  this  refusal  to  reply  was  not  calculated  to  mend  mat 
ters  ;  and  Hamilton  resolved  forthwith  to  make  a  public 
attack  on  the  President.  From  such  a  proceeding  Mr. 
Cabot  strove  most  earnestly  to  dissuade  him.  He  repre 
sented  to  him  the  absurdity  of  supporting  in  one  breath 
for  the  highest  office  in  the  land  a  man  whom  in  the  next 
he  attacked  most  bitterly.  Though  conceding  the  possible 
necessity  of  defending  themselves  against  the  cry  of  "  Brit 
ish  faction,"  Mr.  Cabot  urged  upon  Hamilton  the  great 
dangers  from  the  imputation  of  foul  play  which  would  be 
involved  in  a  public  onslaught  on  their  candidate.  Keenly 
alive  to  the  reflections  to  which  such  a  step  would  expose 
Hamilton  himself,  Mr.  Cabot  even  went  so  far  as  to  say 
that,  if  Hamilton  must  publish,  he  had  better  do  it  anony 
mously.  But  all  was  in  vain.  Hamilton  published  his 
attack  on  Mr.  Adams,  and,  in  so  doing,  signed  the  death- 
warrant  of  his  party.  Every  thing  had  tended  in  but 
one  direction  since  the  departure  of  the  French  mission ; 
but  Hamilton's  pamphlet  was  the  last  act  in  this  melancholy 


1800.]  HAMILTON'S  PAMPHLET.  263 

political  drama.  Whatever  chance  of  success  the  Federal 
ists  may  have  had  before,  nothing  was  now  possible  but 
defeat.  All  confidence  was  destroyed,  all  belief  in  the 
validity  of  party  pledges  and  party  faith  vanished,  and  the 
Federalists  were  left  to  the  contemplation  of  what  their 
own  hands  had  wrought.  Mr.  Cabot  was  too  experienced 
a  political  observer,  and  too  little  of  an  optimist,  not 
to  perceive  clearly  the  unmistakable  presages  of  disaster. 
From  his  letters  during  the  summer,  it  is  evident  that  he 
was  hoping  against  hope,  and  that  he  had  prepared  his  own 
mind,  and  was  striving  to  prepare  his  friends  for  the  coming 
defeat.  But,  however  much  philosophy  he  may  have  dis 
played  in  contemplating  the  probable  future,  his  patience 
was  entirely  overcome  when  he  received  Hamilton's  pam 
phlet.  That  this  ill-timed  and  ill-advised  attack  should 
have  been  made  at  all  was  bad  enough,  but  that  it  should 
be  such  a  lame  assault  was  too  much  to  be  borne.  Not 
only  was  the  self-stultification  of  supporting  and  attacking 
the  same  person  as  complete  as  he  had  foreseen,  but  the 
attack  itself  seemed  to  him  an  utter  failure.  Thoroughly 
disheartened  and  disappointed,  Mr.  Cabot  wrote  Hamilton 
a  letter  in  which,  with  manly  frankness,  but  with  entire 
courtesy,  he  expressed  his  opinion  of  this  performance. 
To  the  credit  of  both  men,  it  may  be  said  that  this  honest 
and  severe  criticism  produced  no  change  or  diminution  in 
their  friendship. 

In  due  course,  the  election  was  held ;  and  the  Federalists 
were  compelled  to  endure  the  defeat  which  their  own 
blunders  and  high  temper  had  made  inevitable.  To  every 
one  who  admires  the  Federalist  party,  as  all  intelligent 
and  fair-minded  men  must ;  to  every  one  who  recalls  the 
courage,  the  ability,  the  sagacity  with  which  the  founda 
tions  of  American  nationality  were  laid;  to  all  who  rev 
erence  the  party  that  counted  Washington,  Hamilton, 
Marshall,  and  Adams  among  its  leaders,  the  story  of  that 
great  party's  downfall  must  be  melancholy  in  the  extreme. 


264  LITE  AND   LETTERS    OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.  [1800. 

Led  by  the  greatest  men  in  American  history,  officered 
with  a  greater  amount  of  ability  than  was  ever  displayed 
by  all  other  political  parties  in  America,  the  Federalists, 
by  their  own  strong  and  uncurbed  wills,  by  their  own 
errors  and  their  own  passions,  brought  upon  themselves  a 
premature  defeat,  which  neither  the  address  of  Jefferson, 
the  wisdom  of  Madison,  nor  all  the  popular  majorities  of 
Democracy  had  been  able  to  compass  ; 

"  And  when  they  fell,  they  fell  like  Lucifer,  never  to  hope  again." 


CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  Jan.  13,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  not  seen  our  friend  Ames  since  he 
received  the  letter  of  which  you  speak.  It  is  impossible  you  should 
be  free  from  great  perplexities  ;  but  why  should  you  not  cultivate  a 

little  stoicism,  and  not  be  wretched  because  and  1 

are  about  you  ? 

Whatever  shall  be  done  or  attempted  that  tends  to  dishonor  us, 
I  am  sure  will  not  be  imputed  to  you.  It  will  be  seen  that  you 
lament  more  than  others  that  a  system  steady,  dignified,  and  con 
sistent  is  too  elevated  for  the  low  and  selfish  views  we  entertain, 
and  requires  more  force  and  vigor  than  our  feeble,  disjointed  ma 
chinery  possesses.  You  can  only  propose  what  is  fit :  you  must 
execute  what  is  prescribed,  and  leave  the  rest  to  Heaven. 

Your  faithful  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

(Private.) 

BROOKLINE,  Jan.  16,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Mr.  Ames  passed  last  evening  with  me  :  he 
is  to  pronounce  the  eulogy  of  Washington  before  our  State  Legisla 
ture  three  weeks  hence.  I  hope  he  will  weave  into  it  as  much  as 
possible  of  his  own  politics:  they  are  such  as  Washington  ap 
proved,  and  I  hardly  know  what  greater  praise  can  be  given  hini 
than  a  display  of  this  fact. 

I  have  viewed  and  reviewed,  again  and  again,  the  picture  you 

1  Left  blank  in  manuscript. 


1800.J 


CORRESPONDENCE.  265 


have  drawn.  I  wished  to  discover  that  you  had  thrown  over  it  an 
air  of  gloom  darker  than  the  truth,  but  I  believe  it  is  a  verisimili 
tude  in  every  particular. 

From  the  moment  the  mission  to  France  was  announced,  it  was 
to  be  foreseen  that  the  President  would  part  wider  and  wider  from 
every  active,  firm  friend  of  the  anti-Jacobin  policy,  which  had  been 
with  infinite  difficulty  just  established.  It  was  to  be  foreseen  that, 
a  direct  attack  of  external  enemies  being  no  longer  dreaded,  no 
sufficient  reason  could  be  offered  to  the  people  for  subjecting  them 
to  the  burden  of  armies  and  taxes,  always  odious  when  first  im 
posed,  and  only  submitted  to  from  a  conviction  of  indispensable 
necessity  so  plain  and  obvious  that  no  one  can  dispute  its  existence. 
Every  sagacious  man,  however,  must  discover  that,  while  the  ap 
pearance  of  danger  has  diminished,  its  reality  has  increased,  and 
thus  we  are  thrown  back  into  a  state  of  peril  and  embarrassment 
similar  to  that  we  were  in  several  years  ago.  The  difficulty  then 
was  to  make  the  people  sensible  of  the  nature  and  extent  of  the 
dangers  to  which  the  country  was  exposed,  and  to  arouse  a  suffi 
cient  indignation  to  repel  it.  When  they  were  almost  persuaded, 
a  measure  was  adopted  which  contradicted  all  that  had  been  taught, 
and  repressed  the  rising  spirit.  Should  the  mission  now  fail  and 
France  be  insolent,  it  will  be  in  vain  to  address  the  people's  resent 
ments  upon  a  subject  on  which  their  passions  have  already  evapo 
rated.  But,  be  all  this  as  it  may,  it  is  not  the  less  incumbent  on 
the  government  to  provide  for  the  public  safety  by  all  the  means 
in  their  power.  Whatever  may  be  the  obstacles  to  an  army,  they 
ought  to  be  overcome  :  the  whole  world  is  becoming  military  ;  and, 
if  we  are  wholly  otherwise,  we  shall  be  as  sheep  among  wolves. 
Indeed,  we  shall  have  wolves  enough  within  our  own  fold,  if  we 
cannot  keep  up  our  guards. 

I  have  more  than  once  been  informed  that  Mr.  Pitt  has  expressed 
in  the  British  cabinet  his  willingness  to  make  peace,  but  has  been 
overruled.  I  have  accounted  to  myself  for  this  circumstance,  so 
extraordinary  in  a  man  of  his  inflexibility,  by  supposing  that  he 
alone  felt  the  extreme  difficulty  of  providing  the  means  to  support 
the  war.  If  the  similarity  of  situations  can  be  supposed  to  have 
biassed  your  opinions,  I  should  not  wonder;  for,  notwithstanding 
our  boasted  resources  actually  existing,  such  is  the  machinery  by 
which  they  are  to  be  drawn  forth,  that  an  American  financier  has 
not  greatly  an  advantage  over  the  British.  The  acquiescence  in  the 


266  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1800. 

direct  tax  is  such  as  I  hope  will  encourage  the  Federalists  to  make 
it  permanent.  But  why  should  not  some  of  the  import  duties  be 
greatly  increased  ?  Half  a  dollar  upon  every  fifty-six  pounds  of  salt 
would  be  an  excellent  tax.  The  article  is  bulky  and  imported: 
evasion  is  therefore  difficult.  It  is  of  universal  use,  and  therefore 
the  tax  would  be  productive.  Though  not  perfectly  equal,  it  is  as 
much  so,  probably,  as  any  tax  can  be ;  and,  if  it  be  punctually  and 
perpetually  paid,  the  inequality  will  be  almost  annihilated  by  the 
incessant  operation  of  well-known  principles.  I  see  no  objection  to 
doubling  the  duties  on  tea,  and  raising  them  considerably  on  coffee 
and  sugar.  There  is  certainly  no  reason  why  these  and  many 
articles  should  not  be  taxed  as  high  as  they  will  bear  without 
encouraging  smuggling.  This  is  a  limit  very  important  to  be 
known.  I  am  not  enough  in  the  world  to  know  what  passes 
openly,  still  less  clandestinely ;  but  I  have  always  entertained 
great  fears  on  this  point.  So  far  as  I  have  known  the  opinions 
which  have  prevailed,  smuggling  appears  to  have  been  deemed  in 
famous.  Whatever  has  been  practised  must  therefore  have  been 
hidden  from  the  citizens  as  well  as  the  revenue  officers,  and  very 
few  men,  probably,  have  been  hardy  enough  to  hazard  the  dis 
grace  ;  but  we  have  had  a  tide  of  commercial  prosperity  constantly 
flowing :  this  must  turn,  and  the  auri  sacra  fames  will  then  subdue 
many  scruples.  The  selection  of  taxes  is  a  choice  among  difficul 
ties  ;  and  it  abundantly  appears,  I  think,  that  indirect  taxes,  as  they 
are  called,  are  the  most  tolerable,  and  therefore  these  must  be  car 
ried  as  high  as  they  can  be  collected.  Doubtless  new  and  addi 
tional  guards  will  become  requisite ;  but,  as  it  becomes  more  and 
more  understood  that  all  smuggling  is  paid  for  by  the  fair  trader, 
I  think  a  pretty  vigorous  system  may  be  established.  From  the 
money-loving  character  of  our  people  as  well  as  from  the  nature  of 
our  government,  I  have  always  thought  the  revenues  are  to  be 
principally  secured  by  the  force  of  pecuniary  penalties.  If  these 
can  be  so  contrived  that  they  cannot  be  avoided,  but  shall  be  always 
dreaded  by  those  who  offend,  I  think  the  offenders  will  be  few  and 
the  revenue  safe.  My  object  would  be  to  have  penalties  certain 
rather  than  excessive,  and  subject  to  no  limitation  of  time  or  place 
which  should  bar  full  proof. 

Your  view  of  continental  Europe  is  more  unfavorable  and  much 
more  profound  than  my  imagination  had  formed.  Doubtless  the 
selfishness  of  the  German  Emperor  is  a  bar  to  the  exertions  of 


1800.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  267 

the  conquered  States.  A  glorious  opportunity  has  been  lost  to 
destroy  the  power  of  Jacobinism.  So  much  depends  on  opinion, 
that  the  success  of  the  campaign  in  Italy  would  have  armed  half 
of  Europe  against  France  and  half  of  France  against  the  usurp 
ers,  if  the  coalition  had  acted  fairly,  on  principles  entirely  just  and 
had  supported  faithfully  their  first  enterprises.  Suwarrow  had 
consumed  his  army  by  employing  them  in  the  service  he  had  to 
perform ;  he  was  exhausted,  though  always  victorious ;  and  as  he 
approached  France,  where  was  the  main  body  of  his  enemies,  he 
was  almost  alone.  But  will  not  the  adversity  which  closes  the 
campaign  operate  to  unite  more  closely  and  effectually  the  three 
great  powers  ? 

I  confess  to  you  nothing  can  exceed  my  chagrin  at  seeing  a  cam 
paign,  which  promised  every  thing  to  my  hopes,  produce  so  little. 
Still,  however,  it  has  produced  something  of  value  :  it  has  proved 
to  the  terrified  people  of  various  countries  that  their  oppressors 
are  not  immortal,  and  that  whoever  opposes  them  with  courage  will 
defeat  them.  It  has  shown  France  incapable  of  such  great  efforts 
as  she  made  for  several  successive  years,  when  she  easily  sent  forth 
eight  or  ten  hundred  thousand  soldiers  to  plunder  and  destroy  those 
who  refused  to  be  her  willing  slaves.  She  has  this  year  manifested 
great  anxiety  for  the  safety  of  her  revolutionary  system,  and  has 
been  unable  to  command  five  hundred  thousand  for  her  own  defence. 
The  recall  of  several  great  leaders  from  Egypt  indicates  an  aban 
donment  of  all  hope  of  any  success  in  that  quarter,  and  probably 
was  in  part  occasioned  by  a  want  of  the  name  and  talents  of  some 
of  them  and  the  support  of  their  united  partisans. 

I  do  not,  therefore,  yet  despair  of  reaping  next  year  the  golden 
harvest  I  vainly  expected  at  this  time.  The  success  in  Hollai.d 
may  tempt  the  French  once  more  to  expose  their  fleet.  They 
have  strong  inducements  ;  and,  if  they  yield  to  them,  England  will 
probably  be  reinvigorated  by  another  naval  victory. 

G.   CABOT. 

CABOT  TO   GORE. 

JAN.  21,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Long  before  this  will  reach  you,  Mr.  Payne l 
will  have  arrived,  and  informed  you  of  the  state  of  things  here. 
They  have  grown  something  worse  since  he  departed.  The  tide  of 

1  Mr.  Gore's  brother-in-law. 


268  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1800. 

wealth  which  had  flowed  so  long  has  considerably  ebbed,  and  the 
effect  of  this  change  has  become  visible  in  every  thing.  Property 
has  fallen  in  price ;  real  estates,  especially,  are  not  worth  so  much 
by  twenty  per  cent  as  three  months  ago.  Our  politics  have  de 
clined  as  much  as  our  commercial  wealth.  The  most  sensible  Fed 
eralists  are  generally  silent.  They  would  offend,  if  they  spoke 
freely  what  they  think.  With  all  their  circumspection,  they  are 
denounced  however  as  oligarchical,  as  aiming  at  a  dictatorship  over 
the  executive.  Your  old  friend  Otis  is  said  to  be  worshipping  at 
the  Presidential  shrine ;  and  there  are  those  who  charge  him  with 
sinister  views,  those  who  think  that  he  would  even  go  into  the 
department  of  state,  if  the  intractability  of  the  present  incumbent 
should  provoke  his  dismissal,  &c.  But  you  must  reject  these 
slanders. 

The  present  House  of  Representatives  in  Congress  is  composed 
of  a  greater  number  of  Federalists  than  any  former  one,  but  they 
are  uncemented,  and  will  do  less  than  their  predecessors  to  promote 
the  common  weal.  You  may  see  by  their  answer  to  the  speech 
how  they  are  embarrassed.  In  order  to  satisfy  Mr.  Marshall  and 
the  Southern  Federalists,  it  was  necessary  to  appear  satisfied  with 
the  mission ;  and  in  order  to  please  others,  perhaps  all  the  true 
Federalists,  it  was  necessary  to  withhold  all  praise  of  the  measure. 
Hence  an  awkward  circumlocutory  phraseology  resulted,  which, 
while  it  seemed  to  approve,  does  not  really  approve  the  step. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  honest  but  uninformed  part  of  the  commu 
nity  is  perplexed  and  confounded.  At  one  time,  they  are  told  that 
France  is  so  enfeebled  that  she  can  no  longer  inspire  fear,  and  that 
she  will  make  peace  on  such  terms  as  the  coalesced  powers  may 
choose  to  offer  her.  Again,  they  are  told  that  peace  is  impractica 
ble,  and  that  the  allies,  grown  insolent  from  success,  are  greatly  to 
be  feared,  and  that  prudence  requires  every  opposition  to  be  made 
to  them  to  preserve  the  balance  of  power.  But  at  this  moment  it 
is  discovered  that  the  coalition  is  at  an  end  and  triumphant,  and 
that  France,  instead  of  being  provoked,  should  be  amused  and  con 
ciliated.  Thus  our  speculations  vary,  and  every  arrival  discloses  to 
us  a  new  reason  for  the  mission  to  France. 

Unhappily,  the  Federalists  of  the  North  do  not  agree  with  those 
of  the  South.  The  former  have  pretty  generally  expressed  an 
open  disapprobation,  while  the  latter  have  as  openly  vindicated  the 
mission  to  France.  The  antis  of  Virginia  maintain  that  the  Presi- 


1800.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  269 

dent  has  been  compelled  by  the  force  of  public  opinion  to  attempt 
a  negotiation  which  he  means  should  fail,  from  the  improper  char 
acter  of  the  persons  he  employed  and  the  inadmissible  terms  he 
has  probably  demanded.  They  confess,  however,  he  has  done  well 
in  a  partial  yielding  to  the  popular  voice,  and  they  trust  to  the 
magnanimity  of  France  to  do  the  rest.  France  knows,  they  say, 
the  depressed  condition  of  the  true  republicans  in  the  United  States 
under  the  present  administration,  and  will  therefore  accommodate 
her  behavior  to  the  present  exigency,  and  thus  keep  open  the  door 
for  a  complete  restoration  of  friendship  by-and-by,  if  it  cannot  be 
effected  now.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Southern  Federalists  have 
been  driven  to  defend  the  mission  as  wise,  sincere,  arid  well-timed, 
and  say,  if  it  fail,  all  men  must  admit  it  a  full  proof  of  the  moder 
ation  of  our  government  and  the  injustice  and  hostile  designs  of 
France. 

You  see  General  Marshall  leads  in  Congress.  He  doubtless  has 
great  talents  and  I  believe  great  virtues ;  but  I  fear  he  is  not  yet  a 
politician,1  and  has  much  to  learn  on  the  subject  of  practicable 
theories  of  free  government. 

It  is  long  since  I  have  heard  from  you.  Doubtless  you  have 
great  disasters  to  relate,  but  I  indulge  the  hope  that  the  misfor 
tunes  which  have  closed  the  campaign  will  produce  a  more  effectual 
combination  and  greater  exertions  the  next  season.  Such  one 
would  suppose  to  be  the  tendency.  Austria  must  now  see  that  a 
selfish  policy  has  ruined  every  thing  at  the  same  time  that  enough 
has  been  done  to  prove  to  all  parties  that  France  can  be  thor 
oughly  beaten,  if  the  allies  do  their  best.  I  have  written  Mr.  King 
something  like  what  is  written  here,  yesterday,  which  will  go  by  a 
different  ship. 

I  beg  you  to  believe  me  always  your  unfeigned  friend,2 

G.  C. 

CABOT   TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  Feb.  28,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  Sm,  —  I  presume  you  have  learned  that  the  King  of 
Denmark  has  joined  the  coalition,  and  that  a  treaty  is  negotiating 

1  "We  must  remember  that  politican  had  a  somewhat  different  sense  in 
1800  from  that  which  it  now  bears.     By  "  politician,"  Mr.  Cabot  meant  one 
versed  in  public  policy  and  the  practical  arts  of  state-craft  and  government. 

2  This  letter  gives  a  painfully  exact  description  of  the  difficulties  and 
distractions  by  which,  thanks  to  their  own  dissensions,  the  Federalists  were 
at  this  time  beset. 


270  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE   CABOT.  [1800. 

at  Stockholm  with  a  view  to  engage  Sweden.  It  is  determined,  if 
this  can  be  accomplished  by  England  and  Russia,  to  treat  other 
powers  who  shall  trade  with  France  as  accomplices. 

Talleyrand  was  taken  under  the  consular  patronage  upon  the 
belief  that  the  envoys  from  the  United  States  were  on  their  pas 
sage  to  France.  It  is  hoped  in  England  that  Suwarrow  will  be 
largely  reinforced,  and  with  the  addition  of  a  German  division  will 
act  on  the  Rhine,  and  that  Austria  will  act  separately.  Doubtless, 
if  the  Emperor  of  Germany  is  so  disposed,  the  allies  may  carry 
all  before  them ;  but  our  past  experience  does  not  authorize  us 
to  expect  the  sincerity  and  good  faith  which  the  interest  of  all 
requires. 

I  remain  your  much  obliged  and  affectionate  friend, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  GORE. 

MARCH  27,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  owe  you  a  thousand  letters  which  I  shall 
never  pay ;  and,  if  a  bankrupt  law  should  pass  for  this  species  of 
debtors,  I  resolve  to  take  advantage  of  it,  and  defraud  you  of  your 
dues.  A  few  days  ago  we  received  the  constitution  of  Buonaparte 
&  Co.  for  the  year  1800.  It  would  be  a  waste  of  time  to  examine 
the  merits  of  any  thing  so  transient  and  so  useless  as  a  French 
constitution.  Its  design  is  doubtless  to  amuse  the  nation  while 
their  masters  fleece  them.  But  I  am  delighted  with  Lord  Gren- 
ville's  note  to  the  infamous  Jesuitical  Talleyrand.1  It  breathes  a 
noble  disdain  which  every  man  of  English  blood  ought  to  feel. 
You  must  allow  me  still  to  admire  this  nation,  who  have,  except 
oursefaes,  the  best  people  and  the  best  government  in  the  world. 
Without  as  much  urbanity  as  they  ought  to  have,  they  have  more 
good  principles  and  better  habits  than  others.  They  have  as  much 

1  As  soon  as  Napoleon  had  seized  upon  the  supreme  power,  he  made  over 
tures  of  peace  to  England.  Lord  Grenville  declined  these  overtures,  on  the 
ground  that  England  waged  a  purely  defensive  war  in  behalf  of  herself  and 
her  allies,  and  for  the  security  of  "  property,  personal  liberty,  social  order, 
and  religious  freedom."  As  long  as  the  system  of  attacking  the  very  exist 
ence  of  civil  society  was  adhered  to  by  France,  Lord  Grenville  said  England 
would  never  make  peace.  He  did  not  consider  that  the  advent  of  Napoleon 
and  his  usurpation  of  power  gave  any  sufficient  pledge  in  itself  for  the  aban 
donment  of  the  revolutionary  system.  This  bold  and  determined  note  of 
Lord  Grenville  is  given  in  full  in  Alison's  History  of  Europe,  IV.  94,  95. 
See  also  Thiers,  Histoire  du  Consulat,  52,  64. 


1800.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  271 

liberty  as  they  can  manage,  and  more  than  any  other  people  of 
Europe  can  immediately  bear,  while  their  government  is  as  just  as 
any  and  more  energetic.1 

You  will  have  learned  by  the  newspapers  that  Truxtun  has  lately 
acquired  great  honor  in  pursuing,  attacking,  and  beating  an  enemy 
which  he  must  have  known  to  be  his  superior  in  force.2  Our 
little  navy  has,  on  the  whole,  done  great  service ;  our  commerce  is 
immense,  and  it  is  pretty  well  protected. 

I  can  give  you  no  information  of  domestic  politics,  for  I  have 
scarcely  known  of  any  thing  passing  beyond  the  limits  of  my  own 
farm  these  several  weeks.  Strong  and  Gerry  are  the  gubernatorial 
candidates :  the  first  would  doubtless  be  a  great  acquisition,  and 
the  second  an  injury  to  the  cause  of  good  government ;  but  you  are 
not  to  conclude  that  the  former  will  of  a  certainty  be  elected.  It 
is  highly  probable,  but  the  advantage  of  Presidential  favor  is  in 
favor  of  the  latter.8  Delicacy  or  a  mistaken  policy  prevented 
a  public  discussion  of  the  conduct  of  Mr.  Gerry:  in  consequence, 
he  is  less  censured  than  he  deserves  to  be  among  the  small  Feder 
alists. 

Notwithstanding  the  despondency  you  sometimes  feel,  it  seems 
to  me  that  there  is  good  ground  to  expect  that  England  will  persist 
in  her  hostility  to  Jacobinism  until  the  force  of  the  sect  is  destroyed. 

Yours  truly,  G.  C. 

CABOT  TO  "WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  May  26,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  While  I  feel  the  highest  indignation  at  the 
unmerited  treatment  of  Mr.  Pickering,  I  feel  no  less  regret  at  the 
necessity  he  supposes  it  has  created  for  him  to  go  again  into 

1  For  views  like  these,  Mr.  Cabot  and  men  who  felt  as  he  did  were 
termed  a  "  British  faction."  To-day  they  appear  sensible  and  proper  enough ; 
but  they  were  then  regarded  with  sentiments  of  horror,  and  those  who  held 
such  opinions  were  denounced  by  the  Democrats  as  monarchists  at  heart, 
and  enemies  of  the  republic. 

-  Truxtun's  defeat  of  the  French  frigate  "L'Insurgente."  This  was  the 
first  of  the  exploits  of  our  navy,  as  Truxtun  was  the  first  of  our  naval  heroes. 
He  had  the  misfortune,  however,  to  be  a  Federalist ;  and  Jefferson  seized  the 
first  opportunity  to  rid  the  naval  service  and  the  country  of  him  and  his 
obnoxious  politics. 

8  The  election  resulted  in  the  choice  of  Strong  by  a  majority  of  about 
twenty-five  hundred.  The  opposition,  however,  showed  much  more  strength 
than  was  generally  anticipated. 


272  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE   CABOT.  [1800. 

the  wilderness.  Mr.  Pickering's  friends  and  family  connections 
are  greatly  distressed  at  the  idea  of  his  undertaking  new  settle 
ments  at  his  time  of  life,  and  with  a  large  family ;  and  they  have 
deputed  Mr.  Timothy  Williams,  nephew  of  Mr.  Pickering,  to  go 
to  Philadelphia,  and  dissuade  him,  if  possible,  from  executing  his 
project.  I  have  desired  Mr.  Williams,  who  is  a  sensible  and  re 
spectable  man,  to  call  on  you  for  such  advice  and  information  as 
he  may  need.  You  can  probably  inform  him  whether  Mr.  Picker 
ing  would  be  likely  to  find  employment  sufficiently  lucrative  in  the 
banks,  insurance  companies,  or  any  other  great  corporation  at 
Philadelphia.  I  recollect  some  years  ago,  when  Mr.  Hamilton  was 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  you  were  often  spoken  of  as  a  suitable 
president  for  the  bank  of  the  United  States ;  and  at  that  time  I 
have  no  doubt,  if  you  had  chosen  the  office,  you  would  have  had  it 
with  a  handsome  salary.  If  any  thing  similar  is  attainable  now,  I 
think  you  must  know  it;  and  I  should  imagine  Mr.  Pickering's 
claims  would  be  admitted  by  every  good  man. 

Excuse  my  troubling  you  on  this  occasion,  which  interests  every 
friend  to  virtue,  to  justice,  or  the  government. 

Your  faithful  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BROOKLINE,  May  26,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Mr.  Williams,  knowing  the  interest  I  take  in 
whatever  concerns  you,  has  put  into  my  hands  the  letter  in  which 
you  speak  of  the  President's  conduct  toward  you,  and  your  intended 
migration.  Every  honest  mind  will  feel  indignant  at  such  unmer 
ited  treatment,  wherever  it  is  known.  But  permit  me  to  ask  whether 
it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  you  subject  yourself  again  to  all  the 
hardships  and  sufferings  which  are  inseparable  from  a  new  settle 
ment  in  the  wilderness  ?  I  don't  rely  much  upon  the  gratitude  of 
society,  and  therefore  should  not  expect  your  just  claims  to  avail ; 
but  I  cannot  be  persuaded  that  your  well-known  talents  and  quali 
ties  would  remain  long  unemployed  and  unsought  for  in  Philadel 
phia.  I  have  conversed  with  Judge  Dana  and  some  other  friends 
on  this  topic,  and  all  agree  that  you  ought  not  to  withdraw  from 
the  world  until  a  fair  experiment  shall  prove  it  to  be  necessary. 
This  it  is  believed  will  never  happen.  If  nothing  better  occurs, 
why  should  you  not  convert  your  lands  into  money,  and  once  more 


1800.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  273 

try  your  fortune  in  trade  ?  I  have  no  doubt  that,  as  a  commission 
merchant,  you  would  find  more  encouragement  than  formerly,  and 
it  would  soon  bring  forward  the  talents  of  some  of  your  sons.  At 
any  rate,  I  think  you  ought  not  to  encounter  the  labors  and  self- 
denials  of  the  frontiers  until  one  year's  trial  of  what  can  be  done 
on  the  sea-board.  Wherever  you  may  be,  and  whatever  you  finally 
decide  to  undertake,  you  will  have  my  ardent  prayers  for  your 
happiness,  and  that  of  all  about  you,  in  which  sentiment  Mrs. 
Cabot  most  cordially  unites. 

Your  faithful  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 

HAMILTON  TO  CABOT.1 

HEADQUARTERS,  Oxford,  June  11,  1800. 

SIR,  —  It  is  just  reported  to  me  that,  among  the  means  of  paying 
the  troops  which  have  been  transmitted  to  this  place,  there  is  a 
treasury  draft  on  the  collector  at  Portsmouth  for  five  thousand 
dollars.  Without  this  sum,  the  troops  cannot  be  put  in  possession 
of  their  dues ;  and  a  recourse  to  the  collector  would  be  attended 
with  considerable  delay.  It  would  therefore  be  necessary  to  keep 
an  entire  regiment  here  for  some  time,  and  thus  an  expense  of  some 
importance  would  be  incurred  by  the  public.  Under  this  view 
of  the  subject,  I  trust  you  will  deem  it  expedient  to  advance  the 
money  and  take  the  draft  on  the  collector  of  Portsmouth.  In 
doing  so,  you  will  particularly  oblige  the  army,  and  render  a  ser 
vice  to  the  government.  The  consideration  of  the  loan  you  can 
arrange  hereafter  with  the  Treasury  Department. 

With  consideration,  &c.,  A.  HAMILTON. 

CABOT   TO   WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  June  14,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND,  —  I  have  more  than  once  spoken  of  your 
situation  in  the  government  to  men  whom  you  already  esteem, 
and  to  others  whom  you  would  esteem,  if  you  knew  them.  They 
all  agree  that  you  fulfil  a  high  but  difficult  duty  in  remaining  at 

1  This  letter  was  an  official  one,  addressed  to  Mr.  Cabot  in  his  capacity 
of  President  of  the  Office  of  Discount  and  Deposit  of  the  United  States  Bank 
Boston.  Mr.  Cabot  had  accepted  this  post  at  the  time  of  Hamilton's  secre 
taryship.  See  p.  7? 

18 


274  LIFE    AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE   CABOT.  [1800. 

your  post,  while  the  public  good  so  strongly  demands  it.  Whatever 
may  be  your  apprehensions,  I  hope  you  will  see  the  issue  of  the 
presidential  election  before  you  decide  on  any  new  course  of  life. 
It  is  not  easy  to  answer  satisfactorily  the  question,  "  how  far  the 
influential  men  in  Massachusetts  will  go  in  attempting  to  save  the 
declining  cause  ?  "  You  may,  however,  rely  upon  it  that  the  most 
influential  men  think  as  you  do  upon  the  nature  of  our  difficulties, 
and  the  remedy  for  them.  It  is  one  of  the  evils  incidental  to  pop 
ular  systems,  that  the  best  friends  of  government  feel  themselves 
obliged  to  conceal  the  defects  and  magnify  the  good  qualities  of 
those  who  administer  public  affairs.  A  reputation  and  degree  of 
personal  power  is  by  this  means  acquired,  which  may  be  used  for 
wrong  purposes,  and  cannot  be  suddenly  counteracted.  A  perfect 
silence  has  been  observed  in  Massachusetts  until  very  lately  on  the 
caprices,  ill-humor,  selfishness,  and  extreme  vanity  of  a  man  who 
with  these  faults  and  weaknesses  possesses  some  good  qualities, 
great  talents  for  unpolitical  speculation,  and  has  rendered  some 
important  services.  Many  good  men  had  the  fear,  as  you  know, 
that  Mr.  Adams  would  make  wild  steerage,  if  placed  at  the  helm, 
notwithstanding  he  had  written  well  on  the  subject  of  political 
navigation  ;  but  those  men  suppressed  their  opinions,  and  co-oper 
ated  with  others  in  giving  praise  as  often  as  they  could,  and  thus 
contributed  to  strengthen  the  public  sentiment  in  his  favor.  Thus 
his  fame  is  in  some  sort  interwoven  with  the  web  of  the  national 
government.  Local  ideas  also  concur  to  unite  them  in  the  minds  of 
the  people  here,  so  that  every  attempt  to  separate  them  is  ill  re 
ceived.  I  think,  however,  that,  if  electors  were  now  to  be  appointed, 
they  would  vote  unanimously  for  Adams  and  Pinckney.  Our  Legis 
lature  have  taken  this  business  into  their  own  hands  ;  and,  although 
they  do  not  wish  to  see  Mr.  Adams  discarded,  I  am  satisfied  they 
would  not  hazard  the  mischief  of  having  Mr.  Jefferson  elected  by 
wasting  a  single  Federal  vote.  Every  moment  brings  me  new  proof 
that  the  opinion  extends  itself  of  the  propriety  of  uniting  all  oar 
votes  with  the  Federalists  of  other  States,  as  the  only  measure  by 
which  the  government  can  be  preserved.  Having  thus  given  you 
my  own  single  opinion,  I  ought  to  suggest  my  apprehension  that 
great  pains  will  be  taken  in  the  course  of  the  summer  to  rouse  the 
passions  and  prejudices  of  our  people  in  various  ways,  and  bring 
them  to  bear  upon  the  Legislature  in  such  a  manner  as  to  deter 
them  from  pursuing  their  own  measures  on  principles  which  ought 


1800.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  275 

to  govern.  Events  abroad,  too,  may  be  of  a  kind  to  be  convertible 
to  the  same  purposes.  All  these  and  other  contingencies  are  deduc 
tions  from  present  estimates  which  you  will  naturally  make.  On 
the  whole,  I  trust  the  good  sense  of  New  England  will  see  its  in 
terest,  and  will  not  sacrifice  it  to  the  views  of  any  individual. 

Yours  faithfully  and  affectionately,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


PICKERING  TO  CABOT.1 

PHILADELPHIA,  June  16,  1800. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  While  McKean's  election  was  pending,  it  was 
given  out  that,  if  he  should  be  chosen  governor  of  Pennsylvania, 
the  insurgents  would  be  pardoned,  and  many  other  good  things  done 
for  the  patriots  and  true  republicans.2  McKean  was  with  the 
President  shortly  before  the  pardons  issued,  and  I  am  assured 
spent  many  hours  with  him  the  preceding  afternoon.  The  Jacobins, 
far  from  giving  the  President  any  credit  for  his  "  clemency,"  ascribe 
the  pardons  (and  justly)  to  political  views.  I  have  been  told  that 
Fries  manifested  his  "penitence"  by  reviling  the  government  as 
soon  as  he  was  set  at  liberty. 

A  day  or  two  before  the  President  set  off  for  the  city  of  Wash 
ington,  a  gentleman  in  conversation  with  him  mentioned  the  dis 
mission  of  one  Jacob  Mayer,  consul  of  the  United  States  at  Cape 
Francois,  whom  he  (the  gentleman)  had  supposed  a  deserving  man. 
"  Why  [said  the  President],  he  slandered  Colonel  Pickering,  and 
had  the  audacity  to  charge  him  with  being  concerned  in  the  f  Kings 
ton's  '  cargo  ;  and  therefore  I  removed  him  !  "  And  yet  I  was  told 
(since  my  removal  from  office)  that  in  his  private  companies  I  was 
the  constant  theme  of  the  President's  abuse  during  the  whole  of 
the  last  winter ! 

1  The  copy  of  this  letter  in  the  Pickering  MSS.  only  professes  to  give 
extracts  from  the  original,  but  I  think  every  thing  essential  is  preserved. 

2  This  refers  to  Fries,  the  most  prominent  leader  in  the  Northampton 
insurrection,  who   was   found  guilty,  and  sentenced    to   death.     President 
Adams  pardoned  him,  and  his  action  was  attributed  by  his  enemies  to  polit 
ical  motives.     However  much  the  advisability  of  pardoning  Fries,  when  con 
demned  on  two  trials  for  treason,  may  be  questioned,  no  one  can  doubt 
that  the  motives  of  Mr.  Adams  were  of  the  purest  and  most  honorable  kind. 
That  a  political  significance  should  have  been  attached  to  this  act  of  exec 
utive  clemency  was  from  the  circumstances  of  the  times  unfortunate  and 
unjust,  but  still  inevitable. 


276  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE    CABOT.  [1800. 

You  will  doubtless,  have  seen  Mr.  Goodhue,  and  heard  him  recite 
in  substance  the  conversation  between  the  President  and  him  on 
May  9,  the  day  preceding  the  President's  notice  to  me  to  resign. 
Mr.  Goodhue  omitted  some  things.  I  recollect  he  told  me  next 
morning  that,  among  other  accusations  against  the  "  damned  fac 
tion,"  the  President  said,  "  And  you  crammed  Hamilton  down  my 
throat." 

In  the  dialogue  between  the  President  and  Mr.  McHenry,  you 
will  see  an  evidence  of  what  Wolcott  and  I  have  more  than  once 
said  to  each  other,  that  the  President  is  destitute  of  sincerity  ;  you 
will  see  that  while  he  has  so  many  times  been  pronouncing,  in  strong 
language,  Washington's  praise,  his  heart  was  strong  with  envy  at 
the  mention  of  his  name.  In  the  same  dialogue,  he  pronounced  a 
panegyric  upon  Jefferson,  and,  comparing  him  with  Hamilton,  he 
said  :  "  Mr.  Jefferson  is  an  infinitely  better  man,  a  wiser  one  I  am 
sure ;  and,  if  President,  will  act  wisely.  I  know  it,  and  would 
sooner  be  Vice-President  under  him,  or  even  minister  resident  at 
the  Hague,  than  be  indebted  to  such  a  being  as  Hamilton  for  the 
Presidency." 

Yet,  a  short  time  before  my  removal,  in  conversing  with  the 
President,  I  mentioned  Mr.  Jefferson's  letter  to  Sir  John  Sinclair, 
describing  the  mould-board,  of  which  I  sent  you  a  model,  and 
repeated  the  substance  of  Mr.  Jefferson's  political  observations 
with  which  he  concluded  the  letter.  Upon  which  I  remarked 
that  I  supposed  Mr.  Jefferson  to  be  a  very  learned  man,  "but 
certainly  he  is  a  very  visionary  man."  The  President  answered, 
"  Why,  yes,  he  has  a  certain  kind  of  learning  in  philosophy,  &c., 
but  very  little  of  that  which  is  necessary  for  a  statesman." 

That  he  would  readily  serve  as  Yice-President  under  Mr.  Jeffer 
son,  I  assured  Mr.  Wolcott  two  months  ago ;  and  I  believe  that 
his  coalition  with  Mr.  Jefferson  (of  which  I  entertain  no  doubt) 
has  taken  place  with  the  view  of  securing  that  station,  seeing 
he  despaired  of  being  chosen  President ;  and  probably  Jefferson 
and  his  friends  flattered  him  with  hopes  of  a  lift  from  their  party. 

In  the  course  of  my  correspondence  with  General  Washington 
in  1798,  in  which  I  informed  him  of  the  President's  hatred  of 
Hamilton,  and  stated  the  necessity  of  his  (General  Washington's) 
direct  interposition  to  prevent  Hamilton's  degradation  and  Knox's 
elevation,  I  used  this  expression  :  "  I  respect  the  President  for 
many  great  and  excellent  qualities ;  but  I  cannot  respect  his  errors, 


1800.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  277 

his  prejudices,  or  his  passions."  I  have  regretted  that  my  opinion 
then  expressed  should  have  unavoidably  changed  ;  that  subse 
quently  I  had  reason  to  retract  it,  and  to  deny  him  the  useful 
qualities  of  an  ordinary  statesman.  I  had  then  no  conception  that 
vanity,  ambition,  and  avarice  could  so  blunt  the  moral  sense  of  a 
man,  who  had  so  long  sustained  a  fair  reputation,  as  to  render  him 
capable  of  base,  dishonorable,  and  dishonest  conduct  in  the  admin 
istration  of  public  affairs.  Instead  of  resentment  for  his  treat 
ment  of  me,  I  lament,  for  the  sake  of  human  nature  and  civil 
society,  the  degeneracy  of  such  a  man  ;  a  man  grown  gray  in  the 
public  service,  and  who,  with  all  his  foibles,  was  esteemed  the  con 
stant,  firm  patriot  and  upright  man.  The  measure  he  took  to  color, 
at  least  to  his  own  mind,  the  pardon  of  the  three  insurgents,  which 
I  have  described  in  my  letter  to  Mr.  Gore,  is  such  an  outrage  on 
decency,  propriety,  justice,  and  sound  policy  as  stamps  the  man 
with  indelible  disgrace,  and  demonstrates  his  unfitness  for  any 
public  trust. 

When  I  spoke  of  the  consul  Mayer,  I  intended  to  have  informed 
you  that  on  authentic  documents  I  stated  to  the  President,  in  a 
formal  report,  the  baseness,  falsehood,  and  infamy  of  the  man, 
and  the  necessity  of  his  immediate  removal  from  the  consulship. 
He  had  slandered  Doctor  Stevens,  the  consul-general  for  St. 
Domingo,  and  embarrassed  him  in  the  exercise  of  his  functions; 
he  had  openly  and  repeatedly  declared  that  "Wolcott  and  I  were 
concerned  in  the  ship  "  Kingston's  "  cargo,  and  insinuated  that  the 
President  also  had  been  dabbling.  For  these  reasons,  the  fellow 
was  dismissed,  and  not  (as  the  President  was  willing  to  make  the 
gentleman  before  referred  to  believe)  "  for  slandering  Colonel 
Pickering,  as  honest  a  man  as  lived."  Pardon  these  last  six 
words,  as  they  seemed  necessary  in  this  history  of  Presidential 
proceedings. 

This  report  concerning  Mayer  I  finished  and  sent  to  the  Presi 
dent  in  the  short  interval  between  the  transmission  of  my  answer, 
in  which  I  refused  to  resign,  and  the  receipt  of  his  reply,  declaring 
my  discharge  from  my  office.  And  the  case  was  so  clear  that,  with 
my  report,  I  sent  the  recommendations  I  had  received  of  two  can 
didates  (there  were  no  more)  to  succeed  Mayer.  The  candidate  I 
wished  to  have  appointed  was  Henry  Hammond  (brother  of  Abijah 
Hammond,  of  New  York),  who  was  then  at  the  Cape,  and  had 
been  recommended  by  Dr.  Stevens  himself.  The  other  candidate, 


278  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.          [1800. 

I  believe,  was  a  worthy  man  and  very  competent  to  the  office ;  but, 
unfortunately  for  him,  among  his  recommendations  was  one  from 
General  Hamilton,  which  was  enough  to  defeat  his  wishes. 

Referring  to  the  uncertainty  of  the  issue  of  the  next  election  of 
President,  whether  Mr.  Adams  or  Mr.  Jefferson  would  be  chosen, 
I  thus  expressed  myself  in  a  letter  of  7  March  last  to  my  son  John 
in  London :  "  I  am  prepared  for  either  event,  —  determined  to  act 
independently  whether  in  or  out  of  office.  My  only  solicitude  is 
for  my  children,  that  I  may  have  it  conveniently  in  my  power  to 
give  them  educations  suited  to  their  capacities  and  dispositions,  &c. 
For  the  rest,  though  ashamed  to  beg,  I  am  willing  and  able  to  dig ; 
and,  if  it  were  convenient  to  gratify  my  own  inclinations,  I  would 
return  to  the  calling  of  my  ancestors,  and  become  '  a  tiller  of  the 
ground.'  When  the  occasion  occurs,  I  shall  do  it  without  reluc 
tance." 

JUNE  17,  1800. 

P.  S.  Mr.  McHenry  thinks  it  ineligible  to  have  the  dialogue 
communicated  by  copies,  though  he  would  have  no  objection  to  a 
confidential  reading  by  gentlemen  meriting  confidence,  &c. 

WOLCOTT  TO   CABOT. 

PHILADELPHIA,  June  18,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  SIR, —  On  my  return  from  Connecticut  two  days 
since,  I  received  your  letter  of  May  26,  when  I  had  the  pleasure 
of  being  introduced  to  Mr.  Williams  by  Colonel  Pickering.  I 
have  conversed  with  him  on  the  subject  of  his  private  affairs,  and 
have  tendered  him  my  services.  He  remains  of  opinion  that  it  is 
best  for  him  to  attempt  a  settlement  upon  his  new  lands.  You 
may,  I  believe,  rest  assured  that  this  determination  has  been 
formed  with  deliberation,  and  that  his  mind  is  not  in  the  least 
depressed  by  the  cruel  treatment  he  has  received. 

I  wrote  a  letter  to  Mr.  Ames  from  Hartford,  which  I  desired 
him  to  show  to  you.  Whatever  may  be  thought  of  my  sentiments, 
I  think  it  right  to  communicate  them  to  my  friends.  It  is  proba 
ble  the  same  opinions  will  be  more  generally  entertained  than 
avowed ;  but,  if  General  Pinckney  is  not  elected,  all  good  men 
will  find  cause  to  regret  the  present  inaction  of  the  Federal  party. 
It  is  at  least  in  their  power  to  defend  their  principles,  and  to 
assume  a  position  in  which,  if  defeated,  they  may  avoid  dishonor. 


1800.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  279 

It  is  with  grief  and  humiliation,  but  at  the  same  time  with  per 
fect  confidence,  that  I  declare  that  no  administration  of  the  govern 
ment  of  President  Adams  could  be  successful.  His  prejudices  are 
too  violent,  and  his  resentments  of  men  of  influence  are  too  keen 
to  render  it  possible  that  he  should  please  either  party  ;  and  we 
all  know  that  he  does  not  possess  and  cannot  command  the  tal 
ents,  fortitude,  and  constancy  necessary  to  the  formation  of  a  new 
party. 

The  facts  upon  which  these  opinions  are  founded  are  not  gener 
ally  known  to  the  Federalists,  although  they  are  well  understood 
by  our  adversaries  ;  and  this  circumstance  constitutes  our  principal 
danger.  There  is  nothing  said  in  defence  of  the  government 
which  is  understood  by  the  people.  The  newspapers,  on  our  side, 
are  filled  with  toasts  and  nonsensical  paragraphs,  attributing  wis 
dom  and  firmness  to  the  President ;  while,  at  the  same  time,  all 
confidence  is  destroyed  by  the  skilful  attacks  of  a  vindictive  and 
intelligent  opposition. 

I  am  no  advocate  for  rash  measures,  and  know  that  public  opin 
ion  cannot  be  suddenly  changed ;  but  it  is  clear  to  my  mind  that 
we  shall  never  find  ourselves  in  the  straight  road  of  Federalism 
while  Mr.  Adams  is  President.  If,  however,  sensible  men  think 
otherwise,  he  will  be  supported ;  for  I  shall  certainly  admit  that 
a  change  ought  not  to  be  attempted,  except  upon  the  clearest 
evidence. 

The  beginning  of  the  next  week  I  shall  proceed  to  Washington, 
where  I  will  endeavor  to  do  as  much  good  and  as  little  mischief  as 
possible.  It  would,  however,  be  an  affectation  of  insensibility  to 
pretend  that  I  do  not  expect  to  suffer  much  unhappiness,  knowing, 
as  I  well  do,  that  the  whole  vengeance  of  the  party  will  be  exerted 
against  the  Treasury  department,  and  that  the  views  of  certain  indi 
viduals,  whom  I  do  not  yet  consider  as  Jacobins,  will  be  promoted 
by  destroying  my  character,  if  possible.  The  engines  for  effecting 
these  purposes  are  prepared,  and  the  operations  have  commenced. 
Some  of  the  clerks  in  the  offices  either  of  the  auditor,  comptroller, 
or  register,  will  continue  to  furnish  extracts  from  the  files  and 
records,  which  will  be  published  and  misrepresented  in  Duane's 
paper.  Unjust  as  the  accusations  will  be,  both  in  respect  to  my 
self  and  the  other  officers  of  the  department,  they  will  make  a 
considerable  impression,  and  I  shall  be  held  accountable  for  frauds 
which  I  could  not  prevent,  and  for  errors  which  others  have  com 
mitted. 


280  LITE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE    CABOT.  [1800. 

I  must  state  one  instance  in  point :  Mr.  Dayton,1  as  Speaker, 
called  for  thirty-three  thousand  dollars  at  the  close  of  the  session 
in  July,  1798.  The  money  was  advanced  on  his  written  appli 
cation,  for  the  compensation  of  the  House  of  Representatives. 
It  was  impossible  for  me  to  know  that  the  whole  sum  was  not 
wanted ;  and  I  ought  certainly  to  presume,  as  I  did  presume,  that 
any  balance  which  might  remain  unexpended  would  be  instantly 
refunded.  Mr.  Dayton,  however,  on  various  pretexts,  neglected 
to  settle  his  accounts  till  last  winter,  when  it  was  discovered  that  a 
balance  of  more  than  eighteen  thousand  dollars  had  been  retained 
by  him  since  July,  1798. 

The  day  I  was  informed  of  it  I  called  on  Mr.  Dayton,  and 
represented  the  nature  and  tendency  of  his  conduct.  I  afterwards 
wrote  him  a  private  letter,  and  during  the  session  recovered  the 
money  for  the  public.  The  accounts  have,  by  some  means  not 
to  be  discovered,  been  copied  for  Duane,  and  published  in  the 
"  Aurora,"  with  most  insolent  accusations  of  my  conduct.  As 
Dayton  cannot  be  defended,  his  breach  of  trust  will  attach  suspi 
cion  to  the  officers  of  the  treasury,  and  to  every  man  who  has  an 
account  open  with  the  public,  and  of  course  the  sums  accounted 
for  will  be  plausibly  represented  as  sums  which  have  been  embez 
zled.  Part  of  Colonel  Pickering's  accounts  are  unsettled,  and  he 
has  been  attacked  in  the  most  indecent  manner,  although  I  am  cer 
tain  that  not  a  cent  of  money  has  been  applied  improperly.  This, 
indeed,  appears  from  his  accounts,  which  have  lately  been  rendered 
for  settlement.  OLIVER  WOLCOTT. 

N.  B.  What  think  you  of  the  answer2  to  the  Alexandria 
dinner-makers  ?  Ought  not  the  last  war  with  Great  Britain  to  be 
considered  as  having  been  terminated  by  the  treaty  of  peace  ? 

O.  W. 

1  Jonathan  Dayton,  of  New  Jersey,  member  of  Congress  and  afterwards 
senator  from  that  State.     He  was  Speaker  of  the  House  from  1795-99.     He 
was  arrested  for  complicity  in  Burr's  treason,  but  the  prosecution  against 
him  was  dropped. 

2  This  refers  to  a  reply  to  an  address  from  Alexandria,  in  which  Mr. 
Adams  alluded  to  the  revolution,  to  the  outrages  by  the  English,  and  to 
his  own  and  the  people's  spirit  of  resistance.     (See  Works  of  John  Adams, 
IX.  238.)     Wolcott  evidently  looked  on  the  address  as  but  another  appeal 
to  the  latent  hatred  of  the  English,  and  as  directed  —  though  not  in  so  many 
words  —  against  his  wing  of  the  party. 


1800.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  281 


CABOT   TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  July  20,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  SIR, —  Mr.  Ames  put  into  my  hands  the  letter  you 
wrote  from  Hartford ;  and  I  have  since  received  your  favor  of  the 
28th  June,  from  Philadelphia.  Let  me  repeat  to  you  now  the 
wish  which  is  daily  expressed  by  your  friends  here,  that  you  will 
not  quit  the  Treasury  while  a  just  sense  of  character  will  permit 
you  to  remain.  Doubtless,  a  man  may  act  independently  in  office 
as  well  as  out ;  and  he  can  only  be  made  responsible  for  his  own 
individual  opinions  and  those  acts  which  he  approves.  If  you 
were  out  of  office,  you  would  not  wholly  avoid  the  anxiety  which 
you  now  feel  for  the  national  welfare  and  the  dignity  of  the  gov 
ernment  ;  and,  although  you  would  escape  some  mortifications,  I 
doubt,  on  the  whole,  whether  you  would  then  allow  them  so  much 
weight  as  you  do  now.  It  is  and  must  be  the  fate  of  every  man 
of  sensibility  to  suffer  in  the  public  service  in  proportion  to  his 
usefulness.  If  the  cause  of  the  present  chagrin  were  removed, 
I  apprehend  no  less  would  proceed  from  other  causes  inherent  in 
our  system.  I  lament  that,  for  the  sake  of  the  public  and  for  your 
own  sake,  you  were  not  born  under  Saturn  instead  of  Mercury, 
and  that  your  nativity  was  not  in  Germany,  where  a  good  stock  of 
phlegm  would  have  been  nourished  in  your  constitution ;  but  these 
things  cannot  be  altered,  and  it  only  remains  to  accommodate  to 
them.  The  public  feeling  is  opposed  to  the  censure  of  Mr.  Adams 
in  this  quarter.  Some  good  men  are  very  reluctant  to  admit  his 
unfitness  for  his  office,  because  to  admit  it  is  to  admit  the  necessity 
of  a  change,  which  involves  the  idea  of  disorder,  discord,  and  tur 
bulence,  which  they  desire  to  avoid.  It  is  impossible,  however, 
that  Mr.  Adams  should  govern  as  a  Federal  man,  and  this  must  be 
seen  presently  by  all  sagacious  men  who  attend  to  political  affairs. 
It  is  evident  Mr.  Adams  calculates  upon  engaging  the  force  of  the 
passions  and  prejudices  of  the  populace  on  his  side,  and  with  this 
reinforcement  to  overcome  or  beat  down  his  Federal  opponents. 
He  has  lately  toasted  men  whom  he  has  hated  or  despised  these 
fifteen  years ;  and  I  am  told  he  talks  of  his  late  friends  as  men 
either  afraid  of  the  English,  for  which  they  ought  to  be  treated  as 
cowards,  or  devoted  to  the  English,  for  which  they  ought  to  be 
branded  as  infamous.  But,  for  himself,  he  sees  no  evil  to  be  ap 
prehended  from  a  war  with  England,  and  is  ready  to  meet  it.  I 


282  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOEGE  CABOT.          [1800. 

do  not  think  it  much  proof  of  the  courage  or  philosophy  of  a  man 
to  be  indifferent  to  the  danger  and  sufferings  of  others,  especially 
if  he  may  be  likely  to  profit  by  them  himself.  I  readily  conceive 
that  Mr.  Adams,  by  rousing  the  spirit  of  animosity  against  the 
English,  which  only  sleeps  in  the  bosoms  of  our  people,  may  secure 
his  re-election,  and  a  double  portion  of  power  with  it.  This  sus 
picion  is  so  natural,  that  it  will  be  felt  by  many  men  who  know 
how  much  we  have  to  lose  and  how  little  to  gain  by  a  war  with 
England.  Great  efforts  are  making  to  persuade  our  people  that 
they  ought  to  throw  away  votes  at  the  election,  lest  Mr.  Pinckney 
should  be  made  President ;  but  no  satisfactory  opinion  can  yet 
be  formed  of  what  Massachusetts  will  do.  If  it  could  be  made  to 
appear  that  the  election  of  General  Pinckney  would  secure  our 
internal  tranquillity,  our  Legislature  would,  I  think,  appoint  electors 
who  would  contribute  all  in  their  power  to  the  attainment  of  that 
object ;  but  it  is  seen  that,  if  Mr.  Pinckney  is  chosen,  he  will 
enjoy  but  little  support  from  those  who  are  now  devoted  to  Mr. 
Adams.  Perhaps  he  will  be  opposed  by  them,  and  doubtless  he 
will  be  opposed  by  the  Jacobins.  There  are  even  men  among  the 
Federalists  who  prefer  Jefferson  to  a  Federal  rival  of  Mr.  Adams, 
and  there  are  some  certainly  who  would  prefer  Mr.  Jefferson  to 
Adams.  The  motives  of  these  various  parties  are  too  obvious  to 
need  explaining.  There  seems  to  me  to  be  only  one  sufficient 
reason  for  the  good  men  to  exert  themselves  in  favor  of  Mr. 
Pinckney  in  preference  to  both  the  others ;  and  that  is,  in  case  of 
success,  they  will  then  be  again  where  such  men  must  always  wish 
to  be,  —  arranged  with  their  chief  on  the  side  of  the  Constitution 
and  the  laws. 

I  have  not  yet  waited  on  the  President,  and  I  think  I  shall  not. 
When  a  man  in  his  station  attempts  to  render  odious  those  who 
differ  from  him  by  imputations  which  he  cannot  possibly  believe, 
he  certainly  discharges  them  from  all  obligation  of  extraordinary 
respect.  At  present,  therefore,  I  feel  at  liberty  to  stay  at  home, 
though  perhaps  I  am  not  bound  to. 

With  unfeigned  esteem  and  respect,  I  remain 

Your  faithful  friend,  G.  CABOT. 


1800.1  COEEESPONDENCE 


CABOT  TO  HAMILTON. 

BROOKLINE,  Aug.  10, 

MY  DEAR  SIR, —  Your  letter  of  the  1st  did  not  reach  me  until 
last  evening.  The  enclosure  shall  be  transmitted  to-morrow  or  the 
day  following,  by  some  trusty  person  who  will  attend  the  levee, 
if  one  can  be  found  who  will  engage  to  deliver  it ;  otherwise,  I 
may  perhaps  send  it  in  the  regular  package  which  goes  from  the 
post-office. 

This  method  would  be  better  than  to  send  a  servant,  who  might 
be  obliged  to  deliver  it  to  another  servant.1 

There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  the  first  course  will  be  pursued,  and 
I  shall  not  delay  to  inform  you  of  the  delivery  as  soon  as  it  is 
ascertained. 

Although  I  cannot  but  feel  unhappy  at  the  gloomy  prospect  of 
our  public  affairs,  yet  I  do  not  feel  my  usual  degree  of  solicitude 
for  the  issue  of  the  election.  There  is  something  like  a  balance  of 
advantages  and  disadvantages  in  the  success  of  either  of  the  three 
candidates. 

Mr.  Adams  will  doubtless  continue  to  sacrifice  the  independent 
Federalists  so  long  as  he  finds  victims  who  will  be  acceptable  to 
those  whose  favor  he  courts. 

He  will  also  hazard  a  war  with  Great  Britain,  which  he  evi 
dently  thinks  would  be  no  injury  to  him;  but,  if  he  has  justly 
forfeited  the  confidence  of  the  country,  he  has  not  yet  actually 
lost  it  in  this  quarter,  and  the  men  who  adhere  to  him  while  they 
zealously  sustain  him  are  also  a  restraint  upon  him,  and  for  some 
time  at  least  may  prevent  his  worst  measures,  and  until  they  have 
given  him  up  will  not  cordially  support  another. 

Jefferson's  election  would  tend  to  reunite  the  Federal  party  ; 
and  if  it  is  evidently  effected  by  the  Jacobin  force  unaided  by  any 
Other,  or,  if  aided  at  all,  by  the  adherents  of  Mr.  Adams,  the 
reunion  of  our  old  friends  would  be  complete. 

Should  Mr.  Pinckney  be  elected,  he  would  be  opposed  by  Mr. 
Adams  and  his  warm  adherents,  and  would  be  heartily  supported 
by  those  only  who  are  now  detached  from  Mr.  Adams.  This  state 
of  things  would  be  unpropitious  to  Mr.  Pinckney's  administration. 

1  The  enclosure  here  referred  to  was  Hamilton's  first  letter,  inquiring 
whether  Mr.  Adams  had  accused  him  of  belonging  to  a  "  British  faction." 
See  Hamilton's  Works,  VI.  449. 


284  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1800. 

There  is,  however,  one  unanswerable  reason  for  wishing  Mr. 
Pinckney  to  succeed,  and  that  is  that  the  best,  and,  indeed,  all  the 
truly  good  men  would  find  themselves  in  their  proper  places,  ar 
ranged  under  the  banners  of  the  Constitution  and  laws,  on  the  side 
of  the  national  chief. 

The  question  has  been  asked,  whether,  if  the  Federalists  cannot 
carry  their  first  points,  they  would  not  do  well  to  turn  the  election 
from  Jefferson  to  Burr.  They  conceive  Burr  to  be  less  likely  to 
look  to  France  for  support  than  Jefferson,  provided  he  could  be 
supported  at  home.  They  consider  Burr  as  actuated  by  ordinary 
ambition,  Jefferson  by  that  and  the  pride  of  the  Jacobinic  philoso 
phy.  The  former  may  be  satisfied  by  power  and  property,  the 
latter  must  see  the  roots  of  our  society  pulled  up  and  a  new  course 
of  cultivation  substituted. 

Certainly  it  would  have  been  fortunate  for  the  United  States  if 
the  second  candidate  on  the  Jacobin  side  had  been  one  who  might 
be  safely  trusted. 

No  great  progress  has  been  made  in  convincing  people  of  the  pro 
priety  of  voting  for  Pinckney  with  all  our  strength ;  yet  I  believe 
if  it  shall  appear  clearly  that  Adams  will  fail,  and  that  Pinckney 
may  be  elected,  our  Legislature  will  act  properly,  especially  if  there 
is  no  just  imputation  of  unfairness  against  Mr.  Pinckney 's  friends. 

I  am  told  New  Hampshire  will  vote  for  Adams  and  Pinckney, 
but  that  Rhode  Island  will  sooner  give  some  votes  for  Jefferson 
than  all  for  Pinckney. 

I  am,  with  increasing  esteem  and  attachment, 

Your  faithful  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  HAMILTON. 

BROOKLINE,  Aug.  21,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  An  exposition  of  the  reasons  which  influence 
many  men  of  unquestionable  patriotism  and  loyalty  to  withhold 
from  Mr.  Adams  the  confidence  he  once  enjoyed  may  be  useful, 
by  satisfying  the  intelligent  and  candid  part  of  the  public  that  those 
men  act,  as  they  have  ever  done,  on  genuine  national  principles. 
The  reasons  are  strong,  and  require  only  to  be  placed  in  a  clear 
light ;  but  this  must  be  done  with  infinite  care  and  circumspection, 
that  neither  anger  nor  jealousy  may  be  excited.  It  must  be  done 
in  a  manner  that  shall  clear  up  the  doubts  which  now  exist,  of  the 


1800.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  285 

sincerity  and  consistency  of  the  party  who  promote  the  union  of 
votes  for  Adams  and  Pinckney.  It  is  perceived  by  Mr.  Adams's 
personal  friends  that,  while  the  party  profess  a  zealous  desire  to 
unite  all  the  Federal  votes  for  Adams  and  Pinckney,  there  are 
many,  or  at  least  some,  individuals  among  those  who  compose  it, 
whose  wishes  are  known  to  be  that  the  election  may  issue  in  favor 
of  Mr.  Pinckney,  and  therefore  it  is  inferred  such  persons  will  not 
act  and  do  not  aim  as  they  profess.  To  this  charge  it  is  generally 
answered,  "that  without  a  union  of  all  the  Federalists  neither  Mr. 
Adams  nor  Mr.  Pinckney  can  probably  be  chosen,  but  that  with 
such  a  union  one  may  probably  be  President  and  the  other  Vice- 
President,  and,  considering  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  the 
chance  and  the  preponderance  of  wishes  are  in  favor  of  Mr.  Adams;  " 
"  that  although  there  may  be  many,  and  doubtless  are  some,  indi 
viduals  who  would  think  it  by  no  means  propitious  to  the  national 
welfare  that  Mr.  Adams  should  be  re-elected,  yet  they  yield  to  the 
superior  consideration  of  union,  by  which  alone  Jefferson  can  be 
kept  out  and  Adams  or  Pinckney  put  into  the  office  ;  and  there 
fore  these  men  act  and  will  act  fairly  toward  Mr.  Adams,  giving 
him  all  their  support,  upon  the  just  expectation  of  a  similar  support 
to  Mr.  Pinckney  from  those  who  prefer  Mr.  Adams  ; "  "  that  the 
plan  formed  at  Philadelphia  to  support  both  was  a  compromise, 
which  contemplated  Mr.  Adams  as  President,  but  liable,  however, 
to  be  superseded  by  Pinckney  from  the  nature  of  the  election ; " 
and  "  that  good  faith  would  and  ought  to  be  observed  as  the  only 
means  of  success  and  as  the  only  ground  of  content  after  success." 
Such  is  the  tenor  of  our  language  to  the  public :  we  think  it  true, 
and  we  shall  be  greatly  embarrassed  if,  at  this  late  period,  after 
our  sentiments  are  extensively  known,  there  should  be  a  new  or 
different  ground  taken.  You  must  allow  me,  therefore,  to  insist 
that,  whatever  display  is  made  of  Mr.  Adams's  misconduct,  it  must 
be  continually  recollected  that  he  may  be  again  chosen  by  us,  and  that 
we  are  pledged  to  give  him  the  full  chance  of  the  united  vote  con 
certed  at  Philadelphia. 

So  that  whatever  is  said  against  him  must  be  explicitly  avowed 
to  be  the  complaint  of  those  of  us  who  have  yielded  individual 
opinions  to  the  general  opinion  of  the  party  as  a  matter  of  expe 
diency,  and  not  the  language  of  the  party.  And  it  ought  to  be 
admitted  that  the  party,  from  various  considerations,  rather  prefer 
the  election  of  Mr.  Adams  to  Mr.  Pinckney. 


286  LIFE    AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1800. 

I  understand,  through  a  friend,  that  the  Carolinians  adhere  to 
these  ideas  as  they  were  digested  and  agreed  to  at  Philadelphia. 

Mr.  Harper  writes  from  Baltimore,  the  llth  inst.,  "that  our 
friends  may  now  count  with  some  certainty,  and  very  great  cer 
tainty,  on  a  unanimous  vote  for  Adams  and  Pinckney  in  Mary 
land."  Although  I  think  some  good  may  be  derived  from  an 
exhibition  of  Mr.  Adams's  misconduct,  yet  I  am  well  persuaded 
that  you  may  do  better  than  to  put  your  name  to  it. 

This  might  give  it  an  interest  with  men  who  need  no  such  inter 
est  ;  but  it  will  be  converted  to  a  new  proof  that  you  are  a  dan 
gerous  man.  Ames  and  I  agree  that  you  will  give  the  enemy  an 
advantage  to  which  he  has  no  claim. 

In  every  situation,  believe  me  obediently  and  faithfully  yours, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  HAMILTON. 

BROOKLINE,  Aug.  23,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  shown  to  several  of  our  wisest  and 
best  men  a  copy  of  what  I  wrote  you  on  the  25th  inst. 

They  all  concur  in  the  sentiments  it  contains  :  still,  it  is  probably 
fit,  and  it  may  be  indispensable,  to  expose  Mr.  Adams  fully  to  the 
public.  The  countenance  and  authority  given  by  him  and  his 
friends  to  the  vile  calumnies  against  us  may  strengthen  their 
credit  so  much  as  to  render  them  irrefutable  without  such  an 
exposition. 

/  don't  think,  however,  we  can  discard  Mr.  Adams  as  a  candidate, 
at  this  late  period,  without  total  derangement  and  defeat  in  this 
quarter. 

It  is  true  there  is  an  apparent  absurdity  in  supporting  a  man 
whom  we  know  to  be  unworthy  of  trust.  It  is  a  dilemma,  however, 
into  which  we  are  brought  by  the  proceedings  at  Philadelphia,  and 
which  we  could  not  shun.  Or  perhaps  it  is  a  natural  result  of  the 
mode  of  election,  and  could  not  have  been  avoided ;  but,  be  this  as 
it  may,  we  have  considered  as  an  agreed  point  among  the  Federal 
ists  that  Adams  and  Pinckney  are  to  be  voted  for  together,  and  we 
accordingly  have  urged  with  great  confidence  that  this  is  the  inten 
tion  of  the  Federal  party  generally,  and  that  it  is  acquiesced  in  by 
most  of  those  who  are  supposed  to  influence  them.  I  think,  there 
fore,  you  cannot  omit  to  make  a  clear  and  explicit  reference  to 
this  known  state  of  things  in  whatever  you  may  publish,  and  possi- 


1800.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  287 

bly  as  a  consequence  of  it  to  ground  the  publication  chiefly  on  the 
necessity  of  it,  to  exculpate  those  whom  it  vindicates  from  the 
abominable  charges,  insinuations,  and  unmerited  denunciations  of 
Mr.  Adams  and  some  of  his  personal  friends.  Indeed,  I  see  no 
impropriety  in  regretting  that  a  compromise  has  been  made  which 
must  be  observed  at  every  hazard,  it  being  too  manifest  that  Mr. 
Adams  has  relinquished  the  system  he  was  chosen  by  the  Federal 
ists  to  support,  and  that  he  has  become  hostile,  and  will  necessarily 
become  more  and  more  hostile,  to  the  firm  advocates  of  that  system 
and  all  who  adhere  to  it. 

I  think,  however,  it  must  be  shown  that  the  opposition  to  Mr. 
Adams  is  founded  upon  broad  public  principle.  For  myself,  I  often 
declare  that  the  mission  to  France,  though  impolitic,  unjustifiable, 
dangerous,  and  inconsistent ;  the  expulsion  of  able,  upright,  and  faith 
ful  officers,1  though  a  ruinous  precedent ;  the  pardon  of  Fries,  though 
a  sacrifice  of  the  safety  as  well  as  dignity  of  the  State ;  that  many 
other  transactions  of  inferior  magnitude,  though  shamefully  wrong, 
yet  that  all  these  would  not  of  themselves  induce  me  to  oppose  the 
President's  re-election,  if  I  did  not  view  them  as  evidence,  explained 
and  confirmed  by  other  evidence,  that  he  has  abandoned  the  system 
he  was  chosen  to  maintain,  and  that  he  is  likely  to  introduce  its 
opposite  with  all  its  pernicious  consequences  as  fast  as  he  can,  and 
as  far  as  his  influence  will  go. 

If  this  idea  is  correct,  as  it  appears  to  me,  it  cannot  be  too 
strongly  impressed  on  the  sound  part  of  the  public. 

A  long  letter,  full  of  good  sense  and  instructing  information,  is 
just  received  from  Mr.  Wolcott.  He  thinks  an  examination  of 
President  Adams's  administration  has  been  so  long  delayed  that 
it  can  only  now  be  made  to  grow  out  of  the  unjust  accusations  of 
his  present  friends.  This  excellent  letter  has  been  read  and 
admired  by  several  persons  whose  judgment  you  respect,  but  whose 
opinions  remain  perfectly  fixed  that  we  cannot  now  change  the 
arrangement :  we  are  not  strong  enough  to  break  up,  and  new 
form  in  the  face  of  our  enemy. 

I  have  sent  to  Mr.  Wolcott  a  copy  of  mine  to  you  of  the  25th, 
which  will  explain  to  him  sufficiently  our  situation.  Mr.  Gordon 
tells  me  that  Xew  Hampshire's  electors  will  all  vote  for  Adams  and 
Pinckney  certainly,  except  one,  of  whom  the  same  is  probable,  but 
not  certain. 

1  [Since  Mr.  Pickering  was  expelled,  the  President  has  said  of  him  to  a 
gentleman,  "  as  honest  a  man  as  ever  lived."  G.  C.  ]  See  above,  p.  277. 


288  LIFE   AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1800. 

The  persons  for  electors  are  supposed  to  be  predestinated  by  the 
Legislature. 

Colonel  Burr  is  to  be  at  Providence  to-day.  He  probably  may 
expect  that,  as  Governor  Fenner  will  vote  for  Jefferson,  he  may 
also  be  induced  to  vote  for  him.  As  he  is  a  very  sanguine  man, 
he  may  expect  even  more.  Yours  faithfully, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  Aug.  23,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  read  with  great  attention  your  letter  of 
the  llth.  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Dana  and  Mr.  Parsons  have  also 
given  it  a  reading.  As  you  probably  see  our  newspapers,  you 
must  perceive  that  we  have  taken  our  course  as  we  understood  it 
to  have  been  settled  by  our  friends  at  Philadelphia.  The  enclosed 
copy  of  my  letter  to  General  Hamilton  will  explain  to  you  the 
difficulties  we  apprehend  from  a  disclosure  of  Mr.  Adams's  defects, 
unless  accompanied  with  suitable  acknowledgments  that  he  is  to  be 
supported  as  one  of  the  candidates,  notwithstanding  those  defects. 
This  apparent  absurdity  is  only  to  be  reconciled  by  the  truth  of  the 
case  arid  the  necessity  of  mutual  concession.  T  am,  and  have  long 
been,  as  fully  convinced  as  you  are  that  Mr.  Adams  ought  to  have 
been  abandoned  by  the  Federal  party,  whom  he  had  in  fact  sacri 
ficed  ;  but  it  seems  a  majority  were  not  brought  to  this  opinion  in 
season,  and  the  present  half-way  system  was  the  consequence.  I 
wish  every  Federalist,  who  can  understand  it,  might  read  your 
excellent  letter ;  and  I  wish  to  see  a  full  but  calm  discussion  of  all 
the  grounds  of  discontent  with  Mr.  Adams,  in  a  pamphlet  or  news 
paper.  But  still  I  do  not  see  how  it  will  be  practicable  to  discard 
Mr.  Adams  as  a  candidate,  at  this  period,  without  confounding  us 
in  this  quarter,  and  consequently  exposing  the  whole  party  to  a 
defeat.  Besides,  if  Jefferson  is  to  come  in,  is  it  not  very  important 
that  he  shall  not  have  come  in  by  any  division  among  the  Federal 
ists  ?  I  fear  we  are  too  weak  at  best  to  face  our  enemy  ;  but  at 
any  rate  we  are  not  strong  enough  to  break  up,  and  new  form  on 
the  field  of  battle. 

I  have  often  contemplated  the  various  issues  of  the  election,  and 
I  see  in  each  a  considerable  approximation  of  balance  of  advantage 
and  disadvantage.  General  Pinckney  is  the  only  one  from  whom 
I  should  expect  pure,  honest,  steady  efforts  to  save  the  State.  On 


1800.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  289 

his  side,  the  wise  and  good  would  be  in  their  proper  place ;  and,  if 
they  fail  of  doing  all  the  good  they  wish,  yet  they  could  neither  be 
destroyed  nor  disgraced.  But  it  is  too  obvious  that  Mr.  Adams 
and  many  with  him  will  oppose  the  Pinckney  administration,  and 
very  many  more  support  it  coldly. 

A  comment  upon  your  letter  would  make  a  great  book,  and,  if 
worthy  of  the  text,  would  be  invaluable.  I  shall  for  ever  regret 
that  the  ideas  it  contains  have  not  been  communicated  to  every  man 
of  sense  and  honesty. 

With  sincere  esteem  and  attachment,  I  remain  as  ever, 

Yours  faithfully,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  September,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  At  the  desire  of  Mr.  Gore,  from  whom  it  has 
just  arrived,  I  enclose  you  a  letter  to  Colonel  Pickering,  with  a 
request  that  you  will  transmit  it  to  him.  You  will  see  by  our 
newspapers  that  .the  negotiation  at  Paris  is  broken  off,  and  I  think 
you  will  soon  see  such  of  its  details  as  may  tend  to  influence  the 
Presidential  election.  The  article  fron\  Paris  is  certainly  intended 
for  that  purpose.  The  French  say  they  will  not  treat  with  us, 
unless  we  put  them  on  the  same  footing  as  the  English  ;  but,  in  the 
twenty -fifth  article  of  Mr.  Jay's  treaty,  we  have  stipulated  that  we 
will  make  no  new  treaty  which  shall  give  to  a  nation  at  war  with 
England  the  advantage  of  our  ports  to  shelter  privateers,  prizes,  &c. 
Previous  to  the  treaty  of  Mr.  Jay,  and  afterward  until  the  annul 
ment  of  the  French  treaty,  France  had  the  same  advantages  over 
the  English  which  she  now  complains  the  English  have  over  her. 
Yet  this  did  not  prevent  an  equitable  and  amicable  treaty  being 
made  by  Mr.  Jay.  When  we  supposed  ourselves  in  danger  from 
the  power  and  hostility  of  England,  as  in  1778,  we  reciprocated 
with  France  certain  exclusive  stipulations  relative  to  maritime 
rights,  which  we  then  thought  suited  our  condition.  In  1794,  we 
reciprocated  with  England  similar  stipulations,  and  which  by  the 
violations  of  France,  in  the  face  of  our  treaty  with  her,  gives  an 
efficacy  to  the  stipulation,  which  it  could  never  have  had  in  relation 
to  France.  If  this  is  inconvenient  or  injurious  to  France,  it  is  her 
own  fault.  For  we  saved  to  her  all  the  rights  she  enjoyed  by 
treaty ;  and  she  wantonly,  wickedly,  and  insolently  violated  that 

19 


290  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE   CABOT.  [1800. 

• 
same  treaty  by  which  she  held  them.     If  I  were  not  too  indolent, 

I  would  throw  two  or  three  of  these  ideas  into  the  papers. 

A  gentleman,  who  saw  Mr.  Ellsworth  the  end  of  June,  informs 
me  that  he  expressed  an  opinion  that  it  was  best  he  and  his  col 
leagues  should  be  where  they  were ;  that  Austria  probably  would 
make  peace,  and  England  perhaps  would  not  continue  the  war 
after  the  summer  campaign  ends ;  that  if  all  others  should  adjust 
their  differences,  arid  ours  remain  unsettled,  we  might  find  it  diffi 
cult  to  obtain  terms  that  were  just  and  reasonable.  These  senti 
ments  are  natural,  but  are  they  sound  ?  What  safety  can  be 
derived  to  us  from  a  piece  of  parchment,  if  Buonaparte  is  able  and 
disposed  to  disturb  us  ?  Does  not  our  danger  increase  with  his 
preponderance  of  power,  and  is  not  that  preponderance  increased 
by  the  extinction  of  our  enmity?  Is  there  any  safety  for  any 
nation  against  the  power  and  ambition  of  France,  but  in  a  power 
and  disposition  to  resist  them  of  themselves,  or  in  concert  with 
others  ?  I  think  there  is  not ;  and  I  still  hope  that  England  thinks 
so,  and  will  therefore  revive  the  spirit  of  King  William  and  Queen 
Anne's  times,  and  make  neither  peace  nor  truce  with  France  until 
her  power  is  reduced. 

I  should  be  most  happy  to  see  you  here,  although  I  should 
expect  to  hear  you  denounced  as  an  intriguer,  if  you  were  to  visit 
us  at  this  time.  I  am  told,  however,  that  to  Mr.  Parsons  the 
President  denies  that  he  ever  called  us  "  British  faction,  or  any  of 
the  hard  names  of  which  he  has  been  accused."  He  does  not 
recollect  these  intemperances,  and  thinks  himself  greatly  misunder 
stood  or  misrepresented ;  he  does  not  recollect  to  have  used  the 
expressions  mentioned  by  Mr.  Goodhue,  and  never  spoke  of  the 
Essex  Junto  in  the  opprobrious  terms  charged  against  him.  It 
seems,  on  the  whole,  he  was  disposed  to  moderation,  and  to  be 
reconciled  to  those  few  who  have  omitted  to  visit  him,  if  they 
wished  to  be  reconciled.  Yours  faithfully, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  GORE. 

SEPT.  30, 1800. 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND,  —  I  have  looked  into  citizen  Barras's  vale 
dictory  address  to  citizen  Monroe  as  published  here,  and  find  the 
words  to  be  as  I  had  supposed :  "  We  restore  in  you  a  representative 
to  America."  In  the  publication  you  quote,  the  word  "  send " 
changes  the  signification  entirely. 


1800.] 


CORRESPONDENCE.  291 


I  wish  it  were  possible  to  give  a  satisfactory  opinion  upon  the 
Presidential  election,  but  the  probability  fluctuates  weekly.  For 
some  time  past,  Jefferson's  chance  was  much  the  best ;  but  within  a 
few  days  we  have  been  informed  that  the  Federalists  in  South  Car 
olina  hope  to  prevail  in  the  united  vote  for  Adams  and  Pinckney. 
If  this  proves  well  founded,  it  gives  Mr.  Adams  the  only  chance  he 
could  have.  If,  however,  the  new  Pennsylvania  Legislature  can 
be  managed  by  McKean  and  Dallas,  Jefferson  will  still  prevail. 
Against  this,  we  are  assured  by  the  Pennsylvania  Federalists  that 
a  majority  in  their  Senate  will  immovably  adhere  to  the  district 
election,  in  which  case  the  final  issue  must  be  considered  as  now 
wholly  uncertain.1  I  could  give  you  many  details  and  conjectures 
on  this  subject,  but  they  would  not  enable  you  to  form  a  satisfac 
tory  judgment,  and  therefore  I  spare  you  the  trouble  of  reading 
them.  I  think,  however,  such  is  the  activity  of  parties,  and  they 
are  now  so  distinct,  that  we  shall  soon  be  able  to  give  a  statement 
of  the  votes  that  may  be  expected. 

Mr.  Wolcott  thinks  Mr.  Marshall  accepted  the  secretaryship2 
from  good  motives,  and  with  a  view  of  preserving  union,  and  that 
he  and  Dexter,3  by  accepting,  have  rendered  the  nation  great  ser 
vice  ;  for,  if  they  had  refused,  we  should  have  had  —  Heaven  alone 
knows  whom !  He  thinks,  however,  as  all  must,  that  under  the 
present  chief  they  will  be  disappointed  in  their  hopes,  and  that  if 
Jefferson  is  President  they  will  probably  resign. 

I  am  alarmed  at  the  talk  of  peace  which  is  heard  at  your  table 
and  Mr.  King's.  There  can  be  no  security,  and  therefore  should  be 
no  peace.  England  may  be  undone  by  a  peace  while  the  power  of 
France  is  so  predominant.  There  is  no  good,  but  every  evil,  to 
England  to  be  dreaded  from  a  peace ;  and  certainly  there  is  no 
necessity  for  it.  Will  any  man  pretend  that  England  has  not  the 
means  of  opposing  the  universal  empire  of  France  now  with  as 
much  effect  as  at  the  beginning  of  the  century  ?  I  have  lately  been 
reviewing  the  events  of  that  period,  and  cannot  but  be  struck  with 
the  immense  superiority  of  advantage  which  the  British  govern 
ment  and  nation  now  enjoy  compared  with  it.  If  Great  Britain 
perseveres,  she  cannot  fail  of  a  triumph  over  her  rival,  and  will 

1  The  Pennsylvania  Senate  did  hold  out,  and  the  House  finally  compro 
mised  for  seven  Federal  and  eight  opposition  electors.     In  South  Carolina, 
the  Federalists  were  beaten,  the  opposition  obtaining  all  the  eight  votes. 

2  Of  state. 

8  Appointed  Secretary  of  War  to  succeed  McIIenry. 


292  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1800. 

ultimately  be  reimbursed  her  expense  as  well  as  enjoy  the  glory  of 
redeeming  Europe.  The  power  and  influence  which  she  acquires 
by  her  exertions  are  as  solid  as  the  gold  she  expends,  and,  if  they 
are  used  wisely  and  without  abuse,  will  make  her  as  great  as  a 
nation  can  be,  —  perhaps,  indeed,  too  great. 

I  concede  to  you  that  your  estimate  of  Buonaparte's  talents  was 
the  most  correct.  Since  his  return  from  Egypt,  he  has  risen  in  my 
esteem  by  his  conduct  and  success,  though  both  have  been  favored 
by  circumstances. 

"  The  damned  British  faction  "  is  now  smaller  in  numbers  than 
it  has  been  for  several  years.  Ames  and  I,  with  half  a  dozen  others 
of  your  friends,  still  adhere  with  unshaken  constancy  to  those  sen 
timents  of  true  patriotism  (as  we  think)  which  have  drawn  upon 
us  this  extraordinary  denunciation. 

Yours  faithfully,  G.  C. 


CABOT  TO  GORE. 

OCT.  11, 1800. 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND,  —  I  wrote  to  you  and  Mr.  King  each  a  short 
letter,  which  my  son  copied,  and  which  copies  are  under  this  cover. 

We  are  in  statu  quo  as  regards  the  election,  though  I  think  the 
sentiments  favorable  to  a  united  vote  for  Adams  and  Pinckney 
have  extended  themselves  considerably.  While  you  and  my  good 
friend,  Mr.  King,  lament  the  asperity  of  parties  here,  you  will  nat 
urally  recollect  that  your  distance  from  the  fire  enables  you  to  keep 
more  cool  than  those  who  are  in  the  midst  of  it.  Jacobinism  is 
declining  in  Europe,  because  the  master  of  the  workshop  has  now 
an  interest  to  maintain,  at  least  within  doors,  the  principles,  and 
observe  the  maxims  of  all  regular  establishments.  Still,  a  little  of 
this  mischief  abroad  may  be  promoted.  Excessive  democracy,  which 
is  a  sort  of  natural  Jacobinism,  threatens  the  United  States  with 
great  trouble ;  and  most  men  who  reflect  much  and  see  far  think 
we  cannot  avert  it.  Some  efforts,  however,  will  be  made  to  con 
solidate  and  invigorate  New  England.  An  "  anti-Jacobin  "  news 
paper  is,  among  other  things,  to  be  printed,  and  filled  with  the 
productions  of  our  best  men.  It  is  at  least  hoped  by  this  measure 
to  unite,  and  to  keep  united,  the  Federalists,  to  correct  their  dan 
gerous  errors,  and  to  prepare  them  for  evils  which  cannot  be 
shunned.  You  will  not  expect  much  from  this  undertaking,  yet 
you  will  think  it  proper  to  be  pursued.  It  seems  to  be  considered 


1800-1  CORRESPONDENCE.  293 

by  the  most  sensible  men,  in  some  of  the  Southern  and  Middle 
States,  that  there  is  no  hope  for  our  government  but  what  rests 
upon  New  England ;  and  the  most  knowing  ones  think  that  a  very 
slender  dependence.  In  New  York,  we  are  told  there  is  a  total 
despondence ;  in  New  Jersey,  the  parties  are  balanced ;  but,  in 
Pennsylvania,  Jacobinism  triumphs. 

With  all  these  melancholy  appearances,  you  will  not  fail  to  remem 
ber  what  has  often  happened,  —  that  we  derive  the  means  of  escape 
from  evil  very  often  from  the  terror  it  excites. 

Yours  affectionately,  G.  C. 


CABOT  TO  HAMILTON. 

BROOKLINE,  Saturday,  Oct.  11,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Your  letter  of  the  2d  did  not  reach  me  until 
last  evening,  it  having  been  accidentally  detained  at  the  stage-house 
in  this  village  several  days. 

The  President  is  on  the  point  of  departure  for  the  seat  of  govern 
ment,  so  that  no  opportunity  of  conveyance  by  a  private  gentleman 
could  be  found.  I  have  therefore  sent  your  letter  by  a  sure  hand 
to  the  post-office,  whence  it  undoubtedly  goes,  in  the  President's 
regular  package  of  letters,  to  Quincy  this  day.1  I  have  chosen 
this  method  as  more  sure  of  reaching  his  own  hand  than  if  I  had 
sent  it  by  a  servant,  who  would  have  been  obliged  to  deliver  it, 
perhaps,  to  another  servant,  instead  of  to  the  President  or  his 
secretary. 

1  The  letter  referred  to  was  a  second,  addressed  by  Hamilton  to  Adams 
on  the  charge  of  "  a  British  faction,"  and  is  as  follows :  — 

NEW  YOBK,  Oct.  1,  1800. 

SIR,  —  The  time  which  has  elapsed  since  my  letter  of  the  1st  August 
was  delivered  to  you  precludes  the  further  expectation  of  an  answer. 

From  this  silence,  I  will  draw  no  inference ;  nor  will  I  presume  to  judge 
of  the  fitness  of  silence  on  such  an  occasion,  on  the  part  of  the  chief  magis 
trate  of  a  republic  towards  a  citizen,  who  without  a  stain  has  discharged  so 
many  important  public  trusts. 

But  thus  much  I  will  affirm,  that,  by  whomsoever  a  charge  of  the  kind 
mentioned  in  my  former  letter  may  at  any  time  have  been  made  or  insin 
uated  against  me,  it  is  a  base,  wicked,  and  cruel  calumny,  destitute  even  of 
a  plausible  pretext  to  excuse  the  folly  or  the  depravity  which  must  have 
dictated  it. 

With  due  respect,  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  your  obedient  servant, 

ALEXANDER  HAMILTON. 

See  Works  of  Hamilton,  VI.  470,  471. 


294  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE    CABOT.  [1800. 

Our  people,  after  all  their  scolding,  seem  now  to  admit  more 
generally  that  Massachusetts  ought  fairly  to  vote  for  Adams  and 
Pinckney ;  but  you  know  that  we  can  only  give  conjectures  until 
the  meeting  of  our  Legislature.  Although  I  am  not  "  an  influential 
man"  and  wish  I  was  not  thought  to  be,  I  expect  at  least  one,  and, 
if  printed,  several  copies  of  your  justificatory  letter. 

Dr.  Dwight1  is  here  stirring  us  up  to  oppose  the  demon  of 
Jacobinism.  A  new  paper,  to  be  entitled  the  "  New  England 
An ti- jacobin,"  is  to  be  published  at  Boston,  and  circulated  as 
extensively  as  passible,  especially  through  New  England.  The 
labors  of  many  good  men  are  expected  in  its  support,  and  yours 
among  the  rest.  Some  good  may  reasonably  be  expected  from  it 
in  the  dissemination  of  useful  truths,  in  correcting  some  of  the 
dangerous  errors  embraced  by  the  Federalists,  in  uniting  and  keep 
ing  them  united,  and  in  some  measure  preparing  them  for  the  evils 
they  cannot  shun.  But  the  object  is  too  vague  and  the  means  too 
inconstant  to  satisfy  all  our  anxieties. 

The  President  has  been  endeavoring  to  be  calm  and  discreet, 
and  has  discovered  a  desire  to  be  visited  by  the  individuals  of  the 
"  damned  faction  "  whom  he  has  formerly  proscribed. 

Yours  affectionately  and  faithfully,  G.  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  Oct.  5,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  SIR, —  A  letter  from  Mr.  Gore,  dated  August  21, 
informs  me  that  the  Americans  who  daily  arrive  in  London  from 
Paris  are  generally,  if  not  universally,  of  opinion  that  nothing  will 
be  effected  by  our  envoys.  These  itinerants  seem  to  think,  too, 
that  we  are  in  the  wrong,  not  because  we  have  humbled  ourselves 
before  the  "  Great  Nation,"  but  because  our  humility  is  limited  by 
the  instructions  which  ought  to  have  permitted  the  acceptance  of 
such  terms  as  France  would  prescribe. 

I  have  already  intimated  to  you  my  fears  that  the  high  and  well- 
tempered  mind  of  our  excellent  friend  Ellsworth  has  been  shaken, 
perhaps  by  sickness  in  part,  but  in  part  also  by  the  events  which 
he  has  witnessed,  and  by  others  which  he  apprehended,  and  all 
aggravated  by  the  acts  and  management  of  a  set  of  people  at  Paris 

1  Dr.  Timothy  Dwight,  President  of  Yale  College. 


1800.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  295 

employed  for  the  purpose,  as  the  Kosciuskos,  Barlows,1  &c.  For 
my  own  part,  I  rejoice  exceedingly  that  Mr.  Jay's  treaty  contains  a 
bar  to  such  conventions  as  the  French  insist  on.  On  this  point,  I 
published  yesterday  in  the  Centinel,  as  "  One  of  the  American 
People"  a  few  ideas  which  occurred  on  reading  the  Paris  article ; 2 
and  I  have  sent  to  the  same  press,  for  Wednesday's  paper,  some 
further  remarks  on  the  impudence  as  well  as  the  insidiousness  of 
all  the  dogmas  and  doctrines  of  the  French  respecting  the  commer 
cial  rights  of  neutrals,  all  which  I  consider  are  maintained  by  them 
with  the  sole  view  of  engaging  the  neutrals  to  become  pledged  to 
support  a  system  by  which  France  can  have  her  own  commerce 
covered,  or  neutrals  be  brought  to  fight  for  her.  You  know  I  am 
too  indolent  to  illustrate  and  enforce  these  ideas  as  they  merit, 
but  the  hints  will  be  useful  to  abler  and  more  active  men.  Great 
pains  are  taken  by  Dr.  Morse  3  and  some  others  to  effect  a  recon 
ciliation,  as  it  is  called,  between  the  President  and  those  who  dis 
approve  his  politics ;  but,  though  well  meant,  the  attempt  is  absurd. 
We  believe  the  President's  course  leads  to  the  division,  disgrace, 
and  rum  of  the  Federal  cause.  He  denounces  us  for  entertaining 
these  sentiments.  No  personal  good-humor  can  alter  the  fact.  I 
am  one  of  the  few  who  prefer  remaining  under  Presidential  frowns 
and  displeasure  rather  than,  by  visiting  him  or  any  other  act,  indi 
cate  to  the  public  that  I  have  renounced  opinions  which  are  com 
pletely  established,  or  that  I  can  abandon  men  in  public  life  whose 
conduct  and  character,  I  think,  ought  to  endear  them  to  every  friend 
of  order,  virtue,  and  public  liberty.  Although  I  still  think  the  en 
gagement  to  support  Mr.  Adams  with  Mr.  Pinckney,  and  which 
perhaps  was  unavoidably  made,  ought  to  be  sacredly  respected,  yet 
I  am  strongly  inclined  to  believe,  in  our  untoward  situation,  we 
should  do  as  well  with  Jefferson  for  President,  and  Mr.  Pinckney 
Vice-President,  as  with  any  thing  that  we  can  now  expect.  Such 
an  issue  to  the  election,  if  fairly  produced,  is  the  only  one  that  will 
keep  the  Federal  party  together,  and  in  a  state  to  act  with  renewed 
vigor  when  circumstances  shall  require  it. 

Yours  faithfully  and  affectionately,          GEORGE  CABOT. 

1  Joel  Barlow,  of  Connecticut,  famous  for  his  good  Democratic  principles 
and  his  bad  poetry.     See  above,  p.  240. 

2  See  p.  597. 

3  Dr.  Jedidiah  Morse,  of  Connecticut,  better  known  by  his  geographical 
works  and  his  religious  labors  than  by  politics,  with  which,  however,  he 
seems  to  have  busied  himself  to  a  considerable  extent. 


296  LIFE  AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1800. 

WOLCOTT  TO  CABOT. 

(Private.) 

WASHINGTON,  Nov.  16,  1800. 

DEAR  SIR, — I  received  your  favor  of  October  5  a  few  days  since, 
after  my  return  from  a  visit  to  Connecticut.  We  know  nothing 
more  of  the  result  of  the  mission  to  France  than  what  appears  in 
the  papers.  A  treaty  has  unquestionably  been  signed,  although 
our  previous  information  justified  a  confident  belief  that  nothing 
would  be  done.  I  fear  there  are  grounds  for  the  apprehensions 
you  suggest ;  and  I  shall  be  happy  if  the  embarrassments,  which 
the  mission  to  France  has  already  occasioned,  are  not  increased  by 
its  future  consequences.  Let  us  not  however  anticipate  difficulties, 
but  prepare  to  meet  them. 

After  due  reflection,  I  have  considered  it  to  be  my  duty  to  retire 
from  office.  I  have  accordingly  written  a  respectful  letter  to  the 
President,  offering  my  resignation  at  the  close  of  the  ensuing  month, 
to  which  I  have  received  an  obliging  answer.  I  reflect  with  satis 
faction  that  the  business  of  the  Treasury  department  has  not  suf 
fered  in  my  hands,  that  the  revenue  of  the  present  greatly  exceeds 
that  of  any  former  year,  and  that  loans  can  be  obtained,  if  neces 
sary.  It  would  be  affectation  to  pretend  that  my  resignation  has 
not  been  attended  with  a  conflict  of  emotions.  I  can  however 
declare  that  none  of  them  have  been  of  a  nature  to  produce  self- 
crimination  ;  and  I  presume  to  hope  that  my  future  conduct  will 
evince  a  zealous  attachment  to  the  interests  of  my  country  and  its 
government,  and  sincere  gratitude  to  those  who  have  honored  me 
with  their  confidence,  friendship,  and  support.  I  am,  dear  sir, 
with  esteem  and  friendship, 

Your  obedient  servant,  O.  W. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

(Private  and  confidential.) 

Nov.  27,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND, — Although  I  had  long  contemplated  the 
possible  event  of  your  retirement  from  office,  yet  my  mind  was  not 
quite  prepared  for  it  when  your  letter  of  the  16th  arrived.  I  have 
revolved  it  the  greatest  part  of  the  last  night,  which  I  found  impos 
sible  to  pass  in  sleep ;  and  I  still  can  view  the  subject  only  as  grief 


1800.]  COERESPONDENCE.  297 

or  indignation  presents  it.  A  government  which  cannot  tolerate 
the  virtues  which  have  been  exhibited  in  ours  cannot  long  enjoy 
the  confidence  of  the  wise  and  good ;  it  cannot  long  be  preserved 
pure,  and  will  soon  be  thought  to  be  not  worth  preserving.  I  know 
not  how  this  event  will  operate  upon  the  minds  and  feelings  of 
others;  but  I  can  hardly  doubt,  if  pride  and  prejudice  had  not 
made  this  State  so  blind  to  Mr.  Adams,  they  would  have  wished  to 
withhold  their  votes  at  this  late  period.  In  Connecticut,  they  are 
differently  circumstanced  and  may  dare  to  act  according  to  the 
dictates  of  genuine  public  principles. 

You  must  indulge  my  wishes  to  know  your  future  destiny,  so  far 
at  least  as  it  is  foreseen  by  yourself.  I  am  anxious  to  learn  what 
course  you  have  prescribed  yourself,  that  I  may  direct  the  prayers 
of  my  heart  in  conformity. 

If  what  the  newspapers  represent  with  great  appearance  of  truth 
be  correct,  I  should  think  the  affairs  of  our  country  are  in  the 
worst  possible  situation  in  regard  to  foreign  nations.  We  nourish 
all  the  substantial  differences  between  us  and  the  two  leading 
European  powers,  and  we  wantonly  throw  away  the  means  which 
their  rivalry  affords  us  to  remove  those  differences. 

I  remain  ever  yours,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


CABOT   TO   WOLCOTT. 

Nor.  28,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND,  —  Who  is  it  possible  to  find  for  your  suc 
cessor  in  office  ?  I  have  sought  in  vain  for  a  character  competent 
to  its  duties,  and  who  would  undertake  them.  Indeed,  there  are  but 
few,  very  few,  who  could  perform  them.  Mr.  Steele l  will  be 
offended,  if  he  is  neglected ;  but  a  man  ought  to  have  more  than 
common  merits,  coming  from  such  a  quarter,  to  secure  public  con 
fidence.  I  will  thank  you,  if  a  leisure  moment  recurs,  to  inform 
me,  when  the  arrangement  is  made,  what  it  is. 

Writing2  to  General  Hamilton,  I  have  taken  the  liberty  to 
inform  him  that  some  of  his  respectable  friends  censure  him  for 
displaying  too  much  egotism  and  vanity  in  his  book.  I  know  how 
difficult  it  is  for  a  man  to  be  told  of  his  faults  without  offence  ;  but 

1  I  suppose  this  to  refer  to  John  Steele  of  North  Carolina,  and  at  this 
time  First  Comptroller  of  the  Treasury. 

2  This  refers  to  the  next  letter. 


298  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF  GEORGE  CABOT.  [1800. 

I  was  encouraged  to  do  what  I  thought  a  necessary  service  by  the 
belief  that  he  cannot  possibly  mistake  my  motive  or  doubt  either 
my  affection  or  esteem.  If  I  have  materially  diminished  his  friend 
ship,  it  will  be  a  new  spur  to  my  cynical  feelings,  which  already 
exceed  those  of  Diogenes. 

Since  the  success  of  the  friends  of  Mr.  Pinckney  in  our  State 
Legislature,  it  has  been  thought  by  some  that,  if  your  policy  had 
been  pursued  and  Mr.  Adams  renounced  absolutely  by  the  Feder 
alists,  it  would  have  been  in  our  power  to  have  carried  Pinckney 
and  Ellsworth  or  Jay.  I  am  not  of  this  opinion  ;  but  I  think  the 
issue  may  now  be  as  unfavorable  to  the  permanent  interest  of  the 
Federal  cause  as  it  would  have  been  in  any  issue  of  the  other 
course.  But  the  truth  is  local  causes  support  Mr.  Adams  here  too 
strongly ;  and  in  the  Middle  States,  where  he  ought  to  have  been 
first  openly  opposed,  the  Federalists  were  too  weak  for  the  opera 
tion.  In  Pennsylvania,  nothing  would  have  been  hazarded,  because 
all  was  previously  lost ;  but  in  Delaware,  and  especially  in  Jersey, 
the  attempt,  by  dividing  the  Federalists,  would  have  defeated  them 
altogether.  I  do  not  therefore  see  how  the  thing  could  have  been 
well  managed  very  differently.  Your  resignation  gives  great  pain 
to  the  few  persons  whom  I  have  made  acquainted  with  it,  and  will 
doubtless  excite  general  uneasiness  among  the  sober  people  and 
those  who  have  much  property. 

Accept  my  unfeigned  regards.  G.  CABOT. 

I  have  sent  a  copy  of  Judge  Washington's  paragraph  to  Rhode 
Island,  and  shall  put  the  letter  you  sent  into  the  hands  of  our 
electors. 

CABOT  TO  HAMILTON. 

BROOKLINE,  Nov.  29,  1800. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  It  is  too  late  to  use  the  letter  you  enclosed 
me  in  Vermont,  and  here  it  is  unnecessary. 

I  am  satisfied  the  votes  in  this  State  and  New  Hampshire  will 
be  all  for  Adams  and  Pinckney.  You  will  have  seen  with  some 
pleasure  that  our  Legislature  have  conducted  in  the  manner  which 
was  predicted  by  our  friend,  Mr.  Lowell,  Jr.1  To  his  efforts,  in 
deed,  much  of  the  success  may  be  attributed. 

1  John  Lowell,  son  of  Judge  Lowell  mentioned  above,  p.  175.  He  was 
distinguished  as  a  lawyer,  and  was  one  of  the  ablest  of  the  politic-al  writers 
of  his  day.  He  was  Mr.  Cabot's  nephew,  and  a  warm  personal  friend  as 
well. 


1800.]  COEEESPONDENCE.  299 

Some  fears  are  entertained  lest  the  electors  in  Rhode  Island, 
though  decidedly  Federal,  will  not  all  vote  for  Pinckney.  To 
avoid  such  a  misfortune,  Ames  has  written  earnest  expostulations, 
which  will  be  communicated  to  the  electors,  or  some  of  the  influ 
ential  ones ;  and  Mr.  Mason,1  who  will  be  at  Providence  on  Mon 
day,  carries  with  him  a  copy  of  a  letter  just  received  by  me  from 
Mr.  Wolcott,  containing  a  paragraph  from  Judge  Washington, 
extremely  well  calculated  to  induce  a  fair  and  equal  vote  for 
Pinckney  in  New  England. 

Admitting  that  your  friends  are  "  dismayed  "  by  your  letter  con 
cerning  Mr.  Adams,  it  is  nevertheless  possible  you  may  be  right 
in  publishing  it.  I  am  of  opinion  that  no  publication  of  the  kind 
would  have  been  well  received  at  this  time  in  any  part  of  the 
United  States ;  and  this  opinion  is  manifestly  supported  by  the 

fact:  — 

"  Truths  would  you  teach,  or  save  a  sinking  land, 
All  fear,  none  aid  you,  and  few  understand." 

So  said  the  man  who  had  more  good  sense  than  commonly  falls  to 
the  lot  of  a  poet.2 

I  don't  think  the  case  exactly  parallel,  yet  I  cannot  omit  to 
remind  you  of  "  Burke's  Reflections,"  which  were  reprobated 
almost  universally  when  they  first  appeared.  Even  those  who 
approved  the  sentiments  thought  the  avowal  of  them  imprudent 
and  the  publication  of  them  untimely. 

I  wish  some  one  who  is  more  in  the  world  than  I  am,  and  who 
feels,  if  possible,  as  much  interest  in  every  thing  that  affects  you  as 
I  feel,  would  furnish  you  with  correct  information  of  all  the  opin 
ions  which  are  expressed  by  sensible  men,  and  especially  by  your 
friends. 

While  I  cannot  conceal  that  some  of  these  would  be  unpleasant 
to  hear,  I  am  persuaded  that  most  of  them  are  explicable,  on  the 
principles  of  human  nature,  and  do  not  in  the  smallest  degree  incul 
pate  the  writer.  Men  are  easily  made  angry  with  the  messenger 
of  ill  news,  and  they  who  love  their  ease  listen  with  great  impa 
tience  to  those  who  tell  them  they  must  no  longer  indulge  it.  Some 
who  felt  great  dislike  to  Mr.  Adams  are  disappointed  that  you  have 
treated  him  with  so  much  moderation.  They  opened  your  book 
with  the  expectation  of  seeing  Mr.  Adams  convicted  of  designs  to 

1  Jonathan  Mason,  of  Boston,  senator  from  Massachusetts  1800-3,  and 
afterwards  member  of  Congress  from  1817-20. 

2  Pope,  Essay  on  Man. 


300  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE  CABOT.  [1800. 

involve  the  country  in  war  with  Great  Britain,  that  he  might  thus 
secure  to  himself  the  support  of  those  numerous  but  mistaken 
people,  whose  animosity  to  Britain  is  ardent  and  inveterate ;  they 
expected  you  would  describe  in  just  but  glowing  colors  his  perni 
cious  jealousy  of  Washington's  superior  merits  and  fame,  and  the 
intolerance  of  such  a  spirit  toward  all  men  who  enjoy  a  great 
degree  of  public  confidence ;  they  expected  you  would  have  ana 
lyzed  him  so  effectually  as  to  prove  that  he  is,  and  must  be,  but 
little  attached  to  the  support  of  public  credit  and  the  rights  of 
property,  and  that  his  ideas  respecting  commerce,  and  the  use  it 
may  be  put  to  in  our  foreign  politics,  are  more  unsound  than  even 
Jefferson's  or  Madison's :  in  a  word,  that  war  with  England, 
privateering,  and  paper  money,  with  all  their  baneful  appendages 
and  consequences,  are  viewed  by  him,  not  as  evils  to  be  deprecated, 
but  resources  to  be  preferred  to  that  stable  condition  aimed  at  by 
the  Washington  system,  which  he  hates,  and  which  he  has  been 
constrained  by  circumstances  to  support. 

Yet  the  men  who  looked  for  all  this  acknowledge  it  would 
have  been  highly  impolitic  and  injudicious,  if  you  had  executed  it. 

There  are  others,  but  they  are  not  numerous,  who  think  you 
have  done  too  much  already  in  the  crimination  of  Mr.  Adams. 

All  agree  that  the  execution  is  masterly,  but  I  am  bound  to  tell 
you  that  you  are  accused  by  respectable  men  of  egotism  ;  and  some 
very  worthy  and  sensible  men  say  you  have  exhibited  the  same 
vanity  in  your  book  which  you  charge  as  a  dangerous  quality  and 
great  weakness  in  Mr.  Adams. 

I  should  have  left  it  to  your  enemies  to  tell  you  of  the  censures 
of  your  friends,  if  I  was  not  persuaded  that  you  cannot  possibly 
mistake  my  motives  or  doubt  of  the  sincerity  of  my  affection  or 
the  greatness  of  my  esteem. 

Yours  faithfully,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


1801-6-1  PRIVATE  LIFE.  301 


CHAPTER   IX. 

1801-1806. 

Private  Life.  —  Society.  —  Business.  —  Occupations.  —  Political  Matters.  — 
Correspondence. 

AFTER  the  downfall  of  his  party,  Mr.  Cabot  withdrew 
more  completely  even  than  before  from  the  field  of  politics. 
At  no  time  was  he  a  good  correspondent ;  but,  after  the 
beginning  of  the  century,  his  indolent  habits  in  this  respect 
became  more  confirmed,  and  his  letters  steadily  diminished 
in  number.  The  realization  of  his  melancholy  forebodings 
as  to  the  political  fate  of  the  country,  and  the  disgust 
excited  by  the  internal  dissensions  and  consequent  ruin  of 
the  Federalist  party,  were  the  principal  causes  of  the  in 
crease  in  Mr.  Cabot's  innate  aversion  to  publicity  and  to 
public  affairs.  Other  events,  too,  of  a  more  private  char 
acter  contributed,  as  years  went  on,  to  the  same  result. 

His  life  at  this  time,  though  quiet  and  secluded,  was  both  a 
contented  and  happy  one.  Although  fond  of  the  country,  he 
did  not  enjoy  the  drudgery  of  farming,  and  relieved  himself  of 
it  bv  a  judicious  lease  of  his  estate  to  a  tenant.  His  house 
hold  was  a  small  one,  and  its  affairs  were  regulated  with  a 
wise  simplicity  and  necessary  economy.  He  still  held  the 
office  of  President  of  the  Boston  Branch  of  the  United  States 
Bank,  and  this  necessitated  occasional  visits  to  Boston  ;  but, 
except  in  this  way,  he  saw  little  of  society.  His  old  party 
friends  from  other  States  were  sometimes  in  Boston,  and 
then  he  had  the  pleasure  of  entertaining  them  at  his  house. 
Now  and  again,  one  would  come  to  Brookline  for  several 
days ;  but  the  only  person  whom  Mr.  Cabot  saw  regularly 
or  frequently  was  Fisher  Ames,  with  whom  he  constantly 


30^  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1801-6. 

interchanged  visits,  and  whose  society  was  always  one  of 
his  chiefest  and  most  valued  pleasures.  But  Mr.  Cabot's 
principal  resources  were  found  in  his  library.  Books  were 
to  him  unfailing  and  ever  welcome  friends,  and  from  them 
he  derived  at  this  time  his  greatest  satisfaction.  A  life  of 
such  perfect  retirement  and  leisure  suited  well  with  his 
disposition.  His  natural  indolence,  his  disinclination  to 
mix  much  with  other  men,  his  dislike  of  the  jarrings  of  the 
outer  world,  his  studious  tastes  and  reflective  temperament 
were  all  gratified  by  a  condition  which  he  himself  terms 
that  of  "  a  complete  recluse."  But  man  lives  not  to  him 
self  alone,  and  domestic  duties  required  a  change  in  his 
mode  of  life,  which  put  an  end  to  this  secluded  and  peace 
ful  existence.  In  these  days  of  rapid  transit,  the  distance 
of  five  miles  from  a  large  city  seems  trifling  in  the  extreme, 
and  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  that  at  the  beginning  of 
the  century  residence  in  Bropkline  not  only  meant  entire 
seclusion,  but  also  involved  separation  from  those  members 
of  the  family  who  were  compelled  to  live  in  Boston.  Mr. 
Cabot's  eldest  son,  Charles,  had,  like  his  father,  entered 
upon  the  career  of  a  sea  captain  and  merchant ;  and  long 
voyages  to  the  East  Indies  permitted  but  rare  and  distant 
visits  to  his  home.  This  separation  from  their  eldest  son 
caused  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Cabot  to  cling  even  more  closely  to 
their  other  children.  Henry,  the  second,  and  Edward,  the 
third  son,  were  respectively  at  this  time  in  a  law  office 
and  counting-house  in  Boston  ;  and  so  long  as  their  father  re 
mained  in  Brookline,  therefore,  they  were  unable  to  be  with 
him  except  on  Sunday.  To  this  almost  constant  separation 
Mr.  Cabot  was  most  unwilling  to  submit ;  and  he  did  not, 
moreover,  think  it  right  that  his  only  daughter,  then  just 
entering  upon  womanhood,  should  for  six  months  in  the 
year  be  entirely  cut  off  from  all  society.  From  these 
motives,  though  with  great  reluctance,  he  sold  his  farm  in 
Brookline,  and  early  in  the  year  1803  removed  to  Boston, 
where  he  passed  the  rest  of  his  life.  At  this  time,  also, 


1801-6.] 


DEATH   OF   HAMILTON.  303 


the  firm  of  Lee  &  Cabot,  formed  in  the  early  days  at 
Beverly,  but  which  had  long  since  ceased  to  carry  on 
any  active  business,  was  finally  dissolved.  The  year  of  his 
removal  to  Boston  closed  sadly  for  Mr.  Cabot,  darkened  by 
sorrow  for  the  death  of  his  youngest  son,  Edward ;  and,  be 
fore  six  months  more  had  elapsed,  he  was  called  upon  to  bear 
a  large  private  share  in  the  profound  public  grief  excited 
by  the  tragic  and  untimely  death  of  Hamilton.  Not  only 
did  this  event  cause  the  keenest  sorrow  to  Mr.  Cabot  as  the 
loss  of  an  intimate  and  valued  personal  friend  to  whom  he 
was  warmly  attached,  but  it  removed  the  last  hope  which 
he  had  ventured  to  cherish  for  his  party  and  its  future 
success.  Under  the  guidance  of  Hamilton,  in  changed  cir 
cumstances  and  as  the  advocates  of  a  new  policj^,  the  Fed 
eralists  might  have  again  succeeded  to  power,  or  at  least 
might  have  remained  a  powerful  and  dreaded  opposition. 
But  the  loss  of  their  great  leader  was  irreparable,  and  no  one 
was  left  in  the  smallest  degree  capable  of  wisely  directing 
the  party,  and  at  the  same  time  maintaining  a  strong  ascend 
ancy  over  its  members.  Hamilton,  at  his  death,  left  his 
family  in  very  straitened  circumstances;  and  Mr.  Cabot 
devoted  himself  at  once  to  relieve  them  and  ameliorate  their 
condition.  Several  years  before,  Colonel  Pickering,  on  his 
dismissal  from  office,  had  resolved  to  go  again  into  the 
wilderness,  and  support  himself  and  his  family  by  cultivat 
ing  the  lands  which  he  there  possessed.  This  scheme 
alarmed  his  friends  ;  and,  as  Colonel  Pickering  would  receive 
no  direct  assistance,  they  raised  sufficient  money  to  buy 
his  wild  lands  at  a  generous  price,  and  thus  enabled  him  to 
live  in  Massachusetts,  and  to  enter  once  more  into  public 
life.  Mr.  Cabot  was  a  large  subscriber  to  the  fund  for  the 
purchase  of  Colonel  Pickering's  land,  and  was  one  of  those 
most  interested  and  most  active  in  the  whole  affair.  He  and 
his  associates,  however,  were  none  of  them  men  who  could 
do  any  thing  with  the  territory  they  had  bought,  and  indeed 
it  seems  never  to  have  occurred  to  them  that  the  land 


304  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1801-6. 

was  any  thing  more  than  an  excuse  to  assure  a  competency 
to  Colonel  Pickering.  That  they  regarded  their  purchase 
solely  as  a  gift,  as  a  means  of  retaining  their  friend  amongst 
them,  and  as  a  tribute  which  that  friend  eminently  de 
served,  is  evident  from  the  fashion  in  which  the  subscribers 
neglected  their  newly  acquired  property.  No  attempt  was 
made  to  improve,  set  off,  or  sell  the  lands ;  nor  were  the 
final  deeds  even  passed  between  the  associates  and  Colonel 
Pickering.1  But  now  the  death  of  Hamilton,  and  the  press 
ing  needs  of  his  family,  suggested  a  use  to  which  this 
extensive  property  might  be  applied.  The  ensuing  corre 
spondence2  explains  itself,  and  the  kindness  to  which  it 
bears  witness,  connected  as  it  is  with  a  previous  act  of  like 
generosity,  reflects  credit  and  honor  upon  all  concerned, 
while  at  the  same  time  it  illustrates  the  fidelity  and  practical 
value  of  undemonstrative  New  England  friendship. 


[Subscription  for  the  Benefit  of  General  Hamilton's  Family, ,] 

Having  in  remembrance  the  exalted  worth  and  pre-eminent  ser 
vices  of  the  late  General  Hamilton,  —  his  extraordinary  and  truly 
patriotic  exertions,  which  contributed  so  much  to  save  our  country 
from  the  greatest  impending  calamities  ;  his  able,  disinterested, 
and  successful  efforts  to  inculcate  the  wisdom,  justice,  and  advan 
tage  of  all  those  maxims  of  jurisprudence  which  render  sacred  the 
rights  of  property  and  which  are  inseparable  from  true  liberty, 
and  especially  recollecting  that  the  devotion  of  his  time  and  talents 
to  these  public  interests  has  operated  to  deprive  his  family  of  a 
common  share  of  those  pecuniary  advantages  which  his  labors,  if 
applied  to  them,  would  have  easily  made  abundant:  we,  there- 

1  Life  of  Pickering,  IV.  28,  35-41. 

2  These  documents  have  already  been  partially  printed  in  Mr.  Upham's 
Life  of  Pickering ;  but  from  Mr.  Cabot's  connection  with  the  affair,  as  well 
as  from  the  nature  of  the  transaction  and  the  light  it  throws  on  the  sincere 
attachment  felt  by  the  leading  Federalists  for  Hamilton,  I  have  no  hesita 
tion  in  giving  them  again,  and  without  abbreviation. 


1801-6.]  PROVISION  FOR  HAMILTON'S  FAMILY.  305 

fore,  whose  names  are  subscribed,  to  testify  in  some  degree  our 
sense  of  departed  excellence,  and  our  gratitude  for  benefits  con 
ferred  on  our  country,  do  engage  that  we  will  pay  into  the  hands 
of  the  Honorable  George  Cabot,  Thomas  Davis,  and  Theodore 
Lyman,  Esqs.,  the  sums  of  money  set  against  our  respective 
names,  to  be  by  them  applied  to  the  benefit  of  the  children  or 
family  of  General  Hamilton  in  any  manner  they  shall  judge  proper. 
And  whereas  we  whose  names  follow  are  proprietors  of  certain 
parcels  of  land  in  Pennsylvania,  which  we  purchased  in  1801  of 
Timothy  Pickering,  Esq.,  in  shares  of  $100  each,  which  lands  are 
not  yet  divided  or  formally  conveyed,  we  do  hereby  authorize  and 
request  the  said  Timothy  Pickering,  Esq.,  to  convey  by  a  quit 
claim  deed  to  such  person  or  persons  as  shall  be  named  to  him  for 
that  purpose,  by  the  afore-mentioned  George  Cabot,  Thomas  Davis, 
and  Theodore  Lyman,  Esqs.,  or  any  two  of  them,  so  many  of  our 
shares  in  said  lands  as  we  have  set  against  our  respective  names.1 

Some  time  after  this  scheme  had  been  set  on  foot,  Mr. 
King  arrived  from  New  York,  and,  anxious  to  engage  the 
New  England  Federalists  in  the  plan  adopted  by  the  New 
York  friends  of  Hamilton,  addressed  the  following  letter  to 
Mr.  Cabot :  - 

KING  TO  CABOT. 

WALTHAM,  Oct.  10,  1804. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  According  to  a  schedule  of  General  Hamilton's 
estate,  drawn  up  by  himself  a  few  days  before  his  death,  it  appears 
that  his  property  consists  altogether  of  new  lands  situate  in  the 
western  part  of  New  York,  and  of  a  house  nine  miles  from  the 
city.  The  new  lands  cost  fifty -five  thousand  dollars,  and  the  coun 
try  house  and  grounds  about  twenty-five  thousand.  The  General's 
debts  amount  to  fifty-five  thousand  dollars ;  and,  as  the  estate  is 
unproductive  and  the  debts  bear  an  interest,  it  is  the  opinion  of 
judicious  persons  that,  with  the  most  prudent  management,  the 
estate  will  be  but  barely  sufficient  to  pay  the  debts.  Mrs.  Hamil 
ton  is  a  daughter  of  General  Schuyler,  who  has  a  family  of  eight 
or  nine  children.  The  General  is  supposed  to  have  a  good  real 

1  Then  follows  a  list  of  all  the  subscribers,  with  one  exception,  to  the 
Pickering  fund  for  the  amounts  severally  subscribed  in  1801.  This  list  is 
given  in  the  Life  of  Pickering,  IV.  28. 

20 


306  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.        [1801-6. 

estate,  but  not  much  personal  property ;  so  that  little  expectation 
can  be  entertained  of  any  considerable  amount  from  this  quarter, 
either  for  the  maintenance  of  General  Hamilton's  family,  or  for  the 
education  and  advancement  of  his  children.  To  the  sorrow  that 
every  virtuous  mind  has  felt  for  the  death  of  this  distinguished 
patriot,  it  is  painful  to  add  the  reflection  that  his  young  and  help 
less  family  must  depend  for  their  support,  not  upon  the  earnings 
of  their  father,  for  he  served  the  public,  but  upon  the  contributions 
of  a  few  individuals  who  admired  his  unequalled  worth.  The  sub 
scription  for  this  purpose  at  New  York  amounted  to  upwards  of 
nineteen  thousand  dollars  when  I  last  heard  from  thence  (which 
was  before  my  journey  to  the  eastward),  and  it  was  expected  that 
a  considerable  addition  would  be  made  to  this  sum. 
With  the  most  affectionate  regard,  I  am,  dear  sir, 

Your  faithful  and  obedient  servant,      RUFUS  KING-. 


TRUSTEES'  LETTER  TO  COLONEL  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Nov.  16,  1804. 

SIR,  —  The  design  which  was  formed  to  transfer  to  the  heirs 
of  General  Hamilton  the  lands  purchased  of  you  in  1801  is  now 
accomplished,  so  far  as  depended  on  the  acts  of  those  purchasers. 
By  the  enclosed  papers,  it  will  appear  that  the  actual  conveyance 
of  the  land,  either  to  the  executors  of  General  Hamilton's  will,  or 
to  any  other  persons,  as  well  as  the  time  and  manner  of  making 
such  conveyance,  remains  to  be  definitively  regulated  and  arranged 
by  and  between  those  gentlemen  and  you.  Whenever  this  is  com 
pleted,  we  shall  cancel  and  deliver  to  you  the  written  covenants  you 
entered  into,  which  are  now  in  our  possession. 

It  is  understood  that  you  have  paid  for  taxes,  surveying,  &c., 
one  or  two  hundred  dollars,  which  ought  to  be  reimbursed  with 
out  delay.  We  wish,  therefore,  you  would  be  so  good  as  to  inform 
us  of  the  amount,  that  we  may  immediately  provide  for  its  dis 
charge. 

With  the  highest  respect  and  esteem,  we  are,  dear  sir, 

Your  assured  friends  and  servants, 

GEO.  CABOT. 
THOS.  DAVIS. 
THEO.  LYMAN. 


1801-6.]  PROVISION   FOR   HAMILTON'S   FAMILY.  307 


TRUSTEES  TO  EXECUTORS  OF  HAMILTON'S  WILL. 

BOSTON,  Nov.  26,  1804. 

GENTLEMEN,  —  "We  enclose  you  a  copy  of  an  original  paper 
which  is  committed  to  us  by  the  gentlemen  whose  signatures  it 
bears.  Its  objects  as  well  as  motives  are  sufficiently  explained; 
but  in  relation  to  what  yet  remains  to  be  done,  to  fulfil  the  pre 
cise  intentions  of  the  subscribers,  it  may  be  proper  to  observe : 
1st,  that  the  purchasers  of  the  Pennsylvania  lands  having  in  view 
the  accommodation  of  Colonel  Pickering  more  than  any  pecuniary 
advantage  to  themselves,  it  is  to  be  considered  as  a  condition  of  the 
present  transfer,  that  his  interest  and  convenience  should  be  con 
sulted  in  the  future  disposal  of  the  property  no  less  than  that  of 
the  new  proprietors  ;  2d,  Colonel  Pickering  retained  for  himself 
eighty-eight  shares,  which  is  something  more  than  a  fourth  part  of 
the  whole  property,  and  it  was  expected  he  would  superintend  it 
altogether ;  accordingly  he  alone  has  paid  to  it  the  attention  it  has 
received,  and  for  this  care  he  would  at  some  subsequent  period 
have  been  compensated,  by  a  commission  on  the  sales  or  some 
other  equivalent  emolument ;  and,  lastly,  it  may  be  remarked  that 
the  conveyance  of  the  lands  by  Colonel  Pickering  is  to  be  in  deeds 
of  quitclaim  only,  and  not  with  warranties.  This  provision  has 
not  proceeded  from  any  distrust  of  the  titles  by  which  Colonel 
Pickering  holds,  but  from  the  original  determination  of  the  sub 
scribers  to  liberate  an  estimable  friend  from  all  responsibility  for 
title,  if  from  any  cause  it  should  in  whole  or  in  part  be  ever  found 
defective.  These  observations  we  have  deemed  essential  to  a  just 
understanding  of  the  views  of  those  whom  we  have  the  honor  to 
represent ;  but,  for  whatever  may  assist  you  in  judging  of  the  value 
of  the  property  or  its  proper  management  in  future,  we  must  refer 
you  to  Colonel  Pickering,  who  we  are  assured  will  readily  im 
part  to  you  all  the  information  he  possesses.  As  we  are  intrusted 
with  the  nomination  of  the  persons  to  whom  the  property  shall  be 
conveyed,  we  cannot  hesitate  to  name  the  executors  of  General 
Hamilton's  will,  leaving  it  with  them  to  name  others,  if  they  think 
it  expedient,  and  also  to  arrange  with  Colonel  Pickering  the  time 
and  circumstances  of  making  the  conveyance. 

Every  occurrence  that  forces  the  mind  back  to  the  epoch  of  Gen 
eral  Hamilton's  death  revives  the  most  poignant  sorrow.  The 
deep-felt  grief  of  wise  and  good  men  everywhere  testifies  their 


308  LIFE   AND    LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1801-6. 

sense  of  an  irreparable  loss  to  the  public,  while  the  strong  sympa 
thies  which  are  awakened  for  those  who  were  by  nature  attached 
to  him  are  a  just  tribute  to  his  private  virtues.  If  it  were  possible 
to  express  our  own  regrets,  they  would  show  how  dear  he  was  to 
us.  We  are,  gentlemen,  with  the  greatest  respect, 
Your  most  humble  servants, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 

THOS.  DAVIS. 

THEO.  LYMAN. 

JOHN  B.  CHURCH,  NICHOLAS  FISH,  NATHANIEL  PENDLETON,  Esqs.,  Execu 
tors  of  the  last  will  and  testament  of  Alexander  Hamilton  (deceased). 


EXECUTORS  TO  TRUSTEES. 

NEW  YORK,  Nov.  29,  1804. 

GENTLEMEN, —  We  received  the  letter  you  did  us  the  honor  to 
write,  of  the  26th  inst.,  with  a  copy  of  a  deed  authorizing  a  con 
veyance  of  certain  valuable  lands  to  trustees,  for  the  benefit  of  the 
heirs  of  General  Hamilton,  and  a  copy  of  a  letter  from  you  to 
Colonel  Pickering,  as  to  the  manner  of  effecting  it. 

This  act  of  munificence  towards  the  family  of  a  man  so  dear 
to  his  country  and  his  friends,  from  persons  of  such  well-known 
worth  as  those  whom  you  represent,  will  be  regarded  as  a  testi 
mony  equally  strong  and  honorable  of  his  merit ;  and  their  liberality 
and  the  manner  of  it  are  no  less  delicate  than  the  motives  are  noble 
and  disinterested. 

We  receive  with  the  greatest  respect  the  honor  you  have  done 
us  personally,  by  naming  us  the  trustees  of  your  benefaction. 
Having  been  long  and  closely  united  with  General  Hamilton  by 
the  ties  of  an  intimate  friendship,  and  feeling  it  to  be  no  less  our 
duty  than  our  wish  to  render  to  his  family  any  services  that  may 
be  in  our  power,  we  cannot  decline  any  trouble  a  trust  created  for 
so  interesting  a  purpose  may  give  us.  We  therefore  accept  it, 
and  we  hope  we  need  not  add  our  assurance  that  it  shall  be  per 
formed  with  fidelity.  ? 

We  take  the  liberty  to  suggest  that  in  any  deed  that  may  be 
executed  by  Colonel  Pickering,  for  the  lands  in  question,  pursuant 
to  your  directions,  our  wish  is  that  the  precise  objects  of  the  trust 
may  be  designated,  and  that  the  powers  intended  to  be  given  to 
the  trustees  for  the  disposition  or  improvement  of  the  fund  may  be 
as  definite  as  the  nature  of  the  subject  will  permit. 


1801-6.]  PKOYISION  FOR   HAMILTON'S  FAMILY.  309 

We  have  the  honor  to  be,  gentlemen,  with  esteem  and  considera 

tion,  your  obedient,  humble  servants, 

J.  B.  CHURCH. 
NICHOLAS  FISH. 
NATHANIEL  PENDLETON. 

Hon.  GEORGE  CABOT,  THOMAS  DAVIS,  THEODORE  LYMAN. 


TRUSTEES  TO  EXECUTORS. 

BOSTON,  1st  January,  1805. 

GENTLEMEN,  —  We  were  honored  with  your  letter  of  29th 
November,  which  we  ought  to  have  acknowledged  before  this  late 
day. 

The  gentlemen  whom  we  represent  desire  that  their  contribu 
tions  may  be  as  subservient  as  possible  to  the  use  and  convenience 
of  General  Hamilton's  children  and  family.  With  a  view  to  this, 
it  was  proposed  to  convey  the  property  to  the  trustees,  free  from 
all  conditions  which  might  embarrass  its  disposal  or  the  application 
of  its  proceeds,  if  it  should  be  sold.  But,  if  a  more  definite  appro 
priation  is  thought  necessary,  we  request  that  the  conveyance  may 
be  to  John  B.  Church,  Nicholas  Fish,  and  Nathaniel  Pendleton, 
the  survivors  or  survivor  of  them,  and  the  heirs  of  the  survivor, 
upon  this  special  trust  and  confidence  :  to  sell  the  same  or  any  part 
thereof,  and  to  apply  the  proceeds  thereof  to  the  use  of  the  chil 
dren  of  General  Hamilton,  at  the  discretion  of  the  said  trustees, 
the  survivors  or  survivor  of  them,  and  the  heirs  of  the  survivor; 
but,  until  such  sale  shall  be  so  made,  the  lands  to  be  holden  for  the 
use  of  General  Hamilton's  children  as  joint-tenants  in  fee-simple, 
provided  that  Colonel  Pickering  may  sell  and  dispose  of  the  same 
lands,  or  any  part  thereof,  at  the  direction  and  request  of  the  said 
trustees,  the  survivors  or  survivor  of  them,  or  the  heirs  of  the  sur 
vivor,  instead  of  the  conveyance  first  aforesaid,  and  pay  over  the 
proceeds  of  such  sale,  by  him  so  made,  to  the  said  trustees,  the 
survivors  or  survivor  of  them,  or  the  heirs  of  the  survivor,  &c.,  to 
be  received  upon  the  same  trusts  as  the  moneys  which  may  be 
received  by  the  said  trustees  upon  sales  by  them  made,  if  any  are 
above  directed. 

If  this  form  of  words  should  be  thought  either  inconvenient  or 
inadequate,  we  shall  be  ready  to  adopt  any  other  more  eligible, 
which  you  shall  have  the  goodness  to  recommend.  And  we  take 


310  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1801-6. 

the  liberty  of  suggesting  to  ^ou  the  expediency  of  seeing  Colonel 
Pickering  as  he  passes  through  your  city,  on  his  return  from 
Washington,  that  the  business  may  be  definitively  arranged  as  far 
as  is  practicable. 

We  are,  gentlemen,  with  the  highest  respect,  your  most  obedient 

servants, 

G.  CABOT. 
T.  DAVIS. 
T.  LYMAN. 

To  JOHN  J3.  CHURCH,  NICHOLAS  FISH,  NATHANIEL  PENDLETON,  Esq., 
New  York. 


The  tranquillity  of  Mr.  Cabot's  life  was  but  little  dis 
turbed  by  political  events  during  the  years  covered  by  the 
letters  in  this  chapter ;  and  his  participation  in  affairs  of 
public  interest  was,  with  scarcely  an  exception,  limited  to 
the  letters  and  conversations  on  political  topics,  in  which 
every  reflecting  man  was  at  that  period  wont  to  indulge. 
The  utter  defeat  of  the  Federalists,  although  anticipated, 
still  caused  deep  regret  to  Mr.  Cabot,  because  it  appeared  to 
preclude  the  possibility  of  the  strong  constitutional  govern 
ment  he  had  hoped  to  see  established.  Yet  he  regarded 
this  change  as  the  inevitable  result  of  natural  causes,  at 
which  it  was  useless  to  repine.  He  had  no  sympathy  with 
the  intrigues  by  which  his  party  in  Washington  sought  to 
gratify  their  hatred  of  Jefferson,  by  the  elevation  of  Burr ; * 

1  Mr.  Randall  says  in  his  Life  of  Jefferson  (II.  583),  "Cabot  had  previ 
ously  written  to  Hamilton,  favoring  the  idea  of  preferring  Burr."  This 
assertion  Mr.  Randall  supports  by  reference  to  a  letter  from  Hamilton  to 
Wolcott  (Hamilton's  Works,  VI.  487).  The  first  paragraph  of  the  letter 
referred  to  reads  as  follows :  "  Your  last  letter,  my  dear  sir,  has  given  me 
great  pain  ;  not  only  because  it  informed  me  that  the  opinion  in  favor  of 
Mr.  Burr  was  increasing  among  the  Federalists,  but  because  it  also  told  me 
that  Mr. was  one  of  its  partisans.  I  have  a  letter  from  this  gentle 
man,  in  which  he  expresses  decidedly  his  preference  for  Mr.  Jefferson  "  The 
rest  of  the  letter  from  which  this  is  quoted  refers  solely  to  Burr's  character. 
I  made  an  application  to  the  state  department  in  Washington  for  a  copy  of 
this  letter,  that  I  might  determine  whether  Mr.  Cabot's  name  was  the  one 
which  filled  the  blank  in  the  printed  form.  A  copy  of  the  letter  was  refused 
me,  without  any  reason  being  stated ;  but  Mr.  Hunter,  the  second  assistant 


1801-6.]  FEDERALIST   POLICY,    1801-6.  311 

but  at  the  same  time  Mr.  Cabot,  like  most  of  his  political 
associates,  seriously  misunderstood  Jefferson's  character, 
and  attributed  to  him  a  reckless  determination  to  carry 
out  in  practice  all  that  he  believed  as  theory.  In  one  of 
his  letters,  indeed,  he  speaks  of  Mr.  Jefferson  as  conser 
vative  in  temperament,  but  this  is  evidently  an  expres 
sion  caused  by  deference  to  the  opinion  of  others ;  for  the 
profound  distrust  and  dislike  with  which  he  really  regarded 
the  new  President  are  very  apparent  throughout  his  corre 
spondence.  Mr.  Cabot,  however,  found  some  ground  for 
consolation  and  hope  in  the  appointment  of  Mr.  Madison 
and  Mr.  Gallatin,  whom  he  considered  reasonable,  intelli 
gent,  and  conservative  men,  according  to  their  kind,  and 
opposed  to  the  most  visionary  and  mischievous  theories  of 
their  chief.  In  regard  to  the  future  course  of  his  own 
party,  Mr.  Cabot's  views  were  at  first  quite  different  from 
those  adopted  and  acted  upon  by  the  official  leaders.  Be 
lieving  that  the  principles  of  pure  democracy  had  com 
pletely  triumphed,  he  thought  that  the  utmost  now  to  be 
expected  was  to  modify  and  soften  the  effects  of  those  prin 
ciples,  and  he  perceived  but  one  way  in  which  this  could 
be  brought  about :  as  he  constantly  says  in  his  letters, 
"  Things  must  grow  worse  before  they  are  better."  He 
felt  that  the  Democratic  doctrines  were  sure  to  be  speedily 
pushed  to  dangerous  extremes,  that  by  the  inevitable  reac 
tion  which  would  then  ensue  divisions  would  arise  among 
the  Jacobins,  that  a  conservative  force  would  be  generated 

Secretary  of  State,  in  conveying  this  refusal,  said,  —  "  You  may,  however, 
be  informed  that  the  name  of  George  Cabot  is  not  the  one  that,  in  the  copy 
of  Hamilton's  letter  here,  fills  the  blank  in  the  printed  copy."  It  therefore 
appears  that  Mr.  Randall  filled  this  blank  by  conjecture,  and  then  founded 
on  it  an  accusation  against  Mr.  Cabot  Nor  was  this  all :  in  the  same  vol 
ume  of  Hamilton's  Works  (p.  454)  is  a  letter  from  Mr.  Cabot  (given  above, 
p.  284),  in  which  he  speaks  of  the  opinions  of  some  Federalists  favorable  to 
Burr,  but  adds  that  he  is  not  a  man  who  can  be  trusted.  Mr.  Eandall  has 
therefore  not  only  made  his  accusation  on  the  authority  of  a  letter  in  which 
Mr.  Cabot's  name  was  not  even  mentioned,  but  he  did  this  in  the  face  of  Mr. 
Cabot's  own  adverse  opinion  printed  in  the  same  volume. 


312      LIFE  AND  LETTERS  OF  GEORGE  CABOT.   [1801-6. 

in  their  ranks,  and  that  the  moderate  men  would  part  com 
pany  with  the  violent  partisans.  To  unite  at  the  moment  of 
this  division  with  the  more  conservative  among  their  present 
opponents  seemed  to  Mr.  Cabot  to  offer  to  the  Federalists 
the  only  possible  chance  for  future  success.  But,  in  order  to 
take  such  an  advantage  of  the  enemies'  dissensions,  he  felt 
that  the  Federalists  ought  to  concentrate  and  consolidate 
their  forces,  and  prevent  at  all  hazards  any  further  feuds 
within  the  party ;  that  they  ought  to  refrain  from  unmeas 
ured  attacks,  and  above  all  that  they  ought  to  beware  of 
cultivating  deep  and  bitter  animosities  with  the  men  who 
might  one  day  be  their  allies.  It  is  eas}T  now  to  point  out 
the  wrong  premise  on  which  this  reasoning  was  based. 
Jefferson  was  the  last  man  to  run  into  any  thing  so  unpop 
ular  as  the  vices  of  the  French  proletariat.  But  though 
Mr.  Cabot  misjudged  Jefferson,  in  supposing  him  bold  and 
reckless,  and  capable  of  precipitating  a  ruinous  division  in 
his  party,  yet  a  split  was  sure  to  come  sooner  or  later ; 
and  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  such  a  division  between 
the  moderate  and  extreme  Democrats  was  the  only  way  in 
which  the  Federalists  could  obtain  the  very  limited  measure 
of  success  henceforth  possible  to  them.  They  could  never 
have  returned  to  the  power  they  held  in  the  days  of  Wash 
ington  and  Adams  ;  but  they  might  have  shared  the  admin 
istration  with  conservative  Democrats,  and  modified  the  evils 
which  Jefferson,  now  leading  and  now  pushed  by  his  extreme 
partisans,  brought  upon  the  country.  In  any  event,  however, 
the  firm,  temperate,  and  dignified  policy  which,  after  their 
defeat,  Mr.  Cabot  wished  his  party  to  adopt,  would  have 
been  by  far  the  best  and  wisest.  Unfortunately,  the  actual 
leaders  thought  differently;  and,  in  the  miserable  years 
which  followed  Jefferson's  first  term,  any  thing  resembling 
moderation  was  flung  away  by  both  sides,  and  by  all  public 
men.  The  result  was  a  series  of  blunders,  failures,  egre 
gious  mistakes,  and  savage  quarrels,  which  can  be  palliated 
only  by  the  extreme  and  perhaps  insurmountable  difficulties 


1801-6.]  THE   DEMOCRATIC   POLICY.  313 

of  the  political  situation.  It  was  the  only  period  of  our 
history  when  we  filled  the  perhaps  useful,  but  certainly 
disagreeable  position  of  foot-ball  for  the  two  great  nations 
of  Europe.  As  a  consequence  of  our  humiliating  situation, 
and  of  the  difficulties  incident  to  an  honorable  or  even 
possible  extrication,  the  policy  of  individuals  and  of  parties 
presents  but  little  for  proud  contemplation .  No  matter  what 
our  political  sympathies  may  be,  the  first  fifteen  years  of 
this  century  offer  nothing  of  a  political  nature  that  is  not 
in  some  degree  mortifying  and  painful.  » 

The  removals  from  office  for  political  reasons,  and  the 
Democratic  attacks  on  the  judiciary,  during  Jefferson's  first 
term,  greatly  alarmed  Mr.  Cabot,  and  met  with  his  severest 
reprobation.  He  sympathized  also  with  his  party  in  their 
oppposition  to  the  acquisition  of  Louisiana,  a  measure  which 
he  considered  unconstitutional,  as  well  as  politically  danger 
ous.  But,  much  as  he  feared  and  disliked  the  policy  of  Jef-/ 
ferson's  administration,  he  was  by  no  means  prepared  to  takel 
part  in  the  scheme  for  a  separation  of  the  Union,  which  was  \ 
urged  upon  him  by  his  friend,  Colonel  Pickering.  In  \ 
reply  to  the  latter's  letter  on  this  subject,  he  took  the  ground 
that  the  plan  was  not  only  impracticable  and  unwise,  but 
that,  if  carried  out,  it  would  not  accomplish  the  desired  re 
sults.  In  a  letter  to  Mr.  King,  Mr.  Cabot,  commenting  upon 
Colonel  Pickering's  suggestions,  says  that  he  is  strongly  of 
opinion  that  the  proposed  separation  is  not  justified  by 
the  political  mismanagement  of  the  dominant  party.  He 
believed  that  the  Union  was  of  too  great  value  to  be 
endangered,  merely  on  account  of  a  bad  and  perhaps 
temporary  policy.  In  these  opinions  as  to  a  separation  of 
the  States,  Mr.  Cabot  was  in  full  accord  with  Hamilton, 
King,  and  most  of  the  other  leading  Federalists,  whose 
quiet  opposition  sufficed  to  extinguish  completely  this 
plan,  which  had  emanated  entirely  from  those  members 
of  the  party  who  were  at  that  time  senators  or  members^ojx' 
Congress.  The  close  of  the  year  1805  was  marked  by  the 


314  LIFE   AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1801-6. 

only  occasion  on  which  Mr.  Cabot  took  any  active  part  in 
public  matters.  This  happened  in  connection  with  the 
first  symptoms  of  the  coining  troubles  with  England.  Un 
der  the  modification  of  the  rule  of  1756,  as  recognized 
hitherto  by  the  British  orders  in  council,  neutrals  might 
trade  to  and  from  the  colonies  of  belligerents,  and  also  to 
and  from  the  mother  countries,  but  not  between  the  two. 
By  a  slight  extension  of  the  voyage,  therefore,  the  rule 
could  be  evaded,  and  the  produce  of  the  colonies  of  bellig 
erents  be  carried  to  their  respective  mother  countries. 
The  Americans,  quick  to  perceive  their  opportunity,  soon 
made  a  practice  of  loading 'their  vessels  with  colonial  pro 
duce,  touching  at  some  American  port,  and  then  sailing  at 
once  for  Europe.  While  the  desperate  struggle  in  \vhich 
England- and  France  were  engaged  lasted,  the  result  of  this 
proceeding  on  'the  part  of  our  merchants  was  that  nearly  all 
the  great  carrying  trade  fell  into  American  hands.  The 
English,  indignant  both  at  the  immunity  enjoyed  by  French 
commerce  thus  carried  on  by  neutrals,  and  at  the  loss  of  their 
own,  seized  some  of  the  American  vessels  engaged  in  this 
trade ;  and  the  British  admiralty  courts  adjudged  them 
good  prize,  on  the  ground  that  the  neutral  flag  was  in  many, 
if  not  in  most  cases,  a  mere  fraud  to  protect  belligerent 
property.  The  news  of  these  seizures,  or  rather  of  the  con 
sequent  decisions,  aroused  the  anger  of  all  Americans,  but 
especially  of  those  inhabiting  the  seaport  towns.  In  all 
the  great  commercial  centres,  indignation  meetings  were 
held,  and  bulky  memorials  drafted  and  sent  to  Congress. 
One  of  these  was  a  meeting  of  the  merchants  of  Boston, 
to  remonstrate  to  Congress  against  the  British  doctrines. 
A  committee,  of  whom  Mr.  Cabot  was  one,  was  appointed ; 
and  they  reported  a  memorial  drawn  by  Mr.  Lloyd,1 
which  was  adopted  and  forwarded  to  Washington.2 
Mr.  Cabot  felt  himself  constrained  to  accept  a  place  on 

1  James  Lloyd,  afterwards  senator  from  Massachusetts. 

2  For  this  memorial,  see  Annals  of  Congress,  1806-7,  p.  890 ;  New  Eng 
land  Palladium  for  Jan.  31,  1806 ;  or  Waite's  State  Papers,  V.  367. 


1801-0.]  ADMIRALTY  DECISIONS.  315 

this  committee,  as  one  of  Boston's  leading  merchants ;  but, 
while  he  was  not  convinced  that  the  decisions  of  the  courts 
were  incorrect,  he  also  feared  that  the  excitement  attend 
ant  on  all  popular  movements  might  result  in  measures  and 
demonstrations  which  he  himself  could  not  but  deem  ex 
treme  and  mischievous.  Thus  it  was  that  he  consented 
with  the  greatest  reluctance  to  take  a  leading  part  in  the 
meeting ;  for  he  was  especially  averse  to  the  barest  appear 
ance  of  professing  opinions  which  he  did  not  really  hold, 
or  of  acceding,  from  deference  to  the  popular  wish,  to  meas 
ures  which  he  had  always  conscientiously  opposed.  Fisher 
Ames,  writing  at  this  time  to  Colonel  Pickering,  says :  — 

"  I  have  just  returned  from  Boston,  where  I  find  the  merchants 
have  had  a  meeting  on  Mr.  Fitzsimmons's  letter,  and  appointed  a 
committee  of  seven.  Our  friend  Cabot  is  much,  too  much,  morti 
fied  that  he  is  one  of  them.  He  hates  hypocrisy,  and  respects 
principles ;  and  he  dreads  lest  the  popular  feeling  should  impel  the 
committee  to  deny  what  he  believes  to  be  true,  or  to  ask  for  what 
he  knows  to  be  mischievous.  I  confess  I  have  rather  approved  the 
meetings  of  merchants.  ...  I  expect  more  good  than  evil  from 
their  interposition,  especially  if  such  men  as  Cabot  will  consent  to 
appear  among  them.  I  hope  they  will  be  prevailed  on  soon  or 
late  to  depute  such  men  as  James  Lloyd  and  Thomas  H.  Perkins 
to  the  government,  as  their  committee,  who  could  not  fail  to  impose 
respect  on  the  Sam.  Smiths  1  among  you."  2 

Colonel  Pickering,  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  Lowell  many  years 
later,  says :  — 

"  Much  against  his  will,  and  contrary  to  his  own  better  judgment, 
he  [Mr.  Cabot]  was  placed  at  the  head  of  the  committee  which,  in 
1806,  subscribed  and  sent  to  Washington  the  remonstrances  drawn 
by  Lloyd  against  the  British  doctrine  concerning  neutral  trade. 
He  signed  it  (he  afterwards  told  me),  officially,  as  one  of  the  mer 
chants'  (or  town's)  committee."3 

These  admiralty  decisions  were  but  the  beginning  of  the 
end.  The  peace  and  prosperity  of  Jefferson's  first  term, 

1  Mr.  Smith  was  a  senator  from  Maryland,  and  brother  of  Robert  Smith, 
Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

2  Works  of  Ames,  I.  342.  8  See  p.  542. 


316  LIFE  AND   LETTEES   OF   GEOEGE   CABOT.       [1801-6. 

engendered  by  the  twelve  previous  years  of  wise  and  strong 
administrations,  now  came  rudely  to  a  close ;  and  our  gov 
ernment  embarked  on  that  crazy  policy  which,  after  years 
of  contumely  abroad  and  factious  opposition  at  home,  re 
sulted  in  the  unnecessary  and  fruitless  war  of  1812.     To 
Jefferson's  embargo  policy,  the  first  step  on  the  downward 
path,  Mr.  Cabot  was,  of  course,  most  deeply  opposed.     On 
this   subject,  his  wide   commercial   experience   gave    him 
peculiar  fitness  to  judge ;  and  he  had  always  been  a  con 
sistent  enemy  to   embargoes,  and  indeed  to  any  doctrine 
which  favored  much  interference  with  trade.     In  1794,  he 
opposed  and  voted  against  such  a  measure  when  introduced 
in    the    Senate ;   and  a  few  years  later,   in  writing   to   his 
friends,  at  the  time  of  the  French  difficulties,  he  expressed 
his  strong  objections  to  an  embargo,  except  when  laid  under 
the  strictest  limitations  and  in  compliance  with  the  severest 
necessity.     In  the  present  instance,  he  regarded  Jefferson's 
restrictive  policy  with  all  his  old  hostility  to  such  measures ; 
and  his  convictions   were  still  more  strengthened   by  the 
circumstances  of  the  time,  which  rendered  an  embargo,  of 
peculiar  danger.     Mr.  Cabot,  like  most  of  the  Federalists, 
believed  that  Jefferson,  for  selfish  ends  and  to  promote  the 
interests  of  France,  sought  to  drive  the  United  States  into 
a   war   with    Great   Britain.     Whether   this  view   of   the 
President's  motives  was  right  or  wrong,  the  fact  that  an 
English  war  was  imminent  could  not  escape  the  attention 
of  any  reflecting  man.     An  embargo,  therefore,  was  not 
only  a  mistake,  but  a  piece  of  criminal  folly ;  for,  while  it 
drew  down  war  with  one  hand,  it  destroyed  with  the  other  our 
best  and  indeed  our  only  means  of  fighting.     It  ran  directly 
counter  to  the  most  cherished  doctrine  of  the  Federalists, 
the  preservation   of    a    strong  neutrality;    and,  what   was 
far  worse,  it  also  was  in  direct  opposition  to  all  the  dictates 
of  common  prudence  and  common  sense.     We  were  actu 
ally  on  the  verge  of  a  conflict  with  the  greatest  maritime 
power  in  the  world;  and  yet,  not  content  with  this  and 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  317 

with  the  prior  destruction  of  our  navy,  the  Jeffersonian  policy 
seemed  to  aim  at  nothing  less  than  the  annihilation  of  our 
mercantile  marine,  from  which  alone  it  was  possible  to 
obtain  seamen  to  navigate  our  public  ships  and  fight  our 
national  battles.  Mr.  Cabot,  on  this  ground  alone,  very 
rightly  believed  that  the  embargo  was  the  most  fatal  meas 
ure  that  could  be  taken.  But  he  also  opposed  the  whole 
policy  on  economic  principles,  which  are  set  forth  at  length 
in  his  letters.  I  shall  attempt,  therefore,  no  summary  of 
his  opinions  on  these  questions,  but  leave  him  to  speak  for 
himself  through  the  medium  of  his  correspondence. 


CABOT  TO  GORE. 

APRIL  10,  1801. 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND,  —  I  received  last  evening  your  letter  of  the 
20th  of  February,  containing  important  information  of  affairs 
on  your  side  the  water  and  some  valuable  speculation  upon  their 
tendencies.  I  shall  inquire  of  persons  learned  in  the  law ;  and,  if  I 
find  that  our  bankrupt  act  will  relieve  insolvent  epistolary  debtors, 
I  shall  avail  myself  of  its  provisions.  If  otherwise,  I  shall  make  the 
best  composition  I  can  with  my  creditors  ;  and,  as  you  and  Mr.  King 
are  the  principal  ones,  I  hope  and  entreat  you  to  be  liberal.  You 
will  naturally  consider  that  idle  men  find  no  time  to  do  any  thing. 
This  truth,  hidden  from  vulgar  eyes,  will  be  the  first  before  yours 
and  his. 

Although  I  do  not  rate  very  highly  the  talents  of  an  English 
cabinet  for  diplomatic  management,  and  although  I  have  always 
thought  they  studied  the  prejudices  and  accommodated  themselves 
to  the  humors  of  others  less  than  their  interest  required,  yet  I  do 
not  think  they  could  by  any  course  of  conduct  have  prevented  the 
hostile  disposition  of  the  continental  nations  as  it  now  appears ;  in 
some  the  effect  of  folly,  in  others  of  rivalry,  and  some  of  terror. 
I  am  glad  you  think  England,  if  quiet  and  orderly  at  home,  will 
succeed  against  the  confederacy.  Heaven  alone  foresees  the  issue ; 
but,  judging  by  such  lights  as  I  enjoy,  I  should  say  there  is  a  moral 
certainty  that  England  will  triumph  over  all  her  external  enemies,  if 


318  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1801-6. 

her  own  subjects  are  true  and  loyal,  as  their  interest  plainly  requires, 
as  well  as  their  duty,  that  they  should  be. 

I  have  good  reason  to  believe  that  our  new  President  is  deter 
mined  to  keep  clear  of  the  war.  Happy  will  it  be  for  our  country, 
if  he  can  maintain  this  determination  against  his  own  pre-existing 
prejudices  and  the  incessant  assaults  of  his  party. 

The  "  Gazette  of  the  United  States  "  and  the  "  Palladium  "  will 
show  you  what  the  good  men  think  on  this  subject,  especially  the 
"  Palladium." 

While  Mr.  Jefferson  pronounces  our  government  the  strongest 
in  the  world,  some  others  of  our  wise  men  affirm  its  best  days  are 
past ;  and  I  believe  the  sentiment  is  extensive,  that  we  are  doomed 
to  suffer  all  the  evils  of  an  excessive  democracy  through  the  United 
States.  Our  elections  grow  worse,  and  the  Maratists  and  Robes- 
pierrians  everywhere  raise  their  heads.  What  should  you  have 
thought  two  or  three  years  ago  if  you  had  been  told  that  a  very 
large  and  powerful  party  was  formed  in  Connecticut,  who  have 
deliberated  and  probably  decided  to  elect  Pierrepont  Edwards,1 
instead  of  Trumbull,2  their  governor  ?  You  may  believe  this  now. 
Probably  they  will  not  succeed  in  their  first  essay ;  but,  if  they 
should,  this  fact,  in  addition  to  others  of  a  similar  nature  which  are 
already  recorded  in  our  annals,  must  put  an  end  to  all  argument 
among  sensible  and  fair  men  on  the  practicability  of  honest  popular 
governments.  Having  been  always  in  heart,  soul,  and  mind,  attached 
to  the  principles  of  our  governments,  and  enthusiastic  in  my  desires 
and  hopes  that  we  should  support  them  arid  be  blessed  by  them, 
I  have  been  for  some  years  suffering  the  pain  of  disappointment  at 
their  successive  failures  which  experiment  has  produced.  There  is 
no  security  for  a  good  government  without  some  popular  mixture 
in  it ;  but  there  will  be  neither  justice  nor  stability  in  any  system, 

1  Pierrepont  Edwards,  son  of  Jonathan  Edwards.     Though  an  advocate 
for  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  he  became  a  prominent  Democratic 
leader,  and  was  the  principal  founder  of  the  so-called  "  Toleration "  party 
in  Connecticut.     Hildreth  says  he  was  "  the  maternal  uncle  of  Burr,  whom 
he  resembled  as  well  in  accomplishments  and  address  as  in  profligacy  of 
private  character,  at  least  in  whatever  related  to  women."    History  of  the 
United  States,  V.  631,  533. 

2  Jonathan  Trumbull  the  younger  son  of  the  celebrated  Revolutionary 
governor.    Like  his  father,  he  held  for  many  years  a  leading  position  in 
Connecticut  politics,  and  was  governor  of  the  State,  from  1798-1809  the 
year  of  his  death. 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  319 

if  some  material  parts  of  it  are  not  independent  of  popular  control. 
Authority,  as  well  as  sentiment  and  interest,  must  combine  to  make 
a  government  a  blessing  to  any  people. 

Yours  truly,  G.  C. 


WOLCOTT  TO  CABOT. 

LITCHFIELD,  July  27,  1801. 

MY  DEAR  SIR, —  After  a  long  silence,  during  which  I  have 
been  neither  inactive  nor  forgetful  of  my  friends,  I  think  it  right 
to  inform  you  where  I  am,  and  how  circumstanced,  and  to  propose 
a  renewal  of  our  correspondence.  I  am  at  length  planted  on  my 
native  hill,  in  a  pleasant  little  town  where  there  are  several  agree 
able  families  and  some  of  the  leading  Democrats  of  Connecticut. 
Kirby,  our  new  supervisor,  is  my  near  neighbor.  We  of  course  ex 
perience  good  and  evil ;  friendship,  envy,  and  slander,  —  in  short, 
most  of  the  pleasures  and  plagues  incident  to  a  village  life. 

It  was  my  expectation  to  have  visited  Boston  this  summer,  in 
company  with  Mrs.  Wolcott.  This  pleasure  must  be  postponed  to 
the  next  season,  in  consequence  of  her  late  indisposition,  and  the 
necessity  I  am  under  of  superintending  some  repairs  to  render  our 
situation  convenient  during  the  ensuing  winter. 

I  have  written  this  detail  of  my  domestic  situation,  to  furnish 
an  excuse  for  requesting  information  respecting  yours.  The  best 
substitute  for  the  pleasure  of  yours  and  Mrs.  Cabot's  society  will 
be  such  a  description  as  you  can  give  of  your  situation,  sentiments, 
and  feelings. 

Mr.  Jefferson,  contrary  to  my  hopes,  and  in  some  degree  to  my 
expectation,  appears  to  have  commenced  a  vindictive  attack  upon 
the  Federalists  of  New  England ;  and,  if  I  understand  his  intention, 
"he  is  determined  to  distinguish  his  administration  by  subverting  the 
systems  and  destroying  the  characters  of  those  who  supported  or 
aided  his  predecessors.  The  attempt,  if  made,  will  not  succeed.  The 
best  mode  of  repelling  this  assault,  however,  ought  to  be  well 
considered.  Will  you  be  so  good  as  to  inform  me  what  impression 
the  President's  conduct  has  made  on  the  minds  of  the  common 
people,  on  Mr.  Adams  and  his  friends,  and  whether  the  gentlemen 
of  information  have  adopted  any  system  of  defence  ?  In  short,  I 
wish  to  know  briefly  the  political  situation  of  Massachusetts.  It  is 
highly  probable  that  we  have  a  serious  task  to  perform.  We  ought 


320  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.        [1801-6. 

not  to  hasten  the  crisis ;  but,  when  it  arrives,  I  hope  we  shall  be 
prepared  to  act  in  concert  and  with  effect. 

I  remain  as  ever  your  assured  friend  and  obedient  servant, 

0.  W. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  Aug.  3,  1801. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  was  much  gratified  with  your  letter  of  the 
27th  July,  which,  having  been  sent  to  Brook/ze/c?  by  mistake  of  the 
postmaster,  did  not  reach  me  until  yesterday  morning.  While  I 
feel  the  strongest  solicitude  that  your  circumstances  should  be  in 
all  respects  propitious  to  happiness,  I  pray  chiefly  that  it  may 
not  be  dependent  on  them.  Every  village,  as  well  as  every  city, 
which  contains  men,  will  have  democrats  and  demagogues,  the 
latter  of  whom  must  live  by  practising  upon  the  weaknesses  and 
administering  to  the  vices  of  the  former.  While  you  have  about 
you  some  whose  society  you  can  enjoy,  there  will  be  others  whose 
interest  and  whose  pleasure  it  must  be  to  mar  your  enjoyment. 

I  am  not  able  to  inform  you  of  the  impression  which  is  made 
upon  our  common  people  by  Mr.  Jefferson's  revolutionary  move 
ments,  nor  do  I  know  with  any  certainty  how  they  are  treated  by 
Mr.  Adams.  I  live  out  of  the  world,  and  have  but  little  commu 
nication  with  it,  and  that  little  through  the  medium  of  our  own  sect 
exclusively.  If  instead  of  a  fact  I  might  offer  an  opinion,  it  would 
be  that  our  common  people  are  not  yet  sensibly  affected  by  any 
thing  done  or  threatened  by  Mr.  Jefferson. 

I  should  think,  however,  Mr.  Adams  must  feel  great  indignation  : 
first,  because  his  own  principles  and  conduct  are  impudently  con 
demned  ;  and,  second,  because  I  learn  that  those  Federalists  who 
adhered  to  his  (Mr.  Adams's)  greatest  errors  are  full  of  resentment 
against  Mr.  Jefferson. 

I  can  speak  of  that  class  of  men  which  I  more  particularly  es 
teem,  and  whose  politics  I  deem  correct,  with  less  doubt.  They 
are  surprised  at  the  weakness,  and  provoked  extremely  at  the  per 
nicious  principles  avowed  by  Mr.  Jefferson  in  his  answer  to  the 
New  Haven  remonstrants.1  It  is,  however,  a  general  opinion 

1  President  Adams  had  appointed  Elizur  Goodrich,  a  member  of  Congress, 
to  the  collectorship  of  New  Haven.  Goodrich  was  in  every  way  a  compe 
tent  man  and  good  officer,  but  his  appointment  had  been  made  after  Jeffer 
son's  election  was  known.  All  nominations  of  this  sort,  Jefferson,  who  was 


1801  -0.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  3*21 

among  these  men  that  no  system  of  defence  can  yet  be  adopted, 
although  it  is  difficult  to  refrain  from  making  the  most  censorious 
observations  themselves,  and  impossible  to  prevent  them  from  being 
made  by  others,  and  inculcated  in  the  newspapers  ;  yet  it  is  a  com 
mon  sentiment  that  considerable  time  must  elapse,  and  much  be 
borne  and  suffered,  before  the  pressure  of  existing  evils  arid  the 
apprehension  of  others  and  greater  ones  to  come  will  so  operate  as 
to  give  a  chance  of  success  to  the  Federal  cause.  The  language"] 
of  some  of  the  Federal  newspapers  is  perhaps  a  little  too  violent  I 
at  this  time,  though  the  sentiments  are  just.  Strictures  will  be-*- 
continually  made  on  the  conduct  of  the  administration,  and  perhaps 
they  are  as  useful  as  they  are  unavoidable.  Errors,  vices,  and 
crimes  must  be  pointed  out,  but  it  should  be  done  in  a  manner  that 
will  not  exasperate  those  whom  it  is  expected  to  convince.  No 
effectual  remedy  can  be  applied  to  our  affairs  until  its  necessity  is 
strongly  and  extensively  felt,  and  a  sense  of  common  danger  shall 
unite  more  closely  the  real  friends  of  the  country.  Mr.  Dexter, 
who  has  a  tem^Drary  residence  in  my  neighborhood,  took  family 
dinner  with  me  yesterday.  He  still  Wames  us  for  not  supporting 
and  adhering  to  Mr.  Adams,  notwithstanding  we  were  deserted, 
betrayed,  and  denounced.  We  agreed,  however,  in  reprobating  Mr. 
Jefferson  as  more  weak  and  more  wicked  than  we  had  thought  him. 

O 

Mr.  Dexter  is  satisfied  that  the  present  administration  is  diligently 
employed  in  ransacking  the  public  offices  in  search  for  faults,  and 
documents  to  prove  them.  He  thinks,  too,  there  must  unavoidably 
be  found  among  the  infinitude  of  transactions  many  which  to  the 
public  eye  may  be  made  to  appear  improper,  though  at  the  time 

then  cautiously  introducing  the  procedure  since  become  infamous  as  the 
"  spoils  system,"  chose  to  treat  as  nullities.  Goodrich  was  removed,  and  a 
man  named  Bishop  appointed.  The  merchants  of  New  Haven  remonstrated 
against  the  change.  Bishop  held  several  state  offices  already,  and  was 
nearly  eighty  years  of  age.  To  meet  their  objections  and  to  justify  remov 
ing  Goodrich,  Jefferson,  after  pointing  out  that  Bishop  was  considered  com 
petent  to  hold  other  offices,  forcibly  replied  that  Franklin,  at  the  same  period 
of  life,  was  "an  ornament  to  human  nature."  This  was  conclusive.  See 
Randall's  Life  of  Jefferson,  II.  660;  Works  of  Jefferson,  IV.  402.  The  real 
explanation,  perhaps,  of  the  appointment  of  Bishop,  a  man  so  old  that  he 
could  not  see  to  write  his  name,  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  his  son,  a 
briefless  lawyer,  was  a  prominent  young  Democrat,  who  had  recently 
delivered  two  orations  in  praise  of  his  party  principles.  The  second  of 
these  productions  was  devoted  to  an  elaborate  parallel  between  Jefferson 
and  Jesus  Christ. 

21 


322  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.        [1801-6. 

they  were  right,  and  that  they  will  be  able  by  the  use  of  such 
means,  and  perhaps  some  real  misconducts  of  some  former  officers, 
to  inflame  the  public  mind  to  a  great  degree  against  honest  and 
faithful  men.  I  do  not  believe  that  the  sensible  and  well-disposed 
part  of  the  community  will  be  the  dupes  of  these  abominable  arts ; 
but  I  can  easily  conceive  that  the  bulk  of  the  people  should  be  de 
ceived.  Our  elections,  as  well  as  other  incidents,  prove  that  we 
are  grown  and  growing  worse  in  this  State.  Our  best  men  think 
more  justly  than  ever  on  the  subject  of  government,  but  their 
influence  over  public  opinion  is  less  than  usual.  The  belief  is  daily 
extending  that  our  affairs  must  necessarily  grow  much  worse  before 
they  can  grow  much  better.  I  confess  myself  to  entertain  this 
belief,  though  I  admit  that  the  efforts  of  good  men  may  very  much 
mitigate  the  evils,  by  assisting  the  public  mind  to  comprehend  the 
nature  and  true  tendencies  of  all  that  passes  under  its  eye.  We 
are  destined  in  this  country,  as  in  all  the  free  states  who  have  gone 
before  us,  to  sacrifice  the  essence  of  liberty  to  the  spirit  of  democ 
racy.  We  are  now  and  have  always  been  more  democratic  in  our 
opinions  and  temper  than  the  form  of  our  government.  The  ten 
dency  of  the  latter  has  been  to  balance,  to  regulate,  and  to  correct 
the  former ;  but  its  force,  from  the  nature  of  its  structure,  was  in 
sufficient.  It  is  in  effect  already  overcome.  Our  government  is  in 
the  hands  of  its  enemies,  and  it  is  placed  there  because  they  are  its 
enemies.  It  is  intrusted  to  them,  because  it  is  believed  that  they 
would  not  use  its  powers  for  those  purposes  for  which  the  govern 
ment  was  professedly  constituted.  A  candidate  for  Congress 
recommends  himself  to  a  majority  of  the  voters  by  inducing  or 
allowing  them  to  believe  that  he  would  sacrifice  the  permanent 
interests  of  the  nation  to  the  passions  and  prejudices  of  the  populace 
rather  than  restrain  those  passions  or  resist  those  prejudices.  I 
will  not  at  this  time  give  an  opinion  of  what  might  be  done  in  a 
society  like  that  of  New  England,  and  especially  the  State  of  Con 
necticut  ;  but  as  a  general  observation,  verified  by  experience  and 
explicable  on  known  principles  of  human  nature,  it  may  be  said 
that  democracy  tends  always  to  place  power  in  the  worst  men's 
hands.  The  most  desperate  and  audacious  men  are  the  most  likely 
to  govern.  If,  by  any  fortunate  concurrence  of  circumstances,  good 
men  are  employed  at  first,  the  tendency  is  every  day  stronger  to 
raise  bad  men  to  their  places,  and  from  bad  to  worse,  until  the 
excess  of  the  evil  brings  the  remedy. 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  323 

I  had  heard  by  accident,  some  days  ago,  that  you  and  Mrs.  Wol- 
coit  contemplated  a  visit  here.  I  at  first  disbelieved  it,  because  I 
had  hoped  that  a  visit  here  would  be  a  visit  to  my  house,  where  I 
should  be  happy  to  see  you  quartered.  We  are  in  a  very  pleasant 
village,  five  miles  from  the  centre  of  Boston,  sufficiently  retired, 
yet  within  visiting  distance  of  several  agreeable  neighbors,  besides 
the  accessibility  of  town  friends.  My  family  consists  of  Mrs.  Cabot 
and  my  only  daughter  (a  girl  of  sixteen)  and  myself.  My  eldest 
son.  Charles,  is  at  the  Isle  of  France,  beyond  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope ;  my  second  son,  Henry,  a  lad  of  eighteen,  is  in  a  law  office 
at  Boston ;  and  my  youngest  son,  Edward,  a  lad  of  seventeen,  is  in 
an  accompting  house.  These  two  last  visit  us  on  Saturday  evening 
every  week,  and  pass  the  Sabbath.  We  all  enjoy  good  health,  and 
have  no  more  of  the  "plagues  "  of  life  than  we  ought  to  have  on 
every  principle.  My  farm  is  very  good  as  well  as  pleasant,  and  my 
love  of  ease  is  more  gratified  than  is  salutary.  I  am  not  rich,  yet 
my  income  is  as  great  as  my  expenses,  and  my  expenses  as  great  as 
my  desires.  Mrs.  Cabot  is  in  better  health  than  when  you  knew 
her.  We  visit  very  little,  yet  we  are  not  long  solitary.  A  single 
man  and  three  females  form  our  list  of  domestics,  the  former  of 
whom  drives  us  round  the  country  every  fine  day.  The  labor  of 
my  farm  is  performed  altogether  by  a  tenant,  to  whom  I  give  spe 
cific  benefits,  that  he  may  have  no  control  over  the  management ; 
and  the  benefits  are  liberal,  that  he  may  be  happy,  and  tied  to  me 
by  his  interest.  When  I  have  no  living  company,  I  call  upon  the 
dead,  who  are  always  ready  to  come  from  my  library  and  entertain 
me.  Among  the  friends  who  contribute  greatly  to  my  happiness, 
Mr.  Ames  is  almost  the  only  one  with  whom  you  are  acquainted, 
but  you  can  easily  conceive  how  precious  he  is.  Our  intimacy,  and 
1  believe  our  mutual  attachment  and  confidence,  have  continually 
increased.  He  lives  seven  miles  from  me,  and  sometimes  takes  my 
house  in  his  way  to  or  from  Boston  ;  and  I  often  go  to  Dedham  to 
see  him.  We  never  meet  without  talking  of  you,  and  expressing 
our  desires  to  see  you.  I  shall  indulge  this  hope  till  it  is  realized. 
You  know  so  well  that  Mrs.  C.  and  I  wish  to  see  you  and  Mrs. 
Wolcott  as  our  guests,  that,  when  you  come  to  this  part  of  the 
country,  you  will  certainly  make  our  house  your  home. 

Yours  affectionately  and  faithfully,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


324  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF  GEOEGE   CABOT.        [1801-6. 


CABOT  TO  GORE. 

MARCH  27,  1802. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Nothing  could  give  me  more  pleasure  than  the 
intelligence  by  your  letter  of  the  llth  of  January.  Our  friend 
has  his  reward  for  all  his  patient,  persevering  attention  and  able 
management,  and  his  reward  is  the  approbation  of  the  wise  and 
good.  There  is  none  better ;  and  I  trust  with  these  he  will  be  con 
tent,  so  far  as  relates  to  externals.1 

If  I  were  not  already  vain  in  the  belief  that  I  had  successfully 
broached  and  preached  a  new  and  salutary  doctrine,  I  should  be 
made  so  by  what  you  have  communicated  to  me  on  the  subject  of 
my  arguments  on  the  rights  of  neutral  traders.  If,  however,  I 
could  have  thought  they  would  be  used  as  auxiliaries  to  an  author 
who  proposes  a  regular  and  full  display  of  the  errors  which  prevail 
on  this  subject,  I  should  have  suggested  to  you  and  Mr.  King  an 
idea  which  occurred  to  me  of  the  difference  between  the  United 
States  and  the  northern  powers  of  Europe ;  which  is,  that  the  lat 
ter  have  an  immediate  interest  in  avoiding  search,  as  they  could 
then  supply  the  vanquished  belligerent  with  naval  stores  and  other 
articles  acknowledged  to  be  contraband.  To  those  nations,  —  say, 
Denmark,  Sweden,  and  Holland,  —  this  would  be  more  lucrative 
than  the  other  branches  of  trade  which,  upon  the  existing  system, 
they  partake  of  in  war.  But  to  us  and  other  nations  the  advantage 
of  trading  for  belligerents,  with  our  own  capital,  as  allowed  by  the 
law  of  nations,  infinitely  outweighs  every  possible  profit  from  the 
other  source.  The  causes  of  this  difference,  as  local  position,  &c., 
will  readily  occur  to  you. 

I  had  a  great  treat  from  Ellsworth,  who  gave  me  in  detail  much 
information  which  I  desired.  I  should  enjoy  many  hours  with  you 
in  hearing  the  condition  of  France  described,  but  I  cannot  reproach 
you  for  refraining  from  such  an  endless  subject  on  paper. 

At  the  distance  you  are,  it  is  possible  you  may  think  the  Federal 
ists  have  been  too  ardent ;  but  I  am  persuaded  they  have  retarded 
the  revolution  which  is  begun.  It  is  a  fact  that  Jefferson  would 
have  displaced  officers  until  he  had  excited  a  general  fever  among 
the  people  ;  but  he  was  restrained  by  some  of  his  counsellors,  who 
were  evidently  alarmed  at  the  public  indignation  which  they  saw 

1  The  loss  of  Mr.  Gore's  letter  renders  it  impossible  to  determine  who  the 
person  here  alluded  to  was,  but  I  suppose  it  to  have  been  Mr.  King. 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  325 

rising.  They  had  resolved  (as  Mason  informs  me)  to  remonstrate 
or  expostulate  in  writing,  if  he  did  not  desist.  I  am  not  informed 
who  these  counsellors  were,  but  concluded  they  could  be  no  other 
than  Madison  and  Gallatin,  the  latter  of  whom  must  foresee  a 
tota!  failure  of  revenue,  if  faithful  officers  are  displaced  and  worth 
less  demagogues  put  into  their  places. 

I  rejoice  exceedingly  that  after  so  tedious  a  delay  you  are  likely 
to  put  a  finishing  hand  to  the  business  of  your  commission  in  a 
manner  that  will  satisfy  you  and  give  so  much  pleasure  to  good 
men.  You  will  be  entitled  to  all  their  gratitude,  and  will  receive  it. 

I  should  fill  my  paper,  but  a  visitor  obliges  me  to  say  no  more 
than  that  I  am 

Your  sincere  and  affectionate  friend,  G.  CABOT. 


WOLCOTT  TO  CABOT. 

LITCHFIELD,  Aug.  28,  1802. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  At  the  close  of  the  week  after  I  left  you,  I  had 
the  pleasure  of  arriving  here  and  finding  my  family  well.  Nothing 
happened  differently  from  what  I  could  have  wished,  except  not 
having  an  opportunity  to  converse  a  few  hours  with  our  friend 
Ames,  who  had  been  called  to  Boston  on  business  the  day  we 
parted. 

I  often  think  of  the  felicity  of  your  situation ;  and  you  will 
believe  me,  when  I  assure  you  that  the  reflection  affords  me  the 
highest  pleasure.  In  the  vicinity  of  one  of  our  most  wealthy  and 
polished  towns,  surrounded  with  those  friends  whose  society  you 
prefer,  with  a  mind  disposed  to  review  the  events  which  have 
passed  and  in  a  situation  which  affords  you  early  information  of 
those  which  are  passing,  you  at  once  realize  the  great  objects  of 
human  pursuit.  May  you  long  live  to  enjoy  them,  and,  if  possible, 
may  they  be  increased. 

The  newspapers  mention  that  the  Moors  have  declared  war 
against  the  United  States,  and  that  Mr.  Jefferson  is,  according  to 
his  system  of  pacific  warfare,  sending  out  presents  to  preserve  peace 
and  frigates  to  maintain  war.  It  is  the  sole  object  of  the  adminis 
tration  to  acquire  popularity.  The  Magi  of  Virginia  imagine  that 
it  would  be  unpopular  either  to  make  war  or  pay  tribute,  and  to 
avoid  censure  they  do  both.  Will  it  not  be  well  to  inquire  how  this 
double-faced  system  is  to  be  reconciled  with  economy  ? 


326  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1801-6. 

When  you  write,  will  you  inform  me  whether  either  of  the  col 
lectors  in  Essex  county  are  supposed  to  have  been  removed  on  the 
ground  of  official  neglects.  I  presume,  from  my  knowledge  of  the 
men,  that  nothing  of  the  kind  is  pretended.  What  are  the  charac 
ters  of  Mr.  Lee  and  Mr.  Warren  ?  Mr.  Lyman  I  know.  I  shall 
want  this  information  for  future  use. 

I  remain  as  ever  your  friend,  OLIVER  WOLCOTT. 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  Sept.  8,  1802. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  As  soon  as  we  learned  that  you  had  missed 
Ames,  we  regretted  exceedingly  that  we  had  permitted  you  to  leave 
us  until  the  following  morning.  1  am  glad,  however,  that  your 
tour  has  been  finished  with  the  happy  sight  of  your  family  all 
well. 

I  think  it  probable  that  the  collector  of  Marblehead  (Mr.  Gerry) 
has  been  removed  for  keeping  back  the  public  money.  He  is  said 
to  be  deficient  four  or  five  thousand  dollars  ;  and  I  am  informed 
his  brother  Elbridge  has  written  a  letter  from  Cambridge  to  the 
merchants  in  Marblehead,  proposing  that  they  should  advance  by  sub 
scription  a  sufficient  sum  to  balance  his  brother's  account  with  the 
Treasury,  and  intimating  that,  if  this  was  not  done,  he  (Elbridge) 
could  obtain  for  him  a  new  appointment.*  The  precise  facts  will 
probably  soon  find  their  way  to  the  press.  It  is  worth  remember 
ing  that  Mr.  S.  R.  Gerry  was  appointed  by  Washington,  in  compli 
ance  with  Democratic  solicitation  chiefly,  if  not  solely.  I  recollect 
well  that  the  rival  candidate,  Colonel  Joshua  Orne,  was  zealously 
supported  and  strongly  recommended  by  the  Federalists.  Mr. 
Warren,  who  is  appointed  to  the  place  of  Gerry,  is  said  to  decline: 
he  thinks  himself  well  entitled  to  a  greater  reward  for  his  services 
and  the  claims  he  inherits  from  both  father  and  mother.  The 
family,  I  believe,  consider  themselves  as  the  most  efficient  anti- 
Federalists.  Mr.  Hiller  has  been  always  esteemed  a  good  officer 
and  an  honest  man.  His  office  is  not  taken  from  him  for  any  fault 
in  his  character  or  conduct ;  but  Colonel  Lee  wanted  it  extremely, 
and  the  government  wanted  Colonel  Lee's  support,  which,  how 
ever,  is  not  powerful,  for  he  is  not  a  man  of  much  political  influ 
ence  or  information.  He  was  an  officer  of  good  reputation  in  the 

*  [Query.  — Is  not  Elbridge  surety  for  Samuel  Eussell  Gerry  ?  — G.  C.] 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  327 

army,  which  he  left  in  1 778, 1  believe.  He  has  been  an  industri 
ous  man  and  good  citizen  since,  always  friendly  to  order,  and  would 
not  have  been  arranged  on  the  Jacobin  side  but  for  the  temptation 
of  a  good  office.  His  property  was  exhausted,  and  his  family  very 
large.  I  understand  he  has  visited  the  Federal  city  since  the  reign 
of  Democracy  commenced,  and  that  when  he  returned  it  was  re 
ported  by  his  children  that  he  would  be  appointed  to  the  office  of 
Mr.  Hiller.1  Mr.  Tyng  was  unquestionably  a  valuable  acquisition 
to  the  government,  and  has  been  so  considered  at  the  Treasury 
long  since  the  new  administration  begun  its  career.  He  is  without 
fault  as  an  officer,  and  in  the  highest  estimation  for  probity,  good 
sense,  and  dignity.  As  a  man,  all  parties  at  Newburyport  lament 
his  removal.  Your  sincere  friend, 

G.  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLIXE,  Oct.  21,  1802. 

MY  DEAR  SIR, — I  cannot  but  approve  the  intention  of  your 
judicial  corps  to  unite  in  a  memorial  or  remonstrance  to  Congress.2 
They  will  doubtless  prepare  the  most  forcible  argument  the  subject 
admits,  and  this  will  be  the  less  difficult  to  perform  because  of  the 
ample  discussion  it  has  already  received.  There  are  two  ideas 
which  ought  to  be  urged  with  perspicuity,  to  justify  completely,  in 
the  minds  of  the  community,  this  proceeding  of  the  judges.  One  is 
that  the  Constitution,  having  rendered  judicial  commissions  irrevo 
cable,  except  for  misbehavior,  evidently  contemplated  a  resistance 
on  the  part  of  the  judges  to  all  attempts  to  remove  them  for  any 
other  cause ;  and  therefore,  second,  if  the  judges  should  silently 
acquiesce,  they  would  be  said  by  one  part  of  the  community  to  have 
tamely  surrendered  a  public  trust,  and  by  the  other  their  silence 
would  be  construed  into  an  acknowledgment  that  their  removal  was 

1  Collector  of  Salem. 

2  This  refers  to  the  repeal  of  the  Judiciary  Act,  and  the  number  of 
judges  thereby  deprived  of  office.     This  is  not  the  place  to  enter  into  a  dis 
cussion  as  to  the  expediency  of  the  measure  at  this  particular  time ;  but  it 
may  be  said  that  nothing  is  better  settled  than  the  right  of  the  Legislature  to 
legislate  out  of  existence  a  judicial  body.     Not  many  years  ago,  this  was 
done  in  Massachusetts  as  the  only  method  of  reforming  and  reconstituting 
the  bench  of  what  is  now  the  Superior  Court.     Nevertheless,  it  is  a  danger 
ous  expedient,  and  one  justifiable  only  in  the  last  resort. 


LIFE   AND    LETTERS    OF    GEORGE   CABOT.       [1801-6. 

constitutional.  It  seems  to  me  these  ideas  may  be  so  stated  as  to 
make  the  interference  of  the  judges  a  manifest  duty.  Our  news 
paper  account  of  the  appointment  of  Stephen  Cross  to  the  collector- 
ship  was  erroneous.  I  was  shocked  at  reading  that  this  man,*  who 
was  early  displaced  by  Washington  for  misconduct,  should  be 
again  placed  in  the  same  office.  But  it  turns  out  to  be  Ralph 
Cross  who  is  commissioned,  —  a  man  much  below  Stephen  in  repu 
tation  ;  indeed,  his  truth  or  integrity  would  be  very  little  trusted  in 
the  part  of  the  country  where  he  lives.  He  once  held  an  office 
under  Mr.  Collector  Tyng,  but  was  discovered  to  connive  at 
smuggling  or  practising  deceit  in  the  weight  or  measure  of  dutied 
goods ;  and  for  this  unfaithfulness  in  his  office  was  displaced  by 
Mr.  Tyng.  I  shall  not  be  surprised  if  appointments  of  this  sort 
should  be  followed  by  deficiencies  of  revenue.  The  Democrats 
will  be  favored  or  allowed  to  smuggle ;  and,  should  this  be  per 
ceived  by  the  Federalists,  they  will  not  submit  to  a  ruinous  par 
tiality.  Yours  affectionately,  G.  CABOT. 

*  [Stephen  Cross  was  collector  prior  to  Wigglesworth.  —  G.  C.] 

CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BROOKLINE,  Dec.  20,  1802. 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND,  —  I  have  never  reflected  on  the  situation 
and  duty  of  the  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court,  in  relation  to  the 
outrage  committed  by  Congress  on  the  Constitution.  Presuming, 
however,  that  your  opinion  is  correct  in  this,  as  I  am  accustomed 
to  think  it  in  every  thing  connected  with  our  affairs,  it  shows  how 
little  dependence  there  is,  even  on  good  men,  to  support  our  sys 
tem  of  policy  and  government.  The  aberration  of  Mr.  Adams, 
in  1798  or  1799,  shows  the  same  thing;  and  his  strange  answer  to 
the  address  of  his  friends,  lately,  shows  it  in  a  still  stronger  light.1 
It  is  no  very  extraordinary  interpretation  of  his  disclaimer  of 
measures  not  specified,  that  they  are  those  which  his  opponents  dis 
like  ;  while  the  "  some"  and  "other"  measures,  for  which  indirect 
apologies  are  offered,  imply  that  much  has  been  wrong.  It  is 
apparent,  too,  that  this  wrong  is  to  be  attributed  to  men  who  gave 
to  him  and  his  administration  the  most  efficient  support. 

1  I  take  this  to  refer  to  the  answer  to  an  address  from  the  inhabitants  of 
Quincy,  in  1802.  See  Works  of  John  Adams,  I.  602.  The  address  is  given 
in  John  Adams's  Works,  but  not  the  answer. 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  329 

I  have  a  great  curiosity  to  see  the  manner  in  which  Congress 
will  treat  the  representation  of  your  corps.1  The  quotation  you 
furnish  pleases  me,  because  it  presents  to  public  view  a  motive 
which  ought  to  govern,  and  which  every  man  who  has  a  head  or 
heart  ought  to  approve. 

You  will  be  a  little  surprised  when  you  learn  that  I  am  about 
to  exchange  the  scene  which  you  justly  admire  for  a  town  life  ; 
but  it  is  determined  that  I  go  to  Boston  as  soon  as  accommodations 
can  be  provided  there  and  my  place  here  disposed  of.  I  shall 
always  be  as  recluse  as  I  can  be ;  but  I  have  not  thought  it  right 
to  shut  up  a  daughter  six  months  in  every  year  in  the  country, 
and  I  cannot  afford  to  hold  my  farm,  if  I  live  in  town.  My  other 
children,  too  (my  three  sons),  will  be  weaned  from  me,  and  I  from 
them,  more  than  is  reconcilable  to  my  natural  disposition,  if  I  do 
not  live  where  they  can  see  me  without  great  sacrifices  of  time 
and  business.  But,  wherever  I  may  be  and  however  circumstanced, 
I  beg  to  be  remembered  among  your  affectionate  friends,  and  to 
be  allowed  the  hope  of  hearing  from  you  often  and  seeing  you 
again.  Yours  faithfully,  G.  CABOT. 

WOLCOTT  TO  CABOT. 

LITCHFIELD,  Feb.  7, 1803. 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND,  —  I  thank  you  sincerely  for  your  favor  of 
December  20th.  The  change  of  residence  which  you  meditate 
will,  I  hope  and  believe,  as  much  increase  your  happiness  as  it 
must  be  productive  of  advantage  to  your  children  ;  and,  in  this 
view,  the  motives  of  your  resolution  are  certainly  proper,  and  will 
be  applauded  by  all  your  acquaintance. 

The  enclosed  paper  will  inform  you  that  I  have  determined  on  a 
removal  to  New  York  immediately.  My  family  will  remain  in  the 
country  till  next  autumn.  To  this  change  of  situation  I  am  im 
pelled  by  a  kind  of  necessity.  I  have  been  contented  here  ;  but 
my  property  is  not  sufficient  to  employ  my  time,  or  to  furnish  the 
means  of  educating  and  providing  for  my  family  as  I  wish.  This 
State  furnishes  no  employments  in  which  I  can  engage,  except 
those  of  a  public  nature,  and  with  those  I  have  been  satiated. 

The  tern\s  on  which  I  have  concluded  to  enter  upon  a  new 
career  of  active  business  are  beneficial  and  as  safe  as  possible  ;  and 

1  Wolcott  was  appointed  judge  of  the  second  circuit  by  President 
Adams. 


330  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF  GEORGE   CABOT.       [1801-6. 

the  gentlemen  associated  with  me  are  all  men  of  ample  fortunes 
and  respectability.  Where  prior  engagements  and  connections  do 
not  interfere,  I  hope  to  experience  the  patronage  and  encourage 
ment  of  my  acquaintance.  Upon  my  friends,  and  upon  you  in 
particular,  I  wish  to  impose  the  tax  of  recommending  me  to  busi 
ness,  on  suitable  occasions,  in  such  terms  as  propriety  and  justice 
will  permit. 

I  amused  myself,  a  few  weeks  ago,  in  some  observations  upon 
the  relative  circumstances  of  different  sections  of  the  United  States, 
the  result  of  which  I  sent  to  Mr.  Ames,  as  a  sort  of  reply  to  an 
interesting  letter  which  I  received  from  him.  This  letter  he  will 
show  you.  It  becomes  more  and  more  evident  that  a  crisis  is 
impending.  It  is  most  probable  that  we  shall  soon  be  engaged  in 
a  war.  The  idea  is  rapidly  diffusing  among  Democrats  that  the 
present  administration  is  incompetent ;  but,  though  Jefferson  &  Co. 
are  going  down,  no  desirable  substitute  yet  appears  to  be  coming 
up.  The  State  of  New  York,  in  the  councils  of  which  we  are 
much  interested,  appears  to  me  to  be  divided  into  State  parties,  by 
which  national  politics  are  but  little  regarded.  Governor  Clinton 
is  the  only  man  living  who  can  preserve  the  least  appearance  of 
union  among  the  factions  into  which  the  present  majority  is  divided. 
Mr.  Burr  has  a  considerable  popular  influence  with  the  secondary 
classes  of  society  in  the  city  of  New  York  ;  but,  in  the  State,  no 
party  can  rally  under  his  name.  His  friends  are  numerous,  and 
consist  of  active,  subtle,  vigilant  spirits,  who  are  able  to  "  perplex 
maturest  councils,"  and  who  place  no  confidence  in  the  present 
system  of  our  country.  These  men  are  not  Federalists,  and 
neither  expect  nor  wish  the  Federalists  to  regain  power  or  influ 
ence.  Against  a  common  foe,  they  are  however  occasionally 
united  with  the  Federalists,  and  are  thus  able  to  neutralize  many 
of  the  measures  of  the  Clintonians. 

I  am,  dear  sir,  your  affectionate  friend, 

OLIVER  WOLCOTT. 

CABOT  TO  KING. 

BOSTON,  July  1,  1803. 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND,  —  We  hear  from  New  York  that  Mr.  King 
is  arrived,  and  confirms  our  accounts  of  war.  The  first  gives  me 
an  unmingled  pleasure,  the  last  excites  a  mixed  sentiment  of  joy 
and  anxiety. 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  331 

I  have  constantly  believed  that  the  struggle  between  France 
and  England  must  continue,  until  the  power  of  the  former  is  effect 
ually  abridged,  or  the  latter  falls.  You  can  judge  best  of  the 
issue ;  but,  after  every  allowance  for  the  immense  advantages  of 
force  on  the  side  of  France,  with  all  continental  Europe  at  her 
disposal,  and  the  wishes  of  all  the  fools  and  knaves  throughout  the 
universe  on  her  side,  I  entertain  great  hopes  and  confidence  in  the 
final  success  of  England.  She  has  means  and  motives  sufficient, 
which,  I  trust,  will  not  be  unavailing  for  want  of  talents  to  employ 
them. 

A  letter  from  Paris  of  the  13th  May  states  that,  previous  to  the 
departure  of  Lord  Whitworth,  a  despatch  from  Russia  had  been 
received,  which  announced  the  consent  of  Alexander  to  guarantee 
Malta  according  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  Amiens,  and  that 
Marcott  dissuaded  Lord  Whitworth  as  much  as  he  could  from 
leaving  Paris.  This  intelligence  comes  from  Cassenove,  an  intimate 
of  Talleyrand,  and  therefore  may  be  true.  Cassenove  also  speaks 
of  Prussia  as  very  closely  connected  with  France.  If  all  this  is 
so,  England  exhibits  the  most  interesting  spectacle  which  my  im 
agination  can  conceive. 

The  cession  of  Louisiana  is  an  excellent  thing  for  France.  It  is 
like  selling  us  a  ship  after  she  is  surrounded  by  a  British  fleet.  It 
puts  into  safe  keeping  what  she  could  not  keep  herself ;  for  Eng 
land  would  take  Louisiana  in  the  first  moment  of  war,  without 
the  loss  of  a  man.  France  would  neither  settle  it  nor  protect  it : 
she  is  therefore  rid  of  an  incumbrance  that  wounded  her  pride, 
receives  money,  and  regains  the  friendship  of  our  populace.  I 
pray  you  to  make  my  best  regards  acceptable  to  Mrs.  King.  I 
think  you  too  wise  to  seek  public  honors ;  and  I  hope  you  are  too 
patriotic  to  shun  them,  if  they  seek  you. 

Your  faithful  and  affectionate  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 

P.  S.  An  expression  which  I  well  remember  in  a  letter  from 
you.  after  your  visit  to  Paris,  leads  me  to  expect  the  pleasure  of 
seeing  you  here.  I  know  nothing  of  the  objections  which  may 
exist  to  your  executing  such  an  intention ;  and  I  can  assure  you 
it  would  give  infinite  pleasure  to  a  great  many  people  here,  and 
especially  to  me. 


332  LIFE  AND  LETTERS  OF  GEORGE  CABOT.     [1801-6. 

CABOT  TO  KING. 

BOSTON,  July  9,  1803. 

MY  DEAR  SIR, —  I  received  from  you,  at  the  beginning  of  this 
week,  the  declaration  of  the  British  government  and  their  corre 
spondence  with  France  ;  and  I  take  great  pleasure  in  observing  that 
so  much  dignity  and  firmness  as  well  as  moderation  have  been  dis 
played  by  the  British  ministry.  Had  I  known  the  secrets,  how 
ever,  I  should  have  trembled  lest  Malta  should  have  been  given  up, 
which  would  have  been  of  more  consequence  than  all  the  other  con 
quests  of  Great  Britain  and  twenty  sail  of  the  line  beside.  Malta  is 
the  spot  intended  by  Providence  for  Great  Britain,  to  enable  her  to 
cover  Egypt,  the  Levant  and  Adriatic,  to  watch  Toulon  and  over 
awe  the  whole  Mediterranean.  Nothing  should  tempt  Great  Britain 
to  yield  it  to  France,  while  France  remains  so  formidable. 

You  give  me  no  conjectures  on  the  manner  in  which  the  rupture 
will  be  treated  by  the  opposition.  Should  they  in  the  true  spirit 
of  faction  clamor  against  the  war,  and  pretend  that  the  peace  might 
have  been  maintained  with  honor  and  safety,  it  will  be  a  difficult 
task  for  ministers  to  carry  on  the  war  with  that  spirit  and  energy 
which  its  dangers  demand.  But  should  the  opposition  (contrary 
to  natural  expectation)  admit  the  necessity  of  the  war  and  of  a 
continued  exertion,  till  the  power  of  France  is  in  some  way 
abridged,  I  should  not  doubt  of  a  successful  issue.  The  English 
possess  means  enough ;  but,  to  use  them,  they  must  resort  to  unpala 
table  measures,  and  these  can  hardly  be  exerted  against  a  powerful 
opposition. 

/  Our  Jacobins  here  already  indulge  their  French  feelings. 
They  allow  that  the  success  of  England,  at  least  in  defending  her- 
(  self,  is  necessary  to  keep  France  from  troubling  us ;  yet,  such  is 
\  their  profligacy  and  their  hatred,  that  they  rather  would  risk  the 
j  liberty  of  our  country  than  see  the  English  beat  the  French. 

I  hear  very  seldom  lately  from  our  friend  Hamilton,  whom  you 
know  I  love  excessively.  When  you  see  him,  I  pray  you  tender 
him  my  affectionate  regards,  and  believe  me  ever,  with  sincere 
attachment, 

Your  faithful  GEORGE  CABOT. 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  333 

CABOT  TO  GORE. 

BOSTOX,  Nov.  15,  1803. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  All  our  attention  is  again  engrossed  by  the 
struggle  on  your  side  the  ocean,  which  must  termimtte,  at  last,  in 
the  establishment  of  universal  empire  or  the  reduction  of  France 
to  its  ancient  limits.  I  am  still  a  believer  that  the  latter  will  be 
the  issue,  and  that  the  Bourbons  will  resume  the  government  of 
that  turbulent  nation.  It  is  said  that  we  talk  more  of  the  invasion 
than  you  do,  which  is  very  possible.  My  own  opinion  has  been 
invariable  that  it  would  be  happy  for  England,  and  for  the  whole 
world,  that  this  desperate  attempt  should  be  seriously  made ;  but 
I  have  never  for  a  moment  thought  it  would  be  made,  and  it  is  not 
difficult  to  conceive  of  sufficient  reasons  for  all  the  menaces  and 
preparations,  nor  the  various  modes  in  which  they  may  eventuate 
without  a  serious  attempt  to  conquer  England  and  overthrow  its 
government. 
/  We  proceed  here  democratically  and  quietly,  all  the  noisy 

/having  their  mouths  stopped  by  loaves  and  fishes,  or  in  immediate 

.  expectation  of  them. 

Your  faithful  and  affectionate  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Dec.  10,  1803. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  had  just  finished  the  reading  of  your  speech 
on  the  Louisiana  bill,  when  your  letter  of  the  28th  was  put  into 
my  hand.  I  am  greatly  pleased  with  both ;  and  although  I  have 
other  objections  to  the  treaty  than  those  you  have  urged,  yet  I  am 
sensible  yours  are  more  indisputable  and  much  the  most  proper  to 
be  offered  in  a  public  debate.  In  a  word,  I  think  the  title  to  this 
great  province  was  to  be  tried  in  the  great  court-martial  now 
sitting  in  Europe.  If  France  can  maintain  her  predominancy,  she 
will  through  Spain  do  what  she  pleases ;  and  if  she  is  beaten,  as  I 
think  she  will  be,  her  cession  is  not  worth  the  money,  for  she 
could  never  in  that  case  have  settled  it  or  disturbed  our  navigation. 
Li  am  not  suprised,  though  I  am  mortified,  to  see  your  colleague 1 
assisting  to  accommodate  the  Constitution  to  the  views  of  the  party 

1  John  Quincy  Adams.  He  and  Pickering  were  at  this  time  senators  from 
Massachusetts. 


334      LIFE  AND  LETTERS  OF  GEORGE  CABOT.   [1801-6. 

in  power,  when  it  is  so  obvious  that  the  influence  of  our  part  of 
the  Union  must  be  diminished  by  the  acquisition  of  more  weight  at 
the  other  extremity.  I  think,  however,  a  paper  constitution  too 
feeble  a  barrier  to  obstruct  a  triumphant  majority  in  their  course, 
and_I^  should  expect  to  see  any  alteration  which  they  require  to  be 
made.] 

I  do  not  think  you  overrate  my  indolence,  which  you  civilly  call 
"tranquillity;"  but  I  beg  you  to  understand  that  I  am  not  "dis 
turbed  "  by  reading  the  longest  letters  my  industrious  friends  may 
have  the  goodness  at  any  time  to  write.  I  love  to  hear,  to  read, 
and  to  think  (if  not  deeply),  and  I  love  to  converse,  but  I  confess 
I  am  too  lazy  to  write  as  much  as  my  friends  would  have  good 
rights  to  require ;  and  on  this  account,  as  well  as  some  others,  I 
am  always  likely  to  be  so  great  a  delinquent  that  I  must  prove  an 
unworthy  correspondent  to  any  sensible,  punctual  man.  There  is 
some  account  in  this  day's  "  Centinel "  of  Mr.  Adams's  motion,  &c. 
I  know  not  from  whence  it  comes. 

Our  newspapers  will  give  you  all  the  foreign  news,  say  from 
England,  late  in  October.  You  will  please  to  remember  that  I 
have  uniformly  discredited  the  serious  invasion  of  England.  I 
learn  nothing  which  ought  to  change  my  opinion,  but  my  wishes 
are  stronger  than  ever  that  I  may  be  wrong.  A  serious  attempt 
would  be  fatal  to  Buonaparte,  and  would  probably  change  the  face 
of  all  the  rest  of  Europe  for  the  better.  I  know  there  are  many 
military  men  who  entertain  different  views,  but  in  this  case  the 
issue  will  not,  or  at  least  certainly  ought  not  to,  depend  on  a  battle 
or  the  skilfulness  of  a  general.  The  defence  of  P]ngland  may  be 
made  certain,  and  no  Marlborough  among  them.  Divisions  of  one 
to  twenty  thousand  men  will  be  conducted  by  as  brave  officers  as 
any  in  the  world,  and  new  ones  will  be  formed  faster  than  old 
ones  destroyed.  If  it  were  to  happen,  therefore,  contrary  to  all 
human  expectations,  that  the  whole  French  force,  say  two  or  three 
hundred  thousand  men,  were  to  land,  I  have  not  the  smallest  doubt 
they  would  be  finally  exterminated.  But  I  do  not  yet  find  that 
any  force  is  prepared  capable  of  beating  the  English  flotillas  and 
small  craft  with  which  they  abound.  Putting  the  navy  of  both 
countries  out  of  the  question,  so  far  as  from  frigates  upward,  and  I 
think  there  is  no  naval  force  on  the  French  coast  capable  of  fight 
ing  their  way  to  the  English  shore.  Ireland  may  possibly  be 
attacked  by  twenty  thousand  men,  which  in  a  peculiarly  favorable 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  335 

moment  may  escape  from  Brest  and  other  ports  in  men-of-war ; 
but,  though  this  would  be  troublesome,  it  would  not  be  fatal,  and 
should  not  pass  as  a  thing  worthy  the  mountain's  labor. 

Your  kinsman,  Mr.  S.  Williams,  I  understand,  gives  his  opinion 
on  the  23d  of  October,  that  Spain  will  be  drawn  into  the  war.  I 
fear  it,  but  hope  it  will  be  avoided. 

Your  faithful  and  affectionate  friend,          GEORGE  CABOT. 


PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  Jan.  4,  1804. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  know  that  the  mind  which  does  not  find 
consolation  in  its  own  reflections  cannot  derive  it  from  any  foreign 
source.  Even  the  sympathy  of  a  friend,  while  it  soothes,  may 
cause  the  wound  inflicted  by  death  to  bleed  afresh.  I  learn  that 
you  have  lost  a  son,  amiable  and  of  great  promise.  For  his 
parents'  sake,  and  for  society,  I  lament  it.  It  reminds  me  of  my 
own  bereavements,  and  renews  my  tears.  Twice  it  has  pleased 
God  to  lay  heavily  his  hand  upon  me,  and  to  take  away  the  objects 
of  my  tender  affection  and  of  my  best  hopes.  The  lapse  of  seven 
and  of  ten  years  has  not  removed  my  affliction.  Ordinary  deaths, 
indeed,  pass  by  as  common  things.  It  is  the  like  affliction  of  a 
friend  which  excites  my  grief  anew.  Accept  the  tribute  of  a  tear 
for  yours. 

But  we  do  not  grieve  as  those  who  have  no  hope.  We  look 
forward  to  a  brighter  and  a  happier  world,  where  sorrow  shall 
cease,  "  and  where  all  tears  shall  be  wiped  away  from  our  eyes." 
How  blest  are  they  who  entertain  such  hopes !  How  wretched 
those  (like  numbers  round  me  here)  whose  views  extend  not  be 
yond  the  grave,  and  whose  best  refuge  is  annihilation !  In  the 
midst  of  my  painful  recollections,  I  sometimes  check  myself,  and 
ask,  is  it  for  my  children,  or  for  myself,  that  my  tears  start 
afresh  ?  I  have  found  my  grief  too  selfish.  I  looked  to  them  for 
comfort  and  joy  in  my  advancing  years :  they  were  indeed  "  very 
pleasant  to  me."  But  "they  have  been  taken  from  the  evil  to 
come."  The  events  of  every  day  serve  to  abate  the  desire  of  life, 
to  point  our  attention  to  a  life  to  come,  and  to  check  all  other 
anxieties  than  to  pursue  the  means  of  obtaining  it,  determined, 
however,  to  wait  "all  the  days  of  our  appointed  time,  till  our 
change  come ; "  in  the  mean  while  bearing  with  Christian  fortitude 


386  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.        [1801-6. 

the  afflictions  inseparable  from  humanity,  aiming  to  fulfil  every 
duty,  enjoying  the  good  which  Providence  bestows,  and  antici 
pating  the  never-ending  happiness  which  is  the  object  of  the  faith 
and  of  the  hope  of  every  virtuous  and  pious  soul. 

To  your  excellent  wife  as  well  as  to  you  I  address  these  senti 
ments,  and  to  both  express  my  sincere  attachment  and  esteem. 

Adieu.  TIMOTHY  PICKERING. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Jan.  10,  1804. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  The  loss  of  a  son,1  whom  I  loved  too  well  to 
part  with,  has  so  absorbed  my  thoughts  that,  had  I  been  as  faithful 
in  my  correspondence  as  I  am  in  my  feelings  of  friendship,  I  could 
not  until  this  moment  have  acknowledged  several  favors  which 
I  have  received  from  you. 

jThe  papers  you  have  sent,  and  especially  the  masterly  speech 
of  Mr.  Tracy,  display  the  subject  of  the  Presidential  election  much 
more  amply  than  had  been  done  before  ;  and,  if  party  principles 
were  not  stronger  than  State  jealousies,  the  small  States  would 
assuredly  resist  the  innovation.  I  am  told  that  your  colleague 
vindicates  the  part  he  early  took  by  referring  to  the  former  opin 
ion  and  instruction  of  Massachusetts  ;  but  surely,  if  it  were  even 
admitted  that  in  the  abstract  the  amendment  were  better  than  the 
Constitution,  we  would  not  be  so  far  the  "  dupes  of  our  own 
virtues  "as  to  subserve  the  pernicious  designs  of  our  opponents. 
This  we  should  certainly  do  by  agreeing  to  change  the  constitu 
tional  mode  of  election  in  the  manner  proposed  and  at  this  junc 
ture  of  time.  I  confess  I  was  once  desirous  of  a  change  of  the 
kind  now  contemplated,  believing  it  an  indispensable  means  of 
preserving  the  government  in  good  hands,  and  the  country  from 
the  fangs  of  France ;  but  we  failed.  Our  opponents  now  wish  the 
same  thing  for  purposes  they  approve,  but  which  we  think  dishon 
orable  and  ruinous.  Shall  we  be  so  weak  as  to  promote  in  this 
manner  the  views  and  perpetuate  the  power  of  those  in  whom  we 
cannot  confide  ?  I  am  sure  they  will  lessen  their  respect  for  us,  if 
we  do7\  Your  constant  and  affectionate  friend, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 

i  See  p.  303. 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  337 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Jan.  14,  1804. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  The  generous  sympathy  and  just  sentiments 
of  consolation  expressed  in  your  letter  to  Mrs.  Cabot  and  me,  and 
which  friendship  alone  could  inspire,  affect  us  most  sensibly  ;  and, 
while  for  a  moment  they  revive  the  keenness  of  our  sorrows,  they 
tend  permanently  to  blunt  their  edge.  We  have  lost  a  child 
deservedly  dear  to  us,  but  in  the  midst  of  our  sufferings  we  do  not 
forget  that  he  who  seemed  to  live  only  for  the  happiness  of  others 
may  have  died  to  be  happy  himself.  Mrs.  Cabot  begs  that  with 
mine  you  will  accept  the  assurance  of  her  grateful  and  sincere 
esteem  and  attachment. 

Your  ever  faithful  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  Jan.  29,  1804. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  A  friend  of  mine  in  Pennsylvania,1  in  answer 
ing  a  letter,  lately  asked  me,  "  Is  not  a  great  deal  of  our  chagrin 
founded  on  personal  dislikes,  the  pride  of  opinion,  and  the  morti 
fication  of  disappointment?"  I  replied,  or  to  speak  correctly, 
I  prepared  the  following  reply.  But  when  I  had  finished,  perceiv 
ing  the  sentiments  too  strong  for  the  latitude  of  Pennsylvania, 
and  perhaps  for  the  nerves  of  my  friend,  I  changed  the  form, 
and  now  address  them  to  you. 

To  those  questions,  perhaps  to  a  certain  degree,  an  affirmative 
answer  may  be  given.  I  have  more  than  once  asked  myself,  for 
what  are  we  struggling?  Our  lands  yield  their  increase,  our 
commerce  flourishes,  we  are  building  houses,  "  are'  marrying  and 
given  in  marriage,"  yet  we  are  dissatisfied  :  not  because  we  envy 
the  men  in  office,  —  to  most  of  us  a  private  life  is  most  desirable. 
The  Federalists  are  dissatisfied,  because  they  see  the  public  morals 
debased  by  the  corrupt  and  corrupting  system  of  our  rulers.  Men 
are  tempted  to  become  apostates,  not  to  Federalism  merely,  but 
to  virtue  and  to  religion  and  to  good  government.  Apostasy  and 
original  depravity  are  the  qualifications  for  official  honors  and 
emoluments,  while  men  of  sterling  worth  are  displaced  and  held 
up  to  popular  contempt  and  scorn.  And  shall  we  sit  still,  until 
1  Judge  Peters. 
22 


338  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1801-6. 

this  system  shall  universally  triumph  ?  until  even  in  the  Eastern 
States  the  principles  of  genuine  Federalism  shall  be  overwhelmed  ? 
Mr.  Jefferson's  plan  of  destruction  has  been  gradually  advancing. 
If  at  once  he  had  removed  from  office  all  the  Federalists,  and  given 
to  the  people  such  substitutes  as  we  generally  see,  even  his  fol 
lowers  (I  mean  the  mass)  would  have  been  shocked.  He  is  still 
making  progress  in  the  same  course ;  and  he  has  the  credit  of  being 
the  real  source  of  all  the  innovations  which  threaten  the  subver 
sion  of  the  Constitution,  and  the  prostration  of  every  barrier  erected 
by  it  for  the  protection  of  the  best,  and  therefore  to  him  the  most 
obnoxious,  part  of  the  community.  His  instruments  manifest  tem 
pers  so  malignant,  so  inexorable,  as  convince  observing  Federalists 
that  the  mild  manners  and  habits  of  our  countrymen  are  the  only 
security  against  their  extreme  vengeance.  How  long  we  shall 
enjoy  even  this  security,  God  only  knows.  And  must  we  with 
folded  hands  wait  the  result,  or  timely  think  of  other  protection  ? 
This  is  a  delicate  subject.  The  principles  of  our  Revolution  point 
to  the  remedy,  —  a  separation.  That  this  can  be  accomplished, 
and  without  spilling  one  drop  of  blood,  I  have  little  doubt.  One 
thing  I  know,  that  the  rapid  progress  of  innovation,  of  corruption, 
of  oppression,  forces  the  idea  upon  many  a  reflecting  mind.  Indeed, 
we  are  not  uneasy  because  "  unplaced."  I  But  we  look  with  dread 
on  the  ultimate  issue,  —  an  issue  not  remote,  unless  some  new  and 
extraordinary  obstacle  be  opposed,  and  that  speedily  ;  for  paper 
constitutions  are  become  as  clay  in  the  hands  of  the  potter.  The 
people  of  the  East  cannot  reconcile  their  habits,  views,  and  inter 
ests  with  those  of  the  South  and  West.  The  latter  are  beginning 
to  rule  with  a  rod  of  iron.  When  not  convenient  to  violate  the 
Constitution,  it  must  be  altered ;  and  it  will  be  made  to  assume 
any  shape  as  an  instrument  to  crush  the  Federalists.  The  inde 
pendence  of  the  judges  is  now  directly  assailed,  and  the  majority 
are  either  so  blind  or  so  well  trained  that  it  will  most  undoubtedly 
be  destroyed.  Independently  of  specific  charges,  as  ground  of 
impeachment,  John  Randolph,  I  am  informed,  avows  this  doctrine : 
that  the  clause  in  the  Constitution  granting  to  the  judges  their 
offices  during  good  behavior  was  intended  merely  to  guard  them 
against  executive  removals,  and  not  at  all  to  restrain  the  two  Houses 
of  Congress,  on  whose  representation  the  President  ought  to  re 
move  them  !  We  should  really  be  safer  without  any  constitution, 
for  then  oppressive  acts  might  excite  public  attention ;  but  while 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  339 

the  popular  tyrants  shelter  themselves  under  the  forms  or  the 
name  of  the  Constitution,  tortured  and  interpreted  to  suit  their 
views,  the  people  will  not  be  alarmed. 

By  the  Philadelphia  papers,  T  see  that  the  Supreme  Court  judges 
of  Pennsylvania  are  to  be  hurled  from  their  seats  on  the  pretence 
that,  in  punishing  one  Thomas  Passmore  for  a  contempt,  they  acted 
illegally  and  tyrannically.  I  presume  that  Shippen,  Yates,  and 
Smith  are  to  be  removed  by  the  Governor,  on  the  representation 
of  the  Legislature.  And  when  such  grounds  are  taken,  in  the 
national  and  State  Legislatures,  to  destroy  the  rights  of  the  judges, 
whose  rights  can  be  safe  ?  Why  destroy  them,  unless  as  the  pre 
lude  to  the  destruction  of  every  influential  Federalist,  and  of  every 
man  of  considerable  property,  who  is  not  of  the  reigning  sect  ? 
New  judges,  of  characters  and  tempers  suited  to  the  object,  will  be 
the  selected  ministers  of  vengeance.  I  am  not  willing  to  be  sacri 
ficed  by  such  popular  tyrants.  My  life  is  not  worth  much,  but,  if 
it  must  be  offered  up,  let  it  rather  be  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  a 
more  stable  government,  under  which  my  children,  at  least,  may 
enjoy  freedom  with  security.  Some  Connecticut  gentlemen  (and 
they  are  all  well  informed  and  discreet)  assure  me  that,  if  the  lead 
ing  Democrats  in  that  State  were  to  get  the  upper  hand  (which 
would  be  followed  by  a  radical  change  in  their  unwritten  constitu 
tion),  they  should  not  think  themselves  safe,  either  in  person  or 
property,  and  would  therefore  immediately  quit  the  State.  I  do 
not  believe  in  the  practicability  of  a  long-continued  union.  A 
Northern  confederacy  would  unite  congenial  characters,  and  present 
a  fairer  prospect  of  public  happiness ;  while  the  Southern  States, 
having  a  similarity  of  habits,  might  be  left  "  to  manage  their  own 
affairs  in  their  own  way."  If  a  separation  were  to  take  place,  our 
mutual  wants  would  render  a  friendly  and  commercial  intercourse 
inevitable.  The  Southern  States  would  require  the  naval  protec 
tion  of  the  Northern  Union,  and  the  products  of  the  former  would 
be  important  to  the  navigation  and  commerce  of  the  latter.  I  be 
lieve,  indeed,  that,  if  a  Northern  confederacy  were  forming,  our 
Southern  brethren  would  be  seriously  alarmed,  and  probably  aban 
don  their  virulent  measures.  But  I  greatly  doubt  whether  prudence 
should  suffer  the  connection  to  continue  much  longer.  They  are 
so  devoted  to  their  chief,  and  he  is  so  necessary  to  accomplish  their 
plans  of  misrule  and  oppression,  that  as  they  have  projected  an 
alteration  of  the  Constitution  to  secure  his  next  election,  with  a  con- 


340  LIFE   AND    LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.        [1801-6. 

tinned  preponderance  of  their  party,  so  it  would  not  surprise  me, 
were  they,  soon  after  his  next  election,  to  choose  him  President  for 
life.  I  am  assured  that  some  of  his  blind  worshippers  in  South 
Carolina  have  started  the  idea. 

But  when  and  how  is  a  separation  to  be  effected  ?  If,  as  many 
think,  Federalism  (by  which  I  mean  the  solid  principles  of  govern 
ment  applied  to  a  federate  republic,  —  principles  which  are  founded 
in  justice,  in  sound  morals,  and  religion,  and  whose  object  is  the 
security  of  life,  liberty,  and  property  against  popular  delusion,  injus 
tice,  and  tyranny),  if,  I  say,  Federalism  is  crumbling  away  in  New 
England,  there  is  no  time  to  be  lost,  lest  it  should  be  overwhelmed, 
and  become  unable  to  attempt  its  own  relief.  Its  last  refuge  is 
New  England,  and  immediate  exertion,  perhaps,  its  only  hope.  It 
must  begin  in  Massachusetts.  The  proposition  would  be  welcomed 
in  Connecticut;  and  could  we  doubt  of  New  Hampshire?  But 
New  York  must  be  associated ;  and  how  is  her  concurrence  to  be 
obtained  ?  She  must  be  made  the  centre  of  the  confederacy.  Ver 
mont  and  New  Jersey  would  follow  of  course,  and  Rhode  Island  of 
necessity.  Who  can  be  consulted,  and  who  will  take  the  lead? 
The  Legislatures  of  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  meet  in  May, 
and  of  New  Hampshire  in  the  same  month  or  in  June.  The  sub 
ject  has  engaged  the  contemplation  of  many.  The  Connecticut 
gentlemen  have  seriously  meditated  upon  it.  We  suppose  the 
British  provinces  in  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia,  at  no  remote  period, 
perhaps  without  delay,  and  with  the  assent  of  Great  Britain,  may 
become  members  of  the  Northern  league.  Certainly  that  govern 
ment  can  feel  only  disgust  at  our  present  rulers.  She  will  be 
pleased  to  see  them  crestfallen.  She  will  not  regret  the  proposed 
division  of  empire.  If  with  their  own  consent  she  relinquishes  her 
provinces,  she  will  be  rid  of  the  charge  of  maintaining  them,  while 
she  will  derive  from  them,  as  she  does  from  us,  all  the  commercial 
returns  which  her  merchants  now  receive.  A  liberal  treaty  of 
amity  and  commerce  will  form  a  bond  of  union  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  Northern  confederacy  highly  useful  to  both. 

Are  these  ideas  visionary  or  impracticable  ?  Do  they  not  merit 
consideration  ?  If  they  do,  let  me  know,  in  such  way  as  you  deem 
expedient,  what  you  think.  Tracy 1  has  written  to  several  of  his 
most  distinguished  friends  in  Connecticut,  and  may  soon  receive 

1  Uriah  Tracy,  senator  from  Connecticut. 


1801-6.]  x  CORRESPONDENCE.  341 

their  answers.  R.  Griswold,1  examining  the  finances,  has  found 
that  the  States  above  mentioned,  to  be  embraced  by  the  Northern 
confederacy,  now  pay  as  much  (or  more)  of  the  public  revenues  as 
would  discharge  their  share  of  the  public  debts  due  those  States  and 
abroad,  leaving  out  the  millions  given  for  Louisiana. 

Perhaps  a  crisis  may  occur  to  mark  the  moment  for  decisive 
measures.  Perhaps  the  violation  of  the  Constitution  in  the  arbi 
trary  removal  of  the  judges  may  hasten  such  a  crisis.  The  signal, 
a  bold  but  safe  step  by  members  of  Congress. 

I  am,  &c.,  T.  PICKERING. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

FEB.  14,  1804. 

JViY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  read  with  great  interest  your  letter  of 
the  3d.2  The  subject  is  as  important  as  it  is  delicate,  and  has  often 
occupied  my  thoughts.  All  the  evils  you  describe  and  many  more 
are  to  be  apprehended ;  but  I  greatly  fear  that  a  separation  would 
be  no  remedy,  because  the  source  of  them  is  in  the  political  theories 
of  our  country  and  in  ourselves.  A  separation  at  some  period  not 
very  remote  may  probably  take  place.  The  first  impression  of  it 
is  even  now  favorably  received  by  many ;  but  I  cannot  flatter  my 
self  with  the  expectation  of  essential  good  to  proceed  from  it,  while 
we  retain  maxims  and  principles  which  all  experience,  and,  I  may 
add,  reason  too,  pronounce  to  be  impracticable  and  absurd.  Even 
in  New  England,  where  there  is  among  the  body  of  the  people 
more  wisdom  and  virtue  than  in  any  other  part  of  the  United 
States,  we  are  full  of  errors,  which  no  reasoning  could  eradicate,  if, 
there  were  a  Lycurgus  in  every  village.  We  are  democratic  alto 
gether,  and  I  hold  democracy  in  its  natural  operation  to  be  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  worst._\  If  democracy  has  not  produced  among  us 
all  the  mischief  to  which  it  necessarily  tends,  the  causes  are  not 
difficult  to  be  traced,  and  I  am  not  without  hopes  that  the  same  or 
other  causes  may  still  operate  to  retard  and  mitigate  those  evils 
which  cannot  be  wholly  averted ;  but  it  is,  in  my  mind,  expecting 
too  much  of  mankind  to  suppose  that  they  will  cease  to  act  from 
impulse- and  habitually  act  from  reflection.  It  is  the  ordinary  duty 

*  Roger  Griswold,  member  of  Congress  from  Connecticut,  a  leading  Fed 
eralist,  and  afterwards  governor  of  his  native  State. 

2  "  Probably  Jan.  29,  in  rough  draft,  which  was  sent  Feb.  3."  This  is  the 
explanation  of  Mr.  Octavius  Pickering,  in  a  manuscript  note  appended  to 
this  letter. 


342  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE   CABOT.       [1801-6. 

of  every  just  government  to  restrain  men  from  doing  what  their 
vicious  inclinations  impel  them  to  do,  and  coerce  them  to  the  per 
formance  of  duties  to  which  they  are  disinclined.  Hence,  in  popu 
lar  governments,  men  are  driven  from  office  for  performing  their 
duty,  and  others  put  in  their  places  who  violate  theirs.  The  people 
will  not  knowingly  employ  men  nor  voluntarily  support  a  govern 
ment  whose  acts  contravene  their  favorite  purposes,  which  are 
often  those  of  their  worst  passions  ;  and  it  is  not  unusual  to  see 
men  of  tolerably  good  characters  urgent  to  choose  for  rulers  those 
whom  they  know  to  be  the  worst,  because,  though  they  do  not 
approve  of  profligacy  and  immorality,  yet  they  will  not  on  this 
account  sacrifice  sinister  objects  of  their  own.  While  I  hold  that 
a  government  altogether  popular  is  in  effect  a  government  of  the 
populace,  I  maintain  that  no  government  can  be  relied  on  that  has 
not  a  material  portion  of  the  democratic  mixture  in  its  composition. 
The  great  and  hitherto  insurmountable  difficulty  has  been  to  estab 
lish  and  maintain  the  empire  of  principles  against  the  assaults  of 
popular  passions.  This  can  only  be  done  by  such  an  organization 
as  supplies  somewhere  vital  powers  which  the  popular  fury  cannot 
extinguish.  The  independent  judiciary  was  the  best  feature  in 
our  national  system,  but  it  is  abolishing ;  and  it  may  be  asked  who 
shall  prevent  the  people  from  destroying  their  own  institutions. 
You  would  hope  that  in  New  England  we  should  be  all  alive  to 
guard  this  sacred  principle,  but  it  is  not  so ;  and  I  doubt  whether  it 
is  possible  by  any  alarm  of  this  kind  to  excite  a  zeal  among  the 
people.  We  look  with  apathy  on  things  of  this  sort. 

At  the  same  time  that  I  do  not  desire  a  separation  at  this  mo 
ment,  I  add  that  it  is  not  practicable  without  the  intervention  of 
some  cause  which  should  be  very  generally  felt  and  distinctly 
understood  as  chargeable  to  the  misconduct  of  our  Southern  mas 
ters  :  such,  for  example,  as  a  war  with  Great  Britain,  manifestly 
provoked  by  our  rulers.  But  they  will  not  hazard  a  war,  though 
they  will  wantonly  excite  much  animosity.  Without  some  single 
event  of  this  kind  to  rouse  us,  I  am  of  opinion  we  must  bear  the 
evils  which  the  delusion  of  democracy  is  bringing  upon  us,  until 
men  of  all  parties  in  our  country  can  be  brought  to  acknowledge 
them  and  unite  in  the  application  of  a  remedy.  Should  this  con 
viction  be  general  in  New  England,  I  think  something  might  be 
done,  in  spite  of  all  opposition  from  the  South ;  but,  until  it  is  gen 
eral,  a  great  Jacobin  party  here,  supported  by  the  nation  and  its 


1801-6.1  CORRESPONDENCE.  343 

government,  would  be  likely  to  triumph.  If,  as  is  probable,  we  do 
not  find  ourselves  strong  enough  now  to  act  with  success  the  part 
proposed,  I  am  sensible  of  the  dangers  you  point  out,  and  see  no 
way  of  escaping  them.  We  shall  go  the  way  of  all  governments 
wholly  popular,  from  bad  to  worse,  until  the  evils,  no  longer  toler 
able,  shall  generate  their  own  remedies. 

There  was  a  time  when  I  believed  that  New  England  might  get 
along  very  well  with  a  system  of  government  which  had  proved  in 
other  times  and  places  inadequate  to  the  purposes  of  social  order, 
but  I  can  truly  say  I  have  despaired  of  our  success  these  ten 
years.  The  prosperity  of  these  States,  and  the  apparent  soundness 
of  their  politics,  may  seem  to  confute  this  opinion ;  but,  like  the 
successful  tide  of  experiment  through  the  United  States,  much  is 
to  be  attributed  to  the  incalculable  advantages  derived  from  a 
neutral  station  in  a  world  of  war.  And,  in  regard  to  our  present 
politics,  let  me  observe  that  there  is  no  energy  in  the  Federal 
party,  and  there  could  be  none  manifested  without  great  hazard 
of  losing  the  state  government.  Some  of  our  best  men  in  high 
stations  are  kept  in  office,  because  they  forbear  to  exert  any  influ 
ence,  and  not  because  they  possess  right  principles.  They  are 
permitted  to  have  power,  if  they  will  not  use  it.  It  is  happy  for 
us  that  we  have  a  governor  1  whose  consummate  prudence  con 
ciliates  opponents  without  detaching  friends,  but  he  will  cease  to  be 
popular  the  moment  he  dares  to  act  with  vigor.  It  must  be  nearly 
the  same  in  New  Hampshire  and  Connecticut.  This  latter  State 
has  given  the  best  example  of  a  self-governed  people  that  the  world 
has  ever  seen ;  but  its  system  is  nearly  run  out,  and  I  doubt,  if 
every  honest  man  in  the  State  were  united,  whether  they  could  long 
prevent  their  opponents  from  getting  the  government.  Let  a  solid 
peace  take  place  in  Europe,  and  the  strength  of  their  government 
would  soon  appear  too  feeble  to  enforce  justice.  I  shall  not  be 
surprised  to  see  Connecticut  as  remarkable  for  disseminating 
anarchical  doctrines  as  it  has  been  for  a  contrary  character.  It 
is  to  be  feared  that  the  superior  information  of  the  Connecticut 
people,  while  it  gives  them  more  power  to  produce  political  effects, 
will  not  give  them  better  dispositions  than  others.  Indeed,  their 
education  increases  their  wants  more  than  their  means  of  supplying 
them  ;  and  such  people  will  of  necessity  become  ungovernable  when 
the  acquisition  of  property  is  difficult.  I  doubt  not  some  of  our 

1  Caleb  Strong. 


844  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE   CABOT.       [1801-6. 

friends  from  that  State  view  this  subject  in  the  light  now  pre 
sented,  but  they  are  very  reluctant  to  admit  it.  The  fears  they  dis 
cover  may,  however,  be  considered  as  unequivocal  evidence  of  their 
private  opinion.  If  no  man  in  New  England  could  vote  for  legis 
lators  who  was  not  possessed  in  his  own  right  of  two  thousand  dol 
lars'  value  in  land,  we  could  do  something  better ;  but  neither  this 
nor  other  material  improvements  can  be  made  by  a  fair  consent  of 
the  people.  I  incline  to  the  opinion  that  the  essential  alterations 
which  may  in  future  be  made  to  amend  our  forms  of  government 
will  be  the  consequences  only  of  great  suffering  or  the  immediate 
effects  of  violence.  If  we  should  be  made  to  feel  a  very  great 
calamity  from  the  abuse  of  power  by  the  national  administration, 
we  might  do  almost  any  thing ;  but  it  would  be  idle  to  talk  to  the 
deaf,  to  warn  the  people  of  distant  evils.  By  this  time,  you  will 
suppose  I  am  willing  to  do  nothing  but  submit  to  fate.  I  would 
not  be  so  understood.  I  am  convinced  we  cannot  do  what  is 
wished  ;  but  we  can  do  much,  if  we  work  with  nature  (or  the  course 
of  things),  and  not  against  her.  A  separation  is  now  impracticable, 
because  we  do  not  feel  the  necessity  or  utility  of  it.  The  same 
separation  then  will  be  unavoidable,  when  our  loyalty  to  the  Union 
is  generally  perceived  to  be  the  instrument  of  debasement  and  im 
poverishment.  If  it  is  prematurely  attempted,  those  few  only  will 
promote  it  who  discern  what  is  hidden  from  the  multitude  ;  and  to 
those  may  be  addressed,  — 

"  Truths  would  you  teach,  or  save  a  sinking  land, 
All  fear,  none  aid  you,  and  few  understand." 

I  have  said  that  a  separation  now  is  not  desirable,  because  we 
should  not  remedy  the  evil,  but  should  bring  it  home  and  aggra 
vate  it  by  cherishing  and  giving  new  sanctions  to  the  causes  which 
produce  it.  But,  if  a  separation  should  by  and  by  be  produced 
by  sufferings,  I  think  it  might  be  accompanied  by  important  amelio 
rations  of  our  theories. 

You  have  doubtless  seen  the  portraits  of  some  of  the  New  York 
patriots,  which  are  said  to  be  good  likenesses.  Some  observations 
on  the  subject  which  appeared  in  the  "  Centinel "  may  be  thought 
worth  reading. 

You  see  how  unstudied  I  give  you  my  thoughts.  With  equal 
unaffectedness,  believe  me 

Always  your  friend,  G.  C.1 

1  The  letter  which  should  have  followed  this  was  accidentally  omitted, 
and  will  be  found  in  the  Appendix,  No.  I. 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  345 


CABOT  TO  KING. 

BOSTON,  March  17,  1804. 

MY  DEAR  SIR, —  In  reply  to  your  inquiry  respecting  the  opin 
ions  of  our  Legislature  on  the  subject  of  Louisiana,  I  can  only 
speculate.  The  session  is  ended,  and  no  one  attempted  to  discover 
what  was  thought  or  what  might  be  done.  We  add  thousands  to 
our  possessions,  but  have  long  since  discarded  the  idea  of  security. 
The  many  do  not  think  at  all,  and  the  few  think  only  to  despond. 
Indeed,  most  men  are  compelled  to  admit  that  our  evils  must  be 
borne  until  their  intolerability  generate  their  cure.  Most  of  those 
which  we  fear  must  therefore  happen  before  a  remedy  can  be  pre 
scribed.  An  experiment  has  been  suggested  by  some  of  our  friends, 
to  which  I  object  that  it  is  impracticable,  and,  if  practicable,  would 
be  ineffectual.  The  thing  proposed  is  obvious  and  natural,  but  it 
would  now  be  thought  too  bold,  and  would  be  fatal  to  its  advocates 
as  public  men ;  yet  the  time  may  soon  come  when  it  will  be  demanded 
by  the  people  of  the  North  and  East,  and  then  it  will  unavoidably 
take  place.  I  am  not  satisfied  that  the  thing  itself  is  to  be  desired. 
My  habitual  opinions  have  been  always  strongly  against  it;  and 
I  do  not  see,  in  the  present  mismanagement,  motives  for  changing 
my  opinion.  It  is  doubtless  true  that  we  are  not  so  perfectly  mad 
in  New  England  as  the  people  in  some  other  States,  especially 
those  of  the  South ;  but  here  we  are  altogether  Democratic  in  our 
principles,  and  those  principles  of  necessity  place  power  in  the 
worst  hands.  If  the  favorable  aspect  of  our  State  politics  seems 
to  contradict  my  opinion,  I  confess  that  those  principles  have  not 
yet  produced  all  the  mischief  to  which  they  tend;  but,  at  the  same 
time,  I  insist  that  our  appearance  is  deceptive,  being  better  than 
the  reality,  and  the  reality  better  than  can  be  well  maintained. 
You  see  good  men  in  high  office  here,  contrary  to  the  natural  oper 
ation  of  Democratic  election;  but  those  men  hold  their  powers 
upon  the  sole  condition  that  they  will  not  use  them,  and  the  moment 
they  shall  dare  to  exercise  them  with  vigor  they  will  cease  to  be 
popular,  and  of  course  cease  to  fill  the  high  offices  they  now  hold. 
There  is  an  unusual  apathy  among  the  Federalists  here.  They 
have  lost  more  of  their  vivacity  than  of  their  numbers.  I  fear 
they  lose  some  of  these.  Our  national  administration  may  destroy 
judiciaries  and  constitutions,  and  make  new  ones  without  exciting 
much  sensibility ;  but,  if  they  had  involved  us  by  their  folly  and 


346  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE   CABOT.       [1801-6. 

baseness  in  a  war  with  Great  Britain,  I  believe  New  England 
might  be  roused  to  do  any  thing  which  her  leading  men  should 
recommend.  Some  distinct  general  cause  of  evil  like  this,  and 
fairly  imputable  to  the  wickedness  or  ignorance  of  those  who  govern, 
would  be  fatal  to  their  power  or  to  the  union  of  the  States.  We  are 
loyal  to  the  national  government,  and  can  bear  every  species  of 
public  dishonor ;  but,  the  moment  our  loyalty  appears  to  be  made 
the  instrument  of  our  impoverishment,  we  shall  be  disposed  to  act 
with  effect  in  defence  of  all  that  is  dear  to  us.  In  the  moral  as  in 
the  natural  world,  we  must  in  all  operations  consult  the  tendency 
of  general  laws.  It  is  vain  to  attempt  sailing  against  wind  and 
tide :  we  ought  to  have  the  influence  of  one  in  our  favor  to  make 
considerable  progress,  and  of  both  to  make  the  greatest.  The 
longer  I  live,  the  more  I  think  on  the  nature  of  man  and  of  society, 
the  more  I  am  convinced  of  the  absurdity  of  expecting  ever  to  see 
a  self -governed  people,  as  we  understand  the  terms.  Men  will  act 
from  the  impulse  of  their  passions.  These  lead  them  to  seek 
power,  property,  &c.,  by  means  incompatible  with  order  and  justice. 
Government  to  enforce  these  is  called  to  counteract  and  coerce 
those  who  (on  our  principles)  have  the  control  of  the  government. 
We  love  virtue  and  virtuous  men;  but  we  respect  power  only,  and 
the  powerful.  If  we  choose  a  man  to  office,  we  displace  him  for 
doing  the  duties  of  it  when  these  thwart  our  sinister  views,  and 
then  it  happens  that  good  men  are  often  found  co-operating  in  the 
election  of  the  bad,  and  to  the  exclusion  of  those  whom  as  men 
they  truly  esteem.  It  is  folly  to  expect  mankind  will  act  other 
wise;  and,  therefore,  although  the  people  must  have  a  great  share 
in  every  good  government,  yet  that  share  should  not  be  so  great  as 
to  destroy  it  at  pleasure,  or  by  the  word  of  their  mouth  to  impede 
its  just  offices.  Viewing  the  subject  in  this  light,  I  contemplate 
with  pleasure  the  prosperous  course  of  our  affairs  for  many  years 
past,  and  feel  neither  surprise  nor  disappointment  at  the  change 
which  is  commenced.  The  first  part  has  been  better  than  we  had 
any  right  to  expect ;  and  without  derogating  from  the  transcendent 
worth  of  men,  who  did  every  thing  that  time  and  circumstances 
would  allow,  I  must  attribute  the  success  of  their  public  measures 
in  a  great  degree  to  favorable  accidents,  which,  though  external, 
have  acted  with  great  force  on  our  internal  affairs.  We  are  now 
going  on  according  to  the  course  of  nature,  and  shall  follow  those 
who  have  gone  before  us  from  bad  to  worse,  till  suffering,  or  the 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  347 

fear  of  suffering  generally  and  deeply  felt,  stimulates  us  to  do  better. 
Indeed,  I  expect  no  essential  improvements  in  our  systems  but 
from  suffering,  from  fear,  or  from  force.  I  think  no  material  change 
can  be  made  except  by  those  whom  we  call  Jacobins.  Good  men 
would  not,  if  they  had  opportunity,  establish  any  system  of  suffi 
cient  force  to  protect  itself.  The  violent  and  unprincipled  are 
more  likely  to  make  a  government  independent  of  popular  consent 
than  their  betters.  I  beg  you,  however,  not  to  infer  that,  because 
I  think  we  cannot  do  things  impossible,  I  would  not  attempt 
every  possible  good,  or  that  I  do  not  think  any  great  good  can  be 
accomplished.  So  far  would  that  be  from  the  truth,  that  I  firmly 
believe  we  owe  much  of  what  we  enjoy,  and  of  what  we  hope 
for,  to  the  influence  of  the  Federal  party.  We  are  a  minority, 
and  unable  to  conquer  the  vast  body  which  keeps  the  field ;  but  we 
are  so  powerful  that  he  is  compelled  to  confine  his  movements  to 
a  narrow  compass,  lest  he  should  give  us  an  advantage  over  him. 
We  have,  therefore,  the  most  commanding  motives  to  preserve  to 
our  party  all  the  weight  we  can,  by  adhering  to  the  principles  on 
which  it  is  formed,  and  keep  it  well  combined  and  well  informed, 
prepared  to  think  and  act  alike  on  every  important  occasion.  In 
this  way,  we  prevent  some  mischief  entirely,  and  mitigate  what  we 
cannot  wholly  avert,  and  shall  be  able  to  soften  every  catastrophe 
in  the  political  drama  which  must  happen,  and  turn  them  to  the 
best  account. 

I  have  lately  received  a  long  letter  from  our  excellent  friend 
Gore.  He  speaks  of  invasion  as  more  likely  than  he  used  to  think 
to  be  attempted.  I  wish  I  may  be  mistaken  in  the  belief  I  con 
stantly  entertain,  that  it  would  never  be  undertaken.  It  would  be 
happy  for  us  and  the  world  to  have  the  attempt  seriously  made 
upon  the  largest  scale;  but  I  cannot  for  a  moment  be  persuaded 
that  Buonaparte  will  play  so  desperate  a  game.  A  hundred  to  one, 
he  would  not  get  over  the  Channel  with  fifty  thousand  men,  and 
a  hundred  to  one  (in  jny  opinion)  that  with  one  hundred  thousand 
he  would  be  destroyed.  No:  he  may  make  little  expeditions  to 
burn  a  dock-yard,  conquer  Guernsey  and  Jersey,  and  land  twenty 
thousand  men  in  Ireland;  but  his  force,  when  collected,  will  be 
chiefly  useful  to  overawe  Denmark,  Prussia,  &c.,  and  perhaps  to 
conquer  them.  It  will  be  useful  to  influence  the  policy  of  every 
continental  power,  and,  if  necessary,  to  fight  them ;  but  he  will  not 
embark  this  host  of  soldiers  to  be  drowned,  taken,  or  shot,  and  give 


348  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1801-6. 

to  England  the  greatest  triumph  she  ever  had,  and  which  she  can 
never  obtain,  if  he  does  not  give  her  this  kind  of  opportunity.  You 
would  give  very  great  pleasure  to  many  whom  you  esteem,  if  you 
were  to  execute  what  you  intimate.  To  me,  it  would  of  all  things  be 
the  most  gratifying  to  review  those  familiar  interviews,  which  have 
been  among  the  most  satisfactory  hours  of  my  life. 

I  should  rejoice  to  see  Burr  win  the  race  in  your  State,  but 
I  cannot  approve  of  aid  being  given  him  by  any  of  the  leading 
Federalists. 

When  you  next  meet  Hamilton,  Benson,  and  Wolcott,  give  my 
affectionate  regards  to  each  of  them. 

Your  faithful  and  affectionate  friend,  G.  C. 


CABOT  TO  JOHN  LOWELL. 

BOSTON,  July  18,  1804. 

MY  DEAR  COUSIN,  —  I  have  received  from  you  two  very  grate 
ful  letters,  without  having  made  you  any  return  for  either.  I  am 
not  satisfied  with  myself  by  any  excuse  for  this  delay,  knowing,  as 
I  do,  how  valuable  every  communication  is  from  domestic  friends 
to  a  man  in  remote  countries.  Your  aunt  and  I  have  felt  very 
sensibly  the  generous  sympathy  you  expressed  when  we  were  de 
pressed  by  affliction;  and,  I  assure  you,  it  alleviated  our  trouble 
to  learn  that  you  were  recovering  health  and  spirits.  I  trust  you 
will  fully  renovate  your  former  vigor  by  the  journey  you  are  to 
make. 

Harry  Lee  is  charged  with  newspapers  of  the  day,  which  will 
announce  and  explain  to  you  the  public  misfortune  experienced 
here  by  the  untimely  death  of  Hamilton.  You  know  how  well  his 
friends  loved  him,  and  all  esteemed  him.  You  can  therefore  judge 
of  the  general  sensibility  at  his  death.  I  have  always  thought  his 
virtues  surpassed  those  of  other  men  almost  as  much  as  his  talents. 
His  errors,  unfortunately  for  the  country,  were  conspicuous,  and 
diminished  his  influence,  which  otherwise  would  have  been  irre 
sistible,  and  was  always  directed  to  the  noblest  purposes.  All  re 
flecting  men  seem  now  to  be  sensible  that  he  was  our  hope  in  the 
isis  to  which  our  affairs  necessarily  drive  us.  France  has  finished 
e  first  and  principal  piece  of  her  drama,  and  it  remains  only  to 
see  who  will  come  out  as  manager,  when  all  appear  in  their  own 
dresses.  You  judge  rightly  of  the  course  of  things  here,  because 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  349 

such  as  you  describe  must  be  the  course  of  all  democracies.  A 
democracy  is  in  terms  a  solecism,  as  we  understand  it  in  the  United 
States.  It  is  absurd  to  expect  any  people  will  voluntarily  and 
knowingly  support  men  or  systems  which  compel  them  to  do  what 
they  wish  to  avoid,  and  restrain  them  from  doing  what  they  desire 
to  do.  Men  may  deliberately  engage  to  give  such  support;  but 
they  will  certainly  violate  those  engagements  as  long  as  man  is 
what  he  has  always  been,  impelled  to  action  by  his  passions.  But, 
although  we  must  deteriorate,  I  hope  the  condition  and  character 
of  our  country  will  render  the  process  more  tolerable  than  it  com 
monly  is. 

I  pray  you  to  make  our  sincere  regards  acceptable  to  Mrs.  Lowell, 
and  believe  me  always 

Your  affectionate  and  faithful  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Nov.  30,  1804. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  am  indebted  to  you  for  three  letters  which 
are  constantly  reproaching  me  for  my  delays  to  acknowledge  them. 
I  trust  much  to  your  knowledge  of  my  indolent  habits,  which  are 
an  overmatch  for  my  sense  of  many  duties,  and  render  my  best 
intentions  often  inert. 

I  can  truly  say  I  feel  more  chagrin  by  sympathy  with  our  friends 
at  Washington  than  I  felt  direct  at  the  issue  of  our  election.  I 
confess  I  did  not  yet  expect  it,  but  I  was  one  of  the  many  who  con 
demned  the  experiment  at  the  time  it  was  proposed  ;  but  it  was  the 
project  of  good  Federalists,  chiefly  from  the  western  parts  of  the 
State.  They  believed  the  measure  l  to  be  essentially  necessary  to 
maintain  the  popularity  of  the  Federal  cause.  There  could  not 
have  been  a  weaker  opinion  formed.  It  is  to  be  remarked,  how 
ever,  that  this  transaction  has  not  made  us  bad,  but  has  shown  too 
plainly  how  bad  we  are.  It  has  also  shown  to  our  opponents  how 
strong  they  are ;  and  when  it  is  considered  that  the  opinion  of 
power,  and  still  more  the  knowledge  of  its  being  possessed  by  a 
party,  tends  much  to  its  increase,  I  think  it  must  be  allowed  that 
our  opponents  are  stronger  in  fact  than  before  this  trial. 

1  Previous  to  the  election  of  1804,  the  Legislature  of  Massachusetts,  in 
which  the  Federalists  were  predominant,  voted  to  give  the  choice  of  electors 
to  the  districts  instead  of  retaining  it  in  their  own  hands.  The  result  was  the 
choice  of  Jeffersonian  electors. 


350  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.        [1801-6. 

Many  good  judges  are  still  of  opinion  that  our  elections  will  not 
be  injured  in  the  spring.  Nothing  can  be  more  uncertain,  yet  I 
think  it  highly  probable  that  Governor  Strong  will  be  re-elected ; 
and  probably  a  majority  may  be  elected  of  Federal  senators,  but  a 
majority  of  Democratic  representatives  is  expected  by  most  men. 

I  thank  you  for  the  paper  you  enclosed,  and  shall  be  always 
gratified  to  see  the  only  arms  we  have  left  used  to  punish  wicked 
rulers.  The  time  will  come,  however,  when  this  avenue  to  public 
opinion  will  be  shut  against  the  truth.  I  have  grieved  for  my 
country  till  I  am  convinced  of  the  futility  of  grief.  I  consider 
what  I  see  as  the  order  of  nature,  and  that  it  is  vain  to  attempt  to 
change  it.  We  may  mitigate,  but  we  can  no  more  avert  these 
evils  than  the  cold  of  winter. 

I  am  truly  and  respectfully  ever  yours,  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Dec.  24,  1806. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  perceive  Congress  have  suspended  their 
ridiculous  law1  against  trade  with  England.  By  suspending  in 
stead  of  repealing  the  act,  it  is  hoped  to  hide  our  folly ;  but  this  is 
impossible.  Every  man  conversant  with  the  subject  must  be  con 
vinced  that  the  system  of  commercial  hostility,  if  fairly  tried,  would 
be  infinitely  more  injurious  to  us  than  to  England,  if  it  did  not 
produce  war ;  and  that  it  certainly  tends  so  strongly  to  war  that, 
if  persisted  in,  it  would  produce  it,  if  other  causes  in  which  we  have 
an  interest  as  well  as  they  did  not  overrule.  I  think  the  affected 
moderation  of  the  British  government  at  this  alarming  crisis  is 
to  be  applauded  as  much  as  our  egregious  and  absurd  vaporing  is 
to  be  condemned. 

Yours  faithfully  always,  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Feb.  10, 1806. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Although  I  have  been  fully  sensible  myself  of 
my  delinquency,  yet  I  hoped  you  would  not  be  ;  and  at  any  rate,  if 
it  occurred  to  you,  that  you  would  forgive  it,  as  you  have  always 
done,  and  as  I  must  rely  you  always  will,  upon  the  recollection  of 

4 

1  This  was  the  Non-importation  Act,  passed  after  the  admiralty  decisions, 
and  suspended  on  account  of  the  Monroe  and  Pinkney  negotiation. 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  351 

the  inveteracy  of  my  bad  habits  and  the  belief  that  the  languor  and 
coldness  of  my  hand  shall  never  reach  my  heart. 

It  is  impossible  so  to  detach  one's  self  from  public  affairs  as  to 
be  uninterested  in  any  measures  proposed  to  guard  our  country 
against  the  evils  that  assail  it.  It  is  not  for  us,  however,  to  indicate 
the  course  to  be  pursued,  and  perhaps  it  will  be  useful  to  our  op 
ponents  to  be  made  to  feel  their  responsibility.  By  this  time,  they 
see  how  vain  it  would  be  to  wrap  ourselves  up  in  the  fancied  secu 
rity  which  local  separation  affords  against  the  arms  of  the  European 
combatants.  We  cannot  exempt  ourselves  from  the  effects  of  their 
wars  any  more  than  an  individual  can  from  the  internal  commotion 
of  the  society  of  which  he  is  a  member. 

I  have  read  cursorily  the  "Baltimore  Memorial,"1  the  great 
book  2  attributed  to  Mr.  Madison,  and  many  other  papers,  all  tend 
ing  to  prove  how  much  we  shall  lose  by  the  operation  of  the  Brit 
ish  principle,  "  how  unsupported  it  is  by  precedent,  how  inconsistent 
and  wavering  Great  Britain  herself  has  been  in  maintaining  it,  &c., 
&c.,  with  some  little  argument  to  show  its  unreasonableness  in  the 
abstract."  These  writings  coincide  with  many  honest,  preconceived 
opinions,  with  many  prejudices,  with  our  animosity  toward  Eng 
land,  with  our  pride  and  vanity,  and,  above  all,  with  our  avarice. 

Yet  afeiv  men  still  say  it  is  impossible  to  prove  the  right  of  a 
neutral  state  to  interfere  and  protect  by  purchase  the  spoils  which 
one  belligerent  has  won  from  the  other ;  but,  however  this  may  be, 
it  would  be  worse  than  useless  to  say  it  openly.  Possibly,  the  man 
would  be  insulted,  who  should  attempt  to  show  it  in  any  public 
assembly.  Certainly,  these  papers  are  to  be  considered  as  the 
argument  on  one  side  only,  and  as  advocates  the  writers  are  not 
bound  to  do  otherwise.  It  must  be  allowed,  I  think,  that  they  are 
the  fruits  of  the  laborious  researches  of  many  able  men,  and  ought 
therefore  to  be  supposed  to  contain  the  strength  and  ingenuity  of 
this  side  of  the  question.  Yet  surely  there  is  much  that  has  no 
close  affinity  to  the  question.  There  is,  too,  some  sophistry  in  some 
of  the  argument,  and  some  false  assumption  of  fact.  It  is  an  extra 
ordinary  assumption  that  our  trade  would  be  annihilated  or  nearly 

1  A  memorial  of  the  merchants  of  Baltimore  against  the  British  doctrine. 
See  Annals  of  Congress  for  1806-7,  p.  824. 

2  This  refers  to  Madison's  "  Memoir,  containing  an  examination  of  the 
British  doctrine  which  subjects  to  capture  a  neutral  trade  not  open  in  time 
of  peace."    This  pamphlet  was  in  answer  to  "  War  in  Disguise,"  an  exposi 
tion  of  the  arguments  on  the  other  side. 


352  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1801-0. 

so,  if  confined  in  war  to  the  kind  and  places  of  trade  accustomed 
in  peace.  Even  with  large  deductions  for  blockades  and  contra 
band,  the  total  of  our  trade  would  commonly  be  much  enlarged  and 
its  profits  doubled  by  a  war  between  France,  Holland,  and  England. 
It  is  certainly  a  fallacious  argument,  too,  that  because  Great  Britain 
opens  to  us  her  monopolies,  therefore  she  is  bound  to  permit  us 
to  accept  the  invitation  of  her  enemy.  Every  belligerent  permits 
neutrals  to  bring  to  itself  supplies  of  military  and  naval  stores. 
Does  it  follow  that  it  must  permit  them  to  be  carried  to  an  enemy  ? 
But  yet  this  argument  is  used  triumphantly. 

Laying  aside,  however,  a  question  not  easily  settled,  I  cannot  but 
remark  to  you  that  I  every  day  hear  the  magnanimous  policy  of 
wise  nations  invoked  to  save  what  remains  of  the  unconquered 
world.  Prussia  is  execrated  as  being  equally  foolish  and  wicked : 
her  fate  is  said  to  depend  on  that  of  Austria,  yet  she  acquiesces  in 
her  subjugation.  Now  are  we  not  also  disposed  to  do  all  the  harm 
we  can  to  those  whose  safety  is  necessary  for  our  independence? 
We  are  ready  to  risk  every  thing  for  a  little  longer  enjoyment  of 
the  spoils  which  are  won  by  the  blood  of  the  hated  English,  and, 
while  we  ought  to  think  of  the  safety  of  the  empire,  we  refer  every 
thing  to  the  pence  table.  I  am  persuaded  we  are  to  be  taught  in 
this  business  as  well  as  governed  by  events  over  which  we  have  no 
control,  and  therefore  indulge  very  little  of  that  anxiety  which 
once  would  have  disturbed  me.  So  commending  you,  my  country, 
and  all  that  is  dear  to  me,  to  a  kind  Providence, 

I  remain  your  sincere  and  affectionate  friend,         G.  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Feb.  17,  1806. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  lately  read  your  gloomy  letter  to 
Ames,  and  his  desponding  answer.  It  was  a  melancholy  pleasure 
to  me,  yet  it  was  a  pleasure.  Would  to  Heaven  all  the  men  whom 
I  esteem  thought  as  correctly !  With  the  single  exception  of  the 
degree  of  facility  with  which  a  French  army  could  conquer  Eng 
land,  I  subscribe  to  all  your  sentiments.  Upon  that  point,  too,  I 
confess  myself  unsatisfied  with  the  British  government.  They  cer 
tainly  ought  to  organize  a  military  force  at  least  a  hundred  thousand 
strong,  in  addition  to  their  present  regular  army ;  which  force 
should  be  subject,  in  every  particular,  to  the  law  and  discipline  of 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  353 

the  regular  army,  except  in  their  time  of  service.  I  am  not  at  all 
surprised  to  hear  that  Mr.  Adams  is  among  the  advocates  for  the 
absurd,  childish,  and  truly  ridiculous  scheme  of  non-importation, 
or  non-intercourse.  I  have  often  heard  the  father  express  his  full 
belief  that,  by  one  or  two  short  laws  in  that  spirit,  we  could  with 
ease  and  certainty  ruin  the  naval  power  of  Great  Britain.  Great 
philosophers  and  men  of  distinguished  talents  will  be  often  found 
the  most  zealous  defenders  of  the  most  monstrous  follies,  —  a  good 
lesson  for  human  pride  ! 

There  are  many  men  who  think,  and  think  justly,  that  Great 
Britain  has  acted  wrongly  in  the  manner  of  enforcing  her  claims 
as  a  belligerent,  and  that  she  ought  in  justice  to  restore  the  prop 
erty  of  all  those  where  fair  voyages  were  shaped  according  to  those 
rules  of  evidence  and  principles  she  herself  had  sanctioned.  But 
there  are  many  sensible  men  who  think  she  might  with  propriety 
in  this  great  crisis  proscribe  all  intercourse  with  her  enemy  by  sea. 
Whatever  may  be  her  motive,  she  is  in  the  greatest  extremity 
defending  the  independence  of  the  civilized  world ;  and  the  neces 
sity  of  the  case  would  justify  her  in  saying  to  neutrals,  If  you  will 
not  help  us  in  the  battle,  you  shall  not  hinder  its  success  under  a 
cover  of  neutral  pretensions. 

I  take  it  for  granted  that  every  man  sees  that  the  projects  of 
Wright,  Gregg,  Smith,  &  Co.,  would,  if  carried  into  effect,  probably 
issue  in  war.  Now  it  is  manifest  that  no  considerable  party  is 
willing  to  take  that  consequence  ;  and  the  government,  —  so  far  is  it 
from  contemplating  war  that  it  is  unwilling  to  disburse  a  dollar  in 
preparation.  It  will  go  to  no  expense  for  any  thing  but  scare 
crows.  Perhaps  this  is  best. 

But  what  a  change  of  appearances  in  Europe  do  we  see  by  the 
late  arrival  from  Liverpool  at  New  York;  and  this  moment  a 
gentleman  whispers  to  me  that  another  vessel  in  twenty-eight  days 
is  arrived  at  the  same  place,  from  whence  we  may  hear  important 
news  to-night.  A  great  defeat,  or  the  death  of  an  emperor  or 
two,  may  make  us  forget  our  disputes  and  almost  our  losses. 

Yours  semper  et  fideliter,  G.  C. 


UNIVERSITY 


354  LIFE    AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1801-6. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

MARCH  29,  1806. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  You  are  a  hard-hearted  man  to  compel  me  to 
think,  which  is  a  bad  employment,  and  to  write  my  thoughts,  which 
is  a  worse. 

All  our  projectors  of  systems  for  coercing  Great  Britain  to 
abandon  or  materially  change  her  commercial  policy  have  appeared 
to  me  to  lay  down  false  premises,  and  many  of  them  to  reason 
absurdly,  if  those  premises  were  admitted  to  be  true.  It  is  assumed 
by  most  of  them  that  our  commerce  with  Great  Britain  is  of  more 
benefit  to  her  than  to  us,  that  consequently  its  interruption  would 
injure  her  the  most.  It  is  expected  that  the  fear  of  that  injury,  or 
the  suffering  it  would  cause,  would  drive  her  from  her  purposes, 
while  we  should  not  be  moved.  It  is  argued  that  a  country  is 
benefited  by  a  particular  branch  of  foreign  trade  in  the  ratio  of  its 
exports,  or  in  the  ratio  of  the  excess  of  those  exports  above  the 
imports  in  the  same  trade.  It  is  maintained  that  a  country  which 
sells  provisions  (the  staff  of  life)  and  raw  materials  for  the  use  of 
manufacturers  possesses  such  a  decided  advantage  over  one  that 
sells  manufactures  only  as  enables  the  former  to  dictate  the  terms  and 
conditions  on  which  the  trade  of  the  two  countries  shall  be  carried 
on.  It  is  contended  not  only  that  navigation,  or  the  carrying  part, 
is  the  most  profitable  part  of  commerce,  but  that  this  latter  will 
flourish  in  proportion  as  the  former  is  confined  to  the  people  of 
our  own  country.  They  suppose  the  navigation  laws  of  Great 
Britain  favorable  to  direct  pecuniary  profit,  and  on  this  account 
supported  with  so  much  rigor.  They  seem  to  think  that  our  trade 
with  those  nations  to  whom  we  sell  much  and  of  whom  we  buy 
little  is  best  deserving  encouragement,  and  that  the  trade  with  those 
from  whom  we  buy  almost  all  we  want  should  be  discouraged. 
They  suppose,  also,  that  wherever  we  supply  the  British  wants,  no 
other  source  is  to  be  found,  if  ours  is  stopped.  I  write  with  a 
galloping  pen,  and  could  continue  as  long  as  my  breath  would 
hold  without  enumerating  the  data  and  postulata  of  these  men,  all 
of  which  are  untrue,  and  in  many  instances  the  inverse  propositions 
can  be  proved.  We  sell  to  Great  Britain  annually  one-half  of  all 
the  surplus  of  our  domestic  produce.  If  this  produce  were  manu 
factures,  they  would  probably,  in  case  of  prohibition,  find  some 
other  market :  they  would  not  immediately  perish.  A  little  varia- 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  355 

tion  of  the  labor  and  skill  that  wrought  them  would  produce  some 
thing  else  of  equal  value  adapted  to  the  taste  of  domestic  or  new 
foreign  customers,  or,  in  spite  of  prohibitory  laws,  would  find  those 
who  had  been  accustomed  to  them.  It  was  triumphantly  declared 
by  Mr.  Madison  and  his  adherents  that,  by  refusing  to  buy  British 
manufactures,  we  could  bring  distress  on  a  million  or  millions  of 
people  in  Great  Britain,  and  that  their  discontents  would  drive  the 
ministry  from  their  places.  It  was  at  the  same  time  urged  with 
equal  confidence  that  our  commercial  power  was  irresistible,  because 
we  held  their  bread  in  our  hands,  which  we  had  only  to  shut  and 
they  would  starve.  This  I  understood  to  apply  to  Europe  as  well 
as  the  West  India  islands.  Now  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  a  sud 
den  stoppage  of  the  West  India  supply  would  be  an  inconvenience, 
and  would  produce  considerable  suffering ;  but  this  must  be  a  stop 
page  of  all  supplies  to  that  quarter,  or  Great  Britain  would  certainly 
have  a  share  of  it,  either  by  capture  or  peaceably  by  purchasing  it 
at  the  other  islands.  It  should  be  remarked  here  that  no  great 
mass  of  population  in  any  country  is  dependent  for  its  principal 
subsistence  on  imported  food.  Nature  is  kind  in  this,  as  a  thousand 
other  cases,  to  set  bounds  to  the  power  of  political  projectors.  The 
West  India  island  settlements  are  more  dependent  than  any  other ; 
yet,  if  they  once  are  compelled  to  raise  their  own  bread  by  our 
prohibitions,  we  should  never  cease  to  lament  arid  condemn  the 
folly  that  produced  them.  It  is  within  my  own  recollection  when 
the  islands  were  chiefly  fed  by  the  corn  of  Europe.  France  never 
permitted  a  barrel  of  flour  to  be  carried  to  her  colonies  from  any 
foreign  country  until  the  revolution  shook  her  laws.  The  little 
she  took  from  us  was  smuggled ;  she  even  supplied  the  Spaniards 
with  the  flour  in  Cadiz  which  they  transported  to  the  Havana. 
More  recently,  the  Havana  market  has  been  supplied  with  wheat 
from  the  Spanish  settlements  on  the  main,  which  is  a  very  fertile 
country.  Every  one  knows  that  maize  and  other  bread  can  be 
raised  in  the  islands  plentifully,  and  would  be,  if  the  profit  on  sugar, 
&c.,  was  not  greater  than  on  raising  bread.  Make  bread  dear  in 
the  West  Indies,  or  make  it  very  uncertain,  and  they  will  no 
longer  look  to  you  for  supplies.  In  regard  to  Europe,  all  the 
provisions  she  takes  from  the  United  States  in  a  year  would  hardly 
amount  to  five  days'  subsistence.  One  shower  of  rain  too  much  or 
too  little  on  their  crops  makes  a  greater  difference.  The  grain  of 
all  kinds  consumed  in  Europe  in  each  year  cannot  be  less  than 


356  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.        [1801-6. 

seven  or  eight,  and  in  some  years  nine,  hundred  millions  of  bushels. 
Notwithstanding  many  embarrassments  on  the  corn  trade,  it  is 
necessarily  distributed  with  tolerable  equality.  Now,  what  a  very 
trifling  difference  can  it  make,  whether  we  send  them  ten  millions 
more  or  not.  The  only  difference  to  them  is  a  present  convenient 
supply  in  those  few  places,  accessible  by  sea,  where  the  scarcity 
is  pointed  out  by  a  high  price.  But,  although  the  difference  to 
them  is  trifling,  yet  to  us  it  would  be  a  serious  loss  to  have  no 
vent  for  a  surplus  of  ten  millions  of  dollars'  value.  Russia  and 
Poland  in  the  north,  Sicily  and  the  people  of  Africa  in  the  south, 
have  been  the  principal  venders  of  grain,  especially  wheat.  I  am 
persuaded,  if  to  all  that  is  exported  from  those  countries  you  add 
all  that  we  export,  the  total  would  be  less  than  five  per  cent  (I 
might  say  three  per  cent)  of  the  consumption  of  Europe.  I  think, 
therefore,  we  could  not  starve  any  nation  in  JZurope,  nor  feed  them 
if  they  were  starving.  With  respect  to  raw  materials,  they  are 
more  certainly  needed  than  food.  I  believe,  however,  we  hold 
nothing  of  this  description  of  great  value  but  what  may  be  acquired 
elsewhere,  or  admits  of  some  substitute  that  can  be  acquired.  The 
improvements  in  chemistry  and  natural  history  go  hand  in  hand  in 
multiplying  uses  of  natural  substances,  and  supplying  those  sub 
stances.  If  ashes  become  scarce,  barilla  will  be  cultivated. 

We  now  sell  cotton  to  the  English  to  the  amount  of  six  millions 
of  dollars,  and  this  article,  if  uninterrupted,  may  increase  to  twelve 
millions  in  ten  years  more,  as  it  has  at  the  same  rate  the  last  ten 
years  ;  but,  if  you  choose  to  interrupt  it,  Great  Britain  has  it  in 
her  power  to  obtain  ample  supplies,  partly  from  Dutch  Guiana  and 
her  own  islands,  and  indefinitely  from  the  East  Indies.  If  the 
carriage  be  dear,  it  will  employ  her  seamen  ;  and  this  gain  of  power 
always  satisfies  her  for  a  little  loss  of  money.  And  this  leads  me 
to  remark  that  her  navigation  laws,  including  her  fishery  bounties, 
are,  as  now  understood,  bottomed  on  the  principles  of  national 
defence  as  depending  on  naval  strength,  and  not  on  the  principles 
of  pecuniary  profit.  Great  Britain  often  pays  direct  bounties  to  a 
greater  amount  than  the  whole  profit  on  the  fisheries.  She  also 
pays  indirectly  a  tax  on  her  internal  industry  to  encourage  naviga 
tion.  All  exclusions  of  foreign  freight  operate  to  raise  or  keep  up 
the  freightage  of  her  own  ships,  but  in  this  she  calculates  that  she 
maintains  her  maritime  force  in  the  cheapest  manner.  Being  an 
island,  her  safety  demands  she  should  be  always  strong  at  sea ; 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  357 

and,  by  contributing  in  various  ways  to  the  support  of  numerous 
seamen  in  time  of  peace,  she  has  them  always  prepared  to  fight  for 
her  in  war.  They  may  be  considered  as  a  naval  militia,  who 
chiefly  subsist  themselves  in  peace  ;  and  the  deficiency  is  supplied  by 
the  nation,  who  converts  them  to  a  regular  military  marine  in  war. 
How  far  this  sort  of  policy  is  demanded  by  the  condition  and 
circumstances  of  the  United  States  I  will  not  now  inquire  ;  but 
that  we  ought  constantly  to  keep  up  a  respectable  naval  force,  and 
be  well  prepared  at  all  times  to  enlarge  it  without  delay,  no  man 
can  doubt  who  considers  what  sort  of  a  world  we  live  in,  —  how 
prone  nations,  as  well  as  individuals,  are  to  violate  each  other's 
rights,  and  how  vain  it  is  to  expect  to  be  spared  upon  any  other 
ground  than  that  you  are  not  to  be  attacked  with  impunity.  I 
observe  among  the  exports  to  Great  Britain  three  millions'  value 
of  tobacco.  This  article  may  be  raised  in  many  countries  as  ad 
vantageously  as  in  the  United  States ;  but  its  superior  fitness  for  a 
heavy  tax  to  most  other  articles  has  almost  everywhere  in  Europe 
subjected  it  to  the  sole  purpose  of  revenue.  It  has  been  therefore 
imported  by  sea,  and  its  culture  forbidden.  Portugal  and  Spain 
import  from  their  own  colonies  vast  quantities  of  an  excellent 
quality,  and  the  former  re-exports  to  a  considerable  amount  the 
Brazil  tobacco.  It  would  be  perfectly  easy  to  make  the  Portu 
guese  and  Spaniards  our  successful  competitors  in  the  production 
of  this  article.  It  would  be  extraordinary  if  there  were  to  be  found 
among  the  articles  of  our  commerce  any  one  thing  indispensable  to 
Great  Britain,  and  not  to  be  procured  elsewhere  ;  but  it  would  not  be 
extraordinary,  in  our  juvenile  state,  if  there  are  many  things  indis 
pensable  to  us  which  we  have  exclusively  received  from  her.  I 
read  and  hear  with  amazement  men  insisting  that  Great  Britain 
would  be  a  greater  sufferer  than  the  United  States  by  an  interdic 
tion  of  trade,  and  that  in  an  experiment  on  self-denying  ordinances 
she  would  be  the  first  to  yield.  Our  public  documents  show  that 
of  all  our  surplus  she  annually  buys  half,  and  of  all  our  foreign 
supplies  she  furnishes  two-thirds  of  what  we  consume.  Is  it,  then, 
possible  any  man  should  doubt  that  our  affairs  would  be  extremely 
deranged,  both  private  and  public  ?  It  is  not. 

But,  although  this  commerce  bears  so  great  a  proportion  to  the 
whole  commerce  of  our  country,  it  bears  a  small  proportion  to 
the  whole  commerce  of  Great  Britain.  All  that  she  buys  from  us 
is  less  than  one-sixth  of  her  imports,  and  all  that  she  sells  to  us 


358  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1801-6. 

less  than  a  fifth  of  her  exports.  This  view  of  the  subject  shows 
that  the  injury  or  inconvenience  would  be  at  times  as  great  to  the 
United  States  as  to  Great  Britain.  I  have  no  doubt,  if  the  experi 
ment  is  tried,  it  will  prove  so ;  and  that,  instead  of  the  button- 
makers  rising  in  England  to  expel  the  ministers,  we  should  see 
the  people  of  the  United  States  clamoring  against  the  folly  of 
their  rulers,  and  demanding  a  change  of  measures.1 

It  is  singular  that  men  who  expect  to  distress  the  British  by 
refusing  to  buy  of  them  should  not  perceive  that  we  must  also 
suffer  by  their  refusing  to  buy  of  us.  I  conceive,  however,  that 
the  idea  is  totally  false  (as  we  apply  it)  that  the  seller  is  most 
benefited.  If  our  trade  with  Great  Britain  were  abolished,  it 
would  soon  be  manifest  that  our  solicitude  to  buy  the  forbidden 
goods  would  be  much  greater  than  theirs  to  sell  them  ;  and  that, 
while  their  prices  at  home  would  scarcely  vary  at  all,  the  articles 
when  brought  here  would  be  doubled  in  price.  On  the  other 
hand,  many  of  the  articles  we  should  wish  to  sell  would  fall  here 
so  much  below  their  common  level  in  price  as  to  compensate  men 
for  sending  them  at  great  risk  by  circuitous  routes  to  the  British 
market,  there  to  be  sold  at  little  more  than  the  ordinary  rate. 

In  our  trade  with  Spain  and  the  south  of  Europe,  we  sell  much 
more  than  we  buy.  There  is  a  loss  often  by  the  ships  returning 
dead  freighted.  There  is  also  a  loss  on  the  balance  of  this  trade, 
which  must  be  received  in  money  or  bills  which  are  ordinarily  of  a 
correspondent  value.  Thus,  when  money  cannot  be  extracted 
from  Spain  without  a  loss  of  five  per  cent  (which  was  commonly 
the  case  formerly),  there  will  be  a  loss  of  about  five  per  cent  on 
bills.  The  same  has  held  true,  when  the  loss  on  money  was 
twelve  or  fourteen  per  cent.  Yet,  as  this  trade  is  one  on  which  we 
sell  more  than  we  buy,  and  receive  the  balance  in  money,  it  is 
conceived  by  many  to  be  the  most  useful,  as  far  as  its  amount  goes, 
of  any  we  carry  on.  In  Russia,  we  sell  little  or  nothing,  and  buy 
to  a  great  amount.  We  go  there  dead  freighted,  and  pay  all  in 
cash  or  rather  in  bills  on  London,  better  to  us  than  money,  having 
cost  us  a  considerable  premium  in  Spain  or  elsewhere ;  yet  who, 
among  those  that  think  no  trade  so  important  to  the  buyer  as  to 
the  seller,  will  dare  to  deny  that  the  trade  with  Russia  since  1783 
has  been  for  its  amount  the  most  useful  trade  to  the  country  ? 

The  hemp,  iron,  and  duck  brought  from  Russia  have  been  to 
our  fisheries  and  navigation  like  seed  to  a  crop.  Had  it  so  hap- 

1  This  prophecy  was  literally  fulfilled  when  the  embargo  was  laid. 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  359 

pened  that  the  trade  of  Spain  and  Russia  were  united,  the  time 
and  expenses  of  a  middle  passage  and  other  losses  would  have  been 
avoided.  That  is,  it  would  have  been  better  if,  as  in  our  trade 
with  England,  we  could  have  sold  and  bought  at  the  same  places. 

]  have  now  given  you  a  general  idea  of  iny  manner  of  thinking, 
but  have  not  answered  your  question. 

I  do  not  perceive  any  considerable  effect  that  will  be  produced 
by  Smith's  bill,  if  it  should  become  a  law.  It  aims  to  open  the 
British  ports  for  articles  not  of  the  United  States  in  American  bot 
toms  ;  and  it  enacts,  if  this  is  not  admitted  by  the  British,  that 
their  bottoms  shall  not  bring  to  us  articles  not  of  their  own  product 
or  manufacture.  I  take  it  for  granted  Great  Britain  will  not 
permanently  admit  us  to  import  into  her  dominions  in  our  bottoms 
any  articles  not  of  our  own  growth  or  product.  According  to  the 
bill,  therefore,  we  shall  refuse  to  her  the  privilege  she  now  enjoys 
of  importing  into  the  United  States  articles  other  than  those  of  her 
own  growth,  product,  and  manufacture.  The  effect  of  the  bill  is 
therefore  to  be  measured  by  the  amount  of  all  the  articles  not  of 
her  own  product  which  are  brought  into  the  United  States  in 
British  bottoms.  Without  recurring  to  documents,  I  should  think 
that  in  war  this  amount  is  very  trifling  indeed,  and  in  peace  not 
very  large.  If  I  am  correct  in  this,  the  only  effect  of  any  impor 
tance  to  be  expected  is  to  irritate  Great  Britain  by  manifesting  a 
spirit  of  hatred  and  animosity,  and  by  attempting  to  intimidate  her 
with  the  dread  of  a  new  enemy,  when  in  truth  she  has  no  such 
enemy  to  fear ;  for  I  am  satisfied  a  war  with  that  nation  would  be 
soon  too  unpopular  for  the  administration  to  maintain  it,  or  main 
tain  their  places.  Every  nation  has  an  equal  right  to  regulate  its 
own  commerce,  and  we  undoubtedly  have  as  good  a  right  to  pass  a 
navigation  law  as  Great  Britain.  Such  a  measure,  therefore,  con 
sidered  in  the  abstract,  is  no  ground  of  offence.  But,  notwithstand 
ing  our  right  is  clear  to  do  this,  it  cannot  be  concealed  that  for 
more  than  ten  years  the  party  now  in  power  have  discovered  a 
desire  to  do  all  the  harm  possible  to  Great  Britain,  without  provok 
ing  her  to  war.  Jefferson,  Madison,  Livingston,  Monroe,  Arm 
strong,  and  many  others,  have  published  their  hostile  wishes. 
Such  a  measure  as  the  one  proposed  at  this  time  would  indicate 
more  of  the  inclination  to  hurt  Great  Britain  than  to  help  our 
selves.  Should  it  produce  on  her  part  any  kind  of  resentment, 
we  should  be  bound  in  honor  to  retaliate ;  and  a  series  of  crimina- 


360  LIFE   AND    LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1801-6. 

tions  and  recriminations  would  tend  strongly  to  an  eventual  inter 
diction  of  commercial  intercourse,  and  thus  cut  asunder  the  tie 
which  binds  us  together  in  peace.  It  cannot  escape  the  notice  of 
British  statesmen  that  we  acquiesce  without  a  murmur  in  regula 
tions  of  other  nations,  which  we  complain  of  when  enforced  by 
Great  Britain.  The  colony  monopoly  of  Spain,  Portugal,  and 
France,  may  be  adduced  as  examples.  The  two  first  of  these 
nations  maintain  in  peace  an  unqualified  exclusion  of  our  trade ; 
and  France,  though  she  admitted  our  vessels  and  thus  favored  our 
navigation,  yet  the  conditions  of  their  trade  were,  on  the  whole, 
as  unfavorable  to  our  national  interest  as  those  of  Great  Britain. 
France  refused  flour,  and  took  fish ;  but  she  took  the  fish  under  a 
duty  of  thirty  per  cent,  which  she  applied  to  the  encouragement  of 
her  own  fishermen.  She  permitted  us  to  take  molasses,  salt,  and 
French  manufactures  only  in  return  ;  but  all  this  was  allowed  in 
our  own  vessels.  The  British  refused  fish,  but  took  flour,  and 
allowed  almost  every  article  in  return  except  cotton,  and  on  the 
same  terms  as  if  carried  to  other  British  colonies ;  but  it  must  all 
be  carried  in  British  ships.  Considering  commerce  and  navigation 
as  one  interest,  and  as  subservient  to  the  producing  interest  of  the 
nation,  it  is  evident  that,  if  our  clamors  against  Great  Britain  were 
justifiable,  they  should  have  been  equally  loud  against  France. 
But  I  have  never  been  convinced  they  were  just  towards  either. 
The  right  of  the  Europeans  to  monopolize  respectively  their  col 
ony  trade  is  established,  and  it  must  be  left  to  their  own  discretion 
how  far  to  relax  it.  We  are  so  situated  as  to  trade  with  them 
in  a  manner  reciprocally  beneficial,  and  I  should  not  despair 
of  obtaining  by  negotiations  a  reasonable  portion  of  it  in  the 
course  of  a  few  years.  But  I  do  not  believe  in  our  competency  to 
extort  it  from  France  or  Great  Britain.  I  deem  it  unfortunate 
that  questions  of  this  kind  should  be  started  at  this  time,  when  it 
must  be  obvious  that  any  settlement  we  could  make  would  be  liable 
to  be  broken  up  by  the  great  events  of  the  war.  It  is  also  morti 
fying  to  see  this  country  so  ardently  contesting  with  Great  Britain 
these  little  points,  at  the  moment  she  is  fighting  for  us  as  absolutely 
as  for  herself,  and  when  it  is  to  be  feared,  if  she  fails,  her  master 
will  be  ours. 

You  see  I  think  it  inexpedient  to  pass  this  law  or  any  of  the 
foolish  resolutions  about  non-importations  and  non-intercourse,  or 
other  non-sense.  If  Great  Britain  cannot  keep  her  ground,  we 


1801-6.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  361 

must  treat  with  France  as  mistress  of  the  world;  and,  if  Great 
Britain  does  maintain  her  standing,  I  think  much  will  depend  on 
the  temper  of  Russia  in  regard  to  the  policy  of  Great  Britain 
toward  neutrals.  The  lofty  tone  of  Great  Britain  was  well  sup 
ported  at  Copenhagen,  in  1800 ;  but  she  availed  herself  of  the  first 
moment  to  dissolve  that  formidable  confederacy  which  had  been 
formed  in  the  North.  About  that  time  (as  I  think)  Mr.  King's 
spirited  note  induced  the  government  to  temporize,  though  reluc 
tantly.  The  peace  with  Russia  soon  after  was  made  by  a  sacrifice 
of  the  colonial  principle,  as  it  is  called.  Lord  Grenville  denounced 
that  part  of  the  Russian  treaty  ;  and  the  new  ministers  obtained 
from  Russia  an  explanatory  article,  restoring  back  a  part  of  what 
Lord  St.  Helens  had  yielded.  Lord  Grenville  is  now  in  place, 
and  his  principles  would  forbid  us  to  hope  for  concessions  toward 
neutrals.  Mr.  Fox,  a  seditious  demagogue  out  of  office,  may  be 
high-toned  in  ;  but  this  is  uncertain.  Mr.  Erskine  from  his  known 
character  may  be  expected  to  favor  moderate  measures  toward 
neutrals,  and  not  the  less  so  toward  the  United  States  from  hold 
ing  large  sums  in  our  funds.  On  the  whole,  the  new  ministry  is 
so  made  up  that  they  may  adopt  vigorous  measures  toward  neutrals, 
if  Russia  will  join  ;  but  I  think  they  will  temporize,  unless  that 
takes  place ;  and  I  should  think  it  highly  proper  for  our  govern 
ment  to  know  the  true  state  of  things  between  those  two  powers, 
before  any  great  measure  is  executed. 

I  hope  Mr.  Lloyd  will  write  to  Mr.  Quincy  by  to-morrow's 
post.  Yours  truly,  and  I  may  now  say  obediently, 

G.  C. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

MARCH  31,  1806. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  sent  you  by  this  day's  mail  four  sheets, 
which,  if  your  patience  were  not  inexhaustible,  you  would  never 
wade  through.  I  am  tempted  to  try  it  a  little  further  by  adding 
another,  though  I  hardly  think  I  shall  have  supplied  one  material 
fact  or  thought  which  you  did  not  possess  before.  It  is  not  a  point 
settled  in  my  mind  how  far  the  navigation  of  the  United  States 
will  be  favored  by  the  laws  and  steady  policy  of  the  country,  if  it 
should  ever  have  a  system  worthy  of  that  name.  Nothing  has  yet 
occurred  to  bring  principles,  opinions,  and  party  influences  to  a 
proper  test.  It  has  indeed  been  believed,  and  the  belief  propa- 


362  LIFE    AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.        [1801-6. 

gated  by  the  lt  New  York  Evening  Post,"  that  our  imposition  of 
forty-four  cents  on  foreign  tonnage,  and  an  augmentation  of  duties 
on  goods  imported  in  foreign  bottoms,  have  occasioned  that  im 
mense  increase  of  American  shipping  which  has  taken  place  since 
1791.  Now,  I  am  of  opinion  that  this  monstrous  increase  of  navi 
gation  and  trade  may  be  attributed  to  the  wars  of  Europe ;  and 
this  is  so  easily  proved,  that  it  is  needless  to  state  the  facts  or  the 
argument. 

In  a  time  of  peace,  I  am  sensible  the  foreign  extra  duties  would 
be  sensibly  felt ;  and,  until  such  a  time,  we  can  hardly  conjecture 
what  measures,  if  any,  will  be  adopted  to  counteract  them  by  those 
nations  who  will  then  feel  their  effects.  Should  foreign  nations, 
however,  retaliate  in  any  manner  that  embarrasses  commerce  and 
depresses  the  value  of  our  native  productions,  I  should  apprehend 
great  discontents  among  the  landholders  and  cultivators.  We  are 
accustomed  to  consider  the  interest  of  navigation  and  the  interest 
of  merchants  as  the  interest  of  commerce.  But  is  this  correct  ?  Is 
it  not  true  that  the  tide  of  commerce  would  swell  the  highest,  if 
all  the  world  were  perfectly  free  to  contribute  to  the  stream,  and 
that  the  fullest,  freest,  and  fairest  competition  in  commerce  would 
give  to  our  producers  the  highest  prices  and  supply  them  at  the 
lowest  ?  But,  while  this  would  best  suit  the  planter,  it  would 
certainly  lessen  the  profits  of  our  ship-owners  and  our  merchants. 
These  are  theoretical  truths,  not  to  be  despised,  and  not  to  be 
too  implicitly  trusted.  Practical  men  know  that,  in  a  country  of 
such  ardent  commercial  enterprise  as  the  United  States,  many  arti 
cles  have  a  value  which  would  be  worthless  among  an  indolent  or 
even  a  phlegmatic  people.  Our  merchants  seek  continually  new 
markets  for  whatever  our  country  can  produce.  This  gives  an 
impulse,  and  often  a  direction,  to  industry  more  advantageous  than 
it  could  otherwise  receive.  Hence  I  infer  that  the  landed  interest 
of  our  country  would  be  well  compensated  for  any  apparent  partial 
sacrifices  in  support  of  the  commercial  and  navigating  interests.  If 
these  latter  decline  and  languish,  the  demand  for  our  productions 
for  foreign  markets  would  be  less  in  amount  and  less  constant,  and 
our  producers  would  feel  the  loss.  Should  the  force  of  these  argu 
ments  be  admitted,  it  still  remains  doubtful  how  far  the  principle 
ought  to  operate  to  exclude  foreign  competitors.  It  is  not  to  be 
imagined  that  we  can  engross  our  whole  trade  with  other  nations. 
If  all  parties  are  equally  strenuous  and  equally  persevering,  we 


1801-6.] 


CORRESPONDENCE.  363 


might  conclude  that  one-half,  or  nearly  that  proportion,  might 
finally  remain  to  each.  For  whatever  claim  of  right  is  set  up  by 
one  party  may  be  set  up  by  the  other  with  equal  reason.  Admit 
ting,  however,  that  from  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  some  nations, 
and  the  character  of  others,  we  could  monopolize  the  trade  between 
this  and  other  countries,  there  is,  I  think,  one  argument  against 
it,  which  the  agricultural  States  may  urge  with  plausibility.  They 
may  say  that  a  war,  if  it  should  happen,  would  be  doubly  distress 
ing  by  cutting  off  at  once  all  demand  for  their  exports ;  whereas, 
if  foreigners  were  employed  to  carry  a  part,  the  evil  would  be  les 
sened  in  that  proportion.  I  have  never  had  much  confidence  in 
the  success  of  our  plans  to  help  commerce  by  prohibitory  laws.  I 
believe  we  could  secure  more  by  negotiation  than  in  any  other 
way,  and  only  resorting  to  prohibitory  laws  in  the  last  resort  in 
cases  of  some  magnitude,  and  of  manifest  unreasonableness  in  the 
other  parts. 

Yours,  G.  C. 


364  LIFE   AND   LETTE11S   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1807-14. 


CHAPTER  X. 

1807-1814. 

The  British  Orders  in  Council.  — The  French  Decrees.  — The  Embargo.— 
Mr.  Cabot  takes  part  in  the  Elections  of  1808.  —  Is  chosen  a  Member  of 
the  Council.  —  Death  of  Ames.  —  Publication  of  Ames's  Works. — Mr. 
Cabot  undertakes  to  edit  Ames's  Letters.  —  Views  as  to  Charges  of  "  British 
Faction  "  and  of  Design  to  dissolve  the  Union.  —  Death  of  Mr.  Cabot's 
Eldest  Son,  Charles.  —  Views  in  regard  to  War  of  1812.  —  Correspondence. 

AFTER  the  decisions  of  the  British  Admiralty  Courts, 
difficulties  rapidly  thickened  round  the  United  States. 
The  retaliatory  non-importation  act,  discussed  at  length  in 
the  letters  just  given,  served  only  as  a  useless  irritant,  and 
effected  nothing.  An  effort  to  negotiate  with  England,  how 
ever,  accompanied  and  made  a  part  of  this  ill-advised  meas 
ure  ;  and  William  Pinkney  was  sent  to  London  as  joint 
commissioner  with  Mr.  Monroe.  The  news  that  their  nego 
tiation  was  proceeding  successfully  induced  Congress,  in 
the  autumn  of  1806,  to  agree  to  a  suspension  of  the  non 
importation  act.  But  these  promising  appearances  were 
soon  clouded.  The  battle  of  Trafalgar  left  England  supreme 
upon  the  ocean,  and  Bonaparte  was  compelled  to  fight 
his  one  unconquered  foe  with  other  than  naval  forces. 
Then  it  was  that,  flushed  with  victories  and  master  of 
continental  Europe,  he  issued  from  the  field  of  Jena  the 
famous  Berlin  decree,  by  which  all  commerce  and  inter 
course  with  Great  Britain  were  interdicted  to  the  whole 
world.  England  was  not  slow  to  retaliate  by  orders  in 
council  of  similar  nature.  From  the  attitude  of  France,  it 
seemed  to  Mr.  Cabot  impossible  to  longer  preserve  the  sem 
blance  even  of  neutrality,  and  the  policy  he  now  desired  to 
see  adopted  was  one  of  definite  alliance  with  England.  By 
such  a  course,  our  commerce,  where  we  alone  were  vulner- 


1807-14.1  FOREIGN  POLICY.  365 

able,  would  have  been  protected ;  and,  aloof  from  the  attacks 
of  Bonaparte's  armies,  we  might  by  an  attitude  of  open 
hostility  have  wrung  from  France  a  secure  and  lasting 
peace.  When  the  European  conflict  was  at  an  end,  we 
should  have  been  in  a  position  to  treat,  at  least,  as  advan 
tageously  with  England  as  at  a  moment  when  her  one 
thought  was  to  crush  at  all  hazards  the  power  of  France. 
By  such  a  policy,  too,  we  should  have  made  ourselves  a 
valuable  ally  to  one  party,  an  undesirable  enemy  to  the 
other,  and  our  friendship  would  have  become  an  object 
which  both  the  great  powers  would  have  sought  either  to 
acquire  or  retain.  On  such  grounds  as  these,  Mr.  Cabot 
favored  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain ;  and  such  a  course, 
whatever  its  abstract  merits,  would  have  been  at  least  well 
denned,  strong,  and  intelligible.  With  such  feelings  as  to 
the  general  policy  proper  to  be  pursued,  Mr.  Cabot  very 
strongly  desired  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  negotiated  by 
Monroe  and  Pinkney,  and  hoped  that  in  this  way  an  escape 
from  the  most  pressing  dangers  would  be  secured.  Not  only 
were  these  hopes  in  regard  to  the  treaty  destined  to  disap 
pointment,  but  the  disgraceful  affair  of  the  "  Chesapeake  " 
seemed  to  render  vain  any  expectation  of  peace.  Mr.  Cabot 
still  thought,  however,  that,  if  Great  Britain  offered  suitable 
reparation  for  the  attack  on  the  "  Chesapeake,"  it  was  our 
duty  to  accept  the  reparation  and  renew  the  negotiations. 
He  therefore  deprecated  all  attempts  to  inflame  further  an 
already  strongly  excited  public  feeling,  for  he  believed  that 
unbridled  anger  and  indignation  tended  to  make  peace  with 
England  impossible,  and  to  encourage  the  administration 
in  wild  and  mistaken  measures.  His  fears  were  not  un 
founded.  A  proclamation  ordering  British  men-of-war  to 
leave  our  coasts,  a  demand  for  reparation  so  linked  with 
the  old  grievance  of  impressment  as  to  make  even  dis 
cussion  difficult,  and  the  famous  embargo,  —  these  were 
the  measures  by  which  Jefferson  hoped  to  overawe  the 
great  powers  of  Europe,  and  to  carry  our  young  nation 
safely  through  the  greatest  of  external  dangers. 


366  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1807-14. 

So  weak  and  wrong  was  the  embargo  policy  that  it  at 
once  gave  new  life  to  the  almost  defunct  Federalist  party. 
It  fell  so  heavily  upon  New  England,  that  Mr.  Cabot 
wrote  to  Pickering,  favoring  war  even  as  less  deadly  in  its 
effects  on  our  commercial  prosperity  and  national  well- 
being  than  the  embargo.  So  strong,  however,  was  the 
righteous  public  indignation  at  the  insult  offered  to  our 
flag  by  England,  that  the  disposition  was  very  general  to 
accept  any  and  every  means  of  retaliation,  even  if  it  took 
the  form  of  commercial  restrictions.  But  the  prominent 
Federalists  in  Massachusetts  rallied  at  once  against  the 
embargo,  and  the  newspapers  teemed  with  their  attacks 
upon  the  policy  of  the  administration.  These  essays,  written 
with  great  vigor  by  some  of  the  ablest  Federalist  leaders, 
were  not  without  effect,  but  other  causes  contributed  much 
more  to  produce  a  change  of  public  sentiment.  The  mis 
managed  negotiations  had  broken  down,  there  was  no  indica 
tion  that  the  embargo  was  merely  temporary,  as  had  been  at 
first  supposed,  and  the  new  year  (1808)  brought  the  alarm, 
ing  tidings  of  a  royal  proclamation  ordering  a  more  strenuous 
enforcement  of  the  right  of  search  for  British  deserters.  This 
was  followed  by  an  insolent  letter  from  Mr.  Canning,  declin 
ing  to  renew  negotiations  on  the  old  basis,  after  what  he  con 
sidered  the  wayward  and  uncertain  course  of  our  administra 
tion.  Mr.  Cabot  still  believed  that  sufficient  reparation  had 
been  offered  by  England  for  the  "  Chesapeake  "  affair,1  and 
that  the  refusal  of  our  government  to  accept  that  reparation, 
and  to  then  proceed  to  treat  fairly  and  honestly,  was  a  ruin 
ous  and  dangerous  policy.  Still  more  did  he  oppose  Jeffer 
son's  plan  of  consultation  with  the  Senate  as  to  the  foreign 
policy,  a  method  of  procedure  which  he  had  always  con 
sistently  resisted.  He  dreaded  a  war  more  than  any  thing 
else,  not  from  a  fear  of  the  evils  which  all  wars  bring,  but 
because  he  felt  that  war  with  England  meant  submission 
to  France ;  and  he  was  convinced  that  both  Jefferson  and 

1  As  Mr.  Madison  afterwards  accepted  this  reparation  from  Mr.  Foster, 
in  1811,  it  may  be  supposed  that  he  and  his  cabinet,  also,  thought  it  sufficient. 


1807-14.]  THE  EMBARGO.  367 

Madison  purposely  avoided  an  honorable  peace  with  the 
former,  not  only  from  a  belief  that  their  popularity  was 
best  sustained  in  this  way,  but  also  from  a  desire  to  serve 
and  maintain  the  interests  of  the  latter. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  opposition  to  the  embargo  in 
creased  rapidly  in  New  England.  The  annihilation  of  the 
shipping  interest  threw  multitudes  of  men  out  of  work,  and 
the  people  turned  to  the  opponents  of  the  administration 
measures  for  guidance.  Colonel  Pickering  threw  himself 
eagerly  into  the  conflict,  and  addressed  a  letter  to  Governor 
Sullivan,  setting  forth  with  considerable  ability  and  great 
vigor  the  grounds  of  the  Federalist  opposition.  To  insure 
publication,  Colonel  Pickering  transmitted  a  copy  to  Mr. 
Cabot ;  and,  on  the  refusal  of  Sullivan  to  communicate  the 
letter  to  the  Legislature,  Mr.  Cabot  sent  the  copy  in  his 
possession  to  the  printers,  and  superintended  its  publica 
tion.  This  pamphlet  was  widely  read,  and  produced  a 
great  sensation  ;  and  Colonel  Pickering,  then  the  most 
prominent  Federalist  in  public  life,  assumed  as  far  as 
possible  the  conduct  of  the  party.  Mr.  Cabot  was  most 
anxious  in  regard  to  the  line  of  policy  which  should  at  this 
time  be  adopted.  What  he  especially  feared  was  the  revival 
of  the  old  cry  of  "  British  faction  ;  "  and,  understanding 
Colonel  Pickering's  extreme  views,  he  dreaded  lest  such 
a  course  should  be  taken  as  to  justify,  in  appearance 
at  least,  this  fatal  accusation.  He  therefore  wrote  to 
Colonel  Pickering  with  perfect  frankness,  urging  him 
most  strongly  to  avoid  every  thing  either  in  speech  or 
action  which  could  justify  their  enemies  in  calling  them  a 
"  British  faction."  Mr.  Cabot  saw  clearly  that  hostility  to 
the  embargo  and  the  other  administration  measures  was  at 
this  time  likely  to  awaken  the  latent  suspicion  of  friendship 
to  England.  He  felt  now,  as  keenly  as  in  1799,  the  injus 
tice  of  the  charge  ;  for  he  himself  regarded  England  only  as 
our  best  bulwark  against  France,  and  he  believed  this  to  be 
the  sentiment  of  his  party.  But,  in  the  critical  state  of  our 


368  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE    CABOT.     [1807-14. 

affairs,  he  foresaw  that  any  rash  or  heated  advocacy  of  what 
were  then  unpopular  views  would  present  an  appearance 
of  sympathy  with  Great  Britain,  not  as  the  foe  of  France, 
but  as  our  own  ancient  and  inveterate  enemy.  In  all 
this  miserable  turmoil  of  foreign  politics,  Mr.  Cabot's 
greatest  anxiety  was  always  for  the  independence,  honor, 
and  welfare  of  his  country.  The  policy  which  he  sup 
ported  he  believed  to  be  the  one  best  adapted  to  serve 
the  nation ;  but  he  knew  that  any  word  or  deed  which 
could  fairly  call  forth  the  odious  accusation  of  being  a 
foreign  faction  would  be  fatal  to  his  party,  its  policy  and 
its  adherents.  Conscious  of  his  own  innocence  in  regard  to 
any  subservience  to  foreign  interests,  he  was  well  aware  that 
the  slightest  false  step  might  lead  to  all  the  dangers  which 
a  charge  of  that  nature  could  produce  ;  and  for  this  reason  he 
was  most  earnest  in  his  warnings  to  Colonel  Pickering,  as 
to  the  line  of  policy  that  should  be  pursued.  As  far  as  he 
was  able,  he  restrained  his  friend,  who,  always  ready  for  the 
fray,  and  now  flushed  with  battle  and  with  the  success  of 
his  first  assault,  seemed  ready  to  become  an  avowed  par 
tisan  of  England.  Very  fortunately,  he  intrusted  to  Mr. 
Cabot's  care  and  discretion  a  variety  of  letters  and  essays 
with  which  he  proposed  to  continue  his  warfare  against 
Democrats  generally,  and  against  those  in  particular  who 
resided  in  Massachusetts.  But  Colonel  Pickering's  exertions 
were  in  this  instance  in  some  measure  frustrated ;  for  Mr. 
Cabot  quietly  suppressed,  or,  in  his  own  words,  "  laid  in  his 
bureau,"  several  diatribes  which  his  friend  launched  from 
Washington  on  the  heads  of  their  foes  in  New  England.1 

The  great  public  excitement  caused  by  the  operation  of 
the  embargo,  and  the  consequent  renewal  of  political  activ 
ity  on  the  part  of  the  Federalists,  drew  Mr.  Cabot  from  the 
life  of  retirement  and  leisure  to  which  he  was  so  much 

1  Among  others  which  never  saw  the  light  is  a  long  letter  for  publica 
tion,  addressed  to  Mr.  Cabot  at  a  later  period,  revealing  the  "  baseness  "  of 
Madison  in  his  negotiations  with  the  British  ambassador. 


1807-14.]  MEMBER   OF   COUNCIL.  869 

attached.  He  not  only  lent  the  assistance  of  his  pen  and  of 
his  advice  to  his  party,  but  he  even  consented  to  the  use  of 
his  name  as  a  candidate  for  office.  The  tide  of  opposition, 
however,  had  not  yet  begun  to  run  with  sufficient  force 
to  give  victory  to  the  Federalists  in  the  State  elections  of 
1808.  Sullivan  was  re-elected  governor;  but  Mr.  Cabot, 
though  his  party  suffered  defeat,  was  individually  successful, 
being  chosen  a  member  of  the  governor's  council.1  Averse 
as  he  was  to  all  forms  of  public  service,  this  position  must 
have  been  peculiarly  irksome  as  well  as  repugnant  to  his 
retiring  and  indolent  disposition ;  but  the  records  of  the 
council  show  that  he  was  as  faithful  in  the  performance  of 
the  duties  entailed  by  this  comparatively  small  office  as  of 
those  which  fell  to  his  lot  when  a  senator  of  the  United 
States.  There  is  no  break  in  the  evidence  of  his  constant 
attendance  at  all  the  meetings  of  the  council,  or  of  his 
attention  to  all  the  various  matters  of  business,  great  and 
small,  with  which  he  was  called  upon  to  deal.  The  usual 
labors  of  the  council  were  moreover,  in  the  years  1808-9, 
increased  by  the  death  of  Governor  Sullivan  before  the 
expiration  of  his  official  term.  Mr.  Cabot  served  but  for 
one  year ;  and  he  doubtless  took  advantage  of  the  rising 
fortunes  of  his  party  to  free  himself  from  what  he  consid 
ered  a  sacrifice  of  his  own  comfort  and  convenience,  and 
which  he  made  only  from  an  unwillingness  to  refuse  aid  to 
his  friends  at  a  critical  period. 

Soon  after  his  election  as  councillor,  Mr.  Cabot  met  with 
a  severe  loss  in  the  death  of  Fisher  Ames,  his  most  intimate 
and  trusted  personal  friend.  It  affected  him  deeply,  and 
made  his  distaste  for  politics  keener,  if  possible,  than  be 
fore.  He  had  long  expected  this  misfortune.  The  failing 
health  of  his  friend  had  given  but  too  ample  and  certain 

1  The  governor's  council  were  at  that  period  chosen  by  the  Legislature, 
where  the  Federalists  were  in  a  majority.  It  is  to  the  credit  of  all  con 
cerned  that  Governor  Sullivan  was  able  to  say  that  he  had  less  contro 
versy  with  his  Federalist  councillors  than  with  those  of  the  preceding  years, 
who  were  of  his  own  party.  See  Amory's  Life  of  Sullivan,  II.  307. 

24 


370  LIFE    AND    LETTERS    OF    GEORGE    CABOT.      [1807-14. 

warning  of  the  approaching  end,  yet  the  shock  was  none 
the  less  haiyi  to  bear  when  it  came.  By  the  death  of  Mr. 
Ames,  ties  of  the  closest  friendship  and  affection,  and  habits 
of  the  most  cherished  and  constant  intercourse,  were  broken. 
There  was  no  one,  outside  of  his  immediate  family,  whose 
loss  would  have  been  so  severe  a  blow,  or  the  deprivation 
of  whose  society  would  have  been  so  sorely  felt. 

To  Mr.  Cabot's  care  were  intrusted  all  Mr.  Ames's  papers 
and  letters;  and  under  his  superintendence  a  volume  of 
political  essays  and  speeches,  for  which  he  wrote  the  pref 
ace,  was  prepared,  and  issued  from  the  press.  To  Mr. 
Cabot  also  was  confided  the  task  of  assorting  and  preparing 
for  publication  a  selection  of  his  friend's  private  letters, 
but  this  work  seems  never  to  have  been  carried  further  than 
the  collection  and  arrangement  of  the  correspondence. 

While  still  a  member  of  the  council,  oppressed  with 
sorrow  for  the  death  of  his  friend,  and  burdened  with  the 
sad  duties  it  entailed,  Mr.  Cabot  was  also  compelled  to 
take  some  share  in  the  party  struggle,  now  additionally 
embittered  by  the  approaching  Presidential  election.  He 
was  consulted  in  regard  to  the  proposed  plan  of  a  union 
with  the  Clintonians ;  but,  from  the  brief  note  on  this  sub 
ject,1  his  opinions  as  to  the  advisability  of  such  a  step  can 
not  be  accurately  determined.  During  the  progress  of  the 
campaign,  the  cry  was  raised,  and  justified  in  some  measure  by 
the  unguarded  language  of  extreme  men,  that  the  Federal 
ists  aimed  at  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  Mr.  Cabot,  be 
lieving,  as  in  1804,  that  such  a  step  was  unnecessary  as  well 
as  useless  and  impracticable,  and  conceiving  the  accusation 
to  be  wholly  unfounded,  urged  on  Colonel  Pickering  the 
necessity  of  a  clear  and  prompt  public  denial  by  the  leaders 
of  any  intentions  to  bring  about  a  separation.  His  advice 
on  this  point  was,  it  would  seem,  unheeded ;  and  no  effort 
appears  to  have  been  made  to  refute  the  charge.  His 
opinions  as  to  separatist  schemes,  at  this  time,  appear  very 
clearly  in  a  letter  which  he  wrote  to  Colonel  Pickering  in 
1  See  below,  p.  397. 


1807-14.]      VIEWS   AS   TO   ADMINISTRATION  POLICY.  371 

the  spring  of  1809.  Colonel  Pickering  apparently  desired 
either  the  town  or  the  State  to  accept  a  proposition  from  a 
French  engineer  to  fortify  the  port  of  Boston.  Mr.  Cabot 
replied  that  such  a  notion  would  not  be  tolerated,  and 
suggested  to  Colonel  Pickering  that  to  fortify  the  ports 
was  the  duty  of  the  national  government,  which  therefore 
was  the  proper  quarter  for  such  an  application. 

In  all  these  questions,  Mr.  Cabot  was  guided  by  the  views 
which  he  took  of  the  general  policy  of  the  administration. 
He  considered  the  embargo  to  be  in  the  interests  of  France ; 
and  he  deemed  the  threats  of  war  as  intended  only  to  main 
tain  the  embargo,  for  he  utterly  discredited  the  idea  that 
the  administration  had  any  serious  intention  of  fighting. 
He  also  felt  that  the  dread  of  war  was  universal  and  strong 
among  the  people,  and  that  it  was  therefore  the  manifest 
policy  of  the  Federalists  to  confine  their  attacks  to  the 
embargo,  and  force  the  administration  into  a  position  where 
the  latter  would  be  compelled  to  make  peace.  To  such  a 
policy  any  violent  action  or  threats  of  separation  would  of 
course  have  been  fatal. 

After  the  period  of  political  excitement  in  1808  and 
1809,  and  the  success  of  the  Federalists  in  forcing  a  repeal 
of  the  embargo,  Mr.  Cabot's  letters  almost  entirely  cease. 
Other  causes  than  the  temporary  advantage  of  his  party 
produced  this  cessation  of  correspondence.  Mr.  Cabot  had 
hardly  recovered  from  the  sorrow  caused  by  the  death  of 
his  friend  Fisher  Ames,  when  he  was  called  upon  to  bear 
the  severest  trial  he  ever  had  to  endure.  Early  in  1811, 
his  eldest  son  Charles,  an  able  and  successful  man,  died  of 
consumption  at  Havana,  in  the  thirty-first  year  of  his  age. 
So  heavy  a  blow  to  his  hopes  and  affections  caused  Mr. 
Cabot  to  withdraw  completely  from  all  outside  and  public 
affairs,  and,  although  in  time  he  recovered  from  the  loss,  he 
never  again  resumed  his  correspondence,  nor,  with  one  ex 
ception,  took  any  active  part  in  politics.  Always  inclined 
to  take  a  dark  view  of  the  political  future  and  to  regard 


372  LIFE   AND   LETTEES   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1807-14. 

passing  events  with  a  gentle  cynicism,  this  severe  domestic 
affliction  seems  to  have  confirmed  him  in  his  desire  for 
perfect  retirement  and  privacy,  and  to  have  strengthened 
the  natural  despondency  of  his  disposition. 

The  war  of  1812  he  regarded  as  an  unmixed  misfortune. 
He  speaks  of  it  at  the  outset  as  unjust  and  wicked,  and 
announces  his  determination  to  refrain  from  aiding,  in  any 
way,  its  prosecution.  But,  with  the  single  exception  of  the 
one  expressing  these  sentiments,  there  are  no  letters  or 
papers  left  which  give  any  clew  to  his  political  opinions, 
until  the  period  of  the  Hartford  Convention,  in  1814. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Feb.  14,  1807. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  think  precisely  as  you  do  of  Mr.  Ames's 
"  Alarming  Prospect  "  and  some  other  of  his  late  writings.  They 
should  now  be  free  from  party  feelings.  I  have  told  him  so,  and 
he  has  profited  a  little  by  it.  You  and  some  others  of  my  friends 
have  given  me  credit  for  an  agency  in  these  writings ;  but  I  have 
no  other  merit  than  that  of  thinking  in  almost  every  particular 
exactly  as  the  writer  does. 

In  the  midst  of  the  gloom  which  the  destroying  power  of  France 
has  produced  on  the  minds  of  reflecting  men,  I  find  there  are  some 
who  cherish  a  hope  that  the  late  decree *  of  Buonaparte  may  be  so 
executed  as  to  drive  us  from  the  fatal  ground  on  which  alone  we  are 
willing  to  remain.  They  think,  too,  the  British  treaty 2  favors  the 
same  expectation.  I  see  distinctly  the  tendency  of  both  measures, 
but  I  confess  my  apprehensions  that  we  are  to  be  purified  only  as 
by  fire.  I  felt  solemnly  affected  by  the  quotation  you  made  in  the 
close  of  your  letter,  and  would  gladly  partake  of  the  consolation 
you  suggest,  —  a  consolation  which  I  honestly  believe  in  your  own 
heart  is  at  its  proper  home.  I  speak  this  without  flattery. 

Although  Great  Britain  is  depressed  and  in  danger  of  being  dis 
couraged,  yet  I  am  perfectly  satisfied  that,  if  she  were  supported 

1  The  Berlin  decree  of  Nov.  21,  1806.     See  above,  p.  364. 

2  That  negotiated  by  Pinkney  and  Monroe.     See  above,  p.  365. 


1807-14.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  373 

by  this  country,  feeble  and  parsimonious  as  we  are,  nothing  need 
be  feared  from  France,  with  all  continental  Europe  at  her  dis 
posal.  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  could  keep  the  sea  in 
defiance  of  all  their  power  ;  and  such  parts  of  the  commercial  inter 
course  as  should  be  kept  up  by  force,  by  stealth,  by  connivance,  or 
by  consent,  would  be  enjoyed  necessarily  by  the  two  nations,  be 
sides  which  they  would  possess  almost  exclusively  the  maritime 
commerce  of  the  other  three-quarters  of  the  world  and  their  own 
with  each  other.  To  do  this,  they  must  act  in  earnest,  as  those 
who  struggle  for  life  ;  but,  if  they  would  act  in  such  a  manner,  I 
have  no  doubt  their  empire  of  the  sea  would  be  complete,  and  that 
the  means  of  sustaining  it  might  be  in  part  derived  from  the  enemy. 
Both  ships  and  men  would  probably  be  procured  by  victories  more 
than  sufficient  to  repair  the  waste.  The  people  of  all  the  northern 
nations,  when  captured,  might  be  used,  and  so  might  some  few  of 
the  southern.  But  I  am  persuaded  we  prefer  the  risk  of  French 
domination  to  the  efforts  which  would  be  required  to  resist  it. 

Yours  truly,  G.  C. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

APRIL  14,  1807. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  — The  enclosed  paper  derives  a  peculiar  impor 
tance  from  the  condition  of  Europe  and  our  relations  to  it.  Nothing 
can  be  clearer  to  my  mind  than  the  expediency  of  a  ratification,  as 
favorable  to  our  political  safety  and  commercial  advantage ;  yet  a 
consideration  of  the  circumstances  of  those  who  guide  our  affairs 
forbids  every  sanguine  hope  that  they  will  do  what  would  be  best.  I 
think  prudence  requires  a  concealment  of  what  we  know  on  this 
subject,  at  least  until  we  have  had  time  to  deliberate.  My  own 
opinion  is  that  the  influential  Democrats  in  the  different  States 
ought,  if  possible,  to  be  excited  to  urge  the  ratification.  I  am  in 
formed  that  our  ridiculous  non-importation  law  operated  unfavor 
ably  on  the  negotiation,1  and  that,  if  we  should  vapor  about  its 
effects,  the  gasconade  will  probably  be  resented.  If  you  should 
communicate  to  Mr.  Thorndike  the  information 2  enclosed,  let  him 
be  enjoined  to  secrecy.  Yours  always,  G.  C. 

1  This  was  correct.     The  British  ministers  objected  to  negotiating  with 
the  non-importation  act  still  in  force,  because  it  would  produce  the  appear 
ance  of  treating  under  coercion.     Monroe  and  Pinknev  had  great  difficulty 
in  overcoming  this  objection. 

2  I  am  at  a  loss  to  know  the  nature  of  the  information  here  referred  to. 
No  other  letter  exists  which  throws  any  light  on  the  subject  of  this  one. 


374  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE  CABOT.      [1807-14. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Dec.  31,  1807. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  In  spite  of  my  indolence,  I  sit  down  to  write 
you  a  short  letter,  because  you  command  it  and  have  rights  which 
I  cannot  dispute.  Most  of  us  are  as  much  surprised  as  you  are  at 
Mr.  Jefferson's  hardihood.  I  believe,  however,  he  still  does  not 
mean  to  go  to  war,  although  every  step  he  takes  leads  to  it.  I 
rely  a  little  on  this  opinion  from  recollecting  how  much  popularity 
he  has  gained  by  his  professions  of  peace  and  parsimony,  but  much 
more  from  the  consideration  that  the  effects  of  a  British  war  will 
probably  be  so  distressing  as  to  render  odious  those  who  unneces 
sarily  produce  it ;  and  certainly,  if  Mr.  Rose  1  acts  his  part  prop 
erly,  he  will  put  us  in  the  wrong,  if  we  refuse  to  be  conciliated. 
If  he  is  commissioned,  as  I  suppose  he  must  be,  to  disavow  as  an 
unauthorized  act  the  attack  on  the  "  Chesapeake,"  notwithstanding 
the  previous  provocation  and  subsequent  hostility  of  the  United 
States,  and  to  offer  reparation  for  the  balance  of  wrong  which  is 
fairly  due  (and  it  would  not  be  much),  I  should  think  a  rejection 
of  his  overtures  would  be  too  dangerous  for  Mr.  Jefferson.  If, 
however,  I  am  wrong  in  this  conjecture,  it  is  completely  within  the 
power  of  the  British  government  to  beat  us  at  our  own  game. 
They  who  exclusively  possess  the  empire  of  the  sea  must  be  con 
sulted  by  us  whenever  we  go  there  (to  sea)  again ;  and  if  we 
abstain  a  few  months  without  foreign  war  to  employ  our  men,  our 
minds,  and  our  passions,  the  people  will  run  mad.  Already  the 
evils  of  the  embargo  begin  to  be  felt,  and  threats  of  violence  are 
whispered.  No  man  can  doubt  that  all  our  commercial  cities  will 
experience  that  degree  of  suffering  which  must  destroy  order  and 
subordination.  Some  thousands  (including  women  and  children) 
of  persons  in  this  town  will  be  without  subsistence  in  a  few  days, 
because  there  is  no  employment  for  them.  If  the  government  cuts 
off  all  the  business  we  are  pursuing,  they  ought  to  provide  a  substitute 
without  delay.  The  embargo  brings  greater  immediate  distress  on 
us  than  war,  though  the  latter  would  finally  bring  ruin.  This 
abominable  measure  is  adopted  by  Mr.  Jefferson,  as  I  think,  to 
avoid  a  dilemma  into  which  the  French  were  pushing  him.  The 
French  decree,  accompanied  with  verbal  declarations,  being  made 
known  to  him,  he  perceived  he  must  either  warn  the  people  of  our 

1  The  British  minister. 


1807-14.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  375 

dangers,  or  by  concealing  them  be  convicted  of  wilful  and  criminal 
neglect  of  duty,  by  which  immense  losses  were  incurred.  He 
escaped  from  this  situation  by  the  embargo,  which  renders  notice 
less  necessary,  and  hides  from  the  country  what,  if  disclosed,  would 
have  excited  resistance  to  France,  and  favored  accommodation  with 
England.  I  have  given  you  my  speculation,  and  wish  you  to  say 
to  Mr.  Quincy  l  and  Mr.  Livermore  2  that  I  acknowledge  myself 
greatly  indebted  to  them  for  their  letters,  but  am  unable  to  pay. 

Yours  always  in  truth,  G.  C. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Jan.  20,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  am  oppressed  by  the  debts  with  which  you 
have  loaded  me,  and  can  never  get  free.  Before  this  reaches  you, 
our  governor's  3  speech  will  show  you  that  no  great  good  is  to  come 
from  him  ;  for,  although  he  dares  not  praise  the  embargo,  yet  he 
has  taken  from  some  of  Jefferson's  parasites  the  hint  to  attack  the 
Boston  writers.  The  truth  is  those  writers  are  not  to  be  answered, 
and  therefore  must  be  silenced  by  threats  or  popular  clamor ;  but 
the  attempt  evidently  fails.  A  few  weak  and  credulous  people  may 
be  duped  by  the  ridiculous  stories  of  our  writings  having  an  influence 
on  the  British  government ;  but  men  of  sense  know  better.  We 
saw  our  country  inflamed  by  false  statements,  and  have  corrected 
them  by  proving  the  exact  truth.  We  read  much  false  reasoning 
concerning  national  rights,  and  we  exposed  it.  Our  country  was 
urged  to  take  up  arms  upon  an  exaggerated  view  of  our  power  to 
injure  the  proposed  enemy,  and  we  have  shown  the  folly  and 
extravagance  of  the  expectation  of  success. 

The  answer  of  the  House,  I  think,  will  please  you,  as  it  now 
stands  ;  but  it  would  have  satisfied  you  better,  if  it  had  remained  as 
it  at  first  passed,  without  the  words  "  royal  proclamation."  The 
answer  of  the  Senate  is  waiting  for  some  Democratic  members  who 
are  absent.  I  fear  it  will  be  bad ;  but,  if  it  should,  there  will  be 
some  very  able  harangues  from  Otis  and  Gore,  which  will  be  ser 
viceable  to  the  Democratic  members  of  the  House,  many  of  whom 

1  Josiah  Quincy,  then  member  of  Congress  from  Massachusetts. 

2  Edward  St.  Loe  Livermore,  member  of  Congress  from  Essex  County, 
Massachusetts,  from  1806-12. 

8  James  Sullivan. 


376  LIFE    AND   LETTERS    OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.     [1807-14. 

will  attend.  It  is  hoped  the  discussion  will  deter  the  House  from 
attempting  to  address  Jefferson ;  but,  on  the  whole,  we  incline  to 
think  the  pressure  of  the  embargo  will  be  more  operative  in  dis- 
affecting  the  people  from  war  than  any  thing  that  can  be  said  or 
done.  If  you  have  seen  all  our  newspapers,  you  see  how  much 
Mr.  Lowell  has  done ;  and  you  must  be  gratified  to  see  how  well 
supported  by  authorities,  by  the  practice  of  nations,  and  by  sound 
reason,  the  Boston  opinions  have  been.  I  trust  you  will  approve 
the  forbearance  to  animadvert  on  the  strange  and  unaccountable 
conduct  of  some  who  are  intrusted  with  our  greater  interests.  It 
would  be  very  easy,  but  it  is  not  expedient,  to  point  out  extreme 
absurdity.  Our  people  are  not  tumultuous  yet ;  but  there  is  no 
doubt  that  discontent  has  already  seized  a  large  portion,  and  will 
extend  to  all  the  people,  against  the  embargo.  I  can  truly  say  I 
do  not  know  a  man  of  any  party  who  openly  vindicates  it,  though 
there  may  be  some  apologists  who  would  palliate  and  excuse  it. 
In  sixty  or  ninety  days,  we  shall  be  in  a  very  unhappy  state,  if  it 
continues.  Yours  ever  in  truth,  G.  C. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

JAN.  28,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  At  the  moment  I  was  expressing  to  you  my 
hopes  that  "bhe_  popular  discontent  with  the  embargo  would  deter 
our  General  Court  from  approving  it,  a  motion  to  approve  was 
under  consideration.  It  has  been  twice  postponed,  but  will  proba 
bly  pass  to-day.  The  truth  is  no  man  likes  the  embargo,  and 
nineteen  in  twenty  detest  it ;  yet  party  hatred  is  stronger,  and  will 
dictate  the  declaration  of  what  you  will  read  in  the  newspaper 
after  another  post.  "We  are  told  of  a  secret  session  of  the  Senate 
of  the  United  States,  which  to  me  augurs  no  good.  In  such  a 
body,  I  should  expect  a  swaggering  spirit  which  disdains  prudence, 
when  called  to  declare  what  reparation  is  sufficient  to  heal  a  wound 
which  has  been  exaggerated  so  much  as  that  we  have  received. 
I  fear  Mr.  Jefferson  is  employing  you  to  do  worse  than  he  would 
dare  to  do  alone.  Although  there  is  a  precedent  in  Washington's 
administration,  which  I  well  remember,  yet  it  is  and  always  was 
contrary  to  my  opinion  to  consult  the  Senate  before  the  negotia 
tion  with  a  foreign  state.  I  have  often  speculated  on  the  possible 
demands  and  compliances  of  the  parties  in  the  present  case,  but 
with  little  satisfaction.  I  see  no  insuperable  obstacle  to  an  engage- 


1807-14.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  377 

ment  of  Mr.  Rose  that  the  two  Americans  l  shall  be  restored,  011 
the  principle  of  the  British  proclamation,  which  fairly  implies  that 
native  citizens  may  be  required  and  are  bound  to  return.  He  may 
engage  that  Berkeley  shall  be  recalled  and  not  serve  on  this  sta 
tion,  or  he  may  engage  that  his  conduct  shall  be  inquired  into  by 
a  competent  court.  But  he  cannot  engage  that  he  shall  be  pun 
ished,  for  no  court  of  any  just  nation  would  punish  in  such  a  case. 
He  may,  however,  be  recalled,  and  disqualified  from  serving  in 
these  seas,  as  a  minister  is  recalled  from  a  particular  court  to  which 
he  is  obnoxious,  on  account  of  the  very  acts  which  fidelity  to  his 
own  State  have  required.  In  relation  to  us,  this  may  be  a  conces 
sion,  while  the  officer  may  be  consistently  remunerated  by  his  own 
country  with  new  offices  and  honors.  But,  at  any  rate,  considering 
the  mission  of  Mr.  Rose  on  such  an  errand  is  itself  the  essential 
reparation,  which  consists  in  acknowledgment  more  than  any  thing 
else,  I  hope  the  Hotspurs  will  not  plunge  us  into  a  war  with 
Great  Britain,  which  would  destroy  every  thing  good  in  our  coun 
try, —  institutions,  property,  and  men,  and  almost  hope  itself. 
IjVTr.  Joseph  Story,2  of  Salem,  goes  to  Washington  as  solicitor  for 
the  Georgia  claimants.  Though  he  is  a  man  whom  the  Democrats 
support,  I  have  seldom  if  ever  met  with  one  of  sounder  mind  on 
the  principal  points  of  national  policy.  He  is  well  worthy  the 
civil  attention  of  the  most  respectable  Federalists ;  and  -I  wish  you 
to  be  so  good  as  to  say  so  to  our  friend  Mr.  Quincy,  and  such  other 
gentlemen  as  you  think  will  be  likely  to  pay  him  some  attention."") 
Yours  faithfully,  though  lazily,  G.  C. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

FEB.  10,  1808. 

Mr  DEAR  SIR,  —  You  see  with  pain  that  our  Legislature  have 
conducted  worse  than  was  expected.  Undoubtedly,  the  votes  were 
given  reluctantly,  for  the  people  in  general  are  known  to  disprove 
the  embargo ;  and,  although  no  violences  are  immediately  appre 
hended,  yet  no  man  believes  we  can  bear  the  measure  long  with 
tranquillity.  The  truth  is,  a  little  more  time  is  required  to  show 
effects  and  produce  turbulences.  I  have  long  since  despaired  of 
accommodation  with  Great  Britain,  and  for  some  days  have  appre 
hended  that  even  the  reparation  offered  for  the  supposed  wrong, 

1  The  two  American  seamen  taken  from  the  "  Chesapeake." 

2  Afterwards  associate  justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 


378  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1807-14. 

in  the  affair  of  the  "  Chesapeake,"  would  be  refused  on  some  pretence 
or  another.  There  are  reasons  enough  for  these  opinions  in  the 
minds  of  all  attentive  observers  of  the  character  and  past  conduct 
of  Jefferson  and  Madison.  Admitting  that  they  see  the  danger  to 
which  we  are  exposed  from  the  power  of  France,  and  our  helpless 
ness  in  case  of  the  fall  of  England,  yet  they  see  an  indissoluble 
connection  between  their  party  power  here  and  their  foreign  poli 
tics.  I  really  feel  ashamed  when  I  recollect  how  much  you  do  to 
inform  and  gratify  me  on  whatever  is  interesting,  while  I  am 
almost  too  lazy  to  express  in  words  my  sense  of  it. 

Yours  affectionately  always,  G.  C. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

FEB.  17,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  ...  I  have  for  some  time  despaired  of  our 
public  affairs,  yet  the  slightest  ground  serves  to  build  a  new  hope 
upon.  Your  mentioning  the  opinions  of  two  leading  Democrats, 
at  a  moment  when  we  hear  by  way  of  New  York,  a  day  or  two 
later,  that  Mr.  Jefferson  declared  his  expectation  of  a  settlement 
with  Mr.  Rose,  revives  a  LITTLE  my  exhausted  expectations.  If 
the  negotiation  continues  to  this  day,  you  must  have  the  French 
decree  l  of  December  17,  which  I  should  think  would  cause  many 
men  to  blush,  if  not  to  change  their  conduct. 

Yours  sincerely,  G.  C. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

FEB.  24,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  We  are  more  tranquil  here  than  it  was  ex 
pected  we  shauld  be  under  the  embargo ;  but  the  constant  hope 

1  On  the  llth  of  November,  1808,  England  had  issued  orders  in  council, 
retaliating  the  Berlin  decree.  By  these  orders,  all  neutral  trade  with  France 
was  forbidden  except  through  Great  Britain.  No  imports  or  exports  were 
to  be  made  to  or  from  the  ports  of  France  or  of  her  allies,  except  with  a 
British  license ;  and  neutral  vessels,  which  had  sailed  before  the  publication 
of  these  orders,  were  to  be  ordered  by  British  cruisers  into  English  ports. 
Possession  of  French  "  certificates  of  origin  "  was  held  a  sufficient  ground  for 
capture.  Bonaparte  replied  to  this  by  publishing,  December  17.  the  Milan 
decree  referred  to  in  the  letter.  By  this  decree,  that  of  Berlin  was  extended 
and  strengthened.  All  vessels  were  pronounced  "  denationalized "  and 
"  forfeited,"  which  should  submit  to  British  search,  or  to  any  tax,  duty,  or 
license  from  England.  All  vessels,  also,  were  forfeited,  which  should  at 
tempt  to  trade  to  or  from  any  of  the  ports  of  Great  Britain  or  her  allies. 
Spain  and  Holland  followed  Bonaparte's  lead  with  hasty  servility,  and  at 
once  issued  similar  decrees. 


1807-14.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  379 

that  it  will  not  continue  long,  and  the  real  difficulties  which  would 
attend  several  branches  of  trade  if  our  ports  were  open,  silence 
complaint.  It  is  evident,  too,  that,  with  all  the  clamors  for  ven 
geance  and  war  upon  the  English,  the  community  are  very  happy 
to  hear  of  any  thing  that  seems  to  promise  peace.  The  policy  of 
the  government  appears  to  be  pretty  well  understood  in  some  par 
ticulars.  They  do  not  wish  for  a  war  with  France,  at  any  rate. 
They  are  not  willing  to  make  war  on  the  English,  which  they  fear 
the  people  would  disapprove.  They  will  avoid,  as  far  as  possible 
without  rupture,  fair  accommodation  of  differences. 

Yours  truly  always,  G.   C. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

THURSDAY,  March  3,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  By  the  mail  due  on  Tuesday,  I  received 
yesterday  morning  three  letters  from  you,  consisting  of  a  copy  of 
your  excellent  communication  to  the  governor,  a  single  sheet  dated 
the  20th,  and  a  single  page  of  the  21st  of  February  to  me.  A 
packet  franked  by  you,  and  superscribed  to  Governor  Sullivan,  was 
at  the  same  time  in  the  post-office ;  but  nothing  has  been  yet  heard 
of  it  in  the  Legislature,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  it  will  be  with 
held  or  sent  with  some  accompanying  observations  to  counteract 
its  effect.  I  fear  our  malady  is  too  inveterate  to  be  cured  ;  but  it 
is  impossible  your  letter  should  be  read  throughout  New  England, 
without  producing  great  benefit.  Indeed,  if  it  could  be  read  in  the 
House  of  Representatives  here  by  one  who  would  do  justice  to  the 
composition,  it  would  for  a  moment  electrify  the  members.  It  is 
decided  to  wait  as  long  as  decorum  requires  for  a  communication 
through  the  medium  of  the  Legislature,  after  which  the  press  will 
give  it  to  the  people  in  a  pamphlet.  Among  the  many  valuable 
truths  you  have  stated  with  perspicuity  and  force,  I  was  glad  to  see 
the  position  that  our  trade  would  be  greater  now,  if  the  embargo 
were  removed,  than  we  should  have  in  profound  peace,  when  every 
nation  monopolizes  its  own  according  to  the  ancient  usage.  After 
a  little  more  time  shall  have  brought  home  to  individuals  the  evils 
of  the  embargo,  there  will  be  but  little  diversity  of  opinion  about 
their  reality  and  weight. 

Yours  truly  always,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


380  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOEGE   CABOT.     [1807-14. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

MARCH  9, 1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  This  day  will  issue  from  the  press  a  copy  of 
your  letter  to  the  governor,  which  he  dared  not  to  communicate. 
Five  thousand  copies  will  be  struck  in  a  pamphlet  form,  and  it 
will  be  reprinted  in  the  newspapers.  Probably,  you  will  receive  a 
pamphlet  with  this  letter.  This  excellent  address  is  well  calcu 
lated  to  rouse  us  from  our  apathy ;  and,  if  we  were  fit  for  any  thing 
but  slavery,  all  New  England  might  be  brought  to  act  with  effect. 

Mr.  Williams  sent  you  a  newspaper  writing  of  Ames's,  which 
would  naturally  lead  you  to  think  he  must  be  better.  The  fact  is 
otherwise.  Mr.  Gore,  who  saw  him  a  few  days  since,  reports  very 
unfavorably  of  him ;  and  this  opinion  is  confirmed  by  others. 

Improbis  viluperari  laudari  est.  You  will  doubtless  have  a 
little  of  this  praise.  I  trust  you  will  neither  be  vain  nor  angry. 

I  am  ever,  with  sincere  esteem  and  regard, 

Yours  truly,  G.  C. 

PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

(Confidential.) 

WASHINGTON,  March  10,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Last  evening  I  received  a  letter  from  Gov 
ernor  Sullivan,  dated  the  3d,  of  which  I  now  enclose  you  a  copy, 
together  with  a  copy  of  my  answer,  forwarded  in  this  day's  mail. 
This  evening  T  expect  a  letter  from  you  relative  to  my  long  letter 
of  February  16  to  the  governor,  of  which  I  sent  a  copy  to  you 
on  the  21st.  Your  answer  will  direct  me  how  to  steer  my  course. 
If  I  do  not  get  a  letter  from  you  this  evening,  then  I  contemplate 
sending  you  a  packet  to-morrow,  containing  the  original  of  my  long 
letter  to  Sullivan,  to  be  laid  before  the  Legislature,  if  in  session, 
and  provided  you  shall  not  have  already  published  it  from  the 
copy.  I  am,  &c.  T.  P. 

PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 
(Confidential.) 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  March  11,  1808. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  On  the  21st  of  February,  I  forwarded  to  you  a 
copy  of  my  long  letter  of  the  16th  to  Governor  Sullivan.  If  to 


1807-14.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  381 

know  the  truth  in  our  public  affairs  (as  far  as  it  was  discover 
able)  were  an  object  deserving  attention,  I  had  a  right  to  expect 
he  would  communicate  my  letter  to  the  Legislature.  He  has  re 
fused  to  do  it,  as  you  will  see  by  the  enclosed,  as  well  as  by  my 
letter  to  you  of  yesterday.  Knowing  the  force  of  party  policy,  I 
was  in  some  measure  prepared  for  such  a  result,  though  I  had  not 
contemplated  a  return  of  my  letter,  much  less  a  rude  return.  As 
it  was  my  intention  and  the  earnest  wish  of  my  Massachusetts 
friends  here  to  have  the  letter,  in  one  way  or  another,  communi 
cated  to  the  people  as  well  as  to  the  Legislature,  I  sent  you  the 
copy,  leaving  it  to  your  "  discretion  "  to  give  or  not  to  give  it  pub 
licity,  as  you  and  the  friends  you  should  consult  should  think  best 
for  the  public  good.  Seeing  the  course  the  affair  has  taken,  it 
may  be  fortunate  if  my  letter  to  the  governor  shall  have  remained 
in  your  pocket.  For  then  the  original,  now  addressed  to  the 
President  of  the  Senate  and  Speaker  of  the  House,  under  cover 
to  Mr.  Otis,  may  be  communicated  to  the  two  Houses,  if  in  ses 
sion.  But  should  they  have  adjourned,  or  if  the  copy  has  not  been 
published,  then  the  publication  of  the  whole  correspondence  may 
be  advantageously  made.  The  order  of  publication  would  be:  1st, 
my  letter  dated  the  —  to  Mr.  Otis ;  2d,  my  letter  dated  the  —  to 
the  President  of  the  Senate  and  Speaker  of  the  House ;  3d,  Gov 
ernor  Sullivan's  letter  to  me,  of  the  3d  instant ;  4th,  my  answer  of 
the  9th ;  lastly,  my  long  letter  to  the  governor,  of  February  16. 

If  my  letter  of  February  16  shall  have  been  already  published, 
then  the  original  now  again  forwarded  cannot  be  presented  to  the 
two  Houses.  At  least,  it  would  seem  to  me  indecorous. 

In  this  case,  Hillhouse  suggests  the  following  course :  That  my 
letter  to  Mr.  Otis,  and  the  one  to  the  President  and  Speaker  of 
the  two  Houses,  should  have  BLANKS  left  for  the  day  of  their  date  ; 
then  if  the  Legislature  have  adjourned,  or  if  not,  then  as  soon  as 
they  do  adjourn,  those  blanks  should  be  filled  with  a  date  about 
seven  or  eight  days  prior  to  their  adjournment,  or  the  usual  num 
ber  of  days  that  a  letter  is  in  passing  from  Washington  to  Boston ; 
then,  that  the  whole  correspondence  should  be  published  in  the 
order  I  have  before  suggested  ;  the  prior  publication  of  the  long 
letter  being  understood  to  have  been  made  from  a  copy  sent  to  a 
friend.  If  you  should  think  proper  to  adopt  this  course  of  pro 
ceedings  (and  I  commit  it  wholly  to  your  own  bosom},  then,  at  the 
proper  time,  after  inserting  the  suitable  dates  in  the  letters  to  Otis 


382  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE    CABOT.     [1807-14. 

and  to  the  President  and  Speaker,  you  can  seal  and  present  the 
packet  to  Mr.  Otis.  But  perhaps  a  simpler  mode  may  be  better. 
If  the  letter  of  February  16  shall  have  been  published  already, 
then,  without  troubling  Mr.  Otis  or  the  President  and  Speaker 
of  the  two  Houses  (if  found  yet  in  session),  it  may  be  useful  to 
publish  the  governor's  letter  to  me  of  the  3d  instant,  and  my 
answer.  But  something  seems  necessary  to  rouse  the  people  from 
the  lethargy  which  appears  to  have  seized  the  public  mind.  I  am 
sorry,  my  dear  sir,  to  impose  on  you  so  much  trouble.  I  am  con 
strained  to  do  it  from  the  impression  we  feel  here  that  the  pro 
posed  publication  may  be  useful.  But  you  who  are  on  the  spot 
can  better  decide  the  question,  and  therefore  I  beg  leave  again  to 
commit  the  whole  affair  to  your  discretion.  Yet,  if  any  doubt 
arise  on  the  expediency  of  publishing,  may  not  the  consideration 
that  the  governor  and  his  friends  may  misrepresent  the  affair,  not 
only  prejudicially  to  me,  but  to  the  Federal  cause,  which  is  the 
cause  of  our  country,  demand  its  publication  ? 

Need  I  assure  YOU  that  I  have  no  personal  wishes  about  this 
business  ?  I  trust  not.  Let  the  question  be  decided  solely  and 
absolutely  as  the  public  good  shall  appear  to  require. 

I  am,  &c.  T.  P. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  March  12,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Your  letter  of  the  2d  confirms  all  my  opinions 
of  the  bad  state  of  public  affairs,  and  prepares  us  to  hear  in  a  short 
time  of  the  departure  of  Mr.  Rose.  It  would  be  a  great  gratifica 
tion  to  see  this  gentleman  in  this  part  of  the  country,  but  perhaps 
his  departure  will  have  a  salutary  influence.  When  it  is  once 
decided  that  the  object  of  his  mission  is  unattainable,  it  will  natu 
rally  augment  our  fears  of  actual  war. 

In  the  event  of  Mr.  Rose's  failure,  it  becomes  a  most  interesting 
inquiry,  what  steps  Great  Britain  will  take,  and  what  course 
pursue  in  relation  to  us.  On  this  we  daily  speculate  with  infinite 
anxiety,  yet  we  always  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  she  will  take 
no  new  steps,  adopt  no  new  measures  that  are  offensive,  but  leave 
us  to  the  effects  of  our  own  policy. 

In  the  tremendous  contest  in  which  Great  Britain  is  engaged, 
she  has  the  strongest  motives  for  rescuing  or  preserving  from  the 


1807-14.]  CORRESPONDENCE. 

grasp  of  France  every  state  that  can  be  saved.  This  her  policy  is 
as  obviously  wise  as  it  is  invariable.  Our  country,  ill  organized  as 
it  appears,  with  all  its  ports,  people,  and  resources,  would  be  a  pow 
erful  auxiliary  to  France ;  but  to  England,  as  an  ally,  it  might  be 
inestimable.  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  united  in  a 
common  cause  of  defence,  would  be  an  overmatch  for  all  the  pow 
ers  on  the  globe,  separated  as  we  are  from  the  strongest  of  them, 
arid  complete  mistress  as  Great  Britain  already  is  of  the  ocean. 
We  could  command  in  every  sea,  direct  and  diet-ate  the  course  of 
maritime  commerce  everywhere,  and  make  it  nourish  and  maintain 
the  protecting  power.  This  would  make  us  both  safe  against  the 
master  of  continental  Europe,  until  his  immense  force  shall  break 
or  be  dissipated  by  a  new  state  of  things.  The  aid  we  could  give 
in  various  ways  to  England,  and  the  steady  support  to  commerce 
and  manufactures  we  should  necessarily  yield,  would  render  the 
two  countries,  if  allied  for  defence,  invincible  and  almost  invulner 
able.  We  are  not  indeed  authorized  to  expect  soon  to  see  this 
desirable  consummation ;  but,  when  we  see  how  strongly  it  is  dic 
tated  by  a  sense  of  safety  as  well  as  interest,  it  ought  not  to  be 
despaired  of.  But  if  at  present  our  jealousies,  prejudices,  or  even 
worse  causes,  prevent  us  from  acting  on  the  most  correct  princi 
ples  ;  if  we  will  not  help  those  whose  success  involves  our  own 
safety,  it  is  of  infinite  importance  that  we  be  kept  from  joining  the 
common  enemy.  If  Great  Britain  should  indulge  her  resentments 
in  acts  of  avowed  hostility,  the  first  blow  would  destroy  all  hope, 
and  almost  all  possibility  of  our  escape  from  the  hands  of  France. 
They  (France)  would  of  course  monopolize  all  our  means  in  war 
and  our  commerce  in  a  subsequent  peace,  if  this  blessing  can  revisit 
us  while  the  two  rival  powers  of  the  world  remain.  Great  Britain 
necessarily  considers  the  nature  of  our  government,  and  the  com 
position  and  condition  of  our  population.  Regarding  these,  as  she 
certainly  must  desire  to  do,  in  all  her  measures,  I  am  persuaded 
she  will  think  it  wise  not  only  to  forbear  to  strike,  but  will  refrain 
from  injuring  or  irritating  us  as  far  as  her  honor  and  substantial 
interest  will  permit.  Our  sufferings  by  a  war  would  be  of  no  ser 
vice  to  England,  but  would  rivet  us  more  strongly,  closely,  and 
lastingly  to  her  deadly  foe. 

Knowing  that  we  shall  not  make  war  and  believing  that  Great 
Britain  will  not  force  it  upon  us,  I  apprehend  she  will  execute 
fairly  the  system  she  has  lately  promulgated,  leaving  our  govern- 


384  LIFE  AND   LETTERS    OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.     [1807-14. 

ment  in  the  ridiculous  attitude  they  have  chosen,  until  a  better  sense 
of  our  true  interest  shall  induce  them,  or  the  force  of  public  opinion 
compel  them,  to  change  it.  But,  further  than  this,  I  should  imagine 
Great  Britain  would  deem  it  proper  to  unfold  to  the  eyes  of  the 
two  nations  all  such  parts  of  the  history  of  the  controversy  as 
would  be  consistent  with  decorum  to  disclose.  She  would  detail 
the  evidence  of  her  constant  readiness  to  remove  all  just  ground 
of  complaint.  She  would  exhibit  a  fair  defence  of  her  maritime 
rights  and  pretensions,  and  show  from  the  perilous  state  of  the 
world  the  necessity  of  her  adherence  to  them.  The  claim  to  search 
for  her  sailors  on  board  merchant  vessels  should  be  justified  on 
principle,  and  its  actual  practice  vindicated  by  the  pressure  of  her 
own  wants  of  her  own  men.  The  allegation  that  it  infringes  the 
rights  of  neutrals,  and  is  an  indignity  to  their  sovereignty,  should  be 
repelled  by  a  reference  to  the  search  for  enemy,  —  persons  as  well 
as  property,  —  which  is  admitted  ;  and  at  the  same  time  the  infor 
mal  arrangements  which  have  been  offered  on  this  point  should  be 
demonstrated  to  be  all  that  safety  and  honor  permit  to  be  offered, 
and  to  be  such  as  ought  to  have  been  accepted.  The  shifts  and 
evasions  by  which  our  administration  have  eluded  an  accommoda 
tion  should  be  exposed,  and  the  real  inability  of  the  United  States 
to  bear  the  privations  and  self-denials  they  have  voluntarily  and 
systematically  become  subject  to,  as  the  chosen  means  of  coercing 
Great  Britain ;  and  the  superior  advantages  Great  Britain  pos 
sesses  for  that  sort  of  contest,  if  she  would  resort  to  it,  might  be 
proved.  •  The  conduct  of  the  American  government  might  also  be 
placed  in  a  light  that  would  justify  hostile  measures ;  but  it  should 
be  insisted  on  that  Great  Britain  has  no  vindictive  feelings  towards 
the  United  States  to  gratify,  and  that  she  will  not  be  wanting  in 
any  reasonable  measures  to  keep  from  them  the  miseries  and  per 
haps  ruin  which  a  war  with  her  might  entail  upon  them.  It 
might  be  intimated  that  the  late  proceedings  of  the  American  gov 
ernment  appear  so  entirely  without  any  adequate  motives,  and  so 
contrary  to  the  true  and  obvious  interests  of  the  country,  that  it  is 
impossible  not  to  suspect  them  of  being  produced  by  that  fear  and 
influence  of  France  which  has  overwhelmed  the  cabinets  of  other 
states,  where  independence  is  now  no  more.  It  might  be  declared 
that,  if  all  the  sacrifices  of  wealth,  comfort,  and  conveniences  which 
we  are  voluntarily  making  are  to  be  continued  until  Great  Britain 
yield  her  just  rights,  they  will  not  speedily  terminate,  since  those 


1807-14.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  885 

will  necessarily  be  supported  with  her  life ;  and  on  this  the  lan 
guage  of  deliberate  firmness  should  be  employed,  to  dispel  the 
delusions  that  may  exist.  Finally,  it  should  be  stated  that,  while 
an  honorable  accommodation  is  offered,  with  sincere  wishes  that  a 
just  regard  to  the  mutual  welfare  of  both  countries  may  prevent 
a  rupture,  the  pacific  disposition  and  amicable  intentions  must  not 
be  misconstrued,  and  the  partiality  of  the  American  government  to 
her  enemy  must  be  kept  within  bounds. 

Among  the  wise  and  good  of  every  nation,  Great  Britain  has 
many  friends.  It  cannot  be  otherwise.  But,  strictly  speaking, 
there  is  no  British  party  here.  Yet  such  a  term  is  affixed  as  an 
opprobrium  to  the  names  of  many  of  the  best  of  our  citizens. 
Great  care  ought  to  be  taken  therefore,  at  all  times,  to  furnish  no 
materials  for  this  villanous  method  of  destroying  the  influence  of 
good  men.1  A  nation  that  has  exhibited  to  the  world  so  much  of 
every  thing  to  admire  and  esteem,  so  much  of  all  that  ennobles 
human  society,  and  above  all  that  singularly  felicitous  combination 
of  liberty  and  law,  —  that  justice  which  has  made  her  enviably 
great,  —  such  a  nation,  if  known  to  inhabit  another  planet,  would 
be  interesting  to  every  man  who  heard  of  their  existence  and 
character. 

I  think,  my  dear  sir,  something  like  the  ideas  I  have  expressed 
will  occur  to  British  statesmen  ;  and  that,  after  Mr.  Rose's  return, 
some  official  communication  of  them  through  parliament,  or  some 
other  channel,  will  be  made.  I  hope  they  will  be  displayed  with 
the  skill  and  ability  with  which  they  easily  can  treat  such  subjects, 
if  they  should  think  it  necessary.  The  temper  should  be  mild,  the 
manner  conciliatory,  while  the  purpose  may  be  jirrn,  and  avowed  to 
be  so.  Such  a  manifesto  would  produce  good  effects  on  both  sides 
of  the  Atlantic.  Here  it  would  promote  the  inclination  for  peace 
and  good  understanding.  In  the  mean  time,  whatever  may  be  the 
views  of  a  few  particular  and  ever  public  men,  our  people  will 
not  be  driven  into  a  war  with  Great  Britain,  if  she,  by  moderation, 
justice,  and  prudence,  furnishes  no  pretence,  no  new  means  of 
inflaming  the  popular  passions  against  her.  I  repeat  then  that,  in 
my  opinion,  Great  Britain  will  do  all  she  consistently  can  to  avoid 
war,  because  the  advantage  of  it  would  be  trifling  to  her,  if  any  at 
all,  and  the  evils  would  be  great  to  both  countries.  To  her,  they 
would  be  lasting ;  to  us,  intolerable  and  probably  irreparable.  If 

1  All  italics  here  and  elsewhere  are  in  the  original  manuscripts. 
25 


386  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1807-14. 

our  government  wants  the  wisdom  or  the  virtue  to  shun  this  terri 
ble  mischief,  it  is  incumbent  on  Great  Britain  to  practise  both. 
This  is  her  interest,  though  in  a  much  lower  degree  than  ours.  It 
would  defeat  the  designs  of  France,  and  could  keep  this  country  in 
a  solvable  state  for  happier  days,  which  may  come  soon,  and  proba 
bly  will  come  before  the  end  of  the  present  conflict.  The  incon 
venience  of  our  present  measures  is  slight  and  temporary  to  Great 
Britain,  and  in  part  believed  by  some  a  substantial  good  ;  and,  if 
let  alone,  would  be  discontinued  by  us  from  choice. 

You  see,  my  dear  sir,  with  what  freedom  I  give  you  my  thoughts, 
without  much  order  or  method.  They  are,  however,  the  result  of 
much  reflection,  and  agree  with  those  of  my  best  friends,  whose 
hearts  like  my  own  are  warm  with  the  love  of  our  country  and 
oppressed  with  anxiety  for  its  fate.  With  unfeigned  regard  and 
respect,  I  remain  your  affectionate  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  March  15,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  wrote  you  a  tedious  letter  on  the  12th,  con 
taining  a  rough  sketch  of  my  opinions  of  the  course  of  conduct 
towards  this  country  which  Great  Britain  would  be  likely  to  pur 
sue.  I  expressed  those  opinions  with  confidence,  because  it  seemed 
to  me  such  a  course  is  so  obviously  wise.  I  am  sensible,  however, 
there  are  many  difficulties  in  the  way,  and  that  our  government 
may  even  make  more  still.  Yet  the  true  policy  of  the  British  ad- 
ministration  will  be  to  foil  every  attempt  to  provoke  them  to  put 
this  country  into  the  hands  of  France.  It  will  not  be  easy  for 
British  pride  to  brook  our  foolish  insolence  in  non-importation 
laws,  or  other  prohibitions,  restrictive  or  discriminative,  between 
them  and  other  nations,  which  are  intended  to  injure  them  ;  yet  it 
is  completely  in  their  power  to  retaliate  (or  perhaps  only  threaten 
to  retaliate)  every  measure  of  that  sort  in  a  manner  unexception 
able  and  yet  efficacious.  Our  angry  passions  are  subsiding,  our 
fears  are  serious  of  rupture,  and  our  irresistible  passion  for  com 
merce  will  be  listened  to.  Indeed,  it  ought  to  be ;  for  no  country 
in  the  world,  perhaps,  would  suffer  more  from  its  abolition. 

When  you  see  Governor  Sullivan's  letter  in  the  newspaper,  you 
will  feel  more  of  contempt  than  any  other  passion.  Some  of  your 
friends  here  think  you  will  answer  him  with  some  severity.  I  think 


1807-U.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  387 

the  perfect  correctness  of  making  the  communication  through  him, 
the  only  topic ;  and  on  this  not  much  need  be  said,  because  no  man 
doubts  it.  The  inference  that  he  has  grossly  violated  his  duty  is 
sufficiently  obvious,  not  to  need  being  much  insisted  on. 

Yours  truly,  G.  C. 

P.  S.  Your  letter  is  read  with  avidity,  and  gives  great  satisfac 
tion.  Fifty  thousand  persons  in  New  England  will  have  read  it 
before  this  month  expires.1 

PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

WASHINGTON,  March  16,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND,  —  This  evening  I  received  your  letter  of 
the  9th,  and,  in  a  blank  cover,  a  correct  copy  of  my  letter  to  Gov 
ernor  Sullivan,  in  a  neatly  printed  pamphlet.  With  your  approba 
tion,  and  the  approbation  of  others  whom  I  respect,  esteem,  and 
love,  I  could  be  well  content,  and  would  cheerfully  dispense  with 
the  other  kind  of  praise  you  mention ;  but  you  rightly  judge,  it 
will  make  me  "  neither  vain  nor  angry  "  improbis  vituperari,  —  you 
will  recollect  I  had  anticipated.  And  here  you  will  allow  me  to 
repeat  what  is  often  present  to  my  mind,  having  heard  it  quoted, 
times  without  number,  by  my  father,  "  Woe  unto  you  when  all 
men  shall  speak  well  of  you."  It  is  added,  "  for  so  did  their 
fathers  to  the  false  prophets."  Truth,  then  (and  our  own  experi 
ence  gives  confirmation),  is  the  very  subject  of  evil-speaking. 

1  This  letter  and  the  preceding  one  were  sent  by  Colonel  Pickering  to 
Mr.  Rose,  the  British  minister,  together  with  the  following  letter  from 
Colonel  Pickering  himself :  — 

PICKERING  TO  GEORGE  HENRY  ROSE. 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  March  22,  1808. 

DEAR  SIR, —Last  evening  I  gave  you  a  letter  from  George  Cabot,  Esq., 
of  Boston,  one  of  my  early  friends,  and  one  of  the  best  of  men,  and  as  en- 
lightened'as  he  is  good.  Ten  or  twelve  years  ago,  he  was  a  senator  in  Con 
gress  from  Massachusetts.  But  though  eminently  well  informed  in  political 
and  commercial  subjects,  yet  always  averse  to  public  life,  he  retired  to 
resume  the  quiet  enjoyment  of  the  pleasures  of  his  domestic  circle  and  of  a 
select  society  of  friends,  and  of  the  studious  leisure  of  a  contemplative  mind. 
You  will  read  his  letter  again  and  with  fresh  interest,  and  I  pray  you  to  con 
sider  it  as  the  result,  on  its  subject,  of  whatever  there  is  of  political  wisdom 
and  real  patriotism  in  Massachusetts  ;  for  the  best  and  most  enlightened 
men  in  that  State  are  his  friends  and  associates. 

On  my  return  to  my  lodgings,  I  found  another  letter  from  Mr.  Cabot,  which 
came  by  the  last  evening's  mail,  and  as  it  is  on  the  same  subject  I  send  it  to 
you  for  the  same  purpose  as  the  former. 


388  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.     [1807-14. 

To-morrow  or  next  day,  you  will  receive  my  letters  of  the  10th 
and  llth,  with  several  enclosures;  among  which,  my  friends  here 
think  the  governor's  letter  of  the  3d  and  my  answer  of  the  9th 
may  be  published  with  some  effect. 

For  a  few  days,  I  have  heard  nothing  of  the  negotiation.1  I  can 
only  say  that  Mr.  Rose  is  still  here. 

For  some  time  past,  I  have  feared  that  I  should  never  see  Mr. 
Ames  again.  Your  letter  confirms  my  fears.  "  Quis  desideriis  sit 
pudor  aut  modus  tarn  cari  capitis." 

The  morning  after  I  received  his  admirable  "  newspaper  writ 
ing"  which  you  mention,  I  was  going  to  send  it  to  Mr.  Rose,  when 
I  found  Mr.  Stedman  was  doing  it.  Mr.  Rose  appears  to  be  a 
very  amiable  man,  so  amiable  and  so  candid  that,  on  so  short  an 
acquaintance,  I  cannot  think  of  him  but  as  a  friend.  Some  time 
ago  I  wrote  to  you,  expressing  my  ideas  of  the  true  policy  of  the 
British  government  to  be  observed  toward  the  United  States,  wish 
ing  to  have  them  confirmed  by  yours.  Mr.  King's  I  have  received. 
He  says,  "  I  entirely  agree  in  your  opinion  concerning  the  immense 
importance  to  England  as  well  as  to  America  that  the  relations  of 
peace  between  them  should  be  cherished  and  preserved,"  &c.  I 
have  enclosed  his  letter  to  Mr.  Rose,  for  I  had  told  Mr.  King  it 
was  for  that  purpose  I  wanted  his  opinion.  It  was  chiefly  that  he 
might  in  person  learn  on  this  subject,  and  on  the  common  interests 
of  the  two  countries,  the  sentiments  of  our  wisest  statesmen  and 
best  citizens,  that  I  have  more  than  once  advised  and  urged  Mr. 
Rose  to  travel  hence  as  far  as  Boston,  if  the  circumstances  of  his 
mission  should  render  it  possible.  His  own  dispositions  are  all  we 
could  wish,  and  I  have  no  doubt  of  his  transmitting  his  impres 
sions  to  his  government. 

MARCH  17. 

I  have  just  given  Mr.  Ames's  communication  to  a  member 
of  the  House,  to  hand  to  the  editor  of  the  Washington  "  Feder 
alist,"  and  to  urge  him  to  print  it.  It  is  time  that  the  silly  notions 
of  those  who  direct  and  mouth  and  vote  our  national  measures 
should  be  attacked  and  subverted.  Even  the  herd  (who,  as  Tracy 
used  to  say,  have  begun  to  walk  on  their  hind  legs)  may  understand 
(if  they  read)  the  most  material  parts. 

Always  truly  yours,  T.  PICKERING. 

1  This  refers  to  Mr.  Hose's  fruitless  negotiation  with  Jefferson. 


1807-14.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  389 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  March  18,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Last  evening  and  this  morning  I  received  your 
three  packets  relating  to  the  Snllivanian  controversy.1  I  regret 
extremely  that  you  could  not  know  what  was  done  here,  which 
would  have  saved  much  of  your  labor.  But  it  was  impossible  you 
should  suspect  the  governor's  fatuity  to  be  so  great  as  to  publish 
his  own  truly  ridiculous  letter.  After  this,  I  should  not  be  sur 
prised  to  see  him  publish  your  answer  on  Monday  next  in  the 
"  Chronicle."  I  shall  wait  until  that  day  is  past  before  1  decide 
on  the  publication  from  the  copy  you  have  sent  me.  There  will 
be  some  of  our  own  party  who  will  not  approve  it,  but  they  are 
very  few.  The  mass  of  them  admire  it,  and  I  am  satisfied  it  has 
a  good  effect  on  both  parties,  and  will  help  us  more  than  any  publi 
cation  we  have  had. 

Our  Legislature  having  risen  and  the  publication  having  been 
made,  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  call  on  Mr.  Otis.  I  was  a  few 
days  since  at  Dedham.  Our  friend  is  very  low  in  health,  so  that  I 
shall  not  be  surprised  if  he  sinks  entirely  in  a  few  months.  My 
hope  that  he  will  not  rests  on  the  remembrance  that  he  rose  last 
year  from  a  similar  depression.  He  spoke  of  you  with  very  great 
approbation  and  friendship ;  admires  your  letter,  and  thinks  much 
good  will  come  out  of  it.  Sincerely  yours,  G.  C. 

Since  my  long  letter  to  you  of  the  12th,  we  have  had  short 
arrivals  from  England  here ;  and  I  am  much  struck,  indeed 
much  gratified,  to  see  the  coincidence  of  the  opinions  of  the  British 
administration  with  those  I  had  expressed  as  likely  to  be  enter 
tained  by  them. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

MARCH  20,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Yours  of  the  13th  is  this  moment  received, 
and  gives  me  much  pleasure ;  for  the  general  complexion  of  it  is 
pleasing,  although  no  positive  good  is  specified. 

You  will  in  turn  be  gratified  to  know  that  you  are  read  with 
advantage  through  all  New  England.  Some  favorable  changes  in 
the  elections  of  our  town  officers  in  various  places  have  taken  place, 

1  See  Pickering's  letter  of  March  11,  to  which  this  is  an  answer,  given 
above,  p.  380. 


390  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF  GEORGE   CABOT.      [1807-14. 

and  some  hope  is  indulged  that  our  State  elections  may  be  such  as 
to  give  to  the  wise  and  good  a  power  of  deciding  what  Presidential 
candidate  shall  have  the  votes  of  Massachusetts.  On  this  head,  how 
ever,  it  is  best  for  us  to  say  as  little  and  do  as  much  as  we  can. 
If  Mr.  Hose  is  not  gone,  he  will  doubtless  observe  these  changes, 
which  may  have  a  great  effect  on  our  foreign  policy  :  indeed,  "  muta 
bility  "  is  inscribed  on  whatever  pertains  to  our  government. 

I  do  not  know  that  it  is  necessary  to  remind  you  that  in  these 
evil  days  we  must  be  circumspect  in  all  that  we  say,  and  still  more 
in  what  we  write,  concerning  our  relations  to  foreign  powers.  The 
most  patriotic  and  honorable  intentions  would  be  perverted  by  un 
principled  men,  and  their  authors  persecuted,  if  they  were  known. 
What  I  wrote  you  is  precisely  what  I  maintain  often  in  conversa 
tion  ;  yet,  in  the  shape  you  have  it,  I  would  rather  it  should  not  be 
seen. 

I  have  not  yet  decided  to  publish  your  reply  to  the  governor. 
One  or  two  friends  desire  it  much,  and  another  with  myself  thinks 
it  doubtful,  and  at  any  rate  it  may  be  delayed  a  few  days.  When 
things  go  well,  all  experiments  are  to  be  avoided.  I  shall  observe 
your  direction,  "  to  forget  you  and  think  of  the  public." 

Yours  faithfully,  G.  C. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

APRIL  2,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Your  answer  to  Sullivan  has  been  very  gen 
erally  approved  in  a  high  degree,  and  stimulated  anew  the  public 
inclination  to  read  the  public  letter. 

In  spite  of  all  my  vis  inertice,  I  am  forced  to  work  much  more 
than  I  like.  You  draw  and  others  drive  me  into  the  vortex  of 
politics,  which  I  wish  to  shun.  You  can  hardly  imagine  how  active 
we  are  to  secure  the  election,  of  which  sanguine  hopes  are  now 
entertained  by  most  of  the  good  men. 

I  am  a  little  surprised  at  the  comprehensiveness  of  Jefferson's 
declaration  in  his  message  concerning  the  communication  of  our 
affairs  with  France.  If  there  is  nothing  really  alarming  or  insolent 
in  the  official  correspondence,  whence  does  he  learn  that  France 
menaced  us  with  captures,  confiscation,  &c.,  which  I  am  persuaded 
he  knows  ?  Did  Dr.  Bullers,  an  ^accredited  messenger,  bring  it  ? 

Mr.  Hillhouse's  letter  will  be  a  valuable  auxiliary  to  yours,  and 
care  will  be  taken  to  place  it  before  the  public  as  soon  as  possible 
after  it  comes  to  hand.  Yours  truly,  G.  C. 


1807-14.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  391 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

APRIL  5,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Our  newspapers  of  this  date  will  damp  your 
hopes  of  our  election.  We  are  all  disappointed.  I  received  your 
letter  of  the  27th  ult.,  with  two  copies  enclosed  of  other  letters,  all 
which  gave  me  great  pleasure  ;  and  I  am  satisfied  with  the  use 
made  of  mine.1  Although  our  people  now  begin  to  suffer  very 
much  from  the  embargo,  yet  it  appears  that  other  feelings  are 
stronger,  and  other  passions  govern  them.  The  individual  wishes 
things  to  go  better,  but  he  prefers  to  govern  others  rather  than 
be  ruled  by  them.  When  shall  we  understand  fully  the  nature  of 
democratic  theories?  When  shall  we  be  satisfied  that  a  govern 
ment  altogether  popular  in  form  tends  irresistibly  to  place  in  power 
the  levellers  of  public  authority,  order,  and  law  ?  The  people  will 
not  permit  their  own  passions,  their  own  favorite  objects,  to  be 
made  to  give  place  to  the  general  good.  The  small  voice  of  reason 
will  be  generally  drowned  in  the  clamors  of  vice  and  folly.  But  I 
have  no  right  to  vent  my  discontents  to  one  who  from  situation 
must  see  and  feel  more  than  enough  of  these  mortifying  truths. 
With  sincere  regard  and  esteem,  I  am 

Always  yours,  G.  C. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

APRIL  9,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  received  your  letters  of  the  28th  and  30th, 
and  the  printed  papers  under  other  covers.  Our  election  of  gov 
ernor  will  be  Democratic,  but  the  majority  will  be  very  small ; 
and  we  still  expect  the  Cumberland  senators  will  one  of  them  be 
Federal,  and  perhaps  both.  In  this  case,  our  condition  will  be 
better  than  last  year.  Whoever  views  the  democratic  theory,  in 
the  true  light,  will  perceive  that  the  natural  downward  course  of 
our  affairs  is  for  the  moment  obstructed,  or  changed  by  accidental 
causes.  I  think  observing  men  will  be  sensible  that,  if  our  election 
had  been  held  two  months  ago,  the  Federalists  would  have  been 
outvoted  by  many  thousands.  But  though  party  feelings  in  a 
large  part  of  the  community  must  prevail  over  all  others,  yet 
many  men  are  alarmed  at  the  shameful  and  dangerous  conduct  of 

1  They  had  been  sent  to  Mr.  Rose,  as  stated  above,  in  note,  p.  387. 


392  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1807-14. 

the  national  administration  toward  foreign  powers  ;  and  this  uneas 
iness  is  the  principal  cause  of  the  great  Federal  vote.  Your  col 
league,1  however,  thinks  us  all  in  the  wrong,  and  has  written  a  long 
letter  to  persuade  the  people  so.  It  is  now  in  the  press,  and  will 
appear  on  Monday  or  Tuesday,  when  I  will  send  you  a  copy.  I 
am  told  its  chief  .object  is  to  controvert  the  sentiments  contained 
in  your  letter.  I  think,  however,  events  are  daily  unfolding  which 
will  prove  that  the  policy  of  peace  and  good  understanding  with 
England  as  a  security  against  France  is  truly  wise. 

Yours  sincerely,  G.  C. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

APRIL  11,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR, —  I  received  yesterday  your  two  letters  of  the 
2d,  and  a  copy  of  that  of  Champagny.2  This  having  already 
appeared  in  the  newspaper,  I  regretted  your  labor  in  transcribing 
it.  Upon  reading  Madison  and  Rose,  I  was  surprised  that  the 
latter  had  not  made  a  better  use  of  the  argument  he  evidently 
possessed. 

By  the  mail  of  this  day,  I  have  sent  you,  under  a  blank  cover, 
J.  Q.  Adams's  letter.3  There  is  a  good  deal  of  presumption  in  it, 
and  a  good  deal  of  slang  ;  but,  on  the  whole,  considering  how  apt 
he  is  to  be  violent,  I  did  not  find  him  more  so  than  I  had  expected. 
I  don't  see  how  it  can  be  known  that  Buonaparte  has  not  declared 
he  will  have  no  neutrals.  His  conduct,  his  decrees,  arid  Cham- 
pagny's  letter,  certainly  give  credibility  to  the  opinions  of  those 
who  believe  that  he  has  declared  so.  The  paucity  of  cases  in  which 

1  John  Quincy  Adams. 

2  I  take  this  to  refer  to  a  letter  from  Champagny,  the  French  minister  of 
foreign  relations,  to  our  minister  at  Paris,  General  Armstrong.     This  letter, 
together  with  one  from  Erskine,  the  British  minister,  to  Madison,  was  trans 
mitted  to  Congress  by  the  President,  April  2,  1808.     Erskine's  was  a  simple 
defence  of  the  British  policy  towards  neutrals.     Champagny's  was  an  insult 
ing  command  that  we  should  at  once  go  to  war  with  England ;  and  the 
information  was  added  that,  in  the  emperor's  opinion,  war  already  existed 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.     Acting  on  this  view,  Cham 
pagny  said  our  vessels  were  to  be  sequestered  until  it  was  seen  whether  we 
engaged  in  war  with  England,  as  was  our  manifest  duty.     See  Waite's  State 
Papers,  VI.  209. 

8  This  was  a  "  Letter  to  the  Hon.  Harrison  Gray  Otis,  on  the  Present  State 
of  our  National  Affairs ;  with  Remarks  upon  Mr.  Pickering's  Letter  to  the 
Governor  of  the  Commonwealth." 


1807-14.]  CORRESPONDENCE. 

the  European  nations  have  taken  their  men  is  surely  no  argument 
against  the  fact  of  their  maintaining  such  right  by  asserting  it  as 
often  as  there  is  opportunity.  But  I  am  not  going  to  comment  on 
what  I  have  scarcely  read,  and  from  which  I  turned  with  disgust. 
I  think,  however,  that  all  the  answers  should  be  written  with  per 
fect  temperance  and  moderation,  that  men  may  not  forget  the 
reality  of  our  safety  from  France  depends  on  Great  Britain's  being 
able  to  defend  herself.  G.  C. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

APRIL  15,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  do  not  know  whether  I  have  acknowledged 
all  your  letters  in  the  order  they  were  received.  Last  evening, 
a  couple  of  packets  with  printed  enclosures  came  to  hand.  Our 
newspapers  begin  to  attack  the  letter  of  your  colleague,  and  will 
probably  persist  until  all  its  falsities  and  fallacies  as  well  as  weak 
ness  shall  be  fully  exposed. 

In  the  case  of  Ratford,1  insinuated  to  be  still  alive  in  Pennsyl 
vania,  we  see  a  renewal  of  the  wretched  attempt  to  persuade  the 
country  that  Bobbins 2  was  a  native  of  Danbury.  I  have  been 
asked  how  you  would  escape  from  the  charge  of  inconsistency,  in 
having  concurred  in  the  resolution  on  which  the  non-importation 
law  was  bottomed,  and  now  arguing  against  measures  naturally 
following  it,  while  Great  Britain  persists  in  the  same  conduct. 
My  answer  is  that,  whatever  may  have  been  your  motives  for  that 
concurrence,  you  are  completely  justified  in  your  present  views  of 
the  policy  which  now  ought  to  be  pursued  from  the  general  aspect 
of  our  foreign  relations.  But  I  say  distinctly  that  Great  Britain, 
in  the  treaty  just  now  rejected,  has  done  her  part  toward  settling 
amicably  and  reasonably  the  principal  question,  —  that  of  the  colo- 

1  Ratford,  alias  Wilson,  was  one  of  the  men  taken  from  the  "  Chesa 
peake."   He  was  proved  on  trial  to  be  a  British  deserter  from  the  "  Halifax  " 
man-of-war,  and  was  hung  at  Halifax,  in  Nova  Scotia. 

2  Robbins  was  the  assumed  name  of  Thomas  Nash,  a  leader  in  the  mutiny 
on  board  the  British  ship  "  Hermione,"  in  1797.     Nash  escaped  to  this  coun 
try,  and  the  British  government  applied  to  have  him  given  up.     Nash  set 
up  as  a  defence  that  his  name  was  Jonathan  Robbins,  and  that  he  was  a 
native  of  Danbury,  Connecticut.     This  defence  broke  down.     He  was  given 
up,  and  was  hanged  at  Halifax.     The  cry  was  raised  that  President  Adams 
had  surrendered  an  American  citizen,  and  that  the  proof  of  Nash's  Irish 
origin  and  British  citizenship  was  manufactured  for  the  occasion,  by  our 
government. 


394  LIFE   AND    LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1807-14. 

nidi  trade;  and  that,  she  having  given  this  ample  proof  of  her 
equitable  disposition  on  that  point,  a  measure  which  might  pos 
sibly  have  been  once  thought  expedient  to  employ  against  her 
would  now  be  highly  improper.  I  have  been  reading  Baring's 
pamphlet,  published  February  7th  at  London.1  It  is  the  best  per 
formance  on  the  subject  of  our  disputes  with  Great  Britain,  and 
shows  him  to  be  a  very  well-informed  man.  Allowance  is  to  be 
made,  however,  for  anti-ministerialism.  I  have  made  a  few  notes 
in  the  margin,  which  indicate  my  objections,  and  shall  send  the 
work  to  you  by  post.  Yours  truly,  G.  C. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

APRIL  20,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  received  last  evening  your  favor  of  the 
12th.  As  you  must  be  much  occupied  until  the  close  of  the  ses 
sion,  I  indulge  a  hope  that,  with  all  your  incredible  industry,  you 
will  not  finish  your  letter  to  Sullivan.  My  reason  is  that  you 
will  probably  think  it  necessary  to  take  some  notice  of  the  violent 
invective  of  your  colleague,  and  perhaps  it  may  be  done  as  well  in 
your  address  to  Sullivan  as  in  any  way.  I  think  so  much  of  this, 
that,  if  it  comes  to  hand,  I  shall  be  tempted  to  lay  it  under  an 
"  embargo "  till  I  hear  from  or  see  you.  A  cutting  criticism  on 
Adams's  letter  as  a  literary  performance  will  appear  in  the  "  Pal 
ladium,"  I  am  told,  on  Friday,  which  shall  be  transmitted.  Many 
answers  to  parts  of  the  letter  are  issuing  from  the  press,  and 
I  have  reason  to  believe  one  or  two  pamphlets  will  be  written.  I 
cannot  go  through  the  labor  of  expressing  my  opinions  on  Mr. 
Hillhouse's  motion ;  but  will  the  strong  man  let  a  weaker  bend 
him?  Yours  Jideliter,  G.  C. 

PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

CITY  OP  WASHINGTON,  April  22,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  am  myself  frightened,  and  you  will  be 
alarmed,  at  the  length  of  my  third  letter  to  Governor  Sullivan. 

1  "On  the  British  Orders  in  Council."  The  author  was  Alexander  Bar 
ing,  son  of  Sir  Francis  Baring,  and  afterwards  Lord  Ashburton.  He  had 
resided  many  years  in  this  country,  and  had  married  a  daughter  of  William 
Bingham,  United  States  senator  from  Pennsylvania.  Mr.  Baring  was  at 
this  time  a  Whig  in  politics,  and,  of  course,  an  opponent  of  the  Tory 
administration. 


1807-14.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  395 

Forty-three  pages !  I  have  examined  and  re-examined  in  order 
to  discover  what  more  I  can  dash  out,  but  am  now  at  my  ne  plus 
ultra.  What  can  be  done  with  it?  Is  the  public  mind  satiated 
with  addresses  ?  Will  even  my  friends  not  have  patience  to  read 
it?  Driven  to  a  vindication  never  before  contemplated,  I  am 
strongly  impressed  with  the  importance  of  laying  it  before  the 
public.  In  regard  to  Sullivan,  ought  this  just  call  to  scourge  him 
to  be  let  slip?  What  will  be  the  reflections  of  himself  and  his 
partisans,  to  the  chief  of  whom  he  will  certainly  communicate  his 
letter  of  March  18,  and  what  their  reports  among  their  underlings, 
if  I  remain  wholly  silent  on  the  monstrous  charges  that  letter 
contains  ?  Ought  this  opportunity  of  clearly  convicting  him  of 
deliberate  falsehood  to  be  neglected  ? 

Perhaps  you  may  think  some  variations  proper  or  expedient. 
Such  can  without  difficulty  be  made  (seeing  the  letter  is  to  go 
directly  to  the  printer)  in  my  absence.  Congress  will  doubtless 
rise  the  25th,  but  it  will  probably  be  as  late  as  the  8th  or  10th  of 
May  before  I  reach  Boston.  To  postpone  its  publication  till  that 
time  would  seem  to  me  to  lessen  its  effect.  Even  now  I  fear  the 
delay  which  has  taken  place  may  be  rather  unfavorable.  As  to 
alterations,  —  "  what  you'd  have  it,  make  it."  I  think  they  cannot 
be  numerous,  and  consequently  not  occasion  you  a  great  deal  of 
trouble ;  while  I  regret  that  my  communications  have  given  you 
so  much. 

A  bill  has  passed  both  Houses,  vesting  the  President  with  power 
to  suspend  the  embargo  laws,  in  the  event  of  peace,  or  a  suspen 
sion  of  hostilities  in  Europe,  or  of  such  changes  in  the  orders  and 
decrees  of  the  belligerents  respecting  neutrals  as  in  the  President's 
opinion  will  render  it  safe  to  renew  our  foreign  commerce.  And 
he  may  suspend  the  embargo  in  whole  or  in  part.  I  had  objected 
to  the  words,  as  opening  a  door  for  dangerous  partialities.  My 
colleague,  by  way  of  reply,  as  it  seemed,  and  notwithstanding  all 
his  anathemas  against  the  British  (and  he  never  lets  slip  an  oppor 
tunity  to  vent  his  hatred  at  them),  said,  "If  the  British  orders 
should  be  repealed,  I  would  remove  the  embargo  as  to  England  in 
the  teeth  of  Buonaparte."  He  continued,  "  But  if  France  repeal 
her  decrees,  and  Britain  leave  hers  in  force,  I  am  not  prepared  to 
say  I  would  remove  the  embargo  in  respect  to  France."  What  a 
strange  man  !  But  with  all  this  ostensible  independence,  and  im 
partiality  towards  the  two  great  belligerents,  I  do  not  recollect  to 


396  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1807-14. 

have  ever  heard  from  his  mouth  one  reproachful  expression  of  the 
French  or  their  master.  When,  pretty  early  in  the  session,  Mon 
roe's  negotiations  with  Canning  about  the  "  Chesapeake  "  were  read 
in  the  Senate  (confidentially),  he  said  to  Mr.  Goodrich,  "There  is 
now  no  cause  of  war  with  England."  Perhaps  no  one  longer 
extended  his  charity  towards  Mr.  Adams  than  I,  but  I  have  in  this 
session  given  him  up.  Bayard  lately  said  to  me,  "  He  is  com 
pletely  sold."  I  do  not  know,  among  my  Federal  friends,  one  who 
thinks  otherwise. 

APRIL  23. 

My  letter.  Its  first  object,  in  order,  is  the  exposure  of  Sulli 
van  ;  but  its  most  important  object  is  the  vindication  of  my  char 
acter.  The  latter,  perhaps,  should  be  exclusive  of  all  electioneering 
views.  Take  both  into  consideration,  and  decide  on  the  most 
auspicious  time  for  its  publication.  You  will  allow  me  to  submit 
it  to  your  correct  judgment. 

When  I  say  "  its  most  important  object  is  the  vindication  of  my 
character,"  I  do  not  mean  as  it  respects  my  individual  self,  but  in 
respect  to  every  public  consideration  connected  with  that  vindication, 
not  excluding,  however,  the  immediate  interests  of  my  family  and 
friends  in  having  the  fairness  of  that  character  maintained.  Is  it 
not  of  some  importance  to  have  the  letter  published  immediately, 
on  account  of  the  part  which  touches  my  colleague  ?  For  I  cun- 
not  write  one  syllable  in  reply  to  this  to  Mr.  Otis,  until  I  return 
home.  For  myself,  I  declare  to  you  that,  if  all  his  learning  —  an 
ample  store  —  and  all  his  talents  could  by  one  act  of  volition  be 
transferred  to  me,  and  I  must  take  with  them  the  single  sentiment 
he  uttered  on  the  passing  of  the  first  embargo  law,  all  would  in  my 
estimation  be  lighter  than  a  feather.  That  degrading  sentiment 
would  haunt  me  like  a  ghost,  and  never  let  me  rest.  I  should  be 
ashamed  to  meet  the  face  of  any  man  who  knew  me.  The  publi 
cation  of  that  sentiment  should  refute  every  thing  in  his  letter 
which  depends  on  opinion  arid  compunction,  —  every  thing  short  of 
incontrovertible  facts.1 

I  enclose  a  copy  of  Sullivan's,  of  March  18th. 

I  am,  my  dear  sir, 

Your  greatly  obliged  friend,  T.  PICKERING. 

1  The  sentiment  here  referred  to  was  contained  in  Mr.  Adams's  speech 
on  the  first  embargo  law  :  "  I  would  not  deliberate,  I  would  act,"  &c.  See 
p.  425. 


1807-14.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  397 


CABOT  TO  EGBERT  BENSON. 

BOSTON,  Aug.  2,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  It  is  proposed  to  get  up  a  book  to  commemo 
rate  the  worth  of  our  excellent  friend,  Ames.  It  will  be  a  single 
volume,  and  it  will  be  grateful  to  his  friends  to  see  a-  large  sub 
scription  of  the  wise  and  good.  We  are  not  willing  that  any  thing 
like  solicitation  should  be  used,  yet  it  may  be  proper  for  you  and 
Mr.  Wolcott  to  suggest  to  a  few  opulent  friends  the  expediency  of 
taking  a  couple  of  copies  each.  A  number  of  gentlemen  here  have 
taken  two  and  three,  and  a  few  have  taken  five.  Will  you  say  to 
Mr.  Wolcott  what  I  have  written,  and,  after  assuring  him  of  all 
my  regard,  accept  the  remainder  yourself  ? 

Yours  truly,  G.  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Aug.  10,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  seen  Mr.  Barton's  letter,1  addressed  to 
you.  There  is  a  correspondence  between  some  gentlemen  here 
and  others  at  Philadelphia  on  the  subject  of  it ;  and  on  Monday 
next  a  conference  will  be  held  at  New  York  by  gentlemen  from 
various  quarters,  with  a  view  to  examine  the  means  and  decide  the 
manner  of  applying  them  to  the  great  question  of  the  Presidency. 
The  gentlemen  from  this  place  are  Mr.  Otis,  Mr.  Gore,  and  Mr. 
Lloyd.  To  the  first  I  have  shown  Mr.  Barton's  letter,  but  I 
believe  that  all  he  writes  is  also  known  from  others. 

Yours  truly  always,  G.  C. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

OCT.  5,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  enclose  a  list  of  the  vessels  which  have  been 
"  permitted  "  to  sail  from  this  port  since  the  embargo  laws  passed. 
I  have  not  heard  that  any  of  them  were  captured,  though  it  is 
possible  that  some  one  or  two  may  have  been ;  and  my  inquiry, 
which  is  very  limited,  may  not  have  ascertained  it.  You  will 

1  This  letter  is  preserved  among  the  Pickering  MSS.  in  the  possession  of 
the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society.  It  sets  forth  a  plan  for  forming  a 
junction  with  Clintonians  against  Madison,  which  was  to  be  proposed  at  a 
meeting  of  Federalists  about  to  be  held  in  Pennsylvania. 


LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1807-14 

doubtless  be  told  that  five  out  of  six  which  sailed  for  France  from 
some  of  our  ports  have  been  captured  and  condemned,  though  in 
ballast.  It  should  be  recollected,  however,  they  were  obnoxious  to 
the  orders  of  council  by  attempting  to  enter  the  prohibited  coun 
tries  after  notice,  and  no  man  supposed  vessels  going  to  such  coun 
tries  would  not  be  liable.  The  English  have  chosen  to  take  the 
lex  talionis  for  a  justification  of  those  orders  ;  but,  in  fact,  the 
ports  interdicted  were  in  general  so  closely  and  constantly  invested 
by  a  naval  force  as  to  give  them  all  the  rights  of  a  blockade,  and 
the  capture  of  five  in  six  of  the  vessels  proves  it.  The  demands  of 
underwriters  for  insurance  against  British  capture  would  show  how 
effectual  their  blockades  are  known  to  be  by  men  who  are  the  best 
judges.  Your  sincere  and  faithful  friend,  G.  CABOT. 

Since  the  within  writing,  I  have  seen  from  several  quarters 
letters  expressing  apprehensions  that  a  disunion  of  the  States  is 
meditated  by  the  Federalists.  Some  Federalists  have  been  made 
to  believe  there  was  foundation  for  these  insinuations,  and  the 
Democrats  at  the  Southward  are  using  this  story  to  deter  men 
from  acting  with  the  Federalists.  I  think,  therefore,  it  will  be 
well  to  pass  some  very  decided  resolution  on  the  importance  of 
maintaining  the  Union  inviolate  under  every  trial,  &c. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Nov.  11,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  On  the  other  side,  you  will  find  a  memo 
randum  l  of  the  state  of  our  maritime  insurance  at  three  principal 
offices.  It  may  not  be  accurate  in  every  little  particular,  but  is 
sufficiently  so  for  all  purposes  of  general  reasoning.  The  result 
you  will  find  to  be  perfectly  coincident  with  the  ideas  of  the  Feder 
alists.  It  appears  that  the  actual  losses  are  so  small,  that,  if  the 
undetermined  risks  issue  in  the  same  ratio  of  loss  as  those  which 
have  ended,  the  profit  of  the  insurers  will  be  very  handsome. 

But  what  avails  it  that  our  opinions  are  correct,  and  those  of 
our  opponents  absurd  ?  Will  they  adopt  ours  ?  I  think  not. 
With  the  folly,  prejudice,  and  vice  of  the  country  on  their  side, 
they  can  do  infinite  mischief,  and  entail  upon  us  irremediable  evils, 
and  I  believe  they  will.  Yours  truly  always, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 

1  Note  by  Mr.  Octavius  Pickering.  [The  following  facts  are  given  in 
T.  P.'s  speech  of  Nov.  30,  1807.  — 0.  P.] 


1807-14.1  CORRESPONDENCE.  399 


CABOT   TO    PICKERING. 

Nov.  23,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  After  seeing  Mr.  Canning's  masterly  letter l 
I  do  not  wonder  at  the  rage  of  the  friends  of  our  administration. 
They  who  are  disgraced  must  feel  resentment.  Nothing  has  morti 
fied  me  so  much  in  all  our  political  discussions  as  to  see  the  facility 
with  which  good  men  have  been  duped  so  as  to  lend  their  aid  to 
their  destroyers.  Too  many  of  our  merchants  have  thoughtlessly 
countenanced  opinions  and  measures  which  are  wrong,  and  thus 
have  enabled  the  government  to  pursue  a  system  which,  without 
such  aid,  they  must  have  abandoned.  It  is,  however,  some  satis 
faction  to  observe  the  amelioration  of  public  opinion  here.  It  is  a 
fact  that  the  declaration  of  our  Legislature  against  the  Presidenc's 
continuing  his  proclamation  was  supported  by  more  hearts  than 
voices ;  and  I  cherish  the  belief  that  New  England  will  steadily 
oppos.e  as  unjust  and  unnecessary  a  war  with  Great  Britain. 

Yours  faithfully,  G.  C. 


CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BOSTON,  Nov.  27..  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Mr.  Olney  informs  me  of  the  safe  arrival  of 
the  engravings,  and  promises  to  send  them  forward  by  a  suitable 
conveyance.  I  owe  you  an  acknowledgment  of  two  letters  con 
cerning  your  care  of  this  business,2  and  must  trouble  you  still 
further  when  the  next  parcels  come  to  New  York.  In  all  this, 
however,  I  know  full  well  that  I  give  you  pleasure. 

As  you  well  remember  the  course  of  my  opinions  on  the  destiny 
of  our  country,  you  will  not  be  surprised  to  learn  from  me  now 
that  I  consider  the  government  of  vice  and  folly  as  inevitable  until 
the  evils  they  bring  shall,  by  their  excess,  necessarily  bring  reme 
dies.  But,  however  all  these  things  may  be,  believe  me  always, 
with  unfeigned  affection  and  esteem, 

Your  friend,  and  obliged  GEORGE  CABOT. 

1  In  reply  to  Pinkney's  proposing  a  repeal  of  the  orders  in  council  on 
condition  of  the  repeal  of  the  embargo,  see   Hildreth,  VI.  90-92;    also 
Waite's  State  Papers,  VI.  288. 

2  The  publication  of  Ames's  Works. 


400  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1807-14. 


PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

WASHINGTON,  Dec.  1,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  received  your  letter  of  the  23d  ult. 
The  administration  and  their  friends  are  indeed  enraged  at  the 
mortifying  situation  in  which  Mr.  Canning's  letter  has  placed  them. 
Anderson,1  of  the  Senate  (whose  person,  I  believe,  you  must  re 
member),  in  a  petulant  but  silly  speech  he  made  at  me  to-day,  had 
the  folly  to  say,  among  other  things,  that  Canning  was  acting  the 
part  of  Genet,  and  that  he  believed  his  letter  was  intended  to  be 
an  appeal  from  our  government  to  the  people !  If  I  had  not  an 
swered  his  remarks  instanter,  I  should  not  have  infringed  the  sacred 
rule,  "Let  not  the  sun  go  down  upon  thy  wrath,"  his  insignifi 
cance  screening  him  from  one's  indignation,  though  he  is  not 
below  contempt ;  so  I  thought  a  few  gentle  stripes  might  not  be 
misapplied.  On  Canning's  letter,  I  had  only  to  observe  that  it 
was  not,  nor  ever  would  be,  published  by  him.  It  was  presented 
to  the  American  people  by  their  own  government. 

The  supporters  of  the  administration  are  sick  of  the  embargo, 
but  the  ground  taken  cannot  at  once  be  relinquished.  An  instant 
repeal  would  wound  their  pride ;  but,  conscious  of  their  own  base 
ness,  their  pride  would  give  way,  if  their  false  character  for  supe 
rior  wisdom  and  patriotism  would  not  fall  with  it. 

But  they  cannot  save  themselves  from  perdition.  One  corner  of 
the  curtain  which  concealed  the  insincerity,  the  duplicity,  the  false 
hood  of  the  executive,  has  been  lifted  up.  It  will  be  raised  still 
higher,  and  all  their  deformity  be  exposed.  They  must  sink. 
Their  partisans  will  make  every  possible  effort  to  support  them, 
knowing  that  they  fall  with  their  two  leaders.  Madison  must 
necessarily  be  privy  to  all  the  impostures  practised  by  the  Presi 
dent  ;  and,  partaking  in  the  fraud,  he  must  participate  in  its  punish 
ment.  The  detection  comes  too  late  to  defeat  his  election.  But 
assuredly  the  corrected  public  sentiment  will  control  his  measures ; 
and  he  may  even  derive  some  credit  for  administering  the  govern 
ment  properly,  though  against  his  will. 

Mr.  Giles  is  to  make  a  speech  to-morrow  on  the  resolution  for 
repealing  the  embargo,  after  which,  perhaps,  the  question  may 
be  taken ;  and  though  he  himself  is  staggered,  and  others  tremble, 

1  Joseph  Anderson,  senator  from  Tennessee. 


1807-14.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  401 

they  will  doubtless,  at  this  time,  reject  it.  Perhaps  this  may  be 
requisite,  more  effectually  to  dissolve  the  spell  which  has  distracted 
the  public  mind. 

Faithfully  and  affectionately  yours,  T.  P. 

The  followers  of  Jefferson  are  sufficiently  angry  with  me,  and 
yet  (though  not  aware  of  it)  pay  me  no  small  compliment.  At 
the  head  of  all  the  publications  on  this  side  of  the  water,  which 
induced  the  British  government  not  to  revoke  the  orders  of  council, 
Anderson  placed  my  letter  to  Sullivan.  And  a  member  of  the 
House,  of  vastly  more  consequence  than  Anderson,  —  Burwell, x  — 
told  Quincy,  just  at  the  opening  of  the  session,  that  but  for  my  let 
ter  the  orders  would  have  been  revoked !  Really,  these  gentlemen 
go  far  beyond  you,  and  in  effect  call  in  question  your  penetration. 
You  saw  only  that  I  had  done  you  the  honor  of  making  you  one 
of  Governor  Sullivan's  councillors :  they  have  discovered  that  I 
direct  the  councils  of  the  British  Empire ! 

I  am,  &c.,  T.  P. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Dec.  15, 1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  — .  ...  It  is  plain  to  me  that  the  governing 
party,  after  ten  years'  perseverance  in  vindicating  the  abominable 
conduct  of  France  and  criminating  the  venial  conduct  of  England, 
are  compelled  to  abandon  the  defence  of  the  former.  But,  in  doing 
this,  they  seize  the  advantage  offered  by  the  corrupt  state  of  public 
opinion,  of  placing  those  two  nations  on  the  same  ground  as  ag 
gressors.  This  opinion,  while  it  shall  continue,  must  blast  every 
effort  that  can  be  used  toward  the  establishment  of  a  just  policy. 
I  know  the  tide  of  prejudice  is  overwhelming  you  in  Congress,  and 
therefore  you  can  do  but  little  for  the  safety  of  the  nation ;  yet 
that  little  is  precious.  I  have  no  desire  to  see  any  of  my  friends 
there  attempt  to  display  those  great  truths  which  are  indispensable 
for  the  people  to  know  until  the  people  are  better  prepared  to 
receive  them ;  but  the  newspapers  may  be  used  with  great  effect 
until  you  stop  them  by  law.  An  examination  of  the  despatches 
appears  in  the  "  Centinel,"  and  is  reprinted  in  the  "  Repertory," 
which  I  think  will  lay  open  fairly  the  scandalous  duplicity  of  our 

1  William  A.  Burwell,  member  from  Virginia  from  1806-21. 
26 


402  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF  GEORGE   CABOT.      [1807-14. 

government  (to  use  no  worse  terms),  by  which  we  are  subject  to 
evils,  which,  if  continued,  will  burst  the  bands  of  society,  unless, 
indeed,  Mr.  Gallatin  means  to  get  rid  of  the  embargo  by  showing 
the  difficulty  of  maintaining  it.  I  should  infer  from  his  letter,  and 
the  general  course  of  our  internal  affairs,  it  was  intended  seriously 
to  arouse  the  dominant  party  against  the  minority,  and  thus  to 
crush  them  as  a  political  party,  under  the  pretence  of  executing 
the  law.  My  present  purpose  of  writing,  however,  is  not  to  specu 
late  on  the  dangerous  views  of  the  administration,  but  to  ask  of 
you  to  read  '*  the  Analysis," l  and,  if  you  think  it  useful,  to  procure 
its  republication  in  suitable  places.  You  will  find  the  work  more 
and  more  interesting  as  it  advances. 

Yours  truly  always,  G.  C. 

DEC.  15, 1808.    P.  M. 

I  had  written  the  enclosed  at  the  council  chamber,  but  was  too 
late  for  the  mail  this  morning.  Since  my  letter,  I  have  received 
your  EXCELLENT  SPEECH.2  On  the  topics  it  treats,  you  have  taken 
precisely  the  course  I  wished.  Your  modesty  may  prevent  you 
from  doing  with  it  all  the  good  of  which  it  is  capable,  but  sure  I 
am  you  ought  to  transmit  to  sensible  good  men  in  various  quarters 
a  copy.  Here,  we  shall  give  it  circulation  in  the  newspaper  or 
a  pamphlet.  I  say,  then,  of  you  and  Lloyd  and  Hillhouse,  you 
deserve  well  of  your  country.  So  fare  you  well.  G.  C. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Dec.  18,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  — ....  I  was  rejoiced  to  see  your  colleague's 8 
observation  on  the  futile  argument  so  often  urged  about  starving 
England  by  our  withholding  supplies  of  grain,  when  she  brews 
into  beer  more  than  we  ever  sell  to  her,  and  almost  as  much  as  we 
can  spare  to  the  whole  world.  This  truth  displaces  a  dangerous 
error,  from  which  we  have  suffered  much.  I  only  regret  that  it  is 
not  possible  to  dispel  other  errors  still  more  dangerous.  I  regret 
that  so  many  causes  have  concurred  to  establish  opinions  in  our 
country  which  I  think  absolutely  false,  and  which,  while  they  prevail, 

1  By  John  Lowell. 

2  On  the  embargo,  delivered  November  30  and  December  1. 
«  Mr.  Lloyd. 


1807-14.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  403 

are  insuperable  obstacles  to  a  just  and  wise  national  policy.  Even 
good  men  seem  to  think  it  a  great  point  gained  that  the  friends  of 
the  administration  place  the  conduct  of  the  two  belligerents  towards 
us  on  the  same  ground  of  injustice.  Now,  if  it  be  true  that,  with 
few  exceptions  and  those  always  fairly  healed,  Great  Britain  has 
habitually  treated  us  with  due  respect,  and  that  France  has  gen 
erally,  and  especially  the  last  ten  years,  violated  every  obligation 
toward  us,  and  held  us  in  perfect  contempt,  how  can  we  take  a 
right  position  toward  those  two  powers,  with  the  present  corrupt 
state  of  public  opinion  ?  We  must  think  more  justly  before  we 
can  act  so ;  and,  if  we  are  incapable  of  this,  we  must  suffer,  and 
shall  suffer  bitterly. 

Yours  truly  always,  G.  C. 


CABOT  TO  WOLCOTT. 

BOSTON,  Dec.  28,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  perceive  with  you  that,  bad  as  the  times 
are,  they  are  to  become  worse.  I  add  with  the  most  painful 
regret  that,  in  my  opinion,  the  evils  which  we  suffer,  and  those 
which  we  justly  fear,  are  the  natural  offspring  of  our  vices,  vanity, 
and  folly  as  a  people.  I  cannot  admit  that  we  have  an  election 
between  the  two  great  belligerents  which  we  shall  treat  as  an 
enemy.  God  forbid  it!  But  I  pray  you  not  to  imagine  that, 
because  I  entertain  these  sentiments  and  think  them  defensible 
against  the  general  opinion  of  the  country,  I  indulge  any  expecta 
tions  of  seeing  them  prevail.  I  have  no  such  hope.  My  mind  has 
for  many  years  been  completely  settled  that  the  fate  of  our  coun 
try  is  inevitable,  and  all  that  good  men  can  possibly  do  is  only  to 
mitigate  in  some  degree  or  defer  calamities  which  no  human  virtue 
and  skill  can  avert.  I  am  indeed  mortified  that  my  friends  some 
times  compel  me  to  take  a  nominal  part  in  public  agency,  but  I 
weakly  yield  to  personal  solicitation  what  I  should  deny  to  other 
motives.  Forgive  me,  if  these  intimations  of  my  political  despond 
ency  disgust  you,  assured  that  I  am  always  sincerely, 

With  high  esteem  and  regard,  your  friend  and  servant, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 


404  LIFE   AND  LETTEES   OF   GEOEGE  CABOT.     [1807-14. 


PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

CITY  OP  WASHINGTON,  Jan.  11,  1809. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  Yesterday  I  received  in  a  pamphlet  the  able  analy 
sis  of  the  late  correspondence  between  our  administration  and  Great 
Britain  and  France.  Some  of  its  numbers  I  had  not  before  seen. 
They  now  appear  with  a  preface,  in  which  is  this  passage :  "  The 
public  mind,  excited  in  the  highest  degree  by  real  distress  and 
more  dreadful  prospects,  has  sought  in  secondary  causes  the  source 
of  our  public  calamities.  The  arrestation  of  our  commerce,  the 
total  annihilation  of  external  as  well  as  internal  trade,  are  effects, 
not  causes.  They  are  the  instruments  employed  to  scourge  and 
afflict  us.  But  the  secret  and  hidden  causes  of  the  infliction  of  this 
punishment  are  to  be  sought  elsewhere.  Remove  our  commercial 
restraints  and  our  evils  are  not  cured :  our  malady  will  only  become 
the  more  inveterate.  Measures  will  succeed  so  much  more  disastrous 
as  to  make  us  look  back  to  our  present  sufferings  and  to  hail  them  as 
blessings."  I  understand  the  writer  to  mean  that  a  removal  of  the 
embargo  will  involve  us  in  a  war  with  Great  Britain.  This  is  the 
precise  sentiment  which  our  administration  wish  to  have  impressed 
on  the  minds  of  the  people  of  the  United  States.  Let  this  impres 
sion  be  made,  and  the  embargo  will  be  in  effect  what  it  is  in  form, 
— permanent.  Now,  my  dear  sir,  be  assured  that  this  alternative, 
an  indefinite  continuance  of  the  embargo  or  war  with  Great  Brit 
ain,  is  a  pernicious  error.  At  a  distance  from  the  seat  of  gov 
ernment,  indeed,  the  conduct  of  the  administration,  the  war  speeches 
of  its  devoted  adherents,  and  the  irritations  intended  to  be  excited 
by  the  newspapers,  alike  devoted,  certainly  tend  to  produce  such  an 
impression.  But  I  beg  you  to  be  persuaded  that,  whatever  may 
be  the  faith  of  the  mass  of  these  devotees  who  are  not  let  into  the 
secrets  of  the  cabinet,  the  administration  will  not  make  war  on 
Great  Britain.  The  threatening  language  daily  heard  is  not  en 
titled  even  to  the  rank  of  gasconade  or  bullying,  because  the  admin 
istration  know  full  well  that  all  such  gasconade  and  bullying  have 
been  and  will  be  viewed  by  Great  Britain  with  utter  contempt. 
But  such  language  is  well  enough  adapted  to  impose  on  the  citizens 
of  the  United  States,  by  terrifying  them  with  the  evils  of  a  war  with 
Great  Britain,  to  induce  them  quietly  and  patiently  to  submit  to  the 
evils  of  the  embargo.  You  may  say  (and  I  know  not  how  to  contradict 
you)  that  old  prejudices  and  attachments  to  France,  —  which, 


1807-14.1  CORRESPONDENCE.  405 

through  all  affected  disguises,  are  still  visible  in  those  who  have 
brought  us  into  our  present  disastrous  situation,  —  and  their  never- 
dying  hatred  of  England,  prompt  them  to  such  a  war.  But,  while  the 
people  of  the  United  States  would  manfully  encounter  every  evil 
incident  to  a  necessary  war,  the  administration  are  not  satisfied  that 
the  same  people,  even  duped  as  they  long  have  been  by  a  thousand 
artifices,  will  be  persuaded  that  war  with  Great  Britain  is  at  this 
time  unavoidable.  The  administration  surely  make  some  calcula 
tion  of  the  expenses  of  such  a  war,  and  know  that  it  could  not  be 
carried  on  without  new  taxes,  which  would  hazard  or  render  cer 
tain  their  own  overthrow,  and  make  way  for  successors  of  a  differ 
ent  character.  They  know  that,  in  the  actual  state  of  the  world, 
our  commerce  during  a  war  with  Great  Britain  would  be  compar 
atively  trifling,  and  the  ordinary  revenues  not  equal  to  the  present 
necessary  expenses  of  government ;  and  they  know  that,  without 
adequate  funds  pledged  for  the  regular  payment  of  the  interest  and 
the  eventual  discharge  of  the  principal  of  new  debts  to  the  vast 
amount  which  must  be  incurred  to  maintain  a  war  with  Great 
Britain,  money  could  not  be  borrowed.  They  know,  or  ought  to 
know,  that  the  conquest  of  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia  would  cost 
more  than  they  would  be  worth,  and  that  the  conquest  of  the 
latter  would  be  impracticable  without  a  naval  force  far  surpassing 
that  we  now  possess.  They  know  that  these  conquests,  if  effected 
by  the  expenditure  of  many  millions  of  dollars,  and  at  the  expense 
of  many  thousand  lives  of  valuable  citizens,  could  not  be  maintained 
without  a  vast  annual  expense  to  support  the  armies  which  must 
be  stationed  in  those  regions  for  their  defence.  Finally,  they 
know  —  and  rely  upon  it,  my  dear  sir,  that,  if  they  think  at  all,  they 
deeply  ponder  this  —  that,  if  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia  were  added 
to  the  United  States,  they  would  add  just  so  much  to  the  popula 
tion  and  strength  of  the  northern  section  of  the  Union,  the  power 
of  which,  of  all  things,  our  present  rulers  would  endeavor  to  prevent. 
Make  what  use  you  think  proper  of  this  letter.  This  is  not  a 
time  to  shrink  from  any  responsibility  in  which  the  public  safety  is 
involved. 

I  am,  &c.,  T.  P. 


406  LIFE  AND   LETTEKS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1807-14. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

JAN.  18,  1809. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  Your  favor  of  the  llth  is  this  moment  re 
ceived.  I  presume  you  know  that  Mr.  Lowell  is  the  writer  of  the 
"  Analysis,"  as  well  as  of  many  other  excellent  publications  here. 
We  do  not,  however,  differ  from  you  materially  in  the  views  you 
take  of  the  policy  of  the  administration.  It  is  not  believed  by  us 
that  they  intend  a  war  with  Great  Britain,  but  that,  by  menacing 
us  with  that  calamity,  they  expect  to  terrify  us  into  acquiescence 
with  their  oppressive  embargo  and  its  concomitants.  We  do  be 
lieve,  however,  that  the  administration  have  only  to  elect  between 
their  own  disgrace  or  the  ruin  of  their  country.  They  would  dread 
the  consequences  of  a  British  war,  which  you  have  described,  and 
therefore  they  do  not  contemplate  declaring  it ;  but  they  have  taken 
a  course  which  leads  to  it,  if  they  persist.  They  know  the  embargo 
will  not  be  borne  much  longer,  and  they  must  be  prepared  with  a 
substitute  of  a  character  coincident  with  their  general  policy.  This 
policy  requires  a  non-intercourse,  with  such  provisions  as,  in  effect, 
will  be  hostile,  unjustifiably  hostile,  to  Great  Britain,  and  she  will 
necessarily  retaliate.  The  present  obnoxious  measure  being  re 
moved,  the  nominal  relief  would  be  popular  ;  and  yet  we  should  in 
fact  have  no  trade,  and  should  only  be  permitted  to  go  upon  the 
ocean  to  provoke  British  captures,  which  our  laws  will  justify  her 
in  making,  but  which  will  be  universally  odious  in  our  country. 
Whether  this  would  be  called  war  or  not,  its  pernicious  effects  on 
us  would  be  the  same.  Our  government  ought  to  raise  the  em 
bargo,  and  leave  commerce  free ;  but  this  they  know  would  offend 
France,  and  therefore  they  refuse  to  do  it.  For  the  same  reason, 
they  will  adopt  no  substitute  for  the  embargo  that  is  not  as  favor 
able  to  the  wishes  of  France  as  the  embargo  itself ;  and  there  are 
so  many  foolish  expedients,  that  would  be  popular  and  yet  ruinous, 
that  we  do  truly  fear  some  of  them  will  be  adopted.  Such  is  the 
explanation  of  the  sentiment  in  the  "  Analysis." 

With  my  best  regards  and  respects  to  your  colleague 1  and  to  the 
"  Old  Sachem  "  2  of  the  Connecticut  tribe,  I  remain  always 

Your  faithful  G.  C. 

1  James  Lloyd,  the  successor  of  J.  Q.  Adams. 

2  James  Hillhouse. 


1807-14.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  407 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

JAN.  19, 1809. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  In  a  short  letter  yesterday,  I  explained  in 
some  degree  the  apparent  difference  between  our  friends  at  Wash 
ington  and  ourselves  here.  We  think  precisely  alike  of  the  policy 
of  the  government,  their  views,  intentions,  and  tricks  ;  but  we  think 
a  little  differently  of  the  consequences  that  may  be  produced.  We 
have  therefore  thought  it  wise  to  alarm  our  people  here  with  a 
just  dread  of  those  consequences,  which  are  too  likely  to  be  realized. 
We  believe  it  has  been  useful  to  direct  the  public  attention  to  the 
danger  of  a  British  war,  that  they  may  the  more  strongly  and 
steadily  resist  every  substitute  for  the  embargo  which  shall  be  cal 
culated  to  involve  us  in  such  a  war.  We  think,  too,  these  discus 
sions  operate  favorably  on  all  the  best  part  of  our  community,  by 
compelling  them  to  see  that  we  have  no  cause  of  war  with  that 
nation,  and  that,  in  fact,  the  want  of  any  color  of  pretext  to  enter 
into  such  a  quarrel  is  now  the  most  embarrassing  circumstance  to 
the  administration.  We  are  sensible,  at  the  same  time,  that  in 
other  sections  of  the  country  our  ideas  give  more  effect  to  the  vile 
artifices  the  administration  are  practising. 

Yours  faithfully,  G.  C. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  May  9,  1809. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  received  your  letter  of  the  1st  instant, 
on  the  subject  of  Mr.  Du  Buc's  proposition.  Although  I  have  no 
authority  to  answer  for  the  town  of  Boston,  and  certainly  none  to 
answer  for  the  State,  yet  I  am  satisfied  that,  in  the  present  posture 
of  our  affairs,  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  of  these  communities 
would  enter  into  a  serious  engagement  for  the  fortification  of  the 
port.  Indeed,  every  one  knows  that  the  national  government  is 
intrusted  with  the  care  of  our  national  defence,  and  to  that  alone 
ought  an  application  to  be  made. 

I  hope  you  will  pardon  my  delay,  when  I  inform  you  that  I 
waited  for  an  opportunity  to  see  a  paper  which  was  laid  before  the 
council  last  June  on  military  affairs,  by  the  late  governor. 

I  am,  with  unfeigned  regard,  always  yours, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 


408  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE  CABOT.     [1807-14. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

MARCH  28,  1810. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  A  packet  franked  by  Mr.  Quincy  and  a  letter 
covered  to  Colonel  May  were  received  the  day  before  yesterday. 
The  reasoning  on  the  subject  of  Jackson's  *  dismissal  is  so  forcible 
and  perspicuous  that  it  could  not  have  failed  to  satisfy  honest 
doubts.  But  the  truth  is,  we  are  past  the  period  of  argument  on 
that  topic  by  about  three  weeks.  Men  will  scarcely  read  a  para 
graph  which  professes  to  prove  the  fallacy  or  falsehood  of  the  gov 
ernment's  pretensions  concerning  Jackson.  This  point  occupies  so 
much  of  the  letter,  and  is  so  interwoven  with  other  parts  of  it,  that 
I  do  not  hesitate  to  use  the  authority  with  which  I  am  vested  to 
deposit  it  in  my  bureau  until  further  order. 

With  the  sincerest  regard  and  esteem,  I  am  ever  truly  yours, 

GEORGE  CABOT. 

CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

JUNE  11,  1813. 

MY  DEAR  SIR, — It  is  absolutely  impossible  for  me  to  perform 
the  task  prescribed  in  your  letter.  I  have  long  since  expelled  from 
my  mind  as  much  as  possible  every  thought  on  the  subject  you 
require  me  to  consider.  I  perceive  there  is  so  much  weight  in  the 
reasons  you  suggest  for  a  repeal  of  the  non-intercourse  law  that  it 
may  be  expected  to  take  place.  The  replenishing  the  treasury  by 
the  double  duties,  and  the  supplies  of  some  indispensable  articles 
to  the  enemy,  are  stronger  motives  for  a  repeal  than  any  which 
now  exist  for  the  continuance  of  that  laV.  If,  however,  the  double 
duties  are  faithfully  collected  (which  I  doubt),  the  Eastern  and 
commercial  people  will  be  most  grievously  oppressed  ;  for  the  con 
sumption  of  imported  articles  by  these  is  out  of  all  proportion 
greater  than  by  the  cultivators  of  the  South  and  West.  I  hear 
many  persons  express  a  hope  that  the  repeal  will  not  be  agreed  to, 
unless  the  double  duties  are  abolished ;  and  others  hope  it  will  be 
resisted  altogether,  because  they  are  not  willing  to  raise  money  by 
any  means  to  support  an  unrighteous  war.  For  my  own  part,  I 
grow  more  indifferent  to  any  of  these  measures,  believing  fully 
that,  since  our  nation  is  so  wicked  and  unjust  as  to  enter  upon  this 

1  Francis  James  Jackson,  British  minister  at  Washington. 


1807-14.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  409 

war,  if  it  suffers,  its  sufferings  will  be  salutary.  I,  therefore,  shall 
obey  the  laws  constitutionally  made,  but  shall  conscientiously 
refrain  from  every  voluntary  aid  to  the  war,  in  thought,  word,  and 
deed.  With  sincere  regard  and  the  highest  esteem  and  respect,  I 
am  always 

Your  assured  friend,  GEORGE  CABOT. 


410  LIFE  AND   LETTERS  J&&  GEORGE   CABOT.       [1800-5 


CHAPTER    XI. 

1800-1805. 
New  England  Federalism  and  the  Hartford  Convention. 

I  PROPOSE  in  the  following  chapters  to  give  some  ac 
count  of  the  Hartford  Convention,  of  which  Mr.  Cabot  had 
the  honor  to  be  chosen  President.  His  acceptance  of  this 
office  was  the  most  momentous  action  of  his  life,  and  I 
shall  therefore  endeavor  to  define  with  exactness  the  opin 
ions  and  intentions  which  led  him  to  take  this  step.  To 
do  this  properly,  it  becomes  necessary  not  only  to  relate 
the  history  of  the  Convention  itself,  but  to  trace  the  course 
of  political  events  which  produced  such  a  measure.  This, 
if  performed  with  fulness,  would  be  to  write  the  history  of 
New  England  Federalism  during  the  first  decade  and  a  half 
of  the  present  century ;  and  a  biography  offers  neither 
place  nor  occasion  for  so  extended  a  work.  By  a  careful 
exclusion  of  all  irrelevant  matter,  a  brief  sketch  of  New 
England  Federalism  and  its  results  may,  I  think,  be  pre 
sented,  and  no  point  essential  to  a  correct  understanding  of 
the  subject  be  left  untouched.  I  shall  aim  to  show  not  merely 
what  the  Federalists  did,  but  also  what  their  opinions  were  ; 
and,  to  do  this  successfully,  I  shall  be  obliged  to  trace,  as 
concisely  as  possible,  the  general  policy  of  the  administra 
tion  during  this  period. 

Mr.  Hildreth  and  Dr.  Von  Hoist  have  alone  attempted 
to  treat  the  Hartford  Convention  and  its  antecedents  his 
torically :  all  other  writers  on  the  subject  have  been  im 
bued  with  a  spirit  of  bitter  partisanship.  I  cannot  claim 


1800-5.]  THE  HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  411 

impartiality,  nor  is  it  my  intention  to  offer  arguments  either 
for  or  against  the  Hartford  Convention  and  its  members. 
I  shall  simply  state  the  facts  of  the  case,  and  leave  the 
work  of  deciding  the  merits  of  the  question  to  the  future 
historian.  I  shall  in  this  connection  present  some  facts 
which  are  wholly  new  and  drawn  from  material  never 
before  published,  and  these  new  facts  will  of  necessity  be 
interwoven  with  many  already  familiar. 

In  enumerating  the  sources  on  which  we  may  rely  for  evi 
dence  in  regard  to  the  history  of  the  Convention  and  of  the 
New  England  Federalists,  it  is  to  be  much  regretted  that 
we  cannot  count  testimony  of  the  best  and  highest  kind. 
There  is  no  evidence  by  a  disinterested  contemporary. 
Partisan  witnesses  abound,  however ;  and  we  are  especially 
fortunate  in  respect  to  the  opinions  of  opponents. 

We  have  in  great  fulness  the  views  of  the  most  extreme 
hostility  as  well  as  those  of  more  temperate  opposition. 
But  we  are  not  compelled  to  trust  to  the  frothy  denuncia 
tions  of  the  Democratic  press  for  a  statement  of  the  case 
against  the  New  England  Federalists.  The  indictment  has 
been  drawn  up  by  one  of  their  former  associates  with  far 
greater  force  and  elaboration  than  any  member  of  the 
Democratic  party  was  capable  of  exhibiting.  In  his  sec 
ond  reply  to  the  thirteen  Boston  gentlemen,  in  1829,  Mr. 
John  Quincy  Adams  has  formulated  an  accusation  against 
the  New  England  Federalists,  pre-eminent  both  in  extent 
and  in  force.1  With  all  the  bitterness  of  confirmed  enmity, 
and  sharpened  by  the  peculiar  animosity  due  to  the  family 
nature  of  the  quarrel,  Mr.  Adams's  fierce  polemic  has  con- 

1  This  second  reply,  here  referred  to,  was  never  published.  The  repub- 
lication,  in  1828,  of  the  accusations  made  by  Mr.  Adams  in  1808,  drew  forth 
from  some  quondam  Boston  Federalists  a  request  for  evidence,  which  Mr. 
Adams  in  a  long  answer  declined  to  give.  The  thirteen  demandants  then 
issued  an  appeal  to  the  public.  These  three  documents  were  published. 
Mr.  Adams  then  prepared  this  second  reply,  but  did  not  give  it  to  the  world. 
Through  the  kindness  of  Professor  Henry  Adams,  I  have  been  allowed  to 
use  this  valuable  paper. 


412  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1800-5. 

centrated  in  one  pamphlet  all  that  can  be  charged  against 
the  Federalists.  If  worse  things  can  be  said  about  them,  I 
have  failed  to  find  them ;  nor  do  I  believe  that  they  exist. 
Mr.  Adams,  in  common  with  Colonel  Pickering,  the  chief 
enemy  of  his  early  years,  believed  conscientiously  that  no 
one  who  differed  from  him  in  opinion  could  be  governed  in 
any  action  of  life  by  aught  except  the  vilest  and  basest 
motives.  Join  such  conviction  as  this  to  a  power  of  vitu 
peration  unequalled  except  in  rare  instances  even  in  New 
England,  and  we  have  an  accuser  who  would  leave  nothing 
unsaid,  and  who  would  not  seek  to  soften  any  thing  that  he 
could  say.  So  well  provided  with  an  opponent's  views,  we 
are  equally  fortunate  in  the  other  direction.  Not  only  from 
Mr.  Cabot's  own  letters,  but  in  the  fullest  measure  from 
the  Pickering  papers,  from  those  of  Governor  Strong,  and 
from  the  deprecating  defences  of  Mr.  Harrison  Gray  Otis, 
are  we  enabled  to  gather  the  views  of  the  New  England 
Federalists  of  all  shades  of  opinion.  Thus  it  is  possible  \o 
know  both  the  best  and  the  worst  that  can  be  alleged  for 
or  against  the  Federal  leaders.  The  future  may,  and  very 
probably  will,  bring  some  new  materials  to  light;  but  it 
does  not  seem  probable  that  any  thing  can  be  presented  to 
essentially  modify  or  alter  the  evidence  contained  in  the 
papers  now  printed.1 

The  principal  points  in  Mr.  Adams's  accusations  may  be 
resolved  into  seven  heads,  which  I  will  enumerate  here  for 
the  sake  of  convenience.  Mr.  Adams  charges  :  — 

I.  That  there  was  a  plot  among  certain  Federalist  leaders 
to  dissolve  the  Union  in  1804. 

II.  That  this  plot  was  never  abandoned,   but  was  re 
newed  in  1808  and  in  1814. 

1  This  may  appear  a  bold  assertion,  but  it  rests  upon  a  conviction  of  its 
truth  derived  from  a  long  and  careful  study  of  the  Pickering  Papers.  What 
ever  schemes  of  separation  were  fomented  in  New  England,  Colonel  Picker 
ing  was  the  foremost  in  them.  He  surpassed  all  his  associates  in  reckless 
and  daring  opposition,  and  that  which  he  did  not  know  and  share  in  regard 
to  New  England  Federalism  cannot,  I  think,  be  vitally  essential  to  its  his 
tory. 


1800-5.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  413 

III.  That  a  dissolution  of  the  Union  was,  as  such,  the 
object  and  wish  of  certain  Federalist  leaders. 

IV.  That  these   leaders   were   in   communication   with 
Great  Britain  in  1807-8,  and  subsequently. 

V.  That  these  leaders  were  a  small  band  of  adroit  con 
spirators,  residing  in  Boston,  who  deceived  and  misled  the 
people,  had  no  real  popular  support,  represented  nobody 
but  themselves,  and  sought  only  their  own   advancement 
and  the  gratification  of  their  own  ambition. 

VI.  That  the  Hartford  Convention  was  the  culmination 
of  this  conspiracy,  and  was  intended  as  the  preliminary  step 
to  the  attainment  of  the  object  of  the  conspirators,  a  disso 
lution  of  the  Union. 

VII.  That  the  Hartford  Convention  was  unconstitutional 
and  treasonable,  and  was  the  only  instance  up  to  that  time 
of  State  resistance  to  the  general  government,  and  wholly 
abnormal,  hideous,  and  wicked.1 

Before  proceeding  with  a  detailed  discussion  of  these 
points,  it  seems  proper  to  say  a  few  words  as  to  the  origin 
and  principles  of  the  Federalist  party,  and  also  to  trace  their 
history  after  their  fall  from  power  in  1801  until  the  first 
scheme  of  separation  in  1804.  The  popular  notion  in  re 
gard  to  Federalism  is  that  to  which  the  name  naturally 
gives  rise.  By  Federalists  are  commonly  understood  those 
men  who  advocated  a  union  of  the  States  and  an  efficient 
Federal  government.  This  conception  is  true,  but  is  at  the 
same  time  so  limited  that  it  may  fairly  be  called  superficial. 
The  name  arose  from  the  first  object  which  the  friends 
of  the  Constitution  strove  to  achieve  ;  but  this  object,  the 
more  perfect  union,  and  even  the  Constitution  itself,  were 
but  means  to  ends  of  vastly  more  importance.  The  ends 
which  the  Federalists  sought  formed  the  great  principles 
on  which  the  party  was  founded,  and  it  can  be  justly  said 

1  I  have  endeavored  to  sum  up  fairly  the  essential  accusations  made  by 
Mr.  Adams.  I  feel  confident  that  I  have  not  exaggerated  them,  and  I  trust 
I  have  not  weakened  them. 


414  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1800-5. 

that  no  nobler  or  better  ends  were  ever  striven  for  by  any 
political  party  or  by  any  statesmen.  The  first  and  para 
mount  object  of  the  Federalists  was  to  build  up  a  nation 
and  to  create  a  national  sentiment.  For  this  they  sought 
a  more  perfect  union.  Their  next  object  was  to  give  the 
nation  they  had  called  into  existence  not  only  a  govern 
ment,  but  a  strong  government.  To  do  this,  they  had  not 
only  to  devise  a  model,  to  draw  a  constitution,  to  organize  a 
legislature,  executive,  and  judiciary,  but  they  had  to  equip 
the  government  thus  formed  with  all  those  adjuncts  without 
which  no  government  can  long  exist  under  the  conditions 
of  modern  civilization.  The  Federalists  had  to  provide  for 
the  debt,  devise  a  financial  and  foreign  policy,  organize  an 
army,  fortify  the  ports,  found  a  navy,  impose  and  collect 
taxes,  and  put  in  operation  an  extensive  revenue  system. 
We  of  the  English  race — whose  creed  is  that  governments 
and  great  political  systems  grow  and  develop  slowly,  are 
the  results  of  climate,  soil,  race,  tradition,  and  the  exigen 
cies  of  time  and  place,  who  wholly  disavow  the  theory  that 
perfect  governments  spring  in  a  night  from  the  heated 
brains  of  Frenchmen  or  Spaniards  —  can  best  appreciate  the 
task  with  which  our  ancestors  grappled.  But  even  we  must 
stand  amazed,  if  we  pause  to  consider  the  social  and  physi 
cal  circumstances  under  which  this  great  experiment  was 
made.  Thirteen  distinct  communities,  scattered  along  a 
vast  extent  of  coast,  with  no  ties  to  bind  them  but  race, 
language,  and  geographical  isolation,  were  to  be  welded 
into  a  compact,  harmonious  nation.  Most  of  these  commu 
nities  were  dispersed  over  great  territories,  were  agricul 
tural,  and  were  destitute  of  the  commercial  and  moneyed 
interests  which  demand  so  peremptorily  a  firm  and  stable 
government.  Moreover,  these  communities  had  always  re 
alized  in  large  measure  the  blessings  of  little  or  no  govern 
ment.  They  were  essentially  self-governing,  and  depended 
solely  on  their  own  good  sense  to  maintain  peace,  order,  and 
justice.  Against  the  mother  country,  the  colonies  had  risen 


1800-5.]  THE   HABTFOKD   CONVENTION.  415 

in  defence  of  the  rights  of  Englishmen  ;  and  after  long  years 
of  struggle,  after  bitter  intestine  broils,  they  had  shaken  off 
the  parental  yoke.  The  contest  had  strengthened  the  inde 
pendence  and  self-reliance  of  the  colonists ;  but  it  had  also 
fostered  their  distrust  of  all  government,  and  had  rudely 
shaken  even  the  weak  local  fabrics.  What  followed  could 
have  been  readily  foreseen.  The  ill-contrived  central  gov 
ernment  of  the  Confederation  went  rapidly  to  pieces.  With 
no  intrinsic  strength,  it  could  not  resist  the  popular  distrust, 
jealousy,  and  contempt.  Independence  became  turbulence ; 
liberty,  license  ;  and  freedom,  anarchy.  A  revulsion  fol 
lowed,  and  the  Constitution  was  the  result.  Amidst  natural 
disadvantages,  increased  a  thousand-fold  by  the  miserable 
years  of  the  Confederation,  Americans  sought  to  build  up  a 
nation.  Upon  a  people  lately  convulsed  by  civil  war,  upon 
a  people  who  had  lost  their  old  political  habits  and  tra 
ditions  without  finding  new  ones  in  their  stead,  it  was  nec 
essary  to  impose  a  government,  and  to  create  a  national 
sentiment.  This  the  Federalists  did,  and  they  need  no  other 
eulogy.  With  no  undue  national  pride,  we  can  justly  say 
that  the  adoption  and  support  of  the  Constitution  offer  an 
example  of  the  political  genius  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  to 
which  history  cannot  furnish  a  parallel. 

The  political  party  to  whose  exertions  these  great  results 
were  due  was  the  Federal  party.  They  were  the  party  of 
order,  of  good  government,  and  of  conservatism.  Against 
them  was  ranged  a  majority  of  their  fellow-citizens.  But 
this  majority  was  wild,  anarchical,  disunited.  The  only 
common  ground  on  which  they  could  meet  was  that  of  sim 
ple  opposition.  The  only  name  they  had  was  anti-Federal 
ists.  They  had  neither  leaders,  discipline,  objects,  nor  even 
a  party  cry.  Before  the  definite  aims  and  concentrated 
ability  of  the  Federalists,  they  fled  in  helpless  disorder,  like 
an  unarmed  mob  before  advancing  soldiers.  But,  though 
dispersed,  the  anti-Federalists  were  still  in  a  numerical  ma 
jority.  They  needed  a  leader,  organization,  and  opportu- 


416  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.        [1800-5. 

nity,  and  they  soon  found  all  three.  Thomas  Jefferson 
arrived  in  New  York,  not  only  to  enter  into  Washington's 
cabinet,  and  lend  the  aid  of  his  great  talents  to  the  suc 
cess  of  the  new  scheme,  but  soon  also  to  put  himself  at  the 
head  of  the  large  though  demoralized  opposition  to  the  ad 
ministration  he  had  sworn  to  support.  Filled  with  the  wild 
democratic  theories  which  his  susceptible  nature  had  readily 
imbibed  in  France,  Jefferson  soon  infused  them  into  the 
minds  of  most  of  his  followers.  Instead  of  a  vague  dislike 
to  any  and  all  government,  he  substituted  a  sharp  and  fac 
tious  opposition  to  each  and  every  measure  proposed  by  the 
friends  of  the  Constitution.  To  that  Constitution  he  had 
been  strongly  opposed,1  and  he  endeavored  to  instil  a  like 
distrust  into  the  minds  of  his  followers.  Failing  in  this, 
with  his  ready  insight  into  popular  wishes,  and  with  his 
instinctive  appreciation  of  the  latent  political  forces,  he 
changed  his  position  to  the  more  tenable  ground  of  a  strict 
and  limited  construction.  He  found  the  opposition  an  inert 
mass,  and  as  far  as  possible  he  informed  it  with  his  own 
spirit,  the  spirit  of  the  French  democrat.  He  found  it  with 
out  objects  or  principles,  and  he  gave  it  both.  He  built  up 
a  party  creed  sentence  by  sentence,  as  the  Federalists  ad 
vanced  from  one  measure  to  another.  To  bind  the  States 
and  to  strengthen  the  national  sentiment,  to  make  the  coun 
try  respected  and  prosperous,  the  genius  of  Hamilton  de 
vised  and  carried  through  the  financial  policy.  Jefferson 
met  it  by  the  cry  of  corruption,  monarchy,  and  repudiation. 
He  denounced  the  national  bank  as  an  engine  of  despotism. 
He  sneered  at  the  forms  with  which  Washington  strove 
to  hedge  the  dignity  of  his  position.  When  Washington 
formulated  the  two  great  principles  of  Federalism,  a  strong 
neutrality  supported  by  a  sufficient  navy,  Jefferson,  im 
bued  with  an  insane  love  of  France,  led  his  party  into  the 
defence  of  that  nation,  and  forced  our  politics  to  turn  on 
those  of  Europe.  Appreciating  the  strength  of  the  latent 
*  Jefferson's  Works,  III.  pp.  315-318,  324,  325. 


1800-5.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  417 

hostility  to  England,  lie  roused  it  to  frenzy,  and  strove  to 
divide  the  nation  into  a  French  and  English  party.  From 
the  same  motives,  he  resisted  and  opposed  Jay's  treaty  ;  and, 
when  he  found  himself  unable  to  stay  the  national  indigna 
tion  against  the  French,  he  grasped  the  terrible  weapon  of 
States'  rights,  and  sought  to  coerce  the  national  government 
by  the  doctrine  of  nullification,  by  threats  of  secession,  and 
by  the  imminence  of  civil  war.1 

The  Federalists  had  come  forward  as  the  champions  of 
order,  as  the  upholders  of  law,  as  the  defenders  of  constitu 
tional  liberty,  and  of  the  rights  of  property.  When  they 
found  themselves  confronted  not  by  the  constitutional 
opposition  which  was  to  have  been  anticipated,  but  by 
what  seemed  a  Gallicized  resistance  to  every  thing  that 
was  not  license,  they  grew  more  and  more  convinced  of  the 
imperative  need  of  a  strong  and  energetic  government. 
The  extreme  ground  taken  by  Jefferson  drove  the  Federal 
ists  to  believe  more  and  more  firmly  in  the  necessity  of 
stringent  measures,  and  in  the  baneful  character  of  every 
thing  approaching  democracy.  Yet  the  vigor  and  success 
of  their  policy  never  gave  them  the  support  of  a  majority 
of  the  people,  except  at  the  moment  of  enthusiasm  awak 
ened  by  the  French  outrages.  Still,  they  maintained  them 
selves  by  sheer  weight  of  ability,  and  for  twelve  years 
frustrated  the  attacks  of  the  opposition.  With  all  his 
marvellous  political  skill,  with  all  his  unequalled  adroitness 
in  the  management  of  men,  Jefferson  succeeded  in  drawing 
over  to  his  views  but  one  man  of  real  ability.  Madison 
left  the  Federalists ;  but  their  ranks  remained  otherwise 
intact,  and  the  Democratic  majority  seemed  vain  before 
the  united  efforts  of  a  party  led  and  officered  by  nearly 
all  the  distinguished  men  of  the  nation.  But  the  Fed 
eralist  party  carried  within  itself  the  seeds  of  destruction. 

1  If  this  seems  overdrawn,  let  any  one  who  is  of  that  opinion  read  the 
Kentucky  resolutions  of  1798,  drafted  by  Jefferson  himself,  the  Virginia  reso 
lutions  of  tlie  same  date,  which  he  instigated,  and  call  to  mind  the  fact  that 
Virginian  troops  were  ready  in  arms  to  seize  in  1801,  as  they  did  in  1861, 
the  arsenals  of  the  United  States. 

27 


418  LIFE    AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE    CABOT.       [1800-5. 

To  continue  successfully  the  political  tour  deforce  by  which 
they  had  obtained  their  power  and  established  their  meas 
ures,  a  perfect  harmony  was  requisite.  In  a  party  which 
found  its  strength  almost  solely  in  the  numbers  and  abili 
ties  of  its  many  leaders,  union  and  co-operation  rested  on 
most  unstable  foundations.  After  the  withdrawal  of  Wash 
ington,  bitter  feuds  broke  out,  and  the  Federalist  party  fell, 
never  to  rise  again.  Then  was  seen  the  unsubstantial 
nature  of  the  popular  support  which  had  been  given  to 
them.  In  the  country,  generally,  their  numbers  melted 
away  with  a  startling  rapidity,  and  even  in  New  England 
their  power  began  to  wane.  The  reasons  for  this  are  not 
far  to  seek.  The  Federalists  were  not  in  sympathy  with 
the  political  forces  at  work  in  the  country ;  whereas  Jef 
ferson  knew  these  forces  by  instinct,  and  directed  his 
course  in  conformity  to  them,  as  surely  as  the  mariner 
follows  the  compass.  Under  no  circumstances  could  the 
Federalist  tenure  of  power  have  been  much  prolonged,  yet 
in  the  short  time  allotted  to  them  they  had  done  much. 
This  is  neither  the  place  nor  the  opportunity  to  rehearse 
their  achievements,  nor  is  it  necessary.  A  party  which,  in 
opposition  to  the  popular  passions,  called  a  nation  into 
being,  and  which  erected  around  our  constitutional  liberties 
the  barriers  that  kept  out  the  flood  of  ignorant  democracy, 
then  threatening  to  engulf  us,  does  not  need  to  have  their 
exploits  catalogued  here.  The  Federalists  could  not  do  as 
they  wished,  and  prevent  our  government  becoming  purely 
democratic  and  popular ;  but  they  did  succeed  in  modify 
ing  democracy,  and  in  rendering  it  both  acceptable  and 
successful.  Yet  they  necessarily  left  much  undone.  They 
had  initiated  the  policy  of  strong  and  real  neutrality,  pro 
tected  by  an  efficient  navy ;  but  they  had  not  habituated 
the  people  to  it,  nor  had  the  glories  of  Truxtun's  victories 
been  sufficient  to  make  men  realize  that  the  sea  was  the 
field  on  which  our  power  could  be  best  maintained  and 
asserted.  The  foreign  policy  and  the  navy  were,  therefore, 


1800-5.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  419 

the  two  points  on  which  Jefferson's  attacks  could  and  did 
succeed ;  and  they  form  the  key  to  nearly  all  the  history 
of  the  next  twelve  years. 

To  understand  and  do  justice  to  the  unmixed  feeling  of 
dread  with  which  the  Federalists  regarded  Jefferson,  we 
must  understand  not  only  the  peculiar  and  strong  nature 
of  New  England  Federalism,  but  also  the  circumstances 
of  the  times,  and  the  character  of  Jefferson  himself,  as  it 
appeared  by  his  words  and  deeds.  In  New  England,  Fed 
eralism  had  always  found  its  chief  support ;  and  there  alone, 
after  the  downfall  of  the  party,  did  it  retain  any  real  vital 
ity.  This  was  due,  of  course,  partly  to  the  stubborn  and 
unyielding  character  of  the  New  England  people,  but 
chiefly  to  the  circumstances  of  their  daily  lives,  to  their 
education,  their  occupations,  and  their  traditions.  The 
population  of  New  England  was  of  the  purest  English  stock, 
unmixed  with  any  foreign  element.  Dependent  wholly  on 
their  own  exertions,  the  New  Englanders  were  not  burdened 
with  the  curse  of  slavery.  Settled  in  towns,  and  not  scat 
tered  over  a  wide  extent  of  territory,  their  interests  and 
habits  were  homogeneous  and  of  long  standing.  The  aver 
age  standard  of  wealth  and  education  was  remarkably  high ; 
and  they  were,  moreover,  essentially  a  trading  and  commer 
cial  community.  Their  social  fabric  was  perfectly  crys 
tallized  and  firm,  and  their  moneyed  interests  were  large, 
extended,  and  sensitive.  They  were  naturally,  therefore, 
the  friends  of  order,  stability,  and  strength  in  the  govern 
ment,  and  of  political  conservatism.  To  the  party  which 
represented  these  principles,  they  were  sure  to  give  an 
obstinate  and  unyielding  adherence. 

All  these  opinions  had  been  invigorated  and  confirmed 
in  the  minds  of  the  Federalist  leaders,  by  the  spectacle  pre 
sented  to  them  in  Europe.  Beholding,  as  we  now  do,  the 
excesses  and  results  of  the  French  Revolution  through  the 
long  vista  of  eighty  years,  we  cannot  easily  appreciate 
the  almost  wild  alarm  with  which  its  principles  were  re- 


420  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.       [1800-5. 

garded  at  the  time  by  the  majority  of  intelligent  men  in 
New  England.  It  is  a  simple  matter  for  us  to  estimate  the 
dangers,  meaning,  and  importance  of  that  awful  convulsion. 
Secure  in  our  established  national  wealth  and  strength, 
brought  up  from  our  cradles  to  believe  in  the  Monroe  doc 
trine  as  the  only  possible  foreign  policy  for  the  United 
States,  we  smile  readily  at  what  seem  to  us  the  almost  mad 
fears  excited  by  the  French  among  the  New  England  Fed 
eralists.  But,  if  we  can  for  a  moment  perform  that  most 
difficult  of  all  feats,  —  carry  ourselves  back  in  imagination, 
and  stand  in  the  places  of  our  ancestors,  —  we  shall  no  longer 
look  upon  their  apprehensions  as  ill-founded.  They  had  a 
commerce  of  enormous  value  and  great  extent,  scattered 
over  the  face  of  the  globe,  and  at  the  mercy  of  the  Euro 
pean  nations.  They  had  but  just  freed  themselves  from 
England,  their  nation  was  still  in  infancy,  and  its  very 
existence  seemed  to  depend  upon  the  actions  of  Europe. 
Foreign  politics  had  a  vital  importance  then,  of  which  we 
can  now  have  no  conception.  And  what  was  the  lesson, 
what  the  spectacle,  that  these  same  foreign  politics  pre 
sented?  They  had  seen  one  of  the  great  nations  of  the 
world  torn  to  pieces  by  the  frenzies  of  a  Parisian  mob. 
They  had.  beheld  universal  license,  atheism,  communism, 
preached  by  the  ephemeral  leaders  whom  these  mobs  had 
set  up.  They  had  seen  every  thing  which  they  considered 
dear  and  valuable  in  life  trampled  in  the  dust  by  the 
French  rulers,  and  this  destruction  exultingly  proclaimed. 
This  was  not  all.  Possibly  their  fears  would  not  have  been 
justified  by  this  alone;  but  when  they  saw  the  pillage, 
carnage,  and  riot  of  mobs  converted  into  sacred  principles, 
and  a  crusade  in  their  behalf  inaugurated  and  supported  by 
a  whole  nation,  they  shrank  from  the  promoters  of  such 
deeds  with  undisguised  horror.  The  Federalists  were  the 
champions  of  "  not  rash  equality,  but  equal  rights." 

..."  They  wished  men  to  be  free : " 
"  As  much  from  mobs  as  kings,  — from  you  as  me." 


1800-5.J  THE  HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  421 

The  liberty  for  which  they  had  fought  the  Revolution, 
and  founded  the  government,  was  the  sober,  intelligent, 
fearless  liberty  of  our  English  ancestors.  But  they  hated 
the  licentious  despotism  of  a  French  rabble,  even  when 
dressed  out  in  the  deceitful  mask  of  "  liberty,  equality, 
fraternity."  Under  the  influence  of  these  specious  names, 
they  had  seen  the  nations  of  Europe  become,  in  turn,  the 
allies,  the  dupes,  and  the  victims  of  French  Republicanism. 
They  had  no  wish  to  follow  in  the  same  path.  Let  it  not 
be  supposed  that  these  men  dreaded  the  arms  of  France. 
They  longed  to  meet  her  in  battle,  and  prove  their  native 
supremacy  to  any  thing  of  Gallic  origin.  What  they  didi 
fear  was  the  subtle  infusion  of  the  poison  of  French  prin 
ciples  with  all  its  baneful  concomitants,  and  concluding,  at 
last,  in  abject  dependence  on  the  "great  republic."  We 
may  call  such  feelings  and  beliefs  madness  or  folly  now ; 
but,  when  we  do  so,  we  should  recall  the  great  men  of  other 
lands,  who  shared  in  the  opinions  of  the  New  England  Fed 
eralists.  Edmund  Burke  was  neither  knave  nor  fool,  nor 
the  sycophantic  Tory  which  Democrats  delighted  to  paint ; 
yet  what  Federalist  ever  equalled  or  even  approached  Burke 
in  savage  and  unmeasured  denunciation  of  France  and  the 
French  Revolution?  William  Pitt  was  neither  a  coward 
nor  a  driveller ;  but  he  regarded  the  principles  of  the 
French  Revolution  with  unmixed  horror,  and,  in  obedience 
to  a  public  sentiment  which  he  could  not  resist,  waged  a 
long  and  doubtful  war  against  them.  George  Canning  was 
neither  dull  nor  timid  ;  yet  he  founded  the  "  Anti-Jacobin," 
to  arrest  the  spread  of  French  doctrines,  and  to  their  suppres 
sion  devoted  all  his  ability.  The  list  might  be  indefinitely 
lengthened,  but  to  no  good  purpose.  French  principles,  as 
then  preached  and  practised,  were  regarded  with  deadly 
aversion  by  a  large  majority  of  able  men  everywhere ;  and 
the  New  England  Federalists,  whether  rightly  or  wrongly  it 
boots  not  now  to  inquire,  formed  no  exception  to  the  rule. 

Actuated   by   such    feelings,    it   becomes   easy   to    com- 


422  LIFE   AND  LETTEKS   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.       [1800-5. 

prehend  their  bitter  political  hostility  to  those  who  not 
only  brought  French  principles  into  vogue,  but  strove,  and 
with  some  measure  of  success,  to  found  a  party  upon  them. 
Chief  among  the  apostles  of  the  new  belief  was  Thomas 
Jefferson.  He  had  opposed  the  Constitution,  and  denounced 
it  as  too  energetic ;  he  had  raised  the  hollow,  canting  cry  of 
"  monarchists  ;  "  he  had  defended  Shays's  rebellion  as  hon 
orable  and  patriotic ;  he  wished  "  the  tree  of  liberty  to  be 
watered  with  the  blood  of  patriots  every  twenty  years ; "  he 
desired  a  rebellion  to  recur,  with  regularity,  at  the  same 
epochs  ; l  he  had  been  the  advocate  of  repudiation,  and  the 
consistent  enemy  of  the  army,  the  navy,  and  the  treasury  ; 
he  favored  rotation  in  office ;  he  was  a  foe  to  strict  neutral 
ity,  and  an  ally  of  France  ;  and  now,  under  what  circum 
stances  it  mattered  not,  he  was  chosen  President  of  the 
United  States.  Perhaps  he  intended  to  carry  out  no  one 
of  his  views,  but  he  avowed  the  contrary.  Nor  is  it  neces 
sary  to  say  that  these  were  the  real  views  of  Jefferson  ;  but 
they  were  his  declared  opinions,  and  in  this  character  had 
he  chosen  to  appear.  Can  we  therefore  blame  the  Feder 
alists  for  regarding  him  as  the  enemy  of  all  respectable 
government,  and  his  accession  to  power  as  the  precursor  of 
a  revolution  destined  ultimately  to  reduce  the  United  States 
to  the  condition  of  France  ? 

One  thing  is  certain  :  the  success  of  Jefferson  was  a  revo 
lution.  To  the  timid  character  of  the  leader  and,  above  all, 
to  the  good  sense  of  the  American  people,  it  is  due  that 
this  revolution  was  a  peaceable  one.  The  natural  political 
forces  which  the  Federalists  had  curbed,  but  which  they 
had  tried  in  vain  to  crush,  were  now  in  the  ascendant,  and 
for  good  or  ill  our  future  history  was  to  move  on  different 
lines  from  those  which  had  at  first  been  drawn.  The  cooler 
heads  in  the  Federalist  party  understood  the  importance 
and  meaning  of  the  change :  they  knew  that  it  was  revolu 
tion;  and,  while  they  believed  it  to  be  inevitable,  their  just 
1  See  note  above,  p.  416. 


1800-5]  THE  HARTFOKD   CONVENTION.  423 

anxiety  was  very  great.     Nor  were  the  first  steps  of  the 
new  President  of  such  a  nature  as  to  allay  their  fears. 

In  the  midst  of  the  anxiety  and  excitement  produced  by 
the  wretched  and  prolonged  intrigue  to  substitute  Burr  for 
Jefferson,  some  of  the  Federalist  leaders  in  Washington 
sought  to  make  terms  with  the  latter,  in  order  to  secure  from 
him  guarantees  that  certain  fundamental  principles  should 
be  observed.  Strange  as  it  may  sound  to  us,  one  of  the 
dangers  most  dreaded  by  the  Federalists  was  that  the  acces 
sion  of  Jefferson  would  be  accompanied  by  a  complete  re 
organization  of  the  civil  service  in  the  interest  of  partisans 
of  the  new  administration  ;  and  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
on  this  point  Jefferson  gave  satisfactory  assurances  to  the 
Federalist  leaders  in  Washington,  through  the  medium  of 
Senator  Smith  of  Maryland.1  The  other  points  on  which 
the  Federalists  were  alarmed  were  the  public  debt,  com 
merce,  and  the  navy,  which  they  considered  as  of  vital  im 
portance,  but  to  which  Jefferson's  hostility  was  notorious  and 
avowed.  On  these  questions,  likewise,  Jefferson's  pledges 
were  satisfactory.  How  far  he  violated  them  will  gradually 
appear  as  we  proceed ;  but  that  they  were  given  is  undoubted, 
and,  although  in  itself  a  matter  of  no  great  moment,  illus 
trates  the  fears  of  the  Federalists,  and  the  extremities  to 
which  they  believed  Jefferson  would  go.  Reference  is  not 
made  to  it  here  for  the  sake  of  charging  Jefferson  with  bad 
faith  subsequently,  although  such  pledges  as  were  given, 
even  if  conveyed  in  a  roundabout  way,  wrere  sufficiently 
precise,  and  were  looked  upon  by  the  parties  as  binding. 

1  See  Hildreth,  II.  407 ;  Diary  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  containing  direct 
testimony  of  Bayard,  1. 428.  Davis's  Life  of  Burr,  pp.  102-107,  contains  a  full 
account  of  this  transaction,  together  with  the  sworn  depositions  of  Bayard 
and  Smith  that  the  negotiation  had  occurred,  and  that  Jefferson  had  acceded 
to  the  conditions  proposed  by  the  Federalists.  That  Jefferson  made  and 
violated  these  pledges  is  now  matter  of  history,  although  in  the  "  Anas  "  he 
denied  the  existence  of  any  negotiations  or  pledges  of  this  character.  In  the 
same  account,  Jefferson  with  his  wonted  adroitness  accuses  Bayard  of  nego 
tiating  for  Burr  with  Democratic  members,  —  a  statement  which  called  forth 
the  publication  of  the  conclusive  testimony  of  Bayard  and  Smith  given  in 
the  Life  of  Burr. 


424  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF  GEORGE   CABOT.       [1800-5. 

The  Federalists  seem  to  have  put  confidence  in  them.  Yet 
Jefferson  was  the  most  changeable  of  men  ;  and  to  expect 
him  to  maintain  pledges  such  as  these,  or  to  accuse  him 
of  bad  faith  in  violating  them,  would  be  little  better  than 
charging  a  man  with  bad  faith  for  changing  his  coat.  But 
we  gain  some  notion  of  the  feelings  —  the  honest,  if  mis 
taken  feelings  —  with  which  the  Federalists  regarded  Jeffer 
son,  by  the  pledges  they  exacted  from  him.  They  are  just 
such  conditions  as  men  would  exact  from  one  whom  they 
deemed  the  enemy  of  property,  of  society,  and  of  vested 
rights.  They  are  the  pledges  that  would  be  demanded  by 
men  who  feared  a  social  and  political  convulsion,  which  was 
precisely  what  the  Federalists  did  fear.  If  any  one  doubt 
the  reasonableness  of  their  terror,  let  them  trace  Jefferson's 
previous  course,  let  them  ponder  the  opinions  he  had  avowed, 
and  consider  the  views  he  had  expressed,  and  the  objects  at 
which  he  professed  to  aim.  A  word  may  be  fitly  said  here  in 
regard  to  the  injustice  so  often  charged  against  the  Feder 
alists  for  concentrating  all  their  hatred  upon  Jefferson. 
We  only  need  to  read  the  history  of  the  party  which 
he  ruled,  to  find  the  explanation  and  justification  of  this 
bitter  personal  animosity.  Jefferson,  while  at  the  head  of 
his  party,  was  the  party.  He  had  found  it  demoralized,  dis 
organized,  without  aims  and  without  principles.  He  had 
breathed  into  it  the  breath  of  life,  he  had.  given  it  objects 
and  principles,  and  he  had  led  it  to  victory ;  but  he  had 
gathered  no  leaders  into  its  ranks.  Except  his  immediate 
successor  and  his  financier,  both  of  whom  he  kept  ever  by 
him,  Jefferson  allowed  no  rivals  near  the  throne.  By  the 
most  consummate  management,  by  unequalled  tact,  by  an 
unsurpassed  power  of  dealing  with  men,  by  these  arts,  and 
by  these  alone,  Jefferson  established  a  supremacy  to  which 
our  history  cannot  furnish  a  parallel.  Such  parliamentary 
ability  as  there  was  in  his  party,  his  crushing  despotism  drove 
into  revolt;  but  the  ringleader1  found  no  followers.  Like 
the  Etruscan  king,  Jefferson  cut  off  the  heads  of  all  the  tall 
1  John  Randolph. 


1800-5.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  425 

poppies,  and  so  devoid  of  leaders  was  the  compact  and  devoted 
majority  in  Congress,  that  they  could  not  repel  the  assaults 
of  the  handful  of  Federalists  and  of  their  former  ally,  John 
Randolph.  So  great  was  the  extremity  at  one  time,  that 
Jefferson  urged  Nicholas  to  return  to  Congress,  and  lead  the 
party.1  The  despotism  was  an  iron  one ;  and  even  John 
Quincy  Adams,  when  he  came  beneath  its  sway,  found  him 
self  helpless.  Strong,  bold,  aggressive  beyond  even  the 
measure  of  the  sternest  New  England  character,  Mr.  Adams, 
when  he  supported  Jefferson,  was  compelled  to  support  him 
without  asking  any  reasons,  and  was  obliged  to  advance  the 
measures  of  the  chief  —  measures  which  involved  the  fate 
of  the  country  —  without  knowing  why  or  wherefore  they 
were  framed.2  The  supple  Virginian,  who  made  no  speeches 
and  wrote  no  pamphlets,  wielded  an  unquestioned  power  as 
relentlessly  as  an  autocrat  of  the  Russias.  He  recognized  no 
master  but  popularity,  and  a  great  party  bent  before  him  in 
blind  subserviency,  while  he  not  only  strained  the  Constitu 
tion  to  the  utmost,  but,  if  need  were,  overstepped  its  limits.3 
With  all  the  political  power  in  the  country  centred  thus  in 

1  Jefferson  to  Nicholas,  V.  4,  48. 

2  Diary  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  p.  497.     See  also  his  remarks  on  the  em 
bargo  bill,  as  given  by  Colonel  Pickering  in  his  letter  to  Governor  Sullivan. 
I  have  found  among  the  Pickering  MSS.  the  following  memorandum  :  — 

"Mem.  at  Boston,  May  11,  1808.  I  was  informed,  that  Mr.  Adams  said 
my  last  letter  (April  22d)  to  Sullivan  did  not  exactly  recite  his  words  in 
Senate,  the  day  the  embargo  bill  passed.  I  reminded  Mr.  Cabot  that,  soon 
after  the  law  passed,  I  wrote  the  words.  The  next  day  (May  12th)  he  fur 
nished  me  with  the  following  extract.  My  letter  to  him  is  dated  January  8. 
'  To  save  you  the  trouble  of  recurring  to  the  letter  [I  suppose  one  I  might 
have  written  to  T.  Williams],  I  repeat,  what  I  shall  never  forget,  the  ex 
pressions  used.'  '  The  President  has  recommended  the  measure  on  his  high 
responsibility.  I  would  not  consider,  I  would  not  deliberate,  but  act.  Doubt 
less,  the  President  has  further  information  to  authorize  the  measure ! '  "  In 
the  appendix  to  the  letter  to  H.  G.  Otis,  ed.  1824,  Mr.  Adams  denies  the  truth 
of  Colonel  Pickering's  insinuation,  that  he  wished  to  resolve  the  legislature 
into  a  mere  exponent  of  the  executive  will ;  but  he  admits  that  the  report 
of  his  words  was  substantially  correct.  Whatever  Mr.  Adams's  intention, 
the  fact  therefore  remains  that  he  had  to  bend  beneath  Jefferson's  sway 
when  he  supported  his  measures. 

3  Jefferson  himself  considered  the  acquisition  of  Louisiana  unconstitu 
tional.     See  IV.  of  his  Works,  500,  501,  504-507. 


426  LIFE   AND    LETTERS    OF    GEOEGE   CABOT.       [1800-5. 

one  man,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  the  Federalists  held 
that  man  responsible  for  all  the  acts  of  his  party,  and  poured 
upon  his  devoted  head  all  the  vials  of  their  wrath.  If  it  be 
also  remembered  that  the  Federalists  sincerely  believed  Jef 
ferson  to  be  in  reality,  as  he  was  in  seeming,  the  embodiment 
of  French  democracy,  the  advocate  and  promoter  of  princi 
ples  which  menaced  with  destruction  all  the  rights  and 
customs  which  alone  made  life  to  them  worth  having,  their 
feelings  may  be  easily  conceived.  The  Federalists  hated 
Jefferson  with  no  common  political  hatred,  but  rather  with 
the  vindictiveness  of  men  toward  a  deadly  foe  who,  as  they 
firmly  believed,  sought  the  ruin  of  all  they  most  prized 
and  cherished.  Eight  or  wrong,  such  were  the  honest  feel 
ings  of  the  New  England  Federalists  toward  Jefferson. 
How  far  his  deeds  conduced  to  an  abatement  of  such 
opinions,  a  brief  statement  of  events  during  his  admin 
istration,  as  they  appeared  to  his  contemporaries,  will 
readily  show. 

Jefferson  came  into  power  at  a  moment  singularly  for 
tunate  for  himself.  We  were  at  peace  with  all  the  world, 
while  at  home  all  the  unpopular  measures  of  organizing  the 
government  had  been  carried  through  by  the  Federalists. 
They  had  laid  the  taxes  which  now  filled  the  Treasury  ;  and, 
under  their  wise  management,  the  debt  had  been  provided 
for,  and  the  revenues  had  grown  to  large  proportions.  Jef 
ferson's  inaugural  address  was  intended  to  be  conciliatory 
in  tone,  and  was  certainly  adroit ;  but,  except  when  he 
adopted  the  Federal  policy,  there  was  nothing  definite  about 
its  loosely  worded  sentences.  It  was  the  first  of  our  public 
documents  where  Talleyrand's  use  of  language  was  adopted, 
and  where  the  real  meaning  of  the  author  was  hidden  under 
a  cloud  of  words.  From  this  address  dates  the  pernicious 
practice  among  our  public  men  of  using  platitudes  to  con 
ceal  meaning  or  a  lack  of  meaning,  as  the  case  may  be. 
"  A  policy  of  wise  frugality,"  unaccompanied  by  any  defi 
nite  suggestion,  was  the  principal  topic  of  the  inaugural. 


1800-5.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  427 

The  reasons  for  this  vagueness  are  obvious.  Jefferson  had 
no  definite  policy  to  offer.  His  pole-star  was  popular  sup 
port,  his  guiding  principles  were  French  theories  of  govern 
ment.  The  cabinet,  however,  promised  better  than  the 
address.  Madison  and  Gallatin  were  by  far  the  ablest  men 
among  the  Democrats,  and  they  filled  the  highest  places. 
They  were  neither  visionaries  nor  theorists,  and  their  ap 
pointment  was  productive  of  confidence.  The  rest  of  the 
cabinet  simply  showed  the  lack  of  ability  in  the  party. 
The  South  had  no  one  capable  of  administering  depart 
ments,  and  Jefferson  filled  up  the  places  with  the  best 
Northern  men  he  could  get.1 

But,  though  Jefferson  was  now  weighted  and  in  some 
measure  sobered  by  the  responsibilities  of  office,  he  had 
no  intention  of  abandoning  his  favorite  theories  without 
a  trial.  The  hungry  party  sent  up  a  cry  for  "  spoils,"  and 
Jefferson  at  once  set  about  gratifying  them,  although  he 
did  not  fail  to  display  his  wonted  circumspection.  First 
came  removals  in  a  number  of  selected  cases,  which  were  not 
considered  to  come  within  his  covenant  with  the  Federalists. 
Then  the  district  attorneys  and  marshals  were  changed. 
Then  Jefferson  claimed  that  all  appointments  made  by 
Mr.  Adams  after  the  election  had  taken  place  were  ipso 
facto  void.  Persons  so  appointed  Jefferson  stigmatized 
comprehensively  as  "  midnight  appointees,"  and  proceeded 
to  dismiss  them,  and  fill  their  places  with  his  own  support 
ers.  These  steps  called  forth  much  vigorous  opposition; 
but,  in  the  message  addressed  to  Congress  in  the  autumn 
of  1801,  measures  far  more  dangerous,  and  more  in  accord 
ance  with  Jefferson's  peculiar  views,  were  broached.  Re 
trenchment  was  advised,  and  effected  at  once  in  the  army 
and  fortifications.  The  naturalization  laws  were  modified 
to  a  mere  nullity,  and  the  gates  were  opened  to  the  flood 
of  emigration  which  brought  fresh  supporters  to  the  ad- 

1  Levi  Lincoln  and  Henry  Dearborn  of  Massachusetts,  and  Robert  Smith 
of  Maryland. 


428  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1800-5. 

ministration  in  ever  increasing  numbers.  Far  worse  than 
this  was  the  repeal  of  the  judiciary  act,  recommended  by 
the  President  and  carried  out  by  Congress ;  supplemented 
by  a  wholesale  attack  on  any  and  all  judiciary  systems  by 
Giles  and  Randolph  of  Virginia,  the  President's  faithful 
and  provident  followers. 

But  it  was  one  of  the  cardinal  points  of  Federalist  policy 
which  suffered  most.  •  Our  policy  of  neutrality  found  all 
its  strength  in  the  gradual  construction  and  preservation 
of  an  efficient  navy.  Suggested  by  Washington,  the  foun 
dation  and  support  of  our  naval  power  had  been  the  chief 
glory  of  Mr.  Adams's  administration. 

A  report  by  Mr.  Stoddert,  dated  Jan.  12,  1801,1  gives  a 
clear  idea  not  only  of  the  state  of  the  navy  at  that  time, 
but  of  the  Federal  policy  in  regard  to  it.  We  find  that, 
inasmuch  as  the  danger  of  a  French  war  had  subsided,  the 
secretary  advised  the  sale  of  all  vessels  in  the  service 
except  thirteen  frigates.  Materials  had  been  already  col 
lected  sufficient  to  build  six  seventy-fours,  and  the  sites 
for  as  many  navy-yards  had  been  purchased.  After  ad 
vising  the  continued  collection  of  materials,  the  report 
proceeds,  — 

"  When  the  United  States  own  twelve  ships  of  seventy -four  guns, 
and  double  the  number  of  strong  frigates,  and  it  is  known  that 
they  possess  the  means  of  increasing  them  with  facility,  confidence 
may  be  indulged  that  we  may  then  avoid  those  wars  in  which  we 
have  no  interest,  without  submitting  to  be  plundered.  An  annual 
sum  of  $117,387  (over  and  above  the  appropriation  for  the  six 
seventy-four  gun-ships  already  authorized)  for  the  purchase  of 
timber  to  be  laid  up  in  docks  for  seventy-four  gun-ships  and  frig 
ates,  and  the  adoption  of  efficient  arrangements  to  secure  the 
manufacture  of  copper,  the  culture  of  hemp,  and  the  manufacture 
of  canvas,  would  in  a  few  years  raise  us  to  this  desirable  state  of 
security." 

An  estimate  was  also  submitted,  which  placed  the  an- 
1  American  State  Papers,  Navy  Department. 


1800-5.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  429 

nual  expense  of  maintaining  the  present  force,  thirteen 
frigates,  six  in  service,  seven  laid  up,  at  $643,000. 

Such  was  the  wise  and  far-sighted  scheme  of  Washing 
ton  and  Adams.  Before  Jefferson's  policy  of  a  "  wise  fru 
gality,"  it  fell  helpless,  and  the  Tripolitan  war  alone  saved 
our  navy  from  utter  extinction.  A  constant  adhesion  to 
this  economical  management  left  us,  when  the  war  of  1812 
broke  out,  with  five  frigates  in  service,  seven  brigs  and  two 
ships ;  and  to  this  little  navy  almost  all  the  glory  of  that 
otherwise  disastrous  war  was  due.  But,  in  the  prosperity  of 
his  first  term,  Jefferson  thought  only  of  his  theories ;  and  the 
"  Chinese  policy  "  had  to  be  carried  out.  In  his  first  mes 
sage,  he  wras  able  to  announce  that  the  marine  corps  had 
already  been  disbanded,  that  the  sites  for  navy-yards  were 
abandoned,  and  that  all  naval  preparations  had  ceased.  A 
prompt  reduction  of  appropriations  by  Congress  completed 
this  triumph  of  "  a  wise  frugality." 

Although  he  thus  withdrew  her  protection,  Jefferson 
could  not  injure  commerce  directly ;  and  in  the  hands  of 
Gallatin,  who  pursued  the  Hamiltonian  policy,  the  finances 
were  safe.  But,  with  characteristic  adroitness,  Jefferson, 
while  he  repealed  stamp  duties  and  excises,  and  removed 
the  tax  on  spirits,  refused  to  meet  the  just  obligations  of 
the  country  to  the  claimants  under  the  French  indemnity. 
All  these  measures,  in  appearance  the  first  cautious  steps 
towards  a  revolution  in  our  system,  were  passed  in  Con 
gress  by  a  brute  vote  ;  and  calls  for  information  by  the 
opposition  were  voted  down  in  silence. 

In  April,  Jefferson  could  write  to  Kosciusko,  and  detail  a 
long  catalogue  of  accomplished  changes.  He  was  able  to 
say:  — 

"  The  session  of  the  first  Congress  convened  since  Republicanism 
has  recovered  its  ascendancy,  is  now  drawing  to  a  close.  They 
will  pretty  completely  fulfil  all  the  desires  of  the  people.  They 
have  reduced  the  army  and  navy  to  what  is  barely  necessary. 
They  are  disarming  executive  patronage  and  preponderance,  by 


430  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1800-5. 

putting  down  one-half  the  offices  of  the  United  States,  which  are  no 
longer  necessary.  These  economies  have  enabled  them  to  suppress 
all  internal  taxes,  and  still  to  make  such  provision  for  the  pay 
ment  of  their  public  debt  as  to  discharge  that  in  eighteen  years. 
They  have  lopped  off  a  parasite  limb  planted  by  their  predecessors 
on  their  judiciary  body  for  party  purposes  ;  they  are  opening  the 
doors  of  hospitality  to  fugitives  from  the  oppressions  of  other 
countries ;  and  we  have  suppressed  all  those  public  forms  and 
ceremonies  which  tended  to  familiarize  the  public  eye  to  the  har 
bingers  of  another  form  of  government."  * 

The  last  clause  refers  to  Jefferson's  watchful  care  for  the 
symbolic  as  well  as  the  essential.  He  had  not  listened  in 
vain  to  the  French  doctrine  which  substitutes  names  for 
things,  which  regards  as  one  prime  object  of  revolution  the 
right  to  alter  the  names  of  Parisian  streets,  and  to  scrawl  new 
mottoes  on  the  walls  of  houses.  There  was,  fortunately,  in 
our  country  no  need  to  do  more  than  discard  the  few  simple, 
dignified  forms  which  Washington  had  adopted  as  befitting 
his  office.  For  the  imposing  speech  to  Congress,  the  delivery 
of  a  written  message,  to  which  no  answer  was  expected,  was 
substituted.  But  these  changes  did  not  suffice  ;  and  Jef 
ferson,  the  high-bred,  aristocratic  Virginian,  therefore  laid 
aside  all  decency  and  courtesy  in  order  to  prove  his  Repub 
licanism.  To  insult  the  representative  of  tyranny,  and  to 
show  his  own  hatred  of  that  odious  crime  against  humanity, 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  dressed  like  a  pawn 
broker's  clerk,  so  far  lowered  himself  and  his  office  as  to 
receive  the  minister  of  England  in  a  manner  which  a  cow 
boy  would  have  blushed  to  adopt.2  Thus  all  parts  of  Repub 
licanism  as  conceived  by  Jefferson  were  preserved.  Such 
changes  may  have  been  wise,  the  policy  that  dictated  them 
may  have  been  just,  but  it  must  be  allowed  that  they  nat 
urally  tended  to  confirm  the  fears  and  suspicions  of  the 
Federalists.  They  had  believed  the  President  to  be  a 


1  Works  of  Jefferson,  IV.  430. 

2  See  Quincy's  Life  of  Josiah  Quincy,  92,  93. 


1800-5.]  THE  HAKTFORD   CONVENTION.  431 

leveller  and  revolutionist;  and  he  seemed  to  them  to  be 
acting  up  to  his  character,  when  judged  by  his  own 
utterances  and  behavior,  and  by  the  measures  of  an 
obedient  Congress.  Nor  were  they  encouraged  by  the  in 
auguration  of  the  new  system  of  -electioneering.  Gallatin's 
report,  in  May,  1802,  was  the  first  of  those  miserable 
documents,  which,  emanating  from  a  great  department  of 
the  government,  served  only  as  a  cover  for  partisan 
attack.  To  this  open  assault  by  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  Wolcott  replied  for  the  Federalists  with  great 
force  and  effect.1 

Meantime,  removals  from  office  went  on  slowly  but 
steadily :  and  the  Federal  newspapers  and  public  meetings 
began  to  attack  the  President  on  this  point  with  bitterness 
and  persistence.2  Though  Jefferson  had  carried  resistance 
to  the  alien  and  sedition  laws  to  the  very  verge  of  secession, 
he  was  too  absolute  a  party  chief  to  permit  newspaper 
assaults  which  he  deemed  injurious,  or  in  cases  where  he 
could  reach  the  offender.  The  notorious  Callender,  con 
victed  under  the  alien  and  sedition  law,  had  just  emerged 
from  prison.  His  faithful,  if  somewhat  dirty  services 
seemed  to  entitle  him  to  a  reward  ;  but  Jefferson  refused 
him  office,  and  gave  him  only  fifty  dollars.  Callender 
thereupon  accused  Jefferson  of  assisting  him  in  the  prepa 
ration  and  publication  of  the  "Prospect  before  us,"  the 
scandalous  pamphlet  whose  authorship  had  caused  Callender 
to  languish  so  many  months  in  a  "  Federal  dungeon."  Jef 
ferson  denied  the  charge  in  print,3  and  promised  to  publish 
all  the  correspondence  between  himself  and  Callender, 
although  characteristically  enough  he  soon  after  said  that 
he  could  not  find  the  letters.  Callender,  however,  was 
more  careful  of  his  papers:  he  not  only  found  all  Jef- 


1  "  Address  as  to  the  Faithful  Expenditures  of  Money  drawn  from  the 
Treasury,"  by  Oliver  Wolcott,  1802. 

2  See  above,  p.  320. 

8  Jefferson's  Works,  IV.  444-446. 


432  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.        [1800-5. 

ferson's  letters,  but  lie  immediately  printed  them.  It  then 
appeared  that  Jefferson  not  only  had  furnished  money  and 
information,  and  revised  the  proofs  for  the  seditious  libel, 
"  The  Prospect  before  us,"  1  but  that  he  had  afterwards 
been  betrayed  into  an  unguarded  denial  of  this  action. 
Callender,  his  revenge  still  unsated,  then  proceeded  to  nar 
rate  a  series  of  disagreeable  and  scandalous  little  incidents 
connected  with  Jefferson's  early  amours.  The  same  hound 
that  had  yelped  at  the  heels  of  Hamilton  was  now  baying 
at  his  own,  and  Jefferson  seems  to  have  been  as  irritated 
and  displeased  as  was  his  great  rival.  Strong  measures 
were  necessary.  George  Hay,  the  district  attorney  of  Vir 
ginia,  therefore  arrested  Callender,  and  strove  to  treat  him 
as  McKean  had  treated  Cobbett,  seeking  to  put  him  in 
prison  until  he  should  give  sufficient  security  that  he  would 
publish  no  more  libels.  Public  opinion  in  a  community 
which  had  lately  been  on  the  brink  of  civil  war,  because 
of  the  alien  and  sedition  acts,  was  hardly  ripe  for  this  pro 
ceeding  against  Callender ;  and  Hay  was  obliged  to  desist. 
Jefferson's  ingenuity  is  well  illustrated  by  the  fact  that, 
while  the  Federalists  had  been  obliged  to  pass  stringent 
laws  in  their  efforts  to  punish  libels,  he  was  able  to  go 
quite  as  far  in  the  same  direction  without  passing  any  laws. 
What  the  law  failed  to  do,  however,  a  just,  and,  in  Jeffer 
son's  eyes,  a  most  merciful  Providence  did  in  silencing 
Callender,  and  removing  him  by  drowning  from  the  scene 
of  his  labors.  He  left,  however,  a  rich  legacy  of  scandal, 
which  the  opposition  press  turned  to  account.  Just  at 
this  time,  also,  appeared  the  letter  which  Jefferson  had 
written  to  Thomas  Paine,  inviting  him  to  this  country,  and 
offering  him  a  passage  in  a  vessel  of  the  United  States.2 
Paine  was  then  regarded  by  most  decent  persons  as  the 
libeller  of  Washington,  the  active  enemy  of  Christianity, 

1  These  letters,  &c.,  were  printed  by  Callender,  in  the  "  Richmond  Re 
corder."    See  Hildreth,  V.  453-455. 

2  Jefferson's  Works,  IV.  370. 


1800-5.]  THE   HARTFORD    CONVENTION.  433 

and  the  foe  of  social  order  and  the  rights  of  property.  To 
honor  him  in  the  name  of  the  United  States  seemed  to 
many,  therefore,  a  startling  and  even  monstrous  prop 
osition. 

I  have  alluded  to  these  two  incidents  of  Callender  and 
Paine,  simply  to  show  not  only  by  his  policy,  but  by  his 
various  public  acts,  the  light  in  which  Jefferson  must  natu 
rally  have  appeared  to  his  opponents.  In  judging  of  the 
position  and  actions  of  the  Federalists,  it  is  important  to 
know  how  they  regarded  the  head  and  single  embodiment 
of  the  Democratic  party.  And  to  judge  justly  that  or  any 
other  past  time,  or  to  weigh  fairly  the  motives  and  actions 
of  individuals  or  parties,  we  must  remember  that  they  did 
not  have  the  strong  illuminating  side-lights  by  which  pos 
terity  can  form  an  exact  opinion.  I  do  not  mean  to  justify 
or  defend  all  the  opinions  of  the  Federalists  in  regard  to 
Jefferson  ;  but  I  do  wish  to  describe  their  opinions,  to  prove 
that  they  were  honest  ones,  and  to  enumerate  the  facts  on 
which  these  opinions  were  based. 

Towards  the  close  of  the  year  1802  came  the  first  breath 
from  Europe  of  the  storm  which  was  destined  to  end  in 
confusion  the  Presidential  career  now  in  such  prosperous 
operation.  News  arrived  that  Bonaparte  proposed  to 
take  possession  of  the  Mississippi.  The  young  life  and 
commerce  of  the  South-Avest  were  threatened  with  extinc 
tion,  and  great  commotion  and  alarm  ensued.  Louisiana, 
therefore,  was  one  of  the  subjects  of  the  message,  which 
also  gave  an  outline  of  the  new  naval  policy  intended  to 
replace  that  of  the  Federalists.  This  was  simply  to  build 
a  dry  dock  at  Washington,  where  vessels  were  to  be  laid 
up  and  roofed  over,  so  that  the  sun  might  not  warp  and 
crack  them ;  and  the  scheme  was  supplemented  by  the 
first  suggestions  of  the  gun-boat  plan.  The  chief  interest 
of  the  session,  however,  was  the  Louisiana  matter.  The 
Federalists  at  once  demanded  information,  which  was  re 
fused  ;  and  then  offered  a  resolution,  asserting  the  right  of 

28 


434  LIFE    AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.        [1800-5. 

the  people  to  the  Mississippi,  which  was  voted  down.  The 
only  real  or  ostensible  reason  for  this  stifling  process  was 
the  President's  wish.  While  matters  were  in  this  state, 
the  ferment  and  commotion  continued  in  the  Western 
States,  on  account  of  the  Spanish  obstruction  of  navigation, 
and  the  refusal  of  a  place  of  deposit.  Mr.  Ross,  therefore, 
brought  forward  a  series  of  resolutions  in  the  Senate,  by 
which  the  President  was  authorized  to  seize  New  Orleans 
as  a  place  of  deposit  in  accordance  with  the  treaty,  and  to 
raise  fifty  thousand  men  for  carrying  this  resolution  into 
effect.  This  was  the  Federalist  policy,  clear,  sharp,  deci 
sive  ;  but  there  were  two  fatal  objections :  it  might  lead  to 
war,  and,  more  awful  still,  it  might  lead  to  war  with  France. 
So  the  Federal  plan  was  voted  down,  and  the  whole  matter 
intrusted  to  the  discretion  of  the  President ;  while,  in  pur 
suance  of  the  "  wise  frugality  "  policy,  two  millions  were 
voted  for  the  private  intercourse  fund.  Scarcely  had  Jeffer 
son's  policy  been  adopted  by  Congress,  when  news  came 
that  Monroe  and  Livingston  had  purchased  Louisiana  for 
fifteen  million  dollars.  Jefferson  and  his  party  acceded  at 
once  to  the  treaty.  All  the  magnificent  territory,  which 
was  thus  obtained,  was  at  that  time  terra  incognita.  Jeffer 
son  only  knew  that  he  had  bought  peace  and  the  mouth  of 
the  Mississippi,  and  in  his  eyes  these  were  worth  any  price. 
In  such  an  opinion,  and  in  his  policy  on  this  particular 
point,  Jefferson  was  unquestionably  right;  but,  in  carry 
ing  out  his  policy,  he  violated  the  Constitution  with  an 
indifference  which  would  have  been  striking  in  any 
one,  but  which,  coming  from  a  strict  constructionist, 
was  absolutely  appalling.  We  do  not  need  to  go  further 
than  Jefferson's  own  letters,  to  find  the  most  convincing 
arguments  against  the  constitutionality  of  the  Louisiana 
purchase.1  Some  faint  show  of  a  desire  to  amend  the 
Constitution  was  the  most  that  ever  came,  however,  from 
the  President's  very  correct  opinions.  Thus,  the  first  exam- 
1  See  above,  p.  426. 


1800-5.]  THE   HARTFORD    CONVENTION.  435 

pie  was  given  of  both  the  will  and  desire  to  violate  the 
Constitution,  if  the  popular  feeling  would  sustain  the  execu 
tive  and  the  legislature  in  so  doing ;  and  in  this  fact  lies 
the  pernicious  and  crying  evil  of  the  Louisiana  purchase. 
It  was  the  first  lesson  which  taught  Americans  that  a 
numerical  majority  was  superior  to  the  Constitution,  was 
a  safe  protection  against  it  when  violated,  and  that,  when 
policy  proved  the  necessity  of  change,  it  was  easier  to  break 
than  to  legally  and  regularly  amend  the  provisions  of  our 
charter.  The  Federalist  opposition  on  the  ground  of  un 
constitutionally  was  strong,  and  their  position  impreg 
nable  ;  but  their  resistance  to  the  general  policy  was 
both  factious  and  unwise.  The  people  fully  appreciated 
the  immense  advantage  gained  by  the  control  of  the  Mis 
sissippi,  and  they  asked  to  know  no  more. 

The  acquisition  of  Louisiana  was  regarded  by  the  New 
England  Federalists  at  the  seat  of  government,  and  by 
extreme  men  of  that  party  everywhere,  with  far  different 
feelings  from  those  which  governed  the  rest  of  the  people. 
The  leaders  in  Congress  saw  clearly  that  this  measure 
sealed  their  doom,  that  their  political  power  would  now 
be  finally  destroyed,  and  the  principles  of  Democracy 
wholly  prevail.  They  saw  in  Louisiana  the  question  of 
life  or  death.  They  believed  that  these  new  and  fertile 
regions  would  draw  away  all  the  population  of  the  North 
ern  and  Eastern  States,  and  would  leave  themselves  beg 
gars  and  outcasts.  They  were  fully  aware  that  the  popular 
will  throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  country  was 
arrayed  against  them,  and  they  knew  of  but  one  method 
of  relief,  —  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  In  a  speech  in 
October,  1803,  Griswold  of  Connecticut  sounded  the  key 
note,  when  he  said  that  the  acquisition  of  Louisiana  threat 
ened  a  subversion  of  the  Union ;  and,  as  they  saw  the  fatal 
measure  closing  in  upon  them,  the  Federalists  in  Washing 
ton,  stimulated  by  constant  and  embittering  opposition, 
turned  from  threats  to  definite  plans  of  separation.  They 


436  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1800-5. 

N/ 

did  not  fear  the  measure  of  acquiring  Louisiana  pe^r  se,  but 
the  supremacy  of  Democracy,  which  was  its  meaning  to 
them.  They  saw  in  it  the  assurance  of  a  perpetuation  of 
Jefferson's  power  and  of  his  maxims,  and  with  their  opin 
ions  of  both  the  man  and  his  principles,  they  could  not  but 
regard  their  indefinite  ascendancy  with  unmixed  horror. 
Two  other  measures  coincided  with  that  involving  Louisiana 
to  spur  them  on  to  the  last  resort  of  American  opposition. 
The  amendment  to  the  Constitution,  providing  for  the  sepa 
rate  election  of  President  and  Vice-President,  was  on  the 
point  of  adoption.  The  Federalists  had  years  before  sup 
ported  this  same  amendment  as  a  security  for  their  own 
tenure  of  power,  and  they  rightly  believed  that  it  was  now 
urged  with  a  like  purpose  by  their  enemies.  This,  too, 
afforded  fresh  support  to  the  hated  supremacy  of  Democ 
racy,  and  was  a  new  stimulus  to  their  spirit  of  desperate 
resistance.  Far  worse  than  this,  in  their  eyes,  was  the  at 
tack  on  the  judiciary,  headed  by  Giles  and  Randolph.  In 
the  midst  of  the  separatist  schemes  of  the  Federalists  came 
that  outrage  on  decency  and  justice,  the  trial  and  condem 
nation  of  Judge  Pickering,  quickly  followed  by  the  resolve 
ordering  the  impeachment  of  Judge  Chase.  The  prime 
movers  in  this  affair  made  no  secret  of  their  opinions  that 
the  judiciary  ought  to  be  a  political  body  removable  at  will ; 
and  these  impeachments  were,  as  they  openly  avowed,  but 
the  preliminaries  to  a  general  onslaught  upon  the  bench.1 
Beneath  the  mouthings  of  Giles  and  the  diatribes  of  Ran 
dolph,  we  can  now  detect  something  else,  which  was  not  then 
perceived,  — the  feline  hostility  of  Jefferson,  aiming  at  the 
overthrow  of  John  Marshall.  Such  a  scheme  as  this  might 
well  have  driven  to  desperation  less  heated  and  less  deter 
mined  men  than  the  New  England  Federalists  of  that  day. 
To  them  it  seemed  nothing  less  than  the  destruction  of  the 
last  bulwark  which  sheltered  their  lives,  their  liberty,  and 
their  property  from  the  tyranny  of  a  mob. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  mind  and  such  the  circum- 
1  See  above,  p.  338 ;  also  Diary  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  I.  322. 


1800-5.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  437 

stances  and  the  exciting  causes  at  the  period  of  the  sepa 
ratist  scheme  of  1803-4.  It  only  remains  to  define  the 
exact  nature  of.  the  plan,  to  show  who  were  interested  in  it, 
and  to  determine  how  far  it  progressed,  in  order  to  meet 
John  Quincy  Adams's  first  point,  as  stated  at  the  beginning 
of  this  chapter.  Much  light  has  already  been  thrown  upon 
this  subject  by  the  "  Life  of  Plumer,"  and  by  Hamilton's 
"  History  of  the  Republic  of  the  United  States  ; "  but  the 
letters  which  follow,  drawn  principally  from  the  Pickering 
MSS.,  leave  but  little  to  be  added.  The  letters  of  Gris- 
wold,  Tracy,  and  Hillhouse,  would  undoubtedly  throw  addi 
tional  light  on  the  subject ;  but,  though  our  knowledge  on 
this  point  may  in  future  be  amplified,  I  doubt  if  any  essen 
tial  change  in  it  can  be  produced. 

From  the  letters  already  printed  and  from  those  about  to 
be  given,  it  becomes  evident  that  the  scheme  originated 
and  was  worked  out  wholly  in  Washington,  by  the  Federal 
ist  members  of  Congress.  Their  aim  was  the  establishment 
of  a  Northern  Confederacy,  to  include  the  New  England 
States  and  New  York,  and  perhaps  Pennsylvania.  Colonel 
Pickering  seems  to  have  anticipated  the  ultimate  addition 
of  Canada,  but  I  cannot  find  that  this  view  was  entertained 
by  any  one  else.  The  theory  was  that  a  movement  of  this 
sort  must  come  from  the  States  interested  through  the 
medium  of  their  Legislatures.  This  was  the  whole  plan ; 
and  the  only  definite  step  actually  proposed  was  a  meet 
ing  of  leading  Federalists,  among  them  Hamilton,  to  be 
held  in  Boston  in  the  autumn  of  1804.  This  meeting  was 
to  be  for  consultation  ;  but  the  whole  business  had  come 
to  an  end  long  before  the  period  set  for  their  assemblage, 
and,  if  any  thing  further  had  been  needed,  the  death  of 
Hamilton,  which  deprived  them  of  their  great  leader,  was 
a  sufficient  obstacle.  But  disapprobation  had  effectually 
checked  even  purposes  of  mere  consultation.  The  only 
action  taken  was  by  the  Federalists  in  Congress  writing  to 
their  leading  party  friends  in  the  different  States,  asking 


488  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.        [1800-5. 

their  advice  and  urging  them  to  push  the  scheme.  Those 
principally  concerned  in  originating  the  plan  appear  to 
have  been  Roger  Griswold  and  Uriah  Tracy  of  Connect 
icut,  Colonel  Pickering  of  Massachusetts,  and  William 
Pluiner  of  New  Hampshire.  Hillhouse  and  the  other 
Federalists  in  Congress  sympathized  and  shared  in  the 
plan  in  a  greater  or  less  degree.  Griswold's  views  and 
Plumer's  have  already  appeared,  and  Colonel  Pickering's 
are  printed  here  in  full. 

Colonel  Pickering  addressed  his  letters  on  the  subject 
to  the  principal  Massachusetts  Federalists,  —  King,  Ames, 
Cabot,  and  Parsons  among  the  number.  The  application 
was  wholly  unsuccessful.  The  party  leaders  at  home  had 
no  faith  in  the  scheme,  and  believed  it  neither  necessary 
nor  advisable.  Hamilton  was  bitterly  opposed  to  it.  In 
his  celebrated  letter  to  Sedgwick,  written  just  before  his 
death,  he  says : — 

"  I  will  here  express  but  one  sentiment :  which  is,  that  dismem 
berment  of  our  empire  will  be  a  clear  sacrifice  of  great  positive 
advantages,  without  any  counterbalancing  good ;  administering  no 
relief  to  our  real  disease,  which  is  democracy ;  the  poison  of  which 
by  a  subdivision  will  only  be  the  more  concentred  in  each  part,  and 
consequently  the  more  virulent."  l 

These  views  find  an  echo  in  the  letters  of  Mr.  Cabot, 
already  given.2  To  Colonel  Pickering  he  says :  — 

"  All  the  evils  you  describe  and  many  more  are  to  be  apprehended ; 
but  I  greatly  fear  that  a  separation  would  be  no  remedy,  because 
the  source  of  them  is  in  the  political  theories  of  our  country  and 
in  ourselves.  A  separation  at  some  period  not  very  remote  may 
probably  take  place.  .  .  .  We  are  democratic  altogether,  and  I  hold 
democracy  in  its  natural  operation  to  be  a  government  of  the 
worst." 

To  King  Mr.  Cabot  wrote  :  — 

"  I  am  not  satisfied  that  the  thing  itself  is  to  be  desired.  My 
habitual  opinions  have  been  always  strongly  against  it,  and  I  do 

l  Hamilton's  Works,  VI.  568.  «  See  above,  pp.  341,  345. 


1800-5.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  439 

not  see  in  the  present  mismanagement  motives  for  changing  my 
opinion." 

Hamilton  and  Cabot  considered  the  whole  scheme  im 
practicable  and  not  justified  by  necessity;  and  they  regarded 
it  in  the  then  state  of  public  affairs,  as  they  had  always 
before  deemed  it,  an  evil  in  itself.  In  these  views,  Ames, 
Parsons,  and  King  concurred.  Similar  opinions,  if  not 
quite  so  pronounced,  were  also  entertained  by  Mr.  Higgin- 
son  and  Mr.  Lyman,  to  whom  Colonel  Pickering  had  also 
written.  From  New  Hampshire,  Mr.  Plumer  received 
letters  which  agree  entirely  in  opinion  with  those  of  the 
Massachusetts  and  New  York  Federalists.  Mr.  Adams's 
own  opinion  is  expressed  in  a  letter  to  Plumer,  whom  he 
was  not  disposed  to  visit  with  the  same  indiscriminate 
censure  which  he  displayed  towards  the  citizens  of  his 
native  State.  Mr.  Plumer's  subsequent  conversion  had 
unquestionably  much  to  do  with  this  unusual  mildness. 
Dec.  31,  1828,  Mr.  Adams  wrote  to  Mr.  Plumer  :- 

"  There  were  moments  of  weariness  and  disgust  in  my  own  mind 
at  the  errors  and  vices  of  Mr.  Jefferson's  administration,  when  I 
almost  despaired  of  the  Union  myself.  That  it  affected  you  to  the 
extent  at  one  time  of  contemplating  with  favor  the  substitution  of 
another  and  more  compassable  system  of  confederation,  can  be  no 
disparagement  to  your  understanding  or  your  heart."  1 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  even  Mr.  Adams  himself,  when 
not  borne  away  by  a  torrent  of  .personal  hatred,  could  re 
gard  with  calmness  the  schemes  for  a  dissolution  of  the 
Union,  and  deem  such  schemes  no  disparagement  to  either 
the  heads  or  hearts  of  their  projectors.  In  Connecticut 
alone  did  the  plan  seem  to  find  any  support,  and  even  there 
it  was  very  slight.  I  give  below  the  only  favorable  letter 
I  have  been  able  to  find  printed  or  imprinted.  In  short, 
the  reception  of  the  scheme  concocted  in  Washington  was 
crushed  by  the  leaders  of  the  party  elsewhere,  and  the  whole 
project  came  to  nothing.  The  men  who  nipped  this  plan  in 
the  bud  were  some  of  them  those  whom  Mr.  John  Quincy 
i  Life  of  William  Plumer,  p.  304. 


440  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1800-5. 

Adams  impliedly  points  out  as  its   principal   aiders   and 
abettors.1 

Bat  one  word  remains  to  be  said  before  coming  to  the 
original  documents.  The  tone  in  which  the  men  of  that 
day  discussed  the  question  of  a  dissolution  of  the  Union  is 
one  that  may  well  startle  the  present  generation,  which  has 
passed  through  a  great  civil  war  in  behalf  of  the  Union,  and 
has  learned  to  consider  the  mere  mention  of  separation  as 
the  blackest  treason.  The  men  who  were  prominent  in 
1804  regarded  a  separation  of  the  States  with  no  such  feel 
ing.  It  was  a  simple  impossibility  that  they  should  do  so. 
They  had  most  of  them  arrived  at  manhood  before  Union 
was  even  thought  of.  They  had  passed  through  the  period 
of  dissolution  under  the  Confederacy.  They  had  formed 
our  present  Union  from  pure  motives  of  policy,  and  they 
regarded  separation  in  exactly  the  same  way.  The  indi 
viduality  and  separate  existence  of  the  States  were  quite  as 
familiar  to  them  as  the  conception  of  union,  and  the  senti 
ment  of  nationality  at  that  time  was  still  in  its  infancy. 
They  had  looked  upon  the  Union,  when  it  was  formed,  as 
an  experiment ;  and  they  continued  to  so  regard  it.  They 
looked  upon  it  as  an  arrangement  which  might  or  might  not 
succeed,  but  whose  maintenance  was  a  mere  question  of  pol 
icy.  Nor  was  this  feeling  confined  to  any  section  nor  to  any 
party.  It  had  less  strength  in  New  England  than  elsewhere, 
and  this  is  what  gives  to  the  separatist  movements  in  New 
England  a  peculiar  importance  and  significance.  But  the 
separatist  feeling  was  universal,  and  broke  forth  at  various 

1  It  is  but  fair  to  say  that  Mr.  Adams  nowhere  names  the  individuals 
whom  he  accused  of  participation  in  this  scheme.  But  the  whole  tenor 
of  his  pamphlet  points  irresistibly  to  certain  men,  including  Mr.  Cabot ;  and 
on  this  I  have  based  the  statement  in  the  text.  As  I  think  I  have  shown 
who  were  concerned  in  the  plan,  and  who  opposed  and  defeated  it,  Mr. 
Adams's  implication,  whether  justly  or  unjustly  interpreted  by  me,  is  of  no 
material  importance  to  the  facts  of  the  case.  But,  if  I  have  not  misunder 
stood  his  implication,  it  shows  the  wholesale  and  indiscriminate  suspicion 
with  which  he  included  all  alike,  and  the  need  of  caution  in  accepting  his 
conclusions  generally,  based  as  they  were  on  insufficient  material  and  dic 
tated  by  the  bitterest  spirit  of  personal  and  political  hostility. 


1800-5.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  441 

periods  before  1804  in  all  parts  of  the  country.  The  mi 
nority  in  national  affairs,  if  they  felt  themselves  oppressed, 
turned  instinctively  to  the  governments  to  which  they  had 
always  been  accustomed  to  look  for  protection  and  support. 
Thus  all  parties  and  all  leaders  during  the  first  twenty-five 
years  of  our  government,  when  defeated  and  as  they  believed 
oppressed,  looked  natural^  to  their  States  as  their  protec 
tors,  and  were  ready  to  take  the  ground  that  the  experiment 
had  failed,  and  that  it  would  be  wise  to  try  something  dif 
ferent.  Schemes  of  separation  therefore  were  treated  and 
discussed  as  any  extreme,  but  nevertheless  perfectly  conceiv 
able  question  of  mere  policy  would  be.  The  hard,  matter-of- 
fact  way,  in  which  men  seventy-five  years  ago  argued  about 
the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  a  dissolution  of  the 
Union,  was  as  natural  and  proper  as  it  is  for  us  to  consider 
that  question  no  longer  an  open  one.  To  condemn  them 
for  the  tone  of  their  discussions  on  this  matter  would  be  as 
wholly  unjust  and  unreasonable  as  it  always  is  to  brand 
individuals  for  the  general  opinions  of  any  past  age  and 
society.  The  only  rule  here  as  in  any  similar  case  is  not 
to  try  men  by  an  abstract  standard  or  by  the  ideas  of  pos 
terity,  until  they  have  first  been  judged  according  to  the 
standards  and  the  ideas  of  the  age  in  which  they  lived. 


PICKERING  TO  JUDGE  PETERS. 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  Dec.  24,  1803. 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND,  —  Although  the  end  of  all  our  Revolutionary 
labors  and  expectations  is  disappointment,  and  our  fond  hopes  oi 
Republican  happiness  are  vanity,  and  the  real  patriots  of  '76 
are  overwhelmed  by  the  modern  pretenders  to  that  character,  I 
will  not  yet  despair.  I  will  rather  anticipate  a  new  confederacy, 
exempt  from  the  corrupt  and  corrupting  influence  and  oppression 
of  the  aristocratic  Democrats  of  the  South.  There  will  be  (and 
our  children  at  farthest  will  see  it)  a  separation.  The  white  and 
black  population  will  mark  the  boundary.1  The  British  provinces, 

1  This  prophecy  came  uncomfortably  near  verification. 


442  LIFE  AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1800-5. 

even  with  the  assent  of  Britain,  will  become  members  of  the 
Northern  confederacy.  A  continued  tyranny  of  the  present  ruling 
sect  will  precipitate  that  event.  The  patience  of  good  citizens  is 
now  nearly  exhausted.  By  open  violations  and  pretended  amend 
ments,  they  are  shattering  our  political  bark,  which  with  a  few 
more  similar  repairs  must  founder.  Efforts,  however,  and  laud 
able  ones,  are,  and  will  continue  to  be  made  to  keep  the  timbers 
together.  The  most  distinguished  you  will  find  in  the  speech  of 
Mr.  Tracy,  which  I  enclose.  He  has  exhibited  the  excellency  of 
the  Constitution  as  it  now  prescribes  the  mode  of  electing  the 
President  and  Vice-President,  and  pointed  out  the  pernicious  ten 
dency  of  the  proposed  amendment.  John  Taylor,1  the  Goliath  of 
the  party,  on  this  question  attempted  to  support  the  amendment ; 
but  the  ground  was  untenable,  and  his  speech  can, do  neither  him 
nor  the  cause  any  honor.  I*  ". 

TAPPING  REEVE  TO  URIAH  TRACY.2 

[Extract  of  a  letter  from  a  gentleman  of  distinction  in  Connecticut  to  his 
friend  in  the  city  of  Washington,  dated  Feb.  7,  1804.]  3 

"  I  have  omitted  answering  your  letter  until  this  time,  that  I 
might  learn,  if  possible,  the  sentiments  of  others  upon  the  subject 
of  your  letter.  I  shall  continue  to  pursue  the  subject  with  all  the 
industry  I  am  capable  of  exercising,  and  will'write  to  you  again  by 
the  mail  next  week.  The  court  is  now  sitting  at  Litchfield,4  and  I 
shall  have  further  opportunities  of  learning  the  sentiments  of  influ 
ential  people.  I  can  now  say  that  there  never  has  been  such  an 
alarm  excited  in  the  minds  of  informed  people  as  at  the  present 
moment.  It  seems  to  be  a  very  general  opinion  that  some  method 
must  be  fallen  upon  to  preserve  ourselves  from  that  ruin  with  which 

i  Colonel  John  Taylor,  United  States  Senator  from  Virginia.  He  was 
the  mover  of  the  nullification  resolutions  of  1708-1799,  in  the  Virginia 
House  of  Delegates.  At  this  period,  he  was  an  ardent  Unionist,  and  would 
have  shrunk  with  abhorrence  from  the  sentiments  expressed  in  this  letter. 
"  Mutato  nomine  de  te  fabula  narratur." 

*  This  letter  is  indorsed  by  Colonel  Pickering  "  T.  R.  to  U.  T.,"  and  Mr. 
Octavius  Pickering  conjectures  with  indubitable  correctness  that  the  ini 
tials  stand  for  the  names  which  I  have  placed  at  the  head  of  this  extract. 
Tapping  Reeve  was  a  distinguished  lawyer  and  judge  in  Connecticut.     His 
wife  was  a  sister  of  Aaron  Burr,  who  knew  of  this  scheme,  and  proposed, 
if  it  seemed  profitable,  to  take  part  in  it.     See  Life  of  Plumer,  and  Hamil 
ton's  History  of  the  Republic  ;  Davis's  Life  of  Burr. 

3  This  is  Colonel  Pickering's  own  head-note  to  the  extract. 

*  Litchfield  was  the  home  of  Tapping  Reeve. 


1800-5.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  443 

we  are  threatened.  We  are  waiting  with  great  anxiety  to  learn  in 
what  manner  the  amendment  will  be  treated  by  Massachusetts.  I 
have  seen  many  of  our  friends ;  and  all  that  T  have  seen,  and  most 
that  I  have  heard  from,  believe  that  we  must  separate,  and  that 
this  is  the  most  favorable  moment.  The  difficulty  is,  how  is  this 
to  be  accomplished  ?  I  have  heard  of  only  three  gentlemen,  as 
yet,  who  appear  undecided  upon  this  subject.  Among  these  is 

.     Pie  is  sufficiently  alarmed,  but  afraid  that  the  country  is 

not  prepared.     I  believe  that  some  proper  step   must  be  taken 

before  there  will  be  that  preparedness  that  he  wishes.     Mr. , 

I  believe,  retains  a  great  degree  of  apathy.  The  other  gen 
tleman's  opinion  is,  I  believe,  governed  in  some  measure  by  Mr. 

-1     But  a  settled  determination  that  this  must  be  done  has 

taken  fast  hold  of  some  minds,  where  you  would  expect  more 
timidity.  It  seems  to  be  the  opinion  of  those  with  whom  I  have 
conversed  that  two  things  must  be  done  with  a  view  to  accom 
plish  the  desired  object,  —  one  by  you  gentlemen  of  Congress,  and 
the  other  by  the  Legislatures  of  the  States.  We  believe,  in  the 
present  state  of  alarm  and  anxiety  among  Federalists,  that  if  you 
gentlemen  at  Congress  will  come  out  with  a  bold  address  to  your 
constituents,  taking  a  view  of  what  has  been  done  under  the  pres 
ent  administration,  with  glowing  comments  on  the  ruinous  tenden 
cies  of  the  measures,  and  if  this  should  be  done  before  the  sitting 
of  our  Legislature,  or  rather  the  election  of  the  members  thereof, 
that  this  will  produce  all  that  preparedness  that  is  wanted.  I 
know  that  it  will  animate  the  body  of  the  people  beyond  any  other 
possible  method,  and  give  a  death-wound  to  the  progress  of  Democ 
racy  in  this  part  of  the  country.  That  this  ought  to  be  followed 
up  by  the  Legislatures  by  such  declarations  as  may  have  the 
strongest  tendency  to  secure  the  object  aimed  at.  In  what  manner 
this  separation  is  to  be  accomplished  is  to  me  wholly  in  the  dark, 
unless  the  amendment  is  adopted  by  three-fourths  of  the  Legisla 
tures,  and  rejected  by  Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire,  and  Connect 
icut,  upon  the  last  ground  taken  by  Delaware.2  In  such  case,  I 
can  see  a  foundation  laid." 

1  These  blanks  are  all  in  the  original. 

2  Note  by  Colonel  Pickering.     "  That  the  amendment  *  had  not  constitu 
tionally  passed  the  two  Houses  of  Congress  ;  that  is,  by  two-thirds  of  the 
entire  number  composing  the  respective  Houses  " 


*  This  amendment  had  evidently  from  Colonel  Pickering's  speeches  and  letters 
been  intended  as  the  ground  on  which  those  who  planned  the  separation  wished 


444  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1800-5. 


PICKERING  TO  THEODORE 

CITY  OP  WASHINGTON,  Feb.  11,  1804. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  The  conduct  of  our  rulers  reminds  me  of  your 
early  predictions,  coeval  I  believe  with  Mr.  Jefferson's  inaugural 
speech.  The  public  debt,  indeed,  is  not  annihilated;  but  in  all 
other  things  they  have,  I  suspect,  surpassed  your  apprehensions. 
The  removals  from  office  have  been  gradual,  not  to  shock  the  public 
mind.  When  the  sensations  produced  by  the  political  death  of  one 
distinguished  Federalist  are  blunted,  another  victim  is  led  to  the 
altar ;  with  the  same  view,  removals  and  appointments  are  no 
longer  made  public.  The  changes  which  take  place  are  but  very 
partially  known,  —  that  is,  only  by  the  neighbors  of  the  individuals 
respectively,  —  while  the  community  at  large  is  kept  in  ignorance  of 
the  accumulated  evil.  The  violation  of  the  Constitution,  though 
not  commenced,  yet  most  remarkable  in  overthrowing  the  judi 
ciary,  is  becoming  habitual.  The  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court 
are  all  Federalists.  They  stand  in  the  way  of  the  ruling  power. 
Its  satellites  also  wish  to  occupy  their  places.  The  judges,  there 
fore,  are,  if  possible,  to  be  removed.  Their  judicial  opinions,  if  at 
all  questionable,  though  mere  errors  of  judgment,  are  interpreted 
into  crimes,  and  to  be  grounds  of  impeachment.  And,  if  these 
should  fail,  they  are  to  be  removed  by  the  President,  on  the 
representations  of  the  two  Houses  of  Congress.  At  least,  this  is 
the  doctrine  of  John  Randolph,  the  leader  of  Democracy  in  the 
House  of  Representatives.2  He  says  that  the  provision  in  the 
Constitution,  that  the  judges  should  hold  their  offices  during  good 
behavior,  was  intended  to  guard  them  against  the  executive  alone, 
and  not  by  any  means  to  control  the  power  of  Congress,  on  whose 
representation  against  the  judges  the  President  should  remove 
them.  Such  a  removal  of  some  would,  or  at  least  ought  to,  occa 
sion  the  resignation  of  all  the  rest.  For  as  upright  men,  feeling 
for  their  own  dignity  and  rights,  how  could  they  consent  to  hold 
their  offices  at  the  will  and  pleasure  of  such  rulers  ? 

1  Mr  Lyman  was  connected  by  marriage  with  Colonel  Pickering,  his  wife 
having  been  the  latter's  favorite  niece,  Miss  Lydia  Williams. 

2  In  confirmation  of  this,  see  authorities  cited  above,  p.  436. 


to  make  their  issue.  Shortly  before  these  letters  sounding  the  leaders  at  home,  Colonel 
Pickering  had  despatched  to  all  parts  of  the  country  letters  inveighing  against  this 
amendment,  together  with  copies  of  the  speeches  which  had  been  made  in  oppo 
sition  to  it  in  Congress. 


1800-5.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  445 

The  removal  of  good  men  from  office,  and  the  appointment  of 
some  of  the  worst  in  their  places,  have  a  pernicious  effect  on  the 
public  morals.  Depravity  is  the  surest  road  to  preferment,  while 
virtue  and  integrity  are  objects  of  virulent  persecution.  Hence, 
the  open  apostasy  of  many,  before  of  decent  character,  but  without 
stability  to  resist  temptation.  The  removal  of  the  present  judges, 
and  the  appointment  of  unprincipled  successors,  will  complete  the 
catastrophe.  The  men  of  stern,  inflexible  virtue,  who  dare  expose 
arid  resist  the  public  corruption,  will  be  the  first  victims  ;  and  the 
best  portion  of  the  community,  already  humbled,  will  be  trodden 
under  foot. 

And  must  we  submit  to  these  evils  ?  Is  there  no  remedy  ?  Is 
there  not  yet  remaining  in  New  England  virtue  and  spirit  enough, 
if  a  suitable  occasion  offer,  to  resist  the  torrent  ?  The  most  intel 
ligent  of  the  Federalists  here  have  been  reflecting  on  this  subject 
with  the  deepest  concern.  Massachusetts,  as  the  most  powerful, 
they  say,  should  take  the  lead.  At  the  word  from  her,  Connecticut 
would  instantly  join.  There  can  be  no  doubt  of  New  Hampshire. 
Rhode  Island  would  follow,  of  necessity.  There  would  probably 
be  no  great  difficulty  in  bringing  in  Vermont.  But  New  York 
should  also  concur  ;  and,  as  she  might  be  made  the  centre  of  the 
Northern  Union,  it  can  hardly  be  supposed  that  she  would  refuse 
her  assent.  New  Jersey  would  assuredly  become  an  associate ; 
and  it  is  to  be  wished  that  Pennsylvania,  at  least  east  of  the  Sus- 
quehannah,  might  be  induced  to  come  into  the  confederacy.  At 
no  distant  period,  the  British  Provinces  on  the  north  and  north 
east  would  probably  become  a  part  of  the  Northern  Union.  I 
think  Great  Britain  would  not  object ;  for  she  would  continue  to 
derive  from  them,  when  become  States,  all  the  commercial  advan 
tages  they  would  yield  if  continued  her  provinces,  without  the 
expense  of  governing  and  defending  them. 

While  thus  contemplating  the  only  means  of  maintaining  our 
ancient  institutions  in  morals  and  religion  and  our  equal  rights,  we 
wish  no  ill  to  the  Southern  States,  and  those  naturally  connected 
with  them.  The  public  debts  might  be  equitably  apportioned 
between  the  new  confederacies,  and  a  separation  somewhere  about 
the  line  above  suggested  would  divide  the  different  characters  of 
the  existing  Union.  The  manners  of  the  eastern  portion  of  the 
States  would  be  sufficiently  congenial  to  form  a  union,  and  their 
interests  are  alike  intimately  connected  with  agriculture  and  com- 


446  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1800-5. 

merce.  A  friendly  and  commercial  intercourse  would  be  main 
tained  with  the  States  in  the  southern  confederacy,  as  at  present. 
Thus  all  the  advantages  which  have  been  for  a  few  years  depend 
ing  on  the  general  Union  would  be  continued  to  its  respective  por 
tions,  without  the  jealousies  and  enmities  which  now  afflict  both, 
and  which  peculiarly  embitter  the  condition  of  that  of  the  North. 
It  is  not  unusual  for  two  friends,  when  disagreeing  about  the  mode 
of  conducting  a  common  concern,  to  separate,  and  manage  each  in 
his  own  way  his  separate  interest,  and  thereby  preserve  a  useful 
friendship,  which  without  such  separation  would  infallibly  be 
destroyed. 

If  even  the  New  England  States  alone  were  agreed  in  the  first 
instance,  would  there  be  any  difficulty  in  making  frank  and  open 
proposition  for  a  separation,  on  the  principles  above  suggested  ? 

The  Northern  States  have  nothing  to  countervail  the  power  and 
influence  arising  from  the  negro  representation,  nor  will  they  ever 
receive  an  equivalent.  This  alone  is  an  adequate  ground  to  de 
mand  a  separation.  The  only  practical  equivalent  is  a  direct  tax, 
which  will  not  be  resorted  to  until  all  other  means  are  exhausted ; 
and  in  the  mean  time  we  suffer  all  the  mischiefs  which  flow  from  an 
unequal  representation. 

Several  distinguished  men  are  turning  the  attention  of  their 
Eastern  friends  to  the  consideration  of  this  subject ;  and  it  being 
of  the  highest  importance,  and  requiring  the  most  serious  reflec 
tions,  I  have  thought  it  right  to  present  it  to  you. 

With  the  greatest  regard  and  esteem,  I  am,  &c.         T.  P. 


THEODORE  LYMAN  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Feb.  29,  1804. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  carefully  and  with  much  solicitude  perused 
the  communications  received  in  your  letter.  There  are  few  among 
my  acquaintance  with  whom  I  could  on  that  subject  freely  con 
verse  ;  there  may  be  more  ready  than  I  am  aware  of,  and  that  are 
kept  back  under  an  impression  that  they  are  more  singular  in  their 
opinion  than  they  really  are.  Patient  waiting  with  prudent  man 
agement,  by  giving  opportunity,  when  it  occurs,  of  expressing 
sentiments,  seems  to  be  the  only  means  to  ascertain  the  opinion  of 
gentlemen  whose  prudence,  discretion,  and  good  judgment  are  to  be 
relied  on.  Many  judicious  and  discerning  men  must  see  that  one 


1800-5.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  447 

encroachment  after  another  on  the  fundamental  principles  of  the 
Constitution  lessens  its  solidity.  Clearly  perceiving  the  danger, 
they  may  yet  feel  at  a  loss  how  to  counteract  a  system  of  proceed 
ing  which  they  are  sure  will  ultimately  destroy  it,  without  endan 
gering  the  peace  and  safety  of  their  country.  There  is,  besides,  a 
large  class  of  valuable  men,  whose  business  takes  up  the  principal 
part  of  their  attention,  and  who  scarcely  ever  cast  their  eye  toward 
the  political  horizon  of  their  country ;  and  they  of  course  do  not 
perceive  the  cloud  that  is  gathering  around  it.  Being  themselves 
honest  and  true  lovers  of  good  government,  they  are  ready  to  be 
lieve,  if  not  at  least  to  hope,  that  all  are  like  unto  themselves. 
These  good  people  cannot  be  made  to  look  up  until  the  cloud  shall 
have  so  much  thickened  that  their  prospects  are  darkened,  and  to 
feel  their  security  is  in  danger.  That  such  is  the  state  of  things 
may  be  to  be  regretted ;  but,  if  the  picture  is  truly  drawn,  must 
not  the  remedy  that  is  to  be  applied  be  in  conformity  thereto  ? 

How  the  project  of  an  adjustment,1  as  has  been  suggested,  would 
suit  the  dominant  party,  is  problematical.  Men  seldom  are  content 
to  stop  at  any  stage  of  power ;  and,  possessing  it  so  completely  as 
they  now  do,  is  it  reasonable  to  suppose  that  any  proposition 
founded  on  reason,  and  that  would  in  its  tendency  promote  the 
united  interest  of  the  whole  nation,  —  is  it  natural,  or  can  it  scarcely 
be  hoped,  that  it  would  be  well  received  ? 

You  know  full  well  my  sentiments,  and  will  believe  me  ready  at 
all  times,  in  any  way  that  is  in  my  power,  to  do  those  things  which 
in  their  tendency  shall  promote  the  interest  of  my  country. 
Faithfully  yours, 

PICKERING  TO  KING. 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON, 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  am  disgusted  with  the  men  who^QV 
with  their  measures.  At  some  manifestations  of  their 
I  am  shocked.  The  cowardly  wretch  at  their  head, 
a  Parisian  revolutionary  monster,  prating  about  humanity,  would 
feel  an  infernal  pleasure  in  the  utter  destruction  of  his  opponents. 
We  have  too  long  witnessed  his  general  turpitude,  his  cruel  re 
movals  of  faithful  officers,  and  the  substitution  of  corruption  and 
looseness  for  integrity  and  worth.  We  have  now  before  the  Senate 

1  This  refers  to  the  taxation  of  slaves  on  the  ground  of  representation. 


448  LIFE   AND   LETTEES    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1800-5. 

a  nomination  of  Merriweather  Jones,  of  Richmond,  editor  of  the 
"  Examiner,"  a  paper  devoted  to  Jefferson  and  Jacobinism  ;  and 
he  is  now  to  be  rewarded.  Mr.  Hopkins,  commissioner  of  loans, 
a  man  of  property  and  integrity,  is  to  give  room  for  this  Jones. 
The  commissioner  may  have  at  once  thirty  thousand  dollars  in  his 
hands  to  pay  the  public  creditors  in  Virginia.  He  is  required  by 
law  to  give  bonds  only  in  a  sum  from  live  to  ten  thousand  dollars ; 
and  Jones's  character  is  so  notoriously  bad  that  we  have  satisfac 
tory  evidence  he  could  not  now  get  credit  at  any  store  in  Rich 
mond  for  a  suit  of  clothes !  Yet  I  am  far  from  thinking,  if  this 
evidence  should  be  laid  before  the  Senate,  that  his  nomination 
will  be  negatived !  I  am  therefore  ready  to  say,  "  Come  out  from 
among  them,  and  be  ye  separate."  Corruption  is  the  object  and 
instrument  of  the  chief,  and  the  tendency  of  his  administration,  for 
the  purpose  of  maintaining  himself  in  power  and  the  accomplish 
ment  of  his  infidel  and  visionary  schemes.  The  corrupt  portion  of 
the  people  are  the  agents  of  his  misrule.  Corruption  is  the  recom 
mendation  to  office,  and  many  of  some  pretensions  to  character,  but 
too  feeble  to  resist  temptation,  become  apostates.  Virtue  and  worth 
are  his  enemies,  and  therefore  he  would  overwhelm  them.  The 
collision  of  Democrats  in  your  State  promises  some  amendment: 
the  administration  of  your  government  cannot  well  be  worse. 

The  Federalists  here  in  general  anxiously  desire  the  election  of 
Mr.  Burr  to  the  chair  of  New  York,  for  they  despair  of  a  present 
ascendancy  of  the  Federal  party.  Mr.  Burr  alone,  we  think,  can 
break  your  Democratic  phalanx ;  and  we  anticipate  much  good 
from  his  success.  Were  New  York  detached  (as  under  his  admin 
istration  it  would  be)  from  the  Virginian  influence,  the  whole 
Union  would  be  benefited.  Jefferson  would  then  be  forced  to 
observe  some  caution  and  forbearance  in  his  measures.  And,  if  a 
separation  should  be  deemed  proper,  the  five  New  England  States, 
New  York,  and  New  Jersey  would  naturally  be  united.  Among 
those  seven  States  there  is  a  sufficient  congeniality  of  char 
acter  to  authorize  the  expectation  of  practicable  harmony  and  a 
permanent  union,  New  York  the  centre.  Without  a  separation, 
can  those  States  ever  rid  themselves  of  negro  Presidents  and 
negro  Congresses,  and  regain  their  just  weight  in  the  political 
balance  ?  At  this  moment,  the  slaves  of  the  Middle  and  Southern 
States  have  fifteen  representatives  in  Congress,  and  they  will 
appoint  that  number  of  electors  of  the  next  President  and  Vice- 


1800-5.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  449 

President;  and  the  number  of  slaves  is  continually  increasing. 
You  notice  this  evil.  But  will  the  slave  States  ever  renounce  the 
advantage?  As  population  is  in  fact  no  rule  of  taxation,  the  negro 
representation  ought  to  be  given  up.  If  refused,  it  would  be  a 
strong  ground  for  separation,  though  perhaps  an  earlier  occasion 
may  present  to  declare  it.  How  many  Indian  wars,  excited  by  the 
avidity  of  the  Western  and  Southern  States  for  Indian  lands,  shall 
we  have  to  encounter,  and  who  will  pay  the  millions  to  support 
them  ?  The  Atlantic  States.  Yet  the  first  moment  we  ourselves 
need  assistance,  and  call  on  the  Western  States  for  taxes,  they  will 
declare  off,  or  at  any  rate  refuse  to  obey  the  call.  Kentucky 
effectually  resisted  the  collection  of  the  excise;  and  of  the  thirty- 
seven  thousand  dollars'  direct  tax  assessed  upon  her  so  many  years 
ago,  she  has  paid  only  four  thousand  dollars,  and  probably  will 
never  pay  the  residue.  In  the  mean  time,  we  are  maintaining 
their  representatives  in  Congress  for  governing  us,  who  surely  can 
much  better  govern  ourselves.  Whenever  the  Western  States  de 
tach  themselves,  they  will  take  Louisiana  with  them.  In  thirty 
years,  the  white  population  on  the  Western  waters  will  equal  that 
of  the  thirteen  States  when  they  declared  themselves  independent 
of  Great  Britain.  On  the  census  of  1790,  Kentucky  was  entitled 
to  two  representatives;  under  that  of  1800,  she  has  six. 

I  do  not  know  one  reflecting  Nov- Anglian  who  is  not  anxious 
for  the  GREAT  EVENT  at  which  I  have  glanced.  They  fear,  they 
dread  the  effects  of  the  corruption  so  rapidly  extending ;  and  that, 
if  a  decisive  step  be  long  delayed,  it  will  be  in  vain  to  attempt  it. 
If  there  be  no  improper  delay,  we  have  not  any  doubt  but  that  the 
great  measure  may  be  taken,  without  the  smallest  hazard  to  private 
property  or  the  public  funds,  the  revenues  of  the  Northern  States 
being  equal  to  their  portion  of  the  public  debt,  leaving  that  for 
Louisiana  on  those  who  incurred  it. 

Believe  me  ever  faithfully  yours,  T.  P. 

The  facility  with  which  we  have  seen  an  essential  change  in  the 
Constitution  proposed  and  generally  adopted  will  perhaps  remove 
your  scruples  about  proposing  what  you  intimate  respecting  negro 
representation.  But  I  begin  to  doubt  whether  that  or  any  other 
change  we  could  propose,  with  a  chance  of  adoption,  would  be  worth 
the  breath,  paper,  and  ink  which  would  be  expended  in  the  acqui 
sition. 

29 


450  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE    CABOT.       [1800-5 


KING  TO  PICKERING. 

NEAV  YORK,  March  9,  1804. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  duly  received,  and  beg  you  to  accept  my 
acknowledgments  for,  your  letters  of  the  3d  and  4th  instant.  The 
views  which  they  disclose  ought  to  fix  the  attention  of  the  real 
friends  of  liberty  on  this  quarter  of  the  Union,  and  the  more  so 
as  things  seem  to  be  fast  advancing  to  a  crisis.  To  save  the  post, 
I  can  do  little  more  than  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  letters. 
By  the  mail  of  to-morrow  or  Monday,  I  will  send  you  a  copy  of 
my  despatch  to  the  Secretary  of  State  respecting  the  effort  I  made 
to  conclude  a  convention  concerning  seamen.1  .  .  . 

RUFUS  KING. 

PICKERING  TO  THEODORE  LYMAN. 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  March  14,  1804. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  received  your  letter  of  the  29th  ult.  Con 
sidering  your  connection  with  a  certain  cousin  of  yours,  I  thought 
it  possible  that  you  might  deem  it  proper  to  start  the  idea  to  him. 
I  had  written  to  G.  Cabot  on  the  same  subject.  He  had  commu 
nicated  my  letter  to  Theophilus  Parsons,  S.  Higginson,  and  Mr. 
Ames :  they  think  the  measure  premature,  while  they  deplore  the 
existing  evils  and  our  future  prospects.  The  idea  suggested  for  your 
consideration  is  certainly  extending,  in  Connecticut  especially ;  and 
it  begins  to  be  entertained  in  New  York.  The  character  and  pro 
ceedings  of  the  virulent  Clintonians  in  that  State,  with  the  declining 
of  Chancellor  Lansing  to  be  the  candidate  for  governor,  will  vastly 
aid  Mr.  Burr's  pretensions,  and  from  the  intelligence  we  have 
here  we  expect  that  Mr.  Burr  will  be  elected.  This  will  break 
the  Democratic  phalanx  of  that  State,  and  prepare  the  way  for  the 
contemplated  event.  Mr.  Burr's  administration  will  be  more  liberal 
than  that  of  the  Clintonian  or  of  the  general  government. 

As  for  the  Constitution,  'tis  mere  paper,  to  be  folded  into  any 
shape  to  suit  the  views  of  the  dominant  party.  Little  regard  is 
had  in  deciding  political  questions  to  it  or  to  justice ;  and  a  great 
part  of  the  public  measures  have  a  bearing  on  politics,  being  cal 
culated  to  depress  the  Federalists  and  to  increase  the  power  and 

1  The  letter  goes  on  from  this  point,  despite  the  haste  necessary  to  save 
the  post,  for  three  closely  written  pages,  on  the  subject  of  our  foreign  policy 
and  impressment. 


1800-5.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  451 

influence  of  their  opponents.  We  have  this  day,  upon  an  ex 
parte  hearing,  and  against  the  testimonies  of  many  respectable 
men  of  the  insanity  of  Judge  Pickering,  district  judge  of  New 
Hampshire,  adjudged  him  guilty  of  high  crimes  and  misdemeanors, 
and  sentenced  him  to  be  removed  from  office.  Justice  should 
have  presided  at  this  trial,  but  was  not  admitted ;  nor  will  she 
again  find  a  place  in  the  court  of  impeachment.  The  demon 
of  party  governed  the  decision.  All  who  condemned  were  Jeffer- 
sonians,  and  all  who  pronounced  the  accused  not  guilty  were 
Federalists.  Some  members  retired,  without  giving  any  vote. 
I  am  told  that  the  "  Aurora "  has  published  that  Mr.  Harper 
was  heard  in  defence  of  Judge  Pickering,  but  'tis  false.  He 
was  permitted  to  read  a  petition  from  Judge  Pickering's  son, 
setting  forth  his  father's  insanity  and  utter  inability  of  body  to 
appear  in  person  to  read  his  depositions,  to  prove  the  suggestions 
in  the  petition,  and  to  enforce  the  prayer  of  it  that  the  cause  might 
be  postponed.  But  Mr.  Harper  explicitly  stated  that  he  did  not 
appear  for  Judge  Pickering,  but  merely  as  his  son's  friend,  and 
the  friend  of  the  court,  to  present  and  support  the  suggestions  in 
his  son's  petition. 

I  am  this  moment  informed  that  the  House  of  Representatives 
have  resolved  to  impeach  Judge  Chase.  You  may  conclude  he 
will  be  condemned.  If  a  considerable  majority  of  the  House  were 
to  impeach  any  man  in  the  United  States,  he  would  by  the  Senate 
be  found  guilty ;  because  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  these  meas 
ures  originate  with  the  administration,  are  made  questions  of  party, 
and  therefore  at  all  events  to  be  carried  into  effect  according  to 
the  wishes  of  the  prime  mover.  There  will,  to  be  sure,  be  some 
stretching  of  conscience.  If  several  of  the  senators  were  left  to  de 
cide  the  questions  individually,  their  consciences  would  give  way ; 
but,  when  a  number  of  consciences  are  joined  together,  they  will  bear 
much  rough  usage  without  being  rent.  Judge  Chase  will  not  be 
brought  to  his  trial  this  session,  for  we  hope  to  adjourn  in  two 
weeks.  Disgusted  and  shocked  with  the  proceedings  of  the  ruling 
sect,  I  long  to  get  away  from  such  scenes  of  political  profligacy  and 
injustice.  I  have  just  now  heard  mentioned  the  means  used  to 
obtain  the  assent  of  Rhode  Island  to  the  alteration  of  the  Constitu 
tion  relative  to  the  choice  of  President  and  Vice-President.  The 
profligate  rulers  of  that  profligate  State,  it  is  said  (and  I  believe 
truly),  agreed  to  adopt  the  amendment,  provided  the  Federal 


452  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.        [1800-5. 

officers  in  the  State,  especially  the  collectors  of  the  customs,  were 
removed,  and  that  Jefferson  promised  to  remove  them.  This,  how 
ever,  will  not  be  done  until  Congress  rises.  He  is  fond  of  remov 
ing  and  appointing  in  the  recess.  The  outrage  becomes  an  old 
story  before  it  is  necessary  to  nominate  the  same  men  to  the 
Senate. 

Under  such  a  man,  and  with  the  means  he  possesses  and  can 
command,  corruption  will  continue  to  make  rapid  progress,  all 
power  will  be  thrown  into  the  hands  of  his  party  in  all  the  States, 
and  the  Federalists  will  curse  the  day  which  detached  them  from 
the  milder  government  of  the  mother  country. 

Such  is  the  fate  which  awaits  us,  and  we  shall  live  to  see  it ; 
yes,  the  next  Presidential  term  will  not  elapse  before  what  is  now 
anticipated  will  be  verified.  One  or  two  Marats  or  Robespierres  in 
each  branch  of  the  Legislature,  with  half  a  dozen  hardened  wretches 
ready  to  co-operate,  a  greater  number  of  half-moderates,  another 
portion  of  gaping  expectants  of  office,  another  of  the  ignorant 
and  undiscerning,  with  the  many  timid  characters,  will  constitute  a 
large  majority,  up  to  any  measure  which  the  revenge,  the  malice, 
the  ambition,  or  rapacity  of  the  leaders  shall  propose.  It  will  be 
enough  to  render  every  such  measure  popular  to  declare  its  object 
to  be  to  crush  aristocracy  and  monarchy,  and  to  secure  liberty  and 
Republicanism. 

And  are  our  good  citizens  so  devoted  to  their  private  pursuits  that 
they  will  not  allow  themselves  time  to  look  up  and  see  the  gathering 
cloud?  Will  nothing  rouse  them  but  its  thunder,  or  strike  their 
eyes  save  the  lightning  bursting  from  its  bosom  ? 

I  am,  indeed,  sick  at  heart  to  see  of  our  Revolutionary  toils, 
dangers,  and  sufferings,  such  a  result,  and  in  the  short  space  of 
twenty  years  !  "  A  virtuous  and  enlightened  people  ! "  The  ear  is 
wounded  by  prostitution  of  those  epithets.  And  is  our  case  really 
hopeless  ?  I  have  little  to  lose,  except  life,  and  that,  verging  to 
threescore  years,  is  not  worth  much ;  yet  I  would  fain  die  in 
peace,  or,  if  that  be  denied,  perish  in  the  hope  of  leaving  it  an 
inheritance  to  my  children,  under  a  free  government,  established  on 
surer  foundations  than  that  which  only  fifteen  years  ago  we  em 
braced  with  so  much  ardor.  The  experienced  errors  of  the  latter 
might,  one  would  hope,  be  remedied  under  a  Northern  con 
federacy.  Are  stability,  justice,  and  tranquillity  incompatible  with 
Republicanism  ? 


1800-5.]  CORRESPONDENCE.  453 

You  have  mistaken,  or  I  did  not  clearly  express  my  meaning 
with  regard  to  an  adjustment.  That  must  be  a  subsequent  meas 
ure.  If  the  States  I  mentioned  were  united,  the  rest  would  not 
dare  to  lift  a  finger  against  them.  After  the  confederacy  of  the 
former  should  be  fixed,  the  terms  of  intercourse  with  the  others 
and  the  distribution  of  existing  burdens  would  be  agreed  on. 

I  remain,  my  dear  sir,  very  truly  yours,  T.  P. 


STEPHEN  HIGGINSON  TO  PICKERING. 

MARCH  17,  1804. 
i 

DEAR  SIR, —  I  have  seen  your  letters  to  Mr.  Cabot  and  Mr. 
Lyman  on  the  question  of  separation,  which  is  a  very  delicate  and 
important  one,  considered  in  the  abstract.  We  all  agree  there  can 
be  no  doubt  of  its  being  desirable ;  but  of  the  expediency  of 
attempting  it,  or  discussing  it  now  at  this  moment,  we  all  very 
much  doubt.  It  is  dangerous  to  continue  under  the  Virginia 
system ;  but  how  to  extricate  ourselves  at  present  we  see  not,  and, 
if  we  remain  long  together,  we  shall  be  bound  with  so  many  liga 
tures  it  will  require  great  efforts  to  get  extricated,  and,  in  the 
present  state  of  the  public  mind,  even  here  no  attempt  can  be 
excited.  It  would  indeed  be  very  unpopular  to  suggest  the  idea  of 
its  being  either  expedient  or  necessary.  It  is  impossible  to  alarm, 
much  less  to  convince,  a  large  portion  of  the  Federal  party  here  of 
their  danger.  A  small  part  only  of  those  called  Federal,  and  who 
in  common  cases  usually  go  with  us,  are  sound  in  their  opinions, 
and  willing  to  look  into  their  real  situation.  Many  even  of  our 
own  party  have  as  much  yet  to  unlearn  as  to  learn.  They  have 
yet  much  of  the  Democratic  taint  about  them  ;  and,  with  this  non 
sense  in  their  brains  and  the  influence  of  a  former  great  man *  and 
his  friends,  who  will  seize  every  occasion  to  keep  up  a  division 
in  the  Federal  party  here,  we  should  be  put  into  the  background, 
were  we  to  make  that  question  the  subject  of  free  conversation. 
As,  in  the  present  state  of  things,  it  would  be  imprudent  even  to 
discuss  the  question,  we  must  wait  the  effects  of  still  greater  out 
rage  and  insult  from  those  in  power  before  we  prepare  for  the  only 
measure  which  can  save  the  New  England  States  from  the  snares 
of  Virginia. 

Democracy  is  rising,  and  will  increase  in  this  State.  Our  elec- 
1  Ex-President  John  Adams. 


454  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.       [1800-5. 

tions  may  this  year  give  us  a  majority  in  both  houses,  and  Governor 
Strong;  but,  without  some  favorable  events,  the  Democrats  will 
succeed  another  year,  and  we  shall  be  revolutionized,  and  the  other 
States  will  follow.  Such  is  my  view  of  our  situation :  it  is  the 
natural  effects  of  existing  causes,  which  will  produce  the  change  I 
contemplate,  and  I  see  no  means  in  our  power  to  control  their 
operation.  But  as  we  may  at  times  check,  perhaps  modify  and 
often  mitigate,  by  a  vigilant  and  steady  opposition,  the  effects  of 
revolutionary  measures,  and  give  ourselves  the  chance  of  the 
chapter  of  accidents  for  a  longer  period  of  time,  I  am  for  remaining 
at  our  posts,  ready  to  seize  every  favorable  event  and  to  keep  the 
robin  alive  as  long  as  we  can. 

Wishing  as  much  success  and  happiness  as  can  attend  you,  I  am 
very  truly  yours,  &c.,  S.  HIGGINSON. 


1804-15.]  THE  HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  455 


CHAPTER  XII. 

1804-1815. 
New  England  Federalism  and  the  Hartford  Convention. 

THE  settlement  of  the  Louisiana  question  concluded  the 
most  important  political  transaction  of  1804.  In  the  spring 
of  that  year,  Mr.  Jefferson  overcame  his  scruples  l  in  regard 
to  a  re-election,  and  accepted  the  nomination  of.  his  party 
caucus  for  a  second  term. 

The  same  year  was  made  memorable  also  by  the  closing 
scenes  in  the  life  of  the  President's  great  opponent.  Just 
before  the  renomination  of  the  former,  Hamilton,  not  less 
illustrious  at  the  bar  than  at  the  head  of  the  Treasury,  had 
fixed  the  attention  of  the  country  by  his  celebrated  defence 
of  the  liberty  of  the  press  in  the  Croswell  case.  A  few 
short  months,  and  all  these  talents,  all  this  genius,  were 
hurried  to  a  premature  grave  by  the  hand  of  Aaron  Burr. 
The  news  of  the  terrible  tragedy  enacted  that  quiet  sum 
mer  morning,  on  the  beautiful  banks  of  the  Hudson,  spread 
fast  and  far.  The  whole  country,  forgetting  for  an  instant 
party  hatred,  mourned  the  untimely  death  of  one  of  her 
greatest  men ;  while  the  Federalists  were  for  the  moment 
crushed  by  the  unexpected  blow.  In  Hamilton,  they  lost 
their  greatest  leader,  the  only  man  who  had  the  power  and 
the  will  to  form  them  to  new  issues,  and  lead  them  again  to 
success.  By  his  death,  Federalism  received  a  check  from 
which  it  never  recovered,  except  in  New  England  ;  and  only 
unforeseen  events  renewed  its  strength  there.  Colonel  Pick 
ering's  letters,  at  the  opening  of  the  next  session,  show  plainly 
1  Jefferson's  Works,  II.  330,  331 ;  III.  15. 


456  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF    GEORGE   CABOT.     [1801-15. 

that  the  material  prosperity  of  the  country  during  Jeffer 
son's  first  term,  the  death  of  Hamilton,  and  the  ill-judged 
resistance  of  the  Federalists  to  the  purchase  of  Louisiana, 
had  done  their  work.  When  Massachusetts  sent  Demo 
cratic  electors  to  vote  for  Jefferson,  the  end  was  near  at 
hand,  the  Democratic  tide  was  almost  at  its  height ;  and  the 
dissolution  and  re-formation  of  parties  could  not  have  been 
far  distant.  Colonel  Pickering  writes  sadly  of  the  decay 
of  party  spirit,  and  the  absence  of  party  feeling  in  Con 
gress.  Had  it  not  been  for  Europe  and  Jefferson's  foreign 
policy,  the  era  of  good  feeling,  the  break-up  of  the  old 
parties  and  the  development  of  new  ones,  would  have  come 
in  1805  instead  of  in  1815.  But  it  was  destined  to  be 
otherwise ;  and  the  country  at  that  very  moment  was  on 
the  verge  of  the  most  bitter  and,  in  some  respects,  the  sor 
riest  political  strife  which  our  annals  have  to  show. 

The  first  signs  of  trouble  were  visible  at  the  opening  of 
the  session  of  1804-5.  The  renewal  of  war  in  Europe 
had  brought  with  it  a  revival  of  impressments  from  our 
vessels ;  and  the  country  was  rudely  awakened  from  its 
tranquillity  to  a  sense  that  storms  were  brewing,  and  that 
"  wise  frugality  "  had  left  a  maritime  people  not  only  with 
out  a  navy,  but  destitute  even  of  cannon  or  fortifications 
with  which  to  guard  their  far-reaching  sea-board  and  de 
fenceless  towns.  The  President,  however,  was  fully  pre 
pared  for  the  emergency.  A  further  curtailment  of  the 
navy  appropriation  was  of  course  obviously  proper ;  but  the 
protection  of  the  coast  had  to  be  provided  for,  and  the  lack 
of  fortifications  supplied.  With  these  last  objects,  appro 
priations  were  made  for  building  twenty-five  gun-boats, 
which  were  to  be  housed,  and  put  in  the  water  only  when 
the  stress  of  war  was  actually  upon  us  ;  and  a  sufficient  num 
ber  of  cannon  mounted  on  wheels  were  to  be  in  readiness  to 
meet  an  attack  at  any  point,  and  thus  supply  the  need  of 
permanent  forts.  By  this  simple  device,  expensive  and 
immovable  fortifications  at  all  the  ports  would  be  avoided ; 


1804-15.]  THE   HARTFOKD  CONVENTION.  457 

while  travelling  fortifications  would  always  be  on  hand  to 
be  trundled  from  one  harbor  to  another,  in  order  to  meet 
the  enemy  wherever  he  appeared.  In  this  way,  money  was 
saved ;  and  at  the  same  time  the  country  and  the  flag  were 
protected. 

The  chief  interest  of  the  session,  however,  centred  in  a 
domestic  question,  the  impeachment  and  trial  of  Judge 
Chase.  Here  the  Federalists  gained  a  decisive  victory,  and 
one  whose  importance  it  is  now  difficult  to  appreciate.  By 
their  efforts,  Judge  Chase  was  acquitted,  the  judiciary  was 
saved,  and  its  independence  protected.  At  this  time,  too, 
the  split,  which  had  been  anticipated  by  the  Federalists, 
between  the  radical  and  conservative  elements  of  the  Demo 
cratic  party,  began  to  show  itself.  There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  there  were  many  men  with  just  wit  enough  to  be  fas 
cinated  by  Jefferson's  theories,  but  wholly  devoid  of  his 
tact,  prudence,  and  address,  whose  designs  fell  little  short 
of  a  complete  revolution  in  our  government.  This  faction 
suffered  a  severe  defeat  by  the  acquittal  of  Chase,  and 
were  suppressed  and  broken  down  by  Jefferson,  but  still 
they  were  not  idle  elsewhere.  Pierrepont  Edwards's  Demo 
cratic  convention  in  Connecticut,  and  the  furious  partisan 
attempts  to  alter  the  Constitution  of  Pennsylvania,  showed 
the  existence  and  activity  of  a  very  dangerous  and  extreme 
party.  Had  not  other  events  intervened,  our  politics  might 
have  turned  at  this  point  into  channels  very  different  from 
those  actually  taken. 

The  famous  English  admiralty  decisions1  were  known 
here  early  in  1805,  and  produced  a  storm  of  indignation  in 
all  our  commercial  cities  whose  interests  were  most  nearly 
affected.  Not  only  were  we  in  trouble  with  England,  but 
our  difficulties  with  Spain  began  to  assume  a  threatening 
appearance.  Once  more  the  President  proved  himself  equal 
to  the  occasion.  At  the  opening  of  Congress  in  the  autumn, 
more  gun-boats  were  advised  in  the  message ;  and  money 
was  required  for  secret  objects.  Jefferson  wished  to  have 
1  See  above,  p.  314 


458  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1804-15. 

the  Mediterranean  fund,  formerly  used  to  buy  off  pirates,  put 
into  his  hands,  and  no  questions  asked  as  to  the  purpose  to 
which  it  was  applied.  A  resolution  in  conformity  with  this 
plan  was  accordingly  introduced  in  the  House  by  one  of  the 
President's  adherents.  Information  was  demanded  by  the 
opposition  as  to  the  use  for  which  this  money  was  intended, 
but  the  "  secret  wishes  "  of  the  President  was  the  only  reply 
vouchsafed.  In  a  spasm  of  self-respect,  the  House,  while 
they  voted  the  appropriation  with  their  usual  obedience, 
refused  to  raise  it  under  cover  of  duties  for  the  Mediterra 
nean  fund,  although  subsequently,  by  a  trick  which  it  is 
unnecessary  to  explain  here,  Jefferson  succeeded  in  carry 
ing  his  point,  and  in  getting  possession  of  the  money  in  the 
form  of  the  fund.  His  object  was  the  very  simple  one  of 
paying  France  to  keep  Spain  in  check.1  He  had  already 
exhibited  his  tenderness  to  those  nations  by  refusing  our 
merchants  permission  to  arm  and  protect  themselves  against 
the  piratical  cruisers  in  the  West  India  islands ;  but  his  re 
gard  for  the  Latin  races  was  still  more  severely  tested,  at  this 
time,  by  the  insults  which  the  Spanish  minister  Yrujo  heaped 
upon  us.  Not  even  the  actual  invasion  of  our  territory  by 
Spaniards  seemed  to  Jefferson  cause  for  prompt  resistance. 
But  while  planning  to  subdue  some  hostile  nations  by  the 
gentle  arts  of  purchase,  and  by  turning  to  their  assailants  the 
still  unsmitten  cheek  for  further  blows,  our  government,  in 
other  directions,  was  both  sensitive  and  even  aggressive,  and 
at  once  retaliated  the  English  admiralty  decisions  by  the 
non-importation  act,  the  first  of  that  dismal  series  of  commer 
cial  restrictions  for  which  we  were  indebted  to  another  of 
Jefferson's  many  theories.  The  Federalists  opposed  this 
whole  policy,  on  the  ground  that  the  trade  affected  by  the 
British  decisions  was  not  a  legitimate  trade,  but  the  growth 
of  the  European  troubles ;  and  they  contended  that  non 
importation  was  a  measure  which  could  lead  only  to  war, 

1  See  Annals  of  Congress,  1805,  1806,  pp.  94(3-994,  Debate  on  Spanish 
Affairs.     Compare  Jefferson,  Works,  IV.  587,  and  V.  27,  164,  181. 


1804-15.]       THE  HARTFORD  CONVENTION.          459 

and  to  a  war  in  defence  of  an  illegal  trade.  Jefferson, 
however,  was  not  neglectful  of  other  weapons.  One  hun 
dred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars  was  voted  in  order  to  for 
tify  all  our  harbors,  and  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
dollars  for  building  more  gun-boats.  Nothing  was  done 
for  the  army,  but  the  navy  was  attended  to.  No  appro 
priation  was  made  to  repair  some  of  the  frigates  which  had 
been  laid  up  ;  but  they  were  sold,  and  thus  turned  to  good 
account.  The  frames,  too,  of  certain  ships  of  the  line  were 
utilized  by  being  cut  up  for  the  gun-boats.  At  the  same 
time,  the  numbers  of  the  seamen  were  limited,  so  that  only 
enough  were  provided  to  man  three  frigates.  The  strong 
position  acquired  by  these  measures  may  be  appreciated 
by  the  action  of  our  government  in  the  Peirce  affair. 
Peirce,  the  captain  of  an  American  vessel,  was  killed  near 
New  York  Harbor  by  a  cannon-shot  from  a  British  cruiser ; 
and,  although  Jefferson  had  just  aimed  a  blow  by  the  non 
importation  act  at  the  commercial  supremacy  of  Great 
Britain,  he  was  both  unwilling  and  unable  to  retaliate,  or 
even  to  display  any  indignation  for  the  death  of  Peirce. 
The  only  notice  taken  of  the  affair  was  to  send  a  copy  of 
the  act,  providing  for  our  naval  peace  establishment,  to  the 
New  York  council,  who  had  called  upon  the  national  govern 
ment  for  defence,  and  to  publish  a  proclamation  ordering 
the  offending  cruiser  to  leave  our  waters.  Thus,  by  these 
missives,  a  sense  of  our  ability  to  enforce  the  demands 
of  the  proclamation  was  conveyed  both  to  us  and  to  the 
English.  No  evidence  remains  to  show  whether  the  British 
cruiser  departed  after  this  pitiable  display  of  weakness  on 
the  part  of  our  government. 

Scarcely  had  the  President  succeeded  in  securing  the 
Mediterranean  fund,  when  it  became  known  that  Talley 
rand  threatened  Avar,  unless  we  abandoned  our  commerce 
with  Hayti.  This  menace,  conveyed  through  the  medium 
of  Turreau,  the  French  minister,  produced  the  desired  effect : 
and  an  act  of  Congress,  in  conformity  with  the  desires  of 


460  LFFE   AND   LETTERS  OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1804-15, 

the  President,  forbade  the  obnoxious  trade.  The  adminis 
tration  was  ready  to  quarrel  with  the  greatest  maritime 
power  in  the  world,  the  only  one  that  could  do  us  essential 
injury,  because  certain  doubtful  commercial  rights  had 
been  infringed ;  while  another  branch  of  trade  was  readily 
prohibited  in  deference  to  the  threats  of  France.  The 
contrast  between  the  policies  pursued  towards  the  two  bel 
ligerents  is,  in  this  instance,  sufficiently  striking. 

Difficulties,  indeed,  thickened  rapidly  about  the  Presi 
dent's  path,  as  our  affairs  drifted  off  into  the  stormy  sea 
of  European  politics.  Before  tracing  their  confused  and 
intricate  course,  it  will  be  of  advantage  to  pause  for  a  mo 
ment,  in  order  to  consider  the  relative  positions  of  political 
parties  and  the  principles  by  which  each  professed  to  be 
actuated.  The  foreign  policy  of  the  Federalists  had  been 
one  of  their  greatest  merits,  and  was  simply  that  of  a  strong 
neutrality,  now  become  traditional  as  the  "  Monroe  doc 
trine."  Jefferson's  theory  was  to  keep  peace,  at  all  hazards; 
to  involve  the  country  in  no  foreign  connections,  and  yet 
at  the  same  time,  with  marvellous  inconsistency,  to  aid 
France  and  injure  England  to  the  utmost  extent.  To 
depress  the  latter  and  exalt  the  former,  without  engaging 
in  actual  war,  were  the  sum  and  substance  of  Jefferson's 
tactics.  When  this  was  first  attempted,  at  the  period  of 
the  Genet  difficulties,  the  immediate  result  was  the  baneful 
division  of  our  people  into  a  French  party  and  an  English 
party,  instead  of  into  two  American  parties.  The  wisdom 
of  Washington  and  the  clear  judgment  of  Adams  steered 
us  through  these  first  troubles,  and  the  position  of  a  strong 
neutrality  was  preserved.  During  Jefferson's  first  term, 
foreign  politics  did  not  disturb  us ;  but  they  came  again  into 
prominence  in  1805.  In  the  interval,  great  changes  had 
been  wrought  in  Europe.  France  no  longer  fought  under 
even  the  hollow  pretence  of  republicanism,  but  solely  to 
advance  the  hungry  ambition  of  one  man.  England,  in  the 
words  of  John  Randolph,  was  doing  battle  for  the  liberties 


1804-15.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  461 

of  mankind,  and  for  the  maintenance  of  civilized  society, 
which  was  the  opinion  entertained  by  the  Federalists. 
That  this  view  was  in  general  correct,  few  persons  at 
this  day  would  care  to  deny ;  but  Jefferson,  unluckily, 
thought  differently. 

Mr.  John  Quincy  Adams'  —  in  the  pamphlet  so  often 
referred  to  here  —  takes  the  ground  that  Jefferson  had 
no  partiality  for  Napoleon.  This  may  be  perfectly  true. 
He  may,  perhaps,  have  had  no  love  for  Bonaparte,  individ 
ually;  but  he  nevertheless  shaped  his  course  in  conformity 
with  his  old  theory  of  supporting  France  against  England. 
His  admiration  for  the  French  and  his  hatred  of  England 
were,  moreover,  powerfully  aided  by  his  abject  fear  of  the 
power  of  the  modern  Csesar.  The  practical  reasons  for  his 
policy  are  easily  discerned.  Jefferson  relied  on  the  popular 
feeling  against  England  as  a  principal  support  to  his  politi 
cal  supremacy,  and  his  d  priori  theories  coincided  fully  with 
what  he  knew  to  be  for  his  own  interests.  The  destruction 
of  the  navy  had  deprived  our  neutrality  of  any  strength  it 
might  have  possessed ;  and  Jefferson  now  destroyed  neutral 
ity  itself,  by  putting  the  country  as  far  as  he  could,  without 
actually  engaging  in  war,  upon  the  side  of  Bonaparte.  One 
immediate  result  was  to  drive  his  opponents  into  an  ex 
treme  support  of  Great  Britain.  The  Federalists  had  seen 
their  naval  policy  overthrown,  and  now  they  beheld  the 
country  with  all  its  vast  and  defenceless  commerce  launched 
upon  a  series  of  measures  which  must  in  the  end  lead  to 
war.  Jefferson  was  unquestionably  sincere  in  his  desire  for 
peace  at  all  risks,  and  the  Federalists  understood  this  fact 
perfectly ;  but  they  nevertheless  believed  that  his  meas 
ures  made  the  preservation  of  peace  ultimately  impossible. 
Strongly  attached  as  they  were  to  the  commercial  inter 
ests,  they  dreaded  war  with  any  power,  but  they  utterly  ab 
horred  the  thought  of  a  conflict  with  the  one  nation  which 
seemed  to  them  the  champion  of  the  liberties  of  mankind 
and  the  independence  of  neutral  nations.  They  feared  a 


462  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1804-15. 

necessary  and  a  just  war  as  little  as  any  one ;  but  they 
were  bitterly  opposed  to  a  policy  that  supported  the  in 
terests  of  a  gigantic  despotism,  and  furthered  schemes  of 
Corsican  brigandage,  in  which  nations  were  the  victims, 
and  myriads  of  soldiers  the  robbers.  There  is  no  need  of 
supposing,  with  Colonel  Pickering,  that  Jefferson  was  the 
minion  and  hireling  of  Bonaparte.  This  was  the  exagger 
ated  charge  of  a  heated  and  bitter  partisan.  But  nothing 
can  be  clearer  than  that  Jefferson  steadfastly  pursued  his 
policy  of  adhering  to  the  French  and  attacking  the  English 
interests.  Great  Britain,  it  is  true,  treated  us  disgracefully ; 
and  in  all  our  relations  with  her  we  exhibited  a  strange 
mixture  of  proud  sensitiveness  and  impotent  resistance. 
Whereas  the  outrages  of  France,  who  behaved  with  still 
greater  brutality,  and  heaped  insults  upon  us  with  generous 
profusion,  were  quietly  discussed,  and  then  hidden  and 
shuffled  over  with  a  tameness  that  is  even  now  very  trying 
to  contemplate.  If  the  Federalist  admiration  and  support 
of  England  were  extreme  and  unwarrantable,  they  are  at 
least  better  than  the  hushed  and  stealthy  subserviency  to 
France  displayed  by  their  opponents.  Both  sides  of  the 
picture  are  dark,  neither  can  give  aught  but  pain  to  an 
American,  but  the  blame  must  fall  chiefly  on  those  who 
wielded  the  powers  of  government.  Those  men,  and  those 
alone,  were  responsible,  who,  not  content  with  destroying 
our  only  weapon,  the  navy,  crippled  our  resources  by  a  suc 
cession  of  measures  which  nearly  drove  a  large  and  populous 
section  of  the  country  into  open  revolt,  and  who,  having 
made  war  the  only  possible  result,  then  refused  to  fight,  and 
left  us  to  be  kicked  about  at  the  mercy  of  the  two  great 
European  powers.  The  two  parties  were  in  this  way  ar 
rayed  against  each  other  on  the  question  of  supporting 
French  or  English  interests,  while  they  never  ceased  to 
proclaim  in  the  loudest  possible  manner  that  they  had  no 
intention  of  supporting  either.  The  issues  arising  from 
such  a  condition  of  affairs  were  so  confused  and  so  falsified 


1804-15].  THE  HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  463 

that  even  now  it  is  no  easy  matter  to  determine  what  any 
one  really  wanted,  while,  as  if  to  make  confusion  worse  con 
founded,  the  administration  persisted  in  a  policy  that  was 
no  policy,  but  only  a  vague  jumble  of  theories. 

Alarmed  by  the  dangerous  aspect  of  our  foreign  relations, 
Jefferson  determined  to  make,  in  appearance  at  least,  a 
genuine  effort  for  a  stable  peace  with  Great  Britain.  With 
this  purpose,  he  despatched  Mr.  Pinkney  to  England  early 
in  the  autumn  of  1806,  and  joined  him  as  special  commis 
sioner  with  Mr.  Monroe  to  conclude  a  treaty.  Many  pre 
vious  attempts  to  settle  the  vexed  question  of  impressment 
had  been  made,  and  had  thus  far  proved  fruitless.  The 
subject,  although  not  mentioned  in  the  Jay  treaty,  had 
been  discussed  by  the  negotiators ;  and  John  Marshall,  at 
the  close  of  the  last  century,  had  urged  the  necessity  of  a 
settlement  upon  the  attention  of  the  British  ministry.  Mr. 
King,  then  minister  to  England,  soon  after  renewed  the 
negotiation,  and  would  have  succeeded  in  obtaining  a  settle 
ment,  had  it  not  been  for  the  determination  of  the  British 
ministry,  at  the  last  moment,  to  retain  the  right  of  search  in 
the  narrow  seas.  The  inadmissibility  of  such  a  claim  forced 
Mr.  King  to  break  off  the  negotiation.  During  the  summer 
previous  to  Mr.  Pinkney's  departure,  Mr.  Madison  had  urged 
upon  Mr.  Merry,  the  British  minister,  the  propriety  of  a  neu 
tral  flag,  protecting  against  seizure  and  impressment ;  and 
Mr.  Monroe,  then  in  London,  had  been  instructed  to  press  the 
same  doctrine,  and  to  protest  against  the  recent  admiralty 
decisions.  When  Mr.  Pinkney  was  joined  with  Mr.  Mon 
roe,  in  order  to  give  weight  to  the  commission  and  to  hasten 
the  conclusion  of  a  treaty,  circumstances  were  peculiarly 
favorable  to  a  successful  issue.  The  short-lived  ministry 
of  Charles  Fox  and  u  all  the  talents,"  who  regarded  us  with 
much  more  kindness,  and  were  disposed  to  treat  us  with 
greater  justice  than  were  their  Tory  predecessors,  was  then 
in  power.  Fox  himself  was  then  laboring  under  the  malady  so 
soon  to  prove  fatal,  and  Lords  Auckland  and  Howick  were 


464  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOEGE   CABOT.      [1804-15. 

therefore  appointed  to  treat  with  the  American  commission 
ers.  The  first  question  was,  of  course,  that  of  impressment. 
Monroe  and  Pinkney  contended  that  this  was  merely  a 
municipal  right,  while  the  English  commissioners  held  that 
it  was  a  prerogative  of  the  crown,  a  universal  legal  right,  — 
the  protection  of  their  navy,  —  and  finally  and  conclusively 
that  no  ministers  would  dare  to  renounce  it.  Lords  Auck 
land  and  Howick  declared,  however,  that  though  the  min 
istry  dared  not  at  that  moment  abandon  this  right  by  a 
formal  treaty,  yet  that  special  instructions  should  be  given 
to  avoid  molesting  any  American-born  citizens,  and  that  in 
case  of  such  injury  the  speediest  redress  should  be  given. 
These  pledges  were  reduced  to  writing,  both  parties  reserv 
ing  all  their  rights  in  the  matter  for  future  negotiation. 
The  American  commissioners  were  also  given  to  under 
stand,  and  did  in  fact  believe,  that  impressment  would  not 
be  attempted  except  where  deserters  from  the  British  navy 
were  known  to  be  on  board  an  American  vessel ;  and  they 
felt  convinced  that  this  was  a  practical,  if  not  a  formal,  set 
tlement  of  the  question.  It  was  at  any  rate  the  greatest 
concession  ever  made  by  England  on  this  point,  and  Mon 
roe  and  Pinkney,  satisfied  that  the  practice  of  impress 
ment  would  be  silently  abandoned,  determined  to  accept 
the  British  note,  and  to  proceed  with  the  negotiations,  al 
though  in  so  doing  they  violated  their  instructions.  After 
the  removal  of  this  obstacle,  a  treaty  was  soon  concluded, 
which  did  not  differ  essentially  from  that  of  Mr.  Jay.  On 
the  question  of  the  carrying  trade,  whose  invasion  had  been 
the  cause  of  the  present  difficulties,  the  rights  claimed  by 
the  United  States  were  practically  admitted.  Just  as  this 
treaty  was  about  to  be  signed,  news  of  the  Berlin  decree 
arrived.  The  British  commissioners  did  not  on  this  account 
withhold  their  signatures  from  the  treaty,  but  merely  en 
tered  a  protest,  reserving  the  right  of  retaliation,  if  the 
decree  were  enforced  against  neutrals.  Soon  after,  England 
did  in  fact  retaliate,  by  proclaiming  a  blockade  of  the 
French  coast  from  Brest  to  the  mouth  of  the  Elbs. 


1804-15.]  THE  HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  465 

In  the  mean  time,  Congress  met;  and  the  President, 
in  consideration  of  the  promising  aspect  of  the  English 
negotiation,  successfully  recommended  a  suspension  of  the 
non-importation  act.  Preparations  for  war  were  not  re 
laxed.  An  increase  of  the  army  was  defeated  ;  but  the  mu 
nificent  sum  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars  was 
voted  for  fortifications,  and  the  President  obtained  a  like 
amount  for  his  favorite  gun-boats,  though  the  latter  appro 
priation  was  stricken  out  afterwards  by  an  unfeeling  Senate. 
At  the  same  time,  five  hundred  additional  seamen  were  voted 
for  the  navy.  These  were  the  principal  government  meas 
ures,  when  a  negotiation  of  doubtful  result  was  pending 
with  England  on  questions  involving  peace  or  war ;  and 
when  Napoleon  had  flung  in  our  face  an  imperious  prohibi 
tion  of  our  commerce.  Other  troubles  were  not  wanting. 
Yrujo,  who  had  publicly  insulted  our  government,  and  been 
dismissed  in  consequence,  had  been  sent  back  by  Bona 
parte's  influence.  The  President's  Spanish  negotiations 
were  looking  very  black,  while  at  the  same  time  Turreau 
was  dragooning  our  unfortunate  administration  in  regard 
to  a  French  claim.  But  these  were  trifling  matters  in  our 
relations  with  France,  compared  with  what  followed.  The 
battle  of  Trafalgar  had  annihilated  the  strength  of  Napoleon 
at  sea,  and  forced  him  to  resort  to  other  methods  for  the 
destruction  of  England.  Master  of  continental  Europe,  he 
issued  from  the  field  of  Jena  the  famous  Berlin  decree,  by 
which  Great  Britain  was  declared  in  a  state  of  blockade 
and  all  commerce  with  her  was  forbidden,  and  by  which  the 
greater  proportion  of  American  shipping  was  threatened 
with  seizure  and  confiscation.  When  the  news  was  received, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  year,  insurance  rose  ruinously,  and 
commerce  almost  ceased.  Armstrong,  our  minister  at  Paris, 
wrote  that  the  French  government  did  not  intend  to  disturb 
our  commerce  ;  but  his  correspondence  with  the  French  min 
ister,  when  laid  before  Congress,  was  not  entirely  reassur 
ing  on  this  point.  Our  measures  of  defence  under  these 

30 


466  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1804-15 

circumstances  have  already  been  alluded  to,  but  the  tone  of 
the  debates  at  this  time  is  not  without  interest.  The  sen 
timents  expressed  by  members  of  that  party,  which  Mr. 
Adams,  disgusted  by  the  lack  of  patriotism  among  the 
Federalists,  soon  after  felt  obliged  to  join,  are  quite  instruc 
tive.  One  gentleman,  opposing  appropriations  for  forts 
and  ships,  said  that  in  case  of  a  war  we  could  abandon 
our  harbors  and  sea-coast,  and  all  retire  to  the  interior. 
Another  patriot,  —  one  Smilie,  of  Pennsylvania,  —  whose 
sensitive  nature  would  have  shrunk  from  the  black  trea 
sons  of  Federalist  New  England,  as  depicted  by  Mr. 
Adams,  now  proclaimed  the  doctrine  that  rather  than  vote 
money  for  a  fleet  he  would  leave  the  country  undefended. 
The  iron  of  a  "  wise  frugality "  had  certainly  entered 
very  deeply  into  these  men's  souls.  The  fact  was,  that 
the  whole  Democratic  party  was  completely  demoralized. 
Without  leaders,  devoted  to  French  principles,  hating 
Great  Britain,  afraid  of  war,  detesting  commerce  and 
New  England,  the  dominant  majority  presented  a  sorry 
sight.  They  do  not  seem  to  have  known  what  they 
wanted,  or  even  what  they  did  not  want.  They  were  re 
solved  to  obey  Jefferson,  and  they  knew  this  must  be  right ; 
yet  they  could  not  help  perceiving  that  the  country  was  drift 
ing  into  a  dreaded  and,  worst  of  all,  into  an  expensive  war. 
Their  last  resource,  at  this  trying  moment,  was  to  cut  down 
appropriations  and  pursue,  as  long  as  possible,  the  precepts 
of  economy.  Now  it  was  that  Jefferson  wrote  despairingly 
to  Nicholas,  begging  him  to  come  to  Washington  and  take 
command  of  their  "  well-disposed,"  but  sadly  inefficient 
forces.1 

With  affairs  in  this  wretched  state,  the  country  alarmed 
and  the  ruling  party  demoralized,  the  treaty  arrived  from 
England.  It  was  a  better  treaty  than  Jay's  treaty  of  1795, 
it  was  a  far  better  treaty  than  that  of  1815.  If  it  was 
right  to  make  and  ratify  those  treaties,  it  was  far  more 
surely  right  to  make  and  ratify  this  one.  No  mention  of 
i  See  above,  p.  425. 


1804-15.]  THE   HARTFORD    CONVENTION.  467 

impressment  was  made  in  Jay's  treaty ;  and  at  the  treaty 
of  1815  we  failed  even  to  press  our  objection  to  it, 
though  for  that,  and  that  alone,  we  had  just  fought  a  long 
and  well-nigh  ruinous  war.  In  1806,  large  concessions, 
and  the  only  ones  ever  granted,  were  made  to  us  on  the 
subject  of  impressment,  and  all  our  rights  in  the  matter 
were  reserved  for  further  negotiation.  The  posture  of 
affairs  abroad  was  far  graver  and  more  threatening  in  1806 
than  in  1795,  and  quite  as  much  so  as  in  1815.  In  1806, 
we  were  wholly  unprepared  for  war ;  while  in  1795  we 
were  united,  and  in  1815  flushed  with  some  success  in 
fighting.  If  it  was  beneath  the  national  dignity  to  accept 
any  thing  short  of  a  formal  stipulation  in  1806,  then  it  was 
baseness  in  Washington  to  accept  less  in  1795,  and  simple 
treachery  and  cowardice  in  Madison  to  abandon  our  rights 
in  1815.  The  treaties  of  1795  and  1815  were  eminently 
wise  and  proper  measures :  one  saved  us  from  war,  the 
other  arrested  it.  The  treaty  of  1806  was  a  better  treaty, 
was  more  demanded  by  circumstances  than  either  of  the 
other  two,  and  was  a  more  clearly  judicious  measure.  The 
difference  in  the  cases  is  the  difference  in  the  several 
individuals  to  whom  the  guidance  of  the  country  was  at 
the  moment  intrusted.  In  the  one  case,  it  was  Washington, 
wise,  dignified,  and  calm ;  in  the  other,  it  was  Madison, 
prudent,  sagacious,  and  badly  frightened  ;  in  the  third,  it 
was  Jefferson,  crafty,  selfish,  and  a  French  doctrinaire. 
Washington  and  Madison  ratified  their  treaties,  Jefferson 
rejected  his.  Without  a  word  to  the  Senate,  or  to  any  one 
but  Madison,  the  treaty  of  1806  was  thrown  aside  ;  and  the 
"war  of  1812,  with  all  the  miserable  years  which  preceded 
it,  was  made  inevitable.  The  history  of  the  time  presents 
no  single  valid  reason  for  Jefferson's  secret  rejection  of  the 
treaty.  To  the  character  and  principles  of  the  man,  we 
must  alone  look  for  explanation.  It  was  the  old  story :  a 
hatred  of  England  and  a  love  of  France,  a  policy  of  covertly 
injuring  one  and  aiding  the  other,  and  a  firm  belief  that 


468  LIFE   AND   LETTEES   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.      [1804-15. 

a  constantly  manifested  detestation  of  England  was  the 
best  way  to  popular  support.  His  views  and  objects  at 
this  time  are  summed  up  in  his  remark  to  Dr.  Logan,  an 
intimate  friend,  and  then  a  senator  from  Pennsylvania  : 
"  To  tell  you  the  truth,  doctor,  I  do  not  wish  to  have  any 
treaty  with  them."  To  quote  Logan's  awn  words :  "  An 
impression  was  made  on  my  mind  that  Mr.  Jefferson  did 
not  at  that  time  wish  a  treaty  of  peace  and  commerce  with 
England.  I  perfectly  recollect  he  terminated  a  conversa 
tion  on  this  subject,  by  observing  that  before  a  treaty  could 
be  ratified  with  Great  Britain  she  might  no  longer  exist 
as  an  independent  nation.  I  am  of  opinion  Mr.  Jefferson 
declined  making  a  treaty  with  England,  not  from  his  hatred 
to  that  country,  but  from  his  fear  of  the  overwhelming 
power  of  Bonaparte." 1  For  the  gratification  of  theory, 
and  of  mingled  emotions  of  hatred,  affection,  and  fear, 
and  for  the  preservation  of  popularity,  Jefferson  rejected 
the  treaty,  and  in  so  doing  involved  his  country  in  priva 
tions,  disgraces,  and  finally  in  an  abortive  and  nearly  ruin 
ous  war.2 

The  Federalists  were  bitterly  disappointed  by  the  loss 
of  the  treaty,  not  simply  because  they  represented  the 
great  commercial  interests  so  wantonly  exposed  to  destruc 
tion,  but  because  they  believed  that  the  rejection  of  the 
treaty  would  sooner  or  later  end,  not  only  in  war  with 
England,  whom  they  regarded  as  the  champion  of  constitu 
tional  liberty,  but  also  in  a  subservient  and  dependent 
alliance  with  France,  or,  in  other  words,  with  Bonaparte, 

1  Pickering  MSS. 

2  See  Monroe's  letters  in  State  Papers,  as  to  the  treaty  and  its  rejection. 
The  reason  given  by  Jefferson  for  this   course  was  that  we  could  never, 
consistently  with  our  national  honor,  recognize  by  treaty  the  principle  of 
impressment.     To  which  it  may  be  replied  that  no  mention  of  impressment 
was  made  in  the  treaty,  and  in  the  informal  notes  on  the  subject  all  rights 
were  expressly  reserved,  and  the  way  for  future  negotiations  explicitly  left 
open.     Thus,  Jefferson's  reason,  if  sincere,  was  shallow  and  unfounded,  —  so 
shallow  and  so  obviously  unfounded  that  it  is  evident  it  was  adopted  merely 
as  a  blind,  and  was  not  the  true  ground  for  the  rejection. 


1804-15.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  469 

whom  they  believed  to  be  establishing  a  universal  despotism. 
Their  hatred  of  Jefferson  could  not  become  under  any 
circumstances  more  intense,  but  it  could  and  did  become 
more  active. 

The  rejection  of  the  Monroe  and  Pinkney  treaty  was 
the  turning  point  in  the  history  of  those  troubled  times, 
and  it  offers  a  good  opportunity  to  compare  once  more  the 
policy  of  the  contending  parties.  On  the  one  side  was 
Jefferson,  at  the  head  of  a  great  majority,  in  complete  pos 
session  of  all  departments  of  the  government.  The  policy 
of  the  leader  and  of  the  party  was  to  aid  France  without 
going  to  war  with  England,  and  to  bend  every  thing  to 
continuing  their  own  popular  support,  by  exciting  hatred  of 
Great  Britain  and  by  sacrificing  every  interest  to  a  false 
economy.  Acting  on  such  principles,  the  dominant  party 
had  stripped  us  of  our  navy,  our  army,  and  our  forts,  —  in 
short,  of  every  means  of  defence.  From  the  same  motives, 
they  had,  while  tamely  submitting  to  the  French  aggres 
sions,  resisted  violently  those  of  England,  and  by  the 
rejection  of  the  treaty  had  exposed  our  vast  and  unpro 
tected  commerce  to  the  dangers  of  an  unavoidable  war 
with  the  one  great  maritime  power  of  the  world.  On  the 
other  side  were  the  Federalists,  numerically  weak,  but  re 
spectable  by  their  wealth,  their  abilities,  and  their  char 
acter.  They  wished  to  arm  the  nation,  to  equip  the  navy, 
to  make  peace  and  perhaps  an  alliance  with  England,  and, 
if  necessary,  declare  war  with  France.  In  this  way,  they 
would  have  protected  both  our  dignity  and  our  commercial 
interests ;  and,  whatever  the  faults  of  such  a  policy,  it  had 
at  least  the  merits  of  decision  and  intelligibility.  The 
Federalist  plan  was  never  tried;  but  the  other,  if  it  can 
be  called  a  plan,  was  tried  to  the  bitter  end.  If  the 
history  of  the  next  nine  years  justified  its  adoption,  there 
is  nothing  more  to  be  said  ;  but  as  the  policies  appeared  in 
bold  contrast,  in  1806,  there  would  seem  to  be  little  room 
for  hesitation  in  deciding  which  was  the  more  dignified, 
the  more  reasonable,  and  the  more  manly  of  the  two. 


470  LIFE   AND  LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.     [1804-15. 

We  can  see  now  that  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  made 
war  ultimately  inevitable ;  but  such  was  not  Jefferson's 
view,  and  he  determined  to  renew  the  negotiations  forth 
with.  Matters  were  very  soon  still  further  complicated  by 
the  British  outrage  upon  the  "  Chesapeake."  This  insult  was 
received  with  general  indignation,  and  every  feeling  was 
for  the  moment  swallowed  up  in  the  sense  of  national  dis 
honor.  Mr.  Adams,  in  describing  the  action  of  the  Feder 
alists,  says  that  George  Cabot,  John  Lowell,  and  Tlieophilus 
Parsons  took  no  part  in  the  indignation  meetings  that 
were  held  in  Boston.  While  this  shows  the  extreme  bitter 
ness  of  party  spirit,  it  also  shows  that  these  were  men  who 
would  not  at  any  time,  or  under  any  circumstances,  pledge 
their  support  to  an  administration  which  they  held  respon 
sible  for  all  our  trouble,  and  for  the  disgrace  to  which  we 
had  been  subjected.  They  did  not  believe  that  the  national 
honor  or  dignity  could  be  preserved  while  the  Jeffersonian 
system  was  in  force,  and  they  were  not  willing  to  belie 
their  opinions  even  to  save  their  popularity. 

Jefferson  managed  the  "  Chesapeake  "  affair  with  that  curi 
ous  mixture  of  defiance,  springing  from  his  hatred  of  Eng 
land,  and  of  feebleness  derived  from  his  determination  not 
to  fight  in  any  event.  He  at  once  published  a  proclama 
tion,  ordering  British  men-of-war  to  leave  our  waters, 
and  at  the  same  time  demanded  satisfaction  from  the 
British  government,  coupling  the  demand  with  the  old 
question  of  impressment.  When  the  attempt  to  reopen 
negotiations  was  thus  made,  affairs  had  changed  in  Eng 
land  most  unfavorably  to  our  interests.  The  administra 
tion  of  "  all  the  talents  "  was  no  more,  and  Tories  reigned 
in  their  stead.  Mr.  Canning  roughly  refused  to  con 
sider  the  questions  of  satisfaction  for  the  "  Chesapeake " 
and  impressment,  when  thus  united;  but  a  minister,  Mr. 
Rose,  was  at  once  sent  to  America  to  offer  sufficient  repara 
tion.1  He  declined,  however,  to  treat  until  Jefferson's  pro- 

1  The  Federalists  thought  the  reparation  offered  sufficient  at  the  time ;  but 
they  would  not,  as  sympathizing  with  England,  be  considered  trustworthy. 


1804-15.]  THE  HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  471 

clamation  was  withdrawn,  and  his  mission  ultimately  came 
to  nothing.  In  the  mean  time,  Great  Britain  issued  a 
proclamation  calling  in  all  British  seamen,  and  directing 
the  officers  of  the  navy  to  seize  and  impress  such  seamen, 
wherever  found.  Against  this,  Mr.  Monroe,  before  his  de 
parture,  protested  strongly ;  and  Mr.  Canning  thereupon 
sent  a  final  reply  to  the  American  commissioners.  He 
refused  to  renew  negotiations  on  the  basis  of  a  treaty  which 
had  been  signed  and  then  rejected,  but  was  willing  to 
open  new  negotiations ;  and  so  the  hopes  of  peace  in  that 
quarter  ended  for  the  present.  The  policy  of  the  adminis 
tration  irritated  England  and  displayed  our  weakness,  and 
by  this  happy  combination  exposed  us  to  all  the  brutal  arro 
gance  and  sarcasm  that  Mr.  Canning  chose  to  indulge  in. 

In  the  message  with  which  he  met  Congress  in  the  au 
tumn  of  1807,  Jefferson  explained  his  views.  He  said  it  was 
proper  to  exclude  offending  vessels  from  our  harbors  by  pro 
clamations,  but  he  added  that  it  was  obviously  wrong  to  keep 
up  a  force  sufficient  to  compel  obedience.  The  British 
infringement  of  the  neutral  coasting  trade  in  Europe  was 
enlarged  upon  with  great  warmth.  As  to  the  other  bellig 
erent,  the  President  was  less  communicative,  although  the 
French  seizures  and  captures  of  our  vessels  had  gone  on 
steadily  and  with  rapid  increase.  Jefferson  also  announced 
that  Spain  had  promulgated  a  similar  decree,  and  he  ex 
pressed  to  Congress  a  natural  curiosity  to  know  whether 
the  Spanish  would  follow  the  example  of  their  French 
masters,  and  prey  upon  our  commerce.  Still,  the  situa 
tion  was  grave  enough  to  suggest  the  advisability  of 
measures  of  defence.  A  million  and  a  half  was  accord 
ingly  proposed  in  Congress  for  the  gun-boats,  and  thus 
one  hundred  and  eighty-eight  of  them  were  to  be  pro 
vided.  Seven  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars  was 
proposed  for  fortifications.  The  Federalists  wished  this 

Since  Mr.  Madison,  five  years  later,  accepted  the  very  same  kind  and 
amount  of  reparation  for  the  "  Chesapeake,"  I  feel  authorized  in  calling  it 
"  sufficient." 


473  LIFE  AND   LETTEES   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1804-15. 

last  appropriation  doubled,  but  were  refused,  because  the 
money  was  not  merely  to  repair  permanent,  but  to  sup 
ply  movable  forts  or  cannon,  by  which  any  other  kind  of 
coast  defence  would  be  superseded.  The  proposition  to 
enlarge  and  strengthen,  or  rather  to  build,  a  navy,  was 
promptly  voted  down,  and  the  gun-boat  scheme  was  substi 
tuted  for  it.  Indeed,  one  argument  made  at  the  time  to 
such  a  scheme  seems  conclusive.  Were  we  to  build  a 
navy,  it  was  urged,  the  British  would  at  once  seize  it, 'as 
they  did  the  Danish  fleet ;  and  we  should  then  have  had  all 
our  trouble  and  expense  for  nothing.1 

While  these  measures  were  under  discussion,  news  came 
of  the  English  proclamation  recalling  all  British  seamen  and 
of  the  extension  of  the  Berlin  decree.  Information  also 
arrived  that  the  Berlin  decree  had  been  interpreted  so  as  to 
cover  American  vessels,  and  that  the  doctrine  had  been 
carried  out  by  the  condemnation  of  the  "  Horizon."  Papers 
relating  to  these  matters  were  laid  before  Congress,  and 
certain  other  papers  which  had  come  to  the  President,  but 
which  were  not  then  published,  were  also  sent  in.  The  un 
published  documents  formed  the  correspondence  between 
Armstrong  and  Champagny,  in  which  the  former  had  asked 
for  explanations  in  regard  to  the  extended  construction  of 
the  Berlin  decree,  and  the  latter  had  replied  by  avowing 
that  the  one  object  of  the  decrees  was  to  unite  the  world 
against  Great  Britain,  the  enemy  of  the  Emperor.  Rumors 
were  also  afloat  of  the  intended  publication  of  new  and  more 
stringent  orders  in  council. 

The  time  seemed  to  have  arrived  when  Jefferson's  guid 
ing  theory  of  no  wars  and  no  treaties  with  anybody  at  any 
time  must  break  down.  War  or  alliance  with  one  of  the 
two  great  belligerents  certainly  appeared  unavoidable.  But 
Jefferson  was  master  of  the  situation.  He  extricated  one 
theory  from  its  difficulties  by  resorting  to  another.  Instead 
of  fighting  or  negotiating  with  either  of  our  enemies,  he 
pursued  the  simpler  and  more  peaceable  plan  of  bringing 

1  Annals  of  Congress  for  1807-8,  pp.  1072-1074,  and  1090. 


1804-15.]  THE  HAKTFOKD   CONVENTION.  473 

the  great  combatants  in  Europe  to  their  knees  by  a  series 
of  restrictions  on  our  own  commerce.  On  the  night  of 
December  22d,  the  embargo  law  was  forced  through 
by  an  obsequious  majority,  acting  in  obedience  to  the 
nod  of  their  chief,  and  the  interests  of  a  large  body  of 
the  people  were  silently  sacrificed.  The  Federalists,  em 
bittered  by  this  defeat,  accused  the  President  of  acting 
in  obedience  to  French  commands:  they  stigmatized  him 
as  the  hireling  of  Bonaparte.  We  can  now  readily  believe 
that  Jefferson  was  guided  in  this  matter  solely  by  a  pre 
conceived  theory  as  to  the  best  kind  of  stern  and  digni 
fied  foreign  policy,  but  it  must  be  admitted  that  the 
Federalists  had  good  reasons  for  their  charges  of  French 
influence.  The  worst  feature  of  the  measure  was  the  Presi 
dent's  concealment  of  the  fact  that  the  embargo  might  be 
permanent,  while  he  permitted  the  country  to  suppose  it 
only  temporary.  The  embargo,  moreover,  though  directed 
against  both  belligerents,  really  injured  England  alone,1  and 
was  a  pure  benefit  to  France.  Yet  this  measure,  so  clearly 
advantageous  to  France  and  hostile  to  England,  was  passed 
when  we  had  just  received  tidings  of  fresh  aggressions  from 
the  former,  as  well  as  from  the  latter.  This  was  certainly 
strong  prima  facie  evidence  of  French  influence;  and  the 
Federalist  convictions  on  that  point  became,  if  possible, 
deeper  and  stronger  than  ever. 

The  absolute  futility  of  such  measures  as  the  embargo 
has  been  long  since  demonstrated,  and  no  civilized  nation 
to-day  would  seek  the  possible  injury  of  its  enemies  by  its 
own  certain  impoverishment.  But  this  general  principle  was 
by  no  means  thoroughly  established  in  1807,  when  naviga 
tion  acts  still  flourished,  and  when  the  memory  of  the  Revo 
lutionary  non-intercourse  was  fresh  among  the  people  of  the 
United  States.  Yet,  tried  merely  by  the  canons  of  common 
sense,  the  embargo,  under  the  circumstances  of  that  time,  was 
as  obviously  bad  as  it  is  now  in  the  light  of  the  principles  of 
political  economy.  By  the  embargo,  about  one-sixth  of  the 
1  Jefferson  to  Rodney,  Works  of  Jefferson,  V.  275. 


474  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1804-15. 

English  commerce  was  cut  off,  while  the  whole  of  ours  was 
destroyed.  To  begin  with,  therefore,  the  exchange  was  an 
unequal  one.  But  the  theory  of  the  embargo  was  wholly 
false,  for  it  assumed  that  a  great  and  powerful  nation,  mis 
tress  of  the  ocean,  flushed  with  the  triumphs  of  Nelson, 
struggling  as  she  believed  for  very  existence,  would,  by  a 
partial  injury  to  material  interests  and  to  a  fraction  of  her 
mercantile  population,  be  constrained  to  make  concessions 
to  an  unarmed  republic  acting  apparently  in  the  interests 
of  her  most  deadly  enemy.  Moreover,  English  statesmen 
perceived  readily  enough  that  our  loss  must  eventually  be 
their  gain,  and  that  our  voluntary  abandonment  of  an  im 
mense  carrying  trade  would  leave  them  without  a  rival. 
Almost  any  one  but  Jefferson  would  have  appreciated  the 
hard  facts  of  the  case,  and  would  have  yielded  to  them ;  but 
preconceived  and  rooted  theories  are  fatal  to  statesmanship 
as  well  as  to  the  dictates  of  reason.  Unfortunately,  the 
theorist  in  this  instance  was  the  possessor  of  a  large  and 
powerful  party  organization,  devoid  both  of  theories  and 
sense,  and  only  wise  enough  to  blindly  follow  their  leader. 
The  embargo  policy  also  strained  the  Constitution  to  the 
utmost,  but  this  was  a  trifle  in  the  eyes  of  a  party  accus 
tomed  to  violate  its  provisions. 

The  measure  had  one  effect,  however,  which  was  not 
foreseen  at  the  moment.  It  breathed  renewed  life  into  the 
expiring  Federalist  party,  and  served  to  render  them  once 
more  a  united  and  formidable  opposition,  although  its  first 
result  was  the  open  defection  of  one  of  their  most  promi 
nent  leaders.  Mr.  John  Quincy  Adams  seized  upon  this 
occasion  to  leave  his  party,  and  declare  his  faith  in  the  pur 
poses  of  the  President.  Filled  with  the  spirit  of  nationality, 
stung  to  the  quick  by  the  sense  of  national  injuries,  and  by 
nature  combative  and  aggressive,  Mr.  Adams,  with  charac 
teristic  independence  and  disregard  for  consequences,  rushed 
to  the  support  of  what  he  supposed  to  be  the  first  effort  of 
determined  and  warlike  resistance.  Posterity  can  under- 


1804-15.]  THE  HARTFOKD   CONVENTION.  475 

stand  his  motives,  and  respect  his  courage  and  his  objects; 
but  they  can  also  see  how  fatally  he  blundered  both  in  oc 
casion  and  time.  Devoted  to  national  principles,  Mr.  Adams 
became  the  advocate  of  a  measure  wholly  sectional  in  its 
practical  operation,  and  calculated  more  than  any  other  to 
kindle  into  a  fierce  flame  the  slumbering  embers  of  separa 
tion.  To  avenge  national  dishonor,  he  supported  a  measure 
degrading  in  itself,  ruinous  in  its  results,  and  which  sub 
jected  us  to  outrages  that  made  all  previous  ones  seem 
gentle  in  comparison.  He  deserted  a  party  in  which,  he 
held  the  place  of  leader,  and  whose  movements  he  might 
have  influenced,  to  enter  into  one  which  moved  at  the  touch 
of  a  single  man.  Disgusted  with  the  partisan  spirit  of  the 
Federalists,  he  supported  Jefferson,  who  deceived  him  as 
to  the  nature  of  the  embargo,  who  exacted  a  blind  and 
unquestioning  obedience,  and  whose  measures  he  was  com 
pelled  to  urge  without  even  inquiry  for  their  reasons.1  He 
broke  finally  with  Pickering,  Ames,  Cabot,  Otis,  and  all  the 
New  England  Federalists;  and  he  parted  for  a  time  from 
King,  Marshall,  Morris,  and  all  the  leading  Federalists  else 
where.  In  their  stead,  he  substituted  Mr.  Giles  and  others 
of  the  same  stripe.  With  Giles,  indeed,  he  entered  into  a 
mutually  affectionate  and  laudatory  correspondence;  and 
this,  be  it  remembered,  was  the  same  gentleman  wfiom  in 
later  years  Mr.  Adams  described  as  "  of  a  character  black 
with  private  infamy,  .  .  .  rising  to  power  on  the  ruins  of 
honor  and  virtue."2  And  all  these  sacrifices  were  made  in 
behalf  of  a  measure  at  once  feeble,  destructive,  and  dan 
gerous.  The  results  of  Mr.  Adams's  course  were  certainly 
very  different  from  the  motives. 

Mr.  Adams's  change  of  party  was  of  course  received  with 
the  deepest  indignation  in  New  England,  where  the  old  tri 
angular  fight  was  at  once  renewed  with  fresh  bitterness. 
No  one  knew  better  than  Mr.  Adams  the  men  with  whom 
he  had  to  deal ;  for  he  was  of  them,  if  not  with  them.  They 
held  the  power  in  Massachusetts,  they  regarded  him  as  an 
1  See  above,  p.  425.  2  j.  Q.  Adams's  Diary,  VII.  369. 


476  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEOBGE  CABOT.     [1804-15. 

apostate,  and  politically  speaking  they  cut  his  throat  with 
out  the  slightest  compunction.  He  would  have  performed 
the  same  friendly  office  for  them,  if  he  could ;  he  would  not 
have  shown  mercy,  he  could  have  expected  none,  and  it  is 
but  fair  to  say  that,  if  he  did,  he  was  soon  undeceived.  In 
the  political  warfare  then  raging,  no  quarter  was  given,  least 
of  all  to  one  esteemed  a  deserter.  Mr.  Adams,  in  his  pam 
phlet,  attempts  a  defence  of  the  embargo,  which  amounted 
merely  to  saying  that  our  ships  were  saved  by  it  from  certain 
capture.  In  other  words,  to  sacrifice  all  our  shipping  and 
all  our  commerce,  to  throw  our  whole  sea-faring  and  ship 
building  population  out  of  employment,  and  to  awaken 
hatred  and  distrust  of  the  national  government,  was  wiser 
than  to  risk  the  loss  at  the  hands  of  England  and  France 
of  a  portion  of  our  vessels,  and  to  rouse  thereby  a  general 
spirit  of  national  resistance.  If  the  embargo  is  defensible 
on  such  grounds,  it  is  useless  to  argue  about  it. 

I  have  anticipated  the  course  of  events,  in  order  to 
describe  Mr.  Adams's  revolt  from  the  Federalists,  which 
formed  an  important  feature  in  their  history,  and  which 
gave  to  Mr.  Adams  himself  the  unquestioned  position  of 
their  strongest  accuser  and  opponent. 

The  embargo  was  received  by  New  England  in  sullen 
silence.  The  people  looked  upon  it  as  merely  temporary, 
a  first  step  to  armed  resistance ;  and  they  accepted  it  as  the 
forerunner  of  a  necessary,  if  unpleasant,  solution  of  their 
difficulties.  The  arrival  soon  after  of  the  new  orders  in 
council  and  of  the  Milan  decree  seemed  to  justify  the 
adoption  of  any  measure,  no  matter  how  stringent  and 
unpalatable.  Both  parties  engaged  actively  in  the  agree 
able  task  of  accusing  each  other  of  foreign  sympathies ; 
and  the  Federalists  no  longer  made  any  secret  of  their 
belief,  that  we  ought  to  side  with  England  or  at  least  ought 
to  make  war  on  France.  Jefferson's  party  had  apparently 
come  round  entirely  to  Bonaparte's  view,  that  there  ought 
not  to  be  any  neutral  commerce ;  and  an  unfortunate  Feder- 


1804-15.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  477 

alist,  who  spoke  in  Congress  of  alliance  with  England,  was 
promptly  denounced  as  a  traitor.  The  insolent  spirit  and 
arrogant  policy  manifested  in  Champagny's  letter,  which 
ordered  us  to  go  to  war  with  Great  Britain  under  penalty 
of  losing  all  our  vessels,  gave  additional  reasons  for  believ 
ing  in  the  dangerous  and  degrading  nature  of  French  predi 
lections.  All  this  received  confirmation  from  the  failure  of 
Mr.  Rose's  negotiation,  through  the  seeming  reluctance  of 
the  administration  to  do  any  thing  that  might  result  in  a 
lasting  peace  with  Great  Britain.  Yet  with  the  gulf  ever 
widening  between  us  and  England,  with  fresh  insults  from 
France,  and  with  the  prospect  of  a  maritime  war  staring  us 
in  the  face,  the  navy  was  still  neglected.  The  naval  policy 
of  the  administration  cannot  be  too  much  insisted  on  ;  for, 
had  a  different  course  been  pursued  in  this  respect,  we 
should  have  been  in  a  position  to  assert  our  rights  and 
maintain  our  neutrality,  or,  if  need  were,  to  fight  success- 
fully. 

The  opportunity  offered  to  the  Federalists  by  the  em 
bargo  was  not  long  neglected.  Colonel  Pickering  made  it 
the  object  of  bitter  attack  in  a  letter  addressed  to  Governor 
Sullivan.  To  this  assault,  Mr.  Adams  replied ;  and  the  paper 
controversy  was  waged  with  great  vigor,  while  public  feeling 
rose  steadily  in  hostility  to  the  measure.  Another  effect  of 
the  new  policy  was  soon  felt  in  the  treatment  we  received 
abroad.  Both  belligerents  seized  on  this  opportunity  to 
harass  us  without  mercy ;  but  the  French  were  especially 
severe,  and  indeed  rather  ungrateful,  for  they  alone  had 
benefited  by  our  restrictive  measures.  The  Bayonne  decree 
struck  a  fresh  blow  at  the  rights  of  neutrals ;  and,  while 
France  undertook  to  enforce  the  embargo  by  seizing  our 
ships,  Great  Britain  connived  at  our  trade,  and  aided  our 
merchants  to  evade  the  law.  Both  infringements  of  our 
sovereignty  were  made  the  subject  of  bitter  though  helpless 
complaint. 

Having  shown  Europe  the  danger  of  arousing  us  to  a 


478  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1804-15. 

policy  of  commercial  restrictions,  Jefferson  now  sought  to 
make  terms  by  offering  a  cessation  of  the  embargo.  If 
Great  Britain  would  withdraw  her  orders,  the  embargo 
would  be  repealed,  as  far  as  she  was  concerned.  If  France 
would  withdraw  her  decrees,  the  embargo  would  be  repealed 
as  to  the  French  ;  and  it  was  hinted  that,  if  England  did  not 
then  revoke  the  orders  in  council,  we  would  go  to  war  with 
that  power  in  the  interests  and  as  the  ally  of  France.  This 
gave  an  opportunity  for  fresh  insults  from  both  nations. 
Mr.  Canning  replied  to  Mr.  Pinkney's  inquiries  that,  while 
cherishing  no  sentiment  of  hostility  towards  the  United 
States,  England  was  far  from  desirous  of  appearing  to  depre 
cate  the  embargo,  which  she  conceived  to  be  wholly  in  the 
French  interest.  France  contented  herself  with  a  simple 
refusal  to  treat  on  the  subject  at  all ;  and  with  good  reason, 
for  the  embargo  satisfied  her  completely.  Armstrong  wrote 
from  Paris  "  that  we  had  overrated  our  means  of  coercion  ;  " 
and  poor  Pinkney,  who  had  been  made  the  butt  of  Canning's 
sarcasm,  sent  to  Mr.  Madison  despatches  brimming  over 
with  helpless  rage  and  mortification.  That  the  embargo 
had  utterly  failed  of  the  great  results  expected  abroad  was 
now  clear  to  every  one  except  the  father  of  the  measure. 

At  home,  matters  were  still  worse.  The  people  of  the 
commercial  States,  who  had  endured  the  embargo  while 
they  supposed  it  merely  temporary  and  initiative,  passed 
rapidly  from  a  state  of  sullen  submission  to  one  of  active 
and  violent  anger,  as  it  gradually  dawned  upon  them  that 
the  ruin  of  their  commerce  was  intended  to  be  a  permanent 
policy.  The  Federalists,  in  full  accord  with  the  rising 
public  sentiment,  strained  every  nerve  to  rouse  and  invigo 
rate  the  opposition  to  the  measure.  In  Boston,  even  the 
Republicans  remonstrated  by  a  memorial  to  the  President. 
A  storm  was  fast  gathering,  which  threatened  to  overthrow 
the  political  fabric  of  the  Democracy. 

But  Jefferson  was  as  blind  as  ever.  Even  his  marvellous 
political  tact  seems  at  this  juncture  to  have  failed  him,  so 


1804-15.]  THE   HAETFOED   CONVENTION.  479 

spell-bound  was  lie  by  the  delusions  of  his  theory ;  and  when 
Congress  met  he  sent  them  a  message  filled  with  praises 
of  the  embargo  as  the  safeguard  of  our  commerce.  But, 
though  Jefferson  was  blind,  his  timid  followers  began  to 
lose  heart,  and  to  dimly  appreciate  that  there  was  some 
thing  in  the  economy  of  nature  more  imperative  than  the 
wishes  of  the  President.  But  they  did  not  yet  dare  to 
revolt  from  their  master;  and  they  voted  the  resolutions 
of  the  committee  on  foreign  relations,  embodying  the  views 
of  the  administration,  and  possessing  at  least  the  merit  of 
simplicity.  They  merely  declared  that  we  had  done  noth 
ing  to  justify  the  injurious  conduct  of  France  and  England, 
and  therefore  that  the  embargo  was  a  good  and  wise  policy, 
and  ought  to  be  maintained  in  its  entirety.  A  sharp  debate 
followed ;  but  even  proof  of  a  request  from  English  mer 
chants  to  their  own  government  to  enforce  the  embargo  pro 
duced  no  effect,  and  the  motion  for  repeal  was  defeated. 

This  was  almost  the  last  Jeffersonian  victory  in  1808 ; 
and  we  may  fitly  pause  here,  and  consider  the  accusation  of 
Mr.  Adams  which  relates  to  the  conduct  of  the  Federalists 
during  this  exciting  period.  The  second,  third,  and  fourth 
of  Mr.  Adams's  charges,  as  stated  at  the  beginning  of  the 
last  chapter,  were  that  the  plot  of  1804  for  a  dissolution 
of  the  Union  was  never  abandoned,  but  was  renewed  in 
1807  and  1808  ;  that  the  Federalist  leaders  aimed  at  a  dis 
solution  of  the  Union,  because  a  dissolution  was  intrinsi 
cally  good ;  and  that  these  same  leaders  \vere  in  communi 
cation  with  Great  Britain.  The  two  first  propositions  can 
be  answered  together,  the  last  will  demand  a  separate 
discussion. 

What  Mr.  Adams  understood  by  the  word  "  abandon  "  I 
do  not  know,  but  all  mention  of  the  plot  of  1804  ceases  with 
that  year.  Moreover,  there  is  no  evidence  whatever  of  any 
plot  or  plan  of  separation  of  any  kind  in  1807  and  1808. 
As  Mr.  Adams  asserts  the  existence  of  a  plot  at  that  time, 
the  burden  of  proof  is  with  him  to  support  his  affirmative ; 


480  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1804-15. 

but  he  offers  no  evidence  except  his  own  letters,  and  a  state 
ment  that  he  had  heard  of  the  existence  of  such  a  plot. 
That  he  heard  a  great  many  loud  and  violent  denunci 
ations  of  the  government,  and  fervent  wishes  for  separation 
expressed  with  equal  violence  and  loudness,  is  undoubted. 
He  had  bat  to  look  in  the  papers  to  read  them,  or  go  upon 
the  street  to  hear  them,  or  talk  with  his  new  party  allies  to 
have  them  enlarged  and  described.  But  angry  political  talk 
is  not  a  plot,  nor  are  newspaper  articles  a  plan,  nor  the 
assertions  of  enemies  a  scheme.  I  have  sought  with  the 
aid  of  much  material,  to  which  Mr.  Adams  had  no  access, 
to  substantiate  his  statement ;  and  I  have  sought  in  vain. 
There  is  not  a  shred  of  evidence  that  there  was  any  plot 
outside  of  the  busy  brain  of  Colonel  Pickering,  if  it  existed 
at  that  time  even  there.  Talk  of  secession  there  was  in 
great  abundance,  and  even  resolutions  by  towns,  and  sug 
gestions  by  individuals  that  it  would  be  well  to  take  active 
measures ;  but  there  was  no  plot,  no  combination,  no  defi 
nite  proposal  even  on  the  part  of  the  leaders.  This  is 
the  fair  deduction  from  Mr.  Adams's  own  evidence;  this 
is  the  united  testimony  of  all  the  letters  of  the  day ;  and 
this,  in  the  utter  absence  of  all  rebutting  evidence,  must  be 
considered  as  the  exact  truth. 

We  cannot  wonder,  however,  that  Mr.  Adams,  con 
vinced  of  the  existence  of  a  scheme  of  dissolution  in  1804, 
should  have  firmly  believed  in  its  revival  in  1807-8. 
The  signs  of  the  times  certainly  authorized  such  a  belief. 
The  air  was  full  of  threats  and  demands  for  separation, 
produced  as  might  have  been  expected,  and  as  was  always 
the  case,  by  real  or  fancied  injuries  inflicted  upon  the 
minority  by  the  dominant  party;  and,  in  this  instance, 
the  injuries  were  only  too  real.  The  letters  in  this  volume 
are  alone  sufficient  to  carry  conviction  of  the  sufferings,  the 
miseries  of  the  Eastern  States.  The  embargo  had  fallen 
like  a  withering  curse  upon  New  England.  Under  its 
desolating  blight,  her  ships  rotted  at  their  wharves,  her 


1804-15.]  THE  HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  481 

business  stagnated,  her  industries  were  paralyzed,  and  her 
laboring  population  was  thrown  out  of  work.  Ruin  con 
fronted  her  merchants,  poverty  and  starvation  stared  her 
working  men  in  the  face.  Yet  they  were  expected  to 
tamely  endure  all  this  wretchedness,  because  a  Virginian 
planter  said  that  in  this  way  commerce  was  defended,  and 
the  national  dignity  protected.  In  vain  did  the-  men  of 
New  England  beg  to  have  arms,  to  be  allowed  even  the 
privilege  of  arming  themselves.  In  vain  did  they  urge  that, 
if  commerce  were  left  free,  they  would  defend  it,  and  would 
see  to  it  that  the  national  honor  did  not  suffer.  They  were 
told  that  this  would  lead  to  war,  and  they  were  not  to  be 
permitted  to  even  shed  their  own  blood.  Men  still  remem 
bered  the  day  when  Massachusetts  had,  single-handed,  re 
sisted  England ;  they  had  never  known  their  State  to  fail 
them ;  they  were  proud  of  their  traditions ;  and  they 
turned,  as  every  American  then  did  in  the  hour  of  trouble, 
to  their  State  for  the  relief  which  the  general  government 
could  not  or  would  not  give.  Not  only  did  men  cry  out 
against  the  government  of  Jefferson,  but  they  made  no 
secret  of  their  desire  for  separation  from  a  union  which 
seemed  ruinous.  Far  worse  than  this  were  the  immediate 
dangers  which  lurked  behind  the  distress  of  the  lower 
orders.  The  wisest  men  justly  feared  lest  there  should  be 
tumults  and  insurrections. 

In  such  a  condition  of  affairs,  the  hour  had  surely  come 
for  those  men  whose  sole  object  was  to  dissolve  the  Union. 
The  Federalist  leaders  were  skilful  politicians,  and  by  a 
little  management  might  readily  have  brought  their  ten 
derly  cherished  plans,  as  imputed  to  them  by  Mr.  Adams, 
to  fulfilment.  In  the  midst  of  popular  tumult,  the  plan  of 
secession  would  have  found  ready  adherence.  Yet  these 
very  men  deprecated  and  dreaded  tumult.  They  strained 
every  nerve  to  bring  about  in  a  legitimate  manner  the 
repeal  of  the  embargo,  the  very  measure  that  was  surest  to 
cause  a  dissolution  of  the  Union,  if  persisted  in.  They 

31 


482  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1804-15. 

encouraged  every  form  of  legal  opposition ;  and  their  most 
distinguished  lawyer  argued  in  court  against  it,  while  the 
juries  refused  to  convict  under  it,  and  their  writers  and 
speakers  strenuously  denounced  it.  In  other  words,  the 
men  who  aimed  at  a  dissolution  of  the  Union  sought  to 
overthrow  the  very  measure  by  which  dissolution  was 
hastened.  Had  they  really  wished  a  separation,  they  would 
not  have  opposed  the  measure  constitutionally,  but  by  open 
resistance.  The  path  was  an  easy  and  a  sure  one,  for  one 
violence  would  have  led  to  another.  But  the  Federalists 
did  not  seek  a  dissolution  of  the  Union  for  its  own  sake. 
They  were  not  even  prepared,  in  1808,  to  use  it  as  a  threat 
in  order  to  force  those  alterations  which  they  deemed  essen 
tial  to  the  preservation  of  union.  On  the  contrary,  they 
were  content  to  seek  the  desired  changes  by  the  regular 
and  recognized  methods  of  the  Constitution.  They  did  all 
in  their  power  to  render  abortive  the  strongest  incentive  to 
dissolution ;  and  so  anxious  were  some  of  them  to  succeed 
in  their  opposition  to  the  embargo,  that  Mr.  Cabot  urged 
upon  the  Federal  convention  the  necessity  of  disclaiming 
all  sympathy  with  schemes  of  separation,  in  order  that  they 
might  obtain  the  confidence  of  the  whole  country.1  Surely 
no  men,  bent  on  bringing  about  secession,  would  have 
sought,  as  a  preliminary  measure,  to  strengthen  mutual  con 
fidence  among  the  different  States.  Sectional  animosity 
would  have  been  the  one  thing  they  would  have  wished  to 
cultivate.  Mr.  Adams  believed  Colonel  Pickering's  letter 
to  Sullivan  to  be  the  preconcerted  signal  for  the  commence 
ment  of  a  separatist  movement ;  whereas  the  correspondence 
with  Mr.  Cabot  on  this  subject  shows  that  no  idea  of  this 
sort  existed,  but  that,  on  the  contrary,  the  letter  was  chiefly 
directed  against  the  embargo,  and  to  break  down  the 
Republican  party  in  Massachusetts.  Moreover,  Mr.  Cabot 
strove  to  suppress  further  pamphlets  as  prejudicial  to  party 
success  in  the  general  government,  rather  than  to  stimulate 
i  See  above,  p.  398.' 


1804-15.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  483 

the   controversy.     In   support  of  the  second  and  third  of 
Mr.  Adams's  charges,  therefore,  there  is  no  proof  beyond 
his  own  assertion ;  and  he  may  well  have  been  misled  in 
making  them  by  the  circumstances  of  the  time.     All  the 
evidence  points  exactly  the  other  way ;  and,  although  it  can 
hardly  ever  be  said  that  a  negative  in  a  matter  of  this  sort 
has  been  proved,  it  may  be  safely  asserted  that,  in  the  face 
of  the  opposing  testimony,  Mr.  Adams's  unsupported  alle 
gation  falls  to  the  ground.     The  New  England  Federalists, 
in    1807-8,    did    not  form  any  plan  or  combination  for  a 
dissolution  of  the  Union,  but,  on  the  contrary,  took  steps 
which  led  to  the  opposite  result.     They  behaved,  moreover, 
in  the  very  way  in  which  men  who  aimed  at  a  dissolution 
would  not  have  behaved.     There  was,  no  doubt,  much  talk, 
both  in  public  and  private,  about  secession  and  a  New  Eng 
land  convention,1  as  well  as  much  vigorous  denunciation  of 
the  general  government.     This  was  known  before,  and  this 
is  all  that  the  hitherto  unpublished  correspondence  of  their 
most  prominent  leaders  reveals.     Mr.  Cabot's  correspond 
ence  at  this  time  with  Colonel  Pickering,  with  whom  he  was 
on  the  most  confidential  terms,  discloses  their  views  with  the 
greatest  freedom  ;  and  it  has  been  given  here  with  perfect 
fulness.     No  trace  is  to  be  found  of  a  plan  of  separation  like 
that  of  1804,  and  the  rest  of  the  Pickering  correspondence  is 
equally  barren.    There  may  have  been  plots  of  that  kind,  of 
which  not  only  Colonel  Pickering  and  Mr.  Cabot,  but  all 
Colonel  Pickering's  correspondents,  were  wholly  unaware. 
But  this  is  a  violent  inference  ;  and  I  doubt  if  even  Mr. 
Adams  would  have  ventured  to  say  that  a  secession  scheme 
existed  in  New  England,  from  all  knowledge  of  which  both 
Colonel   Pickering  and  Mr.  Cabot  were  excluded.     I  am 
unable  to  carry  further  a  refutation  of  Mr.  Adams's  second 
and  third  propositions,  because  I  am  offering  negative  proof 
which    cannot   in   its   nature   be    final.     But,   until  direct 
affirmative  proof  of  some  sort  is  brought  forward,  I  think 

1  See  Colonel  Pickering's  first  letter  to  Sullivan.     Also  Otis  to  Quincy, 
below,  p.  492. 


484  LIFE   AND    LETTERS    OF    GEOKGE    CABOT.      [1804-15. 

it  must  be  admitted  that  there  was  no  Federalist  scheme 
of  secession  in  1807—8,  and  that  the  leaders  did  not  then 
or  at  any  previous  time  desire  a  dissolution,  as  in  itself 
a  good  and  advantageous  event. 

The  fourth  charge  made  against  the  Federalists  by  Mr. 
Adams  of  treasonable  communication  with  Great  Britain 
is  much  graver  than  the  two  preceding  ones.     Fortunately, 
it  is  more  specific  and  more  easily  met.     Mr.  Adams  has  sup 
ported  this  accusation  by  what  he  seems  to  consider  good  tes 
timony.     I  had  expected  from  the  language  of  Mr.  Adams's 
pamphlet  to  find  evidence  of  the  strongest  and  most  damning 
kind,  which  would  render  the  charge  at  least  highly  probable ; 
and  I  confess  to  great  surprise  when  I  found  myself  confronted 
by  the  familiar  form  of  John  Henry,  and  by  nothing  else.  The 
statutes  both  of  England  and  of   Massachusetts  require,  in 
order  to  convict  of  treason,  two  witnesses ;  and  here  there  is 
but  one,  unsworn  and  testifying  nothing.     By  the  letters  of 
a  spy  who  sneaked  into  the  houses  of  gentlemen  and  saw 
nothing,  of  an  informer  who  had  no  information  to  give,  of  a 
creature  who  sold  his  own  baseness  and  ignorance  for  a  sum  of 
money,  Mr.  Adams  seeks  to  establish  a  charge  of  treason  and 
of  communication  with  a  foreign  government  against  men 
of  honorable  lives  and  high  reputation.     The  mere  mention 
of  Henry's  character  ought  to  be  enough  to  impeach  his 
testimony,  were  it  ever  so  direct.     But  only  the  most  in 
genious  twisting  can  give  even  a  color  of  meaning  to  his 
vague  statements,  while  the  rebutting  evidence  is  overwhelm 
ing.     The  Federalists  never  sought  to  deny  Henry's  charges. 
They  treated  them  as  too  contemptibly  ridiculous  to  deserve 
notice.     A  few  words  suffice  to  tell  the  whole  story.     John 
Henry  was   an    English  adventurer,  who  had  married  an 
American  lady  of  good  social  position.     Being  without  em 
ployment,  he  suggested  to  the  governor-general  of  Canada 
that  he  should  be  employed  to  gather  in  the  United  States 
information  which  might  be  of  advantage  to  English  in 
terests.      He  was   therefore   commissioned   by   Sir   James 
Craig,  the  governor  of  Canada,  to  carry  out  this  meritorious 


J804-15.]  THE  HARTFOKD   CONVENTION.  485 

plan.  He  went  to  Boston,  where,  thanks  to  his  marriage 
and  his  letters  of  introduction,  he  was  admitted  to  the  best 
houses.1  At  the  dinner-tables  in  Boston,  he  probably  heard 
a  good  deal  of  loose  talk  about  separation,  as  well  as  strong 
expressions  of  sympathy  with  Great  Britain.  The  infor 
mation  he  obtained  amounted  merely  to  this  :  that  in  his 
opinion,  if  war  were  declared  against  England,  there  would 
probably  be  a  congress  of  the  Eastern  States  and  a  dissolu 
tion  of  the  Union.  If  this  were  to  happen,  Henry  thought 
that  a  treaty  with  Great  Britain  would  follow,  but  what  con 
nection  would  come  with  that  country,  he  said,  "  no  person 
was  prepared  to  describe."  This  was  all  he  learned,  abso 
lutely  all,  —  the  unknown  results  of  a  contingency.  He  had 
but  to  read  the  papers  or  talk  with  the  gentlemen  at  whose 
houses  he  dined,  to  get  the  information  on  which  he  based 
such  an  opinion.  He  offered  nothing  but  an  opinion,  a 
mere  conjecture  as  to  what  might  happen  in  certain  events. 
He  did  not  even  say  that  such  things  would  happen,  but 
merely  that  such  was  his  opinion,  if  war  were  declared, 
which  he  did  not  think  probable.  In  his  first  letter  from 
Boston,  he  says  he  has  not  discovered  himself  to  any  one, 
but  that  he  is  able  to  judge  of  the  proper  time  for  mention 
ing  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain ;  and  there  is  no  trace 
in  subsequent  letters  that  he  ever  changed  in  this  respect. 
The  only  possible  inference  is  that  he  never  did  discover 
himself,  and  there  is  not  a  vestige  of  proof  which  would 
lead  to  an  opposite  conclusion.  The  utmost  that  he  says 
in  regard  to  the  opinions  of  the  Federalists  is  that  the  men 
of  talents  and  property  preferred  separation  to  war  with 
Great  Britain  and  alliance  with  France.  That  this  had 
been  the  view  of  many  leading  Federalists  for  a  number  of 
years  is  now  well  known.  Their  one  absorbing  fear  was 
that  the  independence  of  the  country  would  be  sacrificed, 
and  that  under  the  specious  name  of  alliance  they  would 
fall  beneath  the  dominion  of  Bonaparte,  and  go  to  war 
1  See  Quincy's  Life  of  Josiah  Quincy,  p.  250. 


486  LIFE    AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE   CABOT.     [1804-15. 

with  Great  Britain  as  the  nations  of  Europe  had  already 
been  compelled  to  do.  Henry,  then,  did  not  disclose  him 
self  to  any  one,  judging  by  his  own  letters  alone.  Nor  did 
he  mention  the  name  of  a  single  individual  as  authority 
even  for  the  views  which  he  attributed  to  the  Federalists, 
or  for  the  opinion  which  he  himself  had  formed.  The  com 
mittee  on  foreign  relations,  after  maturely  considering  the 
awful  nature  of  the  letters  for  which  Mr.  Madison  paid  fifty 
thousand  dollars,  came  to  the  conclusion  that  there  was 
nothing  to  be  done ;  that  the  letters  contained  no  specific 
charges  and  no  names,  and  that  they  implicated  nobody. 
The  committee  also  examined  Count  Crillon,  a  friend  and 
companion  of  Henry,  and  extracted  nothing  from  him  but 
a  repetition  of  Henry's  own  story.  In  short,  there  was 
nothing  to  tell.  Henry  told  all  he  could ;  for  there  were 
no  motives  for  concealment  except  a  sense  of  honor,  which 
it  would  be  a  gross  absurdity  to  impute  to  a  spy.  If  Henry 
had  names  to  sell,  we  may  be  sure  that  they  would  have  had 
their  price,  and  that  he  would  have  sold  them.  The  only 
person  in  Massachusetts  connected  by  name  with  Henry  was 
Governor  Gerry,  who  gave  him  a  letter  of  introduction  to  the 
President.  From  the  evidence,  therefore,  of  Mr.  Adams's 
only  witness  in  support  of  his  charge,  it  appears  that 
Henry  never  disclosed  himself  as  an  agent  of  the  British 
government  to  any  one,  that  he  could  tell  nothing  that  was 
not  known  before,  and  that  he  did  not  name  or  even  in 
directly  implicate  a  single  individual.  The  British  govern 
ment  disowned  him,  and  refused  him  money ;  and  the  new 
governor  of  Canada  would  do  nothing  for  him.  This,  be  it 
remembered,  was  before  he  discovered  himself.  Never  an 
accredited  agent  of  England,  he  was  angered  at  the  cold 
ness  with  which  he  was  treated.  But  Henry  was  an  acute 
observer  of  American  politics  ;  and  he  knew  that  the  mere 
fact  of  his  having  acted  as  a  British  spy  in  New  England 
would  be  a  valuable  political  cry  to  the  administration. 
He  therefore  sold  himself  to  Mr.  Madison,  who  paid  an 


1804-15.]  THE   HARTFORD    CONVENTION.  487 

enormous  sum,  with  the  very  simple  object  of  exciting 
anew  the  popular  hatred  of  England.  This  was  an  old 
party  trick ;  and  perhaps  we  can  hardly  wonder  that  Mr. 
Madison  should  have  again  employed  it,  and  have  cared 
little,  if  by  his  actions  he  should  succeed  in  fixing  an  odious 
stigma  upon  his  opponents  and  upon  the  States  in  which 
they  lived,  although  he  roused  thereby  sectional  hatreds  at 
a  moment  when  war  was  impending  and  Union  all  impor 
tant.  In  fact,  Henry  makes  a  sorry  witness  in  the  cold, 
clear  light  of  the  present  day;  and  his  testimony,  in  itself 
of  no  importance,  shows  absolutely  nothing  that  cannot  be 
better  known  without  it. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  consider  external  evidence, 
though  it  is  merely  cumulative  in  its  nature ;  for  Henry  is 
his  own  all-sufficient  refutation.  The  Federalists  knew  him 
when  he  was  in  Boston  :  he  went  to  their  houses,  and  mixed 
freely  with  them.  There  is,  however,  no  mention  of  his 
name,  as  far  as  I  am  aware,  in  any  of  the  Federalist  corre 
spondence  before  Mr.  Madison's  disclosures  in  1811.  The 
Pickering  letters  published  and  unpublished,  the  Quincy 
letters,  the  letters  of  Mr.  Cabot,  all  are  silent  before  that 
date  as  to  the  existence  of  such  a  person  as  Henry.  His 
visit  was  evidently  not  deemed  of  importance  by  any  of 
those  whom  he  met  in  Boston.  Even  when  he  made  his 
disclosures,  the  Federalists  gave  the  matter  but  little  at 
tention,  and  treated  it  as  a  mere  device  of  the  enemy.  I 
cannot  close  this  brief  account  of  the  Henry  episode  more 
fitly  than  with  the  words  of  one  of  the  very  few  men  who 
in  that  period  of  bitter  political  feeling  kept  his  temper, 
his  judgment,  and  his  power  of  cool  observation  unim 
paired.  Judge  Peters  writes  to  Colonel  Pickering,  on 
March  18,  1812:- 

"  I  have  read  the  mighty  communications  by  the  President  of 
Henry's  espionage.  I  think  it  a  most  pitiful  electioneering  ma 
noeuvre,  and  I  am  ashamed  of  my  old  friend's  1  push  for  popularity. 

1  Mr.  Madison. 


488  LIFE   AND    LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1804-15. 

Nevertheless,  it  will  have  no  small  effect  among  those  on  whom  it 
is  intended  to  operate.  Some  of  our  politicians  wonder  at  the  folly 
of  publishing  by  authority  libels  on  the  Democrats.1  But  every 
thing  said  by  Henry  will  be  attributed  to  British  enmity  and  hatred 
of  the  only  true  and  immaculate  patriots.  This  will  keep  up  re 
sentment,  and  drive  the  wavering  into  the  old  phalanx  embodied 
against  the  English  and  Anglo-Federalists.  All  sufferings  by  anti- 
commercial  measures  will  be  forgot  for  the  moment,  and  the  frenzy 
will  have  its  effect  before  reason,  among  those  who  have  any,  can 
resume  its  seat.  I  think  the  price  of  his  trash  for  any  good  pur 
pose  would  be  high  at  forty-eight  dollars.  Whether  as  the  news 
papers  allege  forty -eight  thousand  have  been  paid,  I  cannot  pretend 
to  know  or  believe." 

"  If  the  old  humor  produced  among  you  suggested  serious  deter 
mination  to  separate  from  the  Union,  your  good  sense  would  have 
deterred  you  from  trusting  yourselves  in  the  hands  of  such  a 
plenipotentiary ." 

The  letter  from  which  I  have  made  these  extracts  goes 
on  to  speak  of  Henry's  attempt  at  negotiation  as  at  once 
foolish  and  impracticable,  and  with  this  judicial  summing 
up  of  the  whole  affair  we  may  be  content  to  leave  the 
subject. 

Henry's  mission  took  place  in  1809  and  his  disclosures  in 
1812,  so  that  in  dealing  with  the  case  I  have  been  obliged 
to  anticipate  the  order  of  events.  But  before  leaving  Mr. 
Adams's  charge  of  British  influence,  the  evidence  of  which 
I  have  tried  to  consider,  it  seems  not  inappropriate  to  still 
further  refute  his  accusations,  by  citing  in  their  own  words 
the  opinions  of  the  Federalists  on  the  political  situation  in 
1807—8.  I  have  already  endeavored  to  describe  their  con 
victions  that  the  embargo  was  a  wicked  and  dangerous 
measure,  that  England  was  fighting  for  the  liberties  of  man 
kind,  and  that  war  with  her  was  the  greatest  of  all  possible 
evils,  entailing,  as  they  believed  it  must,  an  alliance  with 
France  and  a  servile  submission  to  Bonaparte.  They  sym- 

1  The  greater  part  of  the  Henry  letters  consisted  of  keen  and  well- 
directed  criticisms  on  the  party  and  the  policy  of  the  Democrats. 


1804-15.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  489 

pathized  far  too  strongly  with  England ;  but  the  bane 
of  foreign  politics  had  fallen  upon  the  whole  country,  and 
they  were  far  from  being  the  most  conspicuous  examples 
of  the  evil  effects  of  outside  influences.  The  New  Eng 
land  Federalists  preferred  a  separation  to  an  English  war ; 
but  in  their  hatred  of  the  embargo,  and  in  their  sympathy 
for  England,  they  were  in  full  accord  with  their  party 
friends  elsewhere.  If  opinions  of  this  last  sort  were  treason 
able,  as  was  freely  said  at  the  time,  there  can  be  no  doubt  of 
their  guilt.  Colonel  Pickering's  and  Mr.  Cabot's  views  have 
already  been  given  in  full ;  and  the  next,  therefore,  which  I 
shall  quote  will  be  those  of  John  Marshall,  for  his  sympathy 
with  England  differed  but  little  from  that  felt  by  those 
men  whom  Mr.  Adams  stigmatized  as  Tories  and  a  British 
faction. 

MARSHALL  TO  PICKERING. 

RICHMOND,  Dec.  19,  1808. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  thank  you  very  sincerely  for  the  excellent 
speeches  1  lately  delivered  in  the  Senate,  which  you  have  been  so 
obliging  as  to  transmit  me.  If  sound  argument  and  correct  reason 
ing  could  save  our  country,  it  would  be  saved.  Nothing  can  be 
more  completely  demonstrated  than  the  inemcacy  of  the  embargo, 
yet  that  demonstration  seems  to  be  of  no  avail.  I  fear  most  seri 
ously  that  the  same  spirit  which  so  tenaciously  maintains  this 
measure  will  impel  us  to  a  war  with  the  only  power  which  protects 
any  part  of  the  civilized  world  from  the  despotism  of  that  tyrant 
with  whom  we  shall  then  be  arranged. 

You  have  shown  that  the  principle  commonly  called  the  rule  of 
1756  is  of  much  earlier  date,  and,  I  fear,  have  also  shown  to  what 
motives  the  embargo  is  to  be  traced. 

But  I  abstain  from  remarks  on  this  question.  With  great  and 
sincere  esteem,  I  am,  dear  sir, 

Your  obedient  J.  MARSHALL. 

Mr,  Stoddert,  John  Adams's  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  writes 
on  Dec.  6,  1809:  — 

1  On  the  embargo. 


490  LIFE    AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE    CABOT.      [1804-15. 

"  I  see  by  Mr.  Giles's  inflammatory  resolutions  that  there  are 
men  who  mean  to  second  the  views  disclosed  by  the  cabinet  to 
bring  on  a  war  with  England,  which  can  only  end  in  open  and 
acknowledged  submission  to  the  rule  of  France." 

"  I  am  not  now  singular  in  the  hope  that  you  will  now  save  it 
from  a  war  that  would  be  more  fatal  than  a  civil  war." 

Dec.  19,  1808,  James  Ross,  of  Pennsylvania,  writes :  — 

"  Such  is  the  condition  of  the  Old  World  that,  unless  we  reso 
lutely  and  speedily  change  our  national  habits  and  character,  unless 
we  assume  a  military  instead  of  a  negotiating,  temporizing  pol 
icy,  we  are  undone.  To  be  safe  from  wanton  insult  and  attack,  we 
must  be  armed  on  the  ocean  and  on  the  land.  ...  I  have  consid 
ered  the  embargo  as  a  trick,  a  mere  nickname,  devised  by  the  Pres 
ident  to  conceal  the  real  design  and  object  of  the  cabinet,  which 
was  in  effect  to  comply  with  the  demands  of  Bonaparte,  and  to  shut 
our  ports  against  English  commerce  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic, 
while  he  compelled  all  Europe  to  do  the  same." 

John  Jay  says,  in  thanking  Pickering  for  copies  of  the 
latter's  speeches :  — 

"  On  reading  your  speech,  I  observe  sentiments  which  manifest 
your  esteem  and  demand  my  acknowledgments.  It  is  desirable  that 
no  errors  be  permitted  to  prevail  either  in  present  or  future  rela 
tive  to  the  inducements  and  objects  of  the  embargo,  or  relative  to 
the  consequences  resulting  from  it.  A  full,  fair,  and  able  exposi 
tion  of  the  origin  and  progress  of  our  national  embarrassments 
would  be  useful." 

Charles  Carroll  of  Carrollton,  who  survived  all  the  other 
signers  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  says  (Dec.  31, 
1808)  :  - 

"The  antipathy  of  this  man  [Jefferson]  to  England,  and  his 
predilection  for  France,  passions  of  which  his  successor  strongly 
partakes,  will,  I  fear,  ruin  our  country." 

Mr.  Carroll  attributed  the  embargo  to  the  dictates  of 
Bonaparte,  who  in  his  opinion  aimed  at  nothing  short  of 
universal  dominion.  His  letter  continues :  — 


1804-15.]  THE   HARTFOKD    CONVENTION.  491 

"  I  have  no  predilection  for  England  nor  antipathy  to  France ; 
but  the  former  I  wish  success  in  the  present  war,  because  that  suc 
cess  will  establish  the  liberties  of  Europe  and  the  independence  of 
our  own  country,  now  in  jeopardy." 

Rufus  King  writes  to  Colonel  Pickering,  Jan.  15, 
1809:- 

"  I  beg  of  you  to  thank  Mr.  Hillhouse,  in  my  behalf,  for  his  use 
ful  and  constitutional  speech  in  opposition  to  Mr.  Giles's  oppressive 
and  tyrannical  bill  to  enforce  the  embargo.  These  measures  may 
be  borne  for  a  time,  but  they  cannot  be  of  long  duration.  You  will 
have  seen  the  proceedings  of  a  numerous  meeting  in  this  city." 

Mr.  King  thoroughly  sympathized  with  England  in  the 
midst  of  the  struggle  which,  as  he  says  elsewhere,  uwas 
changing  the  face  of  the  world." 

The  public  declarations  of  the  Federalists  were  no  less 
explicit,  not  only  in  their  opposition  to  the  embargo,  but  in 
their  firm  adherence  to  the  naval  policy  and  neutrality  of 
Washington.  Mr.  Quincy,  in  an  eloquent  speech  (Novem 
ber,  1808),  after  declaring  the  embargo  to  be  a  practical 
submission  to  both  belligerents,  said :  — 

"  But  to  my  eye  the  path  of  our  duty  is  as  distinct  as  the  milky 
way,  —  all  studded  with  living  sapphires  and  glowing  with  cumu 
lating  light.  It  is  the  path  of  active  preparation,  of  dignified  en 
ergy.  It  is  the  path  of  1776.  It  consists  not  in  abandoning  our 
rights,  but  in  supporting  them,  as  they  exist,  and  where  they  exist, 
—  on  the  ocean  as  well  as  on  the  land.  It  consists  in  taking  the 
nature  of  things  as  the  measure  of  the  rights  of  your  citizens, 
not  the  orders  and  decrees  of  imperious  foreigners.  Give  what 
protection  you  can.  Take  no  counsel  of  fear.  Your  strength 
will  increase  with  the  trial,  and  prove  greater  than  you  are  now 
aware." 

About  the  same  time,  Mr.  Lloyd  had  said  in  the 
Senate :  — 

"  Remove  the  embargo,  authorize  the  merchants  to  arm  their 
vessels,  put  the  nation  in  a  state  of  defence,  and  assert  your  well- 
established  and  indisputable  rights,  or  perish  in  the  contest." 


492  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE  CABOT.      [1804-15. 

An  earnest  letter  from  Mr.  H.  G.  Otis  to  Mr.  Quincy,  upon 
the  speech  from  which  I  have  quoted,  shows  how  thoroughly 
in  sympathy  the  latter  was  with  the  leaders  at  home.  The 
suggestion,  in  the  same  letter,  of  a  convention  "  to  provide 
some  mode  of  relief  [from  the  embargo]  that  may  not  be 
inconsistent  with  the  union  of  these  States"  is  indicative  not 
only  of  the  misery  which  the  system  of  maritime  restric 
tions  had  already  brought,  but  shows  exactly  how  far  Mr. 
Adams's  "  plot "  had  proceeded.  Harassed  and  nearly 
ruined  by  the  embargo,  threatened  by  riot  and  domestic 
insurrection,  the  Federalists  discussed  extreme  measures. 
This  letter  of  Mr.  Otis  goes  further  than  any  other  at  this 
time ;  but  there  is  very  little  plot  about  it,  and  certainly 
nothing  like  combination. 

In  the  same  year  (1808),  the  Legislature  of  Massachu 
setts  passed  resolutions,  in  which  they  avowed  themselves 
ready  to  bear  every  privation  of  war,  although  believing  a 
peace  policy  to  be  the  true  one,  and  begged  earnestly 
for  an  efficient  navy.  This  is  not  the  language  of  timid 
ity,  of  fanatical  lovers  of  peace,  nor  of  Tory  sympathizers. 
If  such  opposition  as  this  frustrated  Mr.  Jefferson's  long 
ing  for  a  sterner  and  more  warlike  policy,  he  must  have 
labored  under  a  sad  misapprehension  as  to  his  opponents' 
real  wishes. 

Extracts  might  be  multiplied  from  the  writings  of  the 
New  England  Federalists,  expressing  views  identical  with 
those  just  quoted.  But  the  latter  are  sufficient  to  give 
an  exact  and  truthful  picture  of  Federalist  opinion  at  this 
time,  and  to  enable  us  to  compare  it  with  the  policy  of  the 
administration  which  they  resisted  and  opposed.  Such  a 
comparison  would  be  the  surest  and  most  complete  vindica 
tion  of  the  Federalists  that  could  be  devised.  It  would 
justify  the  motto  proposed  for  their  convention  in  Penn 
sylvania,  "  Union,  peace,  and  no  foreign  alliance." l 

The  new  year  (1809)  opened  with  the  passage  of  the 
1  Letter  from  Abraham  Shepherd,  in  Pickering  MSS. 


1804-15.]  THE  HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  493 

enforcing  act,  a  measure  capable  of  leading  to  the  greatest 
tyranny,  oppression,  and  fraud.  To  the  suffering  people  of 
New  England,  it  was  the  last  straw.  We  read  of  a  town 
meeting  in  Boston  demanding  that  the  Legislature  should 
resist  the  enforcing  act ;  and  we  cannot  but  recall  another 
meeting  of  the  same  town  fifty  years  before,  when,  under 
the  guidance  of  Samuel  Adams,  the  representatives  were 
instructed  to  resist  the  first  attempt  to  tax  America.  Lin 
coln,  upon  whom  the  office  of  governor  devolved  at  Sulli 
van's  death,  deprecated  in  his  speech  at  the  opening  of  the 
session  the  hostility  of  New  England  to  the  new  measures, 
and  also  the  threats  of  secession  now  growing  louder  and 
louder.  A  committee,  headed  by  Mr.  Gore,  brought  in  a 
report  which  took  advanced  Federalist  ground  against  the 
French  and  the  embargo  and  in  favor  of  England.  The 
committee  said:  — 

"  Let  Congress  repeal  the  embargo,  annul  the  convention  with 
France,  forbid  all  commercial  intercourse  with  the  French  domin 
ions,  arm  our  public  and  private  ships,  and  unfurl  the  republican 
banner  against  the  imperial  standard." 

The  answers  of  both  Houses  to  the  governor  were  in  a 
similar  strain.  Any  idea  of  a  dissolution  of  the  Union  was 
disclaimed,  but  it  was  intimated  very  distinctly  that  the 
embargo  and  its  adjuncts  were  not  laws.  Both  Houses  de 
nounced  the  enforcing  act,  as  in  many  respects  "  oppressive, 
unconstitutional,  and  not  legally  binding ;  "  but  they  advised 
peaceable  and  legal  resistance.  At  the  same  time,  they 
passed  a  bill  prohibiting  the  search  of  dwelling-houses 
authorized  by  the  enforcing  act,  just  as  a  former  Massachu 
setts  assembly  had  passed  a  bill  to  limit  the  operation  of 
writs  of  assistance.  The  ships  hung  their  flags  at  half-mast 
when  the  commandant  at  the  fort  received  orders  to  allow 
none  of  them  to  leave  the  harbor,  and  the  Legislature  re 
sisted  the  use  of  the  militia  by  Lincoln  to  enforce  the 
obnoxious  laws.  Fresh  threats  were  heard  from  the  town, 


494  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE    CABOT.     [180^15. 

and  the  voice  of  Randolph  recalled  to  Jefferson  the  fate  of 
Lord  North.  Now,  too,  did  Mr.  Adams,  by  letter  and  by 
word  of  mouth,  warn  his  new  allies  against  the  evil  designs 
of  his  friends  and  fellow-citizens.  Exaggerated  and  dis 
torted  by  suspicion  as  this  warning  was,  it  came  none  too 
soon.  The  spirit  of  resistance  was  rising  fast  in  New  Eng 
land  ;  and,  had  it  once  broken  loose,  no  man  could  have 
tamed  it.  Behind  the  legal  and  stubborn  opposition  of  the 
Legislature  lurked  possibilities  of  secession  and  civil  war, 
and  they  were  each  moment  coming  nearer  and  growing 
more  distinct.  The  people  of  Massachusetts  had  in  former 
times  thrown  Andros  into  prison  and  risen  against  Hutch- 
inson  for  oppression  but  little  heavier  than  that  from  which 
they  now  suffered.  They  would  have  been  unworthy  of 
their  race,  and  contemptible  as  men,  had  they  not  been 
ready  to  fight  when  they  honestly  believed  themselves 
intolerably  wronged.  They  intended  to  exhaust  every 
form  of  legal  opposition ;  and,  if  that  did  not  avail,  they 
were  ready  to  draw  the  sword.  This  was  the  spirit  which, 
rightly  or  wrongly  directed,  has  always  made  the  English 
race  respected  and  respectable;  and  this  was  the  spirit 
which  was  abroad  in  New  England,  in  1809.  Moreover, 
the  contagion  was  spreading.  Other  States  were  passing 
out  of  the  control  of  the  Democracy.  All  men  save  one 
saw  that  not  only  political  change,  but  the  ruin  of  the 
country  was  imminent,  if  the  embargo  policy  should  be 
persisted  in.  But,  although  the  President  would  not  aban 
don  his  theory,  the  dread  of  sure  destruction  now  proved 
stronger  with  the  faithful  majority  than  the  word  of  their 
master  The  Northern  Republicans,  influenced  by  the  great 
abilities  of  Story,  that  "pseudo-Republican,"  as  Jefferson 
in  the  bitterness  of  his  heart  afterwards  called  him, 
gave  ground  ;  their  Southern  allies  were  demoralized ;  the 
Federalists  pressed  the  assault,  the  great  majority  gave 
way  in  all  directions,  the  embargo  was  repealed,  and  Jeffer 
son  defeated.  He  mourned  over  this  as  a  fatal  measure, 


1804-15.]  THE  HAKTFOKD   CONVENTION.  495 

yet  lie  was  not  without  compensating  successes.  The  navy 
appropriation  was  very  small,  and  the  army  bill  was  de 
feated.  At  least,  the  country  was  so  completely  unarmed 
that,  even  if  the  removal  of  the  embargo  were  to  lead  to 
war,  but  little  fighting  could  be  done ;  for  there  were  no 
weapons.  The  closing  days  of  Jefferson's  administration 
present  a  wretched  spectacle.  The  party  had  broken  from 
their  leader's  cherished  policy,  and  neither  he  nor  they  had 
any  other  to  suggest.  A  frantic  objection  to  doing  any 
thing  that  by  any  possibility  could  lead  to  war  was  the  one 
distinct  notion  among  the  Democrats  ;  and  so,  after  much 
heated  and  futile  wrangling,  Congress  finally  passed  Mr. 
Madison's  feeble  non-intercourse  bill,  ingeniously  contrived 
to  be  perfectly  ineffective  and  yet  thoroughly  irritating. 
With  this  measure,  Jefferson's  second  term  came  to  an  end. 
Mr.  Madison  succeeded  to  a  terrible  task.  His  prede 
cessor  had  so  hopelessly  entangled  every  thing  that  it  is 
doubtful  if  a  Cromwell  or  a  Richelieu  could  ever  have 
unravelled  the  knots,  but  that  Mr.  Madison  was  wholly 
unable  to  do  so  is  perfectly  clear.  The  last  hours  of  Jeffer 
son's  official  life  had  been  clouded  with  defeat ;  yet,  could 
he  have  shaken  off  his  delusions,  he  might  have  resumed 
his  former  sway.  For  Mr.  Madison,  on  the  other  hand, 
to  assert  and  maintain  the  leadership  of  his  disorganized 
party  was  an  impossibility.  The  magic  touch,  the  delicate 
management,  the  light,  firm  hand,  had  departed  with  Jef 
ferson  ;  and  the  Democratic  party  dragged  their  new  chief 
helplessly  at  the  wheels  of  his  own  chariot.  In  dealing  with 
these  new  conditions,  the  Federalists  made  a  great,  a  capital 
mistake.  They  assumed  that  Mr.  Madison  had  succeeded 
not  only  to  all  the  insignia,  but  to  all  the  real  power,  and 
to  all  the  principles  of  his  illustrious  predecessor ;  and  they 
threw  all  responsibility  upon  him  for  every  party  measure, 
as  they  had  formerly  done  upon  Jefferson.  Nothing  could 
have  been  more  erroneous  or  more  unjust  than  such  a  course, 
and  it  was  of  evil  consequence  to  those  who  adhered  to  it. 


496  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF  GEORGE   CABOT.  .  [1804-15. 

Mr.  Madison  was  in  truth  a  Federalist  at  heart  and  by  tem 
perament,  and  he  was  ever  a  moderate,  wise,  and  concilia 
tory  man.  He  now  found  himself  at  the  head  of  a  broken 
and  disorganized  party,  with  a  powerful  and  increasing  op 
position  to  his  policy  among  his  followers.  Had  the  Fed 
eralists  but  taken  advantage  of  his  difficulties  in  the  proper 
way,  they  might  have  obtained  a  controlling  position,  and, 
with  the  help  of  conservative  Democrats,  have  beaten  off  the 
war  party,  now  rising  into  prominence.  They  were  unluck 
ily  too  much  blinded  by  the  fierce  party  spirit  of  the  times 
to  see  plainly  their  opportunity,  yet  in  the  first  months  of 
the  new  administration  it  seemed  quite  probable  that  they 
and  Mr.  Madison  might  come  together  for  mutual  support. 
This  deceitful  hope  was  excited  by  the  Erskine  negotiation. 
Mr.  Erskine  was  a  sincere  friend  to  this  country,  and  most 
desirous  to  heal  the  differences  existing  with  England.  He 
presented  certain  conditions  demanded  by  Mr.  Canning  as 
essential  preliminaries  to  a  negotiation ;  and  our  government 
accepted  these  conditions,  but  with  such  limitations  that 
Erskine  was  obliged  to  overstep  his  instructions,  in  order 
to  go  on  with  the  treaty.  This  he  did,  however ;  and  the 
preliminary  arrangement  was  signed,  and  sent  to  England. 
Canning,  with  the  short-sighted  and  brutal  arrogance  of 
which  he  was  at  times  capable,  took  advantage  of  Erskine's 
violation  of  his  instructions,  and  refused  a  ratification  to 
what  had  been  done.  Such  impolitic  action  on  the  part 
of  England  set  every  thing  adrift  again.  The  non-inter 
course  act  was  renewed  ;  and  the  Federalists,  who  had  come 
round  toward  the  support  of  Mr.  Madison,  at  the  news  of 
the  successful  negotiations  now  rushed  again  into  bitter 
opposition.  Again  they  called  Mr.  Madison  the  disciple  of 
Jefferson,  the  admirer  of  France,  the  man  who  would  not 
make  peace  with  England  on  any  terms.  Here,  too,  they 
blundered  politically,  and  were  unjust  to  their  opponent. 
Mr.  Madison's  policy  was,  in  conception  at  least,  a  wise 
and  intelligent  one.  He  wished,  if  possible,  to  make  peace 


1804-15.]  THE   HAUTFOKD   CONVENTION.  497 

with  England ;  but  lie  was  determined  that,  if  the  negotia 
tions  broke  down,  the  blame  of  failure  should  rest  upon 
England  alone.  Had  he  behaved  in  a  perfectly  straight 
forward  way,  this  plan  would  have  been  successful ;  but, 
while  he  neither  accepted  nor  refused  the  conditions  pro 
posed  by  Erskine,  he  drew  the  British  minister  on  to  make 
concessions  clearly  unwarranted  by  the  instructions.  This 
slight  tinge  of  duplicity  gave  ground  to  his  enemies  to 
say  that  Erskine  had  been  disingenuously  treated,  and  that 
peace  was  not  really  desired.  So  the  bitter  antagonism 
flamed  up  more  fiercely  than  ever ;  and  the  failure  of  Er- 
skine's  successor,  Jackson,  and  his  quarrels  with  the  admin 
istration,  gave  fresh  reasons  for  suspicion  and  distrust.  Mr. 
Madison  was  meantime  pressed  by  difficulties  on  the  other 
side.  Turreau,  the  French  minister,  addressed  to  our  gov 
ernment  a  letter,  warning  us  to  desist  from  the  Erskine 
negotiation,  and  so  dictatorial  and  insulting  in  its  language 
that  it  rouses  a  keen  feeling  of  shame  and  indignation  even 
now.  Mr.  Madison  swallowed  the  affront  with  the  best 
grace  he  could,  and  said  but  little  as  to  the  French  outrages 
and  seizures  of  vessels,  which  were  now  renewed  in  great 
abundance.  Silence  also  was  preserved  as  to  C  adore 's  infa 
mous  letter  to  Armstrong,  commanding  us  to  go  to  war  with 
England  under  pain  of  the  Emperor's  displeasure.  The 
President's  tameness  under  the  abuse  of  France  showed 
him  to  be  still  hampered  by  the  maxims  of  Jefferson,  and 
destroyed  the  faint  belief  of  the  Federalists  in  his  freedom 
from  French  influence.  Mr.  Madison  was  himself  to  blame 
for  all  this,  and  his  feeble  conduct  under  French  aggressions 
laid  him  fairly  open  to  the  really  undeserved  imputation  of 
being  a  French  sympathizer.  That  the  impression  of  his  ser 
vility  towards  Bonaparte  was  generally  diffused  among  even 
temperate  men  by  his  conduct  appears  from  a  letter  of  John 
Marshall  to  Mr.  Quincy.  The  Chief  Justice  says  :  — 

"  I  had  supposed  the  late  letter  to  Mr.  Armstrong,  and  the  late 
seizure  of  aii  American  vessel,  simply  because  she  was  an  Ameri- 

32 


498  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1804-15. 

can,  added  to  previous  burnings,  ransoms,  and  confiscations,  would 
have  exhausted  to  the  dregs  our  cup  of  servility  and  degradation ; 
but  these  measures  appear  to  make  no  impression  on  those  to  whom 
the  United  States  confide  their  destinies.  To  what  point  are  we 
verging  ?  " 1 

When  Congress  came  together,  although  Mr.  Madison 
was  fully  supported  in  his  treatment  of  Mr.  Jackson,  dis 
organization  was  very  apparent  in  the  ranks  of  the  old 
Jeffersonian  phalanx.  The  restrictive  commercial  policy 
no  longer  found  eager  support,  and  even  the  Federalist  doc 
trine  of  free  commerce  met  with  more  acceptance,  while 
Mr.  Gallatin's  navigation  act  was  ultimately  defeated. 

From  this  time  until  the  actual  declaration  of  war,  our 
unhappy  President  and  his  administration  plunged  from 
one  difficulty  into  another,  and  every  fresh  effort  to  extri 
cate  the  country  only  served  to  sink  it  deeper.  A  breach 
in  the  English  cabinet,  and  the  favorable  disposition  of  Lord 
Wellesley,  afforded  a  momentary  gleam  of  hope  and  an  op 
portunity  to  renew  negotiation.  But  even  this  distant  pros 
pect  of  relief  was  darkened  by  the  increased  number  and 
insolence  of  the  French  seizures  and  by  the  publication  of 
the  Rambouillet  decree,  which  seemed  to  achieve  the  im 
possible  by  inflicting  fresh  injury  on  our  already  shattered 
neutral  rights.  Although  Mr.  Pinkney's  negotiation  with 
the  new  cabinet  failed,  yet  the  opening  of  our  ports  led  to 
a  revival  of  trade  at  which  England  connived,  and  a  better 
state  of  feeling  was  generally  apparent.  The  French  gov 
ernment  were  alarmed,  fearing  that  their  hold  upon  the 
United  States  was  loosening;  and  they  therefore  ingen 
iously  took  measures  to  entrap  us  into  an  open  conflict 
with  Great  Britain.  Bonaparte  offered  to  withdraw  his 
decrees,  on  condition  that  we  should  insist  on  England's 
withdrawal  of  the  orders  in  council.  He  had  not  in  reality, 
we  may  be  sure,  the  slightest  intention  of  revoking  his 
decrees,  but  merely  wished  to  induce  us  to  make  proposals 

1  See  Quincy's  Life  of  Josiah  Quincy,  p.  204. 


1804-15.]  THE   HARTFORD    CONVENTION.  499 

to  England  when  we  had  no  security  that  our  offers  would 
be  made  good.     He  desired  to  make  us  a  go-between,  to 
force  us  into  the  position  of  bargaining  in  the  French  inter 
est,  and  then,  by  a  simple  refusal  to  carry  out  the  promises 
he  authorized  us  to  offer,  to  make  England  reject  our  over 
tures,  and  to  leave  us  embroiled  in  a  hopeless  quarrel  with 
his  one  opponent.     The  ruse  was  only  too  successful.     Mr. 
Madison,  entirely  deceived  by  the  lies  of  the  French  Em 
peror,  blundered  head-first  into  the  snare,  and  found  himself 
engaged  with  a  third  party  in  a  quarrel  about  French  inter 
ests.     At  the  news  of  the  French  propositions,  the  Federal 
ists  took  strong  ground  against  them,  urging  that  only  the 
wildest  folly  would  consent  to  risk  our  British  trade  for  the 
sake  of  French  privileges,  which,  even  if  really  given,  were 
well-nigh  worthless.      All  opposition,   however,   was  vain. 
Mr.  Madison  persisted  in  his  attempt  to  coerce  England  by 
means  of  the  French  decrees,  which  he  assisted  by  a  procla 
mation  reviving  the  non-importation  act  in  all  its  old  sever 
ity  and  injustice.     When  Randolph  proposed  the  repeal  of 
the  act,  he  was  told  that  it  was  a  pledge  to  France.     Yet, 
at  the  very  time  that  we  were  thus  sacrificing  our  interests  to 
those  of  Bonaparte,  our  vessels  were  still  seized  by  his  ships, 
and  condemned  in  his  courts  ;  and  Serrurier,  the  new  French 
minister,  did  not  bring  to  Washington  even  an  offer  of  in 
demnity  for  all  the  injuries  of  our  faithless  ally.     Even  such 
grossly  outrageous  conduct  on  the  part  of  France  could  not 
undeceive  Mr.  Madison.     By  way  of  showing  confidence  in 
the  French,  new  and  stricter  clauses  were  added  to  the  non 
importation  act ;  and  Robert  Smith  was  forced  from   the 
cabinet,  not  merely  because  he  was  incompetent,  as  Mr. 
Madison  very  rightly  asserted,  but  also  because  he  failed  to 
comprehend  the  policy,  and  would  insist  that  the  Emperor 
never  meant  to  recall  the  decrees.1     While  Mr.  Madison 
was  thus  exhibiting,  in  appearance  at  least,  fresh  proofs  of 

1  See  Smith's  Address  to  the  People  of  the  United  States,  1811 ;  also 
Address,  with  Pickering's  Review,  1812 ;  and  Answer  to  Address,  &c.,  1812. 


500  LIFE  AND   LETTEES   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.     [1804-15. 

faith  in  France,  the  English,  who  had  no  confidence  in 
French  promises,  refused  to  trust  to  them,  even  when 
offered  by  us.  The  result,  of  course,  was  the  failure  of 
the  negotiation  and  the  return  of  Pinkney.  He  was  soon 
followed  by  the  new  British  envoy,  Mr.  Augustus  Foster, 
the  prospects  of  whose  mission  were  not  brightened  by  the 
affair  of  the  "  President "  and  the  "  Little  Belt."  Mr.  Mad 
ison,  however,  accepted  the  reparation  offered  by  Foster 
for  the  "  Chesapeake  "  affair,  which  was  identical  in  terms 
with  that  scornfully  rejected  by  Jefferson  four  years  pre 
viously.  Nevertheless,  the  negotiation  did  not  proceed. 
To  Foster's  request,  that  on  the  revocation  of  the  British 
orders  we  should  peremptorily  demand  the  withdrawal  of 
the  French  decrees,  Mr.  Madison  replied  that  we  could 
not  dictate  to  France.  This  was  no  doubt  perfectly  true, 
but  we  had  made  no  difficulty  when  the  French  requested 
a  similar  attempt  on  our  part  at  dictation  to  England. 

But  however  perilous  our  foreign  relations,  a  more  cer 
tain  sign  of  coming  conflict  was  to  be  found  in  the  rise  to 
influence  and  power  of  the  new  war  party.  The  members 
of  this  new  faction  were  principally  drawn  from  the  great 
Democratic  majority,  but  they  were  men  of  very  different 
stuff  from  those  who  had  followed  so  long  at  the  heels  of 
Mr.  Jefferson.  Their  principal  support  came  from  the 
rude  population  of  the  interior  and  backwoods  settlements. 
Their  leaders  were,  for  the  most  part,  young,  rough,  un 
trained,  and  impetuous.  They  brought  with  them  all  that 
wonderful  power  of  blatant  self-glorification,  which  for  so 
many  years  after  made  our  nation  ridiculous,  and  which  is 
only  just  now  passing  into  well-deserved  contempt.  They 
were  at  first  about  as  fit  to  deal  with  delicate  questions 
of  foreign  or  domestic  policy  as  an  Ashantee  savage  with 
a  chronometer  watch,  or  a  Patagonian  Indian  with  a  micro 
scope.  But  they  represented  a  new  phase  and  a  real  force 
in  our  politics,  and  they  represented  them  truly.  Their 
coming  signified  that  the  old  regime  was  over,  that  our  poli- 


1804-15.]  THE  HAKTFORD   CONVENTION.  501 

tics  and  our  politicians  were  henceforth  to  be  as  demo 
cratic  as  our  principles.  They  were  the  sign  that  we  were 
really  democratic  altogether,  and  they  represented  a  new 
departure  in  all  the  departments  and  in  the  character  of 
public  life.  In  1811,  they  appeared  to  the  members  of  the 
old  parties  violent,  strange,  and  abnormal,  for  their  coming 
marked  an  era  in  our  history :  they  absorbed  the  vital  prin 
ciples  of  both  their  predecessors,  and  they  fastened  them 
finally  and  surely  on  our  body  politic.  These  new  men  were 
thoroughly  imbued  with  the  national  spirit,  with  a  sense  of 
national  honor ;  -  and  they  were  ready  to  fight,  as  the  only 
method  they  understood  for  vindicating  their  dignity.  They 
were  the  first  to  fully  represent  the  work  of  nationality 
which  the  union  of  twenty-five  years  had  silently  effected ; 
and  they  were  the  first  men  free  enough  from  tradition  to 
offer  some  definite  plan,  instead  of  the  never-ending  juggling 
of  Jefferson  and  the  timid  hesitation  of  Madison.  The  forces 
which  brought  the  war  party  into  sudden  prominence  were 
natural  as  well  as  powerful,  although  it  is  unfortunate  that 
their  representatives  were  absolutely  ignorant  of  state-craft, 
and  manifested  their  wishes  and  exercised  their  power  with 
roughness  and  brutality.  One  thing  was  clear  to  them :  if 
foreign  nations  did  not  treat  the  United  States  better,  then 
the  United  States  must  fight.  Unluckily,  their  next  definite 
idea  was  that  the  only  proper  country  to  fight  was  England. 
It  is  true  that  they  were  ready  to  attack  anybody  ;  but  they 
had  been  brought  up  under  the  Jeffersonian  auspices,  and 
they  had  a  general  notion  that  Americans  could  neither 
hate  nor  fight  any  one  but  an  Englishman.  Not  content 
with  this  limited  idea  as  to  the  range  of  selection  among 
their  opponents,  they  blundered  into  another  utter  miscon 
ception.  Their  genuine  readiness  for  war  would  of  itself 
have  obtained  for  them  all  they  desired,  but  they  had  deter 
mined  not  only  to  fight  England,  but  also  to  fight  at  all 
events  and  under  any  conditions. 

By   this    headlong    impetuosity,   although    still    but    a 


502  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF    GEORGE   CABOT.     [1804-15. 

faction,  they  dragged  the  rest  of  their  party  with  them. 
The  committee  on  foreign  relations  brought  in  a  report 
favoring  war.  The  new  zealots  talked  loudly  about  con 
quering  Canada,  and  averred  that  the  Canadian  population 
would  fraternize  with  them  after  the  French  fashion. 
Warlike  preparations  were  urged.  But  still  they  were 
under  the  old  spell ;  and,  while  they  called  for  forty-five 
millions  for  an  army  to  prosecute  their  schemes  of  invasion, 
they  would  only  give  to  the  navy  a  pitiful  three  hundred 
thousand  dollars.  Bitterly  as  the  Federalists  hated  the  war 
which  was  fast  coming  upon  the  country,  they  roused  to  a 
last  struggle  in  behalf  of  the  navy.  They  had  never  yielded 
their  conviction  that  this  was  the  one  branch  of  the  service 
on  which  we  ought  to  rely  ;  and  they  now  made  a  last 
desperate  effort  to  get  money,  that  we  might  not  enter  into 
war  with  the  mistress  of  the  seas  unprovided  with  ships  and 
seamen.  Lloyd  of  Massachusetts  pleaded  earnestly  for  our 
navy,  in  a  speech  of  great  force  and  eloquence.  He  said, 

after  combating  the  war  policy  :  — 

i 

"  If,  however,  the  nation  is  determined  to  fight,  to  make  any 
impression  on  England  we  must  have  a  navy.  Give  us  thirty  swift- 
sailing,  well-appointed  frigates Give  us  this  little  fleet. 

Place  your  navy  department  under  an  able  and  spirited  adminis 
tration,  cashier  every  officer  who  strikes  his  flag,  and  you  will 
soon  have  a  good  account  of  your  navy.  This  may  be  thought  a 
hard  tenure  of  service ;  but,  hard  or  easy,  I  will  engage  in  five 
weeks,  yes,  in  five  days,  to  officer  this  little  fleet  from  New  England 
alone." 

This  was  the  last  despairing  cry  of  the  Federalists,  but 
it  fell  upon  deaf  ears.  We  were  to  fight  for  seamen's 
rights,  but  seamen  were  to  take  no  part ;  we  were  to  con 
test  the  dominion  of  the  seas,  but  only  by  an  invasion  of 
Canada. 

Mr.  Madison's  position  was  most  pitiable.  Sincerely 
anxious  for  peace,  distressed  beyond  measure  at  the  prospect 
of  war,  he  had  not  the  courage  to  hold  out  against  his  own 


1804-15.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  503 

party,  or  to  make  one  more  desperate  effort  to  save  the 
country  from  a  ruinous  conflict.  He  tried  to  remain  a 
passive  spectator,  but  even  this  the  war  faction  would  not 
permit.  He  must  be  their  leader,  he  must  sound  the  trumpet 
of  defiance  ;  the  war  must  be  "  Mr.  Madison's  war."  The 
war  faction  had,  fortunately  for  themselves,  one  irresistible 
argument.  The  election  was  at  hand,  they  had  a  candidate 
ready  to  accept  their  nomination,  and  Mr.  Madison  was 
obliged  to  decide  between  adopting  a  policy  he  abhorred  and 
the  loss  of  the  Presidency.1  He  chose  the  former,  although 
it  was  a  heavy  price  to  pay  for  official  preferment.  He  did 
not  possess  that  strong  moral  courage  which  carried  John 
Adams  through  the  trial  of  1798.  Mr.  Adams  lost  the 
Presidency,  shattered  his  party,  and  saved  the  country  from 
war.  Mr.  Madison  saved  his  office  and  his  party,  and 
precipitated  the  country  into  the  war  of  1812. 

The  first  step,  by  way  of  uniting  the  nation  and  rousing 
its  spirit,  was  of  course  to  lay  a  new  embargo ;  and  soon 
after,  on  June  18th,  war  was  formally  declared.  England 
made  a  last,  unavailing  effort  for  peace :  she  also  allowed 
our  vessels  six  weeks  to  leave  her  ports,  and  the  obnoxious 
orders  in  council  were  soon  after  withdrawn.  We  went  to 
war  nominally  on  account  of  the  orders  in  council,  and  of 
the  English  claim  to  the  right  of  impressment.  The  revo 
cation  of  the  orders  left  the  impressment  question  the  sole 
cause  for  fighting.  It  cannot  be  too  often  insisted  on,  there 
fore,  in  judging  the  war  and  the  war  party,  that  we  fough 
solely  in  defence  of  seamen's  rights,  and  that  those  rights 
were  not  mentioned  by  the  treaty  of  Ghent. 

1  Mr.  Madison's  course  was  very  obscure.  He  favored  peace  strongly 
until  just  at  the  close  of  1811.  See  Writings  of  Madison,  II.  523.  He  then 
shifted  his  ground.  It  was  freely  charged  and  as  freely  denied  that,  just 
before  the  nominating  caucus,  Clay  and  a  delegation  of  the  war  party  waited 
on  the  President,  and  obtained  his  promise  to  declare  war.  An  opposition 
candidate  in  the  person  of  Clinton,  and  perhaps  Monroe,  was  certainly 
ready ;  and  the  inference  is  irresistible  that  Madison  yielded  from  a  fear  of 
losing  the  Presidency,  a  view  which  I  have  never  seen  successfully  con 
troverted.  See  Hildreth,  VI.  289,  298. 


504  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1804-15. 

I  do  not  intend  to  trace  the  events  of  the  war.  It  was  a 
long  succession  of  disasters  on  land  and  victories  at  sea. 
The  grand  schemes  of  conquering  and  fraternizing  in  Canada 
broke  down  in  utter  disgrace,  redeemed  only  by  the  exploits 
of  the  little  Federalist  navy.  Instead  of  wresting  prov 
inces  from  England,  our  disorganized  and  ill-led  troops  were 
thrown  back  on  our  frontier  by  the  arms  of  provincial 
soldiery.  Instead  of  invasion,  the  war  became  one  of  des 
perate  defence ;  and  we  were  compelled  to  see  our  capital 
ruthlessly  pillaged  and  destroyed.  The  ships  that  France 
was  to  furnish  never  came.  Disasters  gathered  around 
Bonaparte ;  and  England,  freed  from  her  great  foe,  showed 
no  desire  to  make  peace  with  a  people  who  had  ever  mani 
fested,  as  she  thought,  the  most  unnatural  French  sympathies. 
All  the  hopes  of  Mr.  Madison  vanished  as  France  sank,  and 
we  were  left  alone  to  cope  with  England.  The  loud  boast 
ings  of  the  war  Democrats  only  served  to  show,  by  their 
utter  non-fulfilment,  the  ignorance  and  incompetence  of  the 
men  who  had  hurried  us  totally  unprepared  into  a  struggle 
which  might  have  been  avoided.  Such  a  war,  as  it  pro 
gressed,  was  not  calculated  to  weaken  or  diminish  the  peace 
party. 

The  Federalists  in  Congress,  in  1812,  published  an 
address  to  their  constituents,  denouncing  the  declaration  of 
war  as  wicked  and  unjustifiable;  and  their  sentiments  were 
largely  shared  by  the  people  of  New  England.  This  feel 
ing  of  hostility  increased  and  deepened  as  the  war  went  on, 
and  was  manifested,  from  the  beginning,  in  the  troubles 
between  the  Eastern  States  and  the  general  government. 
The  quiet  but  determined  resistance  of  the  State  govern 
ments,  on  every  point  where  they  could  interpose  a  legal 
obstacle,  caused  the  administration  to  treat  them  with 
marked  disfavor ;  and  demands  which  were  readily  acceded 
to  in  the  case  of  turbulent  Democratic  States  were  rudely 
refused  to  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut.  No  attempt  at 
conciliation  was  made,  and  the  breach  between  the  Federal- 


1804-16.]  THE  HAETFORD   CONVENTION.  505 

ist  States  and  the  Democratic  administration  widened  daily. 
The  merits  of  their  quarrels  can  be  more  fitly  discussed 
when  the  report  of  the  Hartford  Convention  is  reached,  and 
we  may  therefore  proceed  at  once  to  consider  the  history 
and  composition  of  that  body. 

When  the  Legislature  of  Massachusetts  met  in  1814,  the 
condition  of  affairs,  both  State  and  national,  was  gloomy  in 
the  extreme.  But  their  own  condition  was  the  first  thought 
in  the  minds  of  the  Massachusetts  representatives.  The 
war  had  gone  from  bad  to  worse."|~The  little  navy  which 
had  done  so  much  had  disappeareS.  Our  flag  no  longer 
waved  over  a  single  national  vessel.  The  ravages  of  the 
British  on  our  coasts,  culminating  in  the  destruction  of 
Washington,  were  relieved  only  by  an  occasional  stubborn 
and  successful  defence  of  some  isolated  point.  One  British 
expedition  was  on  its  way  to  New  Orleans,  while  another 
was  preparing  to  attack  the  coast  of  New  England,  whose 
shores,  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  national  troops,  were  left 
utterly  defenceless.  The  national  treasury  was  bankrupt ; 
specie  payments  had  ceased ;  and  the  administration  was 
urging  upon  Congress  the  adoption  of  measures  of  a  dan 
gerous  and  oppressive  character,  in  order  to  recruit  our  army 
and  navy.  The  negotiations,  at  the  last  accounts,  were  most 
unpromising;  and  a  conviction  of  the  insincerity  of  the 
administration  made  men  believe  that  all  efforts  for  peace 
would  be  fruitless.  The  Federalists  were  determined, 
therefore,  to  do  two  things.  They  were  resolved  to  protect 
their  own  shores,  which  the  administration  either  could 
not  or  would  not  defend  from  foreign  invasion ;  and  they 
were  equally  resolved  that  they  would  compel  the  general 
government  to  make  peace.  With  these  objects  in  view, 
they  determined  to  call  a  convention  of  the  New  England 
States,  in  order 

"  To  devise,  if  practicable,  means  of  security  and  defence  which 
may  be  consistent  with  the  preservation  of  their  resources  from 
total  ruin,  and  adapted  to  their  local  situation,  mutual  relations,  and 


506  LIFE   AND  LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.     [1804-15. 

habits,  and  not  repugnant  to  their  obligations  as  members  of  the 
Union."  1 

Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island  responded  to  this  invita 
tion,  and  appointed  delegates  whose  instructions  conformed 
to  the  terms  of  the  Massachusetts  circular.  The  Conven 
tion  assembled  at  Hartford,  Dec.  15,  1814.  There  were 
present  twelve  delegates  from  Massachusetts,  seven  from 
Connecticut,  four  from  Rhode  Island,  and  subsequently 
two  from  New  Hampshire  and  one  from  Vermont,  the  three 
last  representing  local  conventions. 

~  This  was  the  body  which,  according  to  Mr.  Adams,  was  a 
band  of  adroit  conspirators,  residing  in  Boston,  who  misled 
and  deceived  the  people,  had  no  real  popular  support,  rep 
resented  nobody  but  themselves,  and  sought  only  their  own 
advancement  and  the  gratification  of  their  own  ambition. 
Let  us  see  how  nearly  the  Convention  corresponded  in 
character  and  in  fact  with  this  description. 

Among  the  members  of  the  Convention  were  men  who 
had  been  distinguished  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States, 
and  who  had  also  proved  the  confidence  reposed  in  them  by 
their  neighbors  by  the  State  offices  which  many  of  them  had 
held.  Among  them  were  eminent  judges,  able  lawyers,  and 
wealthy  merchants.  They  were  all  men  of  mature  age  and 
wide  experience.  Many  of  them  had  served  the  country 
during  the  administrations  of  Washington  and  Adams,  while 
all  were  of  high  social  position,  and  had  much  at  stake  in 
the  well-being  of  the  country.  Honored  by  public  trusts, 
they  were  all  respected  by  the  communities  in  which  they 
lived  for  their  private  lives  and  characters.  The  Hartford 
Convention  was  eminently  a  conservative,  honorable,  re 
spectable,  and  experienced  body,  when  tried  by  the  charac 
ters  of  its  members ;  and  this  is  certainly  not  the  material 
from  which  conspirators  and  revolutionists  are  usually 
made. 

The  leaders  of  the  Convention  undoubtedly  came  from 

1  The  italics  are  my  own. 


1804-15.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  507 

the  metropolis  of  New  England,  but  the  members  repre 
sented  all  sections  in  their  several  States.  If  this  body  did 
not  fairly  represent  a  portion  of  the  people  of  New  Eng 
land,  for  the  sake  of  the  latter,  it  is  to  be  much  regretted. 
But  such  was  not  the  case,  for  they  represented  a  majority  of 
the  people  of  their  respective  States ;  and  to  say  that  under 
our  system  a  convention  of  this  sort  could  meet,  if  disap 
proved  by  the  people  at  large,  is  of  itself  a  gross  absurd 
ity.  The  assertion  arises  from  the  natural  inconsistency 
which  leads  an  opponent  not  only  to  savagely  attack  his 
enemy,  but  to  insist  that  that  enemy  is  of  no  importance, 
and  one  to  whose  actions  the  world  is  wholly  indifferent. 
The  assailant  in  such  cases  rarely  perceives  that  the  sever 
ity  of  the  attack  is  of  itself  proof  of  the  magnitude  of  the 
object  assailed.  But  the  exact  position  of  the  Convention 
in  this  respect  can  be  shown  in  a  moment  by  an  analy 
sis  of  the  popular  vote  for  governor  at  the  preceding  elec 
tions.  In  the  year  1812,  Governor  Strong,  the  Federalist 
candidate,  was  chosen  by  a  slender  majority  of  1,370  votes. 
The  next  year  Strong's  majority  was  13,974 ;  and  in  1814, 
although  the  Democratic  candidate  was  the  distinguished 
Federalist,  Samuel  Dexter,  Strong  received  a  majority  of 
10,421.  The  resolution  ordering  the  Convention  passed 
the  House  in  the  Massachusetts  Legislature  by  a  vote  of 
260  to  90,  and  the  delegates  were  afterwards  chosen  by  the 
Houses  in  convention  by  a  vote  of  226  to  67. l  In  Connecti 
cut,  of  course,  the  Federalist  and  Convention  majority  was 
much  larger.  In  the  face  of  these  simple  figures,  the  charge 
Hhat  the  Hartford  Convention  represented  nobody  drops  to 
the  ground.  They  represented  their  respective  States  and 
a  large  majority  of  the  people  in  those  States,  and  their 
actions  were  the  actions  of  the  States  and  of  the  people  of 

1  The  total  vote  only  represents  about  half  the  members  of  the  Legisla 
ture.  If  all  had  been  present,  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  rela 
tions  between  the  votes  of  the  majority  and  minority  would  have  been 
altered.  The  Federal  majority  was  very  large. 


503  LIFE  AND   LETTEES   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1804-15. 

the  States.  Mr.  Adarns  was  particularly  excited  on  this 
point,  because  Mr.  Otis  had  claimed  that  the  Convention 
represented  all  the  virtue  and  intelligence  of  New  England. 
Such  a  claim  is  manifestly  absurd  in  behalf  of  any  political 
party.  But  it  has  led  Mr.  Adams  into  a  glowing  account 
of  the  size  and  virtue  of  the  Republican  minority  in  Mas 
sachusetts  in  1814,  and  also  into  an  eloquent  defence  of 
minority  rights.  Such  rights  need  defence.  But,  if  the 
Federalists  dragged  their  States  and  large  numbers  of  their 
reluctant  fellow-citizens  into  the  Hartford  Convention  by 
means  of  a  numerical  majority,  how  did  Mr.  Madison  in 
volve  the  country  in  war,  bankruptcy,  and  danger  of  disso 
lution,  if  not  by  a  tyrannical  majority.  If  the  voice  of  the 
majority  was  the  voice  of  God  at  Washington,  why  by  par 
ity  of  reasoning  was  it  not  the  divine  command  in  Massa 
chusetts  ?  In  the  one  case,  Mr.  Adams  represents  that  the 
Federalists  behaved  with  high-handed  and  flagrant  disre 
gard  of  the  rights  of  the  minority  ;  while,  in  the  other, 
the  minority  not  only  had  no  rights,  but  their  opinions 
in  favor  of  peace  were  gross  treachery  to  their  country. 
There  would  seem  to  be  a  rule  here  which  does  not  work 
both  ways ;  and  I  introduce  this  instance,  in  order  to  show 
the  arbitrary  laws  of  criticism  by  which  it  has  been  cus 
tomary  to  try  the  Hartford  Convention. 

Having  considered  whom  the  Hartford  Convention  rep 
resented,  we  can  now  discuss  its  objects  and  intentions. 
These  according  to  Mr.  Adams  were  to  gratify  the  ambition 
of  certain  leaders  by  carrying  through  the  never-abandoned 
plan  of  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  Mr.  Adams  sustains 
his  view  by  a  long  and  ingenious  interpretation  of  the  re 
port.  I  shall  content  myself  here  with  stating  the  essential 
points  in  the  report,  and  by  giving  all  the  external  evidence 
I  have  been  able  to  collect  as  to  the  objects  and  intentions 
of  the  Convention  and  its  members.  But  first  a  word  may 
be  said  as  to  the  journal  of  the  Convention.  Mr.  Adams 
intimates,  and  it  has  been  freely  charged  elsewhere,  that  this 


1804-15.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  509 

journal  was  not  a  full  account  of  the  proceedings  it  pro 
fessed  to  record.  The  testimony  on  this  point  is  direct  and 
simple.  When  the  document  was  deposited  in  the  Secre 
tary's  office  in  Boston,  it  was  accompanied  by  a  certificate 
as  follows :  — 

I,  George  Cabot,  late  President  of  the  Convention  assembled 
at  Hartford  on  the  fifteenth  day  of  December,  1814,  do  hereby 
certify  that  the  foregoing  is  the  original  and  only  journal  of  the 
proceedings  of  that  Convention ;  and  that  the  twenty-seven  written 
pages  which  compose  it,  and  the  printed  report,  comprise  a  faith 
ful  and  complete  record  of  all  the  motions,  resolutions,  votes,  and 
proceedings  of  that  Convention.  And  I  do  further  certify  that  this 
journal  has  been  constantly  in  my  exclusive  custody,  from  the  time 
of  the  adjournment  of  the  Convention  to  the  delivery  of  it  into  the 
office  of  the  Secretary  of  this  Commonwealth. 

(Signed)  GEORGE  CABOT.1 

BOSTON,  Nov.  16,  1819. 

In  1831,  Roger  Minot  Sherman  testified  in  a  libel  case, 
of  course  under  oath,  that,  — 

"  There  was  not,  to  the  best  of  his  recollection,  a  single  motion, 
resolution,  or  subject  of  debate,  but  what  appears  in  the  journal." 

And  he  said  further,  — 

"  I  believe  I  know  their  proceedings  perfectly,  and  that  every 
measure,  done  or  proposed,  has  been  published  to  the  world."  2 

The  third  witness  is  Theodore  Dwight,  the  Secretary  of 
the  Convention,  the  only  person,  not  a  member,  who  was 
present  during  the  debates ;  and  he  says :  — 

"In  the  most  positive  and  unhesitating  manner,  and  with  all 
the  solemnity  which  the  nature  of  the  case  requires,  that  the  Jour 
nal  and  the  Report  of  the  Convention  contain  a  full,  complete,  and 
specific  account  of  all  the  motions,  votes,  and  proceedings  of  the 
Convention" 

1  See  Dwight's  History  of  the  Hartford  Convention,  p.  398. 

2  See  Goodrich's  Recollections  of  a  Lifetime,  II.  26-28,  where  Mr.  Sher- 
man's  testimony  is  given  in  full ;  also,  ibid.,  pp.  19-24,  for  the  testimony  of 
Noah  Webster  on  this  point,  and  for  the  letters  of  Joseph  Lyman  as  to  the 
preliminary  county  convention  at  Northampton,  Mass. 


510  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE    CABOT.      [1804-15- 

And  he  adds  :  — 

"  That  no  proposition  was  made  in  the  Convention  to  divide  the 
Union,  to  organize  the  New  England  States  into  a  separate  govern 
ment,  or  to  form  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain,  or  any  other  for 
eign  power.  On  the  contrary,  every  motion  that  was  made,  every 
resolution  that  was  offered,  and  every  measure  that  was  adopted, 
was,  in  principle  and  in  terms,  strictly  confined  within  the  limits  of 
the  instructions  from  the  several  legislatures  by  whom  the  delegates 
were  appointed."  1 

The  letters  of  Mr.  H.  G.  Otis  on  the  Hartford  Conven 
tion  substantiate  this  testimony.2  The  names  of  the  per 
sons  who  offered  motions  are  not  given,  nor  are  the  debates 
reported  in  the  journal.  No  journal  of  parliamentary  pro 
ceedings,  strictly  speaking,  ever  contains  debates ;  and  the 
full  reporting  of  the  present  day  was  then  almost  unknown. 
The  omission  of  the  names  of  those  offering  motions  is  per 
fectly  trivial.  Rumor  had  it  that  Mr.  Otis  made  the  first 
motion  for  a  committee,  after  they  had  organized,  by  choosing 
Mr.  Cabot  as  President,  and  Mr.  Dwight  as  Secretary.  But 
there  is  nothing  to  be  gained  by  knowing  that  Mr.  Otis 
offered  one  motion,  or  Mr.  Dane  another.  And  when  the 
names  of  all  those  who  served  on  committees,  and  drew  the 
reports  which  guided  the  Convention,  are  given,  it  is  still 
more  preposterous  to  call  the  omission  of  the  authors  of 
motions  "  suppression."  There  can  be  no  suppression  of 
knowledge,  useless  in  itself,  and  rendered  still  more  value 
less  by  the  publication  of  all  matters  of  real  importance. 
The  journal  must  be  accepted  on  the  testimony  of  three 
men  of  unquestioned  integrity  to  be  a  full  and  complete 
record  of  proceedings.3  From  the  loss  of  the  debates,  we 

1  See  History  of  Hartford  Convention,  p.  405. 

2  See  Otis's  Letters  in  Defence  of  the  Hartford  Convention,  Boston,  1824 ; 
and  Letters  by  one  of  the  Convention,  Washington,  1820. 

8  The  journal  deposited  in  the  State  archives  by  Mr.  Cabot  is  now  in 
the  possession  of  the  Hon.  Charles  Francis  Adams.  It  was,  I  believe,  pre 
sented  to  Mr.  John  Quincy  Adams  by  Governor  Eustis.  A  patriotic  Demo 
cratic  House  expunged  the  Hartford  Convention  resolutions  from  the  journals 
of  their  predecessors,  and  cast  out  the  report  from  among  their  archives.  One 


1804-15.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  511 

are  unable  to  sift  out  individual  opinions ;  but  we  can  hold 
each  and  every  member  responsible  for  the  utterances  of 
the  whole,  and  an  analysis  of  the  report  will  give  us  the 

official  declaration  of  the  views  of  the  Convention. 

\s 

The  report  begins  as  follows :  — 

"  The  Convention  is  deeply  impressed  with  a  sense  of  the  ardu 
ous  nature  of  the  commission  which  they  were  appointed  to  exe 
cute, —  of  devising  the  means  of  defence  against  dangers,  and  of  relief 
from  oppressions  proceeding  from  the  acts  of  their  own  government, 
without  violating  constitutional  principles,  or  disappointing  the 
hopes  of  a  suffering  and  injured  people.  To  prescribe  patience 
and  firmness  to  those  who  are  already  exhausted  by  distress  is 
sometimes  to  drive  them  to  despair,  and  the  progress  towards  re 
form  by  the  regular  road  is  irksome  to  those  whose  imaginations 
discern  and  whose  feelings  prompt  to  a  shorter  course.  .  .  . 

"  It  is  a  truth  not  to  be  concealed  that  a  sentiment  prevails  to 
no  inconsiderable  extent,  that  administration  have  given  such  con 
structions  to  that  instrument  [the  Constitution],  and  practised  so 
many  abuses  under  color-of  its  authority,  that  the  time  for  a  change 
is  at  hand.  Those  who  so  believe  regard  the  evils  which  surround 
them  as  intrinsic  and  incurable  defects  in  the  Constitution.  They 
yield  to  a  persuasion  that  no  change  at  any  time,  or  on  any  occa 
sion,  can  aggravate  the  misery  of  their  country.  This  opinion  may 
ultimately  prove  to  be  correct ;  but  as  the  evidence  on  which  it 
rests  is  not  yet  conclusive,  and  as  measures  adopted  upon  the  as 
sumption  of  its  certainty  might  be  irrevocable,  some  general  con 
siderations  are  submitted,  in  the  hope  of  reconciling  all  to  a  course 
of  moderation  and  firmness  which  may  save  them  from  the  regret 
incident  to  sudden  decisions,  probably  avert  the  evil,  or  at  least 
insure  consolation  and  success  in  the  last  resort." 

The  prosperity  of  the  country  under  Washington  and 
Adams  is  then  described  in  the  report  as  a  proof  of  the 

is  irresistibly  reminded  of  the  revenge  of  Charles  Stuart,  when  he  hung  the 
skeletons  of  Cromwell,  Ireton,  and  Bradshaw  in  chains,  affixed  their  heads 
to  Temple  Bar,  and  flung  the  bones  of  Robert  Blake  upon  a  dung-heap.  The 
different  degree  of  ferocity  in  the  two  cases  corresponds  with  the  difference 
in  time ;  but  all  such  incidents  alike  reveal  in  a  deplorable  fashion  the  petti- 
ness  and  impotence  of  party  malice. 


512  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE  CABOT.     [1804-15. 

intrinsic  worth  of  the  Constitution,  while  the  evils  which 
followed  after  the  first  administrations  are  forcibly  repre 
sented.  The  paragraph  concludes:  — 

"  But  to  attempt  upon  every  abuse  of  power  to  change  the  Con 
stitution  would  be  to  perpetuate  the  evils  of  revolution." 

The  power  of  recovery,  the  vigor  of  constitutional  prin 
ciples,  and  the  growing  change  in  public  opinion  are 
pointed  out  as  arguments  against  extreme  measures,  and 
this  portion  of  the  report  then  concludes  as  follows :  — 

"  Finally,  if  the  Union  be  destined  to  dissolution  by  reason  of 
the  multiplied  abuses  of  bad  administrations,  it  should,  if  possible, 
be  the  work  of  peaceable  times  and  deliberate  consent.  Some  new 
form  of  confederacy  should  be  substituted  among  those  States 
which  shall  intend  to  maintain  a  federal  relation  to  each  other. 
Events  may  prove  that  the  causes  of  our  calamities  are  deep  and 
permanent.  They  may  be  found  to  proceed,  not  merely  from  the 
blindness  of  prejudice,  pride  of  opinion,  violence  of  party  spirit,  or 
the  confusion  of  the  times ;  but  they  may  be  traced  to  implacable 
combinations  of  individuals  or  of  States  to  monopolize  power  and 
office,  and  to  trample  without  remorse  upon  the  rights  and  interests 
of  commercial  sections  of  the  Union.  Whenever  it  shall  appear 
that  these  causes  are  radical  and  permanent,  a  separation  by  equi 
table  arrangement  will  be  preferable  to  an  alliance  by  constraint 
among  nominal  friends,  but  real  enemies,  inflamed  by  mutual 
hatred  and  jealousy,  and  inviting  by  intestine  divisions  contempt 
and  aggression  from  abroad.  But  a  severance  of  the  Union  by 
one  or  more  States,  against  the  will  of  the  rest,  and  especially  in 
time  of  war,  can  be  justified  only  by  absolute  necessity.  These 
are  among  the  principal  objections  against  precipitate  measures 
tending  to  disunite  the  States ;  and,  when  examined  in  connection 
with  the  farewell  address  of  the  Father  of  his  Country,  they  must, 
it  is  believed,  be  deemed  conclusive." 

The  report  then  took  up  those  subjects  which  in  the 
opinion  of  the  Convention  were  most  pressing,  and  required 
the  most  immediate  remedies.  These  were  the  authority 
claimed  by  the  administration  and  Congress  over  the  mili 
tia,  and  the  defenceless  condition  of  the  Eastern  States. 


1804-15.]  THE  HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  513 

Under  the  first  head,  they  began  by  an  examination  of  the 
claim  of  the  President  to  be  the  sole  judge  as  to  the  exi 
gency  of  calling  out  the  militia.  1  In  order  to  understand 
this  question,  it  will  be  necessary  to  trace  briefly  the  diffi 
culties  which  had  arisen  during  the  war  between  Massa 
chusetts  and  Connecticut  and  the  general  government. 

Governor  Strong  had  declined  to  obey  the  first  call  for 
militia  in  1812,  and  had  rested  his  refusal  on  two  grounds : 
that  he,  as  governor  of  the  State,  was  judge  of  the  exigency, 
and  not  the  President ;  and  that  the  States  had  the  right  to 
officer  their  militia,  a  right  invaded  in  his  opinion  by  the 
general  government.  Governor  Griswold  refused  the  Con 
necticut  militia  only  on  the  latter  ground.  Governor 
Strong  referred  both  points  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  Mas 
sachusetts ;  and  the  opinion  given  and  signed  by  Parsons, 
Parker,  and  Sewall  confirmed  his  action.1  The  Legislature 
and  the  popular  voice  concurred  with  the  judges ;  and  the 
Convention  now  took  the  same  ground  in  their  report. 
That  this  was  a  blunder,  politically,  is  obvious  enough ; 
but  a  grave  legal  error  was  also  involved  in  these  opinions. 
No  argument  is  required  to  show  that,  if  every  governor 
were  sole  judge  as  to  the  exigency  for  troops,  anarchy 
would  exist  whenever  there  was  war,  foreign  or  domestic, 
and  that  the  central  power  would  be  helpless.  If  such 
an  interpretation  were  acted  on,  one  of  the  main  objects 
of  the  Constitution,  "  to  provide  for  the  common  defence," 
would  be  frustrated.  To  give  the  general  government  the 
exclusive  power  of  declaring  war,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
take  away  the  means  of  carrying  on  such  war,  is  an  abso 
lute  contradiction  in  terms.  Unfortunately,  the  question 
did  not  come  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  until  1827,  when  it  was  decided  that  the  President 
was  the  sole  judge  of  the  exigency  for  calling  out  the 
militia.2  If  a  United  States  court  had  so  decided  in  1812, 

1  8  Mass.  Reports,  Appendix. 

2  Martin  v.  Mott,  12  Wheaton,  19. 

33 


514  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1804-15. 

there  can  be  little  doubt  that  New  England  would  have 
submitted,  as  she  did  to  the  embargo  decision  in  1808.1 
We  may  fairly  acquit  the  governor,  the  Convention,  the 
Legislature,  and  the  people  of  any  illegal  action,  supported 
as  they  were  by  the  highest  legal  authority  of  the  State ; 
but  we  cannot  so  easily  acquit  the  judges.  Three  able  law 
yers  could  hardly  take  so  strange  a  view  of  so  very  simple 
a  constitutional  question  without  undue  partisanship. 

On  the  second  point,  as  to  officering  the  militia,  the 
court  and  the  governor  were  correct.  The  Constitution 
expressly  reserves  this  right  to  the  States  ;  and  the  admin 
istration  had,  in  attempting  to  place  State  militia  under 
the  command  of  subordinate  officers  of  the  regular  army, 
unquestionably  violated  its  provisions.  This  view  is  that  of 
Mr,  Justice  Johnson  and  Mr.  Justice  Story,  who  confirmed 
the  opinion  of  the  Massachusetts  judges,  by  saying  that  the 
right  to  officer  their  own  militia  was  one  of  the  checks  on 
the  general  government  reserved  by  the  States.2 

The  report  of  the  Convention,  after  dealing  with  these 
two  principal  questions,  proceeds  with  a  brief  consideration 
of  certain  others  of  a  similar  nature.  These  were  the 
classification  of  the  militia,  the  forcible  drafting  of  militia 
as  such  into  the  regular  army,  and  the  enlistment  of  minors. 
The  two  first  were  recommendations  of  the  Secretary  of 
War,  the  third  had  become  law.  The  Convention,  after 
elaborate  examination,  concluded  that  all  three  measures 
were  unconstitutional. 

While  the  Convention  were  clearly  wrong  on  the  first  two 
points,  they  were  probably  in  the  right  as  to  the  third ;  but 
none  of  them  are  of  sufficient  importance  to  require  discus 
sion  now,  since  they  do  not  illustrate  the  views  of  the 
Convention  on  the  vital  question  of  the  rights  of  States. 

The  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  which  advised 
impressment,  was  next  touched  upon,  and  the  inconsistency 

1  Story  on  the  Const,  1st  ed.,  III.  162 ;  and  United  States  v.  Brig  William, 
2  Hall's  Law  Journal,  256. 

2  Houston  v.  Moore,  5  Wheaton,  1. 


1804-15.]  THE   HAKTFORD   CONVENTION".  515 

involved  in  supporting  such  a  war  by  such  means  was 
pointed  out.  The  unconstitutionality  of  all  these  acts  was 
then  reviewed  in  general  terms ;  and  the  duty  of  the  States 
to  protest  against  them,  as  unconstitutional  and  void,  was 
declared. 

The  next  subject  was  the  common  defence,  declared  to 
be  the  principal  object  of  the  Convention.  The  conduct 
of  the  war  was  first  reviewed.  All  the  disasters  we  had  en 
dured  were  set  forth ;  and  the  defenceless  condition  of  New 
England,  impoverished  as  she  was  by  the  embargo,  was 
strongly  described.  The  report  argued  that  New  England 
could  not  pay  taxes  for  a  defence  which  was  not  given  her, 
nor  pay  two  sets  of  taxes,  national  and  State,  both  for  de 
fence  and  equally  heavy.  As  a  solution  of  this  difficulty, 
the  Convention  proposed  that  — 

"  These  States  be  allowed  to  assume  their  own  defence  by  the 
militia  or  other  troops.  A  reasonable  portion,  also,  of  the  taxes 
raised  in  each  State,  might  be  paid  into  its  treasury,  and  credited  to 
the  United  States,  but  to  be  appropriated  to  the  defence  of  such 
State,  to  be  accounted  for  with  the  United  States." 

The  remainder  of  the  report  was  devoted  to  a  comparison 
between  the  state  of  the  nation  under  the  first  two  admin 
istrations  and  under  the  last  two,  leading  up  to  an  argu 
ment  in  support  of  certain  amendments  to  the  Constitution. 

The  first  three  of  the  resolutions  adopted  recommend 
to  the  Legislatures  of  the  States  represented  in  the  Conven 
tion  that  they  should  take  proper  measures  to  protect  the 
people  against  the  unconstitutional  action  of  the  adminis 
tration  in  regard  to  the  militia,  that  they  should  endeavor 
to  make  the  financial  arrangement  proposed  by  the  Conven 
tion  with  the  general  government,  and  that  they  should 
provide  for  the  common  defence. 

The  fourth  resolution  recommends  the  Legislatures  to 
urge  upon  the  general  government  seven  amendments  to 
the  Constitution :  1.  To  do  away  with  slave  representa 
tion  ;  2.  That  no  new  State  should  be  admitted  without 


516  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1804-15. 

a  two-thirds  vote ;  3  and  4.  That  Congress  should  not  be 
allowed  to  lay  an  embargo  for  more  than  sixty  days,  and 
that,  to  interdict  commerce,  a  two-thirds  vote  should  be  re 
quired  ;  l  5.  That  a  two-thirds  vote  should  be  required  to 
declare  war ;  6.  That  no  person,  except  a  native-born 
citizen,  should  be  eligible  for  any  office ;  7.  That  the  Presi 
dent  should  be  eligible  for  only  one  term.  There  is  no 
need  to  discuss  the  merits,  or  the  reasonableness  of  the 
amendments  here  suggested.  The  first  has  been  settled, 
others  have  ceased  to  have  either  interest  or  importance, 
while  one  at  least  is  still  agitated.  The  very  fact  that  the 
Convention  suggested  them  showed  clearly  enough  that 
they  still  respected  and  adhered  to  the  Constitution ;  and 
it  was  their  obvious  right,  as  it  is  that  of  all  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  to  offer  any  amendments  they  may  see  fit  to 
that  famous  instrument. 

Mr.  Adams,  with  great  diligence  and  ingenuity,  has 
looked  between  the  lines  of  this  report  to  find  proof  not 
only  of  the  treasonable  intentions  of  the  authors,  but  also 
of  their  duplicity  in  expressing  their  views.  To  me  this 
seems  labor  misspent.  The  men  who  went  to  Hartford 
had  the  courage  of  their  opinions  as  entirely  as  Mr.  Adams, 
and  they  expressed  themselves  with  moderation,  but  with 
plainness.  He  who  runs  may  read  in  the  report,  not  only 
the  objects  of  the  Convention,  but  the  reasons  for  its  assem 
blage.  A  majority  of  the  people  in  the  States  represented 
at  Hartford  knew  themselves  to  be  defenceless  against  the 
attacks  of  a  wanton  enemy ;  they  attributed  their  suffer 
ings  past  and  present  to  a  hostile  administration,  bent  on  their 
political  effacement ;  and  they  believed  the  war  to  be  both 
unjustifiable  and  wicked.  Under  these  circumstances,  they 
determined  to  take  measures  for  self-preservation  ;  and  they 
were  resolved  to  force  the  administration  to  make  peace. 
The  separatist  feeling  was  very  strong  at  that  moment  in 

1  The  two-thirds  vote  to  interdict  commerce  was  one  of  the  burning  ques 
tions  in  the  Constitutional  Convention  where  it  was  stubbornly  supported  by 
the  South.  "  Tempora  mutantur  et  nos  mutamur  in  illis." 


1804-15.]  THE  HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  517 

New  England,  and  the  extremists  urged  violent  measures. 
Indeed  a  dissolution  was  openly  desired  by  the  radical  wing 
of  the  party,  and  demands  for  a  separate  peace  had  appeared 
in  the  newspapers.  In  this  state  of  affairs,  the  Federalists 
determined  to  call  the  Convention  at  Hartford.  Mr.  Adams 
says  their  real  object  was  the  dissolution  of  the  Union, 
and  that  this  was  the  first  step  in  that  direction.  Mr. 
Otis,  on  the  other  hand,  claims  that  the  object  of  the  Con 
vention  was  the  preservation  of  the  Union.  There  is  truth 
in  both  statements,  wholly  incompatible  as  they  may  ap 
pear.  The  most  distinguished  of  foreign  writers  upon  our 
history  has  remarked  on  the  strange  mental  confusion 
which  has  always  existed  in  this  country  among  those  who 
at  any  time  discussed  or  advocated  schemes  of  secession. 
The  same  authority  has  also  pointed  out  that  though  Amer 
icans  have  always  been  extremely  quick  to  invoke  the  rights 
of  States  in  opposition  to  the  general  government,  though 
they  were  always  ready  to  go  to  the  very  edge  of  dissolution, 
they  were  very  slow  and  cautious  in  committing  any  overt 
act.1  These  observations  apply  with  singular  aptness  to 
the  Hartford  Convention.  That  Convention  was  the  expo 
nent  and  result  of  a  strong  separatist  feeling.  The  bare 
fact  of  its  existence  proved  the  strength  of  the  separatist 
forces  at  work  in  the  community.  Yet  the  men  who  went 
to  Hartford  used  these  separatist  forces  to  maintain  the 
Union.  In  short,  they  said  plainly  to  the  general  govern 
ment,  "  unless  you  alter  your  present  policy,  a  dissolution  of 
the  Union  will  ensue."  They  intended  to  coerce  the  admin 
istration  by  threatening  them  with  separation.  If  their 
threat  was  attended  to,  the  Union  would  be  saved ;  if  not, 
it  is  mere  conjecture  whether  the  Federalists  would  have 
pushed  matters  to  extremity.  They  were  determined  men, 
and  much  in  earnest;  and  the  worst  might  have  been 
feared.  Fortunately,  events  made  all  such  threats  and 
their  fulfilment  alike  unnecessary.  Yet  the  policy  of  the 

1  Yon  Hoist,  Constitutional  History  of  the  United  States,  pp.  64,  65,  77. 


518  LIFE   AND  LETTEKS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1804-15. 

Convention  was  one  of  delay ;  and  they  might  and  probably 
would,  if  there  had  been  occasion,  have  protracted  still 
further  any  thing  like  open  resistance.  One  of  their  chief 
objects  was  to  control  and  restrain  the  more  violent  mem 
bers  of  their  own  party.  For  while  the  threat  of  separation 
is  clearly  expressed  in  the  report,  and  the  existence  of  the 
separatist  feeling  is  recognized  in  plain  terms,  the  wish  for 
an  immediate  movement  in  that  direction  is  deprecated  and 
rejected.  This  plain  and  obvious  meaning  of  the  report  is 
borne  out  by  other  testimony,  which  serves  to  show  that 
one,  if  not  the  principal,  object  of  the  Convention  was  to 
prevent  violent  measures.  The  wiser  Federalists  had  to 
choose  between  controlling  and  directing  the  movement 
themselves,  or  allowing  the  extreme  partisans  to  precipitate 
a  dissolution  of  the  Union  and  possible  civil  war.  With 
great  good  sense,  they  adopted  the  former  alternative,  and 
thus  saved  the  country  from  two  imminent  dangers. 
Mr.  Edmund  Quincy  says  in  his  Life  of  his  father :  — 

"  The  Legislature  were  very  careful  to  choose  men  of  known 
moderation  of  views  and  tried  discretion  of  conduct.  It  was  for 
this  reason  my  father  believed  and  said  that  he  was  passed  by  on 
that  occasion.  The  prudent  Federalists,  when  called  upon  to  face 
this  emergency,  were  afraid  of  his  impetuous  temperament  and 
fiery  earnestness.  They  dreaded  lest  he  might  express  too  well 
the  spirit  of  those  whose  urgency  extorted  the  Convention. 

"  He  [Mr.  Quincy]  always  spoke  of  the  Hartford  Convention  as 
a  tub  to  the  whale,  as  a  dilatory  measure  to  amuse  the  malcontents, 
and  keep  them  quiet  under  inaction,  until  events  might  make 
action  unnecessary."  l 

To  appreciate  the  full  force  of  this  rejection,  it  must  be 
recollected  that  Mr.  Quincy  was  one  of  the  most  prominent 
men  in  the  party,  the  last  great  and  eloquent  leader  of  the 
Federalists  in  Congress. 

The  same  object  is  mentioned  by  Mr.  Otis,  in  his  letters 
on  the  Convention.2 

1  Quincy's  Life  of  Josiah  Quincy,  p.  357,  et  seq.        2  See  above,  p.  510. 


1804-15.J  THE  HAKTFOKD   CONVENTION.  519 

From  the  letters  of  Mr.  Lowell  and  Colonel  Pickering, 
given  in  the  next  chapter,  especially  from  those  descriptive 
of  the  members  of  the  Convention,  it  will  be  perceived  that 
they  disapproved  the  selection  of  delegates.  Both  these 
gentlemen  held  extreme  views,  and  they  considered  the 
delegates  too  moderate  and  conservative  in  character  to  act 
with  sufficient  vigor.  They  mistrusted  their  readiness  to 
take  any  decisive  steps.  This  is  especially  noticeable  in 
the  expressions  they  use  concerning  Mr.  Cabot,  the  recog 
nized  head  of  the  Convention.  Despite  their  friendship  and 
admiration  for  him  personally,  they  regarded  him  as  too 
prudent  and  too  despondent  a  man  for  this  emergency. 
Mr.  Lowell  says,  "  I  have  been  unable  to  discover  what 
Mr.  Cabot's  views  are."  Mr.  Cabot's  opinions  were  un 
changed.  He  believed  now,  as  in  1804,  that,  while  a  dis 
solution  might  and  ultimately  probably  would  take  place, 
and  be  perhaps  accompanied  with  important  advantages,  that 
schemes  for  that  object  were  both  useless  and  impracticable. 
With  the  greatest  reluctance,  and  only  from  a  high  sense  of 
responsibility  toward  his  party  and  his  State,  did  he  accept 
the  position  at  the  head  of  the  Massachusetts  delegation. 
An  anecdote  preserves  the  evidence  of  Mr.  Cabot's  prin 
cipal  object  in  going  to  Hartford.  He  was  accompanied 
from  his  house  to  the  Hartford  stage-coach  by  the  late  Dr. 
James  Jackson,  of  Boston,  at  that  time  of  course  a  young 
man.  Dr.  Jackson  inquired  what  they  intended  to  do 
at  Hartford  ;  to  which  Mr.  Cabot  replied,  "  We  are  going  to 
keep  you  young  hot-heads  from  getting  into  mischief."1  If 
any  further  proof  is  needed  to  show  that  the  Hartford 
Convention  was  not  intended  to  dissolve  the  Union,  let  it 
be  remembered  that  the  instructions  of  the  Legislatures 
expressly  forbade  the  delegates  to  do  any  thing  repugnant 
to  the  relations  of  the  States  to  the  Union. 

One  other  object  was  prominent  among  those  of  the  Con 
vention, —  to  defend  themselves  from  invasion.  For  this 
they  made  provision,  by  advising  the  Legislatures  to  ask 

1  This  was  the  object  also  of  Mr.  Dane,  as  appears,  by  the  letter  from 
Hon.  R.  C.  Winthrop,  given  in  the  Appendix,  No.  II. 


520  LIFE   AND    LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1804-15. 

permission  from  the  general  government  to  devote  the  taxes 
to  their  own  defence.  This  deference  is  hardly  consistent 
with  an  immediate  desire  to  dissolve  the  Union  or  to  make  a 
separate  peace.  The  same  request  had  been  granted  to  other 
States,  and  it  was  therefore  both  natural  and  proper.  If  we 
add  to  this  the  evidence  of  the  secretary,  that  "  no  proposition 
was  made  in  the  Convention  to  divide  the  Union,  to  organize 
the  New  England  States  into  a  separate  government,  or  to 
form  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain  or  any  other  foreign 
power,"  we  may  fairly  conclude  that  the  objects  and  inten 
tions  of  the  Convention  were  what  its  reports,  its  members, 
and  its  secretary  declared  them  to  be,  and  not  what  Mr. 
Adams  or  the  Democratic  party  chose  to  think  they  were. 

But  two  points  remain  to  be  considered,  the  unconsti- 
tutionality  of  the  Convention  and  its  unexampled  character. 
The  Hartford  Convention  adopted  and  favored  the  doctrine 
of  Jefferson  and  Madison,  that  the  States  had  a  right  to  nul 
lify  laws  of  the  United  States  which  were  in  their  opinion 
unconstitutional.  We  must  remember  that  this  question 
was  then  an  open  one,  although  it  struck  at  the  very  existence 
of  the  central  government.  Nullification  was,  of  course,  the 
most  effective  weapon  with  which  the  States  could  make 
1  a  constitutional  resistance  to  the  general  government;  and 
it  was  therefore  generally  adopted,  not  only  by  the  Hart 
ford  Convention,  but  by  all  the  Southern  States  at  different 
times.  There  can  now  be  no  question  of  the  unconstitu 
tionally  of  the  nullification  doctrine  ;  but  it  was  not  settled 
in  1814,  nor  for  many  years  after.  But  the  great  point 
against  the  Hartford  Convention  has  always  been  that  it 
consisted  of  representatives  from  several  States  ;  and  this, 
it  has  been  argued,  was  in  itself  a  direct  violation  of  an 
express  provision  of  the  Constitution.  In  dealing  with  this 
question,  we  should  not  forget  that  some  of  New  England's 
most  distinguished  lawyers  were  not  only  concerned  in  get 
ting  up  the  Convention,  but  also  served  in  it  as  delegates. 
These  men  were  as  well  versed  in  the  Constitution  as  any 


1804-15.]  THE  HAETFOKD   CONVENTION.  521 

men  of  their  time,  and  it  is  not  to  be  hastily  supposed  that 
they  would  have  unnecessarily  violated  an  express  constitu 
tional  provision.  The  clause  in  question  says  that  no  State 
shall  enter  into  any  "  agreement  or  compact "  with  any 
other  State,  without  the  consent  of  the  United  States.  The 
whole  question  turns  upon  the  two  words  in  quotation 
marks.  If,  by  the  Hartford  Convention,  certain  States  en 
tered  into  an  "  agreement  or  compact,"  they  violated  the 
Constitution  in  so  doing.  But  they  did  nothing  of  the 
kind.  The  delegates  were  appointed  to  "  confer  with  each 
other,  and  devise  means  for  their  common  defence."  They 
were  to  pave  the  way  for  a  possible  future  "  agreement  or 
compact,"  but  they  were  to  make  none  themselves.  The 
States  are  not  forbidden  to  confer  and  offer  recommenda 
tions  to  their  several  Legislatures,  and  this  has  been  done 
in  several  instances  by  commissioners.  Moreover,  there 
must  be  some  binding  force  in  order  to  make  an  agreement 
or  compact,  and  here  there  was  none.  No  State  was  in 
any  way  bound  by  any  thing  said  or  done  at  Hartford ;  and 
this,  of  itself,  shows  the  non-existence  of  any  "  agreement  or 
compact."  The  authority  intrusted  to  the  President  to  call 
the  Convention  together  again  could  not  alter  the  character 
of  the  body  as  at  first  appointed.  They  had  power  merely 
to  recommend  to  their  several  Legislatures,  who  might 
accept  or  reject  their  recommendations  as  they  pleased. 
The  States  were  at  full  liberty  to  confer.  This  was  all 
that  was  done  at  Hartford,  and  the  Convention  was  therefore 
strictly  within  the  letter  of  the  Constitution. 

The  imputation  that  New  England  stood  alone  in  her 
action  is  easily  disproved.  The  Constitution  had  not  been 
in  force  three  years,  when  Virginian  congressmen  threat 
ened  disunion  on  the  floor  of  the  House ;  and,  a  few  years 
later,  the  whiskey  insurrection,  although  not  a  State  mat 
ter,  gave  a  very  practical  illustration  of  the  devotion 
to  the  Union  in  Pennsylvania.  In  1799,  Jefferson  and 
Madison  drew  up  the  famous  Virginia  and  Kentucky  reso- 


522  LIFE   AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE  CABOT.     [1804-15. 

lutions,  which  embodied  for  the  first  time  the  doctrine  of 
nullification  ;  and  Virginian  troops  were  a  little  later  held 
in  readiness  to  seize  the  arsenals  of  the  United  States. 
But  the  period  of  the  war  of  1812  was  particularly  prolific 
in  instances  of  the  separatist  feeling;  and  the  demands 
which  at  that  time  came  from  Democratic  States  were  com 
plied  with  and  forgotten,  while  the  resistance  of  the  minority 
was  long  and  bitterly  remembered. 

In  1812,  Georgia  was  dissatisfied  with  the  President's 
decision  against  the  seizure  of  East  Florida.  Despite  ex 
press  orders  from  Washington,  Governor  Mitchell  not  only 
refused  to  withdraw  the  State  troops  from  Florida,  but  sent 
another  expedition.  The  Georgia  Legislature  soon  after 
resolved  that,  whether  Congress  authorized  it  or  not,  the 
possession  of  Florida  was  essential  to  their  safety,  and  they 
passed  an  act  to  raise  a  State  army,  which  thereupon 
invaded  the  peninsula.  The  Constitution  says  that  no 
State  shall  "  engage  in  war,  unless  actually  invaded ; "  and 
yet  Georgia  carried  on  a  war  of  conquest,  in  the  teeth  of  a 
direct  prohibition  from  the  general  government.  There  is 
certainly  an  element  of  the  separatist  feeling  and  of  States' 
rights  about  such  conduct  as  this. 

Virginia,  in  1813,  passed  an  act  for  a  State  army.  They 
repealed  this  act  only  on  a  promise  from  the  war  depart 
ment  that  a  regiment  of  regulars  should  be  stationed  at 
Norfolk,  and  that  all  Virginian  troops  heretofore  called  out 
for  local  defence  should  be  paid  by  the  United  States,  not 
withstanding  a  rule  adopted  at  Washington,  and  enfo  ced 
in  other  States,  to  pay  no  militia  not  called  for  by  the 
general  government.  Placed  side  by  side  with  this,  the 
plan  proposed  at  Hartford  for  the  defence  of  New  England 
does  not  look  abnormally  hideous.  Maryland  refused  at 
the  same  time  to  pay  for  the  defence  of  Baltimore. 

In  1812,  a  public  meeting  was  held  in  the  city  of  New 
York.  The  chairman  was  Colonel  Fish.  The  committee 
who  framed  the  resolutions  were  John  Jay,  Rufus  King, 


1804-15.]  THE   HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  523 

Gouverneur  Morris,  Richard  Harrison,  Egbert  Benson, 
Matthew  Clarkson,  and  Richard  Varick.  After  stating 
the  war  to  "  be  unwise,  declared  under  unfavorable  circum 
stances,  and  that  the  consequences  to  which  it  leads  are 
alarming,  that  it  is  alliance  with  the  French  Emperor,  and 
that  they  have  no  confidence  in  the  men  who  declared  war," 
the  resolution  demands  :  — 

"'  That  representatives  be  chosen  in  the  several  counties,  dis 
creet  men,  friends  of  peace.  These  representatives  can  correspond 
or  confer  with  each  other,  and  co-operate  with  the  friends  of  peace 
in  our  sister  States  in  devising  arid  pursuing  such  constitutional 
measures  as  may  secure  our  independence  and  preserve  our  Union, 
both  of  which  are  endangered  by  the  present  war." 

These  men,  too,  must  be  set  down  as  traitors  with  those 
who  went  to  Hartford.  Indeed,  the  arch  traitor  Morris 
considered  the  Hartford  Convention  a  tame  affair.1 

In  1813,  Vermont  refused  to  call  out  her  militia  in  obe 
dience  to  a  call  from  the  general  government ;  and,  at  the 
very  moment  of  the  Hartford  Convention,  Pennsylvania 
was  making  provision  for  a  State  army.  The  instances  of 
outbreaks  of  the  separatist  feeling  since  1814  are  too  fresh 
in  every  one's  mind  to  need  recital  here. 

All  this  amounts  merely  to  saying  that  the  principle  of 
separatism  was  common  to  all  the  States  in  the  Union. 
The  gravity  and  danger  of  the  Hartford  Convention  were 
due  to  the  time  and  place  of  its  assemblage.  That  such  a  con 
vention  should  be  held  in  New  England,  the  very  stronghold 
of  the  sentiments  of  Union  and  nationality,  shows  not  only 
the  extent  of  the  evils  from  which  the  people  thought  they 
suffered,  but  also  proves  how  deep-rooted,  how  vigorous, 
and  how  universal  the  principle  of  separatism  was  in  the 
United  States.  The  great  practical  danger  was  in  the  cir 
cumstances  of  the  time ;  for  the  government  was  bankrupt, 
without  men,  arms,  or  money  ;  and  a  general  disorganization 
in  the  national  fabric  was  only  too  apparent.  One  British 
1  Life  of  Gouverneur  Morris,  by  Sparks,  III.  326. 


524  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF  GEORGE  CABOT.     [1804-15. 

expedition  had  landed  at  New  Orleans,  another  was  on  the 
northern  frontier,  and  threatened  the  severance  of  New 
England  from  the  rest  of  the  country.  We  realize  now 
but  faintly  that  the  nation  stood  upon  the  brink  of  ruin, 
—  a  ruin  which  the  Hartford  Convention  might  have  easily 
precipitated.  But  the  prudence  and  moderation  of  the 
Federalists  at  that  moment  saved  the  country  from  great 
perils  which  even  the  unexpected  peace  might  have  come 
too  late  to  avert. 

^f '  The  Federalists  generally,  all  the  more  sensible  ones  cer 
tainly,  were  satisfied  with  the  work  of  the  Convention.  The 
general  government,  soon  after  the  Convention  adjourned, 
passed  a  law  which  permitted  the  use  of  State  troops,  as 
desired  by  New  England  and  urged  by  the  report  of  the  Con 
vention,  and  not  many  days  after  came  the  welcome  tidings 
of  peace.  The  war  party  no  longer  insisted  on  an  acknowl 
edgment  of  those  rights  for  which  alone  they  had  fought, 
and  for  which  they  had  shed  so  much  blood  and  squan 
dered  so  much  treasure.  If  we  judge  it  only  by  immediate 
results,  the  war  must  be  pronounced  a  total  failure,  and  the 
peace  was  considered  then,  and  for  many  years  after,  a  most 
wretched  one  ; 1  but  the  war  party  was  only  too  glad  to  make 
peace  on  any  terms.  The  events  of  the  war  and  the  terms 
of  peace  fully  justified  the  Federalists,  who  had  denounced  it 
throughout  as  wicked,  unjustifiable,  and  unnecessary  ;  and, 
if  one  looks  only  at  the  immediate  history  and  results  of  the 
struggle,  their  assertions  cannot  be  gainsaid.  But  we,  to-day, 
can  see  that  the  Federalists  were  wrong,  though  no  man 
then  could  know  it.  The  war  of  1812  was  worth  all  it 
cost,  simply  because  it  was  a  war.  Had  we  never  gained 

3  Mr.  John  Quincy  Adams,  who  was  not  likely  to  be  too  severe  on  the 
treaty,  said  of  it :  "  O  the  voracious  maw  and  the  bloated  visage  of  national 
vanity !  If  it  were  true  that  we  had  vanquished  or  humbled  Britannia, 
it  would  be  base  to  exult  over  her ;  but,  when  it  is  so  notorious  that  the 
issue  of  our  late  war  with  her  was  at  best  a  drawn  game,  there  is  nothing 
but  the  most  egregious  national  vanity  that  can  turn  it  into  a  triumph." 
Diary,  IV.  33. 


1804-15.]  THE  HARTFORD   CONVENTION.  525 

a  victory,  the  mere  fact  of  proving  to  the  world  that  we 
could  and  would  fight  as  a  nation  would  have  been  suffi 
cient.  But  the  war  of  1812  did  more  than  establish  our 
nationality  in  the  eyes  of  foreigners :  it  taught  England 
that  there  was  one  people  who  could  meet  and  conquer  her 
at  sea,  and  it  taught  us  to  love  and  cherish  our  navy. 
For  these  reasons,  no  American,  though  the  war  of  181*2 
was  fruitful  in  misery  and  disaster,  and  was  almost  in  the 
end  our  ruin,  would  wish  to  have  its  record  effaced  from 
our  annals. 

1  No  persons  hailed  peace  with  such  joy  as  the  Federalists, 
and  at  its  arrival  all  their  bitter  opposition  faded  away. 
They  disappeared  as  a  party  from  our  history,  and  the 
Hartford  Convention  marks  the  last  point  in  their  career. 
They  disappeared  because  they  no  longer  had  a  reason  for 
existence.  The  war  party  adopted  all  the  doctrines  for 
which  the  Federalists  had  striven,  and  which  became  the 
principles  of  our  government.  This  new  school  of  Feder 
alist-Democrats  supported  and  maintained  the  army,  the 
navy,  the  funds,  the  national  bank,  the  protective  policy, 
the  liberal  construction  of  the  Constitution,  every  thing 
in  short  which  Hamilton  cherished  and  Jefferson  loathed. 
The  Federalists  had  no  longer  an  excuse  for  living  as  a 
political  party,  and  they  were  soon  merged  in  the  ranks  of 
their  old  opponents  and  new  allies J  But,  while  the  party 
perished,  the  principles  on  which  it  was  founded  survived, 
and  we  have  to-day  a  Democratic  government  managed  on 
Federalist  principles.  Jefferson  governs  by  the  rules  and 
maxims  of  Hamilton.  The  Hartford  Convention,  marking 
as  it  does  the  extinction  of  one  of  the  great  original  parties, 
stands  at  the  threshold  of  a  new  era,  and  gains  in  this  way 
a  dramatic  interest  and  significance. 

I  do  not  propose  to  enter  into  either  a  defence  or  a  eulogy 
of  the  last  of  the  Federalists  who  gathered  at  Hartford  in 
1814.  They  require  neither  at  my  hands.  I  have  sought 
to  trace  their  policy,  unveil  their  motives,  and  reveal  their 
true  objects.  If  I  have  done  this,  I  am  satisfied.  An  ex- 


526  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1804-15. 

position  of  their  history  and  all  their  papers,  public  and 
private,  are  before  the  world ;  and  on  these  posterity  and 
future  historians  will  pass  judgment.  But  this  I  will  say, 
that  I  honor  and  respect  those  Federalists  who,  believing 
as  they  did,  shrank  not  from  what  they  considered  their 
duty  to  their  State,  to  their  party,  and  to  themselves. 

The  men  of  the  Hartford  Convention  strove  honestly  to 
do  their  duty  as  seemed  best  in  their  eyes,  and  they  need 
not  fear  the  verdict  of  posterity. 

With  the  incidents  of  an  awful  civil  war  still  fresh  in 
our  memories,  we  naturally  turn  from  aught  that  savors 
of  the  separatist  spirit,  and  State  rights  have  long  been 
esteemed  words  of  evil  omen.  But  let  us  not  therefore 
forget  that  State  rights  are  the  great  safeguards  of  our  liber 
ties.  Let  us  remember,  when  we  judge  the  Hartford  Con 
vention,  that  resistance  to  oppression  has  been  the  peculiar 
glory  of  the  English  race.  Let  us  recall  the  history  of 
Massachusetts.  Her  stubborn  spirit,  though  slow  to  anger, 
has  never  failed  in  the  hour  of  trial.  Who  would  wish  it 
extinguished  because  it  has  not  always  been  directed  with 
perfect  wisdom,  and  who  would  wish  to  believe  that  it  is 
less  vigorous  to  resist  wrong  now  than  at  any  period  of  her 
history?  But  a  few  short  years  ago,  our  greatest  poet 
said,  on  the  occasion  of  another  war,  which  New  England 
believed  to  be  wicked  and  unjustifiable:  — 

"  Ef  I'd  my  way,  I  bed  ruther 

We  should  go  to  work  and  part, — 
They  take  one  way,  we  take  t'other : 

Guess  it  wouldn't  break  my  heart. 
Man  bed  ought  to  put  asunder 

Them  that  God  has  noways  jined ; 
An'  I  shouldn't  gretly  wonder 

Ef  there's  thousands  o*  my  mind." 

The  old  spirit  breathes  in  these  lines.  And  it  is  well 
that  it  should  not  die  among  us ;  for,  while  it  is  our  duty 
to  crush  sectionalism  in  every  form,  it  is  no  less  our  duty 
to  guard  the  great  Anglo-Saxon  principle  of  local  self- 
government. 


1812-15.]          THE   CONVENTION   CORRESPONDENCE.  527 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

1812-1815. 
Correspondence  relating  to  the  Hartford  Convention. 

THE  letters  included  in  this  chapter  are  from  hitherto 
unpublished  manuscripts,  and  are  taken  from  the  Picker 
ing  MSS.  and  from  the  correspondence  of  Governor 
Strong.  Some  of  them,  notably  the  first,  do  not  relate 
directly  either  to  the  Hartford  Convention  or  its  objects ; 
but,  as  illustrations  of  the  opinions  held  during  the  war  of 
1812  by  some  of  the  most  distinguished  Federalists,  they 
have  appeared  to  me  of  sufficient  historical  value  to  merit 
publication.  The  most  interesting  letters  are  unquestion 
ably  those  of  Colonel  Pickering  and  Mr.  John  Lowell. 
From  those  written  by  the  former,  we  get  a  clear  idea  of 
the  views  entertained  by  the  most  extreme  of  the  Federal 
ist  leaders.  Colonel  Pickering's  theory  in  1804,  and  subse 
quently  down  to  1814,  was  to  separate  from  the  Union,  and 
then,  by  the  injury  thus  inflicted  upon  the  Southern  States, 
to  force  them  to  re-form  the  Union  on  terms  dictated  by 
New  England.  The  "  Northern  Confederacy "  seems  to 
have  been  intended  as  the  last  resort,  in  case  this  plan  of 
coercion  failed.  Behind  the  dissolution  of  the  Union,  so 
zealously  urged  by  Colonel  Pickering,  therefore,  was  a  much 
more  extended  plan, — to  restore  to  New  England  and  to  the 
principles  of  the  Federalist  party  their  ancient  political 
supremacy.  In  judging  this  plan,  we  must  remember  that 
the  almost  indefinite  extension  to  the  westward  was  then  but 
little  thought  of.  In  the  absence  of  railroads  and  telegraphs, 
there  were  no  apparent  means  of  uniting  firmly  more  than 


528  LITE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEOUGE   CABOT.      [1812-15. 

a  very  limited  number  of  States,  while  mere  difficulty  of 
communication  made  an  extended  area  seem  an  impossibility 
for  one  government.  Few  men  at  the  beginning  of  this 
century  looked  beyond  the  Alleghanies,  and  the  extension 
made  at  the  South-west  was  regarded  by  the  Federalists  as 
in  itself  a  total  destruction  of  the  old  balance  of  power. 
Such  were  the  premises  from  which  Colonel  Pickering  rea 
soned,  nor  was  the  possible  execution  of  his  plan  by  any 
means  so  chimerical  in  1814  as  it  appears  in  1877.  One 
British  expedition,  although  repulsed,  still  threatened  our 
Northern  frontier,  while  another  had  arrived  at  New  Or 
leans.  That  England  would  obtain  the  control  of  our  Avest- 
ern  territory,  as  Lord  Castlereagh  at  first  demanded  from  our 
commissioners  at  Ghent,  seemed  by  no  means  improbable. 
The  war  had  drained  the  national  resources,  and  the  Union 
appeared  on  the  verge  of  dissolution.  Disorganization  had 
indeed  begun,  and  even  the  most  Democratic  States  were 
making  independent  movements  of  defence.  In  such  a 
condition  of  things,  the  withdrawal  of  New  England  would 
have  brought  the  whole  fabric  down  in  ruins ;  and  she  could 
then  have  either  dictated  her  own  terms  in  a  new  Union,  or 
could  have  formed  a  Northern  Confederacy  in  which  she 
would  have  been  supreme.  Fortunately,  Colonel  Pickering 
was  not  supported  by  most  of  the  Federalist  leaders.  We 
have  seen  by  former  letters  the  lukewarmness  with  which 
his  plan  was  received  in  1804 ;  and  in  1814  he  appears  to 
have  found  only  two  prominent  men,  Mr.  Lowell  and  Mr. 
Gouverneur  Morris,  who  fully  sympathized  with  him.  The 
other  leaders  were  too  prudent  and  too  moderate  to  plunge 
into  desperate  measures.  Yet  it  is  easy  to  see  what  a  tre 
mendous  political  revolution  they  might  have  wrought. 
Colonel  Pickering  expressed  perfect  satisfaction  with  the 
results  of  the  Convention ;  but  we  can  reconcile  this  with 
his  previous  letters  only  on  the  theory  that  he  trusted  to 
events  to  force  the  moderate  leaders  up  to  his  position,  and 
bided  his  time.  He  had  certainly  urged  much  more  deci- 


1812-15.]          THE   CONVENTION   CORRESPONDENCE.  529 

sive  measures  as  the  duty  of  the  Convention  than  any  that 
were  afterwards  adopted  at  Hartford.  It  is  also  very  strik 
ing  that  both  Colonel  Pickering  and  Mr.  Lowell,  dissatisfied 
as  they  were  with  the  moderation  of  the  party  leaders  in  Mas 
sachusetts,  distinctly  disclaim  any  wish  for  a  separation  for 
its  own  sake.  Could  they  have  the  Union  governed  as  they 
believed  it  ought  to  be,  they  had  no  wish  for  a  separation  ; 
and,  much  as  they  felt  themselves  injured,  they  desired  sep 
aration  only  as  a  means  of  coercion  to  re-form  the  old  Union 
or  to  make  a  new  one  on  better  principles.  Certainly,  if  we 
may  trust  to  their  own  letters,  no  one  held  more  advanced 
views  than  Mr.  Lowell  and  Colonel  Pickering,  yet  they  ex 
pressly  say  they  do  not  regard  a  dissolution  as  good  in  itself. 
This  finally  disposes  of  Mr.  Adams's  imputation  that  the 
Massachusetts  leaders  sought  disunion  for  its  own  sake,  and 
solely  to  gratify  their  own  selfish  and  personal  ambition. 

The  letters  from  Mr.  Gore  to  Governor  Strong,  which 
form  the  last  of  this  series,  are  of  interest  in  showing  the 
satisfaction  given  to  the  Federalists  generally  by  the  report 
of  the  Hartford  Convention,  and  that  the  opinions  of  that 
body  accurately  reflected  the  sentiments  of  the  majority  of 
the  party. 

MARSHALL  TO  PICKERING. 

RICHMOND,  Dec.  11,  1812. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  Your  letter  transmitting  the  documents  in  rela 
tion  to  the  French  decree  of  April,  1812,  did  not  reach  this  place 
till  I  had  left  it  on  an  annual  tour  to  the  mountains,  and  were  not 
received  till  October  last.  I  thank  you  very  sincerely  for  this 
flattering  attention.  My  sentiments  on  the  report l  concur  pre 
cisely  with  yours.  It  contains  a  labored  apology  for  France,  but 
none  for  ourselves.  It  furnishes  no  reason  for  our  tame,  unmur 
muring  acquiescence  under  the  double  insult  of  withholding  this 
paper  from  us,  and  declaring  in  our  face  that  it  had  been  put  in 
our  possession.  The  report  is  silent  on  another  subject  of  still 
deeper  interest.  It  leaves  unnoticed  the  fact  that  the  Berlin  and 

1  War  Report  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations. 
34 


530  LIFE   AND   LETTEKS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1812-15. 

Milan  decrees  were  certainly  not  repealed  by  the  insidious  decree 
of  April,  since  it  had  never  been  communicated  to  the»  French 
courts  or  cruisers,  and  since  their  cruisers  had  at  a  period  subse 
quent  to  the  pretended  date  of  that  decree  received  orders  to  con 
tinue  to  execute  the  offensive  decrees  on  American  vessels.  The 
report  manifests  no  sensibility  at  the  disgraceful  circumstances, 
which  tend  strongly  to  prove  that  this  paper  was  fabricated  to 
satisfy  the  importunities  of  Mr.  Barlow,  and  was  antedated  to  suit 
French  purposes  ;  nor  at  the  contempt  manifested  for  the  feelings 
of  Americans  and  their  government  by  not  deigning  so  to  antedate 
it  as  to  save  the  credit  of  our  administration,  by  giving  some  plausi 
bility  to  their  assertion  that  the  repeal  had  taken  place  on  the  1st 
of  November.  But  this  is  a  subject  with  which  I  dare  not  trust 
myself. 

I  look  with  anxious  solicitude,  with  mingled  hope  and  fear,  to 
the  great  events  which  are  taking  place  in  the  north  of  Germany. 
It  appears  probable  that  a  great  battle  will  be  fought  on  or  near 
the  Elbe,  and  never  had  the  world  more  at  stake  than  will  proba 
bly  depend  on  that  battle.  Your  opinions  had  led  me  to  hope 
that  there  was  some  prospect  of  a  particular  peace  for  ourselves. 
My  own  judgment,  could  I  trust  it,  would  tell  me  that  peace  or  war 
will  be  determined  by  the  events  in  Europe. 

With  much  respect  and  esteem,  I  am,  dear  sir,  your  obedient 

J.  MARSHALL. 

PICKERING  TO  SAMUEL  PuTNAM.1 

FEB.  4,  1814. 

If  a  step  of  this  kind 2  should  be  adopted,  one  more  should  be 
taken  :  send  forth  a  solemn  and  earnest  address  to  your  constitu 
ents,  in  plain  but  forcible  language,  which  all  can  understand  and 
feel,  stating  concisely  all  the  great  evils  wantonly  brought  on  them 
by  the  acts  of  the  national  government,  and  for  no  possible  cause 
but  to  co-operate  with  Europe's  execrable  tyrant,  the  ruler  of  France. 
Recite  your  demands  on  Congress  for  relief ;  but  tell  the  people 
that  while,  with  a  sincere  and  strong  desire  to  maintain  the  union 
of  the  States,  you  have  made  one  more  application  to  that  body  for 
a  redress  of  grievances,  past  experience  too  lamentably  shows  how 

1  Senator  in  the  Massachusetts  Legislature. 

2  The  passage  of  certain  resolutions  addressed  to  Congress  against  the 
continuance  of  the  war,  and  in  favor  of  the  right  of  self-defence. 


1812-15.]        THE   CONVENTION  CORRESPONDENCE.  531 

small  is  the  hope  of  relief ;  that  therefore  they  must  prepare  their 
minds,  and  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  "  right  themselves,"  and 
remove  from  them  that  accumulated  load  of  oppression  which  is  no 
longer  to  be  endured. 

Declarations  of  this  sort  by  Massachusetts,  especially  if  con 
curred  in  by  the  other  New  England  States,  would  settle  the  busi 
ness  at  once.  But  though  made  now  by  Massachusetts  alone,  you 
surely  may  rely  on  the  co-operation  of  New  Hampshire,  Rhode 
Island,  and  Connecticut,  and  I  doubt  not  of  Vermont  and  New 
York.  With  the  executives  and  legislatures  of  most  and  the  repre 
sentatives  of  all  of  them,  you  can  freely  communicate. 

Ought  there  not  to  be  a  proposal  of  a  convention  of  delegates 
from  those  six  States?  Recollect  the  times  that  are  past,  when 
circular  letters  were  first  sent  from  the  House  of  Representatives 
of  Massachusetts,  the  cradle  of  American  liberty,  —  whence  ensued 
our  organized  opposition  to  meditated  oppression,  the  harbinger  of 
tyranny,  but  which,  as  compared  with  the  actual  tyranny  of  our 
own  government,  would  now  appear  insignificant. 

In  describing  in  your  address  to  the  people  (for  I  presume  you 
will  not  rise  without  one)  the  oppressions  above  referred  to,  and 
especially  the  calamities  of  this  profligate  war,  will  there  be  any 
impropriety  —  nay,  does  not  the  actual  state  of  things  loudly  call 
for  it?  —  after  showing  concisely  how  the  war  is  unnecessary  and 
unjust,  and  how  impossible  by  its  continuance  for  any  length  of 
time  whatever  to  obtain  a  relinquishment  on  the  part  of  Great 
Britain  of  the  right  of  impressing  her  own  seamen  from  neutral 
merchant  ships,  for  which  absolutely  hopeless  object  alone  the  war 
is  yet  maintained,  —  after  concisely  showing  all  this,  ought  you 
not  to  caution  all  the  citizens  of  Massachusetts  not  to  yield  by  per 
sonal  services  or  by  money  any  voluntary  aid  in  carrying  on  the 
war,  which,  being  criminal  in  its  origin  and  continuance  and  ruin 
ous  in  its  consequences,  all  those  who  voluntarily  contribute  to  its 
support  will  be  involved  in  its  guilt ;  and  then  solemnly  denounce 
all  who  shall  render  such  voluntary  assistance  as  enemies  of  their 
country  ?  I  have  more  to  say,  but  must  do  it  in  another  letter. 

Very  truly  yours, 

T.  PICKERING. 


532  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1812-15. 


PICKERING  TO  SAMUEL  PUTNAM. 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  Feb.  7,  1814. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  Not  looking  to  Massachusetts  at  this  time  for  any 
other  than  preparatory  measures  of  minds  and  means  to  vindicate 
the  rights  of  the  commercial  and  navigating  States,  the  intimations 
in  my  letter  of  the  4th  went  not  beyond  those  objects,  and  I  pre 
sume  they  are  even  within  the  limits  of  moderation.  I  shall 
expect  your  answer  informing  me  of  the  degree  on  the  political 
thermometer  to  which  the  temper  of  men  entitled  to  take  the  lead 
has  risen :  I  mean  as  to  practicable  measures,  which  must  depend 
on  the  support  of  the  people.  The  people,  however,  are  always 
best  pleased  with  bold,  decisive  measures.  And,  if  you  wait  for 
additional  oppression,  the  danger  of  tame  submission  will  be  in 
creased.  It  is  the  gradual  introduction  of  tyranny  that  puts  in 
jeopardy  the  liberties  of  a  free  people. 

Not  to  trouble  you  with  further  observations,  let  me  conclude 
with  the  hope  and  confidence  that  the  tones  of  Massachusetts  will 
be  strong  and  imposing;  and  that  she  will  prepare  to  execute 
boldly  and  firmly  the  measures  which  a  just  and  reasonable  redress 
of  her  wrongs  authorize  and  urge  her  to  take,  and  in  which  the 
ardent  wishes  and  blessings  of  all  the  good  and  patriotic  citizens  of 
the  United  States  will  attend  you.  And  let  me  once  more  assure 
you  that  to  New  England,  especially  to  Massachusetts,  its  head, 
all  such  men  anxiously  look  for  redemption.  Let  then  her  glory 
as  well  as  her  own  and  the  general  safety  animate  her  in  the  honor 
able  attempt,  which,  well  conducted,  cannot  fail  of  success. 

I  am,  &c.,  T.  PICKERING. 


SAMUEL  PUTNAM  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Feb.  11,  1814. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  The  Senate  have  just  passed  the  enclosed  resolu 
tions  upon  the  petition  of  the  town  of  Falmouth  for  protection, 
the  last  of  which  (the  best  measure  that  we  have  adopted  this  ses 
sion)  occasioned  great  excitement  on  the  part  of  the  minority.  I 
have  received  your  two  late  favors.  It  is  the  settled  determination 
not  to  petition  Congress  again. 

The  select  committee  from  each  county  have  agreed  to  certain 
resolutions  expressive  of  the  rights  of  Massachusetts  and  of  the 


1812-15.]         THE  CONVENTION  COEEESPONDENCE.  533 

oppressions  of  the  general  government,  recommending  the  passing 
of  sundry  laws :  one,  to  protect  the  persons  and  property  of  our 
citizens  from  illegal  seizures,  made  without  warrant,  issued  upon 
complaint  on  oath  ;  another,  inflicting  suitable  penalties  upon  all 
who  shall  obstruct  any  persons  going  from  port  to  port  in  the  State, 
after  giving  or  offering  to  give  bond  to  the  collector  not  to  go  to 
any  foreign  port,  &c.,  —  this  to  be  in  force  after  the  10th  of  June 
next,  unless  Congress  shall  before  repeal  the  embargo,  or  so  modify 
it  as  that  it  shall  cease  to  violate  the  rights  of  Massachusetts ;  and  a 
resolve  that  the  people  shall  instruct  their  representatives,  at  the 
next  session  of  the  General  Court,  as  to  the  expediency  of  appoint 
ing  delegates  to  meet  the  delegates  who  may  be  appointed  by  other 
States  in  convention,  for  the  purpose  of  securing  their  commercial 
and  other  rights.  These  projects  have  been  received  with  great 
unanimity. 

They  may  undergo  some  modification,  but  I  apprehend  will  in 
substance  pass  the  Legislature.  An  address  to  the  people  will  also 
be  made,  but  whether  by  the  Legislature  or  by  the  Federalists  is 
not  yet  decided. 

You  will  be  surprised  to  learn  that  Mr.  Dane,1  of  Beverly,  of 
his  own  accord  lately  told  me  that  he  had  learned  from  long  expe 
rience  that  (to  use  his  own  words)  "it  will  not  do  to  trust  the 
Boston  lead."  I  will  give  you  a  particular  account  when  we  meet, 
which  will  prove  that  Dane  is  as  good  a  prophet  as  historian. 
In  haste,  I  am  affectionately  yours, 

SAMUEL  PUTNAM. 


SAMUEL  PUTNAM  TO  PICKERING. 

BOSTON,  Feb.  22,  1814. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  The  enclosed  has  passed  the  Legislature  this  day  ; 
and,  notwithstanding  it  falls  short  of  the  wishes  of  a  vast  number 
of  our  friends,  there  will  (I  trust)  be  no  want  of  union  and  firm 
ness  in  our  future  measures. 

I  remain  affectionately  yours, 

SAMUEL  PUTNAM. 


1  Nathan  Dane,  the  distinguished  lawyer,  reputed  author  of  the  Ordi 
nance  of  1787,  founder  of  the  Dane  professorship  in  the  Harvard  Law  School 
at  Cambridge,  and  one  of  the  delegates  to  the  Hartford  Convention. 


534  LIFE  AND  LETTEES   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.     [1812-15, 

Resolves  on  the  Petition  of  the  Town  of  Falmouth. 

1.  Resolved,  That  his  Excellency  the  Governor  be  and  hereby  is 
authorized  to  furnish  the  town  of  Falmouth,  in  the  county  of  Barn- 
stable,  or  any  other  town  which  in  his  opinion  may  be  in  danger  of 
invasion,  with  such  guns  and  ammunition  as  in  his  discretion  may 
be  thought  proper. 

2.  Resolved,  That  his  Excellency  the  Governor  be  and  hereby  is 
authorized  to  accept  the  services  of  any  military  corps,  or  of  individ 
uals  as  volunteers,  and  cause  the  same  to  be  organized  in  such 
mode  as  he  may  deem  proper,  to  be  held  in  readiness  for  the  special 
defence  and  safety  of  this  Commonwealth. 


CHANCELLOR  KENT  TO  PICKERING. 

ALBANY,  April  26,  1814. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  My  brother  who  arrived  here  yesterday  delivered 
me  your  speech  on  the  loan  bill,  which  you  were  so  obliging  as  to 
enclose  to  me.  I  had  seen  it  before,  and  permit  me  to  say  that  I 
do  and  have  long  held  the  doctrines  contained  in  your  speech,  and 
which  I  think  you  have  most  clearly  illustrated.  I  have  differed 
from  most  of  my  Federal  friends  here  ;  for  I  always  was  of  opinion 
that  the  orders  in  council  of  November,  1807,  were,  under  the  then 
existing  circumstances  of  Europe,  justifiable  on  principles  of  public 
law.  They  resulted  from  necessary  self-defence,  and  as  against 
the  extraordinary  determination  of  France  were  a  just  weapon  of 
retaliation  and  resistance.  The  speeches  of  Mr.  Percival  and  Mr. 
Canning  in  Parliament,  on  this  point,  I  always  believed  to  be  solid. 
But  peace  be  to  their  manes.  You  have  more  undeniably,  than 
any  writer  I  have  seen,  expressed  the  baseness  of  the  motive  and 
the  hypocrisy  of  the  manner  of  our  first  embargo,  and  the  restric 
tive  laws  that  followed  it.  But,  here  also,  peace  be  to  its  manes  ; 
and  as  the  storm  has  gone  over,  and  something  like  a  serene  sky 
smiles  again,  I  look  forward  to  better  times,  and  to  the  hope  that 
the  profligate  administration  of  the  Jeffersonian  dynasty  is  perma 
nently  checked. 

Be  assured,  sir,  that  I  feel  the  utmost  respect  for  your  public 
and  private  character,  and  the  best  wishes  for  your  happiness. 

Sincerely  yours,  JAMES  KENT. 


1812-15.]          THE  CONVENTION   CORRESPONDENCE.  535 


EXTRACT  FROM  A  LETTER   OF  PICKERING  TO  PUTNAM. 

OCTOBER,  1814. 

As  abandoned  by  the  general  government,  except  for  taxing 
us,  we  must  defend  ourselves,  so  we  ought  to  seize  and  hold  fast 
the  revenues  indispensable  to  maintain  the  force  necessary  for  our 
protection  against  the  foreign  enemy,  and  the  still  greater  evil  in 
prospect,  domestic  tyranny. 

EXTRACT  FROM  LETTER  OF  PICKERING  TO  JOHN  LOWELL. 

OCTOBER,  1814. 

I  hope  the  character  of  the  report  to  our  State  Legislature,  signed 
H.  G.  Otis,  will  be  maintained.  A  convention  of  the  New  Eng 
land  States  two  years  ago  (which  I  then  confidently  expected) 
would  have  superseded  the  one  now  contemplated,  and  have  saved 
thousands  of  lives  and  millions  of  money,  by  putting  at  that  time 
an  end  to  the  war.  But  timidity  in  the  garb  of  prudence  defeated 
that  salutary  proposal.  Faithfully  yours,  T.  P. 

PICKERING  TO  GOUVERNEUR  MORRIS. 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  Oct.  29,  1814. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  To-day  I  had  the  pleasure  of  receiving  your  letter 
of  the  17th.  I  was  gratified  to  find  my  own  sentiments  corre 
sponding  with  yours.  "  Union  "  is  the  talisman  of  the  dominant 
party ;  and  many  Federalists,  enchanted  by  the  magic  sound,  are 
alarmed  at  every  appearance  of  opposition  to  the  measures  of  the 
faction,  lest  it  should  endanger  the  "  Union."  I  have  never  enter 
tained  such  fears.  On  the  contrary,  in  adverting  to  the  ruinous 
system  of  our  government  for  many  years  past,  I  have  said :  "  Let 
the  ship  run  aground.  The  shock  will  throw  the  present  pilots 
overboard,  and  then  competent  navigators  will  get  her  once  more 
afloat,  and  conduct  her  safely  into  port."  I  have  even  gone  so  far 
as  to  say  that  a  separation  of  the  Northern  section  of  States  would 
be  ultimately  advantageous,  because  it  would  be  temporary,  and 
because  in  the  interval  the  just  rights  of  the  States  would  be 
recovered  and  secured ;  that  the  Southern  States  would  earnestly 
seek  a  reunion,  when  the  rights  of  both  would  be  defined  and 
established  on  a  more  equal  and  therefore  more  durable  basis. 


536  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.     [1812-15. 

At  a  late  consultation  among  Federalists,  the  great  question  was 
agitated,  "  What  part  shall  we  take  when  the  system  of  taxation 
shall  be  brought  before  us  ? "  In  general  (I  do  not  know  but 
universally,  as  to  those  who  spoke},  it  seemed  to  be  concluded  that, 
as  the  nature  of  the  war  was  now  changed  from  offensive  to 
defensive,  we  could  not  withhold  our  assent.  At  the  same  time,  it 
was  admitted  that  the  present  rulers  were  incompetent  to  carry  on 
the  war,  and  that  the  money  raised  by  means  of  a  system  of  heavy 
taxation  would,  like  the  millions  already  obtained,  be  profusely 
wasted.  But,  in  assenting  to  the  taxes,  all  agreed  that  it  would  be 
proper  to  protest  against  the  administration,  and  declare  it  incom 
petent  to  maintain  the  war  or  to  make  peace !  I  dissented  from 
this  doctrine,  and  avowed  my  opinion  that  our  assent  to  the  system 
of  taxation  should  be  given  only  on  the  condition  that  the  admin 
istration  should  be  changed,  so  that  Federalists  should  control  the 
public  measures,  and  apply  the  public  funds  to  support  them.  I 
presume  I  shall  not  be  left  alone.  I  trust  a  number  of  Eastern 
members,  at  least  of  my  colleagues,  will  agree  with  me,  unless  on 
better  advice  we  should  think  it  expedient  to  adopt  the  plan  of  our 
other  Federal  brethren.  This  day  Eppes  l  called  up  the  resolu 
tions  of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means ;  and  Mr.  Oakley 2 
(who  is  a  man  of  talents)  took  the  ground  above  mentioned,  of 
advocating  the  system  of  severe  taxation,  and  protesting  against 
the  competency  of  the  men  into  whose  hands  the  public  revenues 
would  be  thrown.  The  reproaches  which  on  this  plan  are  neces 
sarily  cast  on  the  administration  and  its  abettors  in  the  two  Houses 
will  render  these  more  bitter,  and  urge  them,  from  pride  and  resent 
ment,  to  pursue  their  course  with  increased  obstinacy. 

As  you  suppose,  some  men  "  are  on  stilts  as  to  British  arrogance 
and  audacity,  in  proposing  terms  of  peace  to  which  we  cannot  listen 
without  disgrace."  I  confess  they  did  not  disturb  me.  For  some 
of  them  (on  which  our  commissioners  had  no  instructions)  I  was  in 
a  degree  prepared.  In  conversation  with  my  friends  at  home,  we 
had  concluded  that  Great  Britain  would  exclude  us  from  those  very 
fisheries,  which  she  now  says  she  will  not  again  yield  to  us  without 
an  equivalent,  but  not  attempt  to  deny  us  the  cod-fisheries  in  the 

1  John  Eppes,  member  of  Congress  from  Virginia,  and  son-in-law  of 
Jefferson. 

2  Thomas  Jackson  Oakley,  member  of  Congress  from  New  York,  after 
wards  judge  and  chief  justice  of  the  Superior  Court  of  New  York. 


1812-15.]         THE   CONVENTION   COKEESPONDENCE.  537 

open  sea,  —  that  is,  on  the  Banks  of  Newfoundland.  What  equi 
valent  was  contemplated  by  the  British  Government  seemed  to  me 
very  obvious.  They  want  a  direct  road  from  Halifax  to  Quebec. 
This  will  cross  the  province  of  Maine,  belonging  to  Massachusetts, 
to  which  State  those  fisheries  are  almost  exclusively  interesting. 
Massachusetts  may  exchange  the  north-east  corner  of  Maine  for 
the  privilege  of  participating  in  the  British  fisheries. 

As  to  the  lakes,  I  said  more  than  a  year  ago  that  it  would  be  a 
most  desirable  thing  if  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  could 
agree  to  have  neither  armed  vessels  on  the  lakes  nor  any  fortifica 
tions  on  their  borders,  but  that  Great  Britain  could  not  so  agree, 
because  in  Canada  she  was  weak,  and  we  were  strong  and  daily 
increasing  in  strength,  which  would  enable  us  to  invade  and  overrun 
her  dominions  there  before  she  could  prepare  to  defend  them. 
But  this  proposition  of  hers  is  not  a  sine  qua  non.  In  its  present 
form,  I  have  an  entire  repugnance  to  it.  She  would  doubtless 
agree  either  to  stipulate  that  neither  power  should  keep  any  naval 
force  on  the  lakes,  each  fortifying  on  the  land  as  it  pleased,  or 
to  say  nothing  about  it,  when  both  would  be  in  the  situation  ex 
isting  prior  to  the  war. 

As  to  the  Indian  boundary,  I  soothed  some  of  my  friends  by  ask 
ing  them  what  Great  Britain  demanded,  answering  that  she  required 
no  cession  of  territory  to  herself  (in  this  proposition),  nor  to  the 
Indians ;  for  the  latter,  being  proprietors  of  the  soil,  Great  Britain 
demanded  in  their  behalf  that  we  should  relinquish  our  right  of 
pre-emption,  which  was  really  all  the  right  we  could  set  up.  I 
added  that,  the  British  demand  out  of  the  question,  good  policy 
should  dictate  to  us  the  same  measure,  —  to  prevent  further  en 
croachments  on  the  Indians  (and  consequently  a  renewal  of  hos 
tilities),  the  dispersion  of  our  citizens  over  vast  and  indefensible 
regions,  when  we  had  yet  so  many  millions  of  acres  of  good  lands 
without  inhabitants. 

To  effect  a  peace,  our  rulers  must  be  changed,  and  men  less 
proud  and  less  haters  of  Great  Britain  be  employed  as  negotiators. 
Faithfully  yours,  T.  PICKERING. 

GOUVERNEUR    MORRIS    TO    PlCKERING. 

MORRISANIA,  Nov.  1,  1814. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  I  have  received  yours  of  the  21st  of  October,  and 
now  see  that  we  are  to  be  taxed  beyond  our  means,  and  subjected 


538  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1812-15. 

to  military  conscription.  These  measures  are  devised  and  pursued 
by  the  gentle  spirits  who  for  more  than  twenty  years  have  lavished 
on  Britain  the  bitterest  vulgarity  of  Billingsgate,  because  she  im 
pressed  her  seamen  fbr  self-defence,  and  have  shed  a  torrent  of 
crocodile  tears  over  the  poor  of  that  country,  crushed,  as  they  pre 
tend,  by  oppressive  taxes  to  gratify  royal  ambition.  Nevertheless, 
this  waste  of  men  and  money,  neither  of  which  can  be  squeezed  out 
of  our  extenuated  States,  is  proposed  for  the  conquest  of  Canada. 
And  thus  after  swearing  and  forswearing  backward  and  forward 
till  their  fondest  adherents  were  grown  giddy,  and  after  publishing 
their  willingness  to  abandon  every  former  pretext,  the  administra 
tion  boldly  avow  that,  although  we  are  so  simple  as  to  call  this  a 
war  of  defence,  it  is  still  on  their  part  a  war  of  conquest. 

What  will  the  Federal  gentlemen  now  say,  who,  to  excuse  their 
support  of  this  administration,  assumed  that  their  unprovoked,  un 
wise,  unjust  war  of  aggression  had,  all  at  once,  become  defensive. 
I  admire  and  applaud  the  proud  consistency  of  our  adversaries, 
who  say  to  these  over-quondam  friends  :  "  We  disdain  your  prof 
fered  support.  You  shall  not  participate  in  power,  neither  shall 
your  quibble  serve  your  turn.  We  wage  no  defensive  war,  but 
mean  to  conquer  Canada.  Vote  for  that  or  vote  against  us,  we 
care  not  which." 

And  now,  my  good  friend,  be,  I  pray  you,  so  kind  as  to  tell  the 
pliant  patriots  who  become  converts  to  Mr.  Monroe's  scheme, 
frankly  communicated  to  enemies  as  to  friends,  of  marching  into 
Canada  by  way  of  inducing  the  British  forces  on  our  coast  to  meet 
us  there,  that,  the  St.  Lawrence  being  no  longer  navigable,  this 
sublime  diversion  cannot  take  effect  before  the  month  of  May. 
But  perhaps  the  Secretary,  as  facetious  as  he  is  sagacious,  meant 
this  diversion  merely  as  a  pleasantry  to  divert  himself  and  his  col 
leagues  at  the  eagerness  with  which  Federal  gudgeons  will,  in  the 
lack  of  bait,  swallow  a  bare  hook. 

Doubts  are,  I  find,  entertained  whether  Massachusetts  is  in  earn 
est,  and  whether  she  will  be  supported  by  the  New  England  family. 
But  surely  these  outrageous  measures  must  rouse  their  patriot 
sentiment  to  cast  off  the  load  of  oppression. 

Yours  truly,  Gouv.  MORRIS. 


1812-15.]         THE   CONVENTION   COBRESPONDENCE.  539 


PICKERING  TO  JOHN  LOWELL. 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  Nov.  7, 1814. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  You  may  recollect  that,  in  my  letter  to  Governor 
Sullivan  (April  16,  1808),  I  said  with  earnestness  "that  it  was 
essential  to  the  public  safety  that  the  blind  confidence  in  our  rulers 
should  cease,  that  the  State  Legislatures  should  know  the  facts  and 
reasons  on  which  important  general  laws  were  founded,  arid  espe 
cially  that  those  States  whose  farms  were  on  the  ocean,  and  whose 
harvests  were  gathered  in  every  sea,  should  immediately  and  seri 
ously  consider  how  to  preserve  them  ;  "  adding  that  "  nothing  but 
the  sense  of  the  commercial  States,  clearly  and  practically  expressed, 
would  save  them  from  ruin."  The  House  of  Representatives  of 
Massachusetts  was  at  that  time  Federal  (and  was  not  the  Senate 
also  Federal  ? )  ;  and,  with  the  spirit  which  ought  to  have  been 
exerted,  the  evils  of  Jefferson's  unlimited  embargo  might  have 
been  shortened,  and  probably  a  free  commerce  (instead  of  the  mis 
erable  and  mischievous  non-intercourse  and  other  restrictions) 
restored,  especially  if  Connecticut  had  been  invited  to  co-operate. 
Obsta  principiis  was  the  motto  of  the  movers  and  leaders  of  our 
Revolution,  before  —  long  before  —  the  obstinacy  and  pride  of  the 
British  government  rendered  that  Revolution  unavoidable.  The 
praises  of  the  sages  and  heroes  of  that  Revolution  are  in  the  mouths 
of  all  our  political  coxcombs  ;  yet  every  man  who  now  exhibits  one 
spark  of  their  spirit  is  denounced  as  the  friend  of  Britain  and  the 
enemy  of  his  own  country,  while  other  Federalists,  alike  sensible  of 
the  wanton  oppression  and  tyranny  of  our  rulers,  have  shrunk  from 
every  proposition  that  contained  one  particle  of  boldness. 

When  the  war  had  been  declared,  the  House  of  Representatives 
of  Massachusetts,  again  Federal,  addressed  their  constituents  to 
rouse  them  to  that  degree  of  opposition  to  our  rulers  which  their 
interests  and  safety  required  within  the  pale  of  the  Constitution, 
recommending  meetings  of  towns  and  county  conventions.  There 
was  a  convention  in  Essex,  in  July,  1812.  We  thought  it  neces 
sary  to  have  a  State  Convention,  and  chose  delegates  to  attend  it. 
This  measure  was  defeated  at  "  The  Headquarters  of  Good  Prin 
ciples."  I  did  not  yet  despair  of  our  country  ;  for,  on  conversing 
afterwards  with  Chief  Justice  Parsons,  he  told  me  the  House  would 
.take  up  the  business  at  the  ensuing  winter  session.  This  arrived, 
and  nothing  was  done.  In  1813,  the  House  of  Representatives  of 


540  LIFE   AND  LETTERS   OF   GEOEGE   CABOT.     [1812-15. 

Massachusetts  addressed  a  long  remonstrance  to  Congress,  with 
just  spirit  enough  in  it  to  make  it  the  jest  of  the  majority.  Massa 
chusetts  had  now  become  an  object  of  contempt.  The  majority 
men,  and  their  partisans  abroad,  concluded  that  Massachusetts  had 
neither  talents  nor  fortitude  to  plan  and  to  execute  any  efficient 
measure  to  control  or  to  check  their  destroying  projects.  Hence  I 
almost  dreaded  to  hear  of  any  movements  in  Massachusetts,  lest, 
like  all  former  ones,  it  should  end  in  smoke,  and  sink  the  State  still 
deeper  in  disgrace.  My  hopes  are  now  revived,  and  this  day 
strengthened,  on  seeing  the  names  of  the  Connecticut  delegates.  I 
know  them  all,  save  Sherman,  —  who  is  the  son  or  nephew  of  the 
famous  Roger  Sherman,  and,  I  am  told,  a  clever  man.  For  a  good 
while  past,  when  intelligent  and  spirited  Federalists  of  the  Middle 
States  (particularly  of  Maryland  and  Virginia)  have  said  to  me, 
"  We  look  to  New  England,  and  especially  to  Massachusetts,  for 
salvation,"  I  have  been  ready  to  hang  my  head,  I  have  been 
mortified  in  the  extreme,  because  I  could  say  nothing  to  encourage 
their  hopes  and  confidence. 

I  am  inclined  to  think  there  was  a  time,  in  the  early  period  of 
the  war,  when  the  sentiments  of  a  New  England  Convention 
(which  might  have  been  strengthened  by  a  delegation  from  New 
York,  by  the  authority  of  their  Federal  House  of  Representatives), 
boldly  and  firmly  expressed,  might  have  put  an  end  to  it,  while 
Britain  was  solicitous  to  make  peace,  without  the  offer  of  any  hard 
or  unpleasant  terms. 

I  hope  in  God  that  the  delegates  of  Massachusetts  (a  decided 
majority,  at  least)  may  now  prove  their  readiness  to  act  as  well  as 
to  speak.  I  consider  the  destiny  of  New  England,  and,  in  the 
result,  of  the  United  States,  to  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  pro 
posed  Convention.  While  any  symptoms  of  faint-heartedness  will 
ruin  all,  the  wise  sentiments  and  efficient  plans  the  Convention  will 
be  able  to  express  and  devise,  and  the  dignified  firmness  with  which 
they  shall  be  enforced,  forbidding  every  suspicion  that  they  will  not 
be  verified  in  act,  will  insure  the  wished-for  success.  The  forlorn 
condition  of  the  general  government,  and  the  destitute  and  helpless 
situation  of  the  States  south  of  the  Potomac,  will  render  your  vic 
tory  easy  and  complete.  That  victory  will  be  used  not  to  destroy, 
but  to  recover  and  confirm  the  Union  of  the  States  on  more  equal, 
solid,  and  durable  bases. 

The  enclosed  extracts  of  letters  from  Virginia  will  enable  you  to 


1812-15.]         THE   CONVENTION   CORRESPONDENCE.  541 

estimate  the  real  power  of  that  State,  which,  by  a  few  of  her  bad 
citizens,  has  led  us  all  to  the  brink  of  ruin.  The  senator  in  the 
State  Legislature  of  Virginia  is  an  old  Revolutionary  officer,  with 
whom  I  am  acquainted,  and  a  decided  Federalist.  The  other  letter- 
writer  I  do  not  know  personally ;  a  brother  of  his,  a  Federalist,  I 
know  very  well.  They  are  of  one  of  the  wealthy  families  of  Vir 
ginia. 

The  House  of  Representatives  have  wasted  a  number  of  days  out 
the  bill  for  enabling  the  President  to  accept  the  service  of  corps  of 
volunteers ;  and  to-day  one  of  its  Kentucky  friends,  observing  that 
in  its  present  altered  form  it  was  inconsistent  and  would  be  ineffi 
cient,  moved  to  have  it  lie  on  the  table,  —  adopted.  While  under  dis 
cussion  to-day,  a  Georgia  war  man  (a  warm  blade,  named  Barnett *), 
who  seemed  to  place  no  great  confidence  in  the  volunteer  bill,  said 
the  people  had  pronounced  the  war  right,  and  they  must  be  com 
pelled  to  come  out  and  face  it.  "  We  [said  the  member]  have  fed 
this  nation  too  long  with  soft  corn,  sir :  we  have  been  afraid  of  our 
popularity,  sir."  Very  truly  and  respectfully  yours, 

TIMOTHY  PICKERING. 

PICKERING  TO  LOWELL. 

(Confidential.) 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  Nov.  7,  1814. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  observe  that  Mr.  Cabot  is  at  the  head  of  the 
list  of  the  Massachusetts  delegates  for  the  Convention  at  Hartford, 
and  I  am  glad  to  see  him  there.  His  information  is  extensive, 
his  experience  and  observation  invaluable.  I  do  not  know  who  has 
more  political  sagacity,  a  sounder  judgment,  or  more  dignity  of 
character  with  unspotted  integrity,  and  perhaps  no  man's  advice 
would  go  further  to  save  a  nation  that  was  in  his  view  solvable. 
But  does  he  not  despair  of  the  Commonwealth  ?  He  considers  the 
evil  —  the  radical  evil  —  to  be  inherent  in  the  government  itself, 
in  democracy,  and  therefore  incurable.  Will  he,  then,  think 
any  plan  which  the  wisdom  of  the  convention  may  devise  worth 
an  effort  of  his  mind  ?  Yes,  it  will  be  answered,  or  he  would  not 
have  consented  to  take  a  seat  in  it.  But  was  he  not  pressed  into 
this  situation,  reluctantly  consenting  to  take  it  ?  Much  against  his 
will,  and  contrary  to  his  own  better  judgment,  he  was  placed  at  the 

i  William  Barnett,  member  from  Georgia,  1812-1815. 


542  LIFE   AND  LETTERS   OF  GEORGE   CABOT.     [1812-15. 

head  of  the  committee  which,  in  1806,  subscribed  and  sent  to  Wash 
ington  the  remonstrance  drawn  by  Lloyd  against  the  British  doc 
trine  concerning  neutral  trade.  He  signed  it  (he  afterwards  told 
me)  officially,  as  one  of  the  merchants'  (or  town's)  committee. 

He  once  said  to  me  (perhaps  twelve  or  eighteen  months  ago), 
"  Why  can't  you  and  I  let  the  world  ruin  itself  its  own  way  ?  " 
These  were  his  words :  they  sunk  deep  into  my  mind,  and  I  confess 
to  you  that  they  never  occur  to  my  thoughts  unaccompanied  with 
regret.  In  this  wicked  world,  it  is  the  duty  of  every  good  man, 
though  he  cannot  restore  it  to  innocence,  to  strive  to  prevent  its 
growing  worse.  This  has  been  your  course.  As  Paul  among  the 
Christian  apostles,  you  among  the  political  teachers  may  say,  "  I 
have  labored  more  abundantly  than  they  all." 

Most  sincerely,  adieu.  T.  PICKERING. 

PICKERING  TO  LOWELL. 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  Nov.  28,  1814. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  Although  I  have  lately  troubled  you  with  several 
letters,  I  trust  you  will  excuse  one  more. 

As  my  thoughts  cannot  fail  of  being  much  occupied  with  the 
deplorable  condition  of  our  country,  the  cause  of  its  calamities,  the 
means  of  deliverance,  and  the  practicable  guard  against  their 
return,  —  subjects  of  the  greatest  importance,  but  of  the  greatest 
difficulty,  and  which  necessarily  turn  my  eyes  toward  the  Hartford 
Convention,  as  the  best  hope  of  our  best  men,  —  so  I  consider  it  the 
duty  of  reflecting  minds  to  contribute  whatever  occurs  that  may 
with  any  probability  merit  the  attention  of  that  body.  While, 
therefore,  I  offer  my  mite,  I  am  highly  gratified  that  this  great 
subject  now  employs  your  pen. 

Like  you,  I  have  uniformly  disclaimed  every  idea  of  a  separa 
tion  of  the  States,  while  the  liberty  and  safety  of  the  parts  can  be 
maintained  in  a  union  of  the  whole.  At  the  same  time,  I  have 
considered  that  there  may  be  evils  more  to  be  deprecated  than  a 
separation.1 

1  Colonel  Pickering  elsewhere  says  (p.  535)  that  he  even  went  so  far  as  to 
speak  of  separation  as  ultimately  advantageous.  Here  he  refers  to  it  as  an 
evil.  Colonel  Pickering  was  not  a  man  to  deceive  himself  with  phrases,  and 
then  write  them  to  John  Lowell.  Such  statements  go  far  to  disprove  Mr. 
Adams's  charge  that  the  Federalists  desired  a  dissolution  of  the  Union,  as  in 
itself  a  good  and  advantageous  thing. 


1812-15.]          THE   CONVENTION   CORRESPONDENCE.  543 

An  intelligent  member  from  Kentucky  lately  remarked  to  me 
that  a  connection  of  New  England  with  the  States  on  the  Missis 
sippi  and  its  waters  would  be  more  advantageous  to  the  former 
than  the  Southern  Atlantic  States,  because  the  latter  will  have  con 
siderable  navigation  of  their  own,  while  their  products  will  be  less 
abundant  than  those  of  the  Western  States,  which  must  for  ever 
remain  destitute  of  ships  and  seamen.  He  mentioned  their  flour, 
tobacco,  flax,  hemp,  and  cotton,  already  vast  in  amount,  and  rapidly 
increasing.  For  some  time  past,  I  had  contemplated  alike  this  sub 
ject  in  this  point  of  view,  although  formerly  I,  with  many  others, 
felt  disposed  to  let  the  Western  States  go  off,  leaving  the  "  good  old 
thirteen  States"  (as  John  Randolph  called  them)  to  themselves,  and, 
so  left,  it  is  natural  to  suppose  they  would  be  more  firmly  united ; 
for  the  Southern  States,  conscious  of  their  separate  impotence, 
would  cling  to  the  strength  of  the  North. 

After  deciding  on  the  means  of  defence  *  and  relief  from  present 
calamities,  I  presume  the  Convention  will  consider  how  we  may 
best  guard  against  their  future  recurrence,  by  amending  the  Con 
stitution.  It  may  be  necessary, — 

1.  To  abolish  negro  representation. 

2.  To  prohibit  the  durable  interruption  of  commerce  under  any 
pretence,  nor  at  all  without  the  concurrence  of  nine  of  the  Atlantic 
States. 

3.  To  render  the  President  ineligible  a  second  time. 

4.  To  prohibit  the  election  of  a  second  President  from  the  same 
State  in  immediate  succession  to  the  first. 

5.  To  restore  the  original  mode  of  electing  the   President  and 
Vice-President ;  to  prevent  the  election  of  a  fool  for  the  latter. 

6.  To  make  some  new  provision  for  appointing  to  offices,  civil 
and  military.     Ever  since  Jefferson  came  to  the  chair  of  state,  the 
public  offices  have  been  instruments  of  bribery,  more  extensive  and 
more  influential  than  the  treasury  of  England  in  the  hands  of  her 
ministers.     This  system  of  Jefferson  and  Madison  has  more  than 
all  other  causes  corrupted  the  morals  of  the  people. 

7.  To   render  naturalization   more  difficult,   and   absolutely  to 
exclude  from  office  and  from  the  national  legislature  all  who  are 
not  natives. 

1  All  these  propositions  of  Colonel  Pickering  were  considered  by  the  Con 
vention,  except  Nos.  6,  10,  and  11,  and  the  last  clause  in  No.  5,  —  "  to  prevent 
the  election  of  a  fool  as  Vice-President." 


544  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE  CABOT.     [1812-15. 

8.  To  limit  the  number  of  representatives,  which,  whatever  shall 
be  the  future  population  of  these  States,  shall  never  be  exceeded. 

9.  To  require   the  vote   of  two-thirds  or  three-fourths  of  each 
House  of  Congress  to  a  declaration  of  war. 

10.  As  a  further  check  to  the  waging  of  wars  of  ambition,  of 
pride,  of  hatred,  or  of  any  other  evil  passion,  to  prohibit  the  borrow 
ing  of  money  by  means  of  any  discount  or  bonus,  or  at  any  rate 
of  interest  higher  than  the  average  rate  of  interest  in  the  three 
States  which,  in  the  year  next  preceding  the  declaration,  shall  have 
contributed  the   largest  sums  to  the  regular  public  revenues.     If 
the  country  at  any  time  is  not  in  a  condition  to  engage  in  a  war 
without  usurious  loans,  it  will  amount  to  a  proof  that  war  ought  not 
to  be  made.     If  war  be  commenced  against  the  United  States,  and 
for  causes  so  flagrantly  unjust  as    that   the   government   cannot 
prevent  it,  then,  as  the  attack  will  rouse  the  whole  nation,  neither 
men  nor  money  can  be  withheld  in  its  defence. 

11.  What  can  be  done  with  the  country  west  of  the  Mississippi? 
If,  as  it  becomes  peopled,  new  States  are  to  be  founded,  the  old 
Atlantic  States  will  become  insignificant.     To  avoid  this  evil,  shall 
the  States  west  of  the  Mississippi  form  a  separate  confederacy  ? 

12.  It  has  more  than  once  occurred  to  me  that  the  first  power 
granted  to   Congress,  in  the  present   Constitution,  has  not  been 
accurately  understood. 

"  The  Congress  shall  have  power  — 

"  To  lay  and  collect  taxes,  duties,  imposts,  and  excises."  I  ask, 
for  what  purposes,  and  answer  in  the  words  of  the  Constitution  : 
"  to  pay  the  debts,  and  provide  for  the  common  defence  and  gen 
eral  welfare  of  the  United  States."  The  words  which  follow  prove 
this  to  be  the  correct  construction ;  "  but  all  duties,  imposts,  and 
excises  shall  be  uniform  throughout  the  United  States."  As  I 
have  often  heard  this  passage  quoted,  the  laying  and  collecting 
taxes,  &c.,  has  been  taken  for  one  power,  and  "  to  pay  the  debts, 
and  provide  for  the  common  defence  and  general  welfare  of  the 
United  States,"  as  a  separate  and  distinct  power,  and  that  of  pro 
viding  for  the  general  welfare  as  an  independent  and  universal 
power,  where  not  expressly  limited  in  other  parts  of  the  Constitu 
tion  as  a  power  to  be  exercised  in  all  things  affecting  the  general 
welfare,  without  any  reference  to  the  expenditure  of  the  "  taxes, 
duties,  imposts,  and  excises." 

Such  are  the  ideas  which  have  now  occurred  to  me;  and,  as 


1812-15.]          THE   CONVENTION  CORRESPONDENCE.  545 

possibly  you  may  think  some  of  them  proper  to  be  embraced  in 
your  inquiry,  "What  the  Convention  can  do,  and  ought  to  do," 
&c.,  I  have  taken  the  liberty  thus  to  communicate  them  for  your 
consideration. 

A  friend  of  mine  from  Albany  has  just  put  into  my  hands  a 
letter,  which,  he  says,  is  written  by  a  worthy  and  judicious  man  of 
that  city.  It  is  dated  the  23d  instant.  The  writer  says :  "  We 
have  given  up  all  hope  of  any  better  times  from  any  thing  in  the 
power  or  disposition  of  the  general  government,  and  have  turned 
our  eyes  to  the  East,  from  whence  we  hope  to  see  the  sun  of  lib 
erty  arise  once  more,  to  cheer  our  hearts  and  bless  our  country. 
Democracy  is  sinking  here  daily,  even  in  their  own  estimation. 
And,  should  the  Eastern  States  move  on  unitedly  in  the  GREAT 
WORK,  I  believe  I  may  say,  without  the  spirit  of  prophecy,  this 
State  will  wheel  in  almost  one  solid  column  in  support  of  their 
measures." 

"  The  pressure  in  this  place  for  cash  is  greater  than  has  ever 
been  known.  STATE  BANK  sick  —  cannot  take  any  food.  J.  T. 
[John  Tayler,  the  lieutenant-governor,  a  zealous  Madisonian]  is 
as  pliable  as  any  man,  —  fears  his  loan  to  government  is  gone. 
Spencer1  is  much  alarmed,  and  even  B.  Knower  speaks  evil  of  the 
administration ;  and  some  of  our  Demos,  admit  the  principle,  when 
alone,  '  that  the  Eastern  States  have  the  right  of  proceeding  to 
protect  themselves.' " 

Multitudes  in  Vermont  are  making  money  by  the  war.  And, 
considering  the  small  preponderance  of  Federalists  in  that  State, 
I  have  thought  it  prudent  in  them  to  suspend  a  co-operation  until 
the  proceedings  of  the  Convention  should  be  known,  when  Ver 
mont  can  without  difficulty  form  a  junction. 

I  am,  &c.,  T.  PICKERING. 

LOWELL  TO  PICKERING. 

(Confidential) 

BOSTON,  Dec.  3,  1814. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  You  wrote  me  on  the  7th  of  November  a  confi 
dential  letter  on  the  subject  of  the  Convention  at  Hartford,  to  which 
I  have  failed  to  reply,  owing  to  my  engagements.  My  feelings  on 
that  subject,  I  perceive,  are  very  similar  to  yours ;  how  far  our 

1  Ambrose  Spencer,  the  distinguished  lawyer  and  judge,  and  afterwards 
chief  justice  of  the  New  York  Supreme  Court. 

35 


% 


546  LIFE   AND   LETTEKS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1812-15. 

projects  would  agree  I  cannot  say.  I  gave  great  offence  during 
the  sitting  of  our  Legislature  by  openly  opposing  the  calling  a 
convention.  I  was  attacked  with  great  asperity  by  some  of  my 
best  friends,  and  among  the  rest  by  my  friend  B.  Pickman,  Jr.,1  at 
the  governor's,  who  threw  in  a  hint  or  two  also  against  me. 

But  when  I  explained  my  reasons,  which  were  that  I  was  con 
vinced  that  the  Convention  would  not  go  far  enough,  and  that  the 
first  measure  ought  to  be  to  recommend  to  the  States  to  pass  laws 
to  prevent  our  resources  in  men  and  money  from  being  withdrawn, 
they  all  started,  and  said  I  was  going  farther  than  anybody. 

I  was  always  convinced,  and  am  now,  that  the  Convention  will  do 
little  ;  that  they  will  be  ridiculed  by  one  party,  and  loudly  censured 
by  the  other.  I  admit  that  it  is  a  very  responsible  situation  and 
one  of  great  difficulty ;  but  they  ought  not  to  have  accepted  it, 
unless  they  felt,  each  one  for  himself,  that  he  was  ready  for  great 
and  decided  measures,  although  he  might  not  have  made  up  his 
opinion  as  to  what  they  would  be. 

I  say  no  man  should  have  accepted  such  an  office,  if  he  expected 
it  was  to  end  in  mere  argument  or  remonstrance. 

We  have  had  enough  of  these  from  Mr.  Gore's  admirable  report, 
in  1809,  to  Mr.  Otis's  excellent  preamble  to  the  resolutions  ap 
pointing  this  Convention.  "Words  are  exhausted.  We  have  said 
more  than  was  said  by  all  the  public  bodies  in  the  United  States 
prior  to  the  Declaration  of  Independence. 

I  was  opposed  sincerely  and  most  zealously  to  the  Convention, 
because  I  found  no  one  man  among  its  advocates  prepared  to  act. 
When  you  ask  any  of  them  what  the  Convention  will  do,  you  will 
find  it  is  expected  they  will  talk :  talk  of  amendments,  talk  of 
militia,  talk  of  defence,  talk  of  being  paid  out  of  the  national  taxes 
what  we  advance,  but  nothing  more.2  I  was  not  anxious  for  any 
decisive  measures  at  present.  I  deprecate  as  one  of  the  greatest  of 
evils  a  separation  of  the  States.8  I  thought,  arid  think  now,  that 
the  people  en  masse  will  act  in  six  or  twelve  months  more.  I  think 
the  remedy  then  will  be  more  effectual,  and  will  produce  more 
lasting  good  effects. 

But  I  was  wholly  opposed  to  a  premature  and  feeble  effort. 

1  Benjamin  Pickman,  of  Salem,  a  member  of  the  Hartford  Convention. 

2  Compare  pp.  616-520. 
8  Compare  pp.  529,  542. 


1812-15.]          THE    CONVENTION   CORRESPONDENCE.  547 

Nothing  sinks  the  character  of  a  people,  or  diminishes  the  force  and 
influence  of  a  party,  so  much  as  suppressed  efforts,  vain  and  futile 
exertions. 

For  measures  of  wisdom  and  prudence,  to  be  considered  and 
adopted  in  common  times  of  tranquillity,  perhaps  the  choice  could 
not  have  fallen  on  more  suitable  persons  than  those  selected  from 
our  State. 

Whatever  they  propose  will  be  received  with  great  respect  by 
the  people ;  and  the  boldest  measures  would  be  considered  prudent, 
if  suggested  by  them. 

But  they  are  not  calculated  for  bold  measures.  Mr.  Cabot  is 
undoubtedly  the  wisest  man  in  our  State,  or  among  the  very  wisest. 
He  has  the  best  stored  mind  of  any  man  I  ever  saw,  except  Hamil 
ton.  He  is  a  very  practical  man,  well  acquainted  with  every  thing 
which  concerns  the  best  interests  of  a  nation ;  but  Mr.  Cabot  has 
been  always  a  desponding  man  as  to  our  public  affairs,  and  their 
downward  course  has  confirmed  his  opinions.  He  hardly  thinks  the 
temporary  preservation  of  the  State  worth  the  effort,  and  he  is  most 
reluctantly  dragged  in  like  a  conscript  to  the  duty  of  a  delegate. 
He  has  no  confidence  in  the  possibility  of  awakening  the  people. 
He  will  not,  therefore,  be  in  favor  of  any  measures  which  will  dis 
turb  our  sleep.  So  at  least  I  fear,  for  I  cannot  find  out  from  him 
what  his  opinions  are. 

Mr.  Otis  is  naturally  timid,  and  frequently  wavering,  —  to-day 
bold,  and  to-morrow  like  a  hare  trembling  at  every  breeze.  It 
would  seem  by  his  language  that  he  is  prepared  for  the  very  bold 
est  measures,  but  he  receives  anonymous  letters  every  day  or  two 
threatening  him  with  bodily  harm.  It  seems  the  other  party  sus 
pect  his  firmness.  He  is  sincere  in  wishing  thorough  measures, 
but  a  thousand  fears  restrain  him. 

Bigelow  1  is  really  bold  on  the  present  question,  has  a  just  con 
fidence  in  the  power  of  Massachusetts,  sneers  as  he  ought  to  do 
(and  as  I  am  sure  I  do)  at  all  the  threats  of  vengeance  of  the  other 
States  ;  and.  if  he  was  well  supported,  I  have  no  doubt  that  meas 
ures  of  dignity  and  real  relief  would  be  adopted. 

Prescott 2  is  a  firm  man,  but  extremely  prudent,  and  so  modest 

1  Timothy  Bigelow,  Speaker  of  the  Massachusetts  House  of  Representa 
tives. 

2  William  Prescott,  son  of  Colonel  Prescott,  of  Bunker  Hill  celebrity, 
and  father  of  the  historian,  W.  H.  Prescott.     He  was  a  distinguished  lawyer, 
and  judge  of  the  Court  of  Common  Pleas  for  Suffolk. 


548  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOEGE   CABOT.     [1812-15. 

that  he  will  too  readily  yield  his  own  opinions  to  the  counsels  of 
others  whom  he  respects.  I  think  he  will  give  his  aid  to  measures 
calculated  to  procure  solid  redress. 

Mr.  Dane  l  you  know.  He  is  a  man  of  great  firmness,  approach 
ing  to  obstinacy,  singular,  impracticable,  and  of  course  it  must  be 
uncertain  what  course  he  will  take.  Honestly,  however,  inclined. 

Mr.  Wilde,2  of  Kennebec,  is  a  very  able  man,  but  one  of  very 
great  caution  and  prudence.  He  lives  among  a  people  naturally 
bad  and  violent,  and  I  should  fear  that  his  counsels  may  be  influ 
enced  by  that  circumstance. 

These  are  the  men  who  will  have  the  greatest  influence  in  our 
delegation. 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  we  had  not  chosen  two  or  three  such 
persons  as  Daniel  Sargent,  William  Sullivan,  and  Colonel  Thorn- 
dike.  I  do  not  know  that  we  have  among  the  delegates  a  single 
bold  and  ardent  man.  I  know  it  will  be  said  that  such  men  are 
not  the  fittest  for  counsel.  That  is  perhaps  true  in  common  times  ; 
but  in  times  of  great  trouble  they  are  often  the  most  proper,  and, 
indeed,  the  only  ones  fit  to  direct  and  manage  affairs. 

I  should  fear  that  the  Connecticut  delegation,  though  extremely 
respectable,  was  much  of  the  same  character. 

If  it  is  thought  expedient  that  nothing  decisive  should  be  done, 
then  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  so  respectable  a  convention  was 
called,  because  it  tends  to  degrade  and  disgrace  the  members  and 
the  people  who  sent  them. 

But,  if  effectual  measures  were  in  contemplation,  it  is  in  my 
judgment  to  be  regretted  that  some  few  more  active  and  resolute 
men  were  not  elected. 

There  does  not  seem  to  be  any  difference  in  opinion  as  to  the 
extremely  hazardous  situation  in  which  we  are  placed,  nor  as  to 
the  incapacity  and  injustice  of  our  rulers,  nor  as  to  their  having 
deserted  us,  and  in  effect  abdicated  the  government,  nor  does  there 
seem  to  be  any  hope  of  redress  in  a  usual  course.  It  is  admitted, 
also,  that  pecuniary  ruin  is  inevitable,  and  that  there  is  a  certainty 
of  national  disgrace,  and  some  danger  of  attempts  against  our  civil 
liberties.  Yet  people  seem  to  have  a  dread  of  any  effectual  meas 
ures  for  relief. 

1  Nathan  Dane.     See  note  above,  p.  533. 

2  Samuel  Sumner  Wilde.     He  was  for  thirty-five  years  a  judge  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Massachusetts,  and  one  of  the  greatest  ornaments  of  that 
bench. 


1812-15.]          THE   CONVENTION   COKRESPONDENCE.  549 

They  tell  you  how  divided  we  are,  and  how  strong  the  party  of 
government  in  other  States.  They  pretend  to  fear  a  civil  war,  if 
we  assert  our  rights. 

My  reply  is,  the  state  to  which  you  are  advancing  in  consequence 
of  the  measures  of  government  will  inevitably  produce  all  the 
evils  you  dread  of  civil  commotion  and  separation,  besides  the 
others  of  absolute  pecuniary  ruin  and  national  disgrace  ;  and,  as  to 
measures  of  relief,  the  people  are  ten  times  more  likely  to  join  you, 
if  the  measures  you  propose  are  practical,  and  bring  them  instant 
and  perfect  relief,  than  if  you  adopt  circuitous  political  schemes  to 
procure  a  distant  and  precarious  one. 

Hence  a  proposal  to  relieve  them  from  taxes  which  go  to  sup 
port  distant  States,  and  to  carry  on  a  wicked  and  useless  invasion, 
will  be  received  with  delight  by  men  of  all  parties ;  and  a  truce  or 
separate  peace  would  be  the  most  popular  measure  which  could  be 
devised. 

If  you  have,  then,  settled  in  your  consciences  that  the  government 
cannot  have  a  right  to  tax  you,  or  force  you  to  defend  yourselves, 
when  they  have  wickedly,  purposely  left  you  defenceless,  what 
should  prevent  you  from  saving  yourselves  from  destruction  ? 

It  is  answered,  the  wrath  of  the  Southern  States,  and  the  danger 
of  your  own  minority. 

As  to  the  first,  it  is  too  ludicrous  to  require  an  answer.  Under 
the  best  circumstances,  it  would  be  a  pretty  arduous  undertaking 
for  all  the  Southern  States  to  attempt  the  conquest  of  New  Eng 
land,  but,  reduced  as  they  now  are  to  indigence,  it  would  be  more 
than  Quixotic. 

As  to  our  own  minority,  there  is  nothing  which  will  ever  unite 
them  to  the  majority  so  readily  as  laws  to  prevent  the  collection  of 
the  proposed  United  States  taxes,  and  the  levy  of  troops,  and  the 
declaration  of  neutrality. 

What  a  satire  it  is  that  the  moment  the  British  take  possession 
of  any  part  of  our  country,  and  relieve  it  from  the  yoke  of  its  own 
government,  its  inhabitants  are  happy  and  grow  rich !  Its  lands 
rise  in  value,  every  species  of  property  is  enhanced  in  price,  and 
the  people  deprecate  the  prospect  of  being  relieved  by  their  own 
government.  Yet  such  is  the  fact,  in  the  two  lower  counties  of 
this  State. 

Let  no  man  fear  the  discontents  of  our  own  people.  They  will 
hail  such  events  as  blessings. 


550      LIFE  AND  LETTERS  OF  GEORGE  CABOT.  [1812-15. 

But  the  permanent  advantages  of  such  measures  will  be  greater 
than  their  immediate  effects. 

It  is  admitted  by  all  persons  that  we  must  have  some  radical 
amendment  of  the  Constitution  as  to  slave  representation,  laws 
regulating  trade,  declaring  war,  &c.  Can  this  ever  be  effected 
by  CONVENTIONS,  —  by  General  Conventions  ?  No  :  we  shall  be 
outvoted.  But  if  you  once  take  a  stand,  and  say,  "  We  go  no 
longer  on  with  you,  unless  you  agree  to  these  stipulations,"  you 
will  SUCCEED.  You  must. 

I  would  have  it  a  treaty,  not  a  constitution.  The  latter  is  mere 
paper,  violated  at  pleasure  by  interested  or  ambitious  men.  But, 
when  a  treaty  is  broken,  you  know  your  remedy. 

I  would  have  the  Northern  States  demand  of  the  Southern  States 
certain  stipulations  as  parts  of  the  compact,  which  should  be  duly 
signed  by  commissioners  and  ratified  by  the  States  respectively. 

These,  sir,  are  my  loose  ideas  on  this  subject ;  but  I  have  little, 
I  may  say  no,  hope  that  any  thing  will  be  done  except, 

1.  An  address  to  the  people  of  the  United  States,  as  a  general 
expose  of  our  grievances  ; 

2.  Proposals  for  amending  the  Constitution  by  general  conven 
tion ; 

3.  That  Congress  should  be  invited  to  permit  us  to  pay  our  own 
expenses  of  defence  out  of  the  national  tax. 

This  I  believe  is  the  project.  I  judge  it  only  from  the  coldness 
with  which  my  ideas  are  received,  and  some  hints  occasionally 
dropped. 

Yours  respectfully  and  sincerely,  J.  LOWELL. 


MORRIS  TO  PICKERING. 

DECEMBER  22,  1814. 

I  care  nothing  now  about  your  actings  and  doings.  Your 
decree  of  conscriptions  and  your  levy  of  contributions  are  alike 
indifferent  to  one  whose  eyes  are  fixed  on  a  Star  in  the  East, 
which  he  believes  to  be  the  dayspring  of  freedom  and  glory.  The 
traitors  and  madmen  assembled  at  Hartford  will,  I  believe,  if  not 
too  tame  and  timid,  be  hailed  hereafter  as  the  patriots  and  sages  of 
their  day  and  generation.  May  the  blessing  of  God  be  upon  them, 
to  inspire  their  counsels  and  prosper  their  resolutions. 

Believe  me  always  and  truly  yours,  Gouv.  MORRIS. 


1812-15.]          THE   CONVENTION    CORRESPONDENCE.  551 


PICKERING  TO  HILLHOUSE. 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  Dec.  16,  1814. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  am  now  sitting  alone  in  our  old  chamber  in 
the  "  Six  Buildings,"  from  which  we  attacked  the  embargo,  while 
you  are  in  council  with  the  wise  men  of  the  East.  I  do  not  con 
sider  the  New  England  Convention  as  consulting  for  those  States 
alone,  but  for  the  Federalists  generally  throughout  the  United 
States.  In  other  words,  I  consider  the  interests  of  the  great  body 
(certainly  the  most  valuable  portion)  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States  as  resting  on  the  result  of  your  proceedings.  I  am  sure 
there  is  no  lack  of  wisdom  :  it  would  not  be  an  easy  matter  to 
assemble  an  equal  number  of  other  citizens,  where  equal  wisdom 
could  be  found.  But  a  full  knowledge  of  the  evils  demanding 
remedies,  and  a  forcible  representation  of  them,  will  make  no  im 
pression  on  the  hardened  sinners  upon  whose  heads  those  evils  must 
be  laid.  I  deprecate  every  thing  which  shall  simply  be  put  on  paper. 
We  have  too  long  contented  ourselves  with  memorials  and  remon 
strances  :  they  procure  for  us  nought  but  contempt.  And  contempt 
from  wretches  in  power,  who  are  themselves  so  contemptible,  is 
sufficiently  provoking.  When  I  look  round  me,  and  see  vice  and 
presumptuous  ignorance  triumphing  over  wisdom  and  virtue, — 
triumphing  in  cases  involving  the  character  and  great  interests  of 
the  country,  and  putting  our  liberties  in  jeopardy,  —  it  is  impossible 
to  repress  my  indignant  feelings.  If  the  Convention  leave  us  in 
this  miserable  situation,  we  may  despair  of  the  Commonwealth. 
Strong  measures  alone  will  procure  relief.  Their  strength  and 
boldness  will  render  them  efficient.  From  sound  Federalists  in 
this  portion  of  the  Union,  I  have  for  years  heard  only  this  declara 
tion,  "  We  look  to  New  England  for  salvation." 

I  wished,  my  good  friend,  for  an  earlier  interposition  of  New 
England  to  stay  the  hands  of  destroyers.  Obsta  principiis  was 
the  governing  maxim,  when  we  resisted  incipient  oppression  by  the 
mother  country,  —  an  oppression  rather  in  prospect  than  in  action. 
But  for  the  last  several  years  we  have  been  submitting  to  one  act 
of  tyranny  after  another,  until  the  people,  familiarized  to  oppres 
sion,  have  their  spirits  depressed  and  humbled  to  a  degree  which, 
if  longer  borne,  will  render  the  cause  of  our  country  hopeless.  It 
is  necessary  for  the  Convention  to  take  those  firm  and  decided 
steps  which  will  rouse  the  people  from  the  spell  which,  through  an 


552  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1812-15. 

unfounded  fear  of  breaking  the  Union,  the  boldness  and  impu 
dence  of  political  mountebanks  have  imposed  upon  them.  You  have 
nothing  to  apprehend  from  the  most  imbecile  of  all  governments, 
and  certainly  nothing  from  individual  States.  Those  which 
eagerly  approved  the  war  are  exhausted.  Virginia  cannot  protect 
herself.  Her  militia  have  been  called  forth  the  past  summer  and 
autumn,  and  are  thoroughly  disgusted.  Their  rulers  seem  to  have 
paid  less  attention  to  them  than  to  their  slaves.  I  have  read  a 
letter,  dated  at  Richmond  the  2d  of  November,  from  a  senator  in 
their  State  Legislature  to  his  son-in-law  in  Congress,  in  which  he 
says,  "  We  have  an  army  of  militia,  chiefly  from  twelve  to  ten 
miles  below,  who  are  generally  very  sickly,  dying,  and  suffering 
for  almost  every  military  and  camp  accommodation."  A  very 
v  orthy  and  intelligent  Virginian  member  of  Congress,  who  has  had 
a  son  (a  lieutenant)  with  the  militia  at  Norfolk,  informs  me  that 
of  the  militia  of  that  State,  which  has  been  called  to  the  defence  of 
Norfolk,  between  three  and  four  thousand  have  perished.  A  letter 
from  my  friend,  the  Adjutant- General l  of  Massachusetts,  recently 
received,  informs  me  that  of  the  three  thousand  six  hundred  militia 
called  out  by  Governor  Strong  for  the  protection  of  Boston,  and  who 
were  in  service  about  two  months,  three  only  died,  and  one  of  the 
three  from  an  injury  received  at  home.  I  have  read  another  letter, 
dated  October  3 1 .  to  the  same  member  of  Congress,  from  a  respect 
able  Virginia  gentleman,  who  had  then  just  been  in  the  lower 
parts  of  the  northern  neck  in  Virginia,  which  had  been  visited  by 
the  British.  He  says  :  — 

"  You,  believe  me,  can  have  no  idea  of  the  losses,  sufferings, 
and  dreadful  distresses  with  which  the  inhabitants  of  it  are  encir 
cled.  The  idea  of  the  war's  continuing  fills  them  with  complete 
horror.  For  they  say,  and  truly,  that  the  lakes,  frontiers,  fish 
eries,  &c.,  are  phantoms  to  them,  when  brought  into  competition 
with  their  exposed  and  ruined  situation.  In  short,  a  more  misera 
ble,  ill-fated,  poor  set  of  men  never  lived.  I  am  confident,  if  some 
prompt  and  efficient  measures  are  not  adopted  by  Congress  (for 
it  seems  the  Virginia  Legislature  will  not  do  any  thing)  for  their 
relief,  they  will  take  care  of  themselves  by  entering  into  the  best 
terms  they  can  with  the  enemy." 

"  I  admire  greatly,  indeed,  the  resolute  conduct  of  Massachusetts 
and  her  sister  States  of  the  East.  They  have  the  firmness  and 
the  virtue,  I  am  persuaded,  to  wield  their  counsels  in  such  a  manner 

1  General  John  Brooks. 


1812-15.]          THE   CONVENTION   CORRESPONDENCE.  553 

as  to  compel  the  obdurate  President  and  his  execrable  followers  to 
abandon  their  foolish  measures  of  conquest,  and  to  withdraw  our 
armies  into  the  Union  for  the  protection  of  the  country." 

The  writer  subjoined  to  his  letter  what  follows :  "  Your  old 
acquaintance,  Colonel  John  Taylor,1  of  Caroline,  is  out  of  all  kind 
of  patience  with  Madison  and  his  party.  He  declares  that  the 
government  is  positively  mad,  and  that  the  British  will  another 
summer  get  this  whole  lower  country :  this  he  said  yesterday." 

It  seems  to  be  the  opinion  (certainly  the  fearful  apprehension) 
of  Western  men  that  New  Orleans  will  be  taken  by  the  British. 
If  well  conducted,  the  expedition  can  hardly  fail.  If  it  succeeds, 
it  will  be  with  a  view  to  hold  it ;  and  hold  it  they  will,  against 
the  whole  force  of  the  Western  States,  such  is  the  nature  of  the 
ground  on  the  Isle  of  Orleans.  For  about  thirty  miles  above 
the  city,  the  strip  of  land  is  but  a  mile  wide,  between  the  Missis 
sippi  and  impassable  swamps.  This  fact  has  been  stated  to  me  by 
Mr.  Brown,  one  of  the  senators  from  Louisiana.  I  asked  him  the 
question,  whether,  if  once  in  possession  of  Orleans  City,  the 
British  could  be  expelled  ?  He  answered,  "  It  would  be  extremely 
difficult  to  dislodge  them."  I  am  confident  it  will  be  impracticable. 
It  will  be  easy  to  erect  an  impassable  barrier  from  the  river  to  the 
swamp.  And  their  armed  vessels  and  boats  on  the  river  would 
render  the  post  unassailable  by  water.  On  the  other  side  of  the 
city,  the  creek  (bayou  St.  John)  connected  with  Lake  Pontchar- 
train  approaches  within  four  or  five  miles.  But  this  also,  accord 
ing  to  my  information,  will  give  no  room  for  an  enemy  to  land, 
being  so  easily  defended.  And  it  is  for  this  reason  concluded  that 
the  British  will  make  their  attempt  by  ascending  the  Mississippi. 

From  the  moment  the  British  possess  New  Orleans,  the  Union 
is  severed.  They  will  not  intermeddle  with  the  governments  of 
the  Western  States  :  these  will  be  told  to  manage  their  own  affairs 
in  their  own  way.  New  Orleans  will  be  the  market  for  all  their 
productions,  which  will  be  transported  in  British  ships  to  every 
country  in  the  world  where  there  is  a  demand  for  them.  Their 
tobacco  will  find  a  market  in  Europe.  Their  cotton  will  all  be 
wanted  in  the  British  manufactories,  and  their  hemp  for  their 
ships.  Their  flour,  when  they  shall  have  improved  their  mills,  and 
their  beef  and  pork  when  they  shall  have  learned  better  to  cure  and 
pack  them,  will  go  wherever  men  want  food.  What  now  constitutes 

1  See  above,  p.  442. 


554  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE    CABOT.     [1812-15 

the  State  of  Louisiana  will  be  changed  to  a  province,  with  a  legiti 
mate  annexation  of  West  Florida  by  cession  from  Spain.  The 
bulk  of  the  inhabitants,  bred  under  monarchies,  will  not  dislike  the 
change ;  while  the  whole  population,  French,  Spaniards,  and 
Americans,  finding  themselves  in  the  possession  of  self-government 
to  every  useful  purpose,  under  a  provincial  Legislature,  with  a 
British  governor  (who,  from  the  immense  importance  of  the 
charge,  will  be  one  of  their  ablest  men),  will  be  quite  as  well 
satisfied  (I  am  sure  they  will  have  reason  to  be  so)  as  with  the 
creature  first  imposed  on  them  by  Jefferson,  and  since  continued 
by  the  votes  of  the  busy  electioneering  portion  of  the  people,  who 
are  not  seldom  their  own  worst  enemies. 

The  Western  people  will  have  no  choice  ;  and,  after  a  little 
experience,  they  will  not  be  displeased  with  their  new  situation. 
Their  products  will  probably  find  more  extensive  markets  than 
they  would  as  members  of  our  Union.  When  peace  takes  place, 
should  the  cottons  of  Carolina  and  Georgia  interfere  with  theirs  in 
the  British  markets,  a  small  extra  duty  may  be  imposed  on  the 
former.  The  incalculable  advantages  Great  Britain  will  derive 
from  the  acquisition  of  Orleans  will  induce  her  to  cherish  the 
good-will  of  the  Western  people.  This,  indeed,  will  require  no 
more  than  a  reasonable  attention  to  their  interests,  and  this  again 
will  best  promote  those  of  Great  Britain. 

Thus  will  Great  Britain  be  virtually  possessed  of  immensely 
rich  provinces,  increasing  in  population  more  rapidly  than  ever, 
without  the  trouble  and  expense  of  governing  and  defending 
them. 

This  severance  will  of  course  annihilate  the  war  debt.  The 
Western  States  will  also  take  to  themselves  all  the  public  lands  ; 
while  they  will  excuse  themselves  from  paying  any  part  of  the 
debt  of  our  Revolution,  for  which  those  lands  were  pledged.  Their 
annual  sales  will  yield  a  revenue  equal  to  the  maintenance  of  all 
their  State  governments. 

Such  are  my  speculations,  arising  out  of  the  present  state  of 
things.  And,  should  the  British  succeed  at  New  Orleans,  I  shall 
consider  the  views  I  have  here  exhibited  as  pro  facto  realized.  In 
one  or  two  years,  if  the  whole  were  left  to  the  choice  of  the 
Western  people,  prompted  by  the  most  powerful  interests,  they 
would  adopt  them,  while  at  the  instant  they  must  yield  to  neces 
sity.  And,  as  in  their  whole  intercourse  with  those  who  at  present 


1812-15.]          THE   CONVENTION   CORRESPONDENCE.  555 

are  enemies,  they  will  hear  and  read  the  English  language  only, 
they  will  soon  forget  that  they  had  not  always  been  one  nation. 

One  more  remark :  should  the  severance  above  mentioned  take 
place,  from  that  moment  the  necessity  of  union  among  the  Atlantic 
States  will  strike  every  man  who  thinks,  as  forcibly  as  during  our 
Revolution ;  and  the  feebleness  of  the  States  south  of  the  Potomac 
will  urge  them  to  cling  to  those  of  the  North,  as  the  Connecticut 
vine  to  the  tree  which  supports  it.  The  terms  of  a  new  compact 
will  be  adapted  to  this  new  state  of  things. 

I  am,  &c.,  T.  PICKERING.' 


PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  Dec.  31,  1814. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  It  is  a  good  while  since  I  troubled  you  with  a 
letter,  because  your  own  reflections  run  before  mine,  even  when  I 
fall  into  the  same  track.  I  now  write  to  communicate  some  short 
extracts  from  a  letter  of  the  22d  instant  from  Gouverneur  Morris,  in 
answer  to  one  from  me  of  the  loth.  These  extracts  exhibit  the 
high  expectations  formed  by  him  of  the  result  of  the  deliberations 
of  the  Hartford  Convention.  He  is  not  singular  in  his  expecta 
tions,  accompanied  with  some  apprehensions  that  the  result  will 
not  rise  to  the  existing  emergency  and  impending  prospects. 

I  stated  to  Mr.  Morris  that  John  Francis  Mercer1  (who,  I 
believe,  was  in  Congress  in  Philadelphia  while  you  were  a  member 
of  the  Senate)  said,  in  a  letter  which  I  had  read,  that  the  clause  in 
the  Constitution  giving  power  to  Congress  "  to  borrow  money,"  ran 
originally,  "  To  borrow  money  and  emit  bills  of  credit ;  "  and  was 
struck  out  on  the  motion  of  Mr.  Morris,  after  a  full  discussion, 
the  question  being  carried  "  almost  by  acclamation."  Mr.  Morris 
does  not  recollect  it,  but  says  a  proposition  to  issue  paper  money 
must  have  met  with  all  the  opposition  he  could  make,  because 
leading  to  a  violation  of  contracts.  I  had  remarked  in  my  letter 
that  treasury  notes  were  paper  money,  or  bills  of  credit.  He  says  : 
'•  It  is  too  late  to  examine  the  nature  of  treasury  notes.  Their 
race  is  run.  Your  new  bank  is  a  new  folly.  Your  taxes  will  not 
sustain  your  system.  Paper  money  will  issue,  and  plunge  you 
still  deeper  in  distress.  All  the  schemes  hitherto  proposed  are 

1  Mr.  Mercer  was  member  of  Congress  from  Maryland,  in  1792-1794, 
and  afterwards  governor  of  the  State. 


556  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1812-15. 

inefficient.  Do  not  ask  me  why,  for  I  will  not  discuss  a  subject 
which  is  no  longer  of  importance.  When  the  North  and  the  East 
cast  off  the  old  form,  if  the  new  one  they  put  on  be  good,  they 
shall  not  suffer  on  the  score  of  finance." 

"  I  care  nothing  now  about  your  actings  and  doings.  Your  de 
cree  of  conscriptions  and  your  levy  of  contributions  are  alike  in 
different  to  one  whose  eyes  are  fixed  on  a  Star  in  the  East,  which 
he  believes  to  be  the  dayspring  of  freedom  and  glory.  The 
traitors  and  madmen  assembled  at  Hartford  will,  I  believe,  if  not 
too  tame  and  timid,  be  hailed  hereafter  as  the  patriots  and  sages 
of  their  day  and  generation.  May  the  blessing  of  God  be  upon 
them,  to  inspire  their  counsels  and  prosper  their  resolutions." 

In  adverting  to  the  discussions  at  Ghent,  Mr.  Morris  says, 
"  I  thought  the  enemy's  first  overture  should  have  been  seized." 
So  I  thought,  and  so  wrote  to  Governor  Strong  and  Mr.  Lowell, 
as  soon  as  I  had  read  the  first  despatches,  and  was  happy  to  find 
a  perfect  agreement  in  our  opinions.  It  is  now  too  late.  The  uti 
possidetis  (with  some  modifications)  will  be  the  basis  of  the  final 
negotiations.  If  the  British  take  New  Orleans,  they  will  hold  it, 
and  thus  command  the  productions  and  commerce  of  a  country 
worth  ten  Canadas.  It  is  possible  they  may  then  relinquish  the 
country  east  of  Penobscot  River.  On  the  subject  of  the  British 
capturing  New  Orleans  and  its  consequences,  I  wrote  on  the  16th 
of  the  month  to  my  friend  Hillhouse.  I  do  not  know  that  he  has 
received  it. 

The  majority  in  the  House  were  determined  to  pass  the  bank- 
bill  (fifty  millions  capital)  yesterday,  and  were  reluctantly  induced 
to  adjourn  after  the  death  of  the  Virginia  senator,  Brent,  had 
been  omciallly  announced.  The  Virginia  representatives  them 
selves  (with  one  or  two  exceptions)  voted  against  adjourning, — 
the  pretence,  with  the  majority,  because  the  official  message  was 
delivered  by  the  Senate's  Secretary,  verbally;  and  the  majority 
had  again  called  up  the  bill,  when  a  letter  from  the  senatorial 
committee  of  arrangement  for  the  funeral,  brought  up  and  handed 
to  the  Speaker  by  a  member  of  the  House  (who  suspected  foul 
management,  and  therefore  went  for  it),  being  read,  they  could  re 
sist  no  longer,  and  adjourned.  On  Monday  a  decision  will  doubt 
less  take  place.  In  the  mean  time,  an  attempt  will  be  made  for  a 
compromise,  of  a  bank  with  twenty-five  millions  capital,  on  proper 
banking  principles ;  but,  as  this  could  not  supply  the  government 


1812-15.]          THE  CONVENTION   COKKESPONDENCE.  557 

with  thirty  millions  of  dollars  on  loan,  the  compromise  will  proba 
bly  not  take  place. 

I  am,  dear  sir,  faithfully  yours,  T.  PICKERING. 

PICKERING  TO  STRONG. 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  Jan.  9,  1815. 

DEAR  SIR, —  .  .  .  Another  subject  of  the  first  magnitude 
claims  attention,  —  the  British  expedition  to  New  Orleans.  I  ex 
pect  they  will  take  it ;  and,  if  they  take  it,  they  will  hold  it.  It 
will  constitute  the  main  article  of  the  rule  of  pacification,  —  uti 
possidetis.  A  severance  of  the  Union  will  inevitably  follow.  The 
train  of  consequences,  as  I  have  a  good  while  since  stated  them  to 
my  friends  in  conversation,  I  will  take  the  liberty  of  presenting  to 
your  view,  in  the  course  of  one  or  two  days. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be  very  respectfully,  dear  sir, 

Your  obedient  servant,  TIMOTHY  PICKERING. 


PICKERING  TO  STRONG. 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  Jan.  10,  1815. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  In  a  short  letter  of  yesterday,  I  mentioned  my  in 
tention  of  presenting  to  you  the  view  I  had  taken  of  the  British 
expedition  to  New  Orleans,  and  its  consequences. 

Although  rumor  announced  New  Orleans  as  the  object  of  the 
British  armaments  preparing  in  England  and  Ireland,  I  had  not 
turned  my  thoughts  that  way,  until  I  read  Admiral  Cochrane's 
letter  of  the  17th  of  September  to  the  Lords  Commissioners  of  the 
Admiralty,  giving  an  account  of  the  expedition  against  Baltimore. 
He  says,  "  the  approaching  equinoctial  new  moon  rendering  it  un 
safe  to  proceed  immediately  out  of  the  Chesapeake  with  the 
combined  expedition,  to  act  upon  the  plans  which  had  been  con 
certed  previous  to  the  departure  of  the  "  Iphigenia,"  &c.,  he  and 
General  Ross  resolved  to  employ  the  interval  "  in  making  a  de 
monstration  upon  the  city  of  Baltimore,  which  might  be  converted 
into  a  real  attack,"  &c.  No  object  of  magnitude  for  a  great  and 
"  combined  expedition  out  of  the  Chesapeake "  occurring,  except 
New  Orleans,  I  concluded  that  to  be  its  destination.  Instantly,  the 
powerful  inducements  to  undertake  it,  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain, 
and  the  consequences  to  the  United  States,  rushed  into  my  mind. 


558  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1812-15. 

The  collected  force,  compared  with  the  means  of  defence,  gave  a 
moral  certainty  of  success.  The  place  captured  will  be  held.  So 
costly  an  armament  is  not  designed  to  gain  a  pledge  for  a  peace. 
Permanent  dominion  is  in  view.  Last  summer  I  entertained  the 
opinion  that  Great  Britain,  without  indulging  a  spirit  of  resentment 
and  revenge,  would  look  forward  to  her  lasting  interests  (which  I 
considered  as  involved  in  a  renewal  and  continuance  of  a  free  and 
extensive  commercial  intercourse  with  the  United  States),  and  make 
peace ;  only  maintaining,  in  their  full  extent,  her  maritime  rights. 
But  now  these  rights  are  not  contested  by  the  United  States.  The 
return  of  peace  will  of  course  restore  commerce,  the  exchange  of 
commodities  commensurate  with  our  wants  ;  and,  by  the  conquest 
of  New  Orleans,  Great  Britain,  without  losing  her  commerce  with 
the  Atlantic  States,  will  engross  the  commerce  of  the  Western 
States  and  Territories,  increasing  and  multiplying  so  long  as  vacant 
lands  remain.  One  objection  occurred  to  this  immense  project : 
that,  as  the  European  nations  were  endeavoring  to  adjust  a  balance 
of  power,  the  acquisition  of  the  Western  World  by  Great  Britain 
might  give  umbrage  to  her  neighbors,  especially  to  the  maritime 
powers.  But  a  moment's  reflection  obviated  this  objection.  Great 
Britain  will  be  wise  enough  to  limit  her  actual,  formal  dominion 
to  the  State  of  Louisiana,  which  she  will  convert  into  a  province, 
holding  the  Isle  of  Orleans  and  the  portion  of  the  State  westward 
of  the  Mississippi  by  right  of  conquest,  and  the  portion  eastward 
of  the  river  (West  Florida)  by  cession  from  Spain.  The  States 
and  Territories  above  the  State  of  Louisiana  she  will  leave  to 
govern  themselves.  She  will  have  no  interest  to  intermeddle  in 
their  internal  affairs :  she  wants  nothing  of  them  but  their  produc 
tions  ;  and  these  she  can  command,  without  making  one  effort  or 
even  issuing  one  order,  for  that  purpose.  She  need  only  tell  them  : 
"  New  Orleans  is  your  market.  I  want  your  tobacco  for  the  Euro 
pean  consumption,  your  hemp  for  my  ships,  your  cotton  for  my 
manufactories  ;  your  flour,  beef,  and  pork  for  my  own  colonies 
(where  they  would  be  admitted  in  vessels  of  the  United  States, 
only  in  cases  of  scarcity),  and  for  all  other  colonies  and  countries 
where  men  want  food.  You  are  now  independent  in  your  govern 
ments :  continue  so.  I  have  no  interest  or  desire  to  interfere. 
With  British  manufactures  and  all  foreign  articles  of  merchandise, 
I  will  supply  you  at  the  first  hand,  and  unburthened  with  the  enor 
mous  duties  and  imposts  laid  upon  them  in  the  Atlantic  States : 


1812-15.]          THE   CONVENTION   CORRESPONDENCE.  5o9 

what  imposts  shall  be  charged  will  be  comparatively  small.  Speak 
ing  the  same  language,  you  will  find  the  same  facility  of  intercourse 
at  New  Orleans,  as  if  the  same  had  continued  a  part  of  the  United 
States.  Besides,  the  Americans  now  there,  and  all  others  from 
your  countries  or  from  the  Atlantic  States  who  choose  to  remain  or 
to  resort  there,  will  enjoy  equal  advantages  with  British  subjects." 
Under  such  circumstances,  why  should  the  Western  people  hesi 
tate  a  moment  ?  Their  interests  would  compel  their  acquiescence, 
and  soon,  very  soon,  their  inclinations  would  concur  with  their 
interests.  Perhaps  they  would  form  a  new  confederacy.  But 
confederated  or  severally  independent,  being  in  possession  of  the 
vacant  public  lands,  they  can  appropriate  them  to  their  own  uses 
exclusively.  If  they  admit  the  Atlantic  States  to  any  participa 
tion,  it  will  be  well ;  but  our  right  to  it  would  not  be  enforced. 
Those  lands  annually  sold  will  defray  all  the  expenses  of  their 
several  governments,  and  exempt  the  people  from  taxes.  They 
may  also  throw  off  the  public  debt,  and  thus  rid  themselves  of  the 
oppressive  taxes,  which  its  payment  would  require.  With  all 
these  advantages,  migration  from  the  Atlantic  States  will  continue, 
and  with  large  increase.  With  this  severance  of  the  Union,  I 
expect,  indeed,  the  war  debt  will  be  annihilated.  This  will  not 
grieve  me.  The  debt  of  the  Revolution  I  view  in  a  different  light : 
it  was  the  price  of  the  independence  of  the  thirteen  Atlantic  States. 
These  will  remain  united,  or  reunite  and  provide  for  that  debt.  I 
also  conclude  that,  in  the  event  of  the  separation  of  the  Western 
States,  those  on  the  Atlantic  will  be  more  closely  united  than  ever, 
and  by  a  new  compact,  to  obviate  the  evils  which  experience  has 
shown  may  be  introduced  under  that  now  existing. 

I  am,  dear  sir,  most  respectfully  yours, 

TIMOTHY  PICKERING. 


GoRE1  TO  STRONG. 

WASHINGTON  CITY  Jan.  14,  1815. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  The  bill  for  State  troops2  has  passed  the 
House  with  an  amendment  to  the  only  section  interesting  to  us, 
said  not  to  be  important. 

1  At  this  time  Senator  from  Massachusetts. 

2  This  was  the  measure  which  the  Hartford  Convention  demanded  as 
necessary  to  the  defence  of  the  New  England  States. 


560  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1812-15. 

The  result  of  the  Hartford  Convention  is  here,  and  affords  satis 
faction  to  most,  if  not  to  all,  —  to  some,  because  they  see  not  the 
point  nor  consequence  of  the  recommendation  as  relates  to  taxes. 

The  gentlemen  had  a  difficult  task,  which,  according  to  my  poor 
judgment,  they  have  executed  with  wisdom  and  discretion. 

With  great  respect,  I  remain,  my  dear  sir, 

Your  faithful  friend  and  obedient  servant,         C.  GORE. 


GORE  TO  STRONG. 

JAN.  17,  1816. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  received  your  favor  from  North  Hampton, 
and,  in  common  with  all  good  men,  rejoice  that  you  allow  me  to 
indulge  the  hope  you  will  continue  where  you  are  during  the  war ; 
indeed,  I  consider  your  term  of  enlistment  to  be  for  and  during 
the  war.  If  peace  ever  arrive  in  our  day,  I  shall  consider  some  of 
our  evils  removed,  and  all  will  be  changed. 

I  wish  I  could  perceive  the  smallest  chance  of  doing  good  here. 
We  can  only  look  for  a  change  of  miseries.  What  will  follow 
these,  now  endured,  it  is  not  easy  to  conjecture. 

I  remain,  dear  sir,  your  faithful  friend,  C.  GORE. 


EXTRACT  FROM  A  LETTER  OF  DR.  LOGAN  TO  PICKERING. 

JAN.  19,1815. 

I  have  with  pleasure  perused  the  proceedings  of  the  Hartford 
Convention.  The  prudence  and  magnanimity  of  that  body  does 
the  greatest  credit  to  its  patriotic  spirit,  and  may  afford  a  rallying 
point  to  our  distracted  country.  It  appears  nothing  of  wisdom  can 
be  expected  from  our  public  councils  at  Washington. 

GORE  TO  STRONG. 

GEORGETOWN,  Jan.  22,  1815. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  The  Congress  have  passed  the  bank  bill,  as 
it  last  came  from  the  House  of  Representatives.  There  is  some 
question  whether  the  President  will  sign  the  act.  This  doubt 
arises  from  its  not  containing  a  clause  authorizing  the  issue  of 
notes,  which  the  corporation  shall  be  under  no  obligation  to  meet 
with  specie. 


1812-15.]         THE  CONVENTION   CORRESPONDENCE.  561 

Mr.  Dallas  has  proposed  to  raise  five  millions  of  dollars  more 
for  the  current  year.  Three  millions  of  this  to  be  on  income. 
This  is  a  direct  tax,  and,  if  assessed,  must  be  apportioned  on  the 
States,  according  to  the  Constitution.  He  proposes  a  tax  of  one 
dollar  per  barrel  on  flour,  in  the  hands  of  the  miller.  He  proposes 
a  further  stamp  duty:  viz.,  on  all  bonds,  mortgages,  conveyances  of 
every  kind,  policies  of  insurance,  bottomry  bonds,  &c. ;  on  wills 
and  testaments,  inventories  of  the  estates  of  deceased  persons,  dis 
tributions  and  successions,  —  that  is  to  say,  legacies  and  devises, 
property  by  descent,  &c.  Mortified  with  the  failure  of  his  scheme 
of  a  bank,  he  may  have  done  this  with  the  view  of  pressing  Con 
gress  to  emit  bills  of  credit,  or  to  pass  some  bill  supplemental  to 
the  act  instituting  a  bank,  authorizing  that  institution  to  issue 
their  notes,  and  loan  to  government  a  large  sum  in  bills,  which  the 
corporation  shall  not  be  obliged  to  redeem  with  specie. 

These  appear  to  me  the  spasms  of  a  dying  government.  From 
New  Orleans  we  have  nothing  further  than  what  the  newspapers 
afford.  Our  last  accounts  from  that  place  are  only  to  the  morning 
of  the  24th  of  December. 

The  bill  authorizing  the  raising  of  State  troops  by  the  States, 
and  at  the  expense  of  the  United  States,  according  to  the  plan 
sent  you  some  time  since,  has  passed  both  Houses.  Thus  one  part 
of  the  recommendation  of  the  Hartford  Convention  seems  to  be 
adopted.  The  other,  that  to  authorize  the  States  to  receive  the 
taxes,  will  probably  be  more  difficult  to  be  attained.  The  accession 
to  this  seems  not  to  accord  with  Mr.  Monroe's  intimation  in  your 
letter,  or  rather  in  his  letter  to  you.  Indeed,  if  they  have  fears  of 
the  State  governments,  one  can  hardly  account  for  this  govern 
ment's  authorizing  the  States  to  raise  and  keep  in  pay  at  the  ex 
pense  of  the  United  States  troops  which  may  be  used  for  purposes 
hostile  to  or  not  conformable  with  the  views  of  the  paymaster. 

I  remain,  my  dear  sir,  very  truly  your  faithful  friend  and  obe 
dient  servant,  C.  GORE. 

PICKERING  TO  LOWELL. 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  Jan.  23,  1815. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  — I  have  had  the  pleasure  to  receive  your  letter 
of  the  16th  inst.  I  regret  that  I  did  not  acknowledge  the  receipt  of 
your  very  interesting  confidential  letter  of  December  3d,  and  thus 
have  prevented  the  anxiety  which  the  omission  has  occasioned.  It 

36 


562  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1812-15. 

seemed  that  I  might  have  communicated  some  parts  of  it  to  partic 
ular  friends ;  but  it  has  so  happened  that  I  remain  the  sole  deposi 
tary  of  its  contents,  and  now  no  motive  occurs  to  me  for  divulging 
any  of  your  sentiments. 

I  believe  that  some  of  my  very  cautious  friends  and  acquaintances 
think  me  too  ardent  in  whatever  pursuits  of  a  public  nature  my 
attention  becomes  engaged,  and  hence  it  may  have  been  supposed 
that  I  was  not  quite  satisfied  with  the  doings' of  the  Convention. 
The  fact,  however,  is  otherwise ;  and,  as  you  have  been  pleased  to 
ask  my  opinion,  I  will  express  it  with  my  habitual  frankness. 

I  think  the  report  of  the  Convention  bears  the  high  character 
of  wisdom,  firmness,  and  dignity.  They  have  explicitly  pronounced 
sentence  of  condemnation  upon  a  miserable  administration,  and, 
stamped  as  it  is  with  the  authority  of  a  body  of  men  so  eminently 
distinguished,  that  judgment  cannot  fail  of  making  a  just  impres 
sion  where  it  is  needed.  They  have  made  a  declaration  of  prin 
ciples  the  landmarks  by  which  Legislatures  and  the  people  may 
direct  their  course.  And  they  have,  in  terms  that  none  can  mis 
take,  and  which  our  rulers,  whatever  for  a  time  they  may  effect, 
will  not  venture  to  disregard,  manifested  a  determination  to  apply 
those  principles  in  corresponding  measures,  when  the  future  con 
duct  or  neglects  of  the  government  shall  require  their  application. 

In  their  proposed  amendments  of  the  Constitution,  I  have  the 
satisfaction  to  find  that  all,  save  that  which  regards  the  admission 
of  new  States  into  the  Union,  were  among  those  which  I  took  the 
liberty  to  intimate  to  you  in  my  letter  of  the  28th  of  November. 
One  which  I  had  deemed  of  vital  importance  is  omitted,  that  re 
specting  the  appointment  of  public  officers.  I  was  aware  of  its 
intrinsic  difficulties ;  while  the  observation  of  fourteen  years  had 
convinced  me  that  it  was  the  great  instrument  of  corruption,  and 
more  than  all  other  means  had  confirmed  and  extended  the  power 
arid  influence  of  the  executive.  Probably  the  Convention  thought 
that  the  limitation  of  the  President's  power  by  a  single  election, 
both  as  to  the  person  and  the  State  from  which  he  should  be  taken, 
would  furnish  an  adequate  check.  Or  it  might  be  among  the  num 
ber  of  further  amendments  alluded  to  as  expedient,  but  under  the 
circumstances  mentioned  less  urgent  than  the  others,  and  there 
fore  not  explicitly  stated. 

With  regard  to  the  admission  of  new  States  into  the  Union, 
events  with  which  the  present  moment  is  teeming  may  take  away 


1812-15.]         THE   CONVENTION  CORRESPONDENCE.  563 

the  subject  itself.  If  the  British  succeed  in  their  expedition  against 
New  Orleans,  —  and,  if  they  have  tolerable  leaders,  I  see  no  reason 
to  doubt  of  their  success,  —  I  shall  consider  the  Union  as  severed. 
This  consequence  I  deem  inevitable.  I  do  not  expect  to  see  a 
single  representative  in  the  next  Congress  from  the  Western  States. 
Those  States,  with  the  Territories,  will  be  under  the  necessity  of 
being  at  peace  with  the  British ;  and  they  will  make  a  virtue  of 
necessity,  and  this  necessity  they  will  soon  find  to  have  materially 
promoted  their  interests.  All  the  public  lands  west  of  the  Alle- 
ghany  Mountains  will  go  with  them.  Migrations  thither  from  all 
the  Eastern  States  have  been  constant  during  the  war,  and  its  con 
tinuance  will  increase  them.  But,  without  entering  farther  on  this 
subject,  permit  me  to  refer  you  to  a  late  letter  from  me  to  Gov 
ernor  Strong,  in  which  I  have  sketched  the  great  and,  in  my  view, 
certain  consequences  of  the  capture  of  Orleans.  Indeed,  I  wish 
you  to  read  it.  Yours,  &c.,  &c.,  TIMOTHY  PICKERING. 

EXTRACT  FROM  A  LETTER  OF  HILLHOUSE  TO  PICKERING. 

FEB.  7,  1815. 

I  was  much  gratified  to  find  that  the  doings  of  the  Convention 
met  general  approbation,  and  more  especially  of  a  friend  whose 
judgment  and  opinion  I  hold  in  such  high  estimation. 

GORE  TO  STRONG. 

WASHINGTON  CITY,  Feb.  18,  1815. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  The  newspapers  will  inform  you,  before  this 
reaches  Boston,  that  the  treaty  of  peace  was  ratified  yesterday. 

If  there  be  any  papers  which  show  the  number  of  inhabitants 
on  Moose  Island,  which  I  cannot  but  consider  is  gone  from  the 
United  States  and  from  Massachusetts,  I  will  thank  you,  if  you  will 
direct  them  to  be  sent  to  me. 

The  treaty  must  be  deemed  disgraceful  to  the  government  who 
made  the  war  and  the  peace,  and  will  be  so  adjudged  by  all,  after 
the  first  effusions  of  joy  at  relief  have  subsided. 

The  bill  herewith  enclosed  has  passed  the  Senate  unanimously, 
and  I  hope  may  be  found  to  afford  us  some  compensation  for  our 
expenses. 

With  great  respect  and  affectionate  regard, 

I  remain,  my  dear  sir,  your  faithful  servant,         C.  GORE. 


564  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1815-23. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

1815-1823. 

Last  Years  of  Mr.  Cabot's  Life.  —  Withdrawal  from  Politics.  —  Occupations. 
—  Illness  and  Death.  —  Personal  Appearance.  —  Private  Character.— 
Political  Opinions.  —  Influence  in  the  Community.  —  Respect  in  which  he 
was  held.  —  Religious  Belief.  —  Conclusion. 

THE  Hartford  Convention  was  the  occasion  of  Mr. 
Cabot's  last  appearance  in  any  public  capacity.  His  life 
of  leisure  and  retirement,  which,  despite  his  efforts,  had 
been  occasionally  interrupted  by  the  disturbing  politics  of 
the  day  up  to  1815,  flowed  on  after  that  time  in  unbroken 
quiet.  Even  his  correspondence  ceased.  Almost  all  his  old 
friends  had  now  like  himself  retired  from  public  life,  many 
of  his  former  associates  were  dead,  and  nothing  remained  to 
spur  his  indolence  in  regard  to  letter-writing  to  even  an  occa 
sional  burst  of  activity.  One  letter  only  remains  of  a  date 
subsequent  to  that  of  the  Hartford  Convention,  addressed 
to  his  friend  Colonel  Pickering,  before  the  latter's  term  as 
a  member  of  Congress  expired.  Colonel  Pickering  wrote 
to  ask  Mr.  Cabot's  opinion  on  a  question  of  political  econ 
omy,  and  the  reply  seems  incidentally  to  embody  the  result 
of  the  latter's  experience  and  thought  on  the  great  sub 
jects  of  free  trade  and  protection.  The  question  is  still  an 
open  one ;  and  Mr.  Cabot's  views  have,  therefore,  not  only 
an  historical,  but  to  some  extent  a  practical,  value.  Hamil- 
tonian  as  he  had  always  been  in  his  political  feelings,  it  will 
be  seen  that  Mr.  Cabot  was,  nevertheless,  convinced  of  the 
soundness  of  free-trade  doctrines,  and  assented  to  but  a 
very  moderate  use  of  protection,  and  then  only  in  excep 
tional  cases. 


1815-23.]  OPINIONS   ON  THE   TARIFF.  565 


PICKERING  TO  CABOT. 

CITY  OF  WASHINGTON,  Dec.  14,  1815. 

DEAR  SIR,  —  Some  petitions  have  already  been  presented  to 
the  House  of  Representatives,  and  more  are  expected,  the  object 
of  which  is  to  obtain  a  repeal  of  the  laws  imposing  duties  on  some 
of  our  manufactures,  and  the  enactment  of  other  laws  to  impose 
or  increase  duties  on  certain  manufactures  imported  from  foreign 
countries,  or  absolutely  to  prohibit  their  introduction  into  the 
United  States ;  of  the  latter,  particularly  to  interdict  the  importa 
tion  of  all  cotton  goods  (nankeens  excepted),  the  production  of 
countries  beyond  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  and  to  augment  the 
duty  on  those  of  coarse  texture  imported  from  other  parts  of 
the  world. 

This  whole  subject  will  come  under  consideration  in  the  Commit 
tee  of  Ways  and  Means ;  and  the  chairman  of  that  committee  (Mr. 
Lowndes,  of  South  Carolina)  has  spoken  to  me,  desiring  to  obtain 
information  particularly  as  to  the  probable  effects  of  such  prohibi 
tion  in  relation  to  cotton  goods  on  the  navigation  of  the  United 
States.  He  had  understood  that,  besides  silver,  various  articles 
entering  into  our  commerce  with  the  East  Indies  were  carried 
thither  by  our  own  merchant  vessels,  and  exchanged  for  their  cot 
tons.  Now,  if  the  prohibition  of  these  cottons  would  materially 
affect  our  shipping  and  seamen,  this  would  constitute  a  serious 
objection  to  a  compliance  with  the  manufacturer's  petitions.  For 
it  seems  to  be  desired  that  our  navigation  should  by  all  proper 
means  be  encouraged  and  increased. 

I  told  Mr.  Lowndes1  that  for  myself  I  possessed  very  little 
knowledge  on  the  subject,  but  I  could  obtain  information  from  the 
best  sources.  He  wished  me  to  do  it.  And  this  is  the  object  of 
the  present  letter.  The  subject  is  important,  and  especially  inter 
esting  to  Massachusetts.  I  must  therefore  pray  you  to  commit  to 
writing  your  views  of  it,  and  in  such  form  as  I  may  be  allowed 
to  communicate  the  same  to  Mr.  Lowndes.  The  information  from 
you  will  be  peculiarly  valuable ;  for,  besides  having  a  perfect 
knowledge  of  the  subject,  you  are  not  personally  engaged  in  com 
merce,  and  are  therefore  exempt  from  that  insensible  bias  which 
not  infrequently  warps  the  opinions  of  upright  men,  who  have  a 
material  interest  at  stake. 

1  Member  of  Congress  from  South  Carolina. 


566  LIFE  AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1815-23. 

It  would  seem  manifestly  proper  to  abolish  the  duties  on  our 
own  manufactures  generally,  those  on  distilled  spirits  and  snuff 
and  perhaps  on  refined  sugar  excepted.  But  the  natural  conse 
quence  of  prohibiting  the  importation  of  cottons  (nankeens  ex 
cepted)  from  the  East  Indies,  and  those  of  coarse  texture  from 
Europe,  would  be  the  deterioration  of  our  own  cotton  fabrics,  while 
their  prices  might  be  double  those  of  East  India  and  coarse  texture 
cottons.  Besides,  many  of  the  cotton  factories  were  established 
(particularly  in  Rhode  Island)  prior  to  the  imposition  of  the  double 
duties,  and  yet  they  flourished.  How,  then,  are  they  to  be  ruined, 
unless  the  prohibitions  and  additional  duties  prayed  for  be  enacted  ? 
I  recollect  to  have  heard  (I  do  not  know  how  truly  stated)  that 
one  of  the  principals  in  the  Providence  cotton  factories  had  several 
years  ago  risen,  from  small  beginnings,  to  a  property  of  upwards 
of  a  hundred  thousand  pounds. 

If  the  duties  actually  imposed  on  foreign  cotton  goods,  or  on  any 
other  imported  manufactures,  will  not  enable  our  own  manufactories 
to  continue  their  operations  with  a  reasonable  profit,  ought  addi 
tional  duties  to  be  laid  to  burden  the  whole  community  for  their 
support?  Where  in  any  of  our  manufactories  imported  articles 
now  charged  with  duties  are  necessary  to  their  operations,  such 
duties  might  be  abolished,  in  cases  when  the  abolition  was  requi 
site  to  afford  the  manufacturer  a  reasonable  profit.  In  all  other 
cases,  if  they  cannot  support  themselves,  it  would  prove  that  they 
have  been  prematurely  and  imprudently  undertaken. 

Have  the  goodness  to  favor  me  with  an  early  answer. 

Very  sincerely  and  respectfully  yours,          T.  PICKERING. 


CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

DEC.  20,  1815. 

MY  DEAR  SIR,  —  I  should  feel  unhappy,  if  I  did  not  believe  you 
will  forgive  me  when  I  reply  to  your  letters  of  the  14th  and  loth, 
that  I  cannot  execute  the  task  you  prescribed.  If  indeed  I  attempted 
it,  I  could  do  little  more  than  elucidate  the  leading  ideas  you  have 
already  suggested.  It  is  admitted  that  a  government  may  wisely 
assist  the  maintenance  of  some  branches  of  industry  indispensable 
to  national  defence ;  and  it  is  conceivable  that  the  public  interest 
might  dictate  a  grant  of  public  aid  in  the  introduction  of  a  manu 
facture  of  peculiar  difficulty,  where  its  establishment  would  certainly 
be  of  lasting  benefit  to  the  community,  but  where  the  undertaking 


1815-23.]  OPINIONS   ON  THE  TAKIFF.  567 

might  be  too  perilous  for  private  enterprise.  It  is  not  to  be  ex 
pected,  however,  that  our  people  would  long  acquiesce  in  any  system 
which  should  take  money  from  their  pockets  to  sustain  a  particular 
class,  unless  the  service  of  these  was  palpably  essential  to  some 
general  interest  of  primary  importance.  It  becomes  every  day 
better  understood  that  manufactures  which  require  permanent  aid 
for  their  support  are  not  consistent  with  good  economy.  They 
must  retard  the  progress  of  wealth  and  diminish  the  proportion  of 
comfort  to  the  laborer.  To  sell  dear  and  buy  cheap  is  obviously  for 
our  interest :  the  widest  market  and  freest  competition  secure  these 
in  the  best  manner. 

Although  the  manufacturers  of  cotton  goods  ask  for  a  prohibi 
tion  of  similar  articles  from  India,  and  a  high  duty  on  those  from 
Europe,  yet  I  should  think  they  would  be  well  satisfied  with  a  high 
duty  on  all  imported,  especially  as  they  might  rely  on  the  continu 
ance  of  duties  which  would  be  profitable  to  the  treasury.  On  the 
other  hand,  a  prohibition  would  disaffect  ship-owners  as  well  as 
consumers.  Our  trade  beyond  the  GREAT  CAPES  is  very  great, 
and  is  daily  increasing.  About  one  hundred  vessels  (beside  the 
whalemen)  are  supposed  to  have  gone  from  the  United  States, 
and  others  are  preparing.  In  twenty-six  vessels  from  Salem,  one 
million  three  hundred  thousand  dollars  in  specie  have  been  ex 
ported,  averaging  fifty  thousand  dollars  to  a  vessel.  In  the  same 
ratio,  one  hundred  vessels  would  have  carried  five  millions  in  silver 
from  the  United  States  since  the  peace.  It  is  well  known  that  in 
this  trade  we  export  but  little  value  beside  silver,  and  therefore  the 
return  cargo  alone  must  yield  the  profit.  A  few  of  the  vessels  to 
Calcutta  have  carried  miscellaneous  cargoes  from  hence,  and  others 
take  wines  from  Madeira  and  Teneriffe,  while  some  take  their  dol 
lars  at  Lisbon  and  Cadiz.  But  why  should  not  dollars  be  as  free 
for  exportation  as  any  imported  articles  ?  If  no  other  currency 
than  specie  or  its  representative,  which  is  the  same  thing  in  effect, 
is  admitted  in  our  country,  there  will  be  always  enough  for  this 
purpose  remain  here.  The  necessity  of  retaining  it  for  domestic 
uses  will  retain  enough  for  those  uses,  and  will  regulate  its  impor 
tation  and  exportation  as  it  now  does  coffee  and  sugar.  The  coin 
of  each  country  is  dependent  for  its  value  on  the  fact  that  the  met 
als  of  which  it  is  composed  are  the  money  of  the  world.  In  other 
words,  the  money  of  each  place  has  its  value  supported  by  its 
uniform  price  as  merchandise  (bullion)  in  all  places. 


568  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1815-23. 

You  will  be  surprised  perhaps  that  the  India  traders  and  those 
round  Cape  Horn  should  not  average  more  than  fifty  thousand 
dollars ;  but  you  will  recollect  that  the  North-west  ships  carry  no 
silver,  and  ten  or  fifteen  of  these  are  included  in  the  estimate  of 
one  hundred.  The  Calcutta  and  Canton  ships  are  the  only  ones 
that  carry  out  large  amounts  of  silver :  some  of  these  carry  two  or 
three  hundred  thousand  dollars,  but  the  other  Indiamen  have  sel 
dom  more  than  fifty  thousand.  The  pepper  ships  at  Sumatra  find 
thirty,  forty,  or  fifty  thousand  dollars  amply  sufficient  to  load  them. 
There  are  many  in  this  trade,  some  of  which  having  sailed  from 
hence  last  spring  are  at  this  moment  vending  their  pepper  in  the 
Mediterranean,  where  we  have  sometimes  procured  dollars  again 
for  a  succeeding  voyage  to  India,  or  brought  them  home.  Thus 
you  see  how  circuitously  our  commerce  winds  about,  supplying 
every  want  and  taking  away  every  surplus  our  eagle-eyed  mer 
chants  can  discover  on  the  globe.  I  pray  that  Congress  may  leave 
it  as  free  as  possible.  I  have  now  filled  two  pages  to  testify  anew 
the  sincere  respect  and  regard  of 

Your  unfeigned  friend,  G.  C. 

Mr.  Cabot's  occupations  during  the  last  years  of  his  life 
were  of  the  same  nature  as  those  which  had  engaged  him 
ever  since  his  retirement  from  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States.  As  president  of  the  Boston  Marine  Insurance  Com 
pany,  he  had  enough  business  to  take  him  every  day  to  the 
resorts  of  merchants,  among  whom  he  had  many  friends, 
and  whose  pursuits  had  once  been  his  own.  This  occupied 
his  morning.  The  rest  of  the  day  was  devoted  to  reading 
and  study  and  to  intercourse  with  his  friends.  His  house 
was  rarely  without  visitors  in  the  evening,  for  he  was  a  man 
whose  society  was  much  sought  and  highly  esteemed.  His 
last  years  were  not  clouded  by  any  domestic  grief.  His 
only  daughter  Elizabeth  still  remained  at  home  ;  his  wife 
was  spared  to  him ;  and  his  son  Henry,  now  married,  lived 
near  him.  His  son's  marriage  brought  him  grandchildren, 
to  the  eldest  of  whom,  a  little  girl,  he  was  most  fondly 
attached.  In  this  happy  way  the  years  glided  by.  They 
yielded  to  Mr.  Cabot  every  thing  that  he  most  valued : 


1815-23  |  ILLNESS  AND  DEATH.  569 

sufficient  occupation,  the  quiet  of  his  library,  opportunity 
for  reflection  and  thought,  the  constant  presence  of  those 
dearest  to  him,  the  society  of  friends,  and  the  honor  and 
respect  of  the  community  in  which  he  dwelt. 

In  1821,  Mr.  Cabot  was  first  attacked  by  the  malady 
which  afterwards  proved  fatal.  His  disease  was  the  stone, 
from  which  the  suffering  was  at  times  extreme  ;  but  he 
bore  with  perfect  fortitude  and  without  a  murmur  all  the 
acute  physical  anguish  to  which  he  was  subjected.  His 
illness  lasted  for  nearly  two  years ;  and  on  April  18,  1823, 
he  died,  meeting  death  with  the  same  calmness  and  com 
posure  that  he  had  exhibited  in  all  the  trials  of  life. 

The  letters  which  form  the  larger  part  of  this  volume 
have  given,  I  trust,  a  clear  idea  both  of  Mr.  Cabot's  mental 
powers  and  of  his  cast  of  mind  and  thought;  while  the 
friendships  which  he  formed  and  retained,  the  public  offices 
he  was  called  upon  to  fill,  and  the  respect  with  which  he 
was  regarded  by  the  community  in  which  he  lived,  are  the 
best  test  of  the  estimation  of  his  abilities  and  character 
held  by  his  contemporaries.  Yet  I  am  unwilling  to  close 
this  final  chapter  without  an  attempt  at  least  to  give  from 
the  scanty  materials  at  my  command  some  better  picture  of 
Mr.  Cabot  than  political  letters  alone  can  furnish. 

For  personal  appearance,  I  am  compelled  to  rely  on 
verbal  description ;  since  Mr.  Cabot  after  he  reached  matu 
rity  could  never  be  persuaded  to  sit  for  his  portrait.  He 
had  an  almost  morbid  aversion  to  any  thing  that  seemed  to 
partake  of  vanity  or  publicity  ;  and  he  seems  to  have  thought 
that  in  his  own  case,  though  not  in  that  of  his  friends,  a 
portrait  was  open  to  both  these  objections.  In  person,  Mr. 
Cabot  was  tall,  measuring  more  than  six  feet,  and  was  large 
and  powerfully  built.  He  was  considered  handsome,  and 
his  contemporaries  speak  of  his  expression  as  one  of  great 
dignity  and  repose.  He  had  a  low,  musical  voice,  but  one 
of  great  power  and  very  attractive,  it  is  said,  to  those  who 
listened.  His  manners  were  gentle  and  courteous  to  one 


570  LIFE   AND   LETTEES   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1815-23 

and  all.  I  am  indebted  to  Miss  Quincy,  the  oldest  daugh 
ter  of  the  late  President  Quincy,  one  of  Mr.  Cabot's  most 
valued  friends,  for  a  description  of  his  personal  appearance 
in  the  last  years  of  his  life.  Miss  Quincy 's  family  occupied 
a  pew  next  to  Mr.  Cabot's,  and  she  saw  him  therefore  every 
Sunday  for  many  years.  She  has  told  me  that  he  made  a 
great  impression  on  her  mind  at  this  time ;  and  she  describes 
him  as  a  tall  and  very  handsome  man,  though  at  that  time 
of  course  well  advanced  in  years.  He  was  still,  however, 
perfectly  erect  and  noticeable  in  appearance.  He  wore  his 
hair  without  powder,  but  drawn  back  and  tied  in  a  queue 
in  the  fashion  of  his  younger  days.  He  dressed  generally 
in  black,  and  never  abandoned  the  even  then  bygone  fashion 
of  knee-breeches  and  silk  stockings.  Mr.  Goodrich  in  his 
"Recollections"  has  given  a  description  of  Mr.  Cabot  as 
he  appeared  at  the  time  of  the  Hartford  Convention.1  He 
says : — 

"  The  most  imposing  man  among  them  [the  members  of  the 
Hartford  Convention]  was  George  Cabot,  the  president.  He  was 
over  six  feet  in  height,  broad-shouldered,  and  of  a  manly  step. 
His  hair  was  white,  —  for  he  was  past  sixty,  —  his  eye  blue,  his 
complexion  slightly  florid.  He  seemed  to  me  like  Washington, 
—  as  if  the  great  man,  as  painted  by  Stuart,  had  walked  out  of  the 
canvas,  and  lived  and  breathed  among  us.  He  was,  in  fact,  Wash- 
ingtonian  in  his  whole  air  and  bearing,  as  was  proper  for  one  who 
was  Washington's  friend,  and  who  had  drunk  deep  at  the  same 
fountain  —  that  of  the  Revolution  —  of  the  spirit  of  truth,  honor, 
and  patriotism.  In  aspect  and  appearance,  he  was  strikingly  dig 
nified;  and  such  was  the  effect  of  his  presence  that  in  a  crowded 
room,  and  amid  other  men  of  mark,  when  you  once  became  con 
scious  he  was  there,  you  could  hardly  forget  it.  You  seemed 
always  to  see  him,  —  as  the  traveller  in  Switzerland  sees  Mont 
Blanc  towering  above  other  mountains  around  him  wherever  he 
may  be.  And  yet  he  was  easy  and  gracious  in  his  manners,  his 
countenance  wearing  a  calm  but  radiant  cheerfulness,  especially 

1  "Recollections  of  a  Lifetime,"  by  S.  G.  Goodrich  (Peter  Parley),  II. 
36.  Mr.  Goodrich's  description  relieves  me  from  any  fear  that  I  have  been 
partial  in  my  own.  See  also  the  description  from  Sullivan's  "  Familiar  Let 
ters,"  given  in  the  Appendix,  No.  III. 


1815-23.1  CONVERSATIONAL  POWERS.  571 

when  he  spoke.  He  was  celebrated  for  his  conversational  powers ; 
and  I  often  remarked  that,  when  he  began  to  converse,  all  eyes  and 
ears  turned  toward  him,  as  if  eager  to  catch  the  music  of  his  voice 
and  the  light  of  his  mind." 

Mr.  Cabot's  conversational  powers,  of  which  Mr.  Good 
rich  speaks  in  so  laudatory  a  fashion,  must  have  been  not 
a  little  remarkable ;  for  they  appear  to  have  deeply  im 
pressed,  even  from  his  earliest  years,  all  with  whom  he 
came  in  contact.  Despite  great  natural  advantages,  Mr. 
Cabot  was  never  an  orator,  and  always  was  averse  to  speak 
ing  in  public.  When  he  did  speak,  it  was  with  simplicity  and 
clearness  ;  but  the  eloquence  which  he  possessed  was  reserved 
for  conversation.  To  his  friends,  he  poured  forth  the  re 
sults  of  patient  thought  and  study  in  well-chosen  language, 
enhanced  by  the  charms  of  a  graceful  manner  and  a  fine 
voice.  There  was  much  conversation  in  those  days,  and 
a  man  wrho  excelled  in  it  exercised  no  small  power  over 
his  circle.  But  conversation  requires  exactness  of  thought 
and  learning,  and  affords  no  opportunity  to  hide  ignorance 
under  oratorical  flourishes  or  vague  and  glittering  similes. 
It  is  therefore  in  some  respects  a  more  difficult  art  than  ora 
tory,  and  requires  a  certain  solidity  which  success  in  the  latter 
does  not  necessarily  imply.  Thackeray  has  said,  "  We  no 
longer  travel :  we  arrive."  And  speed,  which  has  so  much 
injured  travel,  has  also  infected  every  department  of  modern 
life.  We  may  not  unfairly  say,  "  We  no  longer  converse :  we 
talk."  This  does  not  mean  necessarily  that  thought  has 
deteriorated,  or  that  "  talk  "  is  less  good  than  "  conversa 
tion  ;  "  but  the  interchange  of  ideas,  the  discussion  implied 
by  the  latter,  has  lost  much  of  its  deliberation  and  its 
gravity  in  the  former.  The  conversation  of  seventy-five 
years  ago,  though  both  wise  and  witty,  was  often  a  more 
serious  affair,  and  was  tried  by  a  higher  standard  than  we 
now  perhaps  realize.  Mr.  James  Hamilton  has  preserved  in 
his  Reminiscences  an  anecdote  which  illustrates  what  our 
ancestors  meant  by  after-dinner  conversation,  though  that 


572  LIFE  AND   LETTEBS  OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1815-23. 

particular    species    certainly    was    never    professedly    on 
weighty  subjects.     Mr.  Hamilton  says:  — 

"  This  [a  story  of  Gouverneur  Morris]  reminds  me  of  what 
George  Cabot  told  me  when  I  was  staying  at  his  house  in  Boston: 
'  I  never  give  dinners ;  but  Morris  came  to  Boston,  and  having 
known  him  well  in  the  good  old  times  I  felt  it  due  to  him  to  make 
up  a  party  for  him.  I  invited  Fisher  Ames  to  meet  him,  with 
Harrison  Gray  Otis  and  others  of  that  stamp.  After  the  cloth 
was  removed,  I  introduced  as  a  subject  of  conversation,  "  How  long 
can  Great  Britain  sustain  her  load  of  debt  ?  "  I  briefly  expressed 
my  own  views.  All  waited  to  hear  Morris,  who  with  great  force 
and  knowledge  of  the  subject  presented  his.  When  he  had  fin 
ished,  there  was  a  pause :  we  drank,  and  all  eyes  were  turned  to 
Ames,  who  was  admitted  to  be  our  best  talker.  As  you  know,  he 
was  then  in  feeble  health ;  and  he  began  in  his  low,  melodious  tone, 
with  evident  weakness,  to  express  his  views,  which  differed  widely 
from  those  of  Morris.  He  was  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the 
subject,  which,  by  the  way,  was  very  frequently  discussed  at  that 
time,  and  talked  in  his  best  vein  with  singular  clearness  and  elo 
quence.  Morris  was  all  attention.  I  watched  him  closely.  The 
first  clear  indication  on  his  countenance  of  what  was  passing  in  his 
mind  was,  —  "  He  talks  well."  The  next,  "  He  talks  as  well  as  I 
do."  And  at  last,  as  Ames  warmed  with  his  subject,  "  He  talks 
better  than  I  do." ' 

"  Cabot  I  remember  well.  He  was  one  of  the  best  talkers  of  the 
day,  and  one  of  the  most  intelligent,  upright,  amiable,  and  excellent 
of  men."  1 

The  persiflage  and  repartee  of  the  present  day  were  not 
then  looked  upon  as  the  chief  merit  of  conversation,  and 
to  be  a  recognized  leader  in  that  art  required  more  than  a 
lively  and  vivacious  wit  alone  could  furnish.  Mr.  Cabot 
was  not  only  noted  in  social  converse,  but  his  extensive  in 
formation  on  questions  of  government  and  political  economy, 
together  with  a  varied  experience  of  the  world,  made  him 
the  trusted  adviser  of  many  men  in  public  life  as  well  as 
of  those  who  took  counsel  with  him  on  their  private  affairs. 
Mr.  Webster  says :  — 

1  Reminiscences  of  J.  A.  Hamilton,  pp.  12,  13. 


1815-23.]  TBAITS   OF   CHARACTER.  573 

"  To  these  endeavors  to  maintain  a  sound  currency,  I  owe  the 
acquaintance  and  friendship  of  the  late  Mr.  Cabot,  who  was  kind 
enough  to  think  me  entitled  to  his  regard."  1 

Many  letters  whose  publication  would  have  only  encum 
bered  these  'pages  show  the  reliance  which  was  placed  in 
him  as  to  all  matters  demanding  foresight  and  judgment. 

Nor  were  such  appeals  ever  made  in  vain.  Mr.  Cabot's 
kindness  and  urbanity  are  mentioned  by  all  who  knew  him ; 
and  he  was  moreover  charitable  and  benevolent  to  every 
body  who  required  assistance  of  any  kind.  No  one  who 
has  read  the  preceding  letters  can  fail  to  have  perceived 
the  over-sensitive  modesty,  the  retiring  and  even  indolent 
disposition,  which  withdrew  Mr.  Cabot  at  an  early  period 
from  active  political  life.  To  these  traits  of  character  is 
due  the  almost  complete  destruction  of  his  extensive  and 
valuable  correspondence,  a  loss  bitterly  to  be  regretted  by 
his  descendants  at  least.  Yet  one  of  his  old  party  allies 
considered  him  dangerously  ambitious.  In  the  recently  pub 
lished  Life  of  Mr.  George  Ticknor,  the  following  amusing 
anecdote  is  related.  When  the  Hartford  Convention  was 
sitting,  Mr.  Ticknor  went  to  Quincy  to  receive  some  letters 
of  introduction  from  John  Adams. 

"  Soon  after  I  was  seated  in  Mr.  Adams's  parlor,"  to  quote  his 
own  words,  u  where  there  was  no  one  but  himself  and  Mrs.  Adams, 
who  was  knitting,  he  began  to  talk  of  the  condition  of  the 
country,  with  great  earnestness.  I  said  not  a  word ;  Mrs.  Adams 
was  equally  silent.  But  Mr.  Adams,  who  was  a  man  of  strong  and 
prompt  passions,  went  on  more  and  more  vehemently.  He  was 
dressed  in  a  single-breasted,  dark  green  coat,  buttoned  tightly  by 
very  large,  white  metal  buttons  over  his  somewhat  rotund  person. 
As  he  grew  more  and  more  excited  in  his  discourse,  he  impatiently 
endeavored  to  thrust  his  hand  into  the  breast  of  his  coat.  The 
buttons  did  not  yield  readily  ;  at  last  he  forced  his  hand,  saying  as 
he  did  so,  in  a  very  loud  voice  and  most  excited  manner,  '  Thank 
God,  thank  God !  George  Cabot's  close-buttoned  ambition  has 
broke  out  at  last :  he  wants  to  be  President  of  New  England,  sir  ! ' " 

1  Private  Correspondence  of  Daniel  Webster,  I.  26. 


574  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1815-23. 

Mr.  Adams's  suspicions  of  Mr.  Cabot's  deep-rooted  and 
carefully  hidden  ambition  were,  however,  of  much  earlier 
date.  Writing  to  his  wife,  in  1797,  soon  after  Mr.  Cabot's 
retirement  from  the  Senate,  he  says :  — 

"Mr.  Madison  is  to  retire.  It  seems  the  mode  of  becoming 
great  is  to  retire.  Madison,  I  suppose,  after  a  retirement  of  a  few 
years,  is  to  be  President  or  Vice-President.  Mr.  Cabot,  I  suppose, 
after  aggrandizing  his  character  in  the  shade  a  few  years,  is  to  be 
some  great  thing  too ;  and  Mr.  Ames,  &c.,  &c.  It  is  marvellous 
how  political  plants  grow  in  the  shade.  Continued  daylight  and 
sunshine  show  our  faults  and  record  them.  Our  persons,  voices, 
clothes,  gait,  air,  sentiments,  &c.,  all  become  familiar  to  every  eye 
and  ear  and  understanding ;  and  they  diminish  in  proportion,  upon 
the  same  principle  that  no  man  is  a  hero  to  his  wife  or  valet-de- 
chambre.  These  gentlemen  are  in  the  right  to  run  away  and  hide. 
Tell  Mr.  Cabot  so,  if  you  see  him.  His  countrymen  will  soon 
believe  him  to  be  a  giant  in  a  cave,  and  will  go  in  a  body  and  dig 
him  out.  I  wish,  but  don't  tell  Cabot  so,  that  they  would  dig  up 
GERRY ! "  l 

There  was  but  little  love  lost,  it  is  to  be  feared,  between 
Mr.  Adams  and  Mr.  Cabot.  Their  friendly  intercourse 
ceased  at  the  time  of  the  Hamiltonian  controversy;  but 
they  always  maintained  an  attitude  of  silent  and  dignified 
hostility,  and  Mr.  Adams  had  previously  shown  his  respect 
for  Mr.  Cabot's  character  and  talents  by  appointing  him  to 
a  seat  in  his  cabinet. 

Of  Mr.  Cabot's  political  views,  the  letters  in  this  volume 
are  the  best  index.  A  patriot  in  the  Revolution,  he  was 
one  of  the  most  ardent  and  useful  advocates  of  the  Consti 
tution.  He  was  consulted  by  both  Washington  and  Ham 
ilton  on  questions  of  policy ;  and  the  latter  relied  greatly, 
in  all  his  financial  measures,  on  the  knowledge  and  expe 
rience  of  Mr.  Cabot.  Reflection  and  temperament  combined 
to  make  him  the  friend  of  strong  government ;  and  his  own 
share  in  the  early  Federal  measures  caused  him  to  cherish 
their  policy,  which  was  intended  to  lead  to  the  form  of 

1  Letters  of  John  Adams  to  his  Wife,  II.  240. 


1815-23.J  POLITICAL   OPINIONS.  575 

government  that  he  esteemed  the  best.  Like  Hamilton,  he 
desired  a  government  possessing  both  vigor  and  energy ; 
and,  though  he  believed  an  infusion  of  democracy  essential, 
he  thought  a  governing  class  likewise  essential  to  the  high 
est  success.  Bitterly  opposed  to  all  the  doctrines  of  the 
French  Revolution,  his  natural  aversion  to  a  pure  democ 
racy  was  thereby  greatly  increased.  In  the  election  of  Jef 
ferson  he  believed,  and  rightly,  that  the  ascendancy  of  pure 
democratic  theories  was  assured;  and  as  he  was  convinced 
that  this  evil  was  radical,  and  not  to  be  overcome  by  resist 
ance,  he  felt  that  it  must  be  left  to  work  out  its  destiny  with 
such  modifications  as  were  possible.  These  opinions  made 
him  lukewarm  toward  the  aspirations  of  his  more  active 
friends,  and  reluctant  to  join  in  many  of  their  schemes.  He 
was  naturally  despondent ;  and  he  sincerely  believed  that  no 
pure  democracy  could  be  long  successful,  or  could  sufficiently 
protect  the  rights  of  property  and  of  the  individual.  He 
was  disposed  always  to  philosophize  ;  and,  as  he  felt  sure  he 
could  not  check  the  political  forces  whose  action  he  dreaded, 
he  was  inclined,  to  use  his  own  expression  to  Colonel  Pick 
ering,  "  to  let  the  world  ruin  itself  in  its  own  way."  I 
need  hardly  say  that  this  apparent  indifference  arose  from 
no  want  of  definite  or  settled  opinions.  Beneath  all  the 
graciousness  and  repose  of  manner,  there  were  the  stiff 
convictions  and  the  fixed  principles  which  have  ever  marked 
the  Puritan  character.  But  Mr.  Cabot's  was  a  more  liberal 
disposition  than  that  of  many  of  his  New  England  country 
men  ;  and  his  natural  courtesy,  coupled  with  his  indolent 
temperament,  kept  him  free  from  the  bitter  public  contro 
versies  in  which  so  many  of  his  more  ardent  friends  engaged. 
Not  that  Mr.  Cabot  feared  a  necessary  conflict,  but  he 
desired  no  needless  ones.  Being  in  a  quarrel,  he  bore  it 
that  the  opposed  might  beware  of  him.  Two  instances 
occur  among  his  letters,  which  illustrate  this.  His 
youngest  brother  had  been  very  shamelessly  and  unjustly 
accused  of  unfair  dealing  in  a  business  transaction.  Mr. 
Cabot's  advice,  when  applied  to,  was  simple.  "  Go  to  your 


576  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.     [1815-23. 

accuser,"  said  he ;  "  obtain  either  a  reiteration  or  a  with 
drawal  of  his  charges :  if  he  gives  the  latter,  well  and 
good  ;  if  the  former,  your  course  is  plain."  In  the  other  case, 
Mr.  Cabot  was  drawn  into  a  controversy,  which  he  did  all  in 
his  power  to  avoid,  with  a  third  person  by  the  determined 
aggressiveness  of  his  friend  Colonel  Pickering.  The  ques 
tion,  unluckily,  was  one  of  veracity.  Mr.  Cabot  published 
a  brief  note  in  the  paper,  and  his  opponent  was  silenced. 

Mr.  Cabot's  great  influence  in  the  community  is  always 
referred  to  by  his  contemporaries.  One  instance  shows 
the  respect  in  which  his  character  and  judgment  were  held, 
even  outside  the  bounds  of  his  own  State.  A  dispute  in 
volving  a  large  amount  arose  between  an  insurer  and  a 
New  York  insurance  company.  The  case  was  referred  to 
Mr.  Cabot,  and  I  cannot  learn  that  his  decision  was  ever 
appealed  from.  But  his  influence  in  his  own  immediate 
circle  was  almost  unbounded,  At  the  time  of  his  death,  he 
was  spoken  of  as  "  the  Nestor,  the  wise,  cool,  considerate 
counsellor  of  most  of  the  intelligent  statesmen  on  the  Fed 
eral  side."  1  Nor  was  this  less  true  apparently  in  matters 
of  a  more  private  nature.  I  am  indebted  to  the  Hon. 
George  Bancroft  for  an  anecdote  which  not  only  indicates 
the  weight  attached  to  Mr.  Cabot's  opinions,  but  is  also 
illustrative  of  the  power  exercised  by  the  leading  men  of  the 
community  at  that  time.  Deference  to  recognized  leaders 
may  well  be  of  interest  in  these  days,  when  our  most 
respectable  journals  glory  in  the  fact  that,  though  the 
wisest  and  best  men  leave  a  political  party,  no  one  follows 
them,  and  the  party  is  not  affected.  Mr.  Bancroft's  story, 
however,  is  as  follows :  When  he  was  a  young  man,  and 
had  just  graduated  from  college,  he  was  anxious  to  go  to 
Germany,  in  order  to  finish  his  studies.  A  sojourn  in 
Europe  was  then  rare,  and  no  light  matter  to  be  hastily 
decided.  Mr.  Bancroft's  father  took  the  question  into  care 
ful  consideration ;  and  his  first  step  was  to  seek  Mr.  Cabot, 
and  ask  his  advice.  Mr.  Cabot  approved  the  plan,  and 
i  Daily  Advertiser,  April  24, 1823. 


1815-23.]  PEKSONAL  INFLUENCE.  577 

urged  his  friend  to  send  his  son  abroad.  Then  Mr.  Ban 
croft  himself  went  to  Quincy,  and  consulted  John  Adams. 
This  adviser  was  equally  decided  (there  was  no  Greek 
vagueness  about  the  New  England  oracles),  but  his  opinion 
was  the  direct  contrary  of  Mr.  Cabot's.  "  You  had  better 
stay  at  home,"  said  Mr.  Adams :  "  an  American  education 
is  good  enough  for  an  American."  The  future  historian 
was  sent  abroad  to  the  University  of  Gottingen,  and  possi 
bly  some  of  the  accomplishments  which  have  graced  his 
career  may  be  attributed  to  Mr.  Cabot's  advice.  But  the 
story  is  of  real  value  in  illustrating  a  state  of  society  which 
has  now  departed.  It  shows  an  intellectual  domination 
exercised  by  a  few  leading  men,  which  is  utterly  foreign 
to  the  present  day.  We  may  have  done  well  to  free  our 
selves  from  the  control  of  individual  opinion,  but  let  us  not 
too  easily  forget  that  a  people  without  leaders  is  by  no 
means  a  subject  for  rejoicing. 

In  the  opening  chapter,  I  have  sketched  those  studies  to 
which  Mr.  Cabot  chiefly  devoted  himself.  His  commercial 
pursuits  led  him  to  a  close  investigation  of  all  subjects 
connected  with  political  economy ;  and  he  was  considered, 
in  his  day,  an  authority  in  such  matters.  Politics  and 
questions  of  government  occupied  him  constantly,  and 
afforded  food  for  his  thoughts  both  in  reading  and  writing. 
He  was  versed  in  French  and  Spanish,  and  a  fair  Latin 
scholar,  while  metaphysics  and  the  natural  sciences  always 
had  for  him  great  attractions.  But  he  did  not  neglect 
lighter  literature.  Works  upon  the  subjects  I  have  men 
tioned  composed  the  larger  part  of  his  small  and  well-selected 
library,  but  the  English  classics  were  also  well  represented. 
A  complete  edition  of  Swift,  by  its  well-worn  calf  bind 
ing,  attests  the  owner's  fondness  for  that  master  of  style 
and  satire  ;  while  a  once  handsome  copy  of  Fielding,  "  the 
prose  Homer  of  England,"  bears  indelible  marks  of  con 
stant  reading.  To  a  man  devoted  to  such  varied  pursuits, 
the  leisure  of  private  life  and  the  quiet  of  a  library  offered, 
of  course,  irresistible  charms. 

37 


578  LIFE  AND   LETTERS  OF   GEORGE   CABOT.      [1815-23. 

Bred  in  the  Congregational  Church  of  New  England, 
Mr.  Cabot  was  always  a  constant  attendant  upon  religious 
services,  and  a  firm  supporter  of  the  ecclesiastical  institutions. 
But  in  these  matters  also  he  was  liberal  in  his  opinions,  and 
in  later  life  joined  the  Unitarian  sect.  He  brought  to  relig 
ious  matters  the  same  spirit  of  conscientious  investigation 
and  careful  thought  that  he  did  to  all  other  questions ;  and, 
although  a  sincerely  religious  man  in  feeling,  he  was  unable 
to  satisfy  his  scepticism  as  to  the  divine  revelation  of  Chris 
tianity.  His  letters  to  his  friend  and  pastor,  Dr.  Kirkland, 
show  how  deeply  he  was  concerned  about  these  questions,  as 
well  as  the  admiration  which  he  had  for  Christianity  as  a 
moral  system.  But  he  was  never  able  to  remove  the  doubts,  of 
which  he  made  no  concealment,  as  to  its  supernatural  origin. 

Wise  and  patriotic  in  public  affairs,  respected  by  his 
friends,  and  beloved  by  his  family,  of  high  honor  and 
unspotted  integrity,  Mr.  Cabot  left  a  memory  which  must 
ever  be  venerated  by  his  descendants.  I  trust  that  I  am 
not  presumptuous  when  I  express  the  hope  that  his  life  and 
character  may  be  cherished  among  those  which  are  held  in 
honorable  recollection  by  Massachusetts. 

I  cannot  close  this  volume  more  fitly  than  with  the 
words  of  New  England's  great  orator:  "And  the  mention 
of  the  father  of  my  friend 1  brings  to  my  mind  the  memory 
of  his  great  colleague,  the  early  associate  of  Hamilton  and 
of  Ames,  trusted  and  beloved  by  Washington,  consulted  on 
all  occasions  connected  with  the  administration  of  the 
finances,  the  establishment  of  the  treasury  department,  the 
imposition  of  the  first  rates  of  duty,  and  with  every  thing 
that  belonged  to  the  commercial  system  of  the  United 
States,  —  George  Cabot,  of  Massachusetts."  2 

1  Mr.  Goodhue. 

2  Speech  of  Daniel  Webster  at  the  dinner  of  the  New  England  Society 
of  New  York,  on  the  Landing  at  Plymouth,  1843,  Webster's  Works,  II.  205. 


POLITICAL   WRITINGS. 


NOTE.  —  The  following  selections  have  been  made  from  the  many  arti 
cles  contributed  by  Mr.  Cabot  to  the  newspapers  of  the  day.  No  small  part 
of  the  influence  exerted  by  the  Federalists  came  from  their  constant  use  of 
the  public  prints  as  vehicles  to  inform  and  sway  the  public  mind.  A  few 
examples  serve  as  well  as  a  complete  collection  to  illustrate  Mr.  Cabot's 
style  and  mode  (*f  thought  and  expression  ;  and  I  have  not  therefore  thought 
it  necessary  to  give  a  greater  number  of  his  political  writings  than  could  be 
certainly  known  and  obtained  with  ease  from  references  in  his  letters. 


POLITICAL   WRITINGS. 


From  the  Columbian  Centinel,  April  15,  1797. 

'  MR.  RUSSELL,  —  Notwithstanding  there  are  among  us  some 
who  from  various  motives  would  acquiesce  in  our  subjection  to 
France,  yet  the  number  so  devoted  to  that  nation  must  be  small ; 
and  the  support  they  find  from  those  who  do  not  yet  see  their 
dangerous  designs  must  daily  diminish. 

The  American  people  know  that  their  individual  rights  and 
liberties  are  so  connected  with  the  independence  of  the  nation, 
that  the  loss  of  the  latter  must  soon  be  followed  by  that  of  the 
former.  It  was  on  the  broad  and  solid  basis  of  this  truth  that  our 
whole  Revolution  rested,  and  as  long  as  the  force  of  the  sentiment 
is  felt,  and  not  much  longer,  shall  we  be  truly  free.  It  is  in  the 
American  mind  therefore  we  are  to  look  for  the  security  of  our 
freedom.  This  is  well  known  to  the  French,  and  hence  it  is  that 
they  persisted  so  long  in  attempting  to  corrupt,  debauch,  and  cajole 
us  before  they  resorted  to  violence  and  outrage ;  and  hence  it  is 
that  their  instruments  here,  faithful  to  their  masters,  have  labored 
incessantly  to  prove  that  their  most  wicked  and  atrocious  acts  are 
all  justifiable. 

Every  one  must  know  that  France  and  England,  whose  rivalry 
is  perpetually  involving  them  in  wars,  would  each  desire  to  have 
an  influence  over  our  country  which  should  render  us  subservient 
to  its  purposes ;  but  their  attempts  to  establish  this  influence, 
whether  by  fraud  or  by  force,  must  be  repelled  at  every  hazard. 
And  they  always  may  be  repelled  with  certainty,  if  we  are  faithful 
to  ourselves.  Our  own  means  are  sufficient  for  this,  situated  as 
we  are,  three  thousand  miles  from  the  scene  of  their  power ;  but,  in 
addition  to  our  own  strength,  we  may  always  rely  that  either  of 
them  will  co-operate  with  us  against  the  other,  whenever  we  need 


582  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOKGE   CABOT.  [1797. 

it,  —  not  however  from  friendship  to  us,  BUT  ON  THE  SURE  PRIN 
CIPLE    OF    THEIR    OWN    SAFETY    OR    INTEREST. 

It  is  painful  to  see  the  endeavors  of  some  men  to  persuade  the 
people  that  the  power  of  France  is  irresistible,  and  that  she  will 
make  us  feel  her  power,  if  we  do  not  submit  to  her  insolent  de 
mands.  I  trust,  however,  that  the  spirit  of  our  country  will  not 
be  so  dismayed  as  to  bend  to  a  foreign  master,  especially  in  the 
present  instance,  where  we  already  suffer  almost  as  much  injury 
as  is  in  the  power  of  the  French  to  inflict.  For,  great  as  their 
power  is,  it  is  confined  to  the  European  territory,  and  is  chiefly 
supported  by  plunder ;  and,  if  we  consider  the  immense  sums 
swindled  from  the  Americans  under  the  mask  of  friendship,  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  we  should  have  lost  more  by  professed  war 
than  we  have  lost  in  a  perfidious  peace. 

But  notwithstanding  the  immense  depredations  France  commits 
on  our  property,  and  the  insults  she  offers  to  our  government, 
she  has  no  disposition  to  declare  war.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  well 
known  that  she  has  been  encouraged  to  proceed  thus  far  by  the 
hope  of  intimidating  us ;  and  there  is  good  reason  to  believe  that 
she  will  cease  to  injure  us  at  that  point  where  she  finds  us  determined 
to  repel.  When  she  perceives  that  our  government  will  not  betray 
the  country,  nor  the  people  destroy  their  own  government,  she  will 
desist  from  hostilities  and  swear  she  is  our  friend. 

A  FREE  AMERICAN. 

From  the  Columbian  Centinel,  May  3,  1797. 

POLITICAL  THOUGHTS  ON  THE  PRESENT  CRISIS. 

Addressed  to  those  who  truly  love  our  Country:  — 

There  are  those  who  imagine  that  France  would  receive  an 
envoy  extraordinary,  although  she  refuses  to  receive  a  minister 
plenipotentiary  from  the  United  States ;  and  there  are  many  who 
believe  she  would  cordially  receive  Mr.  Jefferson  or  Mr.  Madison 
in  any  diplomatic  character.  If  either  of  these  opinions  is  correct, 
it  must  be  because  the  conduct  of  the  United  States  would  in  that 
case  discover  a  willingness  to  pass  under  the  Gallic  yoke,  and 
because  the  Directory  must  so  understand  it.  The  Directory  knows 
full  well  that  four  years'  practice  of  sedition  and  conspiracy  by 
Genet  and  his  followers,  and  the  immense  robberies  and  plunder- 
ings  of  our  merchants  by  the  agents  of  France,  aggravated  by  the 


1797.]  POLITICAL  WHITINGS.  583 

contemptuous  treatment  of  the  American  nation,  in  the  person  of 
Mr.  Pinckney,  constitute  a  mass  of  outrages  and  insult  such  as  no 
people  would  long  submit  to,  who  mean  to  maintain  their  rights,  their 
interests,  or  their  honor.  The  Directory  knows  full  well  that  the 
hypocrisy  which  for  a  moment  concealed  the  wicked  designs  of 
France  will  no  longer  answer  that  purpose.  The  imposture  is 
fully  detected  in  every  country ;  and  every  individual  not  blinded 
by  party  passions  now  sees  that  the  principal  object  aimed  at  by 
France,  from  the  commencement  of  the  Republic,  has  been  and 
still  is  to  establish  a  permanent  dominion  over  other  nations.  But 
in  this  project  of  universal  national  tyranny  she  can  never  succeed, 
while  England  remains  mistress  of  the  ocean.  "  England  must  be 
destroyed  then,"  say  the  French,  that  the  ambition  of  France  may 
have  its  full  scope.  But  how  is  the  destruction  of  England  to  be 
achieved  ?  Not  by  force,  for  she  conquers  all  her  enemies  upon 
the  sea ;  not  by  intrigues  with  her  subjects,  for  rebels  and  traitors 
are  made  there  with  difficulty,  although  in  other  countries,  called 
free,  French  emissaries  and  French  gold  have  done  wonders.  It 
is  then  only  by  ruining  the  commerce  of  the  whole  world,  which 
indirectly  sustains  British  credit,  the  only  prop  of  their  power,  that 
England  can  be  thrown  down.  Such  is  the  opinion  of  France, 
and,  though  extremely  futile,  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  she  assails 
the  commerce  of  the  neutral  nations.  I  call  this  opinion  futile, 
because  experience  has  proved  that  nations  may  become  formida 
ble  and  destructive  to  others,  as  well  as  more  miserable  among 
themselves,  after  the  dissolution  of  order  and  public  credit  than 
they  were  before. 

England  under  the  tyranny  of  Cromwell  was  the  terror  of  her 
neighbors,  as  France,  now  inexpressibly  wretched  and  enslaved,  is 
the  scourge  or  dread  of  all  the  civilized  world. 

But  it  will  be  asked,  must  we  make  war  upon  France  ?  I  an 
swer,  No.  War  might  be  just,  but  is  not  expedient :  it  is  a  great 
calamity,  and  should  always  be  avoided,  except  when  necessary 
to  prevent  a  greater  evil  than  itself.  The  evil  with  which  we  are 
threatened,  it  is  true,  is  of  this  kind,  but  probably  may  be  guarded 
against  without  war.  France  intends  to  subject  us  to  her  govern 
ment,  if  she  can ;  but  her  measures  will  always  depend  upon  her 
calculations  of  success.  She  began  with  an  attempt  to  seduce  us  ; 
but,  the  arts  of  seduction  having  failed,  she  changed  her  caresses 
and  flatteries  into  reproaches  and  threats,  and,  finding  these  in- 


584  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF  GEORGE   CABOT.  [1797. 

effectual,  she  is  now  endeavoring  to  intimidate  us  by  acts  of  hostil 
ity,  declaring  at  the  same  time  that  these  acts  are  not  to  be  under 
stood  as  amounting  to  a  " rupture"  which  she  wishes  to  avoid ;  that 
is  to  say,  she  wishes  to  try  the  experiment  of  seduction,  menaces, 
and  force  upon  our  country  without  avowing  war,  and,  if  neither  of 
those,  nor  all  of  them  combined,  will  make  us  yield  our  indepen 
dence,  she  will  then  see  that  she  has  been  deceived  by  those  profli 
gate  men  whose  information  she  has  trusted,  and  will  swear  in 
future  to  be  our  sincere  friend. 

Such  is  the  view  of  our  affairs  to  the  eyes  of  enlightened  men, 
arid  from  it  may  be  learned  the  plain  course  which  ought  to  be 
taken.  Effectual  provision  should  be  made  for  the  protection  and 
defence  of  our  country  and  the  people's  rights.  Nothing  offensive 
toward  the  French  Republic  should  be  authorized  by  our  govern 
ment;  but  it  should  be  made  manifest  by  our  preparations  for 
events  that  we  know  the  designs  of  France,  and  have  a  keen  sense 
of  the  injuries  she  has  already  done  us,  and  that  having  at  all  times 
performed  toward  her  every  act  which  reason,  justice,  the  remem 
brance  of  former  friendship,  and  the  love  of  peace  can  demand  of 

US,    WE    CANNOT    DO    MORE,    AND    WILL    NEVER    CONSENT    TO    BE 

GOVERNED  BY  A  FOREIGN  NATION.  This  spirit  of  independence, 
supported  by  the  perfect  rectitude  of  our  cause,  if  exhibited  by  the 
National  Legislature,  will  animate  the  breast  of  every  lover  of  true 
liberty  within  the  United  States,  and  will  dissipate  those  clouds 
which  have  so  long  darkened  our  political  sky.  France  will  then 
abandon  an  enterprise  which  promises  her  no  advantage,  for  she 
will  then  see  that  we  are  not  intimidated ;  and  she  must  know  that, 

WHILE  UNITED  AT  HOME,  WE  CAN  NEVER  BE  CONQUERED. 

FORTITER  IN  RE. 

From  the  Columbian  Centinel,  May  31,  1797. 

[The  Independence  of  the  United  States  was  first  declared  on 
the  4th  of  July,  1776.  Who  could  have  imagined  that  in  1797  our 
rights  as  a  Sovereign  State  would  be  denied  by  France  ?  History 
will  record  the  fact  that  France  has  been  willing  to  see  us  inde 
pendent  of  Britain,  but  not  independent  of  herself. ~\ 

MR.  RUSSELL,  —  There  is  no  candid  man  who,  after  a  fair 
examination  of  the  documents  1  which  are  published,  can  doubt 

1  The  documents  referred  to  are  those  which  accompanied  the  President's 
message  on  May  13,  1797,  and  which  gave  an  account  of  the  failure  of 


1707.]  POLITICAL  WRITINGS.  585 

that  the  conduct  of  our  government  towards  all  the  nations  at  war 
has  been  just  and  impartial  as  far  as  was  in  its  power;  and  that 
whatever  partialities  have  unavoidably  existed  have  been  all  in 
favor  of  France.  But,  notwithstanding  this  truth  is  demonstrated, 
yet  the  atrocious  designs  of  France  against  the  United  States  can 
no  longer  be  denied  even  by  party  men ;  for  she  already  executes 
them  wherever  her  power  extends,  and  in  her  national  acts  mani 
fests  openly  the  disposition,  too  long  concealed,  to  make  us  a  de 
pendent  people.  It  is  not  enough  that  she  robs  us  of  millions  of 
our  hard-earned  property,  to  feed  the  spirit  of  rapine  which  sup 
ports  her  tyranny.  It  is  not  enough  that  she  swears  to  annihilate 
our  commerce,  and  the  commerce  of  all  the  world,  in  order  that 
she  may  impoverish  a  rival ;  but,  in  addition  to  these  unparalleled 
outrages  upon  the  rights  of  men  and  of  nations,  she  avows  the  nefari 
ous  policy  of  separating  the  people  of  the  United  States  from  the 
free  and  just  government  which  they  themselves  have  instituted.  It 
is  thus  she  would  ally  us  more  nearly  to  herself  by  introducing 
into  our  happy  country  that  spirit  of  licentiousness  which  has  pro 
duced,  as  its  natural  offspring,  every  species  of  crime,  cruelty,  per 
fidy,  and  injustice  among  the  French,  and  WHICH  I  FEAR  WILL 

ULTIMATELY  ESTABLISH  AN  IRON  THRONE  ON  THE  SEPULCHRE 
OF  LIBERTY. 

But  it  will  be  asked,  "  "What  can  encourage  France  to  such  a 
bold  attempt  as  the  disorganization  and  subjugation  of  our  country, 
after  she  herself  had  witnessed  our  persevering  efforts  for  inde 
pendence  ? "  To  this  question,  every  well-informed  man  will 
readily  answer,  "  It  is  because  France  has  been  led  to  believe  that 
she  has  a  party  in  the  United  States  to  support  her  pretensions 
more  powerful  than  Britain  had  in  1775."  Such  undoubtedly  is 
the  calculation  of  the  French  Directory ;  and  it  is  not  to  be 
expected  that  they  will  relinquish  their  enterprises  until  they  are 
convinced  that  this  calculation  is  grossly  erroneous,  and  that  the 
American  people  will  defend  their  rights  against  the  usurpation  of 
all  foreign  masters.  Whether  even  this  conviction  will  discourage 
France  in  the  midst  of  her  victories  must  be  doubtful  in  the  mind 
of  every  man  who  knows  the  nature  of  her  designs  and  the  insati- 
ableness  of  those  passions  from  which  they  proceed.  But,  be  this 
as  it  may,  at  this  interesting  moment,  when  a  foreign  nation  is 

Pinckney's  first  negotiation,  and  of  the  insults  to  which  he  had  been  sub 
jected. 


586  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE    CABOT.  [1798. 

actually  taking  hostile  steps  upon  the  presumption  that  we  are  a 
divided  people,  is  it  not  a  sacred  duty  to  unite,  and  is  it  not  the 
dictate  of  wisdom  to  show  that  we  are  united  ?  Every  lover  of 
his  country  will  agree  that  it  is,  and  will  rejoice  that  the  approach 
ing  session  of  our  State  Legislature  affords  an  early  opportunity 
of  joining  their  voice  with  that  of  the  President  and  Congress  of 
the  United  States,  to  proclaim  to  the  world  that  we  have  been 
misrepresented  or  misunderstood ;  "  that  we  are  not  a  degraded 
people,  humiliated  under  a  colonial  spirit  of  fear  and  sense  of  in 
feriority,  fitted  to  be  the  miserable  instruments  of  foreign  influence, 
and  regardless  of  national  honor,  character,  and  interest,"  but  that 
we  know  our  rights  and  will  maintain  them,  our  duties  and  will 
fulfil  them,  and  that,  while  we  scrupulously  perform  towards 
others  every  thing  that  justice  requires  from  us,  we  can  never 
abandon  the  rightful  claim  of  justice  from  them. 

ONE  OF  THE  AMERICAN  PEOPLE. 

From  the  Massachusetts  Mercury,  Jan.  12,  1798. 

MESSRS.  YOUNG  AND  MINNS, —  The  truly  independent  spirit 
of  your  paper  encourages  the  hope  that  you  will  afford  a  place  in 
the  "  Mercury  "  for  the  following  observations  of  one  who  thinks 
himself  "  A  SINCERE  LOVER  OF  HIS  COUNTRY." 

Portugal  is  threatened  with  the  Jacobin  yoke,*  Spain  trembles 
at  the  foresight  of  a  similar  destiny.  Should  these  events  happen, 
the  two  nations  will  become  the  natural  allies  of  the  Great  Horde, 
and  their  spoils  may  subsist  them  for  another  year. 

Belgium  has  been  gleaned,  and  can  yield  nothing  more  until  the 
return  of  industry  shall  prepare  a  new  crop.  Holland,  drained  of 
one  hundred  millions  in  money,  its  commerce  annihilated  and  fleet 
vanquished,  offers  nothing  but  a  dejected  people,  emaciated  by  hun 
ger  and  desperate  from  suffering,  who  wish  for  death  as  a  refuge 
from  their  misery.  Austria,  though  compelled  to  accept  a  respite 
on  hard  terms,  is  yet  too  strong  to  be  plundered  and  too  wise  to 
be  duped. 

Italy  is  probably  appropriated  to  Buonaparte,  and  nothing  can 

[*  Spain  may  be  considered  as  subject  to  France,  since  the  treaty  made 
by  the  Prince  of  Peace ;  but,  to  pass  under  the  Jacobin  yoke,  its  govern 
ment  must  be  subverted,  and  a  set  of  cut-throats  and  desperadoes  must 
reign  without  control.]  — G.  C. 


1798.]  POLITICAL  WRITINGS.  587 

be  drawn  from  it  without  his  consent.  Buonaparte  is  an  Italian, 
and  a  large  portion  of  his  troops  are  also  Italians.  It  is  too  soon 
yet  for  the  development  of  all  his  designs  ;  but,  as  he  has  shown  much 
more  genius  and  talents  than  any  other  actor  on  the  Revolutionary 
scene,  it  is  presumable  that  he  will  achieve  the  object  of  his  ambi 
tion,  if  he  is  not  impeded  by  the  dagger  or  bowl  from  the  hand  of 
a  rival.  It  is  contrary  to  all  fair  reasoning  to  expect  that  the 
superiority  of  this  Italian  can  be  forgiven  by  the  French  Jacobins. 

In  France,  it  is  well  known  that  a  very  large  majority  of  the 
people  wish  for  monarchy ;  but  four  hundred  thousand  soldiers, 
deeply  interested  in  their  own  despotism,  carrying  terror  on  the 
bayonet  point,  and  two  hundred  thousand  spies  employed  by  the 
tyrants,  silence  every  tongue.  The  people  everywhere  are  disarmed, 
and  therefore  must  continue  in  the  same  wretched  slavery  until  the 
discord  or  destruction  of  their  masters  shall  open  the  way  for  their 
escape.  It  is  not  necessary  to  believe  that  Hoche  was  poisoned, 
in  order  to  account  for  the  honors  done  to  his  manes.  Hoche  had  not 
the  talents  of  Cassar  or  Cromwell,  and  the  Directory  might  as  well 
fear  several  others  as  him ;  but  the  public  spectacle  exhibited  at 
Hoche's  funeral  was  a  homage  to  the  army,  which  it  was  proper 
and  politic  for  the  State  to  pay,  when  the  government  became  in 
fact  wholly  military.  . 

England  is  again  menaced  with  an  army  of  French  sans-culottes, 
professedly  to  subvert  the  British  Constitution,  and  to  establish  in 
its  stead  the  power  of  a  banditti  of  ruffians  ;  but  how  this  army  is 
to  be  transported  across  the  channel  is  a  secret  which  the  projectors 
are  too  prudent  to  disclose.  It  is  believed  that  the  navies  of 
France,  and  the  nations  she  has  subjugated,  if  all  assembled,  would 
not  now  be  a  match  for  the  British  tleet ;  and  yet  this  fleet  must  be 
completely  overcome  before  an  invasion  can  be  successful.  Per 
haps  it  may  appear  hereafter  that  the  stinging  mortification  at 
De  Winter's  defeat,  and  the  necessity  of  perpetually  agitating  the 
minds  of  the  troops,  have  given  birth  to  this  gasconade.  But, 
however  this  may  be,  England  has  nothing  to  fear  from  the  under 
taking  ;  while  the  threat  must  open  the  purses  of  Englishmen  of 
every  party,  must  facilitate  the  operations  of  the  minister,  and 
must  give  additional  force  and  stability  to  the  government. 

The  commissioners  of  conciliation  from  the  United  States  sent 
to  France  to  accommodate  differences,  it  is  said,  will  return  re 
infecta.  This  is  credible ;  for  those  who  have  done  to  others  the 


588  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.          [1798. 

most  atrocious  injuries  are  generally  implacable.  This  disappoint 
ment  of  our  desires,  however,  can  be  none  to  the  expectations  of 
well-informed  men,  and  will  create  no  new  uneasiness  in  the  breast 
of  those  who  equally  dread  and  detest  foreign  influence  of  every 
kind.  To  such  men,  it  will  occur  as  an  obvious  truth  that,  what 
ever  may  be  the  disposition  of  the  present  government  of  France, 
her  final  conduct  toward  the  United  States  will  depend  upon  our 
apparent  weakness  or  strength,  and  her  own  actual  condition  and 
power  at  the  end  of  her  conflict  with  England.  It  has  been  shown 
to  the  American  people  by  authentic  proofs  that  from  the  first 
moment  of  our  intercourse  with  France  she  intended  absolutely  to 
govern  the  counsels  and  direct  the  measures  and  force  of  our  nation, 
so  as  to  render  us  completely  dependent  on  her.  It  has  been  seen 
and  sorely  felt  that  this  intention  has  been  pursued  with  redoubled 
efforts  since  the  establishment  of  the  Republic.  Every  art  of  seduc 
tion  has  been  used,  and  sedition  has  been  frequently  excited,  till 
at  last  we  are  the  witnesses  of  avowed  hostility  everywhere  exer 
cised  against  our  unoffending  merchants,  while  in  the  bosom  of  our 
country  venal  presses  and  a  faction  in  government  distract  public 
opinion  and  enfeeble  the  spirit  of  national  defence.  But  although 
the  ultimate  measures  of  France  toward  us  will  depend  on  their 
future  condition,  yet  the  success  under  Providence  will  wholly 
depend  on  ourselves.  Five  millions  of  people,  just  to  all  the 
world,  and  determined  to  be  free,  if  united,  are  not  likely  to  be 
attacked,  and  surely  they  can  never  be  conquered. 


From  the  Massachusetts  Mercury,  Jan.  16,  1798. 

POLITICAL  MONITOR.     No.  I. 

Experience  and  observation  every  day  teach  us  to  believe  that 
those  men  who  are  outrageously  patriotic  in  their  professions  are 
generally  actuated  by  some  criminal  selfishness,  and  would  sacrifice 
the  public  welfare  to  their  own  avarice  or  ambition. 

The  same  truth  is  inculcated  by  the  writers  of  ancient  history, 
who  inform  us  that  in  old  times  the  demagogues  were  zealous  ad 
vocates  for  the  most  popular  forms  of  government,  because  under 
such  forms  they  could  easily  exercise  all  the  powers  of  the  State  with" 
out  any  responsibilities. 

In  Athens,  the  most  democratic  of  the  Grecian  republics,  DEMOS- 


1798.]  POLITICAL  WRITINGS.  589 

THENES  and  PHOCION  were  the  only  leaders  who  refused  the  gold 
of  PHILIP.  Those  two  men  were  such  as  are  now  called  Aristo 
crats  :  they  were  lovers  of  liberty  and  the  best  friends  of  the  peo 
ple,  but  they  hated  their  vices  and  would  not  flatter  them,  while  all 
the  demagogues  without  exception  were  the  pensioners  of  a  foreign 
nation  which  was  then  taking  measures  to  enslave  their  country. 

In  Rome,  it  is  well  known  that  the  tribunes  and  other  democratic 
leaders  were  so  scandalously  venal  as  to  induce  one  who  bribed 
them  to  say  "  that  Rome  would  sell  herself  whenever  a  purchaser 
should  appear" 

The  minister  of  the  French  republic  has  officially  informed  his 
government  that  in  the  United  States  he  has  found  "  PATRIOTS 
whose  consciences  already  have  their  prices,  and  that  the  proof  of 
this  will  remain  for  ever  in  the  archives  of  France"  This  grievous 
charge  is  not  to  be  denied,  nor  that  the  seductive  power  of  French 
gold  has  been  equally  pernicious  among  every  people  who  have 
been  weak  enough  to  think  them  their  friends.  But,  while  Mr. 
Fauchet's  letter  makes  us  blush  for  our  country,  it  ought  always  to 
be  recollected  who  are  the  men  he  calls  patriots. 

It  were  devoutly  to  be  wished  that  France  would  disclose  to  us 
the  names  of  all,  as  she  has  occasionally  of  some,  of  our  citizens 
whose  assistance  she  relies  on  to  establish  her  power  over  us.  Such 
a  disclosure  would  be  very  precious  in  the  eye  of  every  indepen 
dent  American,  who  reads  too  plainly  in  the  miseries  of  the  Hol 
landers  the  cruel  destiny  which  France  had  prepared  for  the  people 
of  the  United  States,  and  which  it  is  well  known  nothing  but  a  want 
of  power  prevented  her  from  inflicting  years  ago. 


From  ike  Massachusetts  Mercury,  Jan.  19,  1798. 

MESSRS.  YOUNG  AND  MINNS,  —  If  it  is  essential  to  the  preser 
vation  of  our  rights  that  Just  sentiments  should  prevail  on  subjects 
that  relate  to  liberty,  a  faint  outline  of  Jacobinism  may  be  profita 
bly  sketched  to  excite  reflection. 

POLITICAL  MONITOR.     No.  II. 

"Whatever  diversity  of  opinion  may  have  once  existed  concerning 
the  real  principle  of  the  French  Revolution,  it  has  long  since  been 
demonstrated  to  be  that  same  lust  of  domination  and  plunder  which 
has  so  often  scourged  the  human  race  in  every  period  of  its  history. 


590  LIFE   AND  LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.          [1798. 

These  turbulent  passions,  rendered  formidable  by  a  union  with 
talents,  were  chiefly  concentrated  in  a  body  of  men  who,  from 
the  place  of  their  meeting,  were  called  Jacobins,  and  from  them 
the  system  of  their  operations  has  been  justly  termed  Jacobinism. 
Among  the  first  members  of  this  famous  society,  there  were  a  few 
who  felt  some  little  restraint  of  religion,  morality,  or  honor,  and 
some  whose  property  seemed  to  give  them  an  interest  in  the  public 
welfare ;  but  all  these  were  forcibly  swept  away,  that  the  society 
might  be  enabled  to  act  with  perfect  freedom,  and  with  what  was 
then  called  republican  energy.  But,  however  desperate  those  men 
were  who  remained,  they  and  their  successors  have  displayed  great 
abilities,  and  have  steadily  pursued  the  same  daring  designs.  As 
they  possessed  neither  power  nor  property,  their  inordinate  desires 
made  them  the  determined  enemies  of  all  who  possessed  either. 
They  saw  the  nation  embarrassed  by  the  errors  and  vices  of  a  bad 
government ;  but,  instead  of  co-operating  with  those  good  citizens 
who  aimed  at  liberty  and  order,  they  boldly  resolved  to  take  ad 
vantage  of  the  public  distress,  and  raise  themselves  to  greatness  on 
the  ruins  of  their  country.  From  the  first  moment  of  their  acting 
in  public  affairs,  they  have  invariably  aspired  to  establish  their  own 
absolute  power  over  France,  and  the  absolute  power  of  France  over 
other  nations.  In  the  first  of  these  designs,  their  success  is  com 
plete.  After  the  solemn  mockery  of  three  constitutions  and  twelve 
revolutions,  which  pretended  to  have  liberty  for  their  object,  but 
which  in  fact  have  been  only  the  changes  of  tyranny,  the  people 
of  France  see  that  every  epoch  in  their  affairs  makes  a  new  rivet 
added  to  their  own  chains,  till  at  length,  sunk  with  their  weight, 
they  are  all  ready  to  abandon  the  hope  of  relief.  While  this  dread 
ful  despotism  has  thus  established  itself  over  all  France,  it  has  been 
no  less  occupied  in  seeking  connections,  alliances,  and  dominions 
in  other  countries.  The  conductors  of  the  Revolution  knew  that 
in  every  society,  however  well  governed,  there  were  many  discon 
tented  spirits  of  their  own  class,  who  would  rise  at  their  call  and 
whose  services  they  could  always  command.  Men  of  lost  charac 
ter  and  broken  fortune,  disappointed  seekers  of  office,  rapacious 
men,  idle  profligates  and  desperadoes  of  all  descriptions,  were  the 
natural  members  of  their  body ;  and  to  these  may  be  added  the 
disciples  which  are  made  among  the  unwary  poor,  who  are  seduced 
by  the  fallacious  promise  of  plenty  without  labor  ;  and  finally  many 
credulous  citizens,  whose  honest,  but  uninformed  zeal  for  public 
happiness  makes  them  the  easy  dupes  of  those  who  promise  it. 


1798.]  POLITICAL   WHITINGS.  591 

To  excite,  combine,  and  organize  these  various  descriptions  of 
persons  in  every  country,  and  to  give  them  activity  in  opposition 
to  its  government,  has  been  and  still  continues  to  be  the  unremit 
ting  endeavor  of  Jacobinism ;  and  this  new  species  of  mischief, 
which  its  wickedness  has  devised,  is  more  dangerous  to  all  civilized 
society,  and  more  destructive  than  all  its  poison,  daggers,  guillo 
tines,  and  bayonets.  Successful  Jacobinism  is  the  consummation 
of  vice  and  tyranny,  and  therefore  to  be  viewed  as  the  greatest 
possible  political  evil ;  and  it  is  justly  to  be  feared,  because  it  is 
propagated  by  eloquence  and  sophistry,  and  is  exhibited  in  the 
garb  of  virtue  and  of  liberty,  whose  sacred  names  it  profanely 
usurps.  It  enjoys,  too,  the  aid  of  the  purse  and  the  sword  of  the 
French  Republic.  In  a  word,  Jacobinism  is  what  the  committee 
of  the  French  Convention  emphatically  pronounced  it :  "A  con 
cert  of  means  to  establish  (everywhere)  the  empire  of  death,  of 
terror,  and  of  crime."  l 

From  the  Massachusetts  Mercury,  Jan.  26,  1798. 

POLITICAL  MONITOR.     No.  III. 

Strictures  on  FaucheCs  Pamphlet. 

Mr.  Fauchet  renews  against  the  United  States  the  groundless 
charges  of  violation  or  inexecution  of  the  treaties  which  bind  us 
to  France.  For  the  particular  facts,  he  refers  his  readers  to  the 
letter  of  MR.  PICKERING  to  MR.  PINCKNEY,  which  has  been 
justly  considered  by  all  fair  reasoners  as  a  complete  refutation  of 
all  those  charges.  It  would  seem  indeed  that  MR.  FAUCHET 
himself  is  not  quite  satisfied  with  the  solidity  of  the  claims  and 
complaints  heretofore  made  by  France,  for  he  now  reminds  us  of 
our  guarantee  of  the  French  possessions  in  America,  which,  he 
says,  we  are  bound  to  fulfil.  This  demand  his  predecessor,  GENET, 
with  all  his  eagerness  to  embarrass  the  government,  never  thought 
it  prudent  to  press ;  doubtless  from  a  conviction  that  the  unten- 
ableness  of  the  claim  would  weaken  his  party  and  strengthen  that 
of  the  government.  They  knew  that  France  was  the  aggressor  in 
every  sense,  and  had  voluntarily  declared  war  against  England; 
and  that  therefore  our  treaty,  which  is  purely  defensive,  did  not 

1  [See  report  of  committee  of  eleven  who  framed  the  last  French  Con 
stitution.]  —  G.  C. 


592  LIFE  AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

oblige  us  to  take  a  part.  This  idea,  simple  and  obvious,  is  suffi 
cient  to  explain  to  reasonable  men  why  France  has  been  so  quiet 
on  this  point,  while  she  has  been  so  violent  on  others  that  were 
frivolous.  MR.  FAUCHET  regrets  extremely  that  the  Revolution 
ary  government  has  acknowledged  the  insincerity  and  perfidy  of 
monarchical  France  toward  the  United  States.  It  is  probable  that 
the  inconvenience  of  this  exposure  has  since  been  felt  by  all  those 
who  have  been  endeavoring  to  cajole  us.  To  recover  the  confi 
dence  of  the  American  people,  thus  lost,  he  insists  that,  in  the 
treaty  of  1778,  France  displayed  an  improvidence  for  herself  or 
an  excessive  good-will  for  us.  Nothing  could  be  more  unseasonable 
than  this  stale  pretension,  set  up  now,  four  years  after  its  falsehood 
has  been  proved  by  the  best  possible  testimony.  All  the  world 
may  see  the  declarations  made  by  the  Revolutionary  government, 
while  in  possession  of  the  evidence  ;  and  which  were  in  substance 
that  the  interference  of  the  old  Court,  and  the  aid  they  gave  us, 
resulted  wholly  from  motives  base,  perfidious,  and  treacherous,  and 
that  they  were  uniformly  hostile  to  the  prosperity  of  the  United 
States.  But,  while  Mr.  Fauchet  laments  the  indiscretion  of  those 
tell-tales  who  have  disclosed  the  secret  views  of  his  nation,  he  is 
not  wholly  free  from  the  same  imputation.  He  exemplifies,  in  his 
own  conduct,  the  true  French  maxim  which  he  lays  down,  "  that 
neither  government  nor  individuals  regulate  their  measures  agree 
ably  to  the  outward  forms  of  correspondence."  This  contra 
diction  of  the  actions  of  the  French  to  what  they  profess  has 
perplexed  many  good  people  in  America.  We  have  often  been 
charmed  with  what  they  were  saying,  till  seized  with  horror  at 
what  they  were  doing.  This  minister  came  to  the  United  States 
professedly  to  erase  the  impressions  and  repair  the  injuries  which 
we  felt  from  GENET  ;  but  it  is  believed  the  same  atrocious  designs 
were  still  pursued,  only  with  a  little  more  secrecy.  With  great 
affectation  of  respect  for  our  violated  rights,  Mr.  Fauchet  publicly 
recalled  the  commissions  which  Genet  had  given  to  American 
traitors  ;  but  he  designed  to  use  the  instruments  of  sedition  which 
were  prepared.  And,  if  the  coffers  had  not  been  emptied,  there  can 
be  no  doubt  we  should  have  seen  an  armed  force  in  the  bosom  of 
our  country,  supported  by  France,  to  overawe  our  government ;  but 
the  million  of  dollars  brought  over  by  Genet,  and  the  proceeds  of 
the  East  India  ships,  were  gone.  All  disappeared  on  FAUCHET'S 
arrival ;  so  that  with  truth  he  might  say  to  RANDOLPH  and 


1798.]  POLITICAL  WRITINGS.  593 

others  that  he  could  not  comply  with  their  demands  for  money. 
He  could  only  command  a  few  dollars  to  be  distributed  among 
journalists,  whose  services  were  necessary,  and  could  be  had  at  a 
very  low  rate. 


From  the  Massachusetts  Mercury,  Jan.  30,  1798. 

POLITICAL  MONITOR.     No.  IV. 
Strictures  on  Fauchefs  Pamphlet. 

In  order  to  understand  the  policy  of  France,  as  it  relates  to 
maritime  affairs,  it  is  necessary  always  to  keep  in  our  eye  the 
object  at  which  she  aims.  This  object  undoubtedly  is  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  naval  power  of  England,  for  it  is  England  alone  that 
prevents  France  from  establishing  the  same  absolute  empire  on  the 
sea  which  she  now  exercises  over  many  nations  by  land.  The 
effect  of  such  an  accumulation  of  power  in  any  nation,  upon  the 
rights  and  independence  of  others,  need  not  be  described  ;  and 
God  grant  that  it  may  never  be  known ! 

Mr.  Fauchet,  after  noticing  the  maxim  of  the  law  of  nations, 
by  which  enemy  property  in  neutral  bottoms  is  liable  to  seizure, 
proceeds  to  observe  that  the  interest  of  neutrals,  and  of  those 
belligerents  who  were  too  weak  to  protect  their  own  commerce, 
equally  suffered  by  this  principle ;  and  therefore  these  two  de 
scriptions  of  powers  have  usually  engaged  in  their  treaties  to  respect 
each  other's  flag,  so  far  as  to  let  the  property  of  an  enemy  pass 
unmolested  when  sailing  under  it.  This  treaty  privilege  he  denom 
inates  "  modern  neutrality."  France,  he  tells  us,  has  defended 
this  new  principle  with  more  warmth  than  any  other  power  ;  and 
he  cites  one  example  where  she  has  made  it  the  means  of  pushing 
a  neutral  nation  into  a  war.  We  are  well  acquainted  with  this 
fact,  and  perhaps  contributed  something  toward  its  occurrence,  with 
a  view  to  our  own  benefit ;  but  we  all  see  and  lament  that,  in  its 
consequences,  it  has  enfeebled  the  nation  to  whom  it  happened, 
and  finally  has  made  them  slaves  of  France. 

Mr.  Fauchet's  disclosure  of  the  motives  for  such  active  zeal 
among  the  French  to  enforce  the  new  doctrine  cannot  fail  to  be 
instructive  to  the  people  of  the  United  States ;  and,  if  duly  con 
sidered,  must  prove  to  us  incontestably  that  our  own  benefit  makes 
no  part  of  its  design. 


594  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

However  desirable  it  may  be  to  see  it  admitted  as  a  part  of  the 
law  of  nations  "  that  free  bottoms  shall  make  free  goods,"  it  is  to 
be  feared  that  those  nations,  single  or  combined,  against  whom  the 
principle  would  operate,  will  always  resist  its  establishment,  and, 
even  if  a  number  of  powers  should  unite  to  support  it,  that  there 
could  be  no  safe  reliance  on  the  permanency  of  such  an  union. 
This  idea  is  justified  by  the  history  of  the  armed  neutrality  and  the 
constitution  of  man  and  of  society.  Mr.  Fauchet,  however,  affirms 
boldly  "  that  France  has  faithfully  maintained  their  modern  neutral 
ity  ;"  but  it  remains  for  Mr.  Fauchet  or  his  partisans  to  reconcile 
this  declaration  with  the  truth.  For  he  must  know,  as  all  the 
world  has  seen,  that  in  contempt  of  this  principle,  and  in  contempt 
of  all  treaty  obligations,  France,  in  May,  1793,  did  pass  a  law 
authorizing  the  seizure  of  all  neutral  vessels  with  enemy  property  on 
board*  and  that  her  cruisers  have  at  all  times  captured  all  such 
vessels  and  many  others,  and  have  often  accompanied  these  acts 
with  circumstances  of  extreme  cruelty  and  flagrant  abuse. 

In  a  subsequent  paragraph,  Mr.  Fauchet  still  further  explains 
the  use  France  proposes  to  make  of  her  agreements  with  particular 
States  respecting  enemy  property  in  neutral  ships.  At  the  time  of 
making  these  stipulations,  they  necessarily  are  considered  by  each 
party  with  a  sole  reference  to  their  own  interest,  and,  when  made, 
their  obligation  cannot  by  any  construction  be  extended  to  their 
respective  intercourse  with  others.  Let  it  be  shown,  then,  that  in 
our  treaty  with  France  we  have  engaged  that  the  principle  of 
"  free  bottoms  making  free  goods  "  should  be  admitted  into  our  sub 
sequent  treaties  with  England  or  other  powers.  No  man  will  be 
hardy  enough  to  contend  that  our  treaty  with  France  contains  any 
such  stipulations :  on  the  contrary,  it  will  appear,  upon  reading  it, 
that  both  parties  were  left  perfectly  free,  each  to  consult  its  own 
interest.  Yet,  because  we  have  presumed  to  use  this  freedom  in 
a  manner  which  our  interest  required,  France  insolently  talks  of 
punishing  us  as  if  we  were  her  colonists.  She  tells  us  plainly 
that  she  plunders  us,  because  we  have  not  done  something  by  the 
use  of  which  she  could  have  forced  us  into  a  war  with  England,  as 
she  did  the  Hollanders  in  1780. 

It  would  be  incredible  that,  at  a  time  when  the  French  have 
nothing  effectual  to  oppose  to  the  growing  superiority  of  the  British 
naval  forces,  they  should  be  so  impolitic  as  to  avow  to  us  their  im 
perious  and  unjust  designs ;  but  a  solution  of  this  problem  is  to  be 


1708-]  POLITICAL   WRITINGS.  595 

found  in  the  wicked  ^-representations  which  France  has  received 
of  the  character  of  the  government  and  people  of  the  United 
States.  It  is  certain  that  the  French  have  heen  taught  to  believe 
that  the  United  States  were  so  blindly  devoted  to  their  cause  that 
they  might  rely  upon  our  acquiescence  to  every  measure  they 
should  adopt,  as  fully  as  if  we  were  their  subjects,  and  that,  if  the 
judicial  government  should  incline  to  oppose  them,  the  spirit  of 
the  people  would  bear  down  upon  the  government.  This  infamous 
libel  against  our  country  has  been  too  much  countenanced  by  the 
temper  of  a  considerable  party  in  the  Federal  House  of  Represen 
tatives,  and  the  feeble  means  of  the  Legislature. 

If  instead  of  exhibiting  a  submissive  spirit,  which  invites  insult 
and  encourages  injury,  the  Legislature  had  unitedly  discovered 
those  elevated  and  patriotic  sentiments  which  the  President  ex 
pressed  in  his  speech  in  June  last,  we  should  probably  have  heard 
of  no  new  outrages  or  indignities  from  France,  and  some  of  the 
present  embarrassments  would  have  been  alleviated.  We  pray 
that  the  errors  of  the  past  time  may  suffice,  and  that  in  future 
party  spirit  may  yield  to  the  public  good.  We  hope  for  measures 
always  just,  butfrm,  —  free  from  insolence,  but  free  also  from  ser 
vility.  Such  measures  will  be  always  acceptable  to  men  who  truly 
love  their  country,  and  who  mean  to  defend  it  against  all  the 
assaults  of  tyranny. 

From  the  Massachusetts  Mercury,  Feb.  2,  1798. 

POLITICAL  MONITOR.     No.  V. 

Strictures  on  Fauchet's  Pamphlet  concluded. 

The  complete  refutation  which  Mr.  PICKERING  has  given  to  all 
the  calumnies  against  our  government  openly  propagated  by  the 
French  seems  to  render  superfluous  any  further  argument  on  the 
subject ;  but,  as  the  partisans  of  France  have  hitherto  justified  all 
her  outrages,  it  may  be  useful  to  remark  that  Mr.  FAUCHET,  the 
Minister  of  the  Decemvirs,  admits  that  the  conduct  of  GENET  and 
the  French  consuls  was  culpable.  He  admits,  too,  the  folly  and 
ignorance  of  the  Directory  in  decreeing  that  French  cruisers 
should  treat  neutrals  as  these  suffer  others  to  treat  them.  Doubt 
less,  he  is  aware  of  the  sentence  which  impartiality  must  pronounce 
on  this  act.  He  perceives  that  it  was  intended  to  let  loose  all  the 


596  LIFE   AND   LETTERS   OF   GEOEGE   CABOT.  [1798. 

robbers  and  pirates  that  were  in  the  dominions  of  France,  to 
plunder  the  unarmed  commerce  of  friendly  nations.  He  admits 
also  that  this  wanton  injustice  is  succeeded  by  a  subsequent  decree, 
as  explained  by  MERLIN,  now  a  member  of  the  Directory,  and 
which  he  says  must  be  prejudicial  to  the  French  cause,  &c.  In 
all  this  there  is  nothing  new,  and  yet  the  confession  is  very  pre 
cious,  because  it  comes  from  a  great  offender,  and  authorizes  us  to 
expect  that,  if  ever  justice  revives  in  France,  these  unprovoked 
aggressions  will  be  condemned  by  the  nation. 

C5?5  * 

Having  made  these  acknowledgments,  Mr.  Fauchet  then  asks 
whether  France  has  not  been  eager  to  redress  our  grievances  when 
we  have  made  them  known  ?  It  is  true  that  the  Robespierrian 
party,  having  destroyed  their  rivals,  the  Brissotins,  did,  at  the  re 
quest  of  the  United  States,  displace  GENET,  who  was  a  creature  of 
that  party,  but  it  should  be  remembered  they  sent  a  successor.  He 
asks  also  if  the  committee  of  public  safety  of  the  second  and 
third  year  did  not  respect  our  neutrality?  To  this  it  may  be 
safely  answered  that  in  NO  YEAR  of  the  Republic  has  France  re 
spected  our  neutrality.  It  is  presumed  that  Mr.  Fauchet  cannot 
adduce  one  example  in  which  a  French  cruiser  meeting  with  enemy 
property  in  an  American  ship  has  complied  with  the  treaty  of 
1778.  If  there  have,  been  any  such  cases,  they  are  very  few,  and 
must  be  lost  in  comparison  with  the  fifteen  or  twenty  millions  of 
dollars  which  have  been  ravished  from  our  honest  industry.  The 
next  question  of  Mr.  Fauchet,  alluding  to  the  intercourse  between 
the  Directory  and  their  avowed  friend  Monroe,  is  a  cruel  insult  to 
those  whose  interests  were  depending.  Unhappily  for  the  United 
States,  this  man  always  mistook  the  interest  of  France  for  the  inter 
est  of  his  own  country,  as  he  does  Jacobin  tyranny  for  rational 
liberty.  Educated  by  JEFFERSON,  he  believes  that  the  abomi 
nable  system  kept  up  in  France  in  the  name  of  Republicanism 
ought  to  be  naturalized  and  cherished  -an  the  United  States,  and 
that  we,  with  the  wretched  slaves-  of  France,  ought  to  be  one 
people. 

Having  criminated  the  conduct  of  the  UNITED  STATES,  Mr. 
Fauchet  undertakes  to  account  for  our  apostasy  by  saying  that, 
after  the  exile  of  FAYETTE  and  the  murder  of  the  king,  the  Rev 
olution  was  viewed  with  a  less  favorable  eye  by  WASHINGTON, 
and  that  all  those  persons  whose  reputation  and  services  might 
give  them  influence  with  him  had  joined  and  encouraged  his 


1800.]  POLITICAL  WRITINGS.  597 

hostile  disposition.  From  this  general  description,  however,  he 
excepted  JEFFERSON,  the  MOULTRIES,  LIVINGSTONS,  CLINTON, 
and  SAMUEL  ADAMS.  It  is  not  proper  absolutely  to  deny  the 
truth  of  this  explanation,  since  it  is  not  wholly  unfounded.  It  is 
well  known  that  the  first  news  of  a  proposed  reform  in  the  French 
government  was  heard  in  every  country  with  pleasure  and  delight 
by  all  good  men ;  but  it  is  also  known  that  long  before  the  murder 
of  the  king  every  statesman  in  Europe  and  America  saw,  and  every 
honest  one  deplored,  that  the  liberty  and  happiness  of  the  French 
people  were  to  be  sacrificed  to  the  lawless  ambition  of  their  Jacobin 
leaders.  This  sentiment  was  every  day  confirmed  by  new  events, 
and,  having  become  common  to  the  upright  and  enlightened  every 
where,  would  have  soon  prevailed  among  all  classes  of  people, 
if  there  had  not  been  in  every  community  some  men  who  were 
interested  to  counteract  it.  Whether  the  men  named  by  Mr. 
Fauchet  were  of  this  description,  the  country  will  judge.  And  let 
them  also  judge  whether  WASHINGTON,  who  supports  and  is  sup 
ported  by  the  wise  and  good,  ought  not  to  have  abandoned  those 
who  were  engaged  in  the  universal  destruction  of  liberty  and 
order. 

From  the  Columbian  Centinel,  Oct.  4,  1800. 

MR.  RUSSELL,  —  Those  who  are  accustomed  to  observe  the 
course  of  diplomatic  affairs,  and  the  "  skill "  practised  by  the  French 
in  their  intercourse  with  other  nations,  will  not  be  surprised  at  the 
elaborate  and  insidious  article  on  the  subject  of  our  envoys,  which 
is  taken  from  a  Paris  paper. 

Those  who  recollect  the  fulminations  of  Mr.  Adet  at  the  period 
of  our  last  Presidential  election,  when  terror  was  the  order  of  the 
day,  will  not  wonder  at  the  sweet  expressions  of  respect  toward  our 
envoys,  now  the  system  of  terror  is  suspended  and  the  old  system  of 
intrigue  resumed. 

But  this  same  paper,  which  would  encourage  us  to  believe  that 
the  differences  between  the  two  countries  will  be  soon  removed, 
tells  us  pretty  plainly  that  France  will  insist  upon  the  same  pro 
vision  respecting  ships-of-war,  privateers,  and  prizes  as  is  contained 
in  Mr.  Jay's  treaty,  although  it  is  supposed  that  no  such  provision 
can  be  made  on  our  part  without  a  violation  of  our  faith.  But  I 
would  inquire  upon  what  ground  France  will  support  this  extraor 
dinary  demand.  She  will  not  say  to  the  American  people,  whom 


698  LIFE  AND   LETTERS   OF  GEOKGE   CABOT.  [1800. 

she  often  addresses,  "  You  had  no  right  to  make  this  stipulation." 
This  has  never  been  said,  I  believe,  even  to  the  populace.  Will  she 
say,  "  This  stipulation  impaired  the  right  of  France  as  secured  by 
former  treaties  "  ?  This  cannot  be  said  with  truth.  For  the  same 
article  in  Mr.  Jay's  treaty  which  contains  the  stipulation  expressly 
provides  that  it  shall  not  operate  contrary  to  former  existing  treaties. 
Will  she  allege  that  the  United  States  first  broke  the  treaty  of 
1778,  which  secured  to  France  the  stipulation  which  she  now 
wishes  to  make  ?  Every  page  of  the  Revolutionary  history  must 
confute  this ;  and  her  legislative  records  will  prove  that  she  author 
ized  the  violation  of  that  treaty  from  May,  1793,  so  that  our  own 
law  of  July  7,  1798,  is  little  else  than  a  declaration  of  the  effects 
flowing  from  the  violations  of  France.  Will  the  French  govern 
ment  say  that  a  sense  of  propriety  or  justice  to  their  citizens  for 
bids  them  to  make  a  treaty  with  us  which  does  not  put  them  on 
the  same  footing  with  the  English  ?  If  this  were  correct,  all 
treaties  should  be  alike ;  whereas  it  is  sufficient  that  they  are  fair, 
equal,  and  reciprocal  between  the  parties,  or  such  as  they  shall 
esteem  so.  Have  the  French  chosen  to  forget  that  previous  to 
the  treaty  of  Mr.  Jay,  and  afterward  until  the  annulment  of  the 
French  treaty  was  declared  by  Congress,  England  was  in  the  same 
predicament  in  relation  to  the  point  in  question  that  France  is 
now?  And  yet  England  was  ready  to  make  an  equitable  and 
amicable  adjustment  of  all  differences,  without  complaining  of  this 
stipulation  existing  between  us  and  France. 

It  will  be  seen  by  all  who  are  not  wilfully  blind  that  the  con 
duct  of  the  United  States  has  been  perfectly  natural,  honest,  and 
fair  in  the  whole  of  this  proceeding,  and  that  the  complaint  of 
France  is  without  any  good  reason.  In  1778,  when  we  appre 
hended  danger  from  the  power  and  the  hostile  disposition  of  Eng 
land,  we  reciprocated  with  France,  among  other  things,  a  certain 
exclusive  stipulation  relative  to  maritime  rights,  which  was  thought 
suitable  to  the  interests  and  views  of  both  the  parties.  In  1794, 
we  stipulated  in  a  similar  manner  with  England,  but  provided 
against  the  operation  of  it  toward  those  who  had  prior  rights 
secured  by  treaty.  France  chose,  however,  to  break  the  treaty  by 
which  she  held  this  prior  right,  and  of  consequence  her  right 
ceased.  If  this  is  inconvenient  or  injurious,  she  must  blame  her 
own  conduct,  and  not  that  of  the  United  States.  Doubtless,  the 
consequence  was  foreseen ;  but  it  was  vainly  believed  in  France 


1800.]  POLITICAL   WHITINGS.  599 

that  they  could  reap  the  double  advantage  of  keeping  us  bound 
and  being  free  themselves,  and  whatever  should  be  wanting  of 
justice  should  be  amply  made  up  by  intrigue  or  by  force. 

ONE  OF  THE  AMERICAN  PEOPLE. 


From  the  Columbian  Centinel,  Oct.  11,  1800. 

MR.  RUSSELL,  —  Among  the  judicious  comments  with  which 
you  accompanied  the  publication  of  the  Paris  article  respecting  our 
envoys,  I  was  rejoiced  to  see  that  you  considered  the  proposition 
relative  to  neutral  bottoms  as  a  mere  "lullaby."  It  is,  indeed, 
unfortunate  that,  on  a  subject  of  such  moment  to  the  United  States, 
so  much  has  been  at  different  times  addressed  to  our  passions  and 
so  little  to  our  understanding,  and  that  our  enemies  still  cherish 
the  belief  that  we  will  sacrifice  our  most  substantial  interests  to 
our  vanity,  pride,  or  mistaken  avarice. 

The  vexation  and  oppression  which  the  commerce  of  neutrals  is 
liable  to  suffer  from  belligerent  nations  will  never  be  essentially 
mitigated  until  adequate  means  are  mutually  agreed  on  to  satisfy 
the  latter  that  the  property  of  their  enemies  is  not  covered.  This 
can  only  be  done  by  particular  stipulations  between  nation  and 
nation.  Although  it  may  be  difficult  by  convention  to  secure  to 
belligerents  and  neutrals  the  full  and  free  exercise  of  all  the  rights 
they  respectively  claim,  yet,  if  there  is  a  sincere  disposition  in  the 
parties,  all  may  be  secured  that  are  important,  and  that  can  be 
reasonably  insisted  on.  But  when  will  this  salutary  arrangement 
take  place,  if  the  neutrals  themselves  do  not  promote  it,  but  enter 
into  the  absurd  projects  of  one  of  the  war  parties  against  the  other? 
A  moment's  reflection  would  satisfy  any  unprejudiced  mind  that 
France,  while  inferior  to  England  in  maritime  force,  will  never 
be  reconciled  to  any  system  respecting  neutrals  which  cannot  be 
made  a  shield  for  her  own  commerce  in  a  time  of  war  with  that 
power.  While,  on  the  contrary,  every  system  convertible  to  such 
a  purpose  will  certainly  be  opposed  by  England,  or  by  any  pre 
dominant  maritime  power,  since  to  every  such  power  this  system 
might,  and  sometimes  would,  be  more  injurious  than  the  arms  of 
the  neutral  in  open  war.  It  is  time  to  put  an  end  to  the  delusions 
which  have  already  beguiled  us  to  the  very  edge  of  a  dangerous 
precipice.  It  is  a  proof  of  the  contempt  which  the  French  feel  for 


600  LIFE   AND   LETTERS    OF   GEORGE   CABOT.  [1800. 

those  whom  they  address  that  they  repeat  these  stale  tricks,  and 
still  expect  to  be  believed  when  they  profess  respect  for  the  rights 
of  nations,  for  they  know  and  are  proud  of  the  distinction.  Since 
the  period  when  imperial  Rome  lorded  it  over  enslaved  nations, 
no  people  so  insultingly,  outrageously,  and  cruelly  tyrannized  over 
others  as  the  French.  They  admit  no  rights  but  those  of  the 
sword.  It  is  too  plain,  therefore,  to  be  mistaken  by  any  but  the 
wilfully  blind  that  all  the  doctrines  and  dogmas  of  the  French 
relative  to  free  bottoms,  &c.,  are  vile  artifices  practised  on  the 
neutrals,  to  engage  them  against  a  nation  whom,  if  they  could  con 
quer  or  destroy,  they  could  then  hope  for  the  consummation  of 
their  wishes  in  the  conquest  of  the  rest  of  the  world. 

ONE  OP  THE  AMERICAN  PEOPLE. 


APPENDIX. 


i. 

The  following  letter  was  accidentally  omitted  in  its  proper  place. 
See  above,  p.  344. 

GEORGE  CABOT  TO  PICKERING. 

[Indorsed  :      Received  March  7,  1804.] 

MY  DEAR  SIR, — Our  friend  Ames,  whose  ill  health  has  kept  him 
from  town  through  the  winter,  made  an  effort  to  visit  my  family  just 
as  I  closed  my  letter  of  the  14th.  I  put  it  into  his  hands,  having  pre 
viously  enclosed  him  the  one  I  had  received  from  you.  He  read  yours 
with  pleasure,  and  a  mingled  emotion  of  anger  which  it  was  impossible 
wholly  to  repress.  His  feelings  were  such  as  your  sentiments  have 
justly  inspired  in  the  few  persons  to  whom  I  have  communicated  them, 
say  Mr.  Parsons  and  Mr.  Higginson ;  but  the  second  thoughts  of  all  of 
us  are  such  as  you  would  collect  from  the  desultory  letter  I  wrote  as 
mine.  Yours,  &c.  G.  C. 

II. 

The  following  letter  was  in  response  to  an  inquiry  in  regard  to 
Mr.  Dane's  objects  in  serving  as  a  delegate  to  the  Hartford  Con 
vention.  See  above,  p.  519. 

BROOKLINE,  Aug.  23,  1878. 

DEAR  MR.  LODGE,  .  .  .  — My  remembrance  is  substantially  this : 
My  father,  from  having  been  always  before  an  old  Governor  Bow- 
doin  Federalist,  sympathized  strongly  with  the  Democratic  support  of 
the  war  of  1812,  and  went  with  Mr.  Dexter  and  Wm.  Gray  and  the 
other  seceders  from  the  Federal  policy.  He  was  an  intimate  friend  of 
Nathan  Dane,  and  had  business  relations  with  him,  I  believe,  in  con 
nection  with  the  old  Plymouth  Land  Company.  Mr.  Dane  was  accus 
tomed  to  call  and  see  him,  when  he  came  up  from  Beverly.  He  did  so 
call  on  his  way  to  attend  the  Hartford  Convention,  and  said  at  once  to 
my  father:  "  Well,  Mr.  Winthrop,  you  are  surprised,  I  doubt  not,  that 


602  APPENDIX. 

I  am  going  to  their  Convention."  "  Yes,"  said  my  father ;  "  I  am  sur 
prised,  and  I  greatly  regret  it."  "Do  not  be  alarmed,"  said  Mr.  Dane; 
"  somebody  must  go  to  prevent  mischief.  I  go  in  that  spirit  and  for 
that  purpose  only,  and  I  hope  to  bring  you  word  on  my  return  that 
every  thing  has  gone  off  safely." 

On  Mr.  Dane's  return  he  called  on  my  father,  agreeably  to  his  prom 
ise,  to  communicate  to  him  the  results  of  the  Convention.  He  brought 
with  him,  as  I  understood  it,  a  printed  report  of  their  doings,  which 
he  gave  to  my  father,  saying:  u  You  will  see  by  this  that  no  mischief 
has  been  accomplished,  but  if  certain  persons  could  have  had  their  own 
way,  and  carried  the  measures  which  they  proposed,  I  know  not  where 
we  should  have  been.  I  rejoice  that  I  went  to  Hartford,  and  helped 
to  avert  danger." 

My  father  gave  me  this  account  somewhere  about  the  time  of  Nathan 
Dane's  death,  in  1835.  .  .  . 

Yours  truly,  ROBT.  C.  WINTHROP. 


III. 

The  following  extract  is  from  a  long  description  of  Mr.  Cabot 
in  Sullivan's  "  Familiar  Letters"  (p.  373).  See  above,  p.  570. 

"  Mr.  Cabot  was  a  tall  man,  well  formed,  of  courteous  and  elegant 
manners,  and  refined  aspect;  his  complexion  light,  his  eyes  blue,  his 
mode  of  speaking  in  colloquial  intercourse  serious  and  earnest,  but 
not  vehement.  The  dress  of  his  thoughts  was  clear,  strong,  and  appro 
priate,  and  every  sentence  apparently  incapable  of  amendment." 

In  a  note  to  this  description  Mr.  Sullivan,  who  knew  Mr.  Cabot 
well,  and  was  himself  a  member  of  the  Hartford  Convention, 

says,  — 

"  It  is  well  remembered  to  have  been  one  of  Mr.  Cabot's  opinions, 
that  this  country  must,  sooner  or  later,  submit  (as  in  ancient  repub 
lics)  to  the  termination  of  freedom,  through  popular  delusion.  He 
thought  the  natural  action  of  this  spirit  was  most  terrible  in  small 
communities ;  and  that  the  prolonged  safety  of  this  country  would  be 
found  in  the  diffusion  of  its  inhabitants  over  a  wide  surface.  He  was, 
therefore,  for  continuing  the  unity  of  the  American  people,  and  avoid 
ing  the  evils  of  party-feeling,  when  limited  to  narrow  spaces,  and  to 
small  numbers." 


INDEXES. 


INDEX    OF    LETTERS. 


c. 

CABOT,  GEORGE,  to  John  Adams, 
165. 

Cabot,  George,  to  E.  Benson,  397. 

Cabot,  George,  to  Benjamin  Good- 
hue,  33,  35,  36. 

Cabot,  George,  to  Christopher  Gore, 
91,  132,  '230,  232,  267,  270,  290, 
292,  317,  324,  333. 

Cabot,  George,  to  Alexander  Hamil 
ton,  43,  46,  48,  73,  283,  284,  293, 
298. 

Cabot,  George,  to  Rufus  King,  73, 
80,  81,  83,  85,  330,  332,  345. 

Cabot,  George,  to  John  Lowell,  348. 

Cabot,  George,  to  Theophilus  Par 
sons,  30,  57,  75,  78. 

Cabot,  George,  to  Samuel  Phillips, 
75. 

Cabot,  George,  to  Timothy  Picker 
ing,  109,  110,  112,  138,  141,  148, 
149,  156,  164,  170,  172,  173,  175, 
179,  183,  185,  189,  216,  218,  219, 
224,  226,  228,  233,  237,  240,  246, 
249,  250,  272,  333,  336,  337,  341, 
349,  350,  352,  354,  361,  372,  373, 
374,  375,  376,  377,  378,  379,  380, 
381,  386,  389,  390,  391,  392,  393, 
394,  397,  398,  399,  401,  402,  406, 
407,  408,  566. 

Cabot,  George,  to  Samuel  Sewall, 
113,  115. 

Cabot,  George,  to  Jeremiah  Smith, 
130. 

Cabot,  George,  to  Caleb  Strong,  95, 
96. 

Cabot,  George,  to  Washington,  43, 
90,  94. 

Cabot,  George,  to  Oliver  Wolcott, 
84,  86,  111,  118,  120, 123,  128,  134, 
135,  137,  139,  140,  148,  150,  153, 


158,  168,  172,  222,  229,  244,  253, 

254,  264,  269,  271,  273,  281,  288, 

289,  294,  296,  297,  320,  326,  327, 
328,  399,  403. 


G. 

Gore,  C.,  to  G.  Cabot,  186. 
Gore,  C.,  to  Caleb  Strong,  559,  560, 
563. 

H. 

Hamilton,  A.,  to  G.  Cabot,  273. 
Higginson,   Stephen,  to   G.   Cabot, 

51. 
Higginson,  Stephen,  to  T.  Pickering, 

453. 
Hillhouse,  James,  to  T.  Pickering, 

563. 

K. 

Kent,  James,  to  T.  Pickering,  534. 
King,  R.,  to  G.  Cabot,  305. 
King,  R.,  to  T.  Pickering,  450. 


L. 

Logan,    George,  to    T.    Pickering, 

660. 

Lowell,  J.,  to  T.  Pickering,  645. 
Lyman,  T.,  to  T.  Pickering,  446. 


M. 

Marshall,  John,  to  T.  Pickering,  489, 
629. 


606 


INDEX  OF  LETTERS. 


Mcllenry,  James,  to  T.  Pickering, 
204. 

Morris,  Gouverneur,  to  T.  Picker 
ing,  537,  550. 


P. 

Pickering,  T.,  to  George  Cabot,  107, 
155,  161,  173,  177,  181,  215,  221, 
223,  235,  242,  248,  249,  275,  335, 
337,  380,  387,  394,  400,  404,  555, 
565. 

Pickering,  T.,  to  James  Hillhouse, 
551. 

Pickering,  T.,  to  S.  Higginson,  441. 

Pickering,  T.,  to  Rufus  King,  447. 

Pickering,  T.,  to  John  Lowell,  535, 
539,  541,  542,  561. 

Pickering,  T.,  to  Theodore  Lyman, 
444,  450. 

Pickering,  T.,  to  Gouverneur  Mor 
ris,  535. 


Pickering,  T.,  to  Samuel  Putnam, 

530,  532,  535. 

Pickering,  T.,  to  Caleb  Strong,  557. 
Putnam  to  T.  Pickering,  532,  533. 


R. 

Reeve,  Tapping,  to   Uriah   Tracy, 
442. 


S. 


Stoddert,   Benj.,   to    John   Adams, 
200. 

w. 

Washington  to  G.  Cabot,  88. 
Watson,  Marston,  to  G.  Cabot,  127. 
Wolcott,  Oliver,  to  G.  Cabot,  117, 
251,  278,  296,  319,  325,  329. 


GENERAL    INDEX. 


A. 

AMES,  FISHER,  30,  35.  Opinion  of 
Mr.  Cabot's  public  speaking,  73. 
Suggests  Mr.  Cabot  as  commis 
sioner  to  France,  101.  Opinion 
of  John  Marshall,  147,  170. 
Member  of  Governor's  Council, 
233.  Eulogy  of  Washington,  264. 
Friendship  with  Mr.  Cabot,  301, 
323.  Approves  indignation  meet 
ings,  315.  Death  of,  309.  Works 
of,  370,  397,  399.  Last  efforts  of, 
388,  399.  Opinion  of  separatist 
schemes  of  1804,  439.  Conversa 
tional  powers,  572. 

Adams,  John,  opinion  of  Essex 
Junto,  20,21.  Casting  vote  when 
Vice-President,  40,  41.  Efforts  in 
1792  against  re-election  of,  57. 
Anecdote  of,  at  second  election  for 
Vice-Presidency,  60.  Mr.  Cabot's 
interview  with,  as  to  dismissal  of 
Genet,  64,  65.  Inauguration  as 
President ;  desire  for  strong  neu 
trality  and  embassy  to  France,  99. 
Composition  of  embassy,  101.  De 
fects  in  commission  as  appointed, 
103,  104.  Account  of  appoint 
ment  of  commission,  103,  104, 
105.  Tone  of  message  1798,  107. 
Favors  warlike  policy  1798,  143. 
Appoints  Mr.  Cabot  Secretary  of 
Navy,  144.  Accepts  Washington's 
list  of  major-generals ;  changes 
the  order,  145.  Yields  to  request 
of  Washington ;  defends  Gerry, 
146,  178.  Account  of  Mr.  Cabot's 
hostility  to  Gerry,  168,  169.  Re 
news  negotiations  with  France 
1799,  191.  Nominates  Murray, 
192,  195.  Peace  policy,  194. 


Soundness   of  his   peace   policy, 

196.  Mistakes  in  carrying  it  out, 

197.  Character  of,  198.     Account 
of  opposition  in  the  cabinet,  199, 
200.      Accuses    his   opponents   of 
being  a  British  faction,  213.  Jeal 
ousy  of  Hamilton,  Pickering,  and 
Wolcott,  and  love  of  Gerry,  233. 
Suspends    departure    of    French 
commission,  246,  247.    Despatches 
commission,    248,    249.      His   ad 
ministration,       253.        Dismisses 
Pickering     and     McHenry,    259. 
Open  quarrel  with  Pickering,  260. 
Necessity  of   supporting  in   1800, 
274.      Feelings     toward      Demo 
crats,   320.      Answer   to    Quincy 
Address,  328.     Influence  of,  453. 
Ambition  of  G.   Cabot,  573,  574. 

Adams,  J.  Q.,  103,  250.  Supports 
Louisiana  purchase,  333,  334. 
Letter  to  H.  G.  Otis,  392, 393,  394. 
Opinions  in  regard  to  France  and 
England,  395,  396.  Pamphlet  and 
accusations  against  Federalist 
leaders,  411-413.  Compelled  to 
submit  to  Jefferson  on  leaving 
Federalist  party,  425.  Opinion 
of  separatist  scheme  of  1804,  439. 
Leaves  Federalist  party,  474,  475. 
His  defence  of  the  embargo,  476. 
Charge  of  separatist  scheme  in 
1807  and  1808,  479,  480.  Founda 
tion  for  this  charge,  483.  Ac 
cuses  the  Federalists  of  being  in 
communication  with  England,  484. 
Charges  against  the  Hartford  Con 
vention,  508.  Interpretation  of 
report  of  Convention,  516. 

Adams,  Samuel,  position  in  Con 
vention  of  1788,  24,  25. 

Adet,    "  proclamation    and     note," 


608 


GENERAL  INDEX. 


Ill,  112.  Opinions  as  to  proba 
bility  of  war  in  1797,  134. 

Anderson,  Joseph,  senator  from 
Tennessee :  Attacks  Pickering, 
400. 

Armstrong,  John :  Thinks  France 
will  not  enforce  decrees,  465. 
Suppressed  correspondence  with 
Champagny,  472.  Cadore's  letter 
to,  497. 

Assumption  of  State  debts,  36,  37. 
Balance  due  Massachusetts,  73. 


B. 

BANCROFT,  GEORGE,  anecdote  of 
Mr.  Cabot,  576. 

Baring,  Alexander,  pamphlet  by, 
394,  and  note. 

Barlow,  Joel,  240.  His  relations 
with  Frencli  Directory,  257  ;  note 
on,  295,  530. 

Barnett,  Win.,  541  and  note. 

Barney,  Joshua,  note  on,  220. 

Barnwell,  Robert,  57  and  note. 

Barton,  William,  Plan  for  uniting 
with  Clintonians  in  1808,  397. 

Benson,  Egbert,  67  and  note. 

Berkeley,  Admiral,  recall  of,  377. 

Bigelow,  Timothy,  character  of,  547. 

Bingham,  Wm.,  221. 

Bowdoin,  James,  conservative  can 
didate  in  1780,  17.  Governor, 
23,  24. 

Bonaparte,  issues  Berlin  decree, 
864,  465.  Issues  Milan  decree, 
378.  Issues  Bayonne  decree,  477. 

Bradford,  William,  Attorney-Gen 
eral,  92. 

Brent,  Richard  :  Death  of,  556. 

Brooks,  John,  552. 

Bullers,  Dr.,  390. 

Burr,  Aaron,  Mr.  Cabot's  opinion 
of,  284.  Influence  in  New  York, 
330.  Should  not  be  supported  by 
Federalists  for  governor,  348. 
Runs  for  governor,  448,  450. 

Burwell,  W.  A,,  401. 


c. 

CABOT,  CHARLES,  career  as  mer 
chant,  302,  323.  Death  of,  371. 

Cabot,  Edward,  business,  302,  323. 
Death  of,  303,  335,  336,  337. 


Cabot,  Henry,  anecdote  of  Wash 
ington,  30.  Enters  a  lawyer's  of 
fice,  302,  323. 

Cabot,  George,  birth,  8.  Education, 
8.  Goes  to  sea ;  results  of  this 
experience,  9,  10.  Becomes  a 
merchant;  marriage,  11.  Town 
affairs ;  Essex  Bridge ;  part  in 
the  Revolution;  privateering,  13. 
Town  report  on  Constitution  of 
1778,  14,  15.  Delegate  to  Conven 
tion  to  fix  prices,  15.  Delegate  to 
Convention  to  form  a  State  Con 
stitution,  16.  Member  of  "  Essex 
Junto,"  17.  State  senator,  22. 
Speech  on  Sunday  law ;  declines 
a  re-election,  23.  Delegate  to  Con 
vention  to  consider  the  Federal 
Constitution,  24.  His  part  in  that 
Convention,  25-30.  Journey  to 
New  York;  receives  Washington 
at  Beverly,  30.  Opinions  on  clause 
in  Constitution  regulating  elec 
tions,  and  on  consolidation  of 
States,  32.  Opinions  on  Beverly 
cotton  factory,  32,  33.  On  as 
sumption  of  State  debts,  36,  37. 
Elected  senator  of  the  United 
States,  88.  His  services  on"  com 
mittees,  38,  39.  Opinion  as  to 
increased  representation,  40.  Bill 
to  encourage  the  fisheries,  41. 
Committee  on  claims  and  revenue, 
42.  Services  in  session  of  1792 
-93,  61.  Introduces  bills  to  re 
claim  fugitives  from  justice,  and 
for  registration  of  fishing  vessels, 
62.  Opinion  as  to  dealing  with 
cry  of  gratitude  to  France,  63. 
Interview  with  John  Adams  as  to 
dismissal  of  Genet,  64,  65.  On 
committee  on  Gallatin's  case  ; 
other  services,  66.  Confers  with 
King,  Ellsworth,  and  Strong  as  to 
English  mission  in  1794,  67.  Jef 
ferson  says  he  favors  a  President 
for  life,  &c.,  68.  Services  in  1794 
-95 ;  withdraws  from  busi 
ness,  and  removes  to  Brookline, 
69.  His  house  and  farm  ; 
opinions  on  the  Jay  treaty,  70. 
Jefferson  says  Mr.  Cabot  an 
nounced  plan  to  dissolve  Union  in 
1795,  71.  Moves  to  strike  out 
"  magnanimous  nation  "  from  res 
olution  of  thanks  to  France,  72. 
Services  in  1795-96  ;  resig 
nation  from  the  Senate,  72.  His 
manner  in  debate ;  President  of 


GENERAL   IXDEX. 


609 


Boston  Branch  of  United  States 
Bank,  73.     Takes   charge  of  the 
son  of  Lafayette,  86,  91.     Motives 
in  resigning  from  Senate,  95,  96. 
Retirement  from  politics  ;    takes 
no  part  in  campaign   of  1796—97  ; 
His  opinions  as  to  duties  of  elec 
tors     at    this    time ;     favors    Mr. 
Adams,  98.     Proposed  by  Hamil 
ton   and    Ames   for  first   French 
commission,  99, 102.     Political  ac 
tivity     in     1797  ;     opposition     to 
French  mission,    106.     Sympathy 
with    President's    message,    1798, 
107.      Recommends    S.    Williams 
for      Hamburg    consulship,     109. 
Opinion   of   Monroe,    110.     Opin 
ion     of    farewell     address,     111. 
Urged    by     Wolcott    to    support 
administration,    118.      Newspaper 
writings  in  support  of  administra 
tion,  123.     Circular  letter  to  Fed 
eralists,   urging  them  to    support 
administration,     124-127.       Opin 
ions  in  regard  to  French  relations, 
128-130.     Writes  letter  to  leading 
Federalists,    urging  strong   meas 
ures,    130-132.       Opinions    as    to 
an  embargo,  131.     Opposition    to 
French  mission,  133,  134,  137,  138. 
Approves  President's  policy,  139, 
140.      Recommends    S.    Williams 
for  consul   at  London,  142.     Re 
newed   political   exertions,    1798; 
declines     secretaryship    of   navy, 
144.     Opinion  on  affair  of  major- 
generals  ;     letter    to    Mr.   Adams 
against  changing  the  order,  146, 
165.      Defence   of  Marshall,   147, 
175,   176.      Opinions   of    French, 
and   of  our    policy   in   regard    to 
them,  150-152.      Heasons  for  de 
clining  secretaryship  of  navy,  156- 

158.  Opinions  as  to  naval  policy, 

159.  Opinion  on  affair  of  major- 
generals,     164<     168,     170,      171. 
Feelings  toward   Gerry,  and  opin 
ion  of  his  character,  168,  169,  183- 
185.    Opinions  as  to  electoral  law, 
189,      190.        Favors      war     with 
France,  190.     Opposition  to  peace 
policy,    and    nomination   of  Mur 
ray,   195.      Dread   of  party  divi 
sions  arising  from  nomination  of 
Murray,    210,    211.       Objects    to 
newspaper     discussions     of    the 
President,  and  to  interference  of 
Senate,   212.      Feelings  in  regard 
to  charge  of  British  faction,  213, 


214.       Opposition     to     Murray's 
nomination,   224,    225.      Opinions 
of    John  Adams's  not   consulting 
cabinet,  227,  228,  230,  231.     Din 
ner      and     interview    with    John 
Adams,    228,    230.      Writes    but 
does   not   publish    six   papers   re 
flecting  on  peace  policy,  237,  240. 
Opinions  of  British  finances,  244- 
246.     Fears   of  results  of  French 
commission,    249,    250.      Indigna 
tion     at    dismissal    of   Pickering, 
260,  272.     And  at  cry  of   British 
faction,  261.    Opinion  as  to  course 
of  party  in  ensuing  election,  261, 
283,    284.      Hamilton's  pamphlet, 
262,   263.     Opinions   as   to   Presi 
dent's  French  policy,  265.     As  to 
taxation,  266.     Opinions   of  Brit 
ish    government,  270,   271.     Sup 
ports   John   Adams,    but    prefers 
Pinckney  as    President,  281,  282, 
285,  286.     Advice  to  Hamilton  as 
to    his   pamphlet,    285-287.     Ob 
jections    to  Hamilton's  pamphlet, 
288,  289.      Refuses  to   visit    Mr. 
Adams,   295.      Opinion    on    Wol- 
cott's  resignation,  296,  297.     Crit 
icism     of    Hamilton's     pamphlet, 
299,  300.     Retired  life  after  1801, 
301,  302,  323.     Removal   to  Bos 
ton,  302,  329.     Dissolves  partner 
ship      with      Jos.     Lee  ;      death 
of     his     son      Edward  ;       death 
of  Hamilton,  303.     Subscribes  to 
fund   for  Colonel   Pickering,   and 
to  that  for  benefit  of    Hamilton's 
family,    303,     304.      Trustee     of 
Hamilton    fund,    and    disposition 
of  the  same,   304-310.     Opposed 
to  intrigues  in  behalf  of  Burr,  310. 
Opinion  of  Jefferson,  of  Madison, 
and  Gallatin,  311.     Of   true  pol 
icy     for    Federalists,     311,     312. 
Opinions  of  Jefferson's  removals 
from    office ;    of    attack    of  'judi 
ciary  ;    opposes  scheme  of  separa- 
tion  in  1804,  313,  341,  347.    Takes 
part   in   indignation   meeting    on 
admiralty  decisions,  314.     Reluc 
tance  to  do  this,  315.     Opposition 
to    embargo     policy,     316,     317. 
Opinion    of   Hamilton,   348.     Fa 
vors  alliance  with   England,  364, 
365,  372,  373.     Considers  repara 
tion   offered    for    "  Chesapeake  " 
sufficient,    365,   366.      Opposition 
to  embargo,  366.     Dread  and  in 
dignation  at  accusation  of  '•  Brit- 


610 


GENERAL   INDEX. 


ish  faction,"  367,  368,  385.  Polit 
ical  activity;  elected  to  gover 
nor's  council,  369.  Grief  for 
Ames's  death,  369,  370.  Takes 
charge  of  Ames's  papers,  370. 
Opposition  to  schemes  of  separa 
tion,  370,  371.  Opinions  on  pol 
icy  of  administration,  371.  Grief 
for  death  of  his  son  Charles,  371. 
Complete  retirement ;  opinions  of 
war  of  1812,  372,  408.  Chosen 
President  of  Hartford  Convention, 
410,  510.  Kef  uses  to  take  part  in 
"  Chesapeake  "  indignation  meet 
ings,  470.  Certificate  as  to  journal 
of  Hartford  Convention,  509.  His 
objects  in  attending  Hartford 
Convention,  519.  Retirement 
after  1815,  564.  Opinions  on 
protection  and  free  trade,  566- 
568.  Occupations  and  family 
during  last  years  of  his  life,  568. 
Illness  and  death,  569.  Personal 
appearance,  569,  570.  His  con 
versational  powers,  571.  Modest 
and  retiring  disposition,  573.  Po 
litical  opinions,  574,  575.  Aver 
sion  to  quarrels,  575,  576.  Influ 
ence  in  Boston,  576,  577.  Literary 
tastes  and  occupations,  577.  Re 
ligious  views,  578.  Political 
writings,  581-600. 

Cabot,  George,  Mrs.,  character  of, 
12. 

Cabot,  name  and  family  of,  1-7. 
Services  in  Revolution,  13,  14. 

Cabot,  Samuel,  agent  under  Jay 
treaty,  160. 

Callender,  J.  T  ,  his  quarrel  with 
Jefferson,  431,  432. 

"  Camillus,"  84  and  note. 

Canning,  George,  letter  to  Pinkney 
in  1808,  399,  400.  Arrogance  of, 
471. 

Carroll,  Charles,  political  opinions  in 
1808,  490. 

Castlereagh,  Lord,  demands  cession 
of  Western  Territory,  528. 

Champagny,  letter  ordering  United 
States  to  go  to  war,  392. 

Chase,  Samuel,  impeachment  of,  436, 
451,  457. 

"  Chesapeake,"  affair  of  the,  365,  374, 
377,  378,  470.  Reparation  for,  ac 
cepted,  500. 

Church,  John  B.,  executor  of  Ham 
ilton's  will,  308,  309,  310. 

Civil  service,  influence  of  senators 
in  regard  to  appointments  to,  43. 


Clay,  Henry,  17. 

Clinton,  George,  candidate  for  Vice- 
Presidency  in  1792,  57.  Close  vote 
in  1792,  60.  Influence  in  New 
York,  330. 

Coin,  device  on,  42. 

Conventions :  at  Concord  to  fix  prices, 

15.  To  frame  State  Constitution, 

16.  To   adopt   the    Constitution, 
24,  30. 

Council,  British,  orders  in,  93,  364. 

Co-xe,  Tench,  official  misconduct  of, 
140,  148.  Publication  of  Mr.  Ad 
ams's  letter,  256. 

Crillon,  Count,  486. 

Cross,  Stephen  and  Ralph,  charac 
ters  of,  328. 

"  Curtius,"  author  of,  84,  note. 

Cutting,  J.  B.,  note  on,  111.  Inter 
view  with  Mr.  Cabot,  122. 


D. 

DALLAS,  A.  J.,  92  and  note.  His 
financial  measures,  561. 

Dalton,  Tristam,  succeeded  by  Mr. 
Cabot  in  U.  S.  Senate,  38. 

Dana,  Francis,  suggested  for  French 
commission, .101,  217,  note. 

Dane,  Nathan,  533  and  note.  Char 
acter  of,  548. 

D'Arunjo,  account  of  French  cor 
ruption,  216. 

Davie,  Thomas,  237. 

Davis,  Thomas,  trustee  of  Hamilton 
fund,  304,  310. 

Dayton,  Jonathan,  280,  note. 

Dearborn,  Henry,  173,  note,  427. 

Democrats,  policy  in  1793, 66.  Opin 
ions  of  French  commission,  254. 
Support  France  and  oppose  Eng 
land,  401, 402.  Demoralization  of, 
466. 

Derby,  H.,  13,  85. 

Dexter,  Samuel,  82  and  note,  254. 
Secretary  of  War,  291.  Opinion 
of  Adams  and  Jefferson,  321. 
Democratic  candidate  for  gov 
ernor,  507. 

Dorchester,  Lord,  speech  to  West 
ern  Indians,  67. 

Du  Buc,  Mr.,  proposition  to  fortify 
Boston,  407. 

D  wight,  Theodore,  testimony  as  to 
journal  of  Convention,  509.  Sec 
retary  of  Convention,  510. 

Dwight,  Timothy,  Dr.,  294,  note. 


GENERAL   INDEX. 


611 


E. 

EDWARDS,  PIERREPONT,  318,  note, 
457. 

Electoral  law,  189,  190,  336. 

Ellsworth,  Oliver,  67.  Commission 
er  to  France,  223,  234.  Opinion 
of  French  negotiations,  237,  238, 
242,  243,  247,  note.  Visits  Mr. 
Cabot,  324. 

Embargo,  opinions  of  Mr.  Cabot  as 
to,  in  1797,  131.  Effect  on  New 
England,  367,  368,  376,  379,  397 
398.  Futility  of,  473,  474.  Effect 
on  Federalist  party,  474.  How 
first  received  in  New  England,  476. 
Effect  on  New  England,  480,  481. 
Repeal  of,  494. 

England,  her  course  in  1793,  her 
blunders,  65.  Mission  to  in  1794, 
67.  Relations  with  in  1794,  76, 
78.  Admiralty  decisions,  314,  457. 
Diplomacy  of,  317.  Negotiations 
with  France  in  1803,  331,  332,  333. 
Proposed  invasion  of,  334,  347,  352. 
True  policy  of  toward  United 
States,  382-386.  Treats  United 
States  better  than  France,  403. 
Demands  of  in  1814,  537. 

Eppes,  John,  536,  and  note. 

Erskine,  Mr.,   his  negotiation,  496 
497. 

Essex  Bridge,  13,  31. 

Essex  Junto,  account  of,  17-22. 

Eustis,  Dr.  William,  82  and  note,  171. 


F. 

FAUCHET,  his  intrigue  with  Ran 
dolph,  91,  94.  Strictures  on  his 
pamphlet,  591,  597. 

Federalists,  difficult  position  as  a 
minority  in  1793,  66.  Carry  a 
bill  for  foundation  of  navy,  1794, 
67.  Plot  to  dissolve  Union  in 
1795,  71.  Strength  of  party  spirit 
among,  147.  Composition  of,  and 
feeling  in  regard  to  Murray's 
nomination,  193,  194.  Condition 
of  in  1799,  214,  215.  Dissensions 
of,  256-263.  Defeat  of,  263,  264. 
Difficulties  of,  268,  269.  Forced 
to  support  Mr.  Adams,  298.  True 
policy  of,  321.  Defeat  in  Massa 
chusetts  in  1808,  391.  Origin  and 
true  meaning  of  name  of,  413. 
Achievements  and  difficulties  of, 


414,  415.      Always    in    minority, 

415,  417.      Secret    of    their    suc 
cess  and  failure,  417,  418.     Their 
achievements,  418.     Federalism  in 
New  England,  419.     Their  opinion 
of  the  French  Revolution,  420,  421. 
Reasons  for  their  hatred  of  Jeffer 
son,  422.     For  concentrating  it  on 
him,  424.     Their  naval  policy,  428, 
429.     Policy  in   regard  to  Louisi 
ana,  434.      Opinions  as    to   West 
India   trade,   458,   459.      Foreign 
policy   of  in   1805,  460,  461,  462. 
Policy  in  1806,  4(59.     Policy  after 
rejection  of  treaty,  472.     Attack 
the  embargo,  477,  478.     Real  ob 
jects     of     in     1807-8,    481,    482. 
Had  no  knowledge  of  Henry,  487. 
Political  opinions  of  in  1808,  488- 
494.     Opposition  to  the  war,  504. 
Satisfaction  with  results  of  Hart 
ford  Convention,  52-4,  563.      De 
light  at  peace  ;    adoption  of  their 
principles    in     government,    525. 
Their  part  in  system  of  taxation 
in  1814,  5m 

Fish,  Nicholas,  executor  of  Hamil 
ton's  will,  308,  309,  310. 
Fisheries,  bill  to  encourage,  38,  41. 
Mr.  Cabot  chairman  of  commit 
tee  on,  39.  Letter  on  to  Hamilton, 
46-48.  Letter  from  S.  Higginson 
on,  51.  Letters  to  Sewall  on,  113- 
116. 

Foster,  Augustus,  his  negotiation, 
500. 

France,  politics  of  and  feelings  of 
Federalists  toward,  62,  63,  64. 
Relations  with  in  1793,  74.  Rela 
tions  with  in  1794,  76,  78.  Diffi 
culties  with  in  1797,  117.  Condi 
tion  of  in  1799,  267.  Negotiations 
with  in  1800,  289,  21X).  Power  and 
objects  of,  and  dangers  from,  581- 
588.  Intrigues  in  United  States, 
588,  589.  Jacobinism  in,  589-591. 
Deceitful  policy  of,  597-600. 

Francis,  Tench,  230. 

Freeman,  Nathaniel,  173,  note. 

Frelinghuysen,  Fred.,  95. 

Freneau,  Philip,  edits  "  National 
Gazette,"  59. 

Frestel,  Mr.,  tutor  to  young  Lafay 
ette,  86-91. 

Fries,  pardon  of,  275. 

Fugitives  from  justice,  bill  for  re 
claiming,  62. 


012 


GENERAL   INDEX. 


G. 

GALLATIN,  ALBERT,  contested  elec 
tion  of  to  Senate,  66, 188.  Financial 
policy,  429.  Report  attacking  the 
Federalists,  431. 

Genet,  his  arrival  in  America,  62. 
His  enrolling  troops,  75. 

Georgia,  separatism  in,  522. 

Gerry,  Elbridge,  urged  by  Mr.  Ad- 
anis  for  the  French  commission, 
101.  Character  of,  104.  Defended 
by  Mr.  Adams,  146.  Mr.  Cabot's 
opinion  of,  168,  169.  Attitude  of, 
after  return  from  France,  168, 171, 
172,  174,  175,  176,  179,  180.  Can 
didate  for  governor,  271.  Con 
duct  in  regard  to  his  brother,  S.  R. 
Gerry,  the  collector,  326.  Con 
nection  with  John  Henry,  486. 

Ghent,  treaty  of,  563. 

Giles,  William  B.,  attack  on  Hamil 
ton,  61.  Demand  for  papers  in 
French  negotiations,  143.  Op 
poses  repeal  of  embargo,  400. 
Attacks  the  judiciary,  428,  436, 
490,  491.  J.  Q.  Adams's  friend 
ship  with  and  opinion  of,  475. 

Gill,  Moses,  233. 

Goodhue,  Benjamin,  M.  C.,  33.  Suc 
ceeds  Mr.  Cabot  in  Senate,  72,  170. 
Opinion  of  Marshall,  179. 

Gore,  Christopher,  writings  in  news 
papers,  84.  Recommended  by  Mr. 
Cabot  for  commissioner  under  Jay 
treaty,  94.  Commissioner  to  Lon 
don,  132.  Opinions  as  to  treating 
with  France,  186.  As  to  treaty 
with  England,  187.  Recommended 
by  Mr.  Cabot  for  minister  to  St. 
Petersburg,  229.  Member  of  Fed 
eralist  Convention  in  1808,  397. 
Heads  committee  against  embargo, 
44)3. 

Gray,  William,  85,  note,  123. 

Grenville,  Lord,  note  to  Talleyrand, 
270. 

Griswold,  Roger,  thrashes  M.  Lyon, 
188,  341  and  note.  Threatens 
separation,  435.  Share  in  sepa 
ratist  scheme  of  1804,  438.  Re 
sists  call  for  militia  in  1812,  513. 


H. 

HAMILTON,  ALEXANDER,  friendship 
for  Mr.  Cabot,  25, 26.     Assisted  by 


Mr.  Cabot  in  financial  measures,  41. 
Replies  to  "  National  Gazette,"  60. 
Attacks  on,  in  Congress,  1792- 
93,  61.  Proposes  and  is  pro 
posed  for  English  mission  in  1794, 
67.  Subdues  whiskey  rebellion, 
69.  Stoned  at  public  meeting  on 
Jay  treaty,  83.  Care  of  young 
Lafayette,  87,  91.  Opinion  as  to 
ratification  of  Jay  treaty,  93. 
Course  during  Presidential  cam 
paign  of  1796,  98.  Scheme  for 
French  commission,  99,  102.  Af 
fair  of  major-generals,  145,  146 
Would  not  serve,  if  superseded  by 
Knox,  164.  Attack  on  Mr.  Adams, 
262,  263.  Death  of,  and  effect 
on  Federal  party,  303,  455.  Pro 
vision  for  family  of,  304,  310. 
Opinion  of  separatist  scheme  in 
1804,  313.  Action  in  regard  to 
separatist  scheme  of  1804,  437, 
438. 

Hammond,  Mr.,  British  minister,  93. 

Hancock,  John,  opposition  to,  in 
1780,  17,  23,  24.  Position  at  time 
of  Convention  of  1788,  24,  25. 
Love  of  flattery,  232. 

Harper,  Robert  Goodloe,  note  on, 
153,  286.  Conduct  in  Pickering 
impeachment,  451. 

Hartford  Convention,  has  not  been 
treated  historically,  410.  Sources 
of  information  for  history  of,  411, 
412.  Appointed,  505.  Terms  of 
appointment ;  characters  of  mem 
bers,  506.  Supported  by  majority 
of  people,  507,  508.  Journal  of, 
509,  510.  Report  of  analyzed,  511- 
516.  Real  objects  of,  518,  519. 
Adopts  doctrine  of  nullifica 
tion,  520.  Unconstitutionality  of, 
521. 

Hauteval,  Mons.,  agent  of  Talley 
rand,  174. 

Henry,  John,  character  and  history 
of,  484-488. 

Henry,  Patrick,  commissioner  to 
France,  223. 

Higginson,  Stephen,  '21,  22, 153, 170, 
172,  217.  Opinion  of  separatist 
scheme  of  1804,  439,  453. 

Hill,  Hugh,  Captain,  13. 

Hillhouse,  James,  letter  of,  390. 
"Old  Sachem,"  406.  Share  in 
separatist  scheme  of  1804,  438. 

Hiller,  Mr.,  replaced  by  Colonel 
Lee  as  collector  of  Salem,  327. 


GENERAL   INDEX. 


613 


I. 


IMPRESSMENT,  negotiations  in  re 
gard  to,  463.  British  note  on  in 
1806,  464. 

Ingersoll,  Jared,  103. 

Iredell,  James,  visits  "  Greenhill," 
Mr.  Cabot's  home,  70. 


J. 

JACKSON,  FRANCIS  JAMES,  dismissal 
of,  408. 

Jackson,  Henry,  note  on,  176. 

Jackson,  James,  Dr.,  anecdote  of 
Mr.  Cabot,  519. 

Jackson,  Jonathan,  note  on,  135. 
Recommended  by  Mr.  Cabot  as 
commissioner  on  British  debts, 
135.  But  declines,  136. 

Jacobin  clubs,  69. 

Jay,  John,  nominated  for  English 
mission,  67.  Proposed  by  Hamil 
ton  for  French  commission,  102. 
Political  opinions  in  1808,  490. 

Jay  treaty,  debate  on  in  House,  70. 
Opinion  in  Massachusetts  on,  80, 
81,  82,  83,  84,  85,  86.  Danger  of 
defeat  in  House,  and  action  of 
Senate,  95. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  anecdote  of  his 
learning  Spanish,  26,  note.  As 
sumes  leadership  of  anti-Federal 
ists,  39,  40.  First  efforts  against 
the  Federalists.  59.  Establishes 
"  National  Gazette,"  59, 60.  Retires 
from  office,  but  not  from  control 
of  party,  66,  67.  Opinion  of  Mr. 
Cabot,  68.  Accuses  Federalists  of 
plot  to  dissolve  Union  in  1795,  71. 
Proposed  by  Hamilton  for  French 
commission,  101.  Foreign  policy 
and  embargo,  316, 317.  Restrained 
by  Madison  and  Gallatin  from 
pushing  his  theories,  324,  325.  His 
policy  to  the  Moors,  326.  His 
policy  in  1807,  374.  Does  not  in 
tend  or  wish  war,  404,  405.  Re 
turns  from  Europe,  enters  cabinet 
and  forms  Democratic  party,  416. 
Rouses  hostility  to  England;  un- 
abl#  to  overcome  Federalists,  417. 
His  avowed  principles  and  the  na 
ture  of  his  success,  422.  His  pledges 
to  the  Federalists,  423,  424.  Con 
trol  of  his  party,  424,  425,  426. 
Fortunate  moment  of  his  acces 
sion,  426.  His  first  measures,  426, 


427  His  cabinet,  427.  Attack 
on^civil  service  and  the  judiciary, 
427.  428.  Ruin  of  the  navy, 
429.  Changes  effected  by  ;  treat 
ment  of  Mr.  Merry,  430.  His 
quarrel  with  Callender,  431,  432. 
Invitation  to  Paine,  432.  Naval 
and  giuiboat  policy,  433.  The 
Louisiana  policy,  433,  434.  Con 
siders  acquisition  of  Louisiana 
unconstitutional,  434,  435.  Ac 
cepts  renomination,  455.  Gunboat 
and  fortification  policy,  456,  457, 
459,  465.  Obtains  Mediterranean 
fund  ;  his  objects,  458.  Conduct  in 
the  Peirce  affair,  459.  Forbids  trade 
with  Hayti,  460.  Foreign  policy, 
4(30,  461,  462.  Reasons  for  reject 
ing  treaty  in  1806,  468.  Position 
of  in  1806,  469.  Management  of 
"  Chesapeake  "  affair,  470.  Policy 
after  rejection  of  treaty,  471. 
Lays  the  embargo,  473.  Grief  at 
repeal  of  embargo,  494.  Close  of 
his  administration,  495. 

Jeffrey,  Patrick,  171,  note. 

Jones,  Merriweather,  448. 

Judiciary,  reform  of,  in  1802,  327, 
329.  Attack  on,  338,  339,  428,  436. 

K. 

KENT,  JAMES,  opinions  as  to  orders 
in  council  and  embargo,  534. 

King,  Rufus,  67.  Plan  to  dissolve 
the  Union  in  1795,  71.  Gloomy 
view  of  foreign  affairs,  149.  Ne 
gotiations  with  Russia,  232.  Ef 
forts  in  behalf  of  Hamilton's 
family,  305,  306.  Opinion  of 
separatist  scheme  in  1804,  314, 
439,  450.  Ability  of,  324.  Politi 
cal  opinions  in  1808,  491. 

Knower,  B.,  545. 

Knox,  Henry,  conduct  in  affair  of 
major-generals,  145,  146,  161,  164, 
173,  174.  Bankruptcy  of,  174, 
176,  177,  184,  188.  Declines  to 
serve  as  major-general,  176,  177, 
186.  Influence  with  John  Adams, 
230. 


L. 

LAFAYETTE,  G.  M.  de,  visit  to  this 
country  in  1795 ;  Washington's 
reception  of  him,  87.  Confided  to 
care  of  Mr.  Cabot,  87,  91. 


614 


GENERAL   INDEX. 


Langdon,  John,  60,  82  and  note. 

Lawrence,  John,  57  and  note. 

Lear,  Tobias,  note  on,  68. 

Learned,  Mr.,  of  Connecticut,  94. 

Lee,  Charles,  opposition  to  peace 
policy,  194.  Position  in  the  cab 
inet,  197. 

Lee,  Joseph,  captain  of  ship  on 
George  Cabot's  first  voyage,  9. 
Business  relations  with  George 
Cabot,  11.  Dissolution  of  partner 
ship  with  Mr.  Cabot,  303. 

Lincoln,  Benjamin,  note  on,  164. 
Indorser  of  Knox's  notes,  165, 174, 
176,  177,  188. 

Lincoln,  Levi,  427.  Supports  em 
bargo,  493. 

Listen,  Mr.,  171,  227. 

Livermore,  Edward  St.  Loe,  375. 

Lloyd,  James,  draws  memorial 
against  admiralty  decisions,  314. 
Member  of  Federalist  Convention 
in  1808,  397.  Speech  on  embargo, 
402.  Political  opinions  in  1808, 
491.  Demands  a  navy,  502. 

Logan,  George,  opinion  of  Hartford 
Convention,  560. 

Louisiana,  purchase  of,  331, 333,  433, 

434.  Effect    on   the   Federalists, 

435,  436. 

Lowell,  John,  Judge,  73,  96.  ^ote 
on,  175. 

Lowell,  John,  character  of  Mrs. 
George  Cabot,  12.  Fourth  of  July 
oration,  233.  Note  on,  298.  Ex 
ertions  in  1808,  376.  His  "  Analy 
sis,"  402,  404.  Refuses  to  take 
part  in  "  Chesapeake  "  indignation 
meeting,  470.  Objects  of  Hartford 
Convention,  519.  Supports  ex 
treme  views  of  Mr.  Pickering, 
528,  529.  Description  of  Hartford 
Convention  and  its  members,  545- 

'•  549.  Character  of  Mr.  Cabot, 
547.  Duties  of  Hartford  Conven 
tion,  549. 

Lvman,  Theodore,  trustee  of  Hamil 
ton  fund,  304,  310.  Opinion  of 
separatist  scheme  of  1804,  439,  446. 
Note  on,  444. 

Lyon,  Matthew,  note  on,  188. 


M. 

MADISOX,  JAMES,  change  of  party, 
37,  59.  Proposed  by  Hamilton 
for  first  French  commission,  99- 


102.  Only  distinguished  man  who 
left  Federalists,  417.  Objects  in 
buying  up  Henry,  487.  Difficul 
ties  of,  at  his  accession,  495.  Con 
duct  in  Erskine  negotiation,  496, 
497.  Supported  in  treatment  of 
Jacks;on,  498.  Enters  into  nego 
tiation  with  England  on  behalf  of 
France,  498,  499.  Declares  war, 
503. 

Major  generals,  affair  of  the,  145, 
146,  161,  164. 

Manning,  Dr.,  180.  [33,  34,  43. 

Manufactures,  account  of  Beverly, 

Marshall,  John,  appointed  on  French 
commission,  103.  Opposition  to 
alien  and  sedition  laws,  147,  175, 
176.  Attacks  on,  177.  Proposed 
for  judge  of  Supreme  Court,  178. 
His  conduct  in  France,  178. 
Leader  in  Congress,  268.  Secre 
tary  of  State,  291.  Political  opin 
ions  in  1808,  489.  Opinion  of 
Madison's  French  policy,  529. 

Maryland,  separatism  in.  522. 

Mason,  Jonathan,  299  and  note. 

Massachusetts,  resolutions  of  Legis 
lature,  1799,  218.  District  choice 
of  electors,  349.  Supports  em 
bargo,  375,  376.  Resolves  of  Leg 
islature  in  1808,  492  Action  of, 
in  1809,  493,  494.  Opinion  as  to 
French  policy,  497,  498.  Action 
in  1814, 505.  Opinions  of,  in  1814, 
532,  533. 

McHenry,  James,  account  of  ap 
pointment  of  French  commission, 
104.  Resists  peace  policy,  194. 
Account  of  cabinet  difficulties  with 
John  Adams,  204-210. 

Mercer,  John  Francis,  555. 

Minot,  George  R.,  31,  33  and  note. 

Monroe,  James  minister  to  France, 
his  recall,  99.  Conduct  in  Parish's 
case,  107-109.  Conduct  in  France, 
110.  Protests  against  impress 
ment,  471. 

Morris,  Gouverneur,  minister  to 
France,  99.  Supports  extreme 
views  of  Pickering,  528.  Political 
opinions  in  1814,  538.  Hopes  of 
Hartford  Convention.  550,  555, 
556.  Anecdote  of,  572. 

Morse,  Jedidiah,  295. 

Motier,  name  assumed  by  young 
Lafayette,  86-91. 

Murray,  Wm.  Vans,  nomination  as 
.minister  to  France,  192,  195,  221, 
223,  224. 


GENERAL   INDEX. 


615 


N. 

NAVY,  foundation  of,  144. 
Neutrals,  rights  and  trade  of,  324, 

350,  351,  352,  353-363,  393. 
New   England,    feeling    in    against 

France  in  1797,  140,  141.     Efforts 

to  consolidate  Federalist  party  in, 

292,  293,  294. 
New  Haven  collectorship,  320,  321 

and  note. 
New  Orleans,  probable   capture  by 

British  and  results,  553,  554,  557, 

558,  559. 
New  York,  separatism   in,  522,  523. 

Feeling  in,  in  1814,  545. 
Novi,  battle  of,  249. 

o. 

OAKLEY,  T.  J.,  536  and  note. 

Osgood,  Samuel,  58,  note. 

Otis,  Harrison  Gray,  opinion  of  alien 
and  sedition  laws,  147,  172,  179. 
Author  of  the  "Envoys,"  229.  Sup 
port  of  Mr.  Adams,  268.  Member 
of  Federalist  Convention  in  1808, 
307.  Political  opinions  in  1808, 
492.  Objects  of  Hartford  Con 
vention,  518.  Character  of,  547. 

P. 

"PACIFICUS,"  74. 

Paine,  Elijah,  95. 

Paine,  Thomas,  432,  433. 

Parish,  Mr.,  consul  at  Hamburg, 
Monroe's  hostility,  removal  of,  107, 
108,  109. 

Parsons,  Theophilus,  his  account 
of  and  connection  with  Essex 
Junto,  20-22  His  part  in  Con 
vention  to  adopt  Constitution,  25. 
Urged  to  enter  Congress,  58. 
Recommended  by  Mr.  Cabot  as 
commissioner  under  the  Jay  treaty, 
94.  Opinion  of  separatist  scheme 
of  1804,  439.  Refuses  to  take 
part  in  "  Chesapeake  "  indigna 
tion  meeting,  470.  Decision  as 
to  calling  out  militia,  513. 

Parker,  Isaac,  note  on,  173.  Deci 
sion  as  to  calling  out  militia,  513. 

Parties,  their  position  in  1791-92, 
39,  40.  Their  relations  to  France 
and  foreign  influence,  62,  64. 
Attitude  of  during  debate  on  Jay 
treaty,  71.  State  of,  in  regard  to 
Murray's  nomination,  192,  193. 


Patterson,    William,    note    on,  175, 
247. 

Payne,  William,  267. 

Pendleton    Nathaniel,    executor    of 
Hamilton's  will,  308,  309,  310. 

Pennsylvania,  separatism  in,  521. 

Peters,    Richard,   opinion   of    John 
Henry,  487,  488. 

Phillips,  Samuel,  75,  note. 

Pickering,  Judge,  impeachment  of, 
436,  451. 

Pickering,  Timothy,  account  of  Es 
sex  Junto,  19-22.  Opposition  to 
peace  policy  in  1797,  100.  Asks 
Mr.  Cabot's  advice  as  to  Hamburg 
consulship,  107-109.  Reply  to 
Adet,  112.  Reply  to  Yrujo,  141. 
Urges  Mr.  Cabot  to  accept  secre 
taryship  of  navy,  144,  155,  156. 
Attacks  of  the  "  Aurora  "  on,  149. 
Account  of  affair of _  major- 
generals,  16~1,  164.  Opinion  of 
Gerry  V-condnet,-  178,  182,  183. 
Report-  on  French  affairs,  191. 
Resists  peace  policy,  194.  Leader 
in  opposition  to  Mr.  Adams,  191. 
Attacks  on  Mr.  Adams,  213, 
275,  278.  Opinion  of  President's 
message,  216.  Subscription  for, 
304,  305.  Plan  of  separation  in 
1804, 337.  Attacks  embargo,  367, 
368.  Wishes  to  have  Boston  for 
tified,  371,  407.  Letters  to  Sulli 
van,  379-382,  388-390,  394-396, 
477.  Views  as  to  J.  Q.  Adams's 
change  of  party,  396.  Attacked 
for  his  letters  in  Congress,  400,- 
401.  Share  in  separatist  scheme  - 
in  1804,  437,  438.  Laments  decay  . 
of  party  spirit  in  1804,  456.  Ob 
jects  of  Hartford  Convention,  519. 
Theories  in  regard  to  separation, 
and  grounds  for  them,  527,  528. 
Extreme  views  of,  528.  Did  not 
wish  separation  for  its  own  sake, 
629.  Urges  Legislature  of  Massa 
chusetts  to  issue  an  address,  530. 
Urges  strong  measures  on  Massa 
chusetts,  532,  535.  Opinions  as 
to  policy  of  Massachusetts,  539. 
Opinions  as  to  Hartford  Conven 
tion,  540,  541.  Character  of  Mr. 
Cabot,  541,  542.  Opinion  as  to 
what  the  Convention  ought  to  do, 
541,  545,  551.  Satisfaction  with 
report  of  Convention,  561-563. 

Pickman,  B.,  546  and  note. 

Pinckney,  C.  C.,  candidate  for  Vice- 
President  in  1796,  98.     Minister 


616 


GENERAL   INDEX. 


to  France,  99.  Urged  by  Hamil 
ton  for  first  French  commission, 
99,  102.  Ministerial  rank  of,  117, 
118.  Affair  of  major-generals, 
145,  146.  Readiness  to  serve  un 
der  Hamilton,  173, 177.  Opinion  of 
Gerry,  184. 

Pinkney,  William,  sent  to  England, 
864.  Negotiation  with  Canning, 
478.  Negotiation  with  Lord  Wel 
les  ley,  408. 

Plumer,  William,  share  in  separatist 
scheme  of  1804,  438. 

"  Porcupine,  Peter,"  attack  on  John 
Adams,  221. 

Prescott,  William,  character  of,  547. 

Privateering  in  the  Revolution,  18. 

Putnam,  Samuel,  530  and  note. 


Q. 

QUTNCY,  JOSTAH,  375.  Political  opin 
ions  in  1808, 491.  Objects  of  Hart 
ford  Convention,  518. 


R. 

RANDALL,  H.  S.,  unfounded  accusa 
tion  against  Mr.  Cabot,  310,  note. 

Randolph,  Edmund,  his  intrigue 
with  Fauchet,  91,  94. 

Randolph,  John,  revolt  from  Jeffer 
son,  424.  Attacks  the  Judiciary, 
428,  43(5,  444.  Recalls  to  Jeffer 
son  the  fate  of  Lord  North,  494. 
Proposes  repeal  of  non-importa 
tion  act,  499. 

Katford,  Win.,  British  deserter  taken 
from  "  Chesapeake,"  393. 

Read,  Jacob,  221. 

Reeve,  Tapping,  442  and  note. 

Representation,  speeches  on,  26,  27, 
28.  Ratio  of,  40.  Letter  to  Par 
sons  on  increase  of,  57. 

Revere,  Paul,  22. 

Bobbins,  E.,  171,  179. 

Robbins,  Jonathan,  case  of,  393. 

Rochefoucauld,  Liancourt,  Due  de  la, 
interview  with  Mr.  Cabot,  121. 

Rose,  George  Henry.  21.  Negotia 
tion  of,  374,  376,  378.  Departure 
and  failure  of  his  mission,  382. 
Mr.  Cabot's  letter  sent  to,  387. 
Character  of,  388,  470. 

Ross,  James,  221,  226.  Political 
opinions  in  1808,  490. 


S. 


SAINT  DOMINGO,  trade  with,  188, 
189. 

Sargent,  Daniel,  548. 

Sedgwick,  Theodore,  221. 

Senate,  absences  from,  in  early 
years,  39,  40,  95.  Powers  of,  235, 
237,  241-243.  President  should 
not  consult,  376. 

Serrurier,  offers  no  indemnity,  499. 

Sewall,  Samuel,  113  and  note,  172. 
Decision  as  to  calling  out  militia, 
513. 

Shepherd,  Abraham,  proposes  motto 
for  Federal  Convention,  1809,  492. 

Skipwith,  Fulwar,  110  and  note. 

Smilie,  John,  466. 

Smith,  Jeremiah,  opinion  of  calum 
nies  against  Washington,  88. 

Smith,  Robert,  leaves  cabinet  and 
opposes  French  policy,  499. 

Smith,  Samuel,  159,  801  and  notes. 

Smith,  William  L.,  57  and  note. 
Negotiations  with  the  Porte,  232. 

Spencer,  Ambrose,  575  and  note. 

State  troops,  bill  for,  559,  561. 

St.  Clair,  41. 

Steele,  John,  297  and  note. 

Stockton,  Richard,  221. 

Stoddert,  Benjamin,  succeeds  Mr. 
Cabot  as  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
128,  130,  144.  Opposition  to 
peace  policy,  194.  Position  in 
the  cabinet,  197.  Account  of 
cabinet  troubles,  200-203.  Report 
on  navy,  428.  Political  opinions 
in  1808,  490. 

Story,  Joseph,  377  and  note.  Oppo 
sition  to  embargo,  494. 

Strong,  Caleb,  friendship  with  Mr. 
Cabot,  88,  67.  Recommended  for 
English  commissioner,  135,  136, 
343.  Resists  call  for  militia,  513. 
Urged  to  remain  in  office  during 
war,  560. 

Sullivan,  James,  relations  with 
council ;  death,  369,  375.  Reply 
to  Pickering,  386. 

Sullivan,  William,  548. 

Sumner,  Increase,  Federalist  princi 
ples  of,  218.  Death,  233. 

Swan,  James,  134  and  note. 


T. 

TALLEYRAND,    knowledge    of     Mr. 
Cabot,   101.      Attempts   to  bribe 


GENERAL   INDEX. 


61T 


American     commissioners,      174. 

Opinion  of  Gerry,  184.     Protected 

by   Bonaparte,   270.       Threatens 

war,  459. 

Tayler,  John,  545. 
Taylor,  John,  442  and  note,  553. 
Tazewell,   William,   his   account   of 

Federalist  plot  in  1795,  71. 
Tennessee,  admission  to  Union,  96. 
Thorndike,  Israel,  548. 
Ticknor,   George,   anecdote   of  Mr. 

Adams  as  to  Mr.  Cabot,  573. 
Tracy,    Uriah,    supports   separatist 

scheme  in  1804,  340,  438. 
Treaty  of  1806,  373,  464.     Compared 

with  those  of  1795  and  1815,  467. 
Trumbull,  John,  14,  174. 
Trumbull,  Jonathan,  318  and  note. 
Truxtun,  Thomas,   naval   victories, 

271. 

Turreau,  Mons.,  459,  465. 
Tyng,  D.,  character  of,  327. 

u. 

UNITED  STATES,  condition  and  dan 
gers  of,  in  1794,  78,  80.  Feeling 
towards  France  in  1797,  119,  120. 
Advantages  to,  from  war  with 
France,  219,  220,  222,  223.  Evils 
resulting  to,  from  negotiations 
with  France,  234,  235.  Feeling 
towards  England,  252,  253.  Plan 
to  dissolve  in  1804,  314,  337,  344, 
437,  440.  Democracy  in,  349. 
Relations  with  France  and  England 
compared,  406,  407.  Opinions  in 
regard  to  separation  in  1804,  440, 
441.  Correspondence  relating  to 
separation  of,  441,  454.  Separa 
tism  in,  523.  Dangerous  condi 
tion  of,  in  1814,  523,  524. 

V. 

VARNUM,  JOSEPH  B.,  note  on,  173. 
Vermont,  separatism  in,  523. 
Vining,  John,  95. 
Virginia,   separatist   movements   in 

1792   and    1799,   521;    1813,   522. 

Condition  of,  during  war  of  1812, 

552. 

w. 

WADSWORTH,  JAMES,  91,  170. 
War  of  1812,  408,  409.     Objects  of, 

503.     Course  of,  504.     Its  failure, 

524.     Its  real  value,  525. 


War  party,  origin,  character,  and 
policy  of,  500-502.  Compels  Mr. 
Madison  to  declare  war,  503. 
Eagerness  to  make  peace,  524. 

Washington,  George,  breakfasts 
with  Mr.  Cabot  at  Beverly,  30. 
His  treatment  of  Genet,  64.  His 
policy  of  strong  neutrality,  65. 
His  course  in  regard  to  young 
Lafayette,  86-91.  Democratic 
calumnies  against,  on  this  account, 
88.  His  opinion  of  Edmund  Ran 
dolph,  92.  Censure  of  Monroe, 
99.  His  list  of  major-generals, 
145.  Insists  on  retaining  original 
order,  146.  Opinions  as  to  affair 
of  major-generals,  163,  164. 
Hopes  of  the  Federalists  as  to 
third  term,  250.  Death  of,  and 
effect  on  Federalist  party,  257. 

Watson,  Marston,  note  on,  127. 

Wayne,  Anthony,  his  Indian  victo 
ries  in  1794,  69. 

Webster,  Daniel,  forms  Mr.  Cabot's 
acquaintance,  573. 

Whiskey  insurrection,  60,  69. 

Wilde,  S.  S.,  character  of,  548. 

Willard,  Joseph,  member  of  Beverly 
committee  to  report  against  Con 
stitution  of  1778,  15. 

Williams,  Samuel,  note  on,  109. 
Recommended  for  consul  at  Lon 
don,  142.  Opinions  on  war,  335. 

Winthrops,  the:  Jacobin  leaders, 
185. 

Wolcott,  Oliver,  opposition  to  peace 
policy  in  1797,  100.  Scheme  for 
French  commission,  103.  Resists 
peace  policy,  194.  Opinion  of 
British  finances,  251.  252.  Opin 
ion  of  Mr.  Adams,  279.  Resigns 
from  the  treasury,  296.  Private 
life  of;  opinion  of  Jefferson,  319. 
Removal  to  New  York,  329,  330. 
Replies  to  Gallatin's  report  at 
tacking  Federalists,  431. 

X. 

X.  Y.  Z.  letters,  publication  of,  and 
feeling  created  thereby,  143,  153. 

Y. 

YRUJO,  Chevalier  de,  conduct  in 
America,  141.  Return  to  America, 
465. 


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